What’s happened over the past 10 years to the selection of retired CEOs as board members?
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Date
2007-05-22
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Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research
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Abstract
I analyze directorships held by CEOs who retired during 1989-1993 and during 1998-2002. My results suggest that retired CEOs became more popular on boards. Also, although pre-retirement accounting performance helps explain the number of outside directorships a retired CEO held in the 1989-1993 sample as Brickley, Linck, and Coles (1999) found, it does not in the 1998-2002 sample. Third, a company's stock performance during a CEO's tenure affects whether he became an inside director of that company after retirement. A 25% change in stock price performance increased the probability by 11% in the 1989-1993 sample, and 51% in the 1998-2002 sample. Finally, if a retired CEO worked in a regulated industry, his probability of serving at least one outside directorship fell by 34% in the 1989-1993 sample, and 24% in the 1998-2002 sample.
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CAEPR, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Corporate governance
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This paper can also be found on SSRN at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=988162
and RePEc at: http://www.iub.edu/~caepr/RePEc/PDF/CAEPR2007-007.pdf.
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Working Paper