DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY:

THE EFFECTS OF PARTICIPATION ON POLITICAL EFFICACY

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For my parents

You never doubted me for a moment and
encouraged me in all aspects of life.

I am eternally grateful.

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the relationship between deliberative democracy, the idea that public decisions should be made by discussion among free and equal citizens, and internal and external political efficacy. Internal political efficacy is the extent to which people feel they can competently participate in politics; external political efficacy is the extent to which people feel that government is responsive to their interests. Some scholars assert that deliberative democracy can increase perceptions of political efficacy; however, little empirical research has tested this proposition.

To help fill that research gap, this study examines one deliberative process, the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting as convened by United Agenda for Children (UAC), a coalition of public and private organizations who joined to ensure a positive future for all the children (from birth to age 21) of Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. The primary research question is: What impact does participation in the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting have on participants' sense of internal and external political efficacy? This study uses a quasi-experimental research design, with survey data collected at three points in time from two non-equivalent comparison groups (participants and non-participants). Multiple analyses are conducted, including various regression models, Heckman treatment effect models, and propensity score matching models.

The study has three major findings. First, before the Town Meeting, participants have significantly lower perceptions of external political efficacy than non-participants. Second, participation in the Town Meeting increases participants' perceptions of both internal and external political efficacy; however, only the increase in external political

efficacy is statistically significant. Finally, the increase in external political efficacy

persists over time. In sum, these results suggest that participation in this deliberative

democracy process increases perceptions of political efficacy, and particularly

perceptions of external political efficacy. The implications of these findings and

directions for future research are discussed.

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INTRODUCTION

> Our public men have, besides politics, their private affairs to attend to, and
> our ordinary citizens, though occupied with the pursuits of industry, are still
> fair judges of public matters; for, unlike any other nation, we regard the
> citizen who takes no part in these duties not as unambitious but as useless,
> and we are able to judge proposals even if we cannot originate them; instead
> of looking on discussion as a stumbling-block in the way of action, we think
> it an indispensable preliminary to any wise action at all (Thucydides II.40;
> quote from Elster, 1998: 1).

OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY

Deliberative democracy, also sometimes called discursive democracy, is the idea that public decisions should be made by discussion among free and equal citizens. More specifically, deliberative democracy seeks to infuse government decision making with reasoned discussion among, and the collective judgment of, citizens (Chambers, 2003; Cunningham, 2002; Elster, 1998; Gutmann and Thompson, 2004). In contrast to the traditional economics-based theory of democracy, which uses voting as the central institution for identifying and aggregating preferences, deliberative democracy accentuates public deliberation as the source of legitimate lawmaking (Mansbridge, 1980; Young, 2000).

The concept of deliberative democracy is as old as the birth of democracy in Athens (Elster, 1998; Gutmann and Thompson, 2004). Although Athenian democracy came to an end in 322 B.C., the concept of deliberative democracy can be seen throughout the ages (for historical perspectives on deliberative democracy, see Elster, 1998; Gastil and Keith, 2005; Gutmann and Thompson, 2004). The concept has also taken on new meaning in Western nations, and especially in the United States, where a

growing number of scholars and theorists point to a "democratic deficit" and a

"citizenship deficit" (e.g., Macedo et al., 2005; see also Elshtain, 1995; Frantzich, 2005;

Putnam, 2000; Sandel, 1996; Skocpol and Fiorina, 1999). A democratic deficit refers to a

situation where democratic organizations, institutions, and governments are seen as

falling short of fulfilling the principles of democracy in their practices or operation

(Chomsky, 2006; Durant, 1995). A citizenship deficit refers broadly to the erosion of

civil society, and more specifically to an erosion of the skills and dispositions of

citizenship among the general public (e.g., Macedo et. al, 2005). To many, these deficits

are a troublesome signal of the weakening of American democracy. For example,

Macedo and colleagues (2005: 1) assert that:

> American democracy is at risk. The risk comes not from some external
> threat but from disturbing internal trends: an erosion of the activities and
> capacities of citizenship. Americans have turned away from politics and
> the public sphere in larger numbers, leaving our civic life impoverished.
> Citizens participate in public affairs less frequently, with less knowledge
> and enthusiasm, in fewer venues, and less equally than is healthy for a
> vibrant democratic polity….Americans should be concerned about the
> current state of affairs. The risk is not to our national survival but to the
> health and legitimacy of our shared political order.

Other scholars join in this lament, asserting that there has been a widespread

withdrawal of Americans from a broad range of civic activities. They supply a battery of

statistics showing declining civic engagement and waning political participation, activity,

and knowledge (e.g., Frantzich, 2005; Putnam, 2000; Skocpol and Fiorina, 1999). For

example:

- American voter turnout rates have dropped about 25 percent since the 1960s,
  and now rank near the bottom among democratic nations.
- Disadvantaged Americans participate less than the well-off, and political
  participation among the young has dropped sharply.

- The proportion of Americans who say that they "trust the federal government to do what is right" has dropped from about three-quarters in the early 1960s to less than one-third in 2000.

- Since 1960, there has been a nearly 10-point increase in the percentage of people who feel that "people like me don't have any say about what government does," with over one-half of all respondents expressing cynicism.

- Over two-thirds of the public do not expect government officials to be responsive to their political opinions and demands.

- Only 38% of respondents to a September 1999 CBS news poll agreed that they feel their views are represented in the laws and bills passed by government.

- Confidence in Congress dropped from over 40 percent in the early 1970s to less than 20 percent in the late 1990s.

- Other political activities, such as writing letters to the editor, participating in rallies and demonstrations, and volunteering in campaigns, fell by about half between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s.

Some scholars assert that deliberative democracy is a remedy for the democratic and citizenship ills of contemporary American society (e.g., Benhabib, 1992, 1996; Dryzek, 1990; Elster, 1998; Fung and Wright, 2003; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996; Habermas, 1989; Michelman, 1988). Advocates assert that deliberative democracy can ensure accountability and quality service delivery and produce improved policy outcomes while simultaneously reversing the trends of declining political participation and the erosion of civil society. The basic argument is that the nature and characteristics of deliberative democracy have both instrumental and intrinsic value. The instrumental value of deliberative democracy enables it to better deal with the problems of modern governance, while its intrinsic value enables it to produce better and more efficacious citizens.

The focus of this study is on the intrinsic value of deliberative democracy – its potential to enhance the skills and dispositions of citizenship. Numerous scholars argue that deliberative processes have an ability to produce "better citizens" by increasing or

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fostering their political sophistication, interest, participation, efficacy, trust, respect, empathy, and sociotropism or public spiritedness (Luskin and Fishkin, 2003; see also Benhabib, 1996; Cohen and Fung, 2004; Cohen and Rogers, 1995; Cooke, 2000; Elster, 1998; Fearon, 1998; Fung, 2003, 2005; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 2004; Macedo, 1999; Manin, 1987). As yet, however, there is a lack of systematic, empirical research confirming these and other potential benefits. This dissertation seeks to fill part of this research gap by focusing on the impacts of participation in a deliberative democracy process on perceptions of political efficacy.

Political efficacy refers to the extent to which people feel they have an impact on, or exert some influence over, public affairs (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, 1954). There are two types of political efficacy: internal efficacy (the belief that one can understand and influence policy and politics) and external efficacy (the belief that the government will respond to one's demands) (Craig, Niemi, and Silver, 1990). Internal and external political efficacy are among the most frequently used measures of general political attitudes and are highly correlated with political participation and mobilization (Conway, 2000; Finkel, 1985). Moreover, internal and external political efficacy are thought to be key indicators of the overall health of democratic systems (Craig, Niemi, and Silver, 1990).

To better understand the relationship between deliberative democracy and political efficacy, this study examines the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting as convened by United Agenda for Children (UAC), a coalition of citizens, civic leaders, corporations, public entities, and community agencies who joined to ensure a positive future for all of the children (from birth to age 21) of Mecklenburg County, North

Carolina (UAC, 2006). The primary research question is: What impact does participation

in the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting have on participants' sense of internal

and external political efficacy? Subsidiary research questions include:

1) Do participants and non-participants differ in terms of political efficacy before participation in the Town Meeting?

2) Do participants have a higher sense of political efficacy after participation in the Town Meeting? If so, what variables affect perceptions of political efficacy?

3) If participants have a higher sense of political efficacy after participation in the Town Meeting, do those effects last over time?

Political efficacy is an important area of research since recent decades have seen

its steady decline among Americans. This is problematic because political efficacy is a

measure of citizenship that broadly signals regime support and legitimacy (Easton, 1965,

1975; Miller 1974). In theory, deliberation should increase perceptions of political

efficacy among participants (e.g., Luskin and Fishkin, 2003). In fact, political efficacy is

the key citizenship characteristic that is to be developed by democratic participation

(Mansbridge, 1995; Pateman, 1970). This potential "efficacy effect" is frequently touted

as a rationale for engaging in deliberative processes and institutionalizing deliberative

democracy in the regular practices of government. However, as discussed in Chapter 3,

little research has been done on the relationship between deliberative democracy and

perceptions of efficacy. This dissertation takes a first step in that direction. Exploring if

and how deliberative participation contributes to perceptions of political efficacy will

help with the development and refinement of both theory and practice.

Although this study examines these effects with regard to a single process, the

America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting, the research takes an important step toward

the development of both theory and practice. As scholars begin to understand the impacts

and outcomes of singular deliberative democracy processes, such as the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting, they can use that information to refine and build theory. In turn, such research efforts can be used to enhance the practice and design of deliberative democracy processes.

This assertion is well illustrated by the substantive meaning of the answers to the subsidiary research questions. For example, the first question explores baseline differences in perceptions of political efficacy among participants and non-participants. Thus, the answer will shed light on the make-up of the engaged (and disengaged) citizenry. This is important in helping scholars to better understand the characteristics of those who are (and are not) civicly engaged. If differences between participants and non-participants exist in terms of political efficacy, then this suggests that the deliberative democracy is less effective than presumed in engaging all segments of the citizenry. Such a result could be used to challenge the legitimacy of deliberative processes – why does government need to use processes that further engage the already efficacious among citizens?

The second question gets to the heart of the dissertation: whether and how participation in a deliberative process increases perceptions of internal and external political efficacy. As noted above, little research has explored the relationship between deliberative democracy and perceptions of political efficacy. Thus, the answers have the potential to make important contributions to both theory and practice. From a theoretical standpoint, it is important to understand the efficacy effect not only in terms of whether deliberation increases perceptions of political efficacy, but also in terms of how it increases those perceptions. In other words, it is important both to look for the efficacy

effect and to determine its contributing variables. In particular, it is important to assess the impact of deliberative features on perceptions of political efficacy.

Additional theoretical importance comes from the third question. As far as I know, this is the first study to assess the long-term impacts of deliberative participation on perceptions of efficacy in a systematic, empirical manner.[1] Just as it is important to know and understand whether deliberation increases political efficacy, it is important to know whether the efficacy effect has longevity. The value of deliberative democracy may be questioned if it produces only short-term gains in political efficacy. Moreover, it is possible that deliberative democracy processes might increase short term perceptions of political efficacy, but result in longer term decreases. This is especially likely if participants have a bad experience in the process.

From a practical perspective, the answers to the questions also inform the design of deliberative democracy processes. The first question tells us if the process is engaging all segments of the citizenry. To the extent that it is not, practitioners must think about the design of deliberative processes in terms of participant selection and recruitment. The second and third questions also inform us about the design choices and functional outcomes of deliberative processes. Specifically, the answers will shed light on how various aspects of deliberation contribute to perceptions of political efficacy, as well as the longevity or persistence of the efficacy effect. These answers may help practitioners and public managers to better design deliberative democracy processes to achieve the desired effects.

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[1] An exception is Luskin and Fishkin (2003). In this unpublished paper, Luskin and Fishkin compare three different Deliberative Polls®; however, they use few indicators of political efficacy, and those indicators vary from poll setting to poll setting. Thus, while the paper makes valuable contributions, it lacks rigorous methodology.

Finally, the overall research design of this study, as well as its specific questions and answers, has methodological importance. The study may help scholars better understand how to measure and think about political efficacy, particularly in a deliberative setting. Likewise, it may help scholars and practitioners better understand how to measure and think about deliberative democracy and its various practices and processes. Finally, the study may help researchers design more sophisticated studies with which to explore the potential intrinsic benefits of deliberative democracy, that is, its potential to impact perceptions of political efficacy and other skills and dispositions of citizenship.

The time is ripe for research that seeks to understand and assess the various impacts and outcomes of deliberative processes, as the deliberative democracy movement is gaining momentum and shows no signs of waning in the near future. The field is rapidly growing, as evidenced by the proliferation of organizations, research institutions, and scholarly books and articles devoted to the subject. For example, the late 1990s and early 2000s saw the creation and development of numerous organizations and institutions that seek to understand and institutionalize various deliberative democracy processes and programs, such as the Deliberative Democracy Consortium, the National Coalition for Dialogue and Deliberation, the Co-Intelligence Institute, the National Issues Forums Institute, Public Agenda, Public Conversations Project, Study Circles Resource Center, Conversation Cafés, and America*Speaks*. Research institutions have emerged at universities and colleges across the country to study the theory and practice of deliberative democracy, such as The Center for Deliberative Democracy at Stanford University, The Democracy Collaborative at the University of Maryland, The Center for

Deliberative Polling at the University of Texas-Austin, and The Deliberative Democracy Project at the University of Oregon. In addition, the National Coalition for Dialogue and Deliberation lists over twenty deliberative democracy education programs at universities and colleges across the country (see: www.thataway.org/resources/explore/colleges.html). The amount of research published on the subject is also impressive, and demonstrable by rather unscientific, but telling search methods. For example, a quick search on www.amazon.com using the term "deliberative democracy" returns almost 400 books published in 2006 or 2007 alone. Moreover, the same search term on www.scholar.google.com returns over 23,000 articles.

The prospective impact of deliberative democracy on public administration increases as interest in deliberative democracy grows and as more groups and organizations seek to implement and institutionalize such processes in the regular practice of governance. There have already been calls for widespread governmental changes to institutionalize deliberation in national politics. For example, Ackerman and Fishkin (2004) propose Deliberation Day, a new national holiday for each presidential election year where citizens throughout the country would deliberate in public spaces about issues that divide the candidates. Similarly, Leib (2004) proposes an institutional design to embed the practice of deliberation in national government by integrating a "popular" branch of government into the existing federal structure.

While these calls are unlikely to be heeded in the near future, it is clearly becoming increasingly important for the field of public administration to understand both the theory and practice(s) of deliberative democracy. From a theoretical standpoint,

current research on deliberative democracy spans the fields of public management, public policy, planning, political science, sociology, communications, and related disciplines. However, public administration is "the logical and natural home" for work as it relates to the research and practice of deliberative democracy since the "field has a broader and deeper understanding of the unique contexts, constraints, ethical obligations, and significance for the functioning of democracy" that is entailed by such work (Bingham and O'Leary, 2006: 166). From a practical perspective, integrating citizens into policy and decision-making processes is a major challenge for governance in the 21st century (see generally, O'Leary, Bingham and Gerard, 2006; see also Collaborative Democracy Network, 2005, 2006). As is evident from the history of citizen participation practices in the United States (and elsewhere), the brunt of responsibility for the creation, development, implementation, and management of such efforts falls squarely on the shoulders of public administrators. Likewise, it is the pejorative 'bureaucracy' and 'bureaucrats' that are generally blamed for perceptions of failure in citizen participation efforts (e.g., Hummel and Stivers, 1998; King, Feltey, and Susel, 1998; King and Stivers, 1998). To the extent that scholars and practitioners want to institutionalize deliberative democracy in the regular practices of government and governance, it behooves public administrators to understand, and care about, deliberative democracy processes and practices.

ROADMAP FOR THE STUDY

Chapter 2 serves as a primer on deliberative democracy and lays the foundation for this study. The chapter begins by defining deliberative democracy and comparing it to

representative democracy. It then discusses the reasons for the resurgent interest in deliberative democracy, asserting that the increased interest is prompted, in large part, by claims about the democratic and citizenship deficits in the United States (and in other Western democracies). The chapter then turns to an examination of the potential benefits and pitfalls of deliberative democracy, specifically discussing how various theorists and scholars believe that deliberative democracy can overcome (or contribute to) these deficits in American governance. Finally, the chapter briefly reviews the characteristics of deliberative democracy processes and provides some examples.

Chapter 3 takes a theoretical approach to the study of deliberative democracy. This chapter begins with a general explanation of the claims about the educative effects of participation and how deliberative democracy is theorized to affect the skills and dispositions of citizenship. The chapter then provides a discussion specifically about the theoretical effects of participatory and deliberative democracy on political efficacy. Next, the chapter turns to an examination of the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting and discusses why the design of this deliberative process is expected to benefit citizens generally, and improve perceptions of political efficacy specifically. The chapter concludes with a review of empirical research on political efficacy and participation in a variety of settings.

Chapter 4 provides an overview of the research approach and methodology used in the study. It begins by outlining the specific research questions and discussing the expected findings in general terms. From there, it articulates the specific hypotheses tested in the study. It also discusses the research design, subjects and procedures for data collection, survey instruments, and variable construction. The study uses a quasi-

experimental, longitudinal research design and data from surveys collected at three times from two non-equivalent comparison groups. One group of subjects consists of "participants" in the 21st Century Town Meeting held in Charlotte, North Carolina. Participants were surveyed at three points in time: before the Town Meeting (Time 1), immediately after the Town Meeting (Time 2), and approximately 24 months after the Town Meeting (Time 3). The second group consists of "non-participants", or citizens of the greater Charlotte area who did not register or attend the Town Meeting. Non-participants were surveyed at two points in time: before the Town Meeting (Time 1) and approximately 24 months after the Town Meeting (Time 3). The chapter concludes with a review of the various analytic methods used to address the specific research questions, including various regression models, Heckman treatment effect models, and propensity score matching.

Chapter 5 presents the results of the study. Its organization follows the order of the subsidiary research questions, and is thus divided into three parts. The first set of results explores differences in political efficacy between participants and non-participants. The second set of results explores differences between participants before and immediately after the 21st Century Town Meeting. Specifically, these results compare the before and immediately after groups of participants on demographic characteristics and perceptions of internal and external political efficacy. In addition, this set of results examines the variables that impact perceptions of political efficacy, such as demographic characteristics, perceptions about the quality of deliberation, and perceptions about the potential impact of the Town Meeting. The final set of results assesses the persistence of perceptions of political efficacy. To determine the persistence of the efficacy effect,

several comparisons are made. First, participants at Time 3 (24 months after the Town Meeting) are compared to participants at Time 2 (immediately after the Town Meeting) and Time 1 (before the Town Meeting). Second, participants at Time 3 are compared to non-participants at Time 3. Finally, non-participants at Time 1 are compared to non-participants at Time 3.

The study has several major findings. First, before the Town Meeting, participants have significantly lower perceptions of both internal and external political efficacy than non-participants. Second, after the Town Meeting, participants experience an increase in both internal and external political efficacy; however, only the increase in external political efficacy is statistically significant. Moreover, the quality of deliberation has no impact on either internal or external political efficacy. The perceived potential impact of the Town Meeting is positively correlated with internal, but not external, political efficacy.

Third, the results indicate that there are no significant changes in internal or external political efficacy among participants at Time 2 and Time 3. These results suggest that the efficacy effect persists over time. Moreover, there are no statistically significant changes in internal political efficacy among participants at Time 1 and Time 3, although the difference in external political efficacy in these time periods is statistically significant. Finally, the strength of the efficacy effect, at least with regard to external political efficacy, is evidenced by other results. There are no significant changes in non-participants' perceptions of internal or external political efficacy between Time 1 and Time 3. Moreover, unlike before the Town Meeting, there are no statistically significant differences in internal political efficacy between participants and non-participants at

Time 3; however, there are significant differences in external political efficacy between participants and non-participants 24 months after the Town Meeting. In addition, the efficacy gap is larger 24 months after the Town Meeting than it was before the Town Meeting. Because the comparison group experienced no changes in political efficacy over time, the strength of the findings regarding the effects of participation in the 21st Century Town Meeting on perceptions of external political efficacy increases.

Chapter 6 examines these and other findings in detail, and discusses their implications for the theory and practice of deliberative democracy. In addition, the final chapter discusses limitations to this research study, and makes several suggestions for future research.

CHAPTER TWO

DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: A PRIMER

The "moral imperative" of democracy requires that "each individual should have the right to participate in making decisions that significantly and directly affect his life. In the absence of this right and its effective exercise, the political system cannot be considered democratic: without them, the system cannot respond to the real interests of the people" (Bachrach, 1975: 44).

INTRODUCTION

This chapter serves as a primer on deliberative democracy, and as such, lays the foundation for the study. The chapter begins by defining deliberative democracy and comparing it to representative democracy. It then discusses reasons for the resurgent interest in deliberative democracy. Specifically, increased interest in deliberative democracy has been prompted, in large part, by claims about a democratic deficit and a citizenship deficit in the United States (and in other Western democracies). Many theorists and scholars believe that the instrumental and intrinsic value of deliberative democracy provide a potential remedy for these ills. The roots of, and evidence for, both of these deficits is discussed in the second section of the chapter, as are various criticisms of the deficit theses. The chapter then turns to an examination of the potential benefits and pitfalls of deliberative democracy, specifically discussing how various theorists and scholars believe that deliberative democracy can overcome (or contribute to) these deficits in American governance. Finally, the chapter briefly reviews the characteristics of deliberative democracy processes and provides some examples.

DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

Broadly defined, deliberative democracy refers to infusing legitimate government

decision making with reasoned discussion and the collective judgment of citizens; it

connects participation in public decision making to the practice of deliberation (Cohen

and Fung, 2004). Although definitions of deliberative democracy differ widely depending

on the perspective of various scholars, there is some agreement on its core elements

(Elster, 1998; Gutmann and Thompson, 2004). For example, Elster (1998: 8) asserts:

> The notion includes collective decision making with the participation of
> all who will be affected by the decision or their representatives: this is the
> democratic part. Also … it includes decision making by means of
> arguments offered *by* and *to* participants who are committed to the values
> of rationality and impartiality: this is the deliberative part.

Likewise, Gutmann and Thompson (2004: 3-7) assert that in its modern conception,

deliberative democracy has four characteristics: (1) it requires reason-giving; 2) it must

take place in public and be accessible to all citizens affected by decisions; 3) it seeks to

produce a decision that is binding for some period of time; and 4) it is dynamic and keeps

open the option for continuing dialogue. Combining these four characteristics, they

define deliberative democracy as

> A form of government in which free and equal citizens (and their
> representatives), justify decisions in a process in which they give one
> another reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible, with
> the aim of reaching conclusions that are binding in the present on all
> citizens but open to challenge in the future (Gutmann and Thompson,
> 2004: 3-7).

In contemporary political theory, deliberative democracy stands in contrast to

aggregative democracy. While both models of political theory share assumptions about

the structuring of democratic institutions, they focus on different decision making

processes (Young, 2000). The aggregative model, which forms the basis of representative

government, relies on the aggregation of individual preferences to arrive at public policy decisions, and uses voting and bargaining to determine how those individual preferences are cumulated (Mansbridge, 1980; Young, 2000). Because voting and bargaining encourage strategic behavior based on individualist and economic incentives (Barber, 1984; Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Riker, 1962, 1982) the aggregative model is also an adversarial model of democracy (Mansbridge, 1980; Miller, 2000). In this adversarial model, public policy (and other governmental) decisions are seen as a zero-sum game where majority rules (for a discussion, see Radcliff and Wingenbach, 2000).

In contrast, deliberative democracy moves away from competitive pluralism by encouraging the distinctive rationality of "the forum" as opposed to the rationality of "the market" (Bohman, 1998). Deliberative democracy

> begins by turning away from liberal individualist or economic understandings of democracy and toward a view anchored in concepts of accountability and discussion …[It] focuses on the communicative processes of opinion and will-formation that precede voting. Accountability replaces consent as the conceptual core of legitimacy. A legitimate political order is one that could be *justified* to all those living under its laws. Thus, accountability is primarily understood in terms of "giving an account" of something, that is, publicly articulating, explaining, and most importantly justifying public policy (Chambers, 2003: 308).

Whereas representative democracy assumes that the preferences of citizens are fixed, and focuses on the aggregation of citizens' preferences through regular elections, deliberative democracy stresses the "public use of reason" during the public decision making process and the possibility of self-transformation through such public discussion activities (Cunningham, 2002).

In other words, deliberative democracy emphasizes public reasoning and well-informed participation. Deliberative democrats argue that "political choice, to be legitimate, must

be the outcome of *deliberation among free, equal, and rational agents*" (Elster, 1998: 5, emphasis in original). Thus, the emphasis of deliberative democracy on "talk-centric" as opposed to "voting centric" approaches to political decision making helps to give public policy more legitimacy than under purely aggregative models (Chambers, 2003: 308).

Deliberative theorists point to additional differences between the aggregative and deliberative models of democracy, particularly when viewed within the context of public policy. For example, theorists assert that deliberative democracy is (or can be) more effective than aggregative democracy in responding to citizen voices and incorporating citizen preferences into the policy process. This is largely a function of differences in participation and access in the two approaches. Deliberative processes provide for participation and access by numerous individuals and groups. If structured properly, then the issues that hinder participation and access in traditional policy making are, or in theory can be, overcome. This means that government interests, public interests, and private interests all have a clear entitlement to a place at the table. Another difference involves voice, deliberation, and engagement -- these qualities are largely absent from aggregative processes. Just as all interests can come to the table, they also have an equal opportunity to engage in dialogue, voice opinions and concerns, and participate in the creation and development of outcomes. As compared to traditional approaches then, deliberative approaches have a different focus on the nature of both the participants and their participation, as well as and how much voice they have and the quality of that voice.

Finally, deliberative democracy processes build on the theory of principled negotiation (Fisher and Ury, 1981), which means that deliberation deemphasizes the aggregation of pre-established preferences (Button and Ryfe, 2005), and instead focuses

on the interests that underlie and form people's preferences and positions (Innes and

Booher, 2003). Unlike traditional aggregative processes, deliberative democracy is based

on cooperation and coordination among diverse and often rival interests. Advocates

believe that deliberative approaches "may ameliorate some of the defects associated with

mass democracy: citizens can pool information and ideas, bring local knowledge to the

table, establish greater levels of equality and political opportunity, and the like" (Leib,

2004: 3). Thus, deliberative democracy, at least in theory, has many attractive elements

that distinguish it from aggregative democracy:

> it fosters cooperation and mutual understanding rather than winning and
> losing (as adversarial democracy seems to); it purports to give all citizens
> a "voice" rather than just the most powerful or the most numerous (as
> tends to occur in majoritarian democracy); and it encourages citizens to
> make decisions based on "public reasons" that can be supported through
> deliberation rather than on individual prejudices that thrive in the privacy
> of the voting booth (Levinson, 2002).

In short, deliberative democracy promotes processes by which politics

ensues through an open and civil discussion of the issue(s) at stake with the aim

of arriving at an agreed judgment. Indeed, the very notion of deliberative

democracy "begins with the view that collective decision-making is to proceed

deliberatively – by citizens advancing proposals and defending them with

considerations that others, who are themselves free and equal, can acknowledge

as reasons" (Cohen and Sabel, 1997: 327). It is important to note, however that

"[a]lthough theorists of deliberative democracy vary as to how critical they are of

existing representative institutions, deliberative democracy is not usually thought

of as an alternative to representative democracy. It is rather an expansion of

representative democracy" (Chambers, 2003: 308). In sum, deliberative

democracy stands in contrast to traditional aggregative and representative processes, where the counting of votes is the method for articulating, combining, and aggregating preferences and selecting outcomes. The "ambitious aim of a deliberative democracy … is to shift from bargaining, interest aggregation, and power to the common reason of equal citizens as a dominant force in democratic life" (Cohen and Fung, 2004: 24).

Advocates provide two broad rationales for deliberative democracy. First, deliberative democracy is argued to have instrumental value; it has the potential to deal more effectively with the problems of modern governance. Second, deliberative democracy has intrinsic value; it can foster the development of better and more efficacious citizens. In theory, deliberative democracy constitutes a just and reasonable approach to collective decision making that can enhance the quality, legitimacy, and fairness of public decisions, while simultaneously educating citizens, allowing them to gain a better understanding of competing interests, fostering moral development, and orienting them toward the collective good (Bingham, Nabatchi, and O'Leary, 2005). These rationales, discussed in more detail below, have provided fertile soil in which the theory and practice of deliberative democracy have taken root.

THE RESURGENCE OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

The concept of deliberative democracy has seen a resurgence in popularity in America (and across the world) in the past few decades. Its recent revival is prompted largely by claims that the conditions of modern reality are challenging the health of

democracy and exacerbating the need to reinvigorate the political and policy making

systems with greater citizen participation (Elster, 1998; Gastil and Keith, 2005; Gutmann

and Thompson, 2004; Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003). In particular, some scholars assert that

we are facing both a democratic deficit in our institutions of government and a citizenship

deficit among the general public. A democratic deficit refers to a situation where

democratic organizations, institutions, and governments are seen as falling short of

fulfilling the principles of democracy in their practices or operation (Chomsky, 2006;

Durant, 1995). A citizenship deficit refers broadly to the erosion of civil society and civic

engagement (Macedo, et al., 2005; Stolle and Hooghe, 2004). As discussed below,

advocates assert that deliberative democracy has the potential to remedy these deficits.

More specifically, the instrumental value of deliberative democracy provides it with the

potential to alleviate the democratic deficit, while its intrinsic value provides it with the

potential to alleviate the citizenship deficit.

Not all scholars, however, support the claims about the democratic and citizenship

deficits (e.g., Manza and Cook, 2002; Stimson, 1998, 2005; Stolle and Hooghe, 2004;

Wittman, 1997). The critics make compelling arguments against the wide-spread

existence of the democratic and citizenship deficits and challenge the assertion that

deliberative democracy is a "cure-all" for any problems of governance or civil society

that might exist. In general, these scholars are not proponents of participatory and

deliberative democracy, and believe that such processes have the potential to produce or

exacerbate problems with government (e.g., Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002;

Huntington, 1975; Sunstein, 2003).

The following sections of the chapter explore these various arguments. First, the roots of the democratic and citizenship deficits are explored from the perspective of deliberative democrats and other scholars of democratic and political theory. Second, the democratic deficit and the citizenship deficit are discussed in detail. Various arguments for, and evidence of, the existence of each deficit are reviewed. Finally, this section of the chapter examines various criticisms of the deficit theses.

