Show simple item record Kenneth, Carow A. Cox, Steven R. Roden, Dianne M. 2010-04-26T16:01:39Z 2010-04-26T16:01:39Z 2003-04
dc.identifier.citation "Mutual Holding Companies:  Evidence of Conflicts of Interest through Disparate Dividends," co-authored with Kenneth Carow and Steven Cox, Journal of Banking and Finance, vol 28, 2004: 277-298.* en
dc.description.abstract The mutual holding company (MHC) structure establishes a dual-class stock that creates a unique opportunity to transfer wealth from thrift depositor-owners to new minority shareholders through the disparate payment of dividends. We show that MHCs are priced higher than comparable non-MHCs and dividend policy is a significant component of this valuation. We also show that MHC thrifts pay significantly higher dividends than non-MHC thrifts and that an Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) ruling reducing the potential for disparate dividends between the two classes of shareholders resulted in lower dividends. These results have policy implications of special significance given that the OTS reversed its position in 2000 and because of the current controversy over the use of the MHC structure in the financial service industry. en
dc.language.iso en_US en
dc.publisher Elsevier en
dc.relation.isversionof en
dc.subject Disparate Dividends en
dc.subject Thrifts en
dc.subject Mutual Holding Company en
dc.title Mutual Holding Companies: Evidence of Conflicts of Interest through Disparate Dividends en
dc.type Article en

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  • Dianne M. Roden [4]
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