Show simple item record Schmidt, David Shupp, Robert Walker, James 2007-08-14T14:30:58Z 2007-08-14T14:30:58Z 2006-08-29
dc.identifier.uri en
dc.identifier.uri en
dc.description.abstract Across many forms of rent seeking contests, the impact of risk aversion on equilibrium play is indeterminate. We design an experiment to compare individuals’ decisions across three contests which are isomorphic under risk-neutrality, but are typically not isomorphic under other risk preferences. The pattern of individual play across our contests is not consistent with a Bayes-Nash equilibrium for any distribution of risk preferences. We show that replacing the Bayes-Nash equilibrium concept with the quantal response equilibrium, along with heterogeneous risk preferences can produce equilibrium patterns of play that are very similar to the patterns we observe. en
dc.format.extent 155989 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US en
dc.publisher Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research en
dc.relation.ispartofseries CAEPR Working Papers en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2006-004 en
dc.relation.isversionof This paper is also available on RePEc and SSRN. en
dc.subject CAEPR en
dc.subject Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research en
dc.subject rent seeking en
dc.subject experiments en
dc.subject risk aversion en
dc.subject game theory en
dc.title Resource Allocation Contests: Experimental Evidence en
dc.type Working Paper en

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