Integrated HPS Community
Permanent link for this communityhttps://hdl.handle.net/2022/25833
This collection consists of contributions presented at the "&HPS" conference series organized by the Committee for Integrated HPS, a network of scholars dedicated to the integration of the history of science and the philosophy of science. The Committee was established in 2006. Its members work at IU's Department of History and Philosophy of Science and in history and philosophy institutions around the world. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the NSF (grant # SES-1921821), which helped fund the gathering of data for this collection.
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Item A (So-So) Novel No-Go: Heisenberg on Hidden Variables (1927-1935)(2009) Elise Crull; ecrull@ccny.cuny.eduItem A Case Study in the Philosophy of Scientific Experimentation: Electron-Proton Inelastic Scattering Program in High Energy Particle Physics(2007) Koray Karaca; k.karaca@utwente.nl; Bill Newman and Jutta SchickoreIn this paper, I address the issue of to what extent the theory-dominated view of scientific experimentation describes scientific practice. I rely on a time period from the history of High Energy Physics (HEP), which spans from early 1960s to early 1970s. I argue that theory-ladenness of experimentation (TLE), which grounds theory-dominated conception of experimentation is too coarse-grained inasmuch as it prevents us from seeing the correct relationship that exists between theorizing and experimenting in the scientific practice of HEP. I articulate that in order to be able to get a better understanding of scientific practice, a revision needs to be made in the general conception of TLE. I propose that such a revision is possible if we abandon the commitment that experimentation is always driven by theory. I consider what I call “theory-drivenness” of experimentation (TDE) as a form of theory-ladenness, which amounts to the claim that experiments, from their initial design up to their final stage, are carried out under the framework of a prevailing theory for the purpose of providing definite answers to specific questions already posed by the same theory. I argue that electron-proton inelastic scattering experiments in HEP were firstly carried out without having any recourse to a phenomenological model. From here, I claim that these experiments are not theory-laden in the sense implied by TDE. On the other hand, I argue, inelastic scattering experiments are theory-laden due to the fact that the scientists who perform them are committed to background theories of HEP. That is, I admit the validity of TLE as a philosophical claim, but I attribute a weaker status to it as opposed to its general conception. That is, I propose to differentiate TDE from TLE by claiming that TLE does not entail TDE.Item A Case Study of Case Studies: Scientific Realism and Integrated HPS(2014) Anjan Chakravartty; chakravartty@miami.edu; Theodore ArabatzisCase studies of science concerning the interpretation of specific theories and the nature of theory change over time are often presented as evidence for or against forms of selective realism: versions of scientific realism that advocate belief in connection with certain components of theories as opposed to their content as a whole. I consider the question of how probative case studies can be in this sphere, focusing on two prominent examples of selectivity: explanationist realism, which identifies realist commitment with components of theories that are putatively required to explain their empirical success; and entity realism, which identifies realist commitment with certain putatively causally efficacious entities. I argue that while case studies are essential to debates about these positions, they are not compelling in the way that their intended use suggests. Regarding explanationism, concerns about the “neutrality” of historical evidence are ultimately indefeasible. Regarding entity realism, arguments for and against naturally dissolve into disputes about the reference of theoretical terms which are insulated from the details of cases. I conclude by suggesting that the morals of this discussion extend to other forms of selective realism, namely structural realism and semirealism.Item A Lofty Mountain, Putrefying Flesh, Styptic Water, and Germinating Seeds: Methodological Reflections on Experimental Procedures from Pascal and Perier to Redi and Beyond(2007) Nico Bertoloni Meli; dbmeli@indiana.edu; Bill Newman and Jutta SchickoreItem A new role for integrated HPS today(2018) Hanne Andersen; hanne.andersen@ind.ku.dkItem Absolute Measurement and the Second Quantification of Physics(2018) Mitchell, Daniel; dmitchell@sciencehistory.orgItem At the Intersection of Historicity and Epistemology(2016) Kate MacCord; kmaccord@mbl.eduEarly in the twentieth century, biology