Show simple item record Young-Ro, Yoon 2007-07-05T15:19:46Z 2007-07-05T15:19:46Z 2007-07-02
dc.identifier.uri en
dc.identifier.uri en
dc.description.abstract In this article, we deal with the topic of intentional information spillover using a model in which both informational- and payoff-externalities are present and the timing of agents' actions is endogenous. In this model, three players, who are heterogeneous in the quality of their information, compete with one another in a common task. According to the results, the weakly-informed players may voluntarily relinquish an option to wait, although no cost is imposed for a delay of action. When acting without a delay, they reveal their information with the hope that others will imitate them. This type of information spillover is due to their incentive, which is to make use of the relative performance evaluation structure under which a bad reputation can be shared if others are also wrong. en
dc.format.extent 337835 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US en
dc.publisher Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research en
dc.relation.ispartofseries CAEPR Working Papers en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2007-011 en
dc.relation.isversionof This paper can also be found on SSRN and RePEc. en
dc.subject CAEPR en
dc.subject Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research en
dc.subject Blame sharing en
dc.subject Endogenous timing of actions en
dc.subject Herding en
dc.subject Information spillover en
dc.subject Informational externalities en
dc.subject Payoff externalities en
dc.title Strategic Information Spillover to be Imitated: Incentive to Make Use of Relative Performance Evaluation en
dc.type Working Paper en

Files in this item

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Search IUScholarWorks

Advanced Search


My Account