Reply to Gregory Landini’s Review of Formal Ontology and Conceptual Realism

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Axiomathes

Abstract

In our discussion of Greg Landini's review, we should distinguish how the logical systems λHST* and HSTλ that I have developed are to be understood in my reconstructions of Gottlob Frege's and Bertrand Russell's (1903) ontologies as opposed to how HSTλ is understood as a (proper) part of my ontology of conceptual realism. Both of these systems are type-free second-order predicate logics that allow predicate expressions (complex or simple) and formulas (propositional forms) to be nominalized and occur in formulas as abstract singular terms.

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Description

This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Axiomathes. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-009-9060-9

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Propositional Attitude Definite Description Intensional Object Conceptual Realism Complex Predicate, Propositional Attitude, Definite Description, Intensional Object, Conceptual Realism, Complex Predicate

Citation

Cocchiarella, N. "Reply to Gregory Landini's Review of Formal Ontology and Conceptual Realism," Axiomathes, vol. 19, no. 2 (2009): 143-153.

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Article