Advertising Intensity and Welfare in an Equilibrium Search Model

Indiana University

dc.contributor.author	McCarthy, Ian
dc.date.accessioned	2008-04-08T16:47:22Z
dc.date.available	2008-04-08T16:47:22Z
dc.date.issued	2008-01-24
dc.identifier.uri	http://ssrn.com/abstract=1087416	en
dc.identifier.uri	http://www.iub.edu/~caepr/RePEc/PDF/2008/CAEPR2008-003.pdf	en
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/2022/3113
dc.description.abstract	We analyze an equilibrium search model in a duopoly setting with bilateral heterogeneities in production and search costs in which firms can advertise by announcing price and location. We study existence, stability, and comparative statics in such a setting, compare the market advertising level to the socially optimal level, and find conditions in which firms advertise more or less than the social optimum.	en
dc.format.extent	259738 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	en_US	en
dc.publisher	Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	CAEPR Working Papers	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	2008-003	en
dc.relation.isversionof	This paper is also available on SSRN and RePEc.	en
dc.subject	CAEPR	en
dc.subject	Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research	en
dc.subject	Advertising	en
dc.subject	Consumer Search	en
dc.subject	Search	en
dc.subject	Welfare	en
dc.title	Advertising Intensity and Welfare in an Equilibrium Search Model	en
dc.type	Working Paper	en