&HPS4

Permanent link for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/2022/26064

Integrated History and Philosophy of Science: Fourth Conference

15–18 March, 2012

Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Athens, Greece

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Now showing 1 - 20 of 24

Where Positivism Went Right: The Positron and the Literal View of Theories
(2012) Robert Rynasiewicz; ryno@jhu.edu; Michela Massimi
Experimenting with spirits: the creative and therapeutic role of experimentation on Francis Bacon’s natural histories
(2012) Dana Jalobeanu; dana.jalobeanu@celfis.ro; Faidra Papanelopoulou
Galileo’s use of experimentation and the limits of nature
(2012) Maarten Van Dyck; Maarten.VanDyck@UGent.be; Faidra Papanelopoulou
The Changing Relationship Between Simulation and Experiment: The Case of Quantum Chemistry
(2012) Johannes Lenhard; johannes.lenhard@uni-bielefeld.de; Vassilios Karakostas
Many disciplines and scientific fields have undergone a computational turn in the past several decades. This paper analyzes this sort of turn by investigating the case of computational quantum chemistry. The main claim is that the transformation from quantum to computational quantum chemistry involved changes in three dimensions. First, on the side of instrumentation, small computers and a networked infrastructure took over the lead from centralized mainframe architecture. Second, a new conception of computational modeling became feasible and assumed a crucial role. And third, the field of computational quantum chemistry became organized in a market-like fashion and this market is much bigger than the number of quantum theory experts. These claims will be substantiated by an investigation of the so-called density functional theory (DFT), the arguably pivotal theory in the turn to computational quantum chemistry around 1990.
What does History Matter to Philosophy of Physics?
(2012) Thomas Ryckman; tryckman@stanford.edu; Stathis Psillos
Naturalized metaphysics remains the default presupposition of much contemporary philosophy of physics. As metaphysics is supposed to concern the general structure of reality, so scientific naturalism draws upon our best physical theories to attempt to answer the foundational question “par excellence ” viz., “how could the world possibly be the way this theory says it is?” A particular case study, Hilbert's attempt to analyze and explain a seeming “pre-established harmony” between mind and nature, is offered as a salutary reminder that naturalism's ready inference from physical theory to ontology may be too quick.
Untitled
Theodore Arabatzis; Don Howard; tarabatz@phs.uoa.gr and dhoward1@nd.edu
Vacuum Experiments in Cartesian Context
(2012) Mihnea Dobre; mihnea.dobre@icub.unibuc.ro; Dionysios Anapolitanos
The Epistemic Structural Realist Program. Some interference
(2012) Angelo Cei; angelo.cei@uniroma3.it; Michela Massimi
In this paper, I present the Epistemic Structural Realist Program, illustrate the main arguments on its behalf and discuss its implications for a realist understanding of scientific change. Then I present and discuss the historical case study and its implications for ESR; Section 4 will draw a general moral from the previous discussion. In particular, I show that: a) Emphasis on the predictive power of purely formal aspects of electrodynamics and their partial/empirical interpretation would lead us completely astray in the interpretation of the Zeeman Effect and of its role in driving research in the fine structure of the atom through spectroscopic investigation. b) Arguments based on the history of science are ineffective in this case. Any attempt to explain the past success through the role of structural aspects of old theory involved in the account is unsuccessful. Both the points will allow to seeing the need for an alternative historical methodology to support the realist cause on the face of theoretical change.
How Theories Begin: Max Planck and the Genesis of Quantum Theory
(2012) Massimiliano Badino; massimiliano.badino@univr.it; Vassilios Karakostas
The Objectivity of our Measures: How many Fundamental Units of Nature?
(2012) Sally Riordan; sr206@cam.ac.uk; Hasok Chang
The fundamental constants of nature, as presented by modern science, can be conceived as natural measures of the universe. In comparison, the standards of the International System of Units, including the kilogram and the meter, are mind-made and hand-crafted to meet the demands of human life. In this paper, the gap between the natural and the conventional is squeezed from two directions. In the first place, we come to understand why the metric measures were originally conceived, by the best of scientists, as being “taken from nature” and “in no way arbitrary”. The kilogram of yesteryear was anchored in yesteryear's science and is reasonably considered natural with respect to that science. We also review a contemporary debate amongst physicists that questions whether any quantity, being necessarily written with units, can be truly fundamental. Modern notions of a fundamental constant are put under the spotlight; the kilogram emerges as bound up with contemporary science today as ever it was. In the picture being painted here, our measures are drawn as dynamic entities, epistemic tools that develop hand-in-hand with the rest of science, and whose significance goes much further than a metal artefact dangled from an abstract number line.
The Norton Dome and the Nineteenth Century Foundations of Determinism
(2012) Marij van Strien; marijvanstrien@gmail.com; John Norton
The recent discovery of an indeterministic system in classical mechanics, the Norton dome, has shown that answering the question whether classical mechanics is deterministic can be a complicated matter. In this paper I show that indeterministic systems similar to the Norton dome were already known in the nineteenth century: I discuss four nineteenth century authors who wrote about such systems, namely Poisson, Duhamel, Boussinesq and Bertrand. However, I argue that their discussion of such systems was very different from the contemporary discussion about the Norton dome, because physicists in the nineteenth century conceived of determinism in essentially different ways: whereas in the contemporary literature on determinism in classical physics, determinism is usually taken to be a property of the equations of physics, in the nineteenth century determinism was primarily taken to be a presupposition of theories in physics, and as such it was not necessarily affected by the possible existence of systems such as the Norton dome.
Symmetries and conserved quantities in integrated historical-philosophical perspective
(2012) Arianna Borrelli; orrelli@tu-berlin.de; Hasok Chang
