Abstract:
We analyze whether a consumer driven health care plan like the newly established Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) can reduce health care expenditures in the United States and increase the fraction of the population with health insurance. We use an overlapping generations model with health uncertainty and endogenous health care spending. Agents can choose between a low deductible- and a high deductible health insurance. If agents choose to purchase the high deductible health insurance, they are allowed to contribute tax free to an HSA. We examine the steady state effects of introducing HSAs into a system with private health insurance for young agents and Medicare for old agents. Since the model is a general equilibrium model, we fully account for feedback effects from both, factor markets and insurance markets. Our results from numerical simulations indicate that HSAs can decrease total health expenditures by up to 3% of GDP but increase the number of uninsured individuals by almost 5%. Furthermore, HSAs decrease the aggregate level of health capital and therefore decrease output. We also address possible extensions of the HSA reform that include the eligibility to pay health insurance premiums with HSA funds, the full privatization of Medicaid via HSAs, and Medicare for workers.