The Roots of the Democratic and Citizenship Deficits

Among scholars, some view the democratic and citizenship deficits as products of long-standing patterns in American public administration, while others assert that the deficits are a function of relatively recent changes in the structures and patterns of government and governance. Each of these perspectives is discussed below. Despite debate about the source of the deficits, most of these scholars would agree that new modes of deliberative participation, particularly with respect to policy making processes, are needed to alleviate the deficits. Specifically, advocates of deliberative democracy assert that the traditional mechanisms of political representation and aggregation are increasingly ill-suited to handling the policy problems of the modern world and ineffective in engendering the central ideals of democracy and democratic politics – fostering reasoned debate among an active and informed citizenry, increasing public dialogue to achieve consensus and allow for the justification of governmental actions, promoting individual liberty while maintaining accountability for collective decisions, and advancing egalitarian social justice and political equality (see generally, O'Leary, Bingham, and Gerard, 2006).

One perspective on the democratic and citizenship deficits begins with the assumption that they are the result of long-standing patterns in administrative structures and traditions. This perspective focuses on issues of public administration and management. A good starting point with which to explore this argument is an examination of two dominant frameworks in American public administration: bureaucratic ethos and democratic ethos (Pugh, 1991: 10-17). These frameworks differ in their content values, origins, and methodology (the systematic process by which the framework ensures its continuity and consistency). Specifically, "bureaucratic ethos is teleological, employs instrumental rationality, and is predicated on the values of capitalism and a market society. Democratic ethos in contrast, is deontological, is based on substantive rationality, and emanates from classical values of the state and higher law" (Pugh, 1991: 26).

Among the content values of bureaucratic ethos are efficiency, efficacy, expertise, loyalty, and accountability. These positivist behavioral norms are evident in both the theory and practice of public administration (Hejka-Ekins, 1988; Pugh, 1991). Bureaucratic ethos finds its roots in several intellectual traditions, including the Weberian model of bureaucracy, with its application of rational principles (Weber, 1946); the Wilsonian concept of the politics administration dichotomy (Wilson, 1887); Taylor's (1967) theory of scientific management, and the scholarly study of comparative administration and the application of rationalism to public administration (Goodnow, 1900, 1903; Willoughby, 1937). Among the numerous social origins of bureaucratic ethos are the social Christianity movement, the progressive political movement, the scientific management movement, and the social science movement. Bureaucratic ethos

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has also been widely embraced by the professional associations and educational institutions of public administration. The methodology of bureaucratic ethos is to assess content values against established rational goals and objectives using instrumentalism and utilitarianism as the criteria for action.

Democratic ethos has a very different set content values, including regime values, citizenship, public interest, and social equity, among others (Pugh, 1991). These content values place the framework clearly within the realm of political theory, and therefore, also lead to its intellectual origins. Regime values are "the values of the American people" as manifest in the U.S. Constitution (Rohr, 1976: 399). The notions of citizenship, the ideal of a citizenry that is informed about government and active in its operation (Pugh, 1991: 15) and the public interest, or "what men would choose if they saw clearly, thought rationally, and acted disinterestedly and benevolently" (Lippman, 1955: 42), are also entrenched in democratic ethos. Finally, the concept of social equity, particularly as embraced by Dwight Waldo (1948), John Rawls (1971), and H. George Fredrickson (1971, 1974, 1990), is important to democratic ethos. The social origins of democratic ethos can be traced to American political institutions, especially the courts, the rural populism and progressivism political movements, the urban reform movement, and the American civil rights movement. The framework also has strong professional roots in governmental research bureaus, educational institutions, and professional associations. Finally, the methodology of democratic ethos is deductive, dialectical, deontological, and grounded in history and political philosophy.

Pugh (1991) asserts that the original political theory of American public administration embraced bureaucratic ethos, and that bureaucratic ethos continues to

dominate the field today in both theory and practice. Thus, he argues that although public administration claims to have rejected the politics-administration dichotomy replacing the emphasis on the word *administration* with an emphasis on the word *public,* the operational values of the field have remained bureaucratic (Pugh, 1991: 26). For example, although many scholars address normative questions in public administration (e.g., deLeon, 1992; Frederickson, 1991, 1996; Gawthrop, 1984, 1988; Hummel and Stivers, 1998; King and Stivers, 1998; Rohr, 1986; Ventriss, 1987; Wamsley, et al., 1990; Wamsley and Wolf, 1996), modern public administration has increasingly embraced and manifest the positivist and empirical values of efficiency and effectiveness (e.g., Behn, 1995; Callahan and Holzer, 1994; Epstein et al., 2000; Kettl, 1998; Lynn, 1994; Osbourne and Gaebler, 1992; Poister and Streib, 1999; Teasley, 1999). The implications of this, Pugh (1991: 27) asserts, are far-reaching: "as long as the field's assumptions are shaped by bureaucratic ethos the politics we speak of will not be democratic."

This last statement has significant implications for public administration. To the extent that public administration focuses on bureaucratic issues of managerialism, organization theory, and public agencies, it fails to adequately confront and understand the issues of public administration in a democracy (Kirlin, 1996; Ramos, 1981; Ventriss, 1987, 1998; Wamsley, et al., 1990).

> One of the fundamental flaws in making public bureaucracy the starting point of public administration is that it easily supports the substitution of organizational concerns and measures of performance for those of a democratic polity, including the rule of law. Organizations may focus on effectiveness, efficiency, or economy. They may also focus on the impacts of organizations on their members or consumer satisfaction. But the ultimate value underpinning organization theory is organizational survival; any other values or constraints must be posed from an external framework, intellectual, political, or legal.

Democratic polities must focus on: the sustained capacity of the political system itself to make and act on collective choices, opportunities for effective citizenship and political leadership, ensuring a limited government, nurturing the civic infrastructure necessary for collective action without public authority, providing the institutional structures necessary for operations of the economy, and protecting individual freedoms and rights. These are very different issues than those seen at the organizational level (Kirlin, 1996: 418).

An excellent articulation of this viewpoint is found in *The New Science of Organizations: A Reconceptualization of the Wealth of Nations,* by Alberto Guerreiro Ramos (1981). In this book, Ramos (1981: 81) contends that that American public administration (indeed all of contemporary social science) suffers from cognitive politics:

Today the market tends to become the shaping force of society at large, and the peculiar type of organization which meets its requirements has assumed the character of a paradigm for organizing human existence at large. In such circumstances the market patterns of thinking and language tend to become equivalent to patterns of thinking and language at large. This is the environment of cognitive politics. Established organizational scholarship is uncritical or unaware of these circumstances, and thus is itself a manifestation of the success of cognitive politics.

Others scholars seem to agree, at least in part, with this contention. For example, some assert that public administration "has been rolled … by classical liberal economic thought" such that rational voluntary action and exchange have become its guiding principles (Golembiewski, 1996: 139). Likewise, Fredrickson (1996) suggests that "the lingua franca of institutions…revenue, offices, supervisors, performance, outcomes" have become an assumed part of modern life and have eroded the norms and values of community, civil discourse, consensus, trust, and responsiveness. The result is that instrumental reason has replaced the search for democratic knowledge rooted in participation and the discourse of shared experiences (Hummel and Stivers, 1998: 29).

In short, Ramos (1981) asserts that the environment of American public administration is "predicated upon an instrumental rationality that is characteristic (and reflective) of the prevailing market system in society" -- this is problematic because the market is "deeply (and inherently) antipublic" (Ventriss and Candler, 2005: 353). Although the managerial values of efficiency, hierarchy, and competence are important in public administration, "they are not sufficient (and never can be) to sustain any substantive credibility or purpose to the role of public administration in shaping societal affairs" (Ventriss, 1998: 235). As long as the focus of public administration is on bureaucratic ethos, the argument goes, there will always be a democratic and a citizenship deficit.

The second perspective asserts that the democratic and citizenship deficits are the product of relatively recent changes in government structures and governance patterns. While related to the above arguments, this perspective focuses more on issues involving public policy than on issues involving public administration and management. The argument begins with the assertion that pressures on the traditional boundaries of public administration have fundamentally changed the nature and structure of governance in the past several decades. As Kettl (2007: 17) notes, "we are now confronting a basic, serious, and troubling problem. The boundaries that served us so well in the past can no long [sic] solve either our administrative or political needs." Since the 1960s, there have been more and more frequent challenges to 1) federalist boundaries, 2) sectoral boundaries, and 3) organizational boundaries.

The nature of the American system, by virtue of its federalist construction, has required and will always require federal-state-local cooperation and collaboration. Early

in the nation's history, the U.S. had a system of dual federalism, often referred to as layer

cake federalism, wherein the federal and state governments each sought to carve out

relatively autonomous spheres of influence and power. However, conceptions of

American federalism and intergovernmental relations began to change in the 1960s as

federal policy responsibilities were devolved to subnational governments for

implementation (see for example, Hall and O'Toole, 2000, 2004; Pressman and

Wildavsky, 1973). A new metaphor, marble cake federalism, emerged to describe this

new situation where "federal-state-local collaboration [became] the characteristic mode

of action" and most "governmental activity… involve[d] the influence, if not the formal

administration, of all three planes of the federal system" (Grodzins, 1960: 266-67). More

recently, the metaphor of picket fence federalism has been used to describe the situation

where all three levels of government are heavily involved in almost all substantive areas

of public policy. Under these conditions, notions about the traditional roles and

responsibilities of the various levels of government were challenged.

The devolution of policy responsibility to subnational governments also

challenged the boundaries among the public, private, and non-profit sectors. As states and

localities gained increased responsibility for policy implementation, including allocation

decisions, service delivery, monitoring and enforcement, and other core administrative

tasks, they too farmed out policy responsibilities to non-governmental organizations.

Until recently, the "nonprofit sector has been viewed as standing apart from government,

as a mediating institution that has helped forge a 'civil society' apart from government or

the private market" (Milward, 1996: 36). Today, the role of the nonprofit sector in the

policy process cannot be doubted. Furthermore, through privatization, government

responsibilities have been extended to private companies that exist outside of the traditionally defined public sector. American public administration, at the local, state, and federal levels, now functions within intergovernmental and intersectoral networks that face specific resource constraints; this situation is fundamentally changing the historic nature of public policy and administration (e.g., Kettl, 1988, 1996, 1998, 2007; Luke, 1991; McGuire, 2007; Salamon 2002). Indeed, it is now "virtually impossible to identify any public program that a single government agency can manage on its own without relying on some partnership with other public agencies or private or non-profit organizations" (Kettl, 1996: 9).

Finally, these changes have resulted in greater demands for accountability and better coordination among government agencies and other organizations engaged in the policy process. These expectations have forced public administrators to reexamine and refashion their organizational structures, processes, programs, policies, and goals. The results of this are challenges to organizational boundaries. "Just as the hierarchical organization emerged during the agricultural age and bureaucracy was the dominant form of organization during the industrial age, the nascent information age has given rise to permeable structures in which people can link across organizational functions and boundaries" (McGuire, 2007: 34).

In short, as the requirements of public administration have become more complex, government has also come to rely more heavily on intergovernmental, nonprofit, and for-profit partners to deliver public services. Thus, the United States has moved from the age of bureaucratic government to the age of network governance (Boyte, 2005; Castells, 1996, 1997; 1998; Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003; Innes and Booher, 2003; Peters and Pierre,

1998; Sørensen, 2002) and collaborative governance (O'Leary, Bingham, and Gerard, 2006). This shift to network and collaborative governance has implications for the development of a "multi-layered system of shared sovereignty" (Sørensen, 2002: 696), as well as for issues concerning representation and citizen participation in policy making (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003). In this environment, it is not surprising that issues of democracy and the role of citizens are taking on renewed importance in American government and governance (Elster, 1998; Gastil and Keith, 2005; Gutmann and Thompson, 2004; Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003). These scholars assert that under these new conditions, we are witnessing the development of both a democratic deficit among institutions of government and a citizenship deficit among the general public (see for example, Benhabib, 1996; Cohen, 1989; Cooke, 2000; Durant, 1995; Elster, 1998; Fung, 2003, 2005; Gastil and Levine, 2005; Gutmann and Thompson, 2004; Leib, 2004).

In sum, there are two perspectives about the roots of the democratic and citizenship deficits in the United States. One perspective assumes that long-standing administrative structures and traditions have shaped the deficits. The other perspective assumes that changing structures of government and shifting patterns of governance have produced the deficits. These perspectives are not necessarily incompatible; in many ways, they are quite complementary. Both agree that important public policy decisions are increasingly being made in locations that are further removed from the democratic vote of the populace. Furthermore, they agree that processes are at work that make public opinion reactionary and incomplete, thereby reducing options for the formulation of smart policy. Thus, regardless of the source, both perspectives agree on the outcome: America now faces both a democratic deficit and a citizenship deficit and these deficits

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are problematic for the stability of American government and governance and the political health of American citizens. To overcome these deficiencies, new modes of direct and deliberative participation in government decision making are needed. The concepts of the democratic deficit and the citizenship deficit are explored in detail below.

The Democratic Deficit

Although the term "democratic deficit" is generally used with regard to the political order of European Union (e.g., Mitchell, 2005; Moravscik, 2004), it has come to find applications within the United States (e.g., Aman, 2004; Chomsky, 2006; Durant, 1995). A democratic deficit refers to a situation where democratic organizations, institutions, and governments are seen as falling short of fulfilling the principles of democracy in their practices or operation. It also refers to a substantial gap between public policy and public opinion (Chomsky, 2006). Some scholars have applied the idea of a democratic deficit to campaign contributions and the role of money in the American electoral process (for a discussion, see Levinson, 2006), others to the counting the votes in elections, and still others to the partisan gerrymandering of legislative districts (Aleinikoff and Issacharoff, 1993). Researchers have also looked for a democratic deficit with regard to how well citizens see their opinions and preferences reflected in political decisions and policy outcomes (e.g., Chomsky, 2006; for an extensive review of the empirical literature on this subject, see Manza and Cook, 2002).

For theorists of deliberative democracy, the democratic deficit is far more profound than is illustrated in these examples. For them, the democratic deficit in the U.S. is inherent in the very nature of modern American governance processes, and

particularly public policy processes (e.g., deLeon, 1992; Durant, 1995; Gutmann and

Thompson, 1996, 2004; Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003; Innes and Booher, 2003; Leib,

2004). For example, Leib (2004: 4) asserts, "Our democracy suffers a *legitimacy deficit*:

citizens are so remote from decision-making that the decisions rendered in their name

cannot be fairly imputed to them and their authorship." To understand this assertion, it is

useful to look briefly at history and the founding of the American government.

To the framers, the long-term stability of the political system was a primary

concern (Rimmerman, 1993). Throughout the constitutional debates, there was

widespread agreement about the dangers and failures of democracy as a political system.

For example, in the Federalist No. 10 (1787), James Madison said: "...democracies have

ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible

with personal security, or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their

lives as they have been violent in their deaths." John Adams, in an 1814 letter to John

Taylor, wrote: "Remember, democracy never lasts long. It soon wastes, exhausts and

murders itself. There never was a democracy yet that did not commit suicide" (Adams,

1851: 484). Alexander Hamilton is perhaps among the best articulators of this issue. For

example, at a 1788 ratifying convention in Poughkeepsie, New York, he said,

> It has been observed that a pure democracy, if it were practicable, would
> be the most perfect government. Experience has proved that no position is
> more false than this. The ancient democracies, in which the people
> themselves deliberated, never possessed one feature of good government.
> Their very character was tyranny: their figure deformity (Harding, 1909:
> 116).

Such arguments are summed up well by Elbridge Gerry, who noted that democracy is

"the worst of all political evils" (Farrand, 1911: vol. 2, 647). In contrast, the virtues of

republicanism were articulated widely among the framers. For example, Thomas

Jefferson, in a 1790 letter to William Hunter, stated: "The republican is the only form of government which is not eternally at open or secret war with the rights of mankind" (Foley, 190: 390).

The framers of the new American government felt a strong need "to guard against what were thought to be the weaknesses of popular democracy" (Mathews, 1994: 51). Recognizing the potential for popular participation to destabilize the new nation, the framers instilled within the Constitution "institutional impediments to direct citizen participation in government" to protect the nation from "some surge of momentary popular passion" (Moe and Gilmour, 1995: 136). They adopted a system of majority rule, with shared powers and checks and balances among separate institutions, created federalism, and allowed for only limited participation by the citizenry in periodic elections. The result was the intentional structuring of the "American system to favor delay over rapid change, to diffuse power rather than concentrate it, to distrust executive action rather than strengthen it" (Kettl, 1998: 57). The representative political system in the United States was designed to limit participation in order to protect political and administrative processes from an over-active citizenry. Morone (1990) asserts that this formulation has produced dichotomous desires among the American people. On the one hand, Americans dread expansive governmental involvement in the private realm. On the other hand, they yearn for government to do something about social problems. Since the founding of the nation, this tension has forced an expansion of governmental checks and balances such that the dreads are quelled, but the yearnings remain unsatisfied. The result is a perpetual "democratic wish" among citizens (Morone, 1990).

In short, although the United States is often noted as the first liberal democracy, the Constitution, adopted in 1788, provided for a republican form of government maintained by the state and based on popular representation. To the framers, representatives were to play two key roles: 1) to "represent sectional and other interests in the national decisionmaking process by mediating competing claims" and 2) to "mediate and moderate the passions of the mob" (Rimmerman, 2001). However, modern theorists suggest that our representatives no longer represent us adequately (e.g., Hummel and Stivers, 1998), often because citizens do not interact directly with representatives, but rather through interest groups (e.g., Fredrickson, 1996). Although it is argued that citizens hold some power over the policy making process because elected officials must vie for their favor,

> That a candidate is elected does not necessarily mean that most citizens prefer all or even most of that official's policies. Whether interests groups close the gap between citizens and government depends on whether such groups speak for their own members rather than their bureaucrats, whether those who need representation get it, and whether the balance of power among all these contenders improves or worsens defects in the entire system (Wildavsky, 1979: 252).

Thus, we have a representative government where our representatives may no longer represent us; instead, representation reveals an "alienated mode of public life" (Hummel and Stivers, 1998: 32). Leib (2004: 2-3) summarizes these problems well, and is worth quoting at length:

> Generally, voters select among candidates with a bundle of policy commitments that cannot be disentangled; federal lawmaking in accordance with Article I, section 7, of the United States Constitution leaves most bills losing steam prior to passage; the committee system is vulnerable to manipulation; divided government often renders legislatures impotent; and the policies that are enacted are often selected by lawmakers for less than kosher reasons (pork-barreling, rent-seeking, log-rolling, etc.). When voters take matters into their own hands through initiative or

referendum, they act out of ignorance or self-interest (rational or not), under the influence of mass media campaigns that are often aimed to misinform; and poor turnouts cast a further shadow of suspicion over electoral results (especially when the poor and minorities are underrepresented and undercounted). Unfortunately, many democratic theorists are willing to accept these losses because they imagine that our democracy is pretty good anyway; indeed, even voters who suffer the failures of democracy accept this trade-off, simply because to them it isn't worth the effort to become more involved or informed. Or perhaps because they do not believe they could do any good. Yet it remains unclear how we can all stay sanguine about our version of democracy when its built-in limitations are so manifold and obvious.

Echoing the argument of Leib (2004), one articulation of the democratic deficit finds "four interrelated and mutually reinforcing trends" each of which "distorts policy discourse" and undermines the stability of democracy (Durant, 1995: 26). First, a "policy-challenged, vocal, and increasingly impatient citizenry" has emerged with a growing desire for more popular participation and direct participation in the affairs of government (Durant, 1995: 27; see also Morone, 1990). Citizens are demanding more opportunities for participation because they believe that government is not addressing their concerns in ways that adequately reflect legitimacy and accountability. Some scholars argue that this failure of government is a sign that America has fallen into "anomic democracy," a situation in which the fundamental principles of democracy have been broken down by government that is incompetent, unresponsive, out of control, and above the law (Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki, 1975).

This is exacerbated by a second trend, which concerns the media and the tactics of news reporting. Specifically, some assert that media reporting tactics have shifted the frequency, substance, and tenor of content on government and governance (Durant, 1995; see also, Johnson and Tversky, 1983; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Stories tend to be more negative and emotionally charged, and issues are covered in such a way as to block

and distort cognitive processes (Durant, 1995; see also Crossen, 1994; Jamieson, 1992). "In the process, factoids get confused with facts, "affect" (or emotion) drives out "intellect" in evaluating news, and a confused public paradoxically presses further demands for redress upon a federal government it perceives as ineffectual" (Durant, 1995: 28). The result is that citizens tend to overestimate (or underestimate) the severity of problems and issues and place more and conflicting demands on government.

The third trend involves how "risk-averse, resource-dependent, and media-conscious politicians" view and respond to these citizens concerns (Durant, 1995: 29). Elected officials prefer to communicate in soundbites and pass off responsibilities to the bureaucracy because they see "scant rewards in a trusteeship model of public service geared toward leavening public understanding, policy discourse, and civic debate" (Durant, 1995: 29).

> Thus, it's not the complexity of public problems, the insatiable demands of citizens for government succor or protection, or principled disagreements over policy ends and means that plague our nation. Rather, it's a lack of common sense, a surfeit of fuzzy-headed thinkers and greedy special interests, and a paucity of integrity and courage in our leaders (Durant, 1995: 27).

The final trend reflects the content values of bureaucratic ethos. Specifically, it concerns a plebiscitary agenda, predicated on control and "the administrative orthodoxy of hierarchy, rules and regulations, and departmentalization by function" (Durant, 1995: 29) that produces "a fragmented and parochial organization…wherein overly regulated sub-units are pitted against each other in a zero-sum conflict over resources, jurisdiction, and influence" (30). To many, government has become "a specialized enterprise increasingly devoted to the exercise of technical rules and procedures, whether or not these take care of real-life problems" (Hummel and Stivers, 1998: 29). The result of these

four trends is a democratic deficit in the processes of public policy, and a "policy implementation structure that is too hollow in capacity to nurture either policy goals, public approbation, or a truly deliberative democracy" (Durant, 1995: 30). As will be seen later in this chapter, not all scholars agree that a democratic deficit exists in the United States. In fact, some assert that many of the problems in the United States are the result of an excess of democracy (e.g., Huntington, 1975). Before reviewing these arguments, however, it is useful to first explore the citizenship deficit.

The Citizenship Deficit

Related to the democratic deficit, is what I am calling a "citizenship deficit." This term has been used to describe the citizenship status of children and youth (e.g., Bhabha, 2003; Roche, 1999), women (Conrad, 2003), and minorities and indigenous peoples (May, 1998); however, I have not found the term used to describe the phenomenon discussed here. My concept of the term citizenship deficit refers broadly to the erosion of civil society and civic engagement, and more specifically to an erosion of the skills and dispositions of citizenship among the general public (e.g., Macedo et. al, 2005; Stolle and Hooghe, 2004). The citizenship deficit is of particular importance in this study, as the research focus is on the intrinsic value of deliberative democracy, that it, its ability to produce better and more efficacious citizens.

Some scholars locate the problem of the citizenship deficit in "the radical notion of individualism embraced by the framers" and its consequent effects on political socialization (Rimmerman, 2001: 16). Political socialization is the informal learning process by which individuals gain knowledge about political figures, processes, and

systems, and thus form their political beliefs and attitudes (Almond and Verba, 1963).

According to Rimmerman (2001: 16), political socialization in the U.S. is guided by the

notion of individualism: "the United States was born a political economy, stressing the

right of individuals to pursue private property and their individualistic impulses in the

private economic sphere." He asserts that the basic elements and values of liberal

democracy do not include "community" or "participation in politics" and thus, are

inimical to the fundamental values associated with participatory democracy (see also

Fredrickson, 1996; Golembiewski, 1996; Hummel and Stivers, 1998; Ramos, 1981;

Ventriss, 1987, 1998). Moreover, "as people pursue 'the American dream' as personified

by the acquisition of private property and other material pleasures, they fail to devote the

time and energy to engaging in the kind of public politics required by advocates of the

participatory democratic vision" (Rimmerman, 2001: 16). This, he asserts, is at the heart

of the decline in the skills and dispositions of American citizenship, or what I call the

citizenship deficit.

The argument about the threat of the citizenship deficit to democracy rests on the

hypothesis that as citizens withdraw support from government, the legitimacy of a

democratic regime is called into question (e.g., Easton, 1965, 1975; Miller, 1974). This

hypothesis represents a prevalent, heralded, and time-honored assumption in political

thought -- that a well-ordered democracy requires citizens with the appropriate

knowledge, skills, and traits of character (e.g., Galston, 1991, 2001). "Competent

democratic citizens need not be policy experts, but there is a level of basic knowledge

below which the ability to make a full range of reasoned civic judgments is impaired"

(Galston, 2001: 218). The links between civic information and civic attributes have been

defined by recent scholarship (e.g., Kahne and Wertheimer, 2006; Kirlin, 2002, 2003a; 2003b; Perry and Katula, 2001; Perry and Thompson, 2004) and are summarized well by Galston (2001: 223-24):

1) Civic knowledge helps citizens understand their interests as individuals and as members of groups.

2) Civic knowledge increases the consistency of views across issues and across time.

3) Unless citizens possess a basic level of civic knowledge – especially concerning political institutions and processes – it is difficult for them to understand political events or to integrate new information into an existing framework.

4) General civic knowledge can alter views on specific public issues.

5) The more knowledge citizens have of civic affairs, the less likely they are to experience a generalized mistrust of, or alienation from, public life.

6) Civic knowledge promotes support for democratic values.

7) Civic knowledge promotes political participation.

Thus, the assumption is that to the extent that civic knowledge and engagement are waning, the potential threat to the democratic order increases.

Evidence of a citizenship deficit in the U.S. can be seen in the numerous statistics that purport to show a decline in civic engagement and social capital (e.g., Frantzich, 2005; Putnam, 2000; Skocpol and Fiorina, 1999; Stolle and Hooghe, 2004). Indicators of this decline are varied and numerous, including voter turnout, political participation, activity, and knowledge, engagement in campaign activities such as working for political

parties, signing petitions, attending a political rallies or speeches, and running for office,

trust in government, and associational memberships among others. Of particular

importance in this study is the decline in Americans' perceptions of internal and external

political efficacy. A review of these indicators has led to a "growing sentiment among

contemporary political scientists and political analysts that the foundations of citizenship

and democracy in America are crumbling" (Dalton, 2006: 1). The next section explores

various general indicators of the citizenship deficit, such as voter turnout, trust, and social

capital. It is followed by a discussion specifically focused on political efficacy.

General Indicators of Citizenship Deficit

To some, voter turnout rates in presidential and off-year elections suggest a

serious risk to the health of American democracy (Hudson, 1995: 112). Table 1 shows the

U.S. population of voting age and the percent of the voting age population that turned out

for presidential and statewide midterm elections from 1960-2004. Between 1966 and

1988, the U.S. experienced a gradual decline in voter turnout for presidential elections. In

1992, there was a slight increase in participation, but still only 55.1 percent of eligible

voters turned out for the presidential election. Although this is a fairly substantial rate for

American elections, it is still significantly lower that the turnout rate in other industrial

democracies. In fact, the United States ranks next to last among industrial democracies in

average voter turnout in recent elections (Miroff, Seidelman, and Swanstrom, 1995;

Rimmerman, 2001). Moreover, Clinton's 44 percent of the plurality vote in 1992

translates into the support of only 24 percent of the American citizenry (Mathews, 1994).

These trends have continued in recent years. In 1996, less than one-half (49 percent) of

eligible voters cast ballots in the presidential election (Rimmerman, 2001); this was the lowest voter turnout since the 1924 presidential election (Hudson, 1995). In 2000, Al Gore won the popular vote, but 'lost' the election to George W. Bush, when the U.S. Supreme Court stopped the counting of ballots in Florida with their ruling in *Bush v. Gore*. That decision resulted in Bush winning the electoral vote by a margin of 271-266 (with 1 abstention). It also raised serious questions about Bush's legitimacy as president and the meaning of the vote in America (Rimmerman, 2001).

A close look at Table 1 reveals that voter turnout in statewide mid-term elections is higher during presidential election years than it is during off-years. In presidential election years, voting in statewide mid-term elections hit a high of 58.5 percent in 1960 and low of 44.9 percent in 1988. It rebounded slightly to 50.8 percent in 1992, before falling and rising again to 51.4 percent in 2004. However, in off-year elections, voter turnout rates have sharply declined since the 1960s. In 1962, the U.S. experienced its highest off-year turnout rate at 45.4 percent. Since 1974, percentages have hovered in the 30s. Less than one-third (32.9 percent) of eligible voters turned out to vote in 1998. To many scholars, "these figures reveal a detached and apathetic citizenry, one that displays a remarkable amount of civic indifference" (Rimmerman, 2001: 34)

Insert Table 1 about here

The decline in voter turnout rates is not the only evidence suggesting a citizenship deficit among Americans. Electoral participation is decreasing not only because fewer Americans are voting, but also because fewer Americans are engaged in other political

activities (Putnam, 2000; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Wattenberg, 2002). There have

been corresponding declines in the numbers of Americans working for political parties,

signing petitions, attending a political rallies or speeches, and running for office (Putnam,

2000). Putnam (2000: 35) notes,

> declining electoral participation is merely the most visible symptom of a
> broader disengagement from community life. Like a fever, electoral
> abstention is even more important as a sign of deeper trouble in the body
> politic than as a malady itself. It is not just from the voting booth that
> Americans are increasingly AWOL.

There have also been declines in American's trust in government. The American

National Election Survey assesses trust in government with the question: "How much of

the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right --

just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time?" Figure 1 shows the

cumulative responses of just about always or most of the time from 1964 to 2004.

Evaluations of trust in government to do what is right just about always or most of the

time ranged from a high of about 76 percent in 1964 to a low of about 21 percent in 1994.

Since 1994, evaluations of trust in government have risen, reaching 56 percent in 2002;

however, there was a sharp drop in 2004, with only 47 percent agreeing that they trusted

government. Scholars using other data assess the average level of trust in government at

about 24 percent from 1964 to 1994 (Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn, 2000). Moreover,

> Recent studies also indicate that over the past thirty-five years there has
> been a decline in Americans' psychological engagement in politics and
> government. Citizens increasingly perceive that they cannot trust
> Washington government officials, and that their participation in any form
> of conventional politics is of little consequence; in short, they are
> exhibiting political alienation (Rimmerman, 2001: 3).

