Democratic Competition for Rank, Cooperation, and Deception in Small Groups

Abstract

ABSTRACT: Stratified groups face at least two obstacles in solving collective action problems and producing public goods. Individuals face temptation to free-ride, and high-ranking group members face incentives to protect their position at the group’s expense. We introduce democratic competition for rank as a solution to the problem of cooperation in groups. We argue that democratic competition for high rank creates incentives for cooperation that are absent in non-democratic groups. In a small-group behavioral experiment, we contrast groups in which individuals compete for a valuable high-ranking position through democratic elections with groups in which individuals compete for high rank in resource-based competitions. Groups faced a fluctuating external threat, and group members could invest resources in manipulating the apparent (but not actual) level of this threat. We find that democratic groups reward high contributors by electing them to the high-ranking position at greater rates than low contributors. We also find evidence that individuals in democratic groups contribute more to the public good than individuals in non-democratic groups. However, high-ranking individuals in democratic groups exaggerate threats to the group at similar rates to high-ranking individuals in non-democratic groups. The findings suggest that democratic competition increases public goods production and overall group efficiency, but does not eliminate – and may exacerbate – individuals’ tendency to deceive their peers.