was seen as grounded in the dual foundations of cells and evolution. Cells provided the most basic living unit, and evolution provided a way for cells to become established in different organisms. However, as the twentieth century progressed, cells and cellular level phenomena became embedded in different research traditions within developmental biology with varying connections to an evolutionary framework. While researchers focusing on differentiation could continue to link their research to evolution through heredity, those focused on morphogenesis largely gave up any evolutionary perspective. Morphogenetic research programs continued, without evolution, until late into the twentieth century, when fruitful new insights brought development back into the process of evolution. This chapter takes teeth as an exemplary case study for these changes with special focus on the enamel knot, now thought of as the morphogenetic control center of the developing tooth. Once development, and especially cellular level phenomena, was seen in the light of evolution, the enamel knot became the central component of a new paradigm in evolutionary developmental biology-one that, to this day, continues to provide a means of understanding the development and evolution of teeth. The intersection of cells and "the Darwinian tradition" is a complex relationship. This chapter offers an alternative history of the ways in which development, evolution, and cells were brought together throughout the twentieth century and challenges the common conception that genes are the sole locus of explanation for research at the intersection of development and evolution.Item Atom's Empirical Eve: Methodological Disputes and How to Evaluate Them(2007) Peter Achinstein; peter.achinstein@jhu.edu; Michela MassimiThis paper examines the debate in the late 19th and early 20th centuries over the acceptability of atomic and molecular physics. It focuses on three prominent figures: Maxwell, who defended atomic physics, Ostwald, who initially rejected it but changed his mind as a result of experiments by Thomson and Perrin, and Duhem, who never accepted it. Each scientist defended the position he did in the light of strongly held methodological views concerning empirical evidence. The paper critically evaluates each of these methodological positions.Item “Beyond the conventional boundaries of physics”: On relating Ernst Mach’s philosophy to his teaching and research in the 1870s and 80s(2014) Richard Staley; raws1@cam.ac.uk; Hasok ChangErnst Mach’s most well known critiques of mechanics concern mass, inertia and space and time. Conceptually motivated towards avoiding unnecessary assumptions and basing physical concepts on measured relations, they were first published in the years around 1870 (for mass and inertia) and in his well known 1883 book Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwickelung historisch-kritisch dargestellt, later translated as The Science of Mechanics: A Critical and Historical Account of its Development. Philosophical discussion of Mach’s critiques has reflected these conceptual concerns, connecting them to Mach’s account of science as the economical description of phenomena. Yet manuscript records of his teaching in the 1870s show that Mach was also animated by psychophysics and the relations between inner and outer worlds. His publications attest to these broader interests as well. In the 1870s, for example, Mach developed physiological studies of the sense of motion. Soon after completing his critical history of mechanics he took up the relations between physiology and psychology in his 1886 Beiträge zur Analyse der Empfindungen. By investigating Mach’s research across subject matter that has usually been treated separately, and integrating his teaching with his research, this chapter aims to offer a study of Mach’s philosophy as it is revealed in practice. Mach presents a highly unusual example of someone whose primary aim was to reform his own discipline of physics through the concerns of other disciplines, something he alluded to in 1886 when stating that he expected the next great enlightenments of the foundations of physics to come at the hands of biology.Item Building Blocks and the Principle of Plurality: Model-Building Heuristics in Long-Term Research Collectives(2018) Kärin Nickelsen; K.Nickelsen@lmu.deItem Can we understand the black hole information paradox by studying its history?