Insert Figure 1 about here

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In 1990-1991, the Harwood Group conducted a study for the Kettering Foundation to better understand what Americans think about their role as citizens in the political system (Harwood Group, 1991). Qualitative data from focus groups in ten cities across the U.S. indicated popular dissatisfaction with government and politics among citizens, a sense of powerlessness and exclusion from government decisions, and the feeling of being "pushed out" of political processes dominated by special interest groups and politicians (Harwood Group, 1991; Mathews, 1994; Rimmerman, 2001).

> To these Americans, a professional political class of incumbent politicians, powerful lobbyists, the media elite, and campaign managers all kept them from participating in the broader political system in a meaningful way. People in the study perceived that the system was dominated by money and that voting in elections simply would not make a difference because the overall system is closed to the average citizen (Mathews, 1994: 12; Rimmerman, 2001: 30).

Moreover, although citizens reported having few opportunities for participation in debates or decisions about important public issues, they also indicated a desire for more meaningful opportunities for participation in the political system (Harwood Group, 1991; Rimmerman, 2001). In short, the results of the Harwood study provide support for arguments about a citizenship deficit, as well as for Mathews (1994: 32) claim that citizens think "the political arena today is too large and distant for individual actions to have an impact."

Additional evidence of the citizenship deficit is found in the literature on social capital. Robert Putnam (2000) warns that civic engagement is decreasing to dangerous levels in America. Citing evidence of decreasing voter turnout and declining membership in groups such as parent-teacher associations and bowling leagues, he asserts that people are in the U.S. are experiencing a general decline in

their ties to each other and to the political system. The result, Putnam claims, is a

massive threat to the successful maintenance of American democracy. The theory

behind this argument is that the "social ties and trust of social capital help

maintain democracy by affecting both the *quantity* and *quality* of political

participation by citizens" (Paxton, 2002: 259). Furthermore, a democracy is

maintained and improved "when a country has a vigorous associational life" as

"voluntary associations provide a training ground for new political leaders, help

members practice compromise and learn tolerance, and stimulate individual

participation in politics" – all of which contribute to a healthy democracy (Paxton,

2002: 254). As Pateman (1970: 42) explains,

> [t]he existence of representative institutions at the national level is not
> sufficient for democracy; for maximum participation by all the people at
> that level socialisation, or 'social training', for democracy must take place
> in other spheres in order that the necessary individual attitudes and
> psychological qualities can be developed.

The social significance of these claims is sharpened when one looks at data

pertaining to youth and young adults. Research shows that young people are less civicly

engaged than older age groups in terms of voting, party politics, membership in voluntary

associations, and various forms of formal and informal interaction (e.g., Dalton, 2002).

Other studies suggest that younger age cohorts are more distrustful and less engaged in

civic activities (Rahn and Transue, 1998). However, as Galston (2001: 219) notes,

> If the only significant differences were cross-sectional, today's heightened
> concern would be myopic. But there are also disturbing trends over time.
> If we compare generations rather than cohorts – that is, if we compare
> today's young adults not with today's older adults but with the young
> adults of the past – we find evidence of diminished civic attachment.

In other words, not only are youth and young adults less civicly engaged than older age groups, but they are also less likely to participate than the generation of their parents were 20 or 30 years ago (Hooghe, 2004: 332). Indeed, recent research has produced,

> a remarkable consensus … that in most Western societies, the political orientations of younger age cohorts differ in fundamental ways from those embodied by their predecessors. Either with regard to political behavior, participation, attitudes or norms and values, current opinion research tends to show marked differences between generations. As a result, generational replacement is generally considered to be a key process driving social and political change with respect to attitudes toward political institutions (Hooghe, 2004: 331).

Political Efficacy

The indicator of citizenship that is most important for the purposes of this study is political efficacy; political efficacy is the major psychological quality and educative effect that deliberative participation is expected to produce and develop (Mansbridge, 1995; Pateman, 1970). In the mid-twentieth century, researchers at the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center developed the concept of political efficacy, defined as the "feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process, i.e., that it is worthwhile to perform one's civic duties" (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, 1954: 187). Since its development, political efficacy has become one of the most frequently used measures of general political attitudes. It is also thought to be a key indicator of the overall health of democratic systems (Craig, Niemi, and Silver, 1990), as it has been linked to feelings of trust in political authorities (Balch, 1974), the concept of diffuse political support (Easton, 1965, 1975), and more generalized support for the political system (Iyengar, 1980). The assumption is that democratic legitimacy and stability are contingent upon citizen support for government; regime stability and

legitimacy suffer to the extent that citizens feel inefficacious (e.g., Easton, 1965, 1975; Miller, 1974). Regime stability is enhanced by "inducing citizens to believe that the government is responsive to their own needs and wishes" (Ginsberg, 1982: 182) or similarly, by "encouraging [citizens] to believe that they are ultimately controlling the government …and keeping them committed to the existing system" (Olsen, 1982: 6).

The concept of political efficacy emerged directly from psychological theory, which suggests that self-referent thoughts and judgments of self-efficacy mediate the relationship between knowledge and action, affecting both motivation and behavior (e.g., Bandura, 1982, 1997). As the study of political efficacy developed, theory and research demonstrated that it was not a unidimensional construct, but rather consisted of at least two related, but distinguishable constructs: internal political efficacy and external political efficacy (Balch, 1974; Converse, 1972). Internal political efficacy refers to one's feelings of personal competence "to understand and participate effectively in politics" (Craig, Niemi, and Silver, 1990: 290). It represents beliefs about the impact a person can have on politics and the political process as a result of their own skills and confidence. External political efficacy refers to one's perceptions about the responsiveness of the political system, both governmental authorities and institutions, to citizen demands (Craig, Niemi, and Silver, 1990: 290). It is the belief that the political system is both receptive and responsive to the interests and actions of citizens.

Internal and external political efficacy have been found to be key mediators between democracy and political participation (Pateman, 1970) and important predictors of political participation (Conway, 2000). Indeed, the idea that participation has individual-level effects is central to much democratic theory (Finkel, 1985; Mansbridge,

1980, 1995; Mill, 1865, 1965, 1997; Pateman, 1970). As Madsen (1978: 869) notes, "A fundamental presumption of democracy is that citizens will feel that collectively, and sometimes even individually, they can intervene in public life to affect the course of governance." More specifically, internal political efficacy has been linked to civic participation (e.g., Almond and Verba, 1963, 1989; Conway, 2000; Pateman, 1970) and external political efficacy has been strongly linked to feelings of "system responsiveness" (Abramson and Aldrich, 1982), political trust (Balch, 1974; Craig, 1979), and diffuse political support (Iyengar, 1980; Wright, 1976).

Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, most Americans felt relatively efficacious and trusting toward government (Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, 1976). This result was interpreted as evidence of American governmental stability and effectiveness in responding to popular concerns (Craig, Niemi, and Silver, 1990). However, during the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, feelings of cynicism and powerlessness became widespread among citizens, and perceptions of political efficacy dropped.[2] There was concern that these developments posed a threat to the established democratic order (Easton, 1965, 1975; Miller, 1974). Moreover, American National Election Survey (ANES) data show that external political efficacy dropped sharply again among citizens during the mid-1980s. Other survey research supports this finding, showing that people felt a decline in the effectiveness of their vote (Teixeira, 1992). Some studies have documented the strong relationship between feelings of external efficacy and electoral participation, arguing that the decline of feelings of governmental responsiveness in the American electorate accounts for some of the decline in voter turnout (Abramson and

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[2] It is interesting to note that the fall of political efficacy in the 1960s coincides with the rise of participatory democracy (see Chapter 3).

Aldrich, 1982; Shaffer, 1981). In fact, some scholars assert that as much as one-half of the decline in presidential turnouts between 1960 and 1980 may be attributed to the erosion of external political efficacy (Ambramson and Aldrich, 1982: 512). Although ANES data show that political efficacy rose during the late 1990s, there was another sharp fall in 2004, particularly among the disadvantaged and the young (Macedo et al., 2005).

Table 2 shows the percentage of respondents that agreed with various ANES questions about internal and external political efficacy. The questions ask how strongly one agrees with the following statements:

1) Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on (COMPLICATED, measures internal political efficacy);

2) People like me don't have any say about what the government does (NO SAY, measures external political efficacy); and

3) I don't think public officials care much what people like me think (NO CARE, measures external political efficacy).

In terms of internal political efficacy, the percentage of respondents who agreed that "government is so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on" has ranged between 60 and 74 percent from 1966 to 2002. In 2000, respondents in agreement with the statement hit 73 percent, the highest rate since 1974. The results for external political efficacy are similar. In 1964, 29 percent of respondents agreed that "people like me don't have any say about what the government does." This rose to an all time high of 56 percent in 1994, and was at 43 percent in 2004. Likewise, in

1964 only 36 percent of respondents agreed that "I don't think public officials care much what people like me think." Again, the percentage in agreement with that statement rose to an all time high of 66 percent in 1994, and was at 50 percent in 2004. These long-term trends in political efficacy "suggest, perhaps simplistically, that most Americans no longer feel that their views are represented adequately in traditional political venues" (Dennis and Owens, 2001: 401-402).

Insert Table 2 about here

In summary, numerous scholars assert that there has been a decline in civic engagement and social capital, as indicated by falling rates of voter turnout, political participation and engagement, trust in government, and associational membership (e.g., Frantzich, 2005; Putnam, 2000; Skocpol and Fiorina, 1999; Stolle and Hooghe, 2004). There have also been corresponding declines in citizens' perceptions of internal and external political efficacy, two indicators that are thought to be fundamental to the stability of democratic regimes. Many scholars assert that this erosion of the skills and dispositions of citizenship has resulted in a citizenship deficit among the general public in the United States. Not all scholars, however, accept the democratic and citizenship deficit theses. It is to the compelling arguments of these critics that this chapter now turns.

Deficits? What Deficits?

Numerous arguments deny the existence of the democratic and citizenship deficits. In terms of the democratic deficit, two points of view are worth noting. First, some scholars assert that a historical review of governance in America demonstrates an

expansion of public access to the work of government. Second, some scholars assert that individual and aggregate policy decisions are generally responsive to public opinion. Both of these arguments are discussed below.

First, many scholars takes issue with claims about restricted access to government processes. They suggest that the history of government legislation and other actions shows otherwise, that there is substantial evidence of an expansion of public access to governance processes. This can be seen in the history of voting laws (Keyssar, 2000) and other citizen participation efforts (see for example, Cooper, Bryer, and Meek, 2006; Rimmerman, 2001; Stewart, 1976; Thomas, 1995). Others suggest that a review of recent legislation demonstrates a proclivity for increasing the opportunities for citizen participation in the work of government. For example, performance management, as promoted by the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) and the National Performance Review (NPR), is argued to be an appropriate and productive tool for increasing citizen participation (e.g. Callahan and Holzer, 1994; Epstein, et. al., 2000). GPRA requires agencies to focus on program results, service quality, and customer satisfaction by incorporating strategic planning and performance measurement in their management processes (Radin: 2000). The NPR movement sought to replace top-down ruled-based government with a bottom-up customer-driven entrepreneurial approach (Kettl, 1998). It promised a "government closer to the people" (Kettl, 1998: 22), and "set out to reconnect citizens with government, to make public programs more responsive, and to use the out-ward looking features of customer service to break bureaucrats out of the tunnel vision that too often afflicts government agencies" (Kettl, 1998: 24).

In addition, legislation that deals particularly with administrative agencies shows an increase in public access to the work of government. For example, the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) is argued to be a significant breakthrough in the public's right to know about and participate in the governance processes of federal administrative agencies (Bingham, Nabatchi, and O'Leary, 2005; Kerwin, 2003; Rosenbloom, 2003).

> The APA fundamentally altered the relation of citizens and stakeholders to the governance activities of administrative agencies. Its requirement of publication made the work of government more transparent. Through public notice and comment in rulemaking, it created an explicit and legitimate voice for citizens. Through adjudication, it assured stakeholders they would have a voice and be heard before government substantially interfered with their interests in life, liberty, or property (Bingham, Nabatchi, and O'Leary, 2005: 550-551).

Moreover, the history of changes in the federal rulemaking process, which is governed by the APA, is essentially one that has expanded public access and input (Kerwin, 2003). In addition, two amendments to the APA, Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1996 (NRA; 5 U.S.C. §§561, et seq.) and the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996 (ADRA; 5 U.S.C. §§571, et seq.), further expanded the forms and opportunities for public participation in the work of government (Bingham, Nabatchi, and O'Leary, 2005).

Second, other scholars discredit the democracy deficit thesis by arguing that individual and aggregate policy decisions are generally responsive to public opinion (for an extensive review of this literature, see Manza and Cook: 2002; see also Stimson, 1998, 2005). Evidence used to demonstrate a high degree of policy responsiveness to public opinion is found in quantitative studies of the effects of district or national majority opinion on policy outputs and in examinations of policy making in a single or small number of policy domains (Manza and Cook, 2002).

Several studies use a micro-level approach to compare representative's behavior with the preferences and opinions of their constituents. Although these employ a variety of methodological assumptions and use different measures of opinions and behavior, many find significant relationships between representatives' votes and constituents' policy preferences (Bartels, 1991; Erikson, 1978; McDonagh, 1992; Miller and Stokes, 1963, 1966; Page, Shapiro, Gronke, and Rosenberg, 1984). Other studies use a more macro-level approach, comparing government policies with aggregate public opinion, and find similar results (e.g., Erikson, 1976; Monroe, 1979; Page and Shapiro, 1983; Weissberg, 1976). Some scholars have attempted to develop a comprehensive global model of the impact of opinion and policy across a wide range of issues (e.g., Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson, 2002; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson, 1995). This research shows that there are both direct and indirect avenues through which public opinion influences policy. Moreover, when taken together, these direct and indirect effects of public opinion produce large coefficients for the impact of public opinion and mood on policy outcomes such that "there exists about a one-to-one translation of preferences into policy (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson, 2002: 316).

In addition, several scholars have used a case study approach to examine the relationship between public opinion and policy making in a single or small number of policy domains. In general, these studies also suggest a high degree of governmental responsiveness. Substantial evidence of responsiveness has been found in studies of equal employment opportunity legislation (Burstein, 1985/1998), welfare reform legislation (Weaver, 2000), Medicaid legislation (Jacobs, 1993), and defense spending (e.g., Hartley and Russett, 1992; Jencks, 1985; Shapiro and Page, 1994; Wlezien, 1995, 1996).

Similarly, Quirk and Hinchliffe (1998) assert that during the 1970s and 1980s, public

opinion influenced several policy domains, including social security, business regulation,

tax cuts, and petroleum policy among others.

Arguments denying the existence of the citizenship deficit also exist. In a review

article, Stolle and Hooghe (2004) lay out four different arguments and evidence

formulated against the decline of social capital and civic engagement thesis. One group of

scholars rejects the decline thesis on empirical grounds, questioning the validity of the

data used by scholars to support the claim. For example, in analyses of the General Social

Survey for the period of 1975-1994, both Paxton (1999) and Wuthnow (2002) find that

not all social capital and civic engagement indictors are declining simultaneously. Thus,

there may not be a social capital syndrome, but rather a decline in only some components

of social capital (Stolle and Hooghe, 2004). Other critics find fault with the measures and

indicators of social capital and civic engagement (see generally, Sobel, 2002). For

example, McDonald and Popkin (2001) find fault with the way the voter turnout

percentages are calculated. The U.S. Census Bureau calculates voter turnout as a ratio of

votes cast to the total number of voting-age residents; however, the ineligible population

has been growing faster than the eligible population, thus giving the appearance that voter

turnout is declining (McDonald and Popkin, 2001). Regardless of how it is calculated,

other scholars claim that low voter turnout is sign of widespread satisfaction with the

political system (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002). From an economic perspective, not

voting is a rational choice:

> Any rational, self-interested person would leave the work of voting – as
> well as the work of becoming informed about issues and candidates – to
> other citizens, and spend election day pursuing personal responsibilities or

individually rewarding activities such as earning money on the job or
spending a day at a ballgame or the beach (Rolfe, n.d.: 1).

Thus, low voter turnout may be simply a sign that people are coming to their senses and

behaving in a politically rational manner. This research and works by others scholars

(e.g., Ladd, 1996; Schudson, 1996) raises doubts about the empirical validity of

arguments purporting to show deficiencies among American citizens.

A second group of scholars accept the decline thesis, but view it as an example of

American exceptionalism. These scholars assert that although Western societies are

experiencing political disenchantment, increasing cynicism, and political alienation, the

same trends with regard to forms of participation that are not expressly political cannot be

observed (Stolle and Hooghe, 2004). The brunt of this argument is that "not all forms of

participation seem to be in decline through Western democracies. Whereas most

democratic countries struggle with a decline in conventional political participation, such

as voting, party membership and even political trust, social relations are not threatened to

the same extent" (Stolle and Hooghe, 2004: 159). Scholars articulating this criticism

suggest a need for comparative research that uses meaningful indicators of social capital

and civic engagement before the civic decline claims can be accepted (e.g., Hall, 1999;

Mayer, 2003; Torpe, 2003).

Similarly, a third critique also accepts that traditional participation may be on the

decline, but argues that its participatory measures fail to capture and pay attention to

emerging forms of participation and interaction (Stolle and Hooghe, 2004). The argument

is that new participation mechanisms, which tend to be informal, non-hierarchical,

grassroots based, and related to life-style or sporadic mobilization efforts, are replacing

the traditional formal and fixed participatory structures of the past (e.g., Gundelach,

1984; Rimmerman, 2001). Moreover, these new participatory mechanisms are not captured in traditional survey research on participation, but are nevertheless likely to contribute to and help maintain social capital (Stolle and Hooghe, 2004). Such critics assert that new instruments must be developed to capture these new and emerging forms of participation before any conclusions about the state of civil society can be made (e.g., Beck, 1997; Castells, 1996, 1997, 1998; Eliasoph, 1998; Lichterman, 1996).

Finally, a fourth group of critics accepts the decline thesis, but disputes its normative interpretations. These scholars assert that the decline of traditional social capital measures does not necessarily mean a decline in social stability, political stability, or democratic order. Rather than viewing the decline as a threat to democracy, they assert that it should be viewed as a function of postmodernization (e.g., Inglehart, 1997; Norris, 2002; Wetzel, Inglehart, and Klingemann, 2003). "In this view, declining levels of participation should not cause any concern about the future viability of democratic systems, as they are merely reflecting a transition from routine participation to a more reflexive and monitoring form of political involvement" (Stolle and Hooghe, 2004: 164). The issue for these scholars is how to ensure, in a post-modern world, that citizens have access to and influence over governments and political system (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Baker, 2000).

In addition, there are similar rebuttals to the assertions about a decline in civic engagement and social capital among youth. For example, some studies indicate that younger age cohorts adhere more strongly to democratic norms; they are more tolerant and tend to be more critical of authoritarian and hierarchical institutions (Inglehart, 2003). Other studies indicate that youth may prefer more informal ways of participating

in politics, espousing more lifestyle-related and loosely structured forms of civic engagement (O'Toole, Lister, Marsh, Jones, and McDonagh, 2003). These arguments echo the broader criticisms of citizenship deficit thesis, and suggest that civic decline among youth is not as problematic as has been portrayed.

In summary, many scholars assert that the democratic and citizenship deficits are non-existent, or to the extent that they do exist, have been exaggerated. Some scholars point to an increase in the opportunities for access to government work as evidence against the democratic deficit, while others point to the congruence of public policy and public opinion. In terms of the latter argument, scholars assert that to the extent that public policy is responsive to public opinion, complaints about falling perceptions of political efficacy, and particularly external political efficacy among Americans are of less significance and importance. There are also many arguments denying the existence of the citizenship deficit. One group of scholars question the validity of the data and empirical analyses used to show a decline in social capital. A second group believes the data demonstrate an example of American exceptionalism. A third argues that participatory measures fail to capture and pay attention to emerging forms of participation and interaction, and a fourth group of critics accepts the decline thesis, but disputes its normative consequences.

Nevertheless, while researchers work to make sense of the data and trends, there seems to be an increasingly pessimistic view of the state of democracy and citizenship in the United States. Regardless of the extent to which one buys into arguments about the democratic and/or citizenship deficits, there can be no doubt that public perceptions matter. As Dennis and Owen (2000: 401) assert,

> public dissatisfaction with politics and government is connected fundamentally to popular perceptions about the political process and representation. In a fully operative democracy, people are likely to have developed the firm expectation that they have the right to be heard, and that officials should be responsible to their needs and take action. If people have come to feel that their own needs, wants, interests, concerns, values, or demands are not being effectively represented in the policy process, then no matter how felicitous the nature of the system outputs is perceived to be, popular resentment likely will result. Resistance will be especially pronounced if people feel effectively excluded from the early stages of the decision-making processes that produced government policies and actions.

In other words, regardless of whether "participation is direct or indirect, actual or only imagined, citizens must be satisfied with the process of inputting their demands if they are to remain supportive of the political system more generally" (Dennis and Owen, 2001: 400). To the extent that the skills and dispositions of citizenship, and particularly political efficacy, are eroding among Americans, the promise of deliberative democracy to remediate this problem is an important area of research. Thus, despite disagreement over whether democratic and citizenship deficits exist, the arguments of deliberative democrats cannot be ignored. There also remains the fact that the deliberative democracy movement is gaining momentum.

> Since Jürgen Habermas (1996) promulgated the view that communicative power coming from the subjects of a regime may be one of the only sources for the legitimation of state power, communication and deliberation have become the focus of democrats interested in finding ways for the voice of the people to be heard more loudly, providing a forum for the rulers to heed the informed views of the ruled (Leib, 2004: 2).

The following sections review the benefits and pitfalls of deliberative democracy, particularly with respect to its potential to remedy (or exacerbate) the democratic and citizenship deficits.

THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

Numerous scholars have outlined the potential instrumental and intrinsic benefits of deliberative democracy. Elster (1998: 11) asserts that "deliberation is (or can be) good because (or to the extent that)" it:

- Reveals private information,

- Lessens or overcomes the impact of bounded rationality,

- Forces or induces a particular mode of justifying demands,

- Legitimizes the ultimate choice,

- Makes for Pareto-superior decisions,

- Makes for better decisions in terms of distributive justice,

- Makes for larger consensus, and/or

- Improves the moral or intellectual qualities of the participants.

Similarly, Gutmann and Thompson (2004: 10-13) outline four purposes of deliberative democracy: (1) to provide the most justifiable conception for dealing with moral disagreement in politics; 2) to encourage public-spirited perspectives on public issues; 3) to promote mutually respectful processes of decision making; and 4) to help correct past mistakes.

Fung (2005) argues that deliberative democracy serves three important democratic values: legitimacy, justice, and effectiveness of public action. Following Robert Dahl's (1989) idea of a minipopulus and Jack Nagle's (1992) notion of Deliberative Assemblies on a Random Basis (DARBs), Fung (2003: 339) refers to the convening of citizens in self-consciously organized public deliberations as minipublics. The term 'minipublic' denotes

some form of small-scale deliberative forum which is designed to foster a process with aspects of the discursive democratic ideal: that is, some form of inclusive and competent engagement between all affected parties over issues of mutual concern in search of judgments that can be assented to by all as representing fair and effective decisions (Davies, Blackstock, and Rauschmayer, 2005: 602).

Examples of minipublics offered by Fung (2003) include Citizen Summits (deliberative forums where residents reflect upon city priorities and communicate their views to the mayor), the Oregon Health Plan (a public participation process that gathered residents to build consensus on health service allocation decisions), and Chicago Community Policing (a process used to engage citizens in problem-solving around public safety issues). It should be noted however, that in Fung's (2003) conception, deliberative processes, despite great variation in their institutional designs, are minipublics in that they advance and have consequences for democratic governance.

Fung (2003) asserts that minipublics are among the most promising efforts for civic engagement and public deliberation in contemporary politics. He also asserts that a healthy minipublic contributes to the quality of democratic governance by (1) improving the character of participation in a minipublic by dealing with issues of quantity, bias, and quality of deliberation; 2) informing officials and citizens and fostering the dispositions and skills of citizenship; 3) connecting deliberation to state action in terms of official accountability, the justice of policies, and their efficacy and wisdom; and 4) increasing popular mobilization. These and other potential benefits of deliberative democracy are discussed in more detail below.

First, advocates of deliberative democracy assert that through the process of deliberation, private information may be revealed, which in turn can help overcome or at least reduce the impacts of bounded rationality and force the justification or giving of

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reasons for individual positions (Elster, 1998; Fearon, 1998; Gambetta, 1998; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 2004). Deliberation deemphasizes the aggregation of and/or bargaining among pre-established preferences and individual interests (Button and Ryfe, 2005); therefore, discussion allows people to express diverse intensities of preferences, whether they have strong or indifferent feelings about particular policy choices (Fearon, 1998). In this sense, deliberation helps with greater distribution of information (Gambetta, 1998), improves one's understanding of policy problems and alternative solutions, and thus, expands the boundaries of rationality for decision making (Fearon, 1998; Manin, 1987). Indeed, research shows that greater discussion can increase the use of new, less commonly shared information (Kelly and Karau, 1999)

Second, building on the influential theories of Jürgen Habermas (1984, 1990) who argues that individual preferences are transformed through the active exchange of ideas, or the voicing of and listening to preferences expressed in an ideal speech situation, advocates of deliberative democracy assert that deliberation can help people clarify, understand, and refine their own preferences and positions on issues (e.g., Elster, 1998). Even if preferences are not transformed, advocates of deliberative democracy assert that the process of discussion can create greater understanding among persons with divergent preferences, as well as more tolerance for opposing views (Benhabib, 1996; Cohen and Rogers, 1995; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 2004; Hunold and Young, 1998) because people may begin to think beyond their own self-interest, to include greater concern for others and their community (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 2004; Macedo, 1999). In addition, deliberation should enhance mutual respect, recognition, and empathy, because

"participants are forced to think of what would count as a good reason for all others involved in, or affected by, the decisions under discussion" (Cooke, 2000: 950).

A considerable amount of empirical research supports these contentions. For example, research indicates that face-to-face communication is a highly significant factor in determining the likelihood of cooperation (Bornstein, 1992; Dawes, van de Kragt, and Orbell, 1990; Ostrom, 1998; Sally, 1995). Talking in a face-to-face situation allows individuals to demonstrate their willingness to cooperate with others, and thus determines others' willingness cooperate (Bornstein and Rapoport, 1988; Kerr and Kaufman-Gilland, 1994; Orbell, van de Kragt, and Dawes, 1988). Other research shows that face-to-face deliberation enables people to see the connection between their individual interests and group interests (Dawes, van de Kragt, and Orbell, 1990; Orbell, van de Kragt, and Dawes, 1988). As Delli Carpini, Cook and Jacobs (2004: 325) note, minority opinions can lead majorities to consider new alternatives and perspectives (Nemeth, 1986; Nemeth and Kwan 1985; Nemeth and Wachtler, 1983; Turner, 1991), to seek out and process new information (Nemeth and Mayseless, 1987; Nemeth and Rogers, 1996), and to more generally empathize with the minority's viewpoint (Moscovici, 1980). In addition, the group consensus that emerges from talk appears to lead to actual cooperative behavior, with more talk leading to more cooperation (Bouas and Komorita, 1996).

A third potential benefit is that deliberation may increase consensus about a policy decision. As Cohen (1989: 33) notes, "deliberation aims to arrive at a rationally motivated consensus – to find reasons that are persuasive to all." Thus, to the extent that public discussion increases individuals' awareness and consideration of other's interests, deliberation can improve compromise and consensus, such that concessions are made

beyond one's immediate self-interests to the general interests of the community and/or other groups (Gambetta, 1998). Empirical research on the role of unanimity in deliberation suggests that this mode of consensus can lead to a greater belief that the deliberation was fair and comprehensive (Kameda, 1991; Kaplan and Miller, 1987; Nemeth, 1977). Moreover, research indicates that requiring consensus can encourage greater open-mindedness toward the views of others (Kameda, 1991).

Fourth, the procedures and preconditions of deliberative democracy are designed to generate legitimate outcomes (Button and Ryfe, 2005; Elster, 1998; Fung, 2003, 2005; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 2004; Young, 2000), which may lead to increased buy-in and longer-term support of policy implementation (Fearon, 1998) and the effectiveness of public action (Fung, 2005). It is argued that deliberation can produce better public decisions and policies both generally, and in terms of distributive justice, by recognizing weaker groups and breaking the cycle of political inequality (Gambetta, 1998; Fearon, 1998; Fung, 2005; Young, 2000). Deliberative processes address legitimacy deficits in that they shift the locus of power and influence away from government officials toward citizens (Fung, 2003, 2005). Thus, the perceived legitimacy of policy decisions increases to the extent there is agreement that all relevant voices are equally heard. The policy outcomes of deliberation are more likely to be seen as distributively and procedurally legitimate because they are the result of an inclusive, voluntary, reasoned, and equal process (Button and Ryfe, 2005; Cohen, 1996; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 2004; Habermas, 1996; Rawls, 1996). In turn, the process improves the quality of the decisions reached by the group (Winquist and Larson, 1998).

Social psychology research on distributive and procedural justice provides some support for these contentions. Distributive justice is rooted in social equity theory, and based on the idea that social behavior is conditioned by the distribution or allocation of outcomes. A significant body of research indicates that satisfaction increases when outcomes are allocated in a fair manner (e.g., Pruitt, 1981; Raiffa, 1982; Rubin and Brown, 1975). Procedural justice refers to perceptions about the fairness of the rules and procedures that regulate a process (Austin and Tobiasen, 1984; Kressel, Pruitt, and Associates, 1989; Thibaut and Walker, 1975). In general, research suggests that when processes and procedures are perceived to be fair, then individuals are more satisfied, more willing to accept the resolution of that procedure, and more likely to form positive attitudes about the decision makers, regardless of whether they substantively agree with the outcome (Lind and Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1994, 2001; Tyler and Blader, 2000; Tyler and Lind, 1992).

Finally, and most important in terms of this dissertation, advocates of deliberative democracy assert that deliberation serves an educative function in that it improves the moral and intellectual capacities of participants. Fearon (1998: 59) describes deliberation as "a sort of *exercise program* for developing human or civic virtues" that helps participants cultivate certain skills and virtues such as eloquence, rhetorical skill, empathy, courtesy, imagination, and reasoning ability. It is in this vein that Luskin and Fishkin (2003) assert that deliberation can make for "better citizens" by fostering and increasing political sophistication, interest, participation, internal and external efficacy, trust, respect, empathy, and sociotropism. The next chapter provides a theoretical

perspective on how deliberation improves the skills and dispositions of citizenship and explores the empirical research on the subject.

