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dc.contributor.advisor Lloyd, Elisabeth A. en_US
dc.contributor.author Klein, Alexander M. en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2010-06-01T22:03:55Z
dc.date.available 2027-02-01T23:03:56Z
dc.date.available 2010-06-19T16:22:15Z
dc.date.issued 2010-06-01T22:03:55Z
dc.date.submitted 2007 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2022/7770
dc.description Thesis (PhD) - Indiana University, Philosophy, 2007 en_US
dc.description.abstract The concept of empiricism evokes both a historical tradition and a set of philosophical theses. The theses are usually understood to have been developed by Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. But these figures did not use the term "empiricism," and they did not see themselves as united by a shared epistemology into one school of thought. My dissertation analyzes the debate that elevated the concept of empiricism (and of an empiricist tradition) to prominence in English-language philosophy. In the 1870s and '80s a lively debate about psychology emerged. Neo-Kantian idealists criticized the very idea that the mind can be studied scientifically. A group of philosopher-psychologists responded, often in Mind. They were among the first to call themselves "empiricists," arguing that psychology could provide a scientific basis for philosophical progress. Idealists held that empirical psychology depended on premises developed by Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. These premises were allegedly absurd because they rendered ideas of extension, as well as other ideas crucial to natural science, unreal. Those who wanted to advance psychology towards becoming a legitimate science were forced to engage these philosophical attacks, while at the same time to develop empirical theories that could successfully explain some characteristics of experience. I show how James's theory of space perception accomplished both tasks. In developing this theory, James found he had to reject the Lockean notion that reality is associated with passively-registered sensations. James also abandoned Berkeley and Hume's claim that ideas are ultimately derived from atomic sensations. Instead, James presented experimental evidence that sensation is a continuous stream. The mind must actively parse this stream if it is to gain a coherent representation of its environment. I argue that James's stream-of-thought thesis served as a presupposition of his entire psychology. The thesis showed how the labor of investigating the mind could be divided between philosophers and scientists, and in a manner sensitive to the concerns of both. The stream thesis also provided a scientific basis for a new philosophical empiricism that, I argue, has a hidden legacy in the history of analytic philosophy. en_US
dc.language.iso EN en_US
dc.publisher [Bloomington, Ind.] : Indiana University en_US
dc.subject Idealism en_US
dc.subject William James en_US
dc.subject Space Perception en_US
dc.subject Empiricism en_US
dc.subject David Hume en_US
dc.subject Thomas Hill Green en_US
dc.subject.classification History, United States en_US
dc.subject.classification Philosophy en_US
dc.subject.classification History of Science en_US
dc.title The Rise of Empiricism: William James, Thomas Hill Green, and the Struggle over Psychology en_US
dc.type Doctoral Dissertation en_US


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