Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author Allen, Colin
dc.date.accessioned 2011-12-29T04:22:01Z
dc.date.available 2011-12-29T04:22:01Z
dc.date.issued 2010-05-25
dc.identifier.citation Allen, C. (2010), Mirror, Mirror in the Brain, What's the Monkey Stand to Gain?. Noûs, 44: 372–391. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00744.x en
dc.identifier.uri http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00744.x/abstract en
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2022/14032
dc.description.abstract Primatologists generally agree that monkeys lack higher-order intentional capacities related to theory of mind. Yet the discovery of the so-called “mirror neurons” in monkeys suggests to many neuroscientists that they have the rudiments of intentional understanding. Given a standard philosophical view about intentional understanding, which requires higher-order intentionality, a paradox arises. Different ways of resolving the paradox are assessed, using evidence from neural, cognitive, and behavioral studies of humans and monkeys. A decisive resolution to the paradox requires substantial additional empirical work and perhaps a rejection of the standard philosophical view. en
dc.language.iso en_US en
dc.publisher Wiley Periodicals, Inc. en
dc.rights Copyright 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. en
dc.subject Intentionality, mirror neurons, action understanding, animal mind en
dc.title Mirror, Mirror in the Brain, What’s the Monkey Stand to Gain? en
dc.type Article en


Files in this item

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Search IUScholarWorks


Advanced Search

Browse

My Account

Statistics