What does History Matter to Philosophy of Physics?

Thomas Ryckman

Indiana University

dc.contributor.author	Thomas Ryckman
dc.contributor.other	Stathis Psillos
dc.creator	tryckman@stanford.edu
dc.date.accessioned	2021-01-29T16:20:19Z
dc.date.available	2021-01-29T16:20:19Z
dc.date.issued	2012
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/2022/26183
dc.description.abstract	Naturalized metaphysics remains the default presupposition of much contemporary philosophy of physics. As metaphysics is supposed to concern the general structure of reality, so scientific naturalism draws upon our best physical theories to attempt to answer the foundational question “par excellence ” viz., “how could the world possibly be the way this theory says it is?” A particular case study, Hilbert's attempt to analyze and explain a seeming “pre-established harmony” between mind and nature, is offered as a salutary reminder that naturalism's ready inference from physical theory to ontology may be too quick.
dc.format	key note address
dc.relation.ispartofseries	4; Open
dc.relation.isversionof	Downstream publication: Ryckman, Thomas. (2015) "Why history matters to philosophy of physics." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, Special Issue 50 Integrated History and Philosophy of Science in Practice, 4-12.
dc.subject	contemporary
dc.subject	metaphysics, philosophy, history
dc.subject	physics
dc.subject	attention to historical details of physical theories provides prophylactic to the "sentiment of rationality" in naturalized metaphysics
dc.title	What does History Matter to Philosophy of Physics?
dc.identifier.doi	10.1016/j.shpsa.2014.09.010