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dc.contributor.author Arcalean, Calin
dc.contributor.author Glomm, Gerhard
dc.contributor.author Schiopu, Ioana
dc.contributor.author Suedekum, Jens
dc.date.accessioned 2007-08-06T14:27:29Z
dc.date.available 2007-08-06T14:27:29Z
dc.date.issued 2007-07-26
dc.identifier.uri http://www.indiana.edu/~caepr/RePEc/PDF/CAEPR2007-003.pdf en
dc.identifier.uri http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=963475 en
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2022/1834
dc.description.abstract We present a dynamic two-region model with overlapping generations. There are two types of public expenditure, education and infrastructure funding, and governments decide optimally on budget size (tax rate) and its allocation across the two outlays. Productivity of government infrastructure spending can differ across regions. This assumption follows well established empirical evidence, and highlights regional heterogeneity in a previously unexplored dimension. We study the implications of three different fiscal regimes for capital accumulation and aggregate national welfare. Full centralization of revenue and expenditure decisions is the optimal fiscal arrangement for the country when infrastructure spending productivity is similar across regions. When regional differences exist but are not too large, the partial centralization regime is optimal where the federal government sets a common tax rate, but allows the regional governments to decide on the budget composition. Only when the differences are sufficiently large does full decentralization become the optimal regime. National steady state output is instead highest when the economy is decentralized. This result is consistent with the “Oates conjecture” that fiscal decentralization increases capital accumulation. However, in terms of welfare this result can be reversed. en
dc.format.extent 307798 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US en
dc.publisher Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research en
dc.relation.ispartofseries CAEPR Working Papers en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2007-003 en
dc.relation.isversionof This paper is also available on RePEc. An older version of this paper can be found on SSRN. en
dc.subject CAEPR en
dc.subject Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research en
dc.subject fiscal federalism en
dc.subject capital accumulation en
dc.subject infrastructure en
dc.subject public education en
dc.title Public Budget Composition, Fiscal(De)Centralization, and Welfare en
dc.type Working Paper en


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