THE POTENTIAL PITFALLS OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

Not all scholars agree that deliberative democracy has such benefits; in fact, many see a distinct dark side to deliberative democracy. On a practical note, some scholars point to the high the transaction costs for participants in deliberative forums and suggest that these costs may outweigh the potential benefits of participation for citizens and policy makers (e.g., Huntington, 1975). For citizens, transaction costs may include time, money (e.g., lost wages or child care costs), and otherwise forgoing more preferable activities (Rydin and Pennington, 2000). Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) articulate this issue well:

> The last thing people want is to be more involved political decisionmaking; they do not want to provide much input to those who are assigned to make these decisions; and they would rather not know all the details of the decisionmaking process. Most people have strong feelings on few if any of the issues the government needs to address and would much prefer to spend their time in non-political pursuits.

Moreover, "securing broad-based, meaningful deliberation on contentious issues from ordinary citizens, most of whom have little desire to engage in public policy discussions, is next to impossible no matter how creative the contrived forum may be" (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2005: 228). Following this argument, the lack of political participation among Americans may in fact not be a bellwether of democratic crisis, but rather a sign of widespread content and satisfaction with the status quo (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002; Macedo et al., 2005). In fact some scholars argue that many of the

problems of governance in the United States today stem from an excess of democracy (Huntington, 1975: 113).

Other scholars assert that the high transaction costs of such participatory endeavors also extend to government officials and decision makers. Time and money are two transaction costs that public agencies and their administrators must deal with when organizing citizen participation efforts. Citizen participation processes require large time commitments; it may take significantly longer to reach a decision through a citizen participation process than if a single administrator or group of administrators made the decision on their own (Lawrence and Deagen, 2001; Irvin and Stansbury, 2004). Citizen participation efforts also often carry significant financial expenses. "Although comparative costs have not been subject to close scrutiny, the low end of the pre-decision cost of citizen-participation groups is arguably more expensive than the decision making of a single agency administrator, even if the citizen participants' time and costs are ignored" (Irvin and Stansbury, 2004: 58). Thus, increased citizen participation may diverge from today's managerial emphasis on rational decision-making, efficiency, and expediency. Indeed, administrators tend to think that citizen engagement impedes administrative processes and increases inefficiency and red tape (King, Feltey, and Susel, 1998).

Additional transaction costs to government officials and decision makers concern their ability to broker policy compromises (e.g., Huntington, 1975). "Because citizen participants are not paid for their time, committees may be dominated by strongly partisan participants whose livelihood or values are strongly affected by the decisions being made, or by those who live comfortably enough to allow them to participate

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regularly" (Irvin and Stansbury, 2004: 59). Thus, given the potential limits of representation among citizen participants, there is little to guarantee that participants will be adequate proxies for the community. This is especially true in larger, more heterogeneous communities (Ostrom, 1990). Even if there is diversity among participants, this diversity can make it more difficult for political elites to make policy decisions that satisfy citizen demands (Huntington, 1975; Sunstein, 2003). As more citizens participate, more views and positions are brought to the table. Policy makers must not only sort through these views, but also take into account the preferences and demands of larger and more diverse groups of citizens (for practical and recent examples of this situation, see Margerum and Whitehall, 2004; Throop and Purdom, 2006; USFS, 2002).

As noted earlier, one of the strongest arguments in favor of deliberative democracy is that such participation has intrinsic benefits for citizens. Not all agree with this assertion. Some scholars argue that the inverse is true, that participation can injure citizens, causing them to feel frustrated and to perceive personal inefficacy and powerlessness.

> Real-life deliberation can fan emotions unproductively, can exacerbate rather than diminish power differentials among those deliberating, can make people feel frustrated with the system that made them deliberate, is ill-suited to many issues, and can lead to worse decisions than would have occurred if no deliberation had taken place (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002: 191).

Advocates of deliberative democracy argue that "[w]hen people come into contact with those who are different, they become better citizens, as indicated in their values and behavior" (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2005: 232); however, to get the full benefits of associational involvement, the groups must be diverse. The logic here is straightforward –

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to experience the benefits of deliberation, one must hear a variety of viewpoints. Despite this argument, social psychology research indicates that it is difficult to get people involved in heterogeneous groups, and that when they do join such a group, they tend to interact with groups members who are similar to them (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2005; Sunstein, 2003).

Social psychology research on small groups highlights several potential pitfalls of deliberation (for an extensive review of this literature, see Mendelberg, 2002). In particular, research suggests three psychological limits to participation: risky shift, the Abilene paradox, and groupthink (e.g., Cooke and Kothari, 2002: 106-109; see also Torres, 2003: 72-73). Risky shift describes the phenomenon that group discussion can lead members to make riskier decisions than they would have made as individuals. The Abilene paradox reflects the experience of groups who make decisions and take actions that contradict their wants and interests in order to alleviate the anxieties and tensions of individual members. Groupthink refers to the replacement of independent critical thinking with irrational and dehumanizing actions against out-groups. As Sunstein (2003: 82) notes, "deliberative enclaves can be breeding grounds for *both* the development of unjustly suppressed views and for unjustified extremism, indeed fanaticism."

Research on small group deliberation supports these contentions. For example, communication has been found to enhance cooperation among individuals at the expense of that between groups (Insko, et al., 1993). When group interests are consistent with individual interests, communication can increase cooperation among groups; however, when group interests compete with individual interests, individual and in-group cooperation increase at the expense of cooperation across groups (Bornstein, 1992).

Moreover, communication across groups of unequal size can make group differences more salient, and thus decrease cooperation (Bettencourt and Dorr, 1998; Miller and Davidson-Podgorny, 1987). Other research suggests that individuals who are perceived to have particular expertise in the subject under deliberation are more likely to be influential in the group's decision (Bottger, 1984; Kirchler and Davis, 1986; Ridgeway, 1981, 1987). Moreover, groups tend to use information that is already commonly shared, and focus less on distinctive information held by specific individuals that could arguably improve the outcome or decision (Gigone, and Hastie, 1993, 1997; Larson, et al, 1998; Stasser 1992, Stasser and Titus, 1985; Stasser, Taylor and Hanna, 1989; Wittenbaum, Hubbel, and Zuckerman, 1999).

The sum of these effects not only limits the potential benefits of participation, but also increases the potential for unwise decisions and polarization (e.g., Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002; Huntington, 1975; Sunstein, 2003). The issue of group polarization is especially relevant:

> Though standard, the term "group polarization" is somewhat misleading. It is not meant to suggest that group members will shift to the poles, nor does it refer to an increase in variance among groups, though this may be the ultimate result. Instead the term refers to a predictable shift *within* a group discussing a case or problem. As the shift occurs, groups, and group members, move and coalesce, not toward the middle of antecedent dispositions, but toward a more extreme position in the direction indicated by those dispositions. The effect of deliberation is both to decrease variance among group members, as individual differences diminish, and also to produce convergence on a relatively more extreme point among predeliberation judgments (Sunstein, 2003: 83).

Indeed, research suggests that discussion tends to move collective opinion in the direction of the preexisting views of the majority (Moscovici and Zavalloni, 1969; Myers and Lamm, 1976; Schkade, Sunstein, and Kahneman, 2000). Moreover, when unanimity is

the decision rule, the chances of deadlock increase (Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington, 1983), as does polarization (Kaplan and Miller, 1987; Mendelberg and Karpowitz, 2000)

Other criticisms of deliberation and deliberative democracy exist. To the extent that polarization occurs, the possibility of co-optation also increases. As Arnstein (1969: 217) notes, "participation without redistribution of power is an empty and frustrating process for the powerless. It allows the powerholders to claim that all sides were considered, but makes it possible for only some of those sides to benefit. It maintains the status quo." Young (2003) articulates this point well, demonstrating how a political activist, a person who would be expected to want to participate in deliberative democratic efforts, might have legitimate moral objections to the compromises required during deliberation.

> The activist is suspicious of exhortations to deliberate, because he believes that in the real word of politics, where structural inequalities influence both procedures and outcomes, democratic processes that appear to conform to norms of deliberation are usually biased toward more powerful agents. The activist thus recommends that those who care about promoting greater justice should engage primarily in critical oppositional activity, rather than attempt to come to agreement with those who support or benefit from existing power structures (Young, 2003: 102-103).

Clearly, there is disagreement among scholars about the potential benefits and pitfalls of deliberative democracy, and as discussed in the following chapter, empirical research does little to resolve this debate. Before reviewing this literature, however, it is useful to briefly discuss some of the processes of deliberative democracy and provide some examples.

PROCESSES OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

Thus far, this chapter has described deliberative democracy in broad, normative, and almost philosophical terms; however, in practice, deliberative democracy does not translate into a single method or process. Instead, deliberative democracy serves as an umbrella term for a wide variety of processes. For example, the Co-Intelligence Institute lists over 50 civic engagement processes, many of which are deliberative in nature (see http://www.co-intelligence.org/CommunityEngagement.html). *The Deliberative Democracy Handbook* (Gastil and Levine, 2005) discusses numerous models of public deliberation, including but not limited to the Kettering National Issues Forum, electoral deliberation and public journalism, deliberative polling, consensus conferences and planning cells, citizen juries, on-line dialogues, the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting, study circles, and e-thePeople and similar e-democracy initiatives.

A discussion about the specific design of each these deliberative democracy processes is beyond the scope of this study, and details about the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting are provided in the next chapter; however, brief examples of some processes are useful for illustrative purposes.

- The America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting engages large numbers of citizens (anywhere from 500 to 5000+) in deliberation around a specific policy issue or set of issues in a particular political community. Participation technology is used to relay information from small table deliberations, to a "Theme Team" that distills the

information into major topics, which are then presented back to the entire room for clarification, modification, and voting. The recorded the preferences (i.e., the 'votes' of participants) are provided to all participants at the end of the day, including decisions makers, who are expected to act upon the deliberated outcomes.

- The Kettering National Issues Forum (NIF) convenes citizens in a variety of institutional settings to deliberate about public problems and the costs and benefits of specific solutions. The goals of these forums are to enhance knowledge about public issues, to explore the underlying values and deeper motivations behind the issues, to help form a public with the skills needed for democratic dialogue and reasoned judgment, and to help (re)define the interests of the public.

- Public journalism, or civic journalism, engages the press in directly helping to revive civic life and public dialogue by convening town meetings where citizens have the opportunity to discuss public problems, question candidates skillfully and in-depth, review policy options, discuss solutions at work in other communities, set an action agenda, and facilitate voluntary citizen action.

- Deliberative Polling®, originated by Professor James Fishkin, constructs a random, representative sample and polls participants on a targeted issue or set of issues. After the baseline poll, members of the sample are invited to gather for a weekend to discuss the issues in depth in small groups led by trained facilitators. Participants are re-

polled after the weekend. The resulting changes in opinion represent

the conclusions the public would reach, if people had opportunity to

become more informed and more engaged by the issues.

- Study circles are voluntary, self-organizing groups of citizens (5-20

  people) whole deliberate, with the assistance of trained facilitators,

  about community problems and potential solutions. The study circles

  generally meet three to six times for two to three hours each to explore

  a subject. Between meetings participants read materials they were

  given at the end of the last meeting. These materials are used as

  springboards for dialogue and education about the issue.

Some scholars expand the list of deliberative processes and categorize

them as quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial deliberative processes (e.g., Bingham,

Nabatchi and O'Leary, 2005; Bingham, O'Leary and Nabatchi, 2005). Quasi-

legislative processes occur "upstream" in the policy making process; they are

prospective activities that help to set standards, guidelines, expectations, or rules

and regulations for behavior. Quasi-legislative processes include, but are not

limited to e-democracy, public conversations, consensus-building, public

dialogues, study circles, deliberative polling, participatory budgeting, the

Kettering National Issues Forum, and the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town

Meeting. Quasi-judicial processes are retrospective, fact-based, and/or determine

the rights or obligations of selected citizens or stakeholders. Quasi-judicial

deliberative processes include numerous alternative or appropriate dispute

resolution (ADR) processes, including but not limited to mediation, early neutral assessment, and arbitration.

It is important to point out that while these processes vary along a number of salient dimensions, they also share key features. Key features shared among the processes are:

1) A focus on action: deliberation is not conducted for its own sake, but rather is conducted to determine what should be done in some situation by some agent;

2) An appeal to values: the interests, principles, and motivations that underlie a problem and its potential solution are explored;

3) The absence of pre-existing commitments: the goal of deliberation is not to persuade others to accept a pre-defined proposal or solution, but to identify, articulate, and develop various possibilities;

4) Mutuality of focus: personal interests are not negotiated; instead the goal is to identify and articulate community interests with respect to a specific issue or set of issues;

5) The free exchange of knowledge and information: information is not withheld; it is shared widely with participants and other interested members of the community; and

6) Activities occur within small groups: while dozens, hundreds, or even thousands may participate in the overall process, the deliberative elements of the process occur within groups of 8-15 people (Lukensmeyer and Brigham, 2005; Torres, 2003).

Differences among the processes include, but are not limited to (1) who participates in deliberation, 2) how participants exchange information and make decisions, and 3) the link between the deliberations and policy or public action (Fung 2005; Bingham, Nabatchi, and O'Leary, 2005). For example, some processes include only selected stakeholders within particular communities of interest deliberating in a private, confidential forum (e.g., most ADR processes), while others involve a cross-section of the electorate in a mass, public process (e.g., NIF, Deliberative Polling, or the 21st Century Town Meeting) (Bingham, Nabatchi, and O'Leary, 2005; Bingham, O'Leary, Nabatchi, 2005; Williamson, 2004). Some processes are small and more informal (e.g., public conversations or study circles) and rely more on relational communication and storytelling; other processes are large and more structured (e.g., NIF or the 21st Century Town Meeting) and favor logical, rational discourse over relationship building (Bingham, Nabatchi, and O'Leary, 2005; Bingham, O'Leary, Nabatchi, 2005; Ryfe 2002). Moreover, the processes vary with their point of connection to the policy process (Fung, 2003, 2005). For example, some may deliberate about emerging community issues (e.g., study circles or public journalism), whereas others aim to provide specific policy recommendations to government officials (e.g., the 21st Century Town Meeting) (Torres 2003).

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this chapter was to provide a broad overview of the concept of deliberative democracy. The chapter began by comparing deliberative and

aggregative/representative democracy. The chapter then moved into a discussion about why deliberative democracy has been gaining popularity in the U.S. and in other parts of the world. Specifically, it argued that the increased interest is, in large part, a response to claims about a democratic deficit and a citizenship deficit in the United States (and in other Western democracies). For some scholars, deliberative democracy, with both its instrumental and intrinsic value, represents a potential cure for these ills. The chapter then reviewed the potential benefits and pitfalls of deliberative democracy and concluded with an overview of deliberative democracy process and some examples.

The next chapter explores the theory of deliberative democracy and explains the hypothesized educative effects of deliberation, including its potential to increase perceptions of political efficacy. In addition, the chapter provides a detailed discussion of the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting. It explains why and how the functional design of the 21st Century Town Meeting may contribute to the development of citizenship skills and dispositions generally, and specifically explores how the process is expected to impact perceptions of political efficacy.

Table 1: Voter Turnout for U.S. Presidential and Midterm Elections, 1960-2004

Year	Population of voting age	Percent of voting-age population that voted for President	Percent of voting-age population that voted in mid-term elections
1960	109,672	62.8	58.5
1962	112,952	--	45.4
1964	114,090	61.9	57.8
1966	116,638	--	45.4
1968	120,285	60.9	55.1
1970	124,498	--	43.5
1972	140,777	55.2	50.7
1974	146,338	--	35.9
1976	152,308	53.5	48.9
1978	158,369	--	34.9
1980	163,945	52.8	47.6
1982	169,643	--	38.0
1984	173,995	53.3	47.8
1986	177,922	--	33.5
1988	181,956	50.3	44.9
1990	185,812	--	33.1
1992	189,524	55.1	50.8
1994	193,650	--	36.6
1996	196,928	49.0	45.8
1998	198,228	--	32.9
2000	205,815	50.2	46.3
2002	215,077	--	34.3
2004	220,377	55.5	51.4

Source: Federal Election Commission. Data drawn from Congressional Research Service reports, Election Data Services Inc., and State Election Offices. Available at: http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0781453.html

Figure 1: Trust in Government to Do What is Right Just About Always or Most of the Time, 1964-2004

Source: ANES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior
Available at: http://www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/toptable/tab5a_1.htm

Table 2: Percentage of Respondents that Agreed with ANES Questions about Internal and External Political Efficacy, 1964-2004

YEAR	COMPLICATED[a] (IPE)	NO SAY[b] (EPE)	NO CARE[c] (EPE)
1964	**	29	36
1966	67	34	34
1968	69	41	43
1970	71	36	47
1972	73	40	49
1974	74	40	50
1976	72	41	51
1978	71	45	51
1980	72	39	52
1982	70	45	47
1984	**	32	42
1986	71	**	52
1988	**	41	21
1990	70	54	63
1992	66	36	52
1994	66	56	66
1996	65	53	61
1998	63	42	62
2000	73	41	56
2002	60	29	31
2004	**	43	50

[a]COMPLICATED: Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on (measures internal political efficacy).

[b]NO SAY: People like me don't have any say about what the government does (measures external political efficacy).

[c]NO CARE: I don't think public officials care much what people like me think (measures external political efficacy).

Source: ANES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior
Available at: http://www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/gd-index.htm#5

CHAPTER THREE

IN SEARCH OF THE EFFICACY EFFECT:

DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND CITIZENSHIP

> ... in many cases, though individuals may not do the particular thing so well, on the average, as the officers of government, it is nevertheless desirable that it should be done by them, rather than by the government, as a means to their own mental education—a mode of strengthening their active faculties, exercising their judgment, and giving them a familiar knowledge of the subjects with which they are thus left to deal (Mill, 1997: 127).

INTRODUCTION

As noted in the previous chapter, many scholars believe that deliberative democracy has the power to create better and more efficacious citizens. This chapter provides a more detailed theoretical analysis of how participation and deliberation are thought to improve the skills and dispositions of citizenship. The chapter begins with a general explanation of the theorized claims regarding the educative effects of participation, and then moves to a more specific discussion about the potential effects of participatory and deliberative democracy on political efficacy. Next, the chapter turns to an examination of the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting and discusses why the design of this deliberative process is expected to benefit citizens and improve perceptions of political efficacy. The chapter concludes with a review of previous research on these issues. Specifically, it reviews research that assesses the impact on efficacy of participation in traditional political activities (i.e., voting, campaign activities, protest activities, and activism), participation in workplace/industrial democracies, and participation in direct democracy (i.e., ballot initiatives, referenda, and town meetings). It

also reviews research that focuses specifically on deliberative democracy processes, including research that broadly examines the effects of deliberation on the skills and dispositions of citizenship, and research that specifically examines the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting.

THE EDUCATIVE EFFECTS OF PARTICIPATION

As Morrell (1998) notes, arguments for direct participation by citizens in political decision making have existed at least since Aristotle, who wrote that "man is by nature a animal intended to live in a polis." In recent history, however, arguments for participatory democracy (re)emerged in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s in the literature of the student movement (e.g., Adelson, 1972; Daniels, 1969; Myers, 1989; Sale 1973; Stewart, 1976) and in the works of political scholars such as Bachrach (1971, 1975), Kaufman (1960), Macpherson (1967, 1973, 1977), and Pateman (1970). Although the modern participatory model of democracy was developed during the turbulence of the 1960s[3], many of its ideas originate in the classic works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and

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[3] Although it is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is interesting to hypothesize about why the ideas of participatory democracy reemerged in the U.S. during the 1960s and 1970s. At the nation's founding, only the landed aristocracy, about 10 to 16 percent of the nation's population, had the right to vote. This reflected the widely held idea that only educated citizens were capable of wisely leading and influencing the activities of government. It would take almost two centuries before all citizens of legal voting age would be allowed the rights of suffrage without any obstacles.

Religious prerequisites for voting were eliminated in 1810, and by the 1850s, property ownership and tax requirements were also eliminated, thereby extending voting rights to almost all adult white male citizens. In 1870, the 15th Amendment to the Constitution was passed. In theory, this amendment gave former slaves the right to vote, thus protecting the voting rights of most adult male citizens regardless of race. In practice, however, a series of impediments such as literacy tests, poll taxes and grandfather clauses were often instituted to keep black males from voting. In 1920, voting rights were extended to women with the passage of the 19th Amendment. In 1924, the Indian Citizenship Act granted all Native Americans the rights of citizenship, including the right to vote in federal elections. Finally, in 1971, the 26th Amendment set the minimum voting age at 18.

Despite the establishment of voting rights, there were still problems in gaining access to those rights. Beginning in the late 1950s, efforts were made to ensure the guarantee of voting rights to all citizens. In 1957, the Civil Rights Act was passed. This law was the first aimed at implementing the 15th Amendment; it established the Civil Rights Commission to investigate voter discrimination, among other duties. In 1965,

John Stuart Mill and have been seen in the New England town meetings for more than two centuries (Rimmerman, 2001).

Participatory democracy emphasizes the broad involvement of constituents in the direction and operation of political systems. The word "democracy" implies that such governments would rely on and encourage the participation of their citizens; after all, its etymological roots are found in the Greek words *demos* and *kratos*, which combine to suggest that "the people rule." However, as noted in the previous chapter, traditional representative democracy tends to limit citizen participation to voting, leaving the main work of governance to professional political elite. Pateman (1970: 1) claims,

> the widely accepted theory of democracy (so widely accepted that one might call it the orthodox doctrine) is one in which the concept of participation has only the most minimal role. Indeed, not only has it a minimal role but a prominent feature of recent theories of democracy is the emphasis placed on the dangers inherent in widespread popular participation in politics.

In contrast, the "theory of participatory democracy is built round the central assertion that individuals and their institutions cannot be considered in isolation from one another" (Pateman, 1970: 42). Participatory democracy seeks to broaden the range of people who have access to such opportunities; it strives to create opportunities for all

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the Voting Rights Act was passed to protect the rights of minority voters and eliminate voting barriers such as the literacy test. The Act was expanded and renewed in 1970, 1975, and 1982. In 1966, poll taxes were found to be unconstitutional by Supreme Court, and in 1975, literacy requirements were permanently banned with the decision of *Oregon* v. *Mitchell.* The Supreme Court's opinion was written by Judge Hugo Black, who cited the "long history of the discriminatory use of literacy tests to disenfranchise voters on account of their race" as the reason for the decision (for en excellent review of the history of the vote in America, see Keyssar, 2000).

This brief history demonstrates that until relatively recently, the primary concerns about citizen participation were in gaining and guaranteeing the right of all citizens to vote for representation in government. Once these rights were firmly established, the debate about the role of the citizen in government changed drastically; a new debate emerged – one that was focused on the extent, character, and nature of citizen participation in the work of government. Until this point, the "dominant theory of American government [had] emphasized the representative nature of government instead of direct participation by the citizenry in day-to-day activities of the state" (Stewart, 1976: 1).

members of a political group to make meaningful contributions to all stages of public

decision making.

> Democratic participation…is a process in which persons formulate,
> discuss, and decide public issues that are important to them and directly
> affect their lives. It is a process that is more or less continuous, conducted
> on a face-to-face basis, in which participants have roughly an equal say in
> all stages, from formulation of issues to the determination of policies.
> From this definition it follows that demonstrations, sit-ins, confrontations,
> and pressure group bargaining on the one hand, and voting, speech
> making, and campaigning on the other, do not, singly or together,
> constitute democratic participation. All these forms of political action are
> legitimate and essential attributes of a democratic polity, and some are
> important if not vital means to the realization of democratic participation.
> However, among other things, none of them affords the individual the
> opportunity to engage in the decision making process on a regular face-to-
> face basis (Bachrach, 1975: 41).

Deliberative democracy is closely related to participatory democracy; the primary

difference concerns the extent and nature of deliberation or reasoned discussion among

participants in the process – it is given more weight and emphasis in deliberative

democracy than in participatory democracy. As Mansbridge (1995) notes,

> Recently the focus of many democratic theories has shifted from the
> educative functions of democracy to its deliberative functions. Each is the
> means to the other's end. Good deliberation ought to educate the
> participants on their interests, clarifying both underlying conflicts and the
> good of the whole. Educated participants, in turn, will be more likely to
> produce good deliberation, which takes the ideas of each into account,
> fosters commonality when appropriate, indicates which issues the group
> handle [sic] with the methods of conflict, and creates, through the
> deliberative process, mutually satisfactory understandings.

Despite the minor differences, deliberative democracy is heavily predicated on the theory

of participatory democracy; thus, it makes sense, and is necessary, to start this theoretical

examination with participatory democracy.

As noted in the previous chapter, most participatory and deliberative democrats

accept that some institutions of representation must exist for the system to function well;

the sheer size and scope of the polity makes a pure participative or deliberative system of

governance all but impossible. However, many also argue that citizens need to be

provided with greater institutional opportunities to participate in the decisions that affect

their lives. The "moral imperative" of democracy means that

> each individual should have the right to participate in making decisions
> that significantly and directly affect his life. In the absence of this right
> and its effective exercise, the political system cannot be considered
> democratic: without them, the system cannot respond to the real interests
> of the people. In other words, when the boundaries between the social and
> the political sectors are set at a place that prevents the political system
> from facilitating the political development of all its citizens, then only
> those who have the private resources for this kind of development can
> articulate their real interests and cross the boundary into the political. A
> significant number are thus blocked from making the conversion from
> feelings and moods to articulated preferences (Bachrach, 1975: 44).

A primary reason for the argument in favor of participatory and deliberative

democracy is that such experiences have beneficial effects on individuals' moral and

political development, and otherwise transform citizens in positive ways (e.g., Barber,

1984; Elster, 1998; Fearon, 1998; Mansbridge, 1980, 1995; Mason, 1982; Morrell, 1998;

Pateman, 1970; Thompson, 1970). The development of

> the necessary individual attitudes and psychological qualities…takes place
> through the process of participation itself. The major function of
> participation in the theory of participatory democracy is therefore an
> educative one, educative in the very widest sense, including both the
> psychological aspect and the gaining of practice in democratic skills and
> procedures (Pateman, 1970: 42).

Thus, according to participatory and deliberative theorists, democratic participation has

intrinsic value:

> were individuals more broadly empowered, especially in the institutions
> that have the most impact on their everyday lives (workplaces, schools,
> local governments, etc.), their experiences would have transformative
> effects: they would become more public-spirited, more tolerant, more
> knowledgeable, more attentive to the interests of others, and more probing

of their own interests. These transformations would improve the workings of higher-level representative institutions, as well as mitigate – if not remove – the threats democracy is held to pose to rights, pluralism, and governability (Warren, 1992: 8).

In other words, "participation is an essential means for the individual to discover his real needs through the intervening discovery of himself as a social human being" (Bachrach, 1975: 40; see also Cunningham, 2002). This "self-transformation thesis" rests on three assumptions that stand in contrast to those of standard liberal democracy.

> The first is that increased democracy transforms individualistic and conflicting interests into common and nonconflicting ones, in the process developing capacities of citizenship that reduce factional threats to rights and pluralism. Second, because these transformations reduce conflict, they allow reduced use of power as a medium of political interaction. This would increase consensus and governability, as well as being desirable in its own right. Third, far from being a threat to the dimensions of the self protected by rights and freedoms, democracy is necessary to the values of self-development, autonomy, and self-governance – the values that rights and freedoms presumably are designed to protect (Warren, 1992: 8).

Carole Pateman (1970) is often credited with both sowing the seeds of this self-transformation thesis and providing one of the clearest arguments about the possible beneficial effects of participation for citizens. However, as Mansbridge (1995) points out, it was Arnold Kaufman (1960: 272) who coined the phrase "participatory democracy," and explained its intrinsic value, arguing that

> democracy of participation may have many beneficial consequences, but its main justifying function is and always has been, not the extent to which it protects or stabilizes a community, but the contribution it can make to the development of human powers of thought, feeling and action.

In her seminal work, *Participation and Democratic Theory*, Pateman (1970) refined the concept of democratic participation so that it required *equal* power for it to have beneficial effects (Mansbridge, 1995). Pateman (1970) asserts that a more participatory democratic society would affect citizens in three areas: education, integration, and

acceptance of decisions. Most relevant to this dissertation is the suggestion that

participatory democracy has an "educative effect" on citizens.

> As a result of participating in decision making the individual is educated
> to distinguish between his own impulses and desires, he learns to be a
> public as well as a private citizen…Once the participatory system is
> established, and this is a major importance, it becomes self-sustaining
> because the very qualities that are required of individual citizens if the
> system is to work successfully are those that the process of participation
> itself develops and fosters; the more the individual citizen participates the
> better able he is to do so (Pateman, 1970: 25, footnote omitted).

In essence, Pateman's (1970: 45) argument is that "the experience of participation in

some way leaves the individual better psychologically equipped to undertake further

participation in the future." Pateman and other participatory and deliberative scholars root

their theories in the work of Rousseau and Mill.

Pateman (1970: 22) suggests that "Rousseau might be called the theorist *par*

excellence of participation." For Rousseau, participation serves three purposes. First,

> the central function of participation in Rousseau's theory is an educative
> one, using the term 'education' in the widest sense. Rousseau's ideal
> system is designed to develop responsible, individual social and political
> action through the effect of the participatory process. During this process
> the individual learns that the word 'each' must be applied to himself; that
> is to say, he finds that he has to take into account wider matters than his
> own immediate private interests if he is to gain co-operation from others,
> and he learns that the public and private interest are linked (Pateman,
> 1970: 24-25).

Second, participation enables collective decisions to be more easily accepted by the

individual. The "participatory process ensures that although no man, or group, is master

of another, all are equally dependent on each other and equally subject to the law. The

(impersonal) rule of law that is made possible through participation and its connection

with 'being one's own master'" leads Rousseau to think that "individuals will

conscientiously accept a law arrived at through a participatory decision-making process"

(Pateman, 1970: 27). Finally, the participation "experience attaches the individual to his society and is instrumental in developing it into a true community"; therefore, participation "increases the feeling among individual citizens that they 'belong' in their community" (Pateman, 1970: 27).

