Show simple item record McCarthy, Ian 2008-04-08T16:47:22Z 2008-04-08T16:47:22Z 2008-01-24
dc.identifier.uri en
dc.identifier.uri en
dc.description.abstract We analyze an equilibrium search model in a duopoly setting with bilateral heterogeneities in production and search costs in which firms can advertise by announcing price and location. We study existence, stability, and comparative statics in such a setting, compare the market advertising level to the socially optimal level, and find conditions in which firms advertise more or less than the social optimum. en
dc.format.extent 259738 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US en
dc.publisher Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research en
dc.relation.ispartofseries CAEPR Working Papers en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2008-003 en
dc.relation.isversionof This paper is also available on SSRN and RePEc. en
dc.subject CAEPR en
dc.subject Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research en
dc.subject Advertising en
dc.subject Consumer Search en
dc.subject Search en
dc.subject Welfare en
dc.title Advertising Intensity and Welfare in an Equilibrium Search Model en
dc.type Working Paper en

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