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dc.contributor.advisor Lloyd, Elisabeth A. en
dc.contributor.author Klein, Alexander M. en
dc.date.accessioned 2010-06-01T22:03:55Z en
dc.date.available 2027-02-01T23:03:56Z en
dc.date.available 2010-06-19T16:22:15Z
dc.date.issued 2010-06-01T22:03:55Z en
dc.date.submitted 2007 en
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2022/7770 en
dc.description Thesis (PhD) - Indiana University, Philosophy, 2007 en
dc.description.abstract The concept of empiricism evokes both a historical tradition and a set of philosophical theses. The theses are usually understood to have been developed by Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. But these figures did not use the term "empiricism," and they did not see themselves as united by a shared epistemology into one school of thought. My dissertation analyzes the debate that elevated the concept of empiricism (and of an empiricist tradition) to prominence in English-language philosophy. In the 1870s and '80s a lively debate about psychology emerged. Neo-Kantian idealists criticized the very idea that the mind can be studied scientifically. A group of philosopher-psychologists responded, often in Mind. They were among the first to call themselves "empiricists," arguing that psychology could provide a scientific basis for philosophical progress. Idealists held that empirical psychology depended on premises developed by Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. These premises were allegedly absurd because they rendered ideas of extension, as well as other ideas crucial to natural science, unreal. Those who wanted to advance psychology towards becoming a legitimate science were forced to engage these philosophical attacks, while at the same time to develop empirical theories that could successfully explain some characteristics of experience. I show how James's theory of space perception accomplished both tasks. In developing this theory, James found he had to reject the Lockean notion that reality is associated with passively-registered sensations. James also abandoned Berkeley and Hume's claim that ideas are ultimately derived from atomic sensations. Instead, James presented experimental evidence that sensation is a continuous stream. The mind must actively parse this stream if it is to gain a coherent representation of its environment. I argue that James's stream-of-thought thesis served as a presupposition of his entire psychology. The thesis showed how the labor of investigating the mind could be divided between philosophers and scientists, and in a manner sensitive to the concerns of both. The stream thesis also provided a scientific basis for a new philosophical empiricism that, I argue, has a hidden legacy in the history of analytic philosophy. en
dc.language.iso EN en
dc.publisher [Bloomington, Ind.] : Indiana University en
dc.subject Idealism en
dc.subject William James en
dc.subject Space Perception en
dc.subject Empiricism en
dc.subject David Hume en
dc.subject Thomas Hill Green en
dc.subject.classification History, United States en
dc.subject.classification Philosophy en
dc.subject.classification History of Science en
dc.title The Rise of Empiricism: William James, Thomas Hill Green, and the Struggle over Psychology en
dc.type Doctoral Dissertation en


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