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dc.contributor.author Yoon, Young-Ro
dc.date.accessioned 2008-08-26T20:11:33Z
dc.date.available 2008-08-26T20:11:33Z
dc.date.issued 2008-08-25
dc.identifier.uri http://ssrn.com/abstract=1254962 en
dc.identifier.uri http://www.iub.edu/~caepr/RePEc/PDF/2008/CAEPR2008-022.pdf en
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2022/3186
dc.description.abstract Can valuable information be disclosed intentionally by the informed agent even within a competitive environment? In this article, we bring our interest into the asymmetry in reward and penalty in the payoff structure and explore its effects on the strategic disclosure of valuable information. According to our results, the asymmetry in reward and penalty is a necessary condition for the disclosure of valuable information. This asymmetry also decides which quality of information is revealed for which incentive; if the penalty is larger than the reward or the reward is weakly larger than the penalty, there exists an equilibrium in which only a low quality type of information is revealed, in order to induce imitation. On the other hand, if the reward is sufficiently larger than the penalty, there exist equilibria in which either all types or only high quality type of information is revealed, in order to induce deviation. The evaluation of the equilibrium in terms of expected payoff yields that the equilibrium where valuable information is disclosed strategically dominates the equilibrium where it is concealed. en
dc.format.extent 435576 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US en
dc.publisher Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research en
dc.relation.ispartofseries CAEPR Working Papers en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2008-022 en
dc.relation.isversionof This paper is also available on SSRN and RePEc. en
dc.subject CAEPR en
dc.subject Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research en
dc.subject Strategic information disclosure en
dc.subject Asymmetry in reward and penalty en
dc.title Strategic Disclosure of Valuable Information within Competitive Environments en
dc.type Working Paper en


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