Show simple item record von Furstenberg, George 2008-04-29T15:25:33Z 2008-04-29T15:25:33Z 2008-04-03
dc.identifier.uri en
dc.identifier.uri en
dc.description.abstract Overpromising remains ingrained in international agreements, clouding their expected aggregate outcomes and how to assess the Parties’ performance. This paper provides a theory-based explanation and evaluation of this regime and its consequences, with an empirical application to the Kyoto Protocol. It shows (1) overpromising to be part of a sustainable strategy for electoral success, and (2) there are common determinants of the countries’ overpromising values that characterize the group regime. (3) Targets need to be adjusted for regression-predicted overpromising to yield rationally-expected outcomes. (4) Individual countries’ performance is best identified by deviations of outcomes from their adjusted, not the agreed, targets. en
dc.format.extent 46282 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US en
dc.publisher Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research en
dc.relation.ispartofseries CAEPR Working Papers en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2008-005 en
dc.relation.isversionof This paper is also available on SSRN and RePEc. en
dc.subject CAEPR en
dc.subject Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research en
dc.subject Overpromising en
dc.subject international agreements en
dc.subject treaty compliance en
dc.subject performance measurement en
dc.subject politics and environment en
dc.subject Kyoto Protocol en
dc.title Performance Measurement under Rational International Overpromising Regimes en
dc.type Working Paper en

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