Advertising Intensity and Welfare in an Equilibrium Search Model

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dc.contributor.authorMcCarthy, Ian
dc.date.accessioned2008-04-08T16:47:22Z
dc.date.available2008-04-08T16:47:22Z
dc.date.issued2008-01-24
dc.description.abstractWe analyze an equilibrium search model in a duopoly setting with bilateral heterogeneities in production and search costs in which firms can advertise by announcing price and location. We study existence, stability, and comparative statics in such a setting, compare the market advertising level to the socially optimal level, and find conditions in which firms advertise more or less than the social optimum.
dc.format.extent259738 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttp://ssrn.com/abstract=1087416
dc.identifier.urihttp://www.iub.edu/~caepr/RePEc/PDF/2008/CAEPR2008-003.pdf
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2022/3113
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherCenter for Applied Economics and Policy Research
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCAEPR Working Papers
dc.relation.ispartofseries2008-003
dc.relation.isversionofThis paper is also available on SSRN and RePEc.
dc.subjectCAEPR
dc.subjectCenter for Applied Economics and Policy Research
dc.subjectAdvertising
dc.subjectConsumer Search
dc.subjectSearch
dc.subjectWelfare
dc.titleAdvertising Intensity and Welfare in an Equilibrium Search Model
dc.typeWorking Paper

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