Reply to Gregory Landini’s Review of Formal Ontology and Conceptual Realism
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Axiomathes
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In our discussion of Greg Landini's review, we should distinguish how the logical systems * and that I have developed are to be understood in my reconstructions of Gottlob Frege's and Bertrand Russell's (1903) ontologies as opposed to how is understood as a (proper) part of my ontology of conceptual realism. Both of these systems are type-free second-order predicate logics that allow predicate expressions (complex or simple) and formulas (propositional forms) to be nominalized and occur in formulas as abstract singular terms.
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This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Axiomathes. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-009-9060-9
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Propositional Attitude Definite Description Intensional Object Conceptual Realism Complex Predicate, Propositional Attitude, Definite Description, Intensional Object, Conceptual Realism, Complex Predicate
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Cocchiarella, N. "Reply to Gregory Landini's Review of Formal Ontology and Conceptual Realism," Axiomathes, vol. 19, no. 2 (2009): 143-153.
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