Show simple item record Lee, Changmin 2007-06-18T19:32:55Z 2007-06-18T19:32:55Z 2007-05-22
dc.description.abstract I analyze directorships held by CEOs who retired during 1989-1993 and during 1998-2002. My results suggest that retired CEOs became more popular on boards. Also, although pre-retirement accounting performance helps explain the number of outside directorships a retired CEO held in the 1989-1993 sample as Brickley, Linck, and Coles (1999) found, it does not in the 1998-2002 sample. Third, a company's stock performance during a CEO's tenure affects whether he became an inside director of that company after retirement. A 25% change in stock price performance increased the probability by 11% in the 1989-1993 sample, and 51% in the 1998-2002 sample. Finally, if a retired CEO worked in a regulated industry, his probability of serving at least one outside directorship fell by 34% in the 1989-1993 sample, and 24% in the 1998-2002 sample. en
dc.format.extent 712448 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US en
dc.publisher Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research en
dc.relation.ispartofseries CAEPR Working Papers en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2007-007 en
dc.relation.isversionof This paper can also be found on SSRN at: and RePEc at: en
dc.subject CAEPR en
dc.subject Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research en
dc.subject Corporate governance en
dc.title What’s happened over the past 10 years to the selection of retired CEOs as board members? en
dc.type Working Paper en

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