Show simple item record Baker, Ronald J., II Walker, James M. Williams, Arlington W. 2006-09-29T16:07:36Z 2006-09-29T16:07:36Z 2006-09-29T16:07:36Z
dc.identifier.uri en
dc.identifier.uri en
dc.description An updated version of this paper is available at
dc.description.abstract Laboratory experiments are used to study the voluntary provision of a pure public good in the presence of an anonymous external donor. The external funds are used in two different settings, lump-sum matching and one-to-one matching, to examine how allocations to the public good are affected. The experimental results reveal that allocations to the public good under lumpsum matching are significantly higher, and have significantly lower within-group dispersion, relative to one-to-one matching and a baseline setting without external matching funds. en
dc.format.extent 201744 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2006 en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 007 en
dc.relation.isversionof This paper is also located in SSRN and on CAEPR's website ( en
dc.subject CAEPR en
dc.subject Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research en
dc.subject public goods en
dc.subject free riding en
dc.subject laboratory experiments en
dc.title Matching Contributions and the Voluntary Provision of a Pure Public Good: Experimental Evidence en
dc.type Working Paper en

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