For Rousseau, the most important aspect of participation is the discovery and identification of the general will. The idea is that "[b]y genuinely willing what is good for all, human beings can take up a new identity as part of a larger whole, and can experience the laws that result not as coercion, but as emanations from the better part of their beings" (Mansbridge, 1995). This argument is reflected in the works of various participatory and deliberative democrats who assert that deliberation helps people to clarify, understand, and refine their own positions on issues, begin to think beyond their own self-interest, to include greater concern for others and their community, and enhance mutual respect, recognition, and empathy to create greater understanding among persons with divergent preferences, as well as more tolerance for opposing views (see Chapter 2; see also Elster, 1998; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 2004; Habermas, 1984, 1990; Sandel, 1996). As Pateman (1970: 23-24) explains,

> the only policy that will be acceptable to all is the one where any benefits and burdens are equally shared; the participatory process ensures that political equality is made effective in the decision-making assembly. The substantive policy result is that the general will is, tautologically, always just (i.e., affects all equally) so that at the same time individual rights and interests are protected and the public interest furthered. The law has 'emerged' from the participatory process and it is the law, not men, that governs individual actions.

Rousseau (1953) believes that certain precautions must be taken for the general will to be discovered: factions must be prevented and limited (29-30) and there must be a rough equality of wealth among citizens (55). These arguments may sound familiar as

they were articulated widely during the founding of the American Republic. They are also shared by some theorists of participatory democracy. For example, Bachrach (1975) requires that all participants possess an approximately equal amount of power resources in the formulation of issues and in the decision-making process. However, recognizing that this is all but impossible to achieve in practice, he suggests three standards for judging the degree to which a particular form of political participation is likely to expose or conceal interests:

1. Whether new issues important to non-elites reach the decision making agenda and are seriously debated and considered;

2. Whether the pattern of decisions manifest a shift in the structure of power in the sub polity in favor of non-elites; and

3. Whether the pattern of policy outputs reflects a more equitable allocation of values between established elites and non-elites (Mansbridge, 1995).

Rousseau also asserts that the proper discovery of the general will requires that citizens do not communicate with one another in decision making processes. "If the people were sufficiently well-informed, and if in their deliberations the citizens held no communication with one another, the general will would always result from the large number of small differences, and the deliberations would always be good" (Rousseau, 1953: 29). Thus, while Rousseau favors participation, he opposes deliberation (Mansbridge, 1995). It is on this point that Rousseau's theory conflicts with modern participatory theory. Like modern participatory and deliberative theorists, Rousseau agrees that citizens must think about the course of action that best conforms to the general will; however, unlike modern participatory theorists, Rousseau asserts that

citizens must not communicate with each other during decision making, as communication may serve only private interests and distort perceptions about the general will (Morrell, 1998).

It is important to note that deliberation can occur at two levels: "Deliberation, on the individual level, is defined as 'careful consideration with a view to decision' and, on the institutional level as 'consideration and discussion of the reasons for and against a measure by a number of councilors (e.g. in a legislative assembly)'" (Gutmann, 1987: 52, footnote omitted). For Rousseau, the proper locus of deliberation is at the institutional level (i.e., the assembly); for participatory and deliberative democrats, both individual and institutional deliberation are essential (Morrell, 1998). This closer examination reveals that Rousseau's theories about participation are in some ways inimical to modern participatory theories. In particular, Rousseau's social contract theory diverges from modern participatory theories in at least three ways: "Rousseau's' discussion of the improvement of citizens centers on the role of the legislator and other non-deliberative institutions; the people Rousseau claims are open to the social contract are limited and unavailable in contemporary society; and most important, participation in the social contract does not include dialogic deliberation among citizens (Morrell, 1998: 7).

Given these difficulties with Rousseau, Pateman (1970) turns to John Stuart Mill for the further development of her participatory theory. Mill (1865: 21) recognizes a need for some system of representation in government, but also argues that the best form of government affords citizens "a voice" in the exercise of sovereignty, where "at least occasionally, [citizens are] called on to take an actual part in the government, by the personal discharge of some public function, local or general." Unlike Rousseau, Mill

explicitly acknowledges that if political participation is intended to improve citizens, then it must include communication during citizen decision making. Specifically, Mill (1965: 763) cites "institutions for lectures and discussion" and "collective deliberations on questions of common interest" as forums for increasing the intellectual faculties of citizens (Morrell, 1998).

Mill (1865: 22) identifies two criteria for good government: "how far it [government] promotes the good management of the affairs of society by means of the existing faculties, moral, intellectual, and active, of its various members, and what is its effect in improving or deteriorating those faculties." For, participation allows for the best management of public affairs because it improves citizens' active, intellectual, and moral faculties. Participation in a democratic polity develops an 'active character' because it gives citizens a voice -- a say -- in the operations of their government (Morrell, 1998). Mill (1865: 26) argues that people with active characters are the "best hopes for the general improvement of mankind," because they "are those who, in the long run, do most to make the world better." Mill (1865) also asserts that participation in public affairs improves the intellectual capacities of citizens by giving them both the incentive and opportunity to become educated about public matters. For proof of this assertion, he looks to ancient Athens, where "the practice of the dicastery and the ecclesia raised the intellectual standard of an average Athenian citizen far beyond anything of which there is yet an example in any other mass of men, ancient or modern" (1865: 27).[4] Finally, Mill argues that participation improves the moral faculties of individuals.

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[4] The ecclesia was the assembly in which all citizens directly made decisions about public issues and the dicastery was the jury system in which large numbers, often 500, decided suits brought against other citizens.

Still more salutary is the moral part of the instruction afforded by the participation of the private citizen, if even rarely, in public functions. He is called upon, while so engaged, to weigh interests not his own; to be guided, in case of conflicting claims, by another rule than his private partialities; to apply, at every turn, principles and maxims which have for their reason of existence the common good: and he usually finds associated with him in the same work minds more familiarized than his own with these ideas and operations, whose study it will be to supply reasons to his understanding, and stimulation to his feeling for the general interest. He is made to feel himself one of the public, and whatever is for their benefit to be for his benefit. Where this school of public spirit does not exist, scarcely any sense is entertained that private persons, in no eminent social situation, owe any duties to society, except to obey the laws and submit to the government. There is no unselfish sentiment of identification with the public. Every thought or feeling, either of interest or of duty, is absorbed in the individual and in the family (Mill, 1865: 27-28).

The brunt of Mill's argument is that moral improvement occurs through a psychology of associations where individuals first take into account interests other than their own private or family concerns, come in contact with others whose perceptions on issues are more developed, and create an "identification with the public" such that one's neighbor is seen as an "ally or associate" (Mill, 1865: 28). Mill believes that the educative effect of participation works through the vote and public office (Mansbridge, 1995).

It is by political discussion that the manual labourer, whose employment is a routine, and whose way of life brings him in contact with no variety of impressions, circumstances, or ideas, is taught that remote causes, and events which take place far off, have a most sensible effect even on his personal interests; and it is from political discussion, and collective political action, that one whose daily occupations concentrate his interests in a small circle round himself, learns to feel for and with his fellow-citizens, and becomes consciously a member of a great community (Mill, 1865: 67).

Like Mill, Cole (1919, 1920a, 1920b) advocates a theory of associations, and claims that it is within these associations that individuals 'learn democracy' (for a

detailed discussion of Cole's theories, see Pateman, 1970: 35-42). Cole defines society as a "complex of associations held together by the wills of their members" (1920b: 12) and "assume[s] that the object of social organisation is not merely material efficiency, but also essentially the fullest self-expression of all the members" (1920a: 208). In this view, self-expression "involves self-government" and requires efforts to "call forth the people's full participation in the common direction in the affairs of the community" (Cole, 1920a: 208). According to Cole, if an individual is to be self-governing, then he has to be able to participate in decision making in all the associations of which he is a member, and the associations themselves have to be free to control their own affairs (Pateman, 1970: 36). Thus, like Rousseau, Cole (1919: 182) believes that the individual is "most free when he co-operates with his equals in the making of laws." Moreover, Cole believes that the educational function of participation is crucial (Pateman, 1970). He advocates "the constant participation of the ordinary man in the conduct of those parts of the structure of Society with which he is directly concerned, and which he has therefore the best chance of understanding" (Cole, 1920a: 114).

As Morrell (1998) discusses, despite the strengths of Mill's concepts of participation, his theories do present problems for modern conceptions of deliberation and participation. It is worth briefly noting these issues. First, Mill does not provide an institutional model of participation that is practical and practicable in modern society (Morrell, 1998). Mill (1865: 27) identifies juries and parish offices as examples of institutions in which participatory education can occur. However,

> [t]here will never be enough juries, especially in large nation-states, for participation in them to create the changes Mill desires…The same holds true for parish offices, but with an additional problem. Officials at the local level are either elected or appointed, and, therefore, persons holding

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these offices must either seek them out or be sought out for them (Morrell, 1998: 17).

Second, Mill believes that political participation is valuable not because it gives citizens avenues of control over their lives, but because it educates citizens to recognize and identify the wisest members of society (Morrell, 1998). In other words, participation causes an "increase in intelligence" and a "progress of … mental cultivation" that gives the masses the intellectual capacity to "judge for themselves of the persons who are and are not entitled" to deference and power in political decision making (Mill, 1965: 765). This argument for a political elite is inconsistent with contemporary participatory democratic thought, although at some level, it is consistent with modern pressures for professional, technocratic policy making. Nevertheless, as Pateman (1970: 33) notes, Mill's "educationally crucial local political level might give scope for direct participation in decision making." For Mill, the real educative effects of participation are most likely to occur at the local level, because local issues most directly affect people and their everyday lives, and one has the best chance of serving on a local body (Pateman, 1970).

In sum, theorists of participatory and deliberative democracy assert that participatory political action should have beneficial and positive effects on the individual's moral and political development (e.g., Mansbridge, 1980, 1995; Mason, 1982; Pateman, 1970; Thompson, 1970). Thus, irrespective of the value of participatory and deliberative democracy in promoting or achieving "instrumental" goals (Parry, 1972), participatory and deliberative scholars advocate for higher levels of mass participation because of its value in terms of individual self-actualization and its positive effects on human character (Finkel, 1985). As Pateman (1970: 24-25), notes

the central feature of participation is an educative one, using the term education in the widest sense. [The system] is designed to develop responsible individual social and political action through the effect of the participatory process … The human results that accrue through the participatory process provide an important justification for a participatory system.

The key psychological variable that reflects these "human results" is the "sense of political efficacy" (Finkel 1985; Mansbridge, 1995; Pateman, 1970). The next section of the chapter examines the specific theoretical links between participatory and deliberative democracy and perceptions of political efficacy.

DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL EFFICACY

Scholars have yet to develop a clear and concise theory of how participation affects perceptions of political efficacy[5]; however, Carole Pateman (1970), looking primarily at the work of John Stuart Mill, provides a strong argument for the operationalization of political efficacy in participatory and deliberative democracy. As explained in the previous section, Mill believes that participation develops an 'active character' in citizens. Pateman (1970) asserts that this concept of an "active character" is akin to the modern concept of political efficacy. Several scholars agree with this operationalization (e.g., Finkel, 1985; Mansbridge, 1995; Morrell, 1998, 2003). Pateman (1970: 45-46) notes, "If one is to be self-governing … then certain psychological qualities are clearly necessary. For example, the belief that one can be self-governing, and confidence in one's ability to participate responsibly and effectively, and to control one's life and environment would certainly seem to be required." Although she acknowledges that it does not fully capture the educative effects of participation, she does

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[5] For an excellent discussion about the theoretical effects of deliberative and participatory democracy on political efficacy (in addition to their effects on tolerance and empathy), see Morrell, 1998.

understand "the sense of political efficacy or competence to be an operational interpretation of, or at any rate part of, the psychological effect referred to by the theorists of participatory democracy" (Pateman, 1970: 46). This articulation resulted in the concept of political efficacy becoming the major psychological quality and educative effect that participation should develop (Mansbridge, 1995).

As Morrell (1998) discusses, the core idea of participatory theory is that when provided with opportunities to participate in public decision making, citizens will develop a propensity to actively address the problems they face. Without such opportunities to address and engage in discussions of public policy, citizens are "reduced to plead from outside the door to the arbiters of their destiny, not taken into consultation within" (Mill, 1865: 27). As one participates in politics, s/he acquires political skills and perceptions of self-competence, which are thought to be qualities necessary for popular self-government and effective control over one's environment. As Pateman (1970: 26) explains, an "individual's actual, as well as his sense of, freedom is increased through participation in decision making because it gives him a very real degree of *control* over the course of his life and the structure of his environment." In addition, the development of this attitude makes it more likely that individuals will participate in the future. Thus, participation creates a circular causal process (Finkel, 1985) whereby "[p]articipation develops and fosters the very qualities necessary for it; the individuals participate, the better able they become to do so" (Pateman, 1970: 42-43).

This articulation of the educative effect of participation most closely resembles internal political efficacy, which reflects feelings about one's competence and ability to participate effectively in government and politics. Participatory theorists also evoke the

concept of external political efficacy, which reflects perceptions about the responsiveness of the political system. The development of 'active character' requires not only opportunities for participation, but also a belief that participation will be effective. Mill (1865: 26) notes, "Endeavour is even more effectually restrained by the certainty of its impotence, than by any positive discouragement." Moreover, because individuals feel that "success depends on the impression he can make upon the sentiments and dispositions of a body of whom he is not one" the "maximum of the invigorating effect of freedom upon the character is only obtained, when the person acted on either is, or is looking forward to becoming, a citizen as fully privileged as any other" (Mill, 1865: 27). In other words, the development of internal political efficacy must be accompanied by the development of external efficacy; to feel confident and competent, one must also feel that participation matters, that government is listening and will be responsive.

As Finkel (1985: 893-894) notes, the effects of participation on external political efficacy can be well understood with the "mobilization of support" theory, articulated by scholars such has Ginsberg (1982), Weissberg (1975), and Wright (1976). Mobilization theorists assert that participation should increase the belief that regime authorities are responsive to attempted influence from citizens (Craig, 1979). The idea is that participation will promote citizens' feelings of legitimacy toward the political system and increase acquiescence to government (Finkel, 1985). In turn, regime stability is enhanced by "inducing citizens to believe that the government is responsive to their own needs and wishes" (Ginsberg, 1982: 182) and by "encouraging [citizens] to believe that they are ultimately controlling the government …and keeping them committed to the existing system" (Olsen, 1982: 6). Indeed, external political efficacy has been closely linked to

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feelings of trust in political authorities (Balch, 1974), the concept of diffuse political support (Easton, 1965, 1975), and more generalized support for the political system (Iyengar, 1980).

Finally, it is important to note that participation must be structured in a certain way for it to have the transformational effects predicted by participatory theorists (Morrell, 1999). Conflict resolution theorists have long recognized that dispute resolution structures affect functional outcomes, and have suggested that interest-based systems are more effective and less costly than rights-based procedures (e.g., Costantino and Merchant, 1996; Ury, Brett, and Goldberg, 1988). Participatory scholars have also asserted that institutional features and designs affect outcomes (e.g., Kaufman, 1960), particularly in workplace settings (Form, 1973; Greenberg, Grunberg, and Daniel, 1996; Lipset, 1962; Pateman, 1970; Sheppard and Herrick, 1972; Sobel, 1993). Indeed, Kaufman (1960: 272) asserts that "different institutional forms of democracy may be and are defended on the basis of different functional outcomes." It holds then that the design features of deliberative processes are also likely to affect outcomes.

While some scholars theorize about how the design choices of deliberative processes affect outcomes (e.g., Fung, 2003, 2005; see also Fung and Wright, 2003), others look beyond the institutions in which participation takes place and examine the democratic structure of participation (e.g., Barber, 1984). For example, Benjamin Barber (1984) asserts that the participatory structure must be in harmony with the norms of strong democracy to have beneficial effects on citizens (Morrell, 1998). He argues that contemporary liberal democracy is "thin democracy" and is based on poor conceptual, epistemological, and psychological frames. According to Barber (1984), liberal, "thin"

democracy reduces politics to bargaining and exchange, and thus limits the effects participation can have on citizens. In contrast, "strong democracy" (as can be found in participatory and deliberative democracy) emphasizes the power of politics to transform citizens.

> The stress on transformation is at the heart of the strong democratic conception of politics. Every politics confronts the competition of private interests and the conflict that competition engenders. But where liberal democracy understands politics as a means of eliminating conflict (the anarchist disposition), repressing it (the realist disposition) or tolerating it (the minimalist disposition), strong democracy also aspires to transform conflict through a politics of distinctive inventiveness and discovery. It seeks to create a public language that will help reformulate private interests in terms susceptible to public accommodation (see Chapter 8); and it aims at understanding individuals not as abstract persons but as citizens, so that commonality and equality rather than separateness are the defining traits of human society (see Chapter 9) (Barber, 1984: 119).

Barber (1984) asserts that the transformative power of strong democracy comes from the use of "strong democratic talk" as the process of decision making. Strong democratic talk serves nine functions: (1) the articulation of interests, bargaining and exchange; 2) persuasion; 3) agenda-setting; 4) exploring mutuality; 5) affiliation and affection; 6) maintaining autonomy; 7) witness and self-expression; 8) reformulation and reconceptualization; and 9) community-building as the creation of public interests, common goods, and active citizens (Barber, 1984: 178). Although the first two functions are found in liberal democracy, the remaining functions are "muted and undervalued in liberal theory" (Barber, 1984: 178). In contrast to liberal democracy, which reduces political talk to political speech, strong democratic talk emphasizes listening and empathizing with fellow citizens such that individuals are able to create mutual understanding with others. In its emphasis on the "mutualistic art of listening" (Barber, 1984: 175), strong democratic talk is implicitly connected to interest-based conflict

resolution theory. More specifically, strong democratic talk, as one might find in the "talk-centric" approach of deliberative democracy (Chamber, 2003: 308), is similar to the concept of principled, or interest-based negotiation (Fisher and Ury, 1981; Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 1991). Indeed, the potential transformative power of deliberative democracy is inherently connected to the skills necessary in conflict resolution work: "Conflict-resolution skills, practices, and processes can contribute to the quality of deliberation by assisting participants in expressing their preferences and reconciling differences in them" (Bingham, Nabatchi, and O'Leary, 2005: 553).

Barber (1984) argues that direct participation is intrinsically beneficial and can solve two related problems of the citizenship deficit: citizens' disinterest in politics and their inability to make good public decisions. Moreover, strong democracy and direct political participation can presumably contribute to both internal and external political efficacy. In terms of internal political efficacy, participation in strong democracy can induce a cooperative and active public, or as Mill would call it, a public with an active character. Barber (1984: 236) quotes de Tocqueville to strengthen this point: "the most powerful and perhaps the only means that we still possess of interesting men in the welfare of their country is to make them partakers in the government … civic zeal seems to me to be inseparable from the exercise of political right." In terms of external political efficacy, Barber (1984) asserts that citizens must believe their participation will be effective if they are to engage in politics. "Of course when participation is neutered by being separated from power, then civic action will be only a game and its rewards will seem childish to women and men of the world; they will prefer to spend their time in the 'real' pursuits of private interests" (Barber, 1984: 236).

Although many have argued that deliberative democracy can increase perceptions of political efficacy (see for example Luskin and Fishkin, 2003; Fearon, 1998), as discussed later in this chapter, relatively little empirical research on this issue has been conducted (Bowler and Donovan, 2002). Nevertheless, since deliberative democracy processes are intended to serve a citizen education function, it is reasonable to expect them to increase internal political efficacy. Likewise, since deliberative democracy processes are generally intended to be a method of direct political participation, we can expect them to increase external political efficacy. The following section details these expectations in regard to the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting.

THE AMERICA*SPEAKS* 21ST CENTURY TOWN MEETING

America*Speaks* is a nonprofit organization based in Washington, D.C. Its mission is to engage citizens in public decision making at every level of government (Lukensmeyer, Goldman, and Brigham, 2005; see also www.americaspeaks.org). To achieve its mission, America*Speaks* created the 21st Century Town Meeting, a deliberative process that enables large groups of citizens (from 100 to 5,000+) to simultaneously participate in deliberation around a specific policy issue in a particular political community, whether at the local, state, or national level (Lukensmeyer and Brigham, 2005). The goals of the 21st Century Town Meeting (hereafter referred to as the "Town Meeting") are to engage large, demographically representative groups in public deliberation and to ensure that: (1) all voices are at the table (those of the general public and those of key stakeholders), 2) the priorities of the public get the attention of decision makers and the media, and 3) a substantial segment of the public supports the results of

the forum and has a stake it its implementation (Lukensmeyer, Goldman, and Brigham, 2005: 157). The next following sections discuss the general Town Meeting process and its specific design features.

The Town Meeting Process

The Town Meeting has several critical components: (1) diverse participants; 2) neutral materials; 3) facilitated table deliberation; 4) participation technology; 5) immediate reporting and theming; and 6) links to decision makers (for a detailed discussion, see Lukensmeyer, Goldman, and Brigham, 2005; Lukensmeyer and Brigham, 2005; see also www.americaspeaks.org). First, although participants are to some extent self-selecting, America*Speaks* works closely with sponsors to conduct widespread outreach and targeted recruitment. The goal of these activities is to ensure diversity among participants and to assemble a large group of citizens that resembles the demographic makeup of the community. Second, all participants receive materials that neutrally detail and balance the perspectives on the issue(s) under consideration. This material helps ensure that participants come to the table with at least a basic knowledge of the issues to be discussed.

A third component of the Town Meeting is facilitated table deliberation; participants are randomly assigned to tables that seat between ten and twelve people including a trained facilitator who helps keep the dialogue on target. This component ensures small group discussion, thus, meeting the required characteristics of deliberative democracy (see Chapter 2), as well as the Habermasian criteria for an ideal speech situation (Habermas, 1984, 1990). The fourth and fifth features of the Town Meeting are

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participation technology, including networked computers and polling keypads, and immediate reporting and theming. Each table is equipped with a networked laptop computer that serves as a 'flipchart' to generate an instant record of the ideas produced by participants at the table. This helps ensure that all voices are heard and that no ideas get lost in the discussion. The ideas recorded on each laptop are transmitted to a central database, where they are distilled and brought back to the entire body of participants for further discussion. This is called facilitated theming. Members of a "Theme Team" read the comments from each laptop in real time, and distill them into key themes, ideas, or messages. The themes are then presented back to all participants in the room to "build collective ownership of the group's work" (Lukensmeyer, Goldman, and Brigham, 2005: 159). In addition, each participant in the Town Meeting is given a wireless polling keypad for voting on issues and comparing personal positions to those of other participants. This use of electronic technology enables America*Speaks* to gather, distill, and articulate themes and allows participants to move between intimate, small-scale table deliberations and collective, large-scale group discussions.

The final element of the Town Meeting is its link to decision makers. America*Speaks* works closely with sponsoring organizations to help ensure that decision makers are also participants in the process. Discussion questions and keypad votes are designed to generate information that will be useful to both decision makers and the decision making process. In turn, decisions makers pledge (and are expected) to seriously review and consider the input of participants.

With these components in place, the 21st Century Town Meeting begins. There are brief opening comments from key political and civic leaders to set the context for the

day's deliberation. Participants are then guided through the use of the polling keypads; a series of demographic questions are asked to teach people how the keypads work and to provide a demographic picture of participants. The next step is facilitated table discussions around a vision or values. This allows participants to gain clarity and to identify what is important to them with regard to the topic(s). Over the next several hours, participants engage in intensive deliberation about key issues and policy options. As each issue or option is discussed, information from each table's laptop is transmitted to the "theme team" for distillation and then presented back to the entire room for clarification, modification, and voting. The Town Meeting concludes with an evaluation of the day and a review of next steps. Key decision makers are provided an opportunity to comment on the day's work. Finally, all participants, including key political decision makers, are provided with a report that summarizes the outcomes as developed and voted upon by participants.

As Williamson (2004: 82) notes, "[i]n some ways, AmericaSpeaks provides an ideal model for reform in that it accomplishes so many of the goals of deliberation, by engaging a diverse group of citizens, allowing for meaningful face-to-face dialogue, enabling a large-group prioritization and decision-making, and ensuring that officials respond." Despite the strengths of the 21st Century Town Meeting, important criticisms of the process should be noted. First, America*Speaks* claims that the 21st Century Town Meeting is a redesigned and scaled-up version of the traditional New England town meeting (Lukensmeyer, Goldman, and Brigham, 2005). However, Jane Mansbridge asserts that the 21st Century Town Meeting is fundamentally different from the traditional

New England town meeting[6] (personal conversation with author, December 2006). In particular, she contends that in the traditional New England town meeting, participants are linked by long-term, intimate community relationships. These relationships are absent in the America*Speaks* model. In their place are discussions among relative strangers who have come together as almost anonymous members of the community. This fundamentally changes the composition, nature, and tenor of deliberation (for a discussion of these issues in the New England town meeting, see Mansbridge, 1980).

Second, the issues to be considered at the Town Meeting are determined and formulated by those who contract with America*Speaks* to conduct the process. The contractors identify the issue(s) for deliberation, in conjunction with America*Speaks*, develop the "neutral" materials about the issue(s). These contractors are, in essence, the architects of, and power holders in, the process. To that end, they have the ability to determine the nature and scope of the deliberation, as well as the degree of empowerment that is given to participants in the process (e.g., Arnstein, 1969). Given that the deliberative content does not emerge deductively from the process, there exists the possibility for artificiality in the content of deliberation.

Third, the Town Meeting process of moving back and forth between small group deliberation and large group discussion presents potential problems. The policy options that are ultimately presented to participants for voting are determined by a 'theme team' that is not part of the deliberative structure. This theme team has the power and control to filter and organize opinions and outcomes; thus, there exists a potential for misspecification of the participants' preferences, or worse, manipulation or cooptation of those preferences. Similarly, the menu of vote options is multiple choice; there is no

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[6] Personal conversation with author, December 2006.

room for additional input beyond what can be entered into the electronic polling keypads. Thus, despite deliberation, policy options are presented as either/or voting choices.

Finally, although the 21st Century Town Meeting has greater links to decision makers than most other deliberative democracy process, there are no guarantees that these officials will act upon the preferences of participants or follow through with the deliberated recommendations. Moreover, and as discussed below, there often exist few opportunities for citizens to monitor the extent of implementation progress, and no opportunities for citizens to enforce the recommendations, as they are not binding.

Nevertheless, the design of the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting makes it an excellent deliberative process to study in this dissertation, as many of its design choices create a context within which one would expect to find evidence of the educative and efficacy effects promulgated by participatory and deliberative theorists. Archon Fung (2003, 2005) has done interesting theoretical work about how the design of a deliberative process functionally impacts outcomes. Fung (2005) asserts that deliberative democracy or direct participation efforts vary along three important dimensions: 1) who participates in deliberation; 2) how participants exchange information and make decisions; and 3) the link between the deliberations and policy or public action. In another article, Fung (2003) outlines eight institutional design choices and their functional consequences for democratic governance. These design choices are reviewed below and illustrated for the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting.

The Town Meeting Design

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A first design choice concerns the ideal of the public sphere, or what a minipublic should do. Fung (2003) suggests several visions for minipublics, including serving as an educative forum, acting as a participatory advisory panel, collaborating through participatory problem-solving, and promoting participatory democratic governance. These visions can be arranged on a continuum of how they link deliberation to policy making or public action. Thus, for example, an educative forum, which "aims to create nearly ideal conditions for citizens to form, articulate, and refine opinions about particular public issues through conversations with one another," is far less connected to policy or decision making than a minipublic that promotes participatory democratic governance, which "seeks to incorporate direct citizen voices into the determination of policy agendas" (Fung, 2003: 340, 342). While the Town Meeting serves an explicit educative function, it is better classified as a participatory problem-solving minipublic and/or as a minipublic that promotes participatory democratic governance.

In terms of education, America*Speaks* works with sponsors to develop accessible, neutral guidebooks to help ensure that participants have adequate information to participate effectively in deliberation. The guidebooks are written in simple, clear language to help "people understand an issue and the diverse menu of options that policymakers are considering" (Lukensmeyer, Goldman, and Brigham, 2005: 158). The guidebooks are usually translated into multiple languages and mailed to registered participants before the Town Meeting. Guidebooks are also distributed throughout the community (e.g., to grocery stores and libraries), and circulated to local the press and media. The guidebooks are given to participants again at the Town Meeting, where they are supplemented with additional information such as presentations and videos. Beyond

these guidebooks, America*Speaks* asserts that the format of the Town Meeting has additional educative elements in that the process "gives citizens an opportunity to learn more about important public issues, hear a diversity of perspectives and understand critical trade-offs" (America*Speaks*, 2006).

Despite this educative element, the 21st Century Town Meeting is better classified as a participatory problem-solving minipublic. A critical component of the Town Meeting is that outcomes are tied directly to decision and policy making processes. Typically, a sponsor organization (or organizations) contracts with America*Speaks* to convene a Town Meeting around a specific issue facing a community. The sponsor is generally the public official or institution that has decision making authority on a given topic; however, sometimes a civic organization without decision making power will contract with America*Speaks* to convene a Town Meeting. In these cases, America*Speaks* works with the sponsoring organization(s) to bring decision makers into the process and to ensure that they are committed to responding to the outcomes of the Town Meeting as decided upon by the citizens (Lukensmeyer, Goldman, and Brigham, 2005).

A second design choice involves participant selection and recruitment. Although the most common mechanism is voluntary self-selection, this is not typically the most inclusive selection mechanism, as those who decide to attend such events are generally wealthy, educated, and professional (Fung, 2003). Other options for participant selection include "affirmative action through recruitment" or trying to get participants that are demographically representative of the general community, and creating structural incentives for low-status and low-income citizens to participate (Fung, 2003: 342). The Town Meeting promotes large-scale, demographically representative public participation.

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To ensure representativeness, America*Speaks* examines U.S. Census Bureau data and considers what, if any, special groups may need additional representation at the Town Meeting. America*Speaks* then uses active, targeted recruitment to ensure that all cross-sections of the community are represented. Data collected from the polling keypads at the start of the Town Meeting is later compared to Census Bureau data to determine whether representativeness was achieved.