Mathematical invariances, usually referred to as “symmetries”, are today often regarded as providing a privileged heuristic guideline for understanding natural phenomena, especially those of micro-physics. The rise of symmetries in particle physics has often been portrayed by physicists and philosophers as the “application” of mathematical invariances to the ordering of particle phenomena, but no historical studies exist on whether and how mathematical invariances actually played a heuristic role in shaping microphysics. Moreover, speaking of an “application” of invariances conflates the formation of concepts of new intrinsic degrees of freedom of elementary particles with the formulation of models containing invariances with respect to those degrees of freedom. I shall present here a case study from early particle physics (ca. 1930–1954) focussed on the formation of one of the earliest concepts of a new degree of freedom, baryon number, and on the emergence of the invariance today associated to it. The results of the analysis show how concept formation and “application” of mathematical invariances were distinct components of a complex historical constellation in which, beside symmetries, two further elements were essential: the idea of physically conserved quantities and that of selection rules. I shall refer to the collection of different heuristic strategies involving selection rules, invariances and conserved quantities as the “SIC-triangle” and show how different authors made use of them to interpret the wealth of new experimental data. It was only a posteriori that the successes of this hybrid “symmetry heuristics” came to be attributed exclusively to mathematical invariances and group theory, forgetting the role of selection rules and of the notion of physically conserved quantity in the emergence of new degrees of freedom and new invariances. The results of the present investigation clearly indicate that opinions on the role of symmetries in fundamental physics need to be critically reviewed in the spirit of integrated history and philosophy of science.
Facing Giere’s challenges to the History and Philosophy of Science
(2012) Samuel Schindler; samuel.schindler@css.au.dk; Jutta Schickore
The role of the rotating frame thought experiment in the genesis of general relativity
(2012) Jonathan Everett; jonathan.everett@uclmail.net; John Norton
Epistemology of a Believer: Making Sense of Duhem’s Anti-Atomism
(2012) Klodian Coko; kchoko@indiana.edu; Alan Chalmers
Pierre Duhem's (1861–1916) lifelong opposition to 19th century atomic theories of matter has been traditionally attributed to his conventionalist and/or positivist philosophy of science. Relatively recently, this traditional view position has been challenged by the claim that Duhem's opposition to atomism was due to the precarious state of atomic theories during the beginning of the 20th century. In this paper I present some of the difficulties with both the traditional and the new interpretation of Duhem's opposition to atomism and provide a new framework in which to understand his rejection of atomic hypotheses. I argue that although not positivist, instrumentalist, or conventionalist, Duhem's philosophy of physics was not compatible with belief in unobservable atoms and molecules. The key for understanding Duhem's resistance to atomism during the final phase of his career is the historicist arguments he presented in support of his ideal of physics.
The Historical Roots of 19th Century Antirealism
(2012) Michael Liston; mnliston@uwm.edu; Alan Chalmers
“Maxwell’s Method of Physical Analogy and the Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics”
(2012) Alisa Bokulich; abokulic@bu.edu; John Norton
The fact that the same equations or mathematical models reappear in the descriptions of what are otherwise disparate physical systems can be seen as yet another manifestation of Wigner's “unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics.” James Clerk Maxwell famously exploited such formal similarities in what he called the “method of physical analogy.” Both Maxwell and Hermann von Helmholtz appealed to the physical analogies between electromagnetism and hydrodynamics in their development of these theories. I argue that a closer historical examination of the different ways in which Maxwell and Helmholtz each deployed this analogy gives further insight into debates about the representational and explanatory power of mathematical models.
The Early History of Chance in Evolution: Causal and Statistical in the 1890s
(2012) Charles H. Pence; charles@charlespence.net; Jutta Schickore
Work throughout the history and philosophy of biology frequently employs ‘chance’, ‘unpredictability’, ‘probability’, and many similar terms. One common way of understanding how these concepts were introduced in evolution focuses on two central issues: the first use of statistical methods in evolution (Galton), and the first use of the concept of “objective chance” in evolution (Wright). I argue that while this approach has merit, it fails to fully capture interesting philosophical reflections on the role of chance expounded by two of Galton's students, Karl Pearson and W.F.R. Weldon. Considering a question more familiar from contemporary philosophy of biology—the relationship between our statistical theories of evolution and the processes in the world those theories describe—is, I claim, a more fruitful way to approach both these two historical actors and the broader development of chance in evolution.
The nature and roles of methods accounts in experimental reports
(2012) Jutta Schickore; jschicko@indiana.edu; Friedrich Steinle
Why do scientific revolutions begin?
(2012) Donald Gillies; donald.gillies@ucl.ac.uk; Vasso Kindi
This paper is concerned with the problem of why scientific revolutions begin. It considers first Kuhn's view that a revolution is started by a build-up of anomalies in the old paradigm. This view is criticized on historical grounds by considering the examples of the Einsteinian revolution and the Copernican revolution. It is argued that there was no significant build-up of anomalies in the old paradigm just before the beginning of these revolutions. An alternative view is then put forward that the start of a revolution has to be explained in terms of technology and practical problems (or tech for short). There are two patterns: (i) tech first in which technological advances lead to new discoveries and these lead to the onset of the revolution, and (ii) tech last in which the need to solve an urgent practical problem produces a challenge to the old paradigm. If this challenge is successful, the new paradigm leads to a solution of the practical problem and so to technological advance. The tech first pattern is illustrated by the example of the chemical revolution, and the tech last pattern by the example of the development of the germ theory of disease. It is then argued that scientific revolutions can exhibit a combination of tech first and tech last, and this is illustrated by the Copernican revolution. In the final section of the paper, it is shown that the 'tech first/tech last' theory explains why the Copernican revolution occurred in Europe in the 16 th and 17 th centuries, and not in the ancient Greek world (with Aristarchus), or in China in the 16 th and 17 th centuries.

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