(2016) Jeroen van Dongen; Sebastian de Haro; J.A.E.F.vanDongen@uva.nlThis is one of a pair of papers that give a historical-cum-philosophical analysis of the endeavour to understand black hole entropy as a statistical mechanical entropy obtained by counting string-theoretic microstates. Both papers focus on Andrew Strominger and Cumrun Vafa's ground-breaking 1996 calculation, which analysed the black hole in terms of D-branes. The first paper gives a conceptual analysis of the Strominger-Vafa argument, and of several research efforts that it engendered. In this paper, we assess whether the black hole should be considered as emergent from the d-brane system, particularly in light of the role that duality plays in the argument. We further identify uses of the quantum-to-classical correspondence principle in string theory discussions of black holes, and compare these to the heuristics of earlier efforts in theory construction, in particular those of the old quantum theory.Item Causality in Medicine and the Streptomycin Case(2016) Donald Gillies; donald.gillies@ucl.ac.ukThis paper considers what evidence is needed to establish the effectiveness and safety of a drug therapy. The claim that A cures D is a particular case of a causal claim in medicine. So the paper begins with a general analysis of the evidence for causal claims in medicine. Such evidence is divided into two types: statistical evidence and evidence of mechanism. These are further divided into observational and interventional, producing a 2x2 classification. It is shown that historically there have different assessments of the importance of these different types of evidence. Evidence-based medicine (EBM) puts forward the thesis that claims of the form ‘A cures D without harming the patient’ can be established using only randomized controlled trials or RCTs. This thesis of EBM is criticized by considering two historical examples: streptomycin and thalidomide. Generalizing from these, it is claimed that the effectiveness and safety of a drug therapy can only be established by using both statistical evidence and evidence of mechanism. This is a specific instance of the Russo-Williamson thesis.Item Checks-and-balances: orbital symmetry and quantitative methods in late twentieth century quantum chemistry(2014) Grant Fisher; Buhm Soon Park; fisher@kaist.ac.kr; Mauricio SuarezItem Chemistry: An Ontology-Free Science?(2007) Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent; bernadette.bensaude@u-paris10.frIt is often assumed that chemistry was a typical positivistic science as long as chemists used atomic and molecular models as mere fictions and denied any concern with their real existence. Even when they use notions such as molecular orbitals chemists do not reify them and often claim that they are mere models or instrumental artefacts. However a glimpse on the history of chemistry in the longue durée suggests that such denials of the ontological status of chemical entities do not testify for any specific allegiance of chemists to positivism. Rather it suggests that the dilemma positivism vs realism is inappropriate for characterizing the ontology of chemistry. This alternative shaped at the turn of the twentieth century in the context of controversies about atomic physics does not take into account the major concern of chemists, i.e. making up things. Only by considering what matters for chemists, their matters of concern rather than their matter theories, can we expect to get an insight on their ontological assumptions. The argumentation based on historical data is twofold. Generating new substances out of initial ingredients which is the raison d’être of chemistry raised a vexing puzzle which has been alternatively solved with the Aristotelian notion of mixt and the Lavoisieran notion of compound. I will argue that an essential tension remains intrinsic in chemistry between the two conceptual frameworks. But how are we to make sense of the long tradition of ontological non-commitment in chemistry? I argue that what is usually considered as a denial of the existence of the basic units of matter is better characterized as a focus on more important actors on the chemical stage.Item Concept dynamics and the realism question(2016) Friedrich Steinle; friedrich.steinle@tu-berlin.deItem Conceptions of experimental control in 19th-century life sciences(2018) Jutta Schickore; jschicko@indiana.edu.This article presents a new framework for the analysis of experimental control. The framework highlights different functions for experimental controls in the realization of an experiment: experimental controls that serve as tests and experimental controls that serve as probes. The approach to experimental control proposed here can illuminate the constitutive role of controls in knowledge production, and it sheds new light on the notion of exploratory experimentation. It also clarifies what can and what cannot be expected from reviewers of scientific journal articles giving feedback on experimental controls.Item Item “Control(led) experiments” in historical and philosophical perspective(2014) Jutta Schickore; jschicko@indiana.edu; Martin KuschItem Coordination of biophysical and biochemical research, 1920s and 1930s(2018) Caterina Schürch; Caterina.Schuerch@lrz.uni-muenchen.de