A third design choice revolves around the subject and scope of deliberation, that is, what issue(s) the participants will consider. As Fung (2003: 343) notes, "the choice of subject importantly shapes the subsequent operation and impact of a minipublic. It determines what, if anything, citizens are likely to contribute in terms of insight, information, or resources in the course of participatory deliberation." As noted earlier, America*Speaks* is contracted to create a deliberative forum around a specific policy issue that is important in a particular political community. Thus, the subject of deliberation is concrete, but the scope of discussion, though structured, is relatively flexible and open.

A fourth consideration involves the mode of deliberation, or how discussions are styled and organized. For example, some deliberative processes aim to provide a space for participants to articulate and gain confidence in their positions; this is particularly useful in helping weaker groups find their voice (Fung, 2003). Other deliberative processes seek to generate consensus or to solve concrete problems; these processes structure dialogue differently. The deliberative mode of the Town Meeting moves between small and large group discussion. This format is important in helping participants to clarify their own positions, understand the positions of other citizens and provide feedback and policy options/solutions to officials.

A fifth design choice involves the recurrence and iteration of the deliberative process, or the frequency of meetings. Educative or participatory advisory panels tend to meet less frequently (and have less need to meet frequently) than those deliberative processes that seek to solve problems or engage in democratic governance. In general, the Town Meeting is a one-time affair; however, America*Speaks* generally encourages clients to create opportunities for future public deliberation on the same and related issues, albeit on a smaller scale.

A sixth issue concerns why the deliberative process exists, or the stakes for participants. For example, the issue under discussion might affect the participants' welfare or involve deeply held beliefs and values. The issue may be one of large-scale public controversy, or might be an issue in which they hold a personal interest. Regardless, the stakes for participants will impact the nature of discussion and deliberation, and thus, constitute an important design choice (Fung, 2003). In general, the stakes for participants in the Town Meeting process are moderate to high; the issues in deliberation are of significant political and social importance and interest in the community.

A seventh design choice involves empowerment – or the degree to which a deliberative process influences public policy, decisions, or actions. This issue is a major point in arguments for empowered deliberative democracy, or deliberative processes that directly connect government or public action to deliberation (Fung and Wright, 2003). Intuitively, it is logical to assert that the degree of empowerment affects numerous other elements in the design of a deliberative process. For example, empowered participants may be more committed to engaging in productive deliberations because their stakes will

be higher. Likewise, if assured that their voices will be heard and used in public decision making, more community members may be willing to participate in the process. America*Speaks* seeks to ensure that policy makers are committed to the outcomes of the Town Meeting and that substantial segment of the public supports the results/recommendations and has a stake in implementation (Lukensmeyer, Goldman, and Brigham, 2005: 157). Thus, there are moderate to high levels of empowerment in the 21st Century Town Meeting process.

Finally, monitoring, or the extent to which a deliberative process promotes a longer-term review of the quality and level of implementation, is an important design choice. The expectation is that politicians and other government officials will take public deliberations seriously, and incorporate deliberative opinions and outcomes into subsequent decisions and actions. Although America*Speaks* generally does little in terms of follow-up after a Town Meeting, possibilities for monitoring and participation in future implementation are often generated as an outcome of the Town Meeting process. However, there are likely low to moderate levels of monitoring over the longer-term implementation of outcomes.

Fung (2003) also examines these eight institutional design choices in relation to their functional consequences. Specifically, he connects design choices to civic engagement as quantity of participation, participation bias, quality of deliberation, informing officials, informing citizens, democratic skills and socialization, official accountability, justice of policy, effectiveness of public action, and popular mobilization. Each of these functional outcomes is explored below and examined within the context of the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting.

One group of potential benefits from public deliberation (civic engagement as quantity of participation, participation bias, and quality of deliberation) concerns the character of participation in a minipublic or deliberative process. As Fung (2003: 347) notes, "[b]y definition, all minipublics aim to increase civic engagement by drawing citizens to deliberate;" therefore, "the quantity of participation is an important measure of success." Design characteristics such as frequency, selection and recruitment, the subject of deliberation, the stakes for participants, and the extent of empowerment of the minipublic all impact the potential quantity of participation. Participation bias concerns the overall profile of participants. Recruitment and selection efforts, the subject of deliberation, the stakes for participants and the extent of empowerment of the minipublic all impact the issue of participation bias. Quality deliberation is not only equal and inclusive, it also should be rational in the instrumental sense that individuals advance their own individual and collective ends through discussion, brainstorming, information-pooling, planning and problem-solving. It should also be reasonable in the sense that participants respect the claims of others and constrain the pursuit of their own self-interest according to the norms of justification (Fung, 2003: 348). Design characteristics such as the subject of deliberation, the deliberative mode, recurrence, monitoring, the stakes for participants, and the degree of empowerment affect the quality of deliberation. As noted above, the Town Meeting is designed to increase both the quantity of participation and the quality of deliberation and to reduce participation bias.

A second set of potential benefits (official accountability, the justice of policy, and the effectiveness of public action) connect public deliberation to state action. Official accountability is affected by design choices such as the subject of deliberation, the mode

of deliberation, the level of empowerment and the degree of monitoring. The justice of

public policy increases to the extent that a deliberative process allows "those who are

politically weak or excluded to form, express, and press for their preferences and values"

(Fung, 2004: 351). Design choices such as recruitment and selection, the subject of

deliberation, the deliberative mode, and the level of empowerment all affect the potential

contribution of deliberative processes to the justice of policy. Fung (2003: 351) asserts

that deliberation can contribute to the efficacy of state action by: (1) creating

"opportunities for those who will be subjected to a policy to criticize it, consider its

justification, and perhaps to modify it"; 2) addressing policy areas where citizens have

comparative advantages in terms of resources or information; and 3) helping to improve

the details of implementation. Design choices such as the subject and mode of

deliberation, the degree of empowerment and monitoring, and recurrence affect these

potential benefits of deliberative processes. As noted earlier, a major goal of the Town

Meeting is to connect the outcomes of public deliberation to state action; the "Town

Meeting restores the citizens' voice in public decision making by creating an opportunity

for the general public to give those in leadership positions direct, substantive feedback on

key public issues" (America*Speaks*, 2006). Thus, the Town Meeting process seeks to

increase official accountability, the justice of policy, and the effectiveness of public

action.

Third, the popular mobilization of citizens is another potential benefit of public

deliberation. Several design factors such as the subject of deliberation, the stakes for

participants, the deliberative mode, recurrence, and the degree of empowerment and

monitoring all affect the potential ability of deliberative processes to create and sustain

popular mobilization. Design choices such as the subject of deliberation, the deliberative mode, and empowerment all suggest that the Town Meeting will produce greater popular mobilization; however, other design features such as low recurrence and monitoring, suggest that popular mobilization may not be sustained over the long-term.

A final group of potential benefits from public deliberation concerns informing both officials and citizens, and fostering the dispositions and skills of citizenship. Advocates of deliberative democracy assert that it can help politicians, public administrators, and other officials gain information. The purpose and vision of the minipublic, the subject of deliberation, recurrence and monitoring are design characteristics that contribute to the ability of public deliberation to inform officials. Similarly, design characteristics such as the subject of deliberation, stakes for participants, and empowerment affect the ability of deliberative processes to inform citizens. A final contribution in this group concerns the function of deliberative processes as "schools of democracy where individual acquire the skills of citizenship" (Fung, 2003: 350). The degree of empowerment, the stakes of participants, and the recurrence of deliberation all affect the potential of a deliberative process to affect democratic skills and socialization. The design of the Town Meeting suggests that it will be effective in informing officials and citizens and in fostering the dispositions and skills of citizenship. As indicated in the above discussion, and explained further in the next chapter, the design choices for the America*Speaks* 21ˢᵗ Century Town Meeting make the process an excellent candidate with which to assess the impacts of deliberation on citizens' perceptions of internal and external political efficacy.

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EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

This section of the chapter reviews the research on participation and efficacy. Despite a resurgence in the popularity of deliberative democracy and the calls for more studies (e.g., Boyte, 2005; Elster, 1998; Gastil and Levine, 2005; Gutmann and Thomspon, 2004; Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003), empirical research on deliberative democracy has lagged behind both theory (Delli Carpini, Cook, and Jacobs, 2004) and practice (Bingham, O'Leary, Nabatchi, 2005). Moreover, little systematic research and evaluation has been conducted specifically on the effects of deliberation on political efficacy. Thus, while the promises of deliberative democracy may be reasonable and compelling, they remain largely untested. Therefore, this review of the empirical literature is broadened to search for the potential effects of participation and deliberation on political efficacy. Accordingly, this review of the research is divided into six sections. The first three sections explore various areas of research regarding participation and political efficacy, including: 1) participation in traditional political activities in representative systems (i.e., voting, campaign activities, protest activities); 2) participation in workplace/industrial democracy; and 3) direct participation (i.e., ballot initiatives, referenda, town meetings). The final two sections look at research more specific to deliberative democracy processes, including research that examines 4) evidence of any effects of deliberative democracy processes on the skills and dispositions of citizenship, and 5) evidence that relates specifically to the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting. In an effort to avoid cross-national differences, only studies conducted in the U.S. are examined.

Participation in Traditional Political Activities

As noted previously, political efficacy is defined as the "feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process" (Campbell, Gurin and Miller, 1954: 187). Using this definition, Eulau and Schneider (1956) were among the first to explore the concept of political efficacy. They assert that participation in politics is determined by the degree to which an individual has internalized political expectations (i.e., 'efficacy') and the degree to which the individual appraises his or her role as being politically significant and effective (i.e., 'relatedness'). They combine these two dimensions of political involvement into an 'index of political relatedness.' Using data from the 1952 U.S. election, they find that those more highly related to the political process are

> more sensitive to differences between the parties, more issue orientated, more concerned about the outcome of the election, more partisan on issues, more partisan in their choice of candidates, more likely to have strong party identifications, more interested in the campaign, know more, are more exposed to the mass media, more likely to vote and otherwise participate in the campaign, know more, are more exposed to the mass media, more likely to vote and otherwise participate in the campaign, than the less related (Eulau and Schneider, 1956: 142).

In short, their research suggests that political efficacy is strongly related to political involvement.

This early study of American voters grounded the research on political efficacy and its impact on participation. Since then, the relationship between political efficacy and traditional political activities has been of great empirical interest. As such, it is perhaps the most voluminous body of literature on political efficacy. This section reviews the research about political efficacy and participation in traditional political activities,

including voting and campaign activity. In addition, it explores the relationship among

political orientation, political efficacy, and protest activities.

Political Participation

With few exceptions, the early studies measured and explored political efficacy at

the individual level, in isolation from macro-level events. Scholars in the 1960s and

1970s generally viewed trust and efficacy as predictors of political participation.

Research linked high levels of efficacy to high levels of trust in political institutions

(Orum, 1989). Scholars reasoned that people who are efficacious and trustful do not have

the need to participate, as they are more likely to feel confident that government officials

will make decisions in their interest with or without their participation (Fraser, 1970;

Gamson, 1968). The hypothesis was that among those who are politically efficacious, the

politically mistrustful are more likely to mobilize and participate than the trustful

(Gamson 1968; Paige, 1971). Research, however, does not support this contention

(Hawkings, Marando, and Taylor, 1971), and sometimes suggests the opposite (e.g.,

Fraser, 1970). In general, research indicates that the higher sense of self-esteem and

political efficacy one has, the more likely s/he is to be an active participant in the political

process (Orum, 1989). Indeed, a considerable amount of survey-based research

consistently shows that those with high levels of political efficacy get involved in

politics, while those with low levels of political efficacy do not (Abramson and Aldrich,

1982; Austin and Pinkleton, 1995; Balch, 1974; Blais, 2000; Campbell, Gurin, and

Miller, 1954; Clarke and Acock, 1989; Converse, 1972; Craig, 1979; Craig and

Maggiotto, 1982; Craig, Niemi, and Silver, 1990; Finkel, 1985; Fraser, 1970; Good and

Mayer, 1975; Hawkins, Marando, and Taylor, 1971; Horwitt, 1999; Langton and Karns,

1969; Niemi, Craig, and Mattei, 1991; White, 1968).

Research on political participation and efficacy often looks at voting and

campaign activities. In addition to political efficacy, a wide variety of factors are

important in influencing voter turnout decisions, including candidate differentiation,

sense of social duty, attachment to relevant groups, resource constraints, residence, the

cost of registering, and the closeness of the election (Moon, 1992). In addition, campaign

activities are thought to motivate voters (Gerber, Green and Shachar, 2003). Studies

generally find that self-confident citizens believe in their ability to participate, and

therefore do so; in other words, voters and those who engage in campaign activities tend

to feel more politically efficacious while non-voters are more likely feel powerless

(Almond and Verba, 1963, 1989).

In one of the most frequently cited articles on the subject, Finkel (1985) uses

1972-1974-1976 panel data from the Survey Research Center to examine the effects of

electoral activities on internal and external political efficacy. He finds that voting and

campaign activities positively influence perceptions of external political efficacy, but that

they have no significant effects on perceptions of internal political efficacy. Other

studies, however, arrive at different results and challenge the assumption that

participation enhances political efficacy. For example in an empirical analysis of pre- and

post-test data from the 1984 National Election Studies, Clarke and Acock (1989) show

that that voting and campaigning have no effect on perceptions internal or external political efficacy.

By the 1980s, scholars developed a more sophisticated view of the links between political participation and efficacy. Until this point, political efficacy was assumed to be positively associated with electoral participation, yet the causal mechanisms were not well understood. Most researchers simply assumed that the causal arrow ran from efficacy to participation; however, research demonstrated that the relationship between efficacy and participation is reciprocal, that is, political efficacy impacts participation, and participation impacts political efficacy (Clarke and Acock, 1989; Finkel 1985; Madsen, 1987). For example, Madsen (1987) finds that internal efficacy is bolstered (though not changed significantly) by activity that results in a desired outcome. Similarly, Clarke and Acock (1989) show that perceptions of internal efficacy increase or decrease depending on whether the individual's preferred candidate wins or loses, regardless of whether the individual voted. Changes in external efficacy in response to political events are even more profound (Clarke and Acock, 1989; Gurin and Brim, 1984). Given these findings, it may be that election (and other political) outcomes, rather than the act of voting or campaigning, are essential to perceptions of political efficacy (Clarke and Acock, 1989). This argument is in accord with the ideas of distributive justice (Pruitt, 1981; Raiffa, 1982; Rubin and Brown, 1975).

More recent research demonstrates that the relationship between political efficacy and voting is even more complex. "Certain people have longstanding feelings of civic obligation, interest in political affairs, and a sense of themselves as voters. These attitudes, or enduring response tendencies, continually express themselves over a series

of elections" (Gerber, Green and Shachar, 2003: 540). Pointing to the fact that various election studies show that socio-economic position, education level, ethnicity, and other demographic variables impact one's propensity to vote, Gerber, Green and Shachar (2003) assert that the underlying link in all of these studies is whether the respondent has voted previously. Thus, they conclude that habit may be the most important determinate of one's propensity to vote. In fact, they assert that the effect of past voting amounts to a 47 percent increase in likelihood of voting in the future.

Finally, increasing cynical perceptions of the political system seem to be correlated with an increase in campaign activities, even in electorates with declining participation (Pollock, 1983). Building on the finding that candidate induced anxiety results in political learning but not political action (Marcus and MacKuen, 1993), Rudolph, Gangl, and Stevens (2000) describe how political efficacy acts as a moderating influence in emotions and its connection to campaign involvement. Specifically, anxiety about a candidate among the highly efficacious drives involvement, while anxiety among those with low political efficacy is of little consequence. Thus, campaign involvement is linked to how people feel about the political situation; the extent of 'negative' effects on campaign involvement is conditional, at least in part, on an individual's perceived ability to successfully undertake political action (Rudolph, Gangl, and Stevens, 2000).

In summary, research has lined high levels of political efficacy to high levels of trust in government. High levels of efficacy appear to lead to more frequent political participation, particularly with respect to voting and campaigning. Likewise, more participation in these political activities generally leads to higher perceptions of political efficacy, although not all studies find this result. In general, the reciprocal effects of

participation and political efficacy appear to be stronger with respect to external political efficacy than internal political efficacy.

Political Orientation and Protests Activities

Another important area of research with regard to traditional political activities concerns political orientation and protest activities. It is hypothesized that "different combinations of efficacy and trust produce decidedly different political orientations which, in turn, lead to either conventional or radical politics" (Bockman and Gayk, 1977: 536). Before reviewing the empirical research on orientation and protest activities, this section provides a brief summary of research on the relationship of demographic characteristics, and particularly race and socio-economic status, to perceptions of political efficacy.

Perceptions of political efficacy have been found to vary with age and gender; older individuals generally feel more efficacious than younger individuals, and men generally feel more efficacious than women (e.g., Lane, 1959). Race has also been found to be a factor in determining perceptions of political efficacy, with minorities feeling less efficacious than whites (e.g., Abramson, 1983; Lyons, 1970; Martinussen, 1972). However, the effects of race on perceptions of political efficacy diminish to the extent that racial minorities are provided with political power (Kleiman, 1976). In fact, although research demonstrates that across the population, blacks exhibit lower perceptions of political efficacy and lower levels of political engagement, these differences disappear

when socio-economic status is controlled for. Thus, middle class blacks are as likely to participate in politics as middle-class whites, while upper-class blacks are more likely to participate than upper-class whites (Orum, 1989).

The most explored demographic characteristic is socio-economic status (SES), perhaps because it is so strongly connected to other demographic characteristics. Verba and Nie (1972) were among the first to study socio-economic status and political participation. They hypothesized and found that individuals of higher socio-economic status feel more personally and politically efficacious and were more interested and active in politics than individuals of lower socio-economic status. The logic is that higher socio-economic status enables higher educational and occupational attainment. In turn, this results in greater accessibility and interpretability of political information and facilitates behavior that is conducive to political participation. Consequently, higher socio-economic status results in higher perceptions of efficacy (Dowse and Hughes, 1972; Kleiman, 1976). This structural view of political participation and efficacy is echoed by Orum (1989). He asserts that those in higher social strata are more likely to have access to political information, engage in political discussions, and have incentive to vote. Therefore, the nature of a class society reinforces and perpetuates lower rates of political efficacy and engagement among those who are in lower socio-economic strata.

Empirical research has shown a reasonably strong positive correlation between socio-economic status and political participation (for a discussion, see Orum, 1989). For example, early research using data from the 1976 University of Michigan presidential election finds that lower socio-economic status respondents are less committed to voting, feel less efficacious, are less interested in politics, and are less politically active than

persons of higher status (Scott and Acock, 1979). In addition, results indicate that participation attitudes are more adversely affected by unemployment experience among those of lower than higher socio-economic status. In other words, there is a consistent relationship between socio-economic status and participation; however, the effect of unemployment on participatory attitudes and behaviors is contingent on socio-economic status (Scott and Acock, 1979).

Underlying this research is an implicit, but often an unstated, concern about political stability. As noted previously, political efficacy is thought to be a key indicator of the stability of a democratic regime. To the extent that there are low perceptions of political efficacy among sub-groups of a population, threats (from those sub-groups) to the overall health of the system grow. Thus, some researchers propose that people who have a high sense of efficacy and a high degree of political trust are more likely to support conventional political ideologies and participate in conventional actions, whereas those who have a high sense of political efficacy, combined with a low sense of political trust are more likely to participate in radical or revolutionary political ideologies (Bockman and Gayk, 1977). Likewise, Orum (1989) describes how citizens with high levels of political efficacy, but low levels of trust are more easily mobilized for resistance efforts aimed at challenging the political establishment and its leaders.

Research seems to generally confirm this position. For example, Pierce and Carey (1971) used data from a survey of black residents in New Orleans to study the effects of participation on political efficacy. From these data, they constructed a single index of political efficacy, as well as an index measuring traditional political activities (whether the respondent discussed politics, tried to influence others on political matters, tried to

register to vote, voted, attended political meetings, helped in political campaigns, and

contacted public officials) and an index measuring political protest activities (talking

protest, boycotting, marching, picketing, sitting-in). They find that as one's sense of

efficacy increased, participation in both traditional and protest activities also increased.

Moreover, at all levels of efficacy, respondents agreed that voting was better than protest;

however, as perceptions of efficacy decreased, the proclivity to engage in protest

activities increased. Pierce and Carey (1971: 218) also found interesting results about the

relationship between political efficacy and one's orientation in the political system:

> The most important conclusion of this paper concerns the relationship of
> an individual's sense of political efficacy to his orientation toward the
> political system in a "participant" or "subject" manner. The participant is
> concerned with both the inputs and outputs of the political process; the
> subject interacts with the system at the output stage. We found that as the
> individual's sense of political efficacy decreases, the orientation is more
> toward output issues and political problems commensurate with a subject
> view of the world. Moreover, those individuals with a lower sense of
> political efficacy are more likely to have been rejected by the system when
> attempting to become participants through voter registration. Thus, the
> degree to which the black citizen feels he can influence political decisions
> is linked to the type of political problems with which he is concerned and
> to the response he receives when he attempts to gain access to the
> participation channels of the system.

Another study using data from the 1972 U.S. National Election Survey finds that

when low levels of trust are combined with high levels of efficacy, there is a high

potential for 'nonallegiant' or unconventional political action (Pollock, 1983). Moreover,

individuals with feelings of high internal political efficacy and low external political

efficacy are more likely to engage in non-conventional political action, and also are more

likely to engage in highly innovative conventional participation. In other words, these

individuals tend to favor high initiative modes of political influence (i.e., campaigning

and contacting), as well as protest behavior.

In sum, perceptions of political efficacy have been found to vary with a number of demographic characteristics, including age, gender, race, and socio-economic status. A significant body of research has show strong positive correlations between socio-economic status and race and political participation. Furthermore, levels of political efficacy and trust are thought to be related to one's propensity to engage in conventional versus radical political action. Those who have a high sense of efficacy and a high degree of political trust are more likely to support conventional political ideologies and participate in conventional actions, whereas those who have a high sense of political efficacy and a low sense of political trust are more likely to participate in radical or revolutionary political activities.

All in all, these studies on political participation and political efficacy provide inconclusive results with regard to the effects of traditional political participation on perceptions of political efficacy. While there are strong indications that participation can increase perceptions of political efficacy, the totality of the results do not provide conclusive proof supporting the claims of participatory democrats. That being said, perhaps the reason for these results is that these studies do not adequately operationalize the concepts of participation and political efficacy. Indeed, the studies use a variety of measures to operationalize the concept of political efficacy, and often do not distinguish between internal and external political efficacy. Moreover, the traditional political participatory opportunities studied in this body of research are not necessarily in accord with the models of participation promoted by participatory democrats. Theorists of participatory democracy would assert that more demanding methods of participation than

traditional political activities (i.e., voting, campaigning, and protesting) are required for participation to have educative and efficacy effects.

Participation in Workplace/Industrial Democracy

Workplace and industrial democracies may provide the kind of participation envisioned by participatory theories. Thus, this body of research may offer more insight into the effects of participation on perceptions of political efficacy. As noted earlier, participatory democratic theorists believe that that participation is critical to the creation and development of democratic citizens. Some participatory theorists assert that participation must extend beyond political institutions to broader social institutions, as it is in these arenas and social relationships that people gain the confidence, knowledge, and perspectives that enable them to be effective participants in society (e.g., Bachrach, 1967; Barber, 1984; Blumberg, 1968; Dahl 1985; Elden, 1981; Greenberg, 1986; Mason, 1982; Pateman, 1970; Petersen, 1992; Smith 1985). Specifically, many participatory theorists view the workplace as a key institution in society for the development of political skills and engagement.

Carole Pateman (1970) was the first to articulate the potential beneficial effects of participation in workplace democracy in what has become known as the "workplace spillover" thesis. The core of the spillover thesis is that "when workplace and job experiences are such that they nurture the desire and the skills to participate in social institutions, people will participate in politics. When work and job are such that they fail

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to nurture participatory aspirations and skills, people are discouraged from active engagement in politics" (Greenberg, Grunberg, and Daniel, 1996: 306). In other words, the "reinforcing nature of participation or nonparticipation at work molds employees' dispositions" both in terms of future participation and the skills and dispositions associated with political participation, such as political efficacy (Sobel, 1993: 341). The assumption behind this thesis is that workplace authority patterns have a "heightened effect" on political participation and skills because the workplace is closer "in time and in kind" to the political sphere (Almond and Verba, 1963: 325). Indeed, Mason (1982) argues that workplace and government experience are similar in terms of the mode, intensity, and quality of participation; therefore, the most efficient and effective way of increasing political participation is to increase workplace participation. The logic is that those who are involved in workplace democracy "are getting [the] experience of participation in decision-making in that side of their lives – their lives at work – where their concern is greater, or at least more immediately and directly felt, than in any other" (Macpherson, 1977: 104).

Pateman (1970) calls attention to two separate, but related, processes in the workplace spillover thesis: first, the connection between workplace democracy and wider political participation, and second, the connection between workplace participation and the development of an individual's personal and political efficacy (Carter, 2006; Greenberg, Grundberg, and Daniel, 1996). Despite her major theoretical contributions, however, one of the major weaknesses in Pateman's (1970) argument is a lack of data: she relies on only one fully worker-owned enterprise, and heavily uses studies of participation in conventional businesses to illustrate her claims. This is forgivable, given

the newness of this research topic at the time; however, almost 40 years later, there are still very few studies that empirically examine the links among workplace democracy, perceptions of efficacy, and political participation (Carter, 2006).

In terms of participation, there is, "modest but intriguing evidence" supporting "the hypothesis that, other things being equal, occupational involvement generates political participation" (Sobel, 1993: 349). Among research that examines singular workplaces, findings suggest that one's job status and degree of autonomy within the workplace is a key factor in determining the extent of political participation. For example, people in non-supervisory, assembly-line jobs tend to participate less in politics than people in white-collar, professional, supervisory, and high-status jobs where work autonomy is more likely (Form, 1973; Lipset, 1962; Sheppard and Herrick, 1972; Sobel, 1993). Similarly, although participation in the workplace is associated with increased political participation, this does not hold equally across all jobs and workplaces. Specifically, variations in the degree of formality in the participatory experience at work affect the kinds of political activities that are engaged in outside of work. In other words, the more congruent the work participatory experience and the outside political activity in terms of authority patterns, the more likely the spillover is to take place (Sobel, 1993). Finally, research suggests that worker-shareholders participate more actively in politics outside of the workplace than traditional workers, and that the longer workers are involved in workplace decision making, the higher their rates of political participation (Greenberg, 1986).

There are only a few studies that use samples beyond a singular workplace to examine the relationship between workplace participation and political participation.

Although these studies generally support the spillover thesis, they have weak statistical associations (e.g., Smith, 1985; Peterson, 1992; Sobel, 1993). Nevertheless, these studies suggest that decision making on the job is associated with involvement in local politics (Smith, 1985; Peterson, 1992) and that participatory acts on the job are a powerful predictor of political participation (Brady Verba, and Schlozman, 1995).

The second element of the workplace spillover thesis looks for evidence that workplace democracy correlates with perceptions of political efficacy (e.g., Almond and Verba, 1963; Elden, 1981; Mason, 1982; Pateman, 1970). Several studies from the 1960s and 1970s found a connection between control over workplace decisions and feelings of personal and political efficacy (for a summary of this research, see Elden, 1981: 53-54). An analysis of 17 early studies on industrial democracy concludes that all affirm the hypothesis that workplace participation increased political efficacy (Blumberg, 1968). Other empirical evidence suggests that workplace participation develops "precisely the skills and resources necessary for participation in political life beyond the workplace" (Elden, 1981; see also, Ambrecht, 1975; Gardell, 1976; Mason, 1982). For example, respondents who report greater participation in workplace decision making reported higher levels of political efficacy and involvement in political activities (Peterson, 1992). Moreover, internal political efficacy is correlated with direct face-to-face participation in workplace decisions, but not representative participation (Greenberg, Grunberg, and Daniel, 1996). Other research indicates that individual control over work and demands on skill are positively related to perceptions of political efficacy (Torbet and Rogers, 1972). Likewise, job autonomy, variety, and responsibility contribute positively to perceptions of political efficacy (Sheppard and Herrick, 1972).

Semiautonomous work groups are linked to a greater sense of political efficacy, while structures that simply make workers more satisfied with their jobs but do not increase their autonomy are not associated with a greater sense of political efficacy (Elden, 1981). Other research suggests a greater sense of embeddedness - the feeling that one's work is meaningful and connects to the work of others - can increase the belief that people can work together to influence their workplaces and communities (Schur, Eaton, and Rubinstein, 2004).

Among the most famous studies of workplace democracy is *Adversary Democracy* (1980) by Jane Mansbridge. In this book, she examines both workplace democracy and the New England town meeting. Her examination of a crisis intervention center that used a participatory approach to management indicates that there may be a relationship between participation and political efficacy. Specifically, she finds that two variables (length of time in the organization and physical proximity to the social center) are significantly related to perceptions of political efficacy. However, in her study, Mansbridge (1980) does not compare participants and non-participants, but rather correlates participants' scores on demographic and other variables with their scores on a political efficacy index. Thus, while her results indicate that participation may have positively affected political efficacy among workers, no causal relationship between participation and efficacy can be established (Morrell, 1998).

Perhaps the most cited study on workplace democracy is Edward Greenberg's (1986) study on the plywood cooperatives of the American Pacific northwest. In this study, Greenberg compares worker-shareholders in the cooperatives with employees of traditional companies.

He finds no significant difference between the two groups' political efficacy scores. Moreover, he finds that workers in participatory settings did not show greater feelings of personal political competence than those in non-participatory workplaces. In terms of participation, he finds that cooperative workers have lower levels of involvement in community organization (such as trade unions, parties, churches) than workers in conventional organizations. However, he also finds that worker-shareholders participated more actively in politics outside of the workplace than traditional workers, although the findings are only statistically significant for community involvement and attendance at government meetings, but not for voting and party campaign activity. Thus, while they did not have higher perceptions of political efficacy, participants in workplace democracy did become more active and engaged in politics. Furthermore, he finds that the longer the cooperative workers had been involved in workplace decision making, the higher their rates of political participation. It is significant to note, however, that a 10-year follow up investigation of three cooperatives, an Employee Share Ownership Plan (ESOP), and a range of conventional firms, indicates that "members of the most democratic enterprises were the least likely to participate in outside politics" (Greenberg, Grunberg, and Daniel, 1996: 306). Therefore, as Carter (2006: 414) notes, "the most important and thorough test of the spillover thesis is inconclusive."

