Gregory of Rimini and Peter of Ailly: Are Mental Sentences Composed of Parts?

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William of Ockham held that, with a few exceptions, the structure of spoken and written sentences mirrored that of mental language, at least with respect to features affecting truth and falsehood. Gregory of Rimini and Peter of Ailly rejected this view. This paper focuses on two of their arguments, one pertaining to word-order in mental language, the other to the mental copula. I conclude that their arguments are ones Ockham cannot answer without complicating his theory of mental language more than he would likely have been willing to do.
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Versions of this paper were read at the Southeastern Medieval Association Meetings held in Richmond, Va., March 24–26, 1977, and at the Twelfth Kalamazoo Conference on the Middle Ages, Kalamazoo, Mich., May 5–8, 1977.
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Mental Language, Middle Ages, Medieval Philosophy, Ockham, William of Ockham, Gregory of Rimini, Peter of Ailly, Pierre d'Ailly, Concepts and Insolubles, Complexe significabile, Mental Language Properly So Called, Mental Language Improperly So Called, Word-Order, Word Order, Syncategoremata, Copula
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“Gregory of Rimini and Peter of Ailly: Are Mental Sentences Composed of Parts?,” by Paul Vincent Spade, is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
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