Review: Realistic Rationalism by Jerrold J. Katz

dc.contributor.authorCocchiarella, Nino
dc.date.accessioned2018-07-30T16:40:59Z
dc.date.available2018-07-30T16:40:59Z
dc.date.issued2000-06
dc.descriptionPublisher's, offprint versionen
dc.description.abstractNaturalism, whether as an ontological doctrine (that there are only natural objects), an epistemological thesis (that knowledge is only of natural objects), or a methodological claim (that knowledge can be attained only by investigating natural objects), was a "fundamental mistake," according to J. Katz, whose goal in this book is to formulate and justify "a new version of traditional realism and rationalist philosophy" (xvii). For Katz, philosophy is not just a second-order discipline of conceptual analysis with no role in the finding and systematizing of facts about the world, as naturalism and empiricism would have it, but also a first-order discipline with its own questions about the world.en
dc.identifier.citationCocchiarella, N. Review: "Realistic Rationalism," by Jerrold J. Katz, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1998; review in Philosophy of Science, vol. 67, no. 2, (2000): 341-343.en
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1086/392780
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2022/22300
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherPhilosophy of Scienceen
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/392780en
dc.titleReview: Realistic Rationalism by Jerrold J. Katzen
dc.typeBook reviewen

Files

Original bundle

Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Name:
Reviewed Work Realistic Rationalism.pdf
Size:
71.41 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
Can’t use the file because of accessibility barriers? Contact us with the title of the item, permanent link, and specifics of your accommodation need.