In sum, although there is some evidence that participation in workplace democracies can increase perceptions of political efficacy and rates of political participation, there is considerable disagreement about the magnitude and strength of the effects. For example, Schweizer (1995: 360) concludes that the educative effects of participation in the workplace are "negligible" and Sobel (1993) concedes that his

empirical support for the educative benefits of participation is of only "modest" strength. Given this, Dahl (1985: 98) concludes that the "evidence as we have does not, I think, warrant high hopes for huge changes in attitudes, values, and character from greater democracy at work." Likewise, Schweizer (1995: 364) asserts that the "empirical findings suggest that the democratization of the workplace may not bring with it the elevation of humankind as promised by Mill, Cole, and Pateman."

In response, some scholars have claimed that the empirical literature suffers from inadequate theorizing (Radcliff and Wingenbach, 2000), and a lack of explicit models that contain intervening variables that affect the extent to which participation results in educative development (Greenberg, Grunberg, and Daniel, 1996). To remedy this situation, some scholars offer a respecification of "the simple spillover thesis" that takes into account: "(1) possible variable effects of the domains and forms of workplace participation; (2) the linkage of workplace and political participation by way if the impact of the former on psychological outlooks; and (3) the economic situation of enterprises within which participatory decision making is taking place" (Greenberg, Grunberg, and Daniel, 1996: 308). Carter (2006) takes this respecification one step further, identifying several factors that mediate the impact of workplace democracy on political efficacy and political participation.

While research on the workplace spillover continues, we must acknowledge that the results of these studies do not firmly establish an empirical connection between workplace/ industrial democracies and political participation and efficacy. Again, these problems may be a function of misspecification, poor and differing operationalizations of workplace participation, different measures of political efficacy, and methodological

issues. Nevertheless, the results do seem to indicate that there is some type of relationship between participation in a democratic or participatory workplace and perceptions of political efficacy, although the relationship between the concepts may be more complex than Pateman (1970) first acknowledged.

Direct Participation

This section reviews the research on the relationship between participation in direct democracy initiatives and perceptions of political efficacy. Specifically, it examines the ballot initiative and the referendum, community participation, and the New England town meeting. The ballot initiative (also known as popular or citizen's initiative) provides a means by which a petition signed by a certain minimum number of registered voters can force a public vote on a proposed statute, constitutional amendment, charter amendment, or ordinance. Similarly, a referendum is a direct vote in which an entire electorate is asked to either accept or reject a particular proposal, such as the adoption of a new constitution, constitutional amendment, or law, or the recall of an elected official or a specific government policy. The New England town meeting is an annual legislative assembly in which all or some voters are empowered to conduct the community's affairs. Town meetings first took place in New England in the colonial era and are still largely a New England phenomenon, partly because the region's towns tend to hold powers that are granted to counties elsewhere (Bryan, 2004). Advocates of direct democracy assert that such measures can increase citizens' perceptions of political efficacy (e.g., Bohnet and Frey, 1994). Despite the popularity and use of these methods of direct democracy, relatively little research based in the United States has examined the effects of these tools of direct democracy on perceptions of political efficacy.

In terms of ballot initiatives and referenda, advocates generally adhere to the ideas of participatory democracy, arguing that meaningful political participation through such activities initiatives will increase citizens' political the competence, interest, and satisfaction (e.g., Gilens, Glaser, and Mendelberg, 2001). Most research in this area has focused on the impact of ballot initiatives and referenda on political participation. Smith and Tolbert (2004) find that the use of the initiative is related to increased political participation in terms of voter turnout, civic engagement, political interest, and in some cases political knowledge. In addition, research finds the presence of ballot measures increases turnout in low-profile, mid-term elections (Smith, 2001; Lacey, 2005; Tolbert, Grummel, and Smith, 2001), as well as in higher profile presidential elections (Tolbert and Smith, 2005). Moreover, the salience of ballot propositions is associated with increases in voters' factual political knowledge (Smith, 2002); Tolbert, McNeal, and Smith, 2003), with higher levels of political efficacy or confidence in government responsiveness (Bowler and Donovan, 2002; Hero and Tolbert, 2004; Mendelsohn and Cutler, 2000). Similarly, the combination of salient ballot measures and campaign efforts can raise voter turnout (Smith, 2001).

There has been relatively little research on the impact of ballot initiatives and referenda on political efficacy. Bowler and Donovan (2002) examine survey data from the 1992 American National Election Study, and find that more frequent exposure to ballot initiatives is associated with higher levels of both internal and external political efficacy. Their analysis suggests that citizens living in states with more initiatives tend to have more positive views of their own political abilities (internal efficacy) and look more favorably on the responsiveness of government (external efficacy). Other studies support

these findings. For example, Hero and Tolbert (2004) find that citizens who live in states with more initiatives on the ballot have higher perceptions of external political efficacy over ten-year period (1988-1998). Recent research replicates these findings. Bowler and Donovan (2003) find that variation in institutional design (initiative qualification difficulty and legislating insulation) tends to significant affect measures political efficacy, with the frequency of initiative use as the most consistent predictor of efficacy attitudes.

In a related study of community participation, Berry, Portney, and Thomson (1993) found that respondents with higher scores on an Index of Community Participation (ICP) tended to have higher perceptions of internal and external political efficacy. Even after controlling for socioeconomic status, they found that face-to-face participation is strongly related to efficacy, but more closely related to internal than external efficacy. Using a reciprocal model, they also find that participation plays "a somewhat more important role in influencing external political efficacy than efficacy plays in determining participation" (Berry, Portney, and Thomson, 1993: 270). Finally, they find a greater influence on external political efficacy in cities with high levels of participation among citizens, than in cities with moderate or low levels of participation. However, these results did not hold for internal political efficacy. Rather, internal political efficacy had a fairly strongly influence on participation in high participation cities, a weaker level of influence in cities with moderate participation, and no influence in low participation cities. In short, their study suggests that face-to-face participation improves perceptions of external efficacy especially in cities with highly participatory citizens and institutions, but that it does not increase perceptions of internal efficacy.

Moreover, the results suggest that feelings of internal political efficacy can increase the likelihood that a citizen will engage in political activity.

In short, these studies indicate that ballot initiatives and referenda are related to increased participation, and that frequent exposure to such methods of direct democracy is associated with higher levels of both internal and external political efficacy. It must be pointed out, however, that even though the ballot initiative and referendum are methods of direct political participation, they do not meet the criteria for what Bryan (2004: 4) calls "real" democracy: "in a real democracy, the citizens – in person, in face-to-face meetings of the whole – make the laws that govern the actions of everyone within their geographic boundaries."

The best example of real democracy in the United States is the New England town meeting, as it offers the best illustration of what real democracy might have looked like in ancient Greece (Bryan, 2004). As de Tocqueville (1984: 61) notes, in the town meeting,

> The native of New England...takes part in every occurrence in the place;
> he practises the art of government in the small sphere within his reach; he
> accustoms himself to those forms without which liberty can only advance
> by revolutions; he imbibes their spirit; he acquires a taste for order,
> comprehends the balance of powers, and collects clear practical notions on
> the nature of his duties and the extent of his rights.

Among the most frequently cited studies of the New England town meeting is Jane Mansbridge's (1980) *Adversary Democracy*. In her examination of one New England town, Mansbridge found that residents of the village scored higher on a political efficacy index than did non-villagers; however, village residents did not show statistically significant higher levels of political activity than non-villagers. Thus, if village residence did cause higher perceptions of political efficacy, this result was not a function of

increased participation. In short, her study does not support the claim that participation increases perceptions of political efficacy.

Beyond this study, there are few empirical assessments of political efficacy vis-à-vis the New England town meeting. Even Bryan (2004) the preeminent scholar on the subject, who attended more than 1,500 town meetings during 28 years of fieldwork in Vermont, does not address whether attendance or participation in town meetings impacts perceptions of political efficacy. In fact, Bryan notes that overall, "little research exists on face-to-face democracy [as is found in the New England town meeting], and what there is has little to say about efficacy." [7]

In sum, the results of empirical studies on direct democracy suggest that such practices may have an impact on citizens' perceptions of political efficacy, and especially perceptions of external political efficacy. However, given the surprisingly scant amount of research on the subject, few conclusions about the effects of direct participation on political efficacy can be drawn. Therefore, the next section reviews research that is specific to deliberative democracy processes.

Participation in Deliberative Democracy Processes

As noted previously, there is scant empirical research on deliberative democracy. The few empirical studies on deliberative processes that do exist show mixed results. For example, several studies suggest that under certain conditions, deliberation can produce more sophisticated, tolerant, and participative citizens (Fung, 2001; Fung and Wright, 2003; Gastil and Dillard, 1999b; Gastil, Deess, and Weiser, 2002; Luskin and Fishkin, 1998; Sulkin and Simon, 2001, Walsh, 2003); however, other scholars report that these

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[7] Personal correspondence with author, June 2007.

positive outcomes are rare and not automatic (Button and Mattson, 1999; Hendricks 2002; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2000; Holt, 1999; Kuklinski et al, 1993; Mendelberg and Oleske 2000). In general, this suggests that the possible positive effects of deliberation are far more complex than imagined and dependent on many factors (e.g., Delli Carpini, Cook, and Jacobs, 2004; Fung, 2003, 2005).

In terms of the general effects of deliberation, deliberation has been found to increase participants' levels of political knowledge (Cook and Jacobs, 1999; Fishkin and Luskin, 1999; Hansen and Anderson, 2004; Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell, 2002) and help participants form more reflective, coherent, and comprehensive judgments about the issue at hand (Carpella, Price, and Nir, 2002; Fishkin and Luskin, 1999; Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell, 2002; Mathews, 1994; Sturgis, Roberts, and Allum, 2005). In a study of National Issues Forums, Gastil and Dillard (1999a) found that deliberation had a short-term effect on participants' political sophistication; the effect of deliberation on long-term political sophistication was not studied. Research has also shown that deliberation can result in attitudinal changes for participants. For example, in a study of the 1996 National Issues Convention, a deliberative poll conducted during the 1996 presidential campaign, Fishkin and Luskin (1999) found significant attitude changes and considerable increases in political knowledge among participants. Likewise, Gastil and Dillard (1999a, 1999b) found that deliberation produced considerable individual level attitude changes, but negligible aggregative attitude change.

Given that some research has established a connection between political efficacy and political action (e.g. Pollock, 1983; Wolfsfeld, 1986), some deliberative scholars suggest that if deliberation increases participants' sense of political efficacy, it may spur

more political engagement. There is some evidence to support this argument. In a study of over 1,000 jurors, Gastil, Deess, and Weiser (2000) found that citizens who served on a jury that reached a verdict were more likely to vote in subsequent elections that those who served as alternate jurors or served on a jury that was dismissed or deadlocked

Not all research finds such positive results. For example, Denver, Hands and Jones (1995) found little change in that attitudes of participants in Granada 500, a British public debate program using face-to-face deliberation. Research also shows that although participation can lead to short-term gains in terms of greater civic involvement, it results in little long-term activity (Kimmelman and Hall, 1997; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996). Other research supports the arguments about the social psychology limits of participation (e.g., Cooke and Kothari, 2002). For example, Gastil and Dillard (1999a) found a consistent level of ideological polarization among participants after deliberation, supporting Sunstein's (2003) criticism of deliberative democracy. Likewise, laboratory experiments point to negative outcomes from deliberation. For example, research suggests that deliberation reduces the consistency between attitudes and behavior among subjects and that deliberation can produce decisions that conflict with both expert decisions and subjects' own personal opinions, and thus lead to decisions they later regret (Holt, 1993, 1999; Wilson, Dunn, Kraft, and Lisle, 1989; Wilson and Schooler, 1991). Moreover, some studies have shown that deliberation can cause participants to doubt that a "correct" decision exists (Armor and Taylor, 2003; Iyengar and Lepper 2000), which can leave them feeling more anxious and frustrated about the issue under discussion after deliberation than before (Cook and Jacobs, 1999; Button and Mattson, 1999; Hendricks, 2003; Kimmelman and Hall, 1997).

Most research, however, has not directly examined the relationship between deliberation and political efficacy (Morrell, 2005), and the few studies that do exist provide mixed results. Some studies suggest increases in perceptions of political efficacy. For example, citizens who participate in National Issues Forums report higher confidence in their abilities to participate in politics after deliberation, suggesting increases in internal political efficacy (Gastil and Dillard, 1999b; Doble, Higgins, Begasse, and Fisher, 1996). Likewise, research on participants in the National Issues Convention, shows large gains in political efficacy (Smith, 1999) and increases in participants' confidence in their political knowledge, judgment and influence, as well as greater trust in politicians and elected officials (Fishkin and Luskin 1999). Gastil and Dillard (1999a) show similar results in their qualitative and quantitative research on small deliberative forums held across the U.S.

However, not all research has such positive results. For example, Gastil (2004) found that adult basic literacy students who participated in a National Issues Forum reported significantly lower levels of efficacy than non-participants. Likewise, research on Intergroup Dialogue Programs shows no effect on internal efficacy, although perhaps because participants entered the process with already high levels of efficacy (Walsh, 2003). Moreover, in an experimental study, Morrell (1998, 2005) found no statistically significant effects of deliberation on internal political efficacy. Finally, participation in deliberative forums has been shown to increase political self-efficacy while reducing group efficacy, that is, after deliberation participants were more confident about their own ability to engage in political action, but less confident about group-based political action (Gastil 1999). Given the balance of this research, only one conclusion can be

drawn: the systematic evaluation of deliberative democracy processes and their impact is in relatively early stages and considerably more work must be done before the advocates' claims can be verified.

Participation in The America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting

Since its inception, America*Speaks* has conducted more than forty-five 21st Century Town Meetings involving a total of more than 100,000 people in governance across the United States (Lukensmeyer and Brigham, 2005; Williamson, 2007). The 21st Century Town Meeting process was used for large-scale citizen participation in the redevelopment of the World Trade Center site, the creation of municipal budgets in Washington, D.C. and San Francisco, and regional planning economic development efforts in the greater Chicago area and northeast Ohio. It has also been used to address national issues such as Social Security reform and youth obesity. Despite the number of 21st Century Town Meetings, empirical research on the process and its outcomes is extremely limited. There are numerous articles that describe the 21st Century Town Meeting process or a setting where it was applied, but few empirical studies (see http://www.americaspeaks.org/projects/cases/index.htm). Moreover, there is little empirical research that specifically examines the effects of the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting on participants' citizenship skills and dispositions.

One recent study examines the 21st Century Town Meeting process from the perspective of political leaders. The America*Speaks* process was recently used to engage citizens of New Orleans in the rebuilding of the city under the Unified New Orleans Plan (UNOP). The study found that local political leaders came to support the plan in large

part as a consequence of the 21st Century Town Meeting process (Williamson, 2007). "Interviews with 20 New Orleans public leaders indicated that [the process] enhanced the credibility of UNOP in their eyes by gathering a representative mix of citizen voices and enabling conversation across differences" (Williamson, 2007: 33).

Another case study examines an America*Speaks* deliberative democratic process in Western Australia (Hartz-Karp, 2005: 7). On participant feedback forms, 42% of respondents indicated that they changed their views as a result of the dialogue, 99.5% thought that the deliberations went "okay or great," and 97% said they would like to participate in such an event again.

Some research has been conducted on the *Citizen Summit III*, a 21st Century Town Meeting held in the District of Columbia in November 2003 (D'Agostino, Schwester, Holzer, 2006; Moy, n.d.). A qualitative analysis of interviews suggests that the process was broadly inclusive and driven by the concerns of average citizens, as opposed to government officials or specialists. However, subjects also indicated there was too much emphasis on consensus, which marginalized minority viewpoints and stifled the two-way exchange of ideas. Moreover, participants reported that they did not critically evaluate their values, assumptions, or positions on specific issues during deliberation (D'Agostino, Schwester, Holzer, 2006).

An analysis of panel participants in the Citizen Summit III suggests that participants experienced changes in political attitudes and behaviors, and well as in their perceptions of government (Moy, n.d.). Evaluation of survey data indicates that participants became more interested in national and local politics and became more

politically engaged. Moreover, although participants did not experience an increase in knowledge, they experience gains in external political efficacy.

CONCLUSION

This chapter began by exploring the theories about how participatory and deliberative democracy are expected to affect the skills and dispositions of citizenship. The chapter also examined theory regarding the effects of participatory and deliberative democracy specifically on perceptions of political efficacy. Next, the chapter examined the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting and discussed why its design can be expected to benefit citizens and improve perceptions of political efficacy. The chapter concluded with a review of empirical research on these issues. Specifically, it reviewed research that assesses the impact on efficacy of participation in traditional political activities, participation in workplace/industrial democracies, and participation in direct democracy. It also reviewed research that focuses broadly on the effects of deliberative democracy on the skills and dispositions of citizenship, and research that specifically examines the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting. This review of the literature clearly shows that systematic evaluation of the America*Speaks* and other deliberative processes and their impacts is in the early stages. More research needs to be done before the claims of advocates can be properly assessed. This dissertation seeks to fill that void in the research. The next chapter explains the research design that guides this study.

CHAPTER FOUR

STUDY OVERVIEW: HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY

"Insight, untested and unsupported, is an insufficient guarantee of truth…
insight is what first leads to the beliefs which subsequent reason confirms
or confutes" (Bertrand Russell, 2002: 24-25)

INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides a methodological overview of the study. It first briefly

examines the research questions that guide this study and notes the expected findings.

Second, the chapter specifies the hypotheses and uses previous research and theory to

provide support for both the hypotheses and expected results. The chapter then moves

into a detailed discussion of the methodology used in this research. Specifically, it

discusses the research design, the subjects and procedures for data collection, the survey

instruments, and issues involving internal and external validity. Finally, the chapter

explains variable measurement and construction, and briefly reviews the methods of

statistical analysis used to address the research questions.

OVERVIEW OF STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

As the previous chapter suggests, substantially more research about deliberative

democracy must be conducted before advocates' claims can be verified. As Bowler and

Donovan (2002: 375) note, "[t]he more subtle effects of direct democracy on citizen

attitudes about politics in the United States has rarely been tested." Since political

efficacy is a premier measure of citizenship, it is of particular importance that scholars

assess its relationship to deliberative democracy. To that end, this study empirically

examines the impact of participation in the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting on perceptions of internal and external political efficacy.

The specific methodology for this study is discussed in detail later in this chapter; however, it is useful to briefly outline the research design before exploring the research questions and hypotheses. This study uses a quasi-experimental, longitudinal research design and data from surveys collected at three times from two non-equivalent comparison groups. One group of subjects consists of "participants" in the 21st Century Town Meeting held in Charlotte, North Carolina. Participants were surveyed at three points in time: before the Town Meeting (Time 1), immediately after the Town Meeting (Time 2), and approximately 24 months after the Town Meeting (Time 3). The second group consists of "non-participants", or citizens of the greater Charlotte area who did not register or attend the Town Meeting. Non-participants were surveyed at two points in time: before the Town Meeting (Time 1) and approximately 24 months after the Town Meeting (Time 3).

As noted earlier, this study attempts to better understand the relationship between deliberative democracy and political efficacy. The primary research question is: Does participation in the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting affect participants' sense of internal and external political efficacy? To address this question, additional questions must be addressed, including:

1) Do participants and non-participants differ in terms of internal and external political efficacy *before* participation in the Town Meeting?

2) Do participants have a higher sense of internal and external political efficacy *after* participation in the Town Meeting? If so, what variables affect perceptions of political efficacy?

3) If participants have a higher sense of internal and external political efficacy after participation in the Town Meeting, do those effects last over time?

With regard to these questions, I generally expect that:

1) Before the Town Meeting, participants will have higher perceptions of internal and external political efficacy than non-participants.

2) Immediately after the Town Meeting, participants will have higher perceptions of internal and external political efficacy than they did before the Town Meeting.

3) Several variables, including perceptions about the quality of deliberation, perceptions of the Town Meeting's potential impact, and demographic characteristics, will affect participants' perceptions of internal and external political efficacy.

4) Participants' sense of internal and external political efficacy will decrease over time, but remain higher 24 months after participation than before participation.

The following section details the specific hypotheses and expected findings.

HYPOTHESES

This dissertation examines four sets of hypotheses. The first set of hypotheses

explores differences between participants and non-participants' perceptions of political

efficacy. As noted previously, America*Speaks* engages in targeted recruitment to ensure

that participants are demographically representative of the community. If such

representativeness exists, then it is possible that participants and non-participants will

have similar levels of political efficacy before the Town Meeting (Time 1). However,

scholars argue that participants in deliberative processes are often not representative of

the broader community, and that they differ significantly from the average citizen. For

example, Fung (2003) asserts that deliberative processes (by design or not) have elements

of voluntary self-selection, such that those who decide to attend are generally wealthy,

educated, and professional. Moreover, research suggests that wealthy, educated

individuals with professional careers tend to have higher perceptions of political efficacy

(Abramson, 1983). Given this, one would expect different levels of political efficacy for

participants and non-participants of a deliberative forum. This produces the first set of

hypotheses.

> H1a: Participants will have higher perceptions of internal political efficacy
> than non-participants at Time 1 ($IPE_{P1} > IPE_{NP1}$).

> H1b: Participants will have higher perceptions of external political
> efficacy than non-participants at Time 1 ($EPE_{P1} > EPE_{NP1}$).

As detailed in Chapter 3, advocates of deliberative democracy assert that

deliberation produces higher levels of both internal and external political efficacy for

participants. This study seeks to empirically verify this claim. Thus, the second set of

hypotheses compares levels of political efficacy among participants before the Town

Meeting (Time 1) and immediately after the Town Meeting (Time 2). These hypotheses

get to the heart of the dissertation, and thus, are the most important hypotheses in the

study.

> H2a: Participants at Time 2 will have higher perceptions of internal
> political efficacy than participants at Time 1 ($IPE_{P2} > IPE_{P1}$).

> H2b: Participants at Time 2 will have higher perceptions external political
> efficacy than participants at Time 1 ($EPE_{P2} > EPE_{P1}$).

Although the results of empirical studies about the impact of direct democracy

and/or deliberation on political efficacy are mixed, these hypotheses are theoretically

supportable (see Chapter 3). Scholars of participatory democracy assert that participation

has an educative effect in that it increases self-confidence and skill-development for

individuals (e.g., Barber, 1984; Mason, 1982; Pateman, 1970; Thompson, 1970). Scholars

of deliberative democracy echo this claim (e.g., Benhabib, 1996; Cohen and Rogers, 1995; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 2004; Hunold and Young, 1998; Luskin and Fishkin, 2003). They assert that deliberation helps people clarify, understand, and refine their own positions on issues (e.g., Elster, 1998), and in doing so, can enhance the individual's perceptions of both internal and external political efficacy (e.g., Barber, 1984; Mansbridge, 1995; Morrell, 1998; Pateman, 1970)

Several elements of the 21st Century Town Meeting suggest that in this case, practice may support theory. For example, as noted in Chapter 3, the educative effects of participation and deliberation, including the advancement of political efficacy, are most likely to occur at the local level, because local issues most directly affect people and their everyday lives and this is the level of government where one has the best chances of contributing (e.g., Bachrach, 1967; Mansbridge, 1980, 1995; Mill, 1865, 1965, 1997; Pateman, 1970; Rousseau, 1953). Thus, because the UAC Town Meeting was a local process that focused on local issues, it is likely to increase perceptions of both internal and external political efficacy among participants.

Several other design features of the Town Meeting suggest that internal political efficacy may increase after participation. Among the most important design features in terms of internal political efficacy are the use of targeted recruitment with the goal of obtaining diversity, the educative materials given to participants before deliberation, the deliberative mode, and the use of participation technology. First, people are more likely to feel confident about their participative abilities when they see other participants who share demographic characteristics (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002; Ostrom, 1990;

Sunstein, 2003). As noted in the previous chapter, America*Speaks* uses targeted to recruitment to ensure diversity among participants.

Second, people may feel more confident about their political skills when they receive more relevant information about an issue than would other be available (Bowler and Donovan, 2002). Prior to beginning deliberation in the Town Meeting, participants receive guidebooks designed to provide them with adequate information for effective participation (Lukensmeyer and Brigham, 2005; Lukensmeyer, Goldman, and Brigham, 2005). Participants are also provided with additional information, such as presentations and videos, at the start of Town Meeting. The goal of these actions is to help participants feel more confident about their political abilities. The more comfortable people are with the subject matter of deliberation, the more likely they are to feel internally efficacious.

Third, the deliberative mode of the Town Meeting moves between small and large group discussions with the goal of helping participants to clarify their own positions and understand the positions of others. The process "gives citizens an opportunity to learn more about important public issues, hear a diversity of perspectives and understand critical trade-offs" (America*Speaks*, 2006). Moreover, given the technology used at Town Meetings, participants are likely to see their opinions reflected in the themes projected for large group discussion and voting, not only reassuring them of their political abilities, but also validating their political perspectives. Thus, the deliberative mode of, and participation technology used in, the Town Meeting may contribute to internal political efficacy among participants.

Other design features of the Town Meeting suggest that external political efficacy may increase after participation. Among the most important design features in terms of

external political efficacy are the use of targeted recruitment and diversity, the participatory nature of the process, the links to decision and policy makers, the degree of empowerment offered to participants, and the focus on high stake issues. First, just as targeted recruitment and diversity may stimulate internal efficacy, they may also do the same for external political efficacy. The extent of diversity among participants may signal to them that decision and policy makers are interested in hearing different views from a cross-section of the resident citizenry. In turn, this signal may increase external political efficacy.

Second, the goal and consequent design of the Town Meeting is to provide people with a chance to participate directly in decision making that is presumed to formally shape public policy. This restoration of "citizens' voices" in the 21st Century Town Meeting creates the "opportunity for the general public to give those in leadership positions direct, substantive feedback on key public issues" (America*Speaks*, 2006). Moreover, the participatory democratic governance approach of the Town Meeting, which directly links deliberation outcomes to decision and policy makers, facilitates moderate to high levels of empowerment among participants. Thus, it is reasonable to assert that this shift in the locus of power from government officials to citizens may increase participants' external political efficacy. Finally, we can also expect the process to increase external political efficacy since the stakes are high for participants. In other words, participants may have higher expectations of political responsiveness since the deliberation is focused on issues of significant political and social importance and interest in the community.

The third set of hypotheses deal with the potential impact of several variables on

political efficacy, including perceptions about the quality of deliberation and expectations

about the potential impacts of the Town Meeting. First, although the theory of

deliberative democracy provides reason to support the expectation of increases in

political efficacy for participants, it also suggests that norms of deliberation must be

effectively facilitated for these benefits to occur. Thus, I expect that perceptions about the

quality of deliberation will impact levels of political efficacy for participants at Time 2

(immediately after the Town Meeting). Second, one goal of the 21st Century Town

Meeting is that politicians and other government officials take the deliberations seriously,

and incorporate deliberative opinions and outcomes into subsequent decisions and

actions. Fung (2003) refers to this as participatory empowerment, and indicates that the

greater the degree of empowerment, the greater the potential benefits of deliberation. This

suggests that perceptions about the potential impact of the Town Meeting may affect

perceptions of political efficacy.

> H3a: Among participants at Time 2, perceptions of the quality of
> deliberation will be positively correlated with perceptions of internal
> political efficacy.

> H3b: Among participants at Time 2, perceptions of the quality of
> deliberation will be positively correlated with perceptions of external
> political efficacy.

> H3c: Among participants at Time 2, perceptions of the potential impact of
> the Town Meeting will be positively correlated with perceptions of
> internal political efficacy.

> H3d: Among participants at Time 2, perceptions of the potential impact of
> the Town Meeting will be positively correlated with perceptions of
> external political efficacy.

Related to these hypotheses are subsidiary propositions about the effect of various demographic characteristics on political efficacy. Research shows that political efficacy is influenced by demographic characteristics, including race, gender, age, educational level, and socio-economic status (i.e., Abramson, 1983; see also Bowler and Donovan, 2002). Indeed, socio-economic status (SES) has been found to be of crucial importance in the development of political efficacy (Almond and Verba, 1954; see also Pateman, 1970). Therefore, I expect that internal and external political efficacy will be affected by several demographic characteristics, including race, age, gender, employment status, parental status, education level, and socio-economic.

The final set of hypotheses concerns the longevity of the efficacy effect. If there is an increase in participants' sense of political efficacy immediately following the Town Meeting, then it is important to know whether this efficacy effect persists over time. In other words, it is important to know if participation results in temporary or longer-term increases in political efficacy. Thus, the fourth set of hypotheses compare participants at 24 months after the event (Time 3) to participants at both immediately after the Town Meeting (Time 2) and before the Town Meeting (Time 1).

H4a: Participants at Time 3 will have higher perceptions of internal political efficacy than at Time 1, but lower perceptions of internal political efficacy than at Time 2 ($IPE_{P2} > IPE_{P3} > IPE_{P1}$).

H4b: Participants at Time 3 will have higher perceptions of external political efficacy than at Time 1, but lower perceptions of external political efficacy than at Time 2 ($EPE_{P2} > EPE_{P3} > EPE_{P1}$).

H4c: The gap between participants and non-participants for internal political efficacy will be smaller at Time 3 than at Time 1 ($IPE_{P3} - IPE_{NP1} > IPE_{P3} - IPE_{NP1}$).

H4d: The gap between participants and non-participants for external
   political efficacy will be smaller at Time 3 than at Time 1 (EPE_{P3} -
   EPE_{NP1} > EPE_{P3} - EPE_{NP1}).

Again, theory supports these hypotheses. Theory suggests that the recurrence or

iteration of a deliberative process affects its ability to create and sustain popular

mobilization (Fung, 2003). It is likely that this holds true for political efficacy as well.

The 21st Century Town Meeting is generally a one-time affair, although America*Speaks*

often works with clients to help create additional smaller-scale opportunities for

deliberation on the same and related issues. Theory also suggests that monitoring, or the

extent to which a deliberative process promotes a longer-term review of the quality and

level of implementation, is an important design choice (Fung, 2003). America*Speaks*

generally does little in terms of follow-up after a 21st Century Town Meeting, although

possibilities for monitoring are often generated as an outcome of the process. Thus, while

design choices such as the subject of deliberation, the deliberative mode, and

empowerment all suggest that the Town Meeting will increase political efficacy, other

design features such as low/no recurrence and monitoring, suggest that such increases

may not be sustained over the long-term.

