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dc.contributor.author Yoon, Young-Ro
dc.date.accessioned 2007-06-27T17:38:30Z
dc.date.available 2007-06-27T17:38:30Z
dc.date.issued 2007-06-19
dc.identifier.uri http://www.iub.edu/~caepr/RePEc/PDF/CAEPR2007-010.pdf en
dc.identifier.uri http://ssrn.com/abstract=995480 en
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2022/1823
dc.description.abstract This paper explores the effects of costly information and asymmetry in reward and penalty on an agent's strategic behavior in acquiring and revealing information. Whether information is costly to acquire or not, in order to induce truthfulness in an agent's action, the penalty should not be stressed more than the reward to avoid herding or imitation. When the reward is greater than the penalty, if information is not costly, for the relatively low quality of information, the agent exhibits anti-herding. However, an equilibrium -- in which she acts truthfully for all parameters of information quality -- can be induced by managing the reward and penalty. If information is costly, within certain parameter sets of information quality, the agent exhibits deviation and imitation. Also, for the moderate quality of information, the agent acquires her information although it is costly and reveals it truthfully. The derived results can provide the reasoning behind agents' behavior trends in information revelation according to reputation and the difficulty of a given task. en
dc.format.extent 348292 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US en
dc.publisher Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research en
dc.relation.ispartofseries CAEPR Working Papers en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2007-010 en
dc.relation.isversionof This paper can be found on RePEc and SSRN. en
dc.subject CAEPR en
dc.subject Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research en
dc.subject Asymmetry in reward and penalty en
dc.subject Information Cost en
dc.subject Truthfulness in information en
dc.subject Herding en
dc.subject Anti-Herding en
dc.subject Imitation en
dc.subject Deviation en
dc.title Effects of Asymmetric Payoffs and Information Cost in Sequential Information Revelation Games en
dc.type Working Paper en


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