&HPS7
Permanent link for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/2022/26067
Integrated History and Philosophy of Science: Seventh Conference
5–7 July, 2018
Hannover University, Germany; co-sponsored by the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science
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Now showing 1 - 20 of 27
Item Absolute Measurement and the Second Quantification of Physics(2018) Mitchell, Daniel; dmitchell@sciencehistory.orgItem Conceptions of experimental control in 19th-century life sciences(2018) Jutta Schickore; jschicko@indiana.edu.This article presents a new framework for the analysis of experimental control. The framework highlights different functions for experimental controls in the realization of an experiment: experimental controls that serve as tests and experimental controls that serve as probes. The approach to experimental control proposed here can illuminate the constitutive role of controls in knowledge production, and it sheds new light on the notion of exploratory experimentation. It also clarifies what can and what cannot be expected from reviewers of scientific journal articles giving feedback on experimental controls.Item Coordination of biophysical and biochemical research, 1920s and 1930s(2018) Caterina Schürch; Caterina.Schuerch@lrz.uni-muenchen.deItem Research Program Evolution: Mutant Collections in Genetics 1920s– 1990s(2018) Alexander Schwerin; a.schwerin@tu-braunschweig.deItem The function and limit of Galileo’s falling bodies thought experiment: Absolute weight, specific weight and the medium’s resistance(2018) Rawad El Skaf; rawadskaff@gmail.comThe ongoing epistemological debate on scientific thought experiments (TEs) revolves, in part, around the now famous Galileo’s falling bodies TE and how it could justify its conclusions. In this paper, I argue that the TE’s function is misrepresented in this a-historical debate. I retrace the history of this TE and show that it constituted the first step in two general “argumentative strategies”, excogitated by Galileo to defend two different theories of free-fall, in 1590’s and then in the 1638. I analyse both argumentative strategies and argue that their function was to eliminate potential causal factors: the TE serving to eliminate absolute weight as a causal factor, while the subsequent arguments served to explore the effect of specific weight, with conflicting conclusions in 1590 and 1638. I will argue thorough the paper that the TE is best grasped when we analyse Galileo’s restriction, in the TE’s scenario and conclusion, to bodies of the same material or specific weight. Finally, I will draw out two implications for the debate on TEs.Item Rethinking the ‘Confrontation Model’: on the Philosophical Presuppositions of the Project of Integrating History and Philosophy of Science(2018) Thodoris Dimitrakos; thdimitrakos@phs.uoa.grItem Linking theoretical content and context: a carrier-trait approach(2018) Gábor Zemplén; zemplen@filozofia.bme.huItem The Ups and Downs of Newton’s Rule 3: A Case Study in the Evolution of Philosophical Concepts(2018) Zvi Biener; zvi.biener@uc.eduItem Building Blocks and the Principle of Plurality: Model-Building Heuristics in Long-Term Research Collectives(2018) Kärin Nickelsen; K.Nickelsen@lmu.deItem Integrating Narratives and Model Analysis: New Epistemic Tools for iHPS(2018) Julia Sanchez-Dorado; Claudia Cristalli; julia.sanchez-dorado@ucl.ac.uk; claudia.cristalli.15@ucl.ac.ukItem Re-integrating HPS: Scientonomy as a Missing Link(2018) Hakob Barseghyan; Gregory Rupik; hakob.barseghyan@utoronto.caItem Evolution of knowledge: history of materials – the case of saltpeter(2018) Silvia Waisse; Ana M. Alfonso-Goldfarb; Marcia H.M. Ferraz; dr.silvia.waisse@gmail.comItem The .05 level of significance and the economy of research(2018) Cornelis Menke; cmenke@uni-mainz.deItem Prehistoric Stone Tool Technology and the Evolution of Cognitive Behavior(2018) Manjari Chakrabarty; manchakrabarty@gmail.comItem Zombie Data from Babylon(2018) Nora Boyd; nboyd@siena.eduItem Plurality in Medicine: Some Aspects of Scientific Pluralism in the Context of Application(2018) Basel Myhub; basel.myhub@uni-bielefeld.deItem ‘Physics is a Kind of Metaphysics’. On Émile Meyerson’s Influence on Einstein’s Rationalistic Realism(2018) Marco Giovanelli; marco.giovanelli@uni-tuebingen.deGerald Holton has famously described Einstein’s career as a philosophical “pilgrimage”. Starting on “the historic ground” of Machian positivism and phenomenalism, following the completion of general relativity in late 1915, Einstein’s philosophy endured (a) a speculative turn: physical theorizing appears as ultimately a “pure mathematical construction” guided by faith in the simplicity of nature and (b) a realistic turn: science is “nothing more than a refinement ”of the everyday belief in the existence of mind-independent physical reality. Nevertheless, Einstein’s mathematical constructivism that supports his unified field theory program appears to be, at first sight, hardly compatible with the common sense realism with which he countered quantum theory. Thus, literature on Einstein’s philosophy of science has often struggled in finding the thread between ostensibly conflicting philosophical pronouncements. This paper supports the claim that Einstein’s dialog with Émile Meyerson from the mid 1920s till the early 1930s might be a neglected source to solve this riddle. According to Einstein, Meyerson shared (a) his belief in the independent existence of an external world and (b) his conviction that the latter can be grasped only by speculative means. Einstein could present his search for a unified field theory as a metaphysical-realistic program opposed to the positivistic-operationalist spirit of quantum mechanics.Item Narrating the Unobservable: On the historical-philosophical study of the relation between experiments and entities(2018) Jan Potters; Jan.Potters@UAntwerpen.beItem Past and Present Uses of Concepts as Tools for Investigating Mental Phenomena: Mental Imagery and Hallucinations(2018) Eden Smith; eden.smith@unimelb.edu.auThe scientific concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations are each used independently of the other in experiments; uses that simultaneously evoke and obscure their historical connections. To highlight one of these connections, I will begin by sketching episodes from the largely separate developmental trajectories of each concept. Considering these historical sketches side-by-side, I will argue that the independent uses of these concepts each inherited a shared set of interdependent associations. In doing so, I seek to illustrate the value of examining historical connections between mental imagery and hallucinations for studying the current uses of these two concepts in neuroimaging experiments.