The following sections of this chapter detail the methodology used to test these

hypotheses and determine whether and how participation in the America*Speaks* 21st

Century Town Meeting affect participants' political efficacy. Specifically, the following

sections provide an overview of the research design, discuss the subjects and procedures

for data collection, explain variable measurement and construction, and examine research

issues such as internal and external validity and selection bias. The chapter concludes

with a brief discussion of the methods for statistical analysis.

METHODOLOGY

As noted earlier, the primary research question explored in this dissertation is: What impact does participation in the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting have on participants' sense of internal and external political efficacy? Secondary questions include: Do participants and non-participants differ in terms of political efficacy before participation in the Town Meeting? Do participants have a higher sense of political efficacy after participation in the Town Meeting? If so, what variables affect perceptions of political efficacy? If participants have a higher sense of political efficacy after participation in the Town Meeting, do those effects last over time?

To answer these questions, this study focuses on one manifestation of the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting held in Charlotte, North Carolina in December 2004. The United Agenda for Children (UAC) contracted America*Speaks* to hold a 21st Century Town Meeting about youth policy issues in Mecklenburg County (the greater Charlotte area), North Carolina. UAC is a coalition of citizens, civic leaders, corporations, public entities, and community agencies who collectively seek to ensure a positive future for all children (from birth to 21) in Mecklenburg County (UAC, 2006). The UAC goals are to create and implement a "united action plan that would ensure that all children in Mecklenburg County are healthy, safe and well-educated." The first step toward that goal was the UAC 21st Century Town Meeting, held on December 11, 2004. At that meeting, more than 1,000 people who live in Mecklenburg County gathered to deliberate about youth policy issues and make recommendations to local decision- and policy makers. Three major youth policy areas were addressed, including education,

health, and safety. UAC planned to spend at least the two years following the Town

Meeting implementing the public's recommendations.

Research Design

Over the spring and summer of 2004, I worked closely with America*Speaks* staff

to create a research design that would meet our respective research needs. The result is a

study best categorized as quasi-experimental research that uses a modified pre-post-post

test design with non-equivalent groups (a treatment group and a comparison group). I

refer to it as a modified pre-post-post design because data were not collected from all

subjects at each of the three points in time; the treatment group was surveyed three times,

whereas the comparison group was surveyed twice. Figure 1 displays a diagram of the

research design.

Insert Figure 1 about here

Subjects and Procedures for Data Collection

All subjects in this study are members of the Mecklenburg County, North

Carolina community. The subjects in this study consist of two groups: 1) participants in

the UAC 21st Century Town Meeting (the treatment group), and 2) non-participants in the

UAC 21st Century Town Meeting (the comparison group). Data were collected through

the administration of surveys at three points in time: Time 1 (before the UAC Town

Meeting), Time 2 (immediately after the UAC Town Meeting), and Time 3 (24 months

after the UAC Town Meeting). Data collection procedures for each point in time are

discussed below. Figure 2 displays the number of respondents and the response rates for each time wave.

Time 1 (Before the UAC Town Meeting)

In the weeks priors to the UAC 21st Century Town Meeting, Pacific Market Research (PMR) administered a telephone survey to random samples of participants and non-participants. The sample of participants was randomly selected from the list of individuals who pre-registered to attend the UAC 21st Century Town Meeting. Most participants pre-registered; however, pre-registration for the Town Meeting continued until the evening before the event. Thus, the pre-registration list was constantly changing, and not all pre-registrants had an equal chance of being selected for the telephone survey. This issue of selection bias is discussed below in the section on internal and external validity. Non-participants were selected using random telephone dial technologies. A total of 138 participants and 299 non-participants completed telephone surveys. The overall response rate for both groups was 63%. The specific response rate for participants is 89.2%. The specific response rate for non-participants is 57.3%.

Time 2 (Immediately After the UAC Town Meeting)

On the day of the UAC Town Meeting, all participants received a self-administered survey in the packet of materials provided by America*Speaks* at the event. Participants were informed about the research during the opening and closing statements of the day. Participants were not told what the research was about; rather, they were simply informed that they would be asked to complete the survey in their materials at the

end of the day. At the close of the Town Meeting, participants were reminded to complete the survey and return it to a drop-box before leaving the event. They were also provided with a pre-addressed, stamped return envelope so completed surveys could be mailed at a later point in time to the Indiana Conflict Resolution Institute at Indiana University. Approximately 1,103 individuals attended the event. Of these, 676 were pre-registrants, 187 were walk-in participants, and about 240 were walk-ins that were not accounted for at the registration table. A total of 525 participants completed surveys, yielding a response rate of about 47.6%. Non-participants were not surveyed at Time 2.

Time 3 (18 Months After the UAC Town Meeting)

The final round of data collection took place approximately 24 months after the UAC Town Meeting. All subjects were mailed an informed consent letter explaining the research, a copy of the appropriate survey instrument, and a pre-addressed, stamped envelope to return completed surveys to the Indiana Conflict Resolution Institute at Indiana University. Surveys were first sent in December 2006, and again to all non-respondents in February 2007. Subjects for this round of data collection included participants in the UAC 21st Century Town Meeting who were accounted for at the registration table, as well as all non-participants surveyed at Time 1 who provided full names and addresses during the telephone interview. Non-participants who refused to provide names or addresses were omitted from the mailing, as it would be impossible to link their responses from Time 1 to their responses at Time 3. With these restrictions, a total of 863 participants and 125 non-participants were mailed surveys. Participants

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returned 140 completed surveys, producing a response rate of about 16.2%. Non-participants returned 40 surveys, producing a response rate of 32%.

Insert Figure 2 about here

In addition to displaying the number of respondents and the response rates for each round of data collection, Figure 2 also shows the potential individual-level data links between surveys at various times. Individual responses for both participants and non-participants can be linked at Time 1 and Time 3 because identifiers were used with the surveys. However, among participants, individual responses cannot be linked between Time 1 and Time 2, or between Time 2 and Time 3. America*Speaks*, in conjunction with the UAC, made the decision about this feature of the research design. The use of survey identifiers at the Town Meeting was not allowed for at least two reasons. First, the time frame within which the study was designed was short, making it difficult to organize and overcome the logistical intricacies of such an effort. Second, and more importantly, both organizations felt that if participants knew their actions were being monitored for research, then they might be less willing or able to participate fully and freely in the deliberative process. Thus, although this feature of the research design creates additional difficulties in terms of data analysis, particularly with respect to selection issues, it was important to respect the wishes of America*Speaks* and the UAC and agree to this condition in the research design in order to proceed with the study. Unfortunately, due to low response rates, only 17 participants and 36 non-participants can be linked between Times 1 and 3.

Survey Instruments

The survey instruments were designed in conjunction with America*Speaks* staff to capture a broad range of information from both participants and non-participants, including demographic characteristics, use of media, perceptions about various issues in government and politics, and perceptions about various citizenship characteristics such as political interest and knowledge, civic engagement, political and social trust, and political efficacy.

Participants' survey instruments vary slightly depending on the time frame of administration. For example, at Time 1 and Time 2, participants were asked questions about their expectations for the event in terms of the potential impact of the Town Meeting. At Time 3, the verb tense of these questions was changed to asses how well their expectations for the event were met in terms of the earlier perceived potential impact. In addition, participant surveys at Time 2 and Time 3 asked subjects about their perceptions of the content and context of the UAC in terms of the issues discussed at the meeting, the quality of deliberation, and perceptions about the overall Town Meeting process. Non-participants were administered identical surveys at Time 1 and Time 3, with the exception of one question that asks whether they attended the UAC Town Meeting. This question was added because it is possible that non-participants surveyed at Time 1 attended the event; however, no non-participants answered this question affirmatively. Appendix 1 contains copies of all surveys.

Internal and External Validity

All research designs have consequences in terms of threats to internal and external validity. Internal validity is concerned with causal relationships and the elimination of confounding variables within a study. External validity is concerned with generalizability, or the extent to which the findings hold in other settings.

As noted earlier, this study uses a non-equivalent comparison group design, without the random assignment of subjects to either the treatment or comparison group. This design controls for many threats to internal validity caused by maturation, testing, instrumentation, and history (Campbell and Stanley, 1966; Cook and Campbell, 1979; see generally Bickman and Rog, 1998). Maturation refers to continuous processes that occur over time and emanate naturally from within the subjects of study (Reichardt and Mark, 1998). In this study, example of maturation might include growing older, having a child, or learning more about local youth or political issues. Testing is a threat to internal validity when the test or recording of an observation affects the results of a later test or observation (Reichardt and Mark, 1998). In this study, an example of a testing threat would be if a participant became more familiar with the survey instrument over time, and thus changed his or her answers.

History refers to specific events, other than the treatment, that occurred between the before and after observations and that could cause changes in the outcome of interest (Reichardt and Mark, 1998). An example of history relevant to this study is if there was a major redistricting of schools in the greater Charlotte area. In terms of this study, one would expect few historical threats between Time 1 and Time 2, because the interval between the periods is so small. Conversely, one might expect a greater threat from

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history between Time 1 and Time 3, where the interval is approximately 24 months. However, history is controlled for in this research design insofar as general historical events would equally affect both the treatment and comparison groups. In other words, events that happened in Charlotte (or in North Carolina, the nation, or the world), would likely be experienced by both participants and non-participants. Moreover, other research about the UAC Town Meeting shows that there were no major political or social issues or upheavals in the Charlotte area from December 2004 through August 2006 (Napoli, Nesbit, and Bingham, 2006).

Nevertheless, this research design does suffer from two threats to internal validity: experimental mortality and selection bias. Experimental mortality, also known as attrition, concerns the loss of subjects in the study, which can create a difference in a before-after comparison (Reichardt and Mark, 1998; Manheim, Rich, Willnat, and Brians, 2006). For example, if participants had a bad experience at the UAC Town Meeting, they might be less willing to complete the follow-up survey and refuse to participate in the study. The potential result is that only those who had a good experience would participate in the follow-up surveys, thus skewing the results. The design of this study prevents assessing mortality rates across all three time periods, since individual responses can only be linked between Time 1 and Time 3. However, between Time 1 and Time 3, there was a significant loss of subjects, as evidenced by the low responses rates of participants and non-participants to the third survey.

A second threat to validity concerns selection bias. Selection bias occurs when the selection process is correlated with the current or future expected value of the dependent variable. In other words, selection bias is the extent to which various subgroups or target

populations are likely to participate in a program, thus affecting the sample and ultimately the results. There are two types of bias: 1) those due to differences in observables (which can be estimated from the data) and 2) those due to unobservables (which are either not known by the researcher or are not easily measured). The unobservables are problematic in that they affect both the decision to participate in the program and the outcome, in this case, political efficacy.

In terms of this study, a particular concern is the issue of self-selection. Self-selection involves "initial selection differences" and "the possibility that, because different groups of individuals are being compared, differences between the treatment group and the control (or comparison) group on the outcome measure are due to initial differences between the groups rather than to the treatment effect" (Reichardt and Mark, 1998: 210). Self-selection is possible whenever the subjects being studied have control over the decision to participate, because subjects' decisions to participate may be correlated with traits that affect the study, making the participants a non-representative sample. Thus, self selection is a threat because the outcome "effect may be due to the difference between the kinds of people in one experimental group as opposed to another" (Cook and Campbell, 1979: 53).

The potential for selection bias is manifest in at least three ways in this study. First, there is the problem of self selection and initial selection differences. Although America*Speaks* uses targeted recruitment, there remains an inherent issue of self-selection. It is possible that many of the participants at the event deliberately sought to be involved in the UAC Town Meeting. Thus, it is possible that the characteristics of participants fundamentally differ from those of non-participants, and that those differing

characteristics are what prompted some (and not others) to participate in the Town

Meeting. Consequently, differences between participants and non-participants might not

be due solely to the experience of deliberation, but may rather be a result of bias due to

self-selection. Second, it is possible that the characteristics of participants who pre-

registered differ from those participants who walked-in on the day of the event. For

example, the pre-registrants might be the more committed members of the community or

activists who are inclined to become involved. If so, this is likely to influence the results.

Thus, responses among participants at Time 1 (who were randomly selected from a list of

pre-registrants) may differ from those who responded at Times 2 and 3 (both pre-

registrants and walk-ins) because of self-selection bias rather than because of any

treatment effects. Finally, there may be self-selection bias among both participants and

non-participants in terms of who decided to complete the survey. This is complicated by

the fact that the survey was administered multiple times. As discussed later in this and

future chapters, these selection issues are controlled for with various statistical methods.

In terms of external validity, it should be noted that the 21st Century Town

Meeting is a highly unique deliberative process, involving lengthy and elaborate

preparation, significant use of new technologies, and varying modes of deliberation.

Moreover, it is a highly managed process, from the development of a neutral statement of

the issue (including issue definition), to intensive facilitation and deliberation, to the

writing of outcomes and recommendations for decision makers. In addition, the process is

intensive for participants, especially when compared to many other deliberative

processes, involving at least 8 full hours of deliberation and discussion. When coupled

with the design elements of the 21st Century Town Meeting, these features raise

important questions about the generalizability of findings from this study. Clearly, the findings are not generalizable across the spectrum of all deliberative democracy processes and applications; however, they may hold in deliberative democracy settings where the observed process shares similar procedural elements or structural characteristics with the 21st Century Town Meeting. Moreover, the findings from the study should be generalizable to other manifestations of the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting, as the process remains constant regardless of the deliberative topic. Despite the limits of generalizability, this research informs the study of deliberative democracy and is valuable to the development of both theory and practice. As noted in the previous chapter, there is a modicum of empirical research examining deliberative democracy. As scholars begin to understand the impacts and outcomes of singular deliberative democracy processes, in this case, the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting, they can use that information to both refine and build theory and enhance practice.

Variable Measurement

This study examines two dependent variables (internal political efficacy and external political efficacy) and eight independent variables (quality of deliberation, potential impact, race, age, gender, parental status, educational level, and socio-economic status). Each variable in the analyses, with the exception of demographic characteristics, is measured with a standardized summative index consisting of several different survey items. The survey instrument included numerous questions intended to measure each construct. Some survey items were taken directly from previous research (Center for

Political Studies (CPS) and American National Election Studies (ANES) survey data).

Other items were developed based on the theory deliberative democracy and the practice

of the 21st Century Town Meeting. Given the variety of question sources, it was

important to test the items and the indices for validity and reliability.

     The general procedure for constructing valid and reliable indices involved several

steps.[8] First, items were grouped into a potential index based on face validity, that is, the

concept that a particular item appeared to measure. Second, principle components factor

analysis was conducted to test the fit of each item within the preliminary index. Third,

items were selected based on both the unrotated and quartimax rotated factor loadings.

Fourth, the psychometric adequacy of each index was evaluated using Cronbach's alpha,

an estimate of the reliability and internal consistency of responses to the items

comprising a given scale (Cronbach, 1951). Finally, items were combined into a

summative index, which was then standardized. In other words, raw scores for each item

in a particular index were added together to create a raw index score for each subject. The

individual raw index scores were then standardized using the mean of 0 and the standard

deviation of 1 (i.e., the mean raw index score was subtracted from the individual raw

score and then the difference was divided by the sample standard deviation).

Standardization is used because these indices have no natural scale. Cases where a

respondent did not answer a question that is included in a final index were omitted from

the analyses. Specific details about this process are reviewed below for each of the four

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[8] Before creating the indices, the data were cleaned. Most of the Likert scale questions had an option to respond as "don't know" or "not sure." These responses were recoded from 99 to system missing so as to not skew analytic results. In addition, negatively worded questions were recoded with an inverse scale.

indexed variables (internal political efficacy, external political efficacy, quality of deliberation, and potential impact).

Dependent Variables

Political Efficacy

Although political efficacy is one of the most frequently used measures of general political attitudes and is thought to be a key indicator of the overall health of democratic systems, there has been considerable dissatisfaction with and debate about the measurement of the concept. The first measures of political efficacy were developed at the University of Michigan's Center for Political Studies (CPS). The CPS time-series scale used six items to measure political efficacy but did not distinguish between internal and external political efficacy. When scholars realized that political efficacy consisted of these two separate components (internal political efficacy and external political efficacy), many attempted to salvage the CPS time series by subdividing the traditional six-item scale in various ways (see for example Acock, Clarke, and Stewart, 1985; Clarke and Acock, 1989; Finkel, 1985; Miller, Miller, and Schneider, 1980; see also Craig, Niemi, and Silver, 1990: 290). However, the traditional measures of political efficacy were still frequently criticized for "their apparent lack of validity and reliability" (Craig, Niemi, and Silver, 1990: 289).

To correct for these perceived problems, some researchers advocated for the development of alternative measures (e.g., Craig and Maggiotto, 1982). In 1988, researchers conducted pilot surveys in conjunction with the National Election Studies

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(NES) to examine items related to political efficacy and political trust. Included among the items were most of the original CPS questions, as well as new, untested measures. Craig, Niemi, and Silver (1990) were the first to report the results of the pilot study. In terms of internal political efficacy, they concluded that researchers can best measure internal political efficacy with four to six items, with only one of the original measures remaining in the new scale. Their conclusions about external efficacy were less clear. They were interested in determining whether the concept of external political efficacy was divisible into regime-based efficacy and incumbent-based efficacy. They concluded that more research is needed particularly with respect to the best measures of external efficacy. In contrast to this research, Acock and Clarke (1990) and Acock, Clarke, and Stewart (1985) conclude that the CPS items are useful measures for internal and external efficacy and that the CPS model works well across a variety of contexts. Their argument is that "[g]iven the thirty-year investment in the SRC [University of Michigan's Survey Research Center] efficacy measures, we believe that it would be premature to abandon these items without additional investigation" (Acock, Clarke, and Stewart, 1985: 1063).

A review of more recent literature on political efficacy shows that the debate about measurement has continued. Researchers approach and measure the concept using and combining a variety of items taken from the original CPS data and the newer NES data, and sometimes even creating their own independent measures. Thus, it appears that there is no agreed upon scale for measuring the concepts. Indeed, one of the major difficulties in sorting out the findings concerning efficacy is that researchers have often relied on different measures (Morrell, 1998, 2005).

The research survey used in this study included most of the original CPS questions, several of the questions from the NES data, and additional questions that were designed with the concepts of internal and external political efficacy in mind. Based on face validity, 11 questions were selected for potential inclusion the efficacy indices. All items are 5 point Likert scale questions with the anchors of 1 = *strongly agree* and 5 = *strongly disagree*. Given the problems with previous measurements of internal and external political efficacy, factor analyses on these 11 items were individually conducted and examined for four samples: (1) both non-participants and participants at Time 1; 2) only non-participants at Time 1; 3) only participants at Time 1; and, 4) participants at Time 2.

For the pooled sample of non-participants and participants at Time 1, the factor analysis extracted four components with Eigenvalues greater than 1. The Eigenvalues for the first two components are 2.283 and 1.999; they explain 38.927% of the cumulative percent of variance. The Eigenvalues for the remaining components are only slightly above 1; thus, they are excluded from the analyses. For the remaining three samples, the factor analyses extracted three components with Eigenvalues greater than 1. For the non-participants at Time 1, participants at Time 1, and participants at Time 2 samples, the respective Eigenvalues for the first components are 2.369, 2.131, and 2.355. Likewise, the respective Eigenvalues for the second components are 1.780, 1.702, and 1.411. Eigenvalues for remaining components in each sample are only slightly above 1; thus, they are excluded from the analyses. For the non-participants at Time 1, participants at Time 1, and participants at Time 2 samples, the cumulative percent of variance explained is respectively 46.095%, 42.582%, and 41.839%. Table 1 displays all of the items used in

the initial allocation, as well as the items used in the final indices for both internal and external political efficacy. More detail about the construction of each of these indices is below.

Insert Table 1 about here

Internal political efficacy (IPE) is measured with the following three items, which ask how strongly the subject agreed that:

1) Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on [COMPLICATED];

2) I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics [MEQUAL]; and

3) I often don't feel sure of myself when talking about politics or government [NOTSURE].

Table 2 shows the rotated factor loadings for the internal political efficacy items, as well as the index alpha score, for each sample. However, for the purposes of constructing the IPE index, the most important samples are those from Time 1. The logic here is that after the treatment intervention (i.e., participation in the Town Meeting at Time 2), one would expect internal political efficacy to change among participants. Thus, the following discussion is restricted to the Time 1 samples only.

The rotated factor loadings for all of the Time 1 samples are reasonable, perhaps with the exception of COMPLICATED for participants at Time 1. It is interesting to note the different values of the loadings for individual samples of non-participants and participants at Time 1, particularly with respect to COMPLICATED and MEQUAL.

These differences are not necessarily surprising as theory suggests that participants may have different levels of confidence with regard to their ability to participate political activities than non-participants (Fung, 2003). Cronbach's alpha, a measure of reliability, is .610 for the pooled sample at Time 1, .622 for non-participants at Time 1, and .570 for participants at Time 1. These values are less than .70, the standard cut-off for high reliability. The low reliability scores are likely a function of two issues. Most obviously, they could be a function of poor measurement, that is, the "lack of validity and reliability" so often noted with political efficacy (Craig, Niemi, and Silver, 1990: 289). The low scores may also be a result of sample size. Comrey and Lee (1992) suggest the following with regard to sample sizes in factor and reliability analyses: 50 is very poor, 100 is poor, 200 is fair, 300 is good, 500 is very good, and 1,000 is excellent. Others suggest that a good general rule of thumb for sample size is 300 cases (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996). Under these criteria, the pooled sample would be categorized as good (n = 437), while both the individual non-participant (n = 299) and individual participant (n = 138) samples would be categorized as poor to fair. However, both of the individual samples meet the more lenient criteria of 50 cases per factor (Pedhazur and Schmelkin, 1991).

Insert Table 2 about here

External political efficacy (EPE) is measured with the following four items, which ask how strongly the subject agreed that:

1) Elected officials don't care what people like me think [NOCARE];

2) People like me don't have any say about what the government does [NOSAY];

3) Elected officials are only interested in people's votes [OFFVOTE]; and

4) Local government is responsive to citizen concerns [LOCRESP].

Table 3 shows the rotated factor loadings for the external political efficacy items, as well as the index alpha score, for each sample. Again however, and following the logic above, the most important samples for the purposes of constructing the EPE index are those from Time 1. The factor loadings for all of the Time 1 samples are reasonable, perhaps with the exception of NOSAY and LOCRESP for participants at Time 1. As was the case with IPE, these differences are not necessarily surprising as theory suggests that participants and non-participants may have different perceptions about the responsiveness of government to citizen concerns. Cronbach's alpha, a measure of reliability, is .676 for the pooled sample at Time 1, .706 for non-participants at Time 1, and .531 for participants at Time 1. Again, the reliability scores may be a function of poor measurement and/or sample size.

Insert Table 3 about here

A final issue should be noted. The low reliability scores suggest that there is measurement error in the two dependent variables. This measurement error is found in other studies of political efficacy (Craig, Niemi and Silver, 1990; or an excellent discussion particularly with respect to internal political efficacy, see Morrell, 1999, 2003, 2005).Given the measurement error in the dependent variables, assumptions about statistical significance are relaxed. In other words, the analyses will check for statistical

significance at the traditional 95% confidence level (p < .05), as well as at the lower

confidence level of 90% (p < .10).

Independent Variables

Quality of Deliberation

Quality of deliberation (QD) is thought to be an important characteristic in

determining the impact of deliberative democracy on citizens (see for example, Cohen,

1989; Gastil, 1993, 2000, 2006; Habermas, 1989); however, there is a "dearth of

measurement instruments that allow researchers to operationalize and quantify the quality

of discourse" (Steenbergen, Bächtiger, Spörndli, and Steiner, 2003). The few existing

research instruments use measurement indices with detailed coding instructions to be

applied to observable behavior (e.g., Gerhards, 1997; Holzinger, 2001; Steenbergen,

Bächtiger, Spörndli, and Steiner, 2003). Survey instruments with valid and reliable

questions that measure deliberative quality have yet to be created. Thus, previous

research was used to create theoretically grounded survey questions for this study.

While there are multiple understandings of public deliberation, all agree that that

substantive discussion among small, face-to-face groups is necessary (e.g., Fishkin, 1997;

Gastil, 2006; Mathews, 1994; Mendelberg, 2002). As discussed in Chapter 3, these

elements are readily present in the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting. In

addition to these requirements, scholars and practitioners have articulated several other

aspects or elements of quality deliberation. For example, America*Speaks* uses three

dimensions with which to measure the quality of deliberation in Town Meetings,

including representation, inclusion, and participation. America*Speaks* describes each

dimension (see www.americaspeaks.org/lab/research/quality/index.htm):

> Representation helps us understand the extent to which town meeting participants reflect the demographic profile of the host community. At the same time, we are working to understand the degree to which town meeting participants reflect the attitudinal dispositions of the population at large as well as larger civic patterns of behavior.
> Inclusion helps us understand the degree to which town meetings, and the table discussions, provide a safe and inclusive environment for all participants to contribute to and be heard. In addition to making town meetings accessible to participants for whom English is not spoken, AmericaSpeaks seeks to conform with ADA criteria.
> Participation helps us understand what actually takes place at discussion tables: do a few well-versed individuals dominate the table discussion? Do participants actually wrestle with trade-offs and conflicting world views? Does the group experience "tipping points" in conversation where new, socially constructed solutions to public problems are produced?

These elements are echoed by Williamson (2004: 11-12), who suggests three important

factors in quality deliberation, including whether 1) there is diversity among participants

who are representative of their community; 2) the tenor of discussion is civil and

respectful; and 3) the event evens the playing field for participation and influence.

Other scholars seem to focus more on the discussion aspects of deliberation,

rather than on structural, procedural, or participatory aspects. For example, two of the

most frequently cited scholars of deliberation, Jürgen Habermas (1989) and Joshua

Cohen (1989), stress the importance of rationality, consensus formation, and the search

for a common good as critical features in quality deliberation. Habermas (1989) asserts

that in a "rational-critical debate" individuals will use "the standards of reason" (28) and

"the authority of the better argument" (36) to address matters of "common concern" (37).

Building on this work, Cohen (1989) identifies freedom, reason, equality, and consensus

as critical elements in judging the democratic legitimacy of deliberation.

Other scholars, however, suggest that quality deliberation requires a period of dialogue that is not focused on problem solving and consensus, but rather on understanding other participants' experiences, perspectives, and ways of thinking and arguing. Such methods of deliberation allow participants to bring "different epistemologies to bear on a common problem, and that can result in a more sophisticated analysis of any public issue. At the same time, dialogue promotes fairness and inclusion by opening up conversation about alternative ways of speaking and knowing" (Burkhalter, Gastil, and Kelshaw, 2002: 411). In this way, deliberation helps to identify shared values and common interests in the community.

Gastil (2000: 22) suggests that "full deliberation includes a careful examination of a problem or issue, the identification of possible solutions, the establishment or reaffirmation of evaluation criteria, and the use of these criteria in identifying an optimal solution." Elaborating on these ideas, Gastil (2006) focuses on the discussion aspects of deliberation, asserting that one important aspect of quality deliberation is the balanced presentation of alternative perspectives such that there is an equal opportunity for voice, where each viewpoint present has a chance to be expressed and heard. He emphasizes the importance of the "balance principle" in deliberation, the idea that "the deliberative process must not be undermined by individuals who take up all the meeting time and refuse to let other points of view be heard" (Gastil, 2006; see also Gastil, 1993).

Building on these works, Chambers (2003: 309) offers a concise definition of deliberation that also speaks well to the characteristics of quality deliberation:

> We can say that [quality] deliberation is debate and discussion aimed at producing reasonable, well-informed opinions in which participants are willing to revise preferences in light of discussion, new information, and claims made by fellow participants. Although consensus need not be the

ultimate aim of deliberation, and participants are expected to pursue their interests, an overarching interest in the legitimacy of outcomes (understood as justification to all affected) ideally characterizes deliberation.

This definition reflects the elements of the discourse quality index (DQI) created by Steenbergen, Bächtiger, Spörndli, and Steiner (2003). The DQI has seven coding categories, including:

1) Participation: the extent to which a speaker is able to participate freely in the debate;

2) Level of justification: the nature of the justification of demands;

3) Content of justification: whether appeals are made in terms of narrow group interests or the common good;

4) Respect for groups: the degree to which negative and positive statements are made about groups;

5) Respect for the demands: the extent to which the demands of others are acknowledged;

6) Respect toward counterarguments: the level of attention given to opposing viewpoints; and,

7) Constructive politics: the degree of consensus building (see Steenbergen, Bächtiger, Spörndli, and Steiner, 2003: 27-30).

As noted above, no survey instruments (or even specific survey questions) that measure the quality of deliberation have been empirically identified or tested. Given this situation, the research survey used in this study was designed with numerous questions that capture various ideas from the literature about the quality of deliberation. Based on face validity, 16 questions from participant data at Time 2 were selected for potential

inclusion in the quality of deliberation index. Sample size is not an issue with this data set

(n = 525) (Comrey and Lee, 1992; Pedhazur and Schmelkin, 1991; Tabachnick and

Fidell, 1996). All items are 5 point Likert scale questions with the anchors of 1 = *strongly*

agree and 5 = *strongly disagree*. All of the items were loaded into an exploratory factor

analysis. The results showed that these 16 questions load into 4 components with

Eigenvalues greater than one. The first component has an Eigenvalue of 5.693 and

explains 35.579 percent of the variance. The remaining three components have

Eigenvalues of 1.881, 1.283, and 1.149 respectively, and, together explain an additional

26.956 of the variance. In sum, the four components explain 62.535 percent of the

cumulative variance.

The rotated factor loadings for the items in the first component were examined;

the remaining components are excluded from the analysis. Further assessment of

convergent validity and reliability resulted in dropping 6 of the items. Among the 10

remaining items, inter-item correlations are high, and factor loadings range from .624 to

.767. Cronbach's alpha is .868, indicating a strong level of reliability. Table 4 shows all

of the items used in the initial allocation, as well as the items used in the final index for

the quality of deliberation.

In its final construction, the quality of deliberation is measured with ten items,

asking how strongly the subject agreed that:

1) There was a diverse group of people at the United Agenda for Children Town

    Meeting [DIVERSE];

2) Participants represented a cross-section of the community [CROSS];

3) Participants worked toward consensus agreements on the issues [CONSENSUS];

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4) A variety of policy alternatives were explored [POLALTS];

5) Participants suggested creative alternatives to the problems [CREATALT];

6) I [the subject] had an adequate opportunity to express my opinions [EXOPIN];

7) The discussions identified shared values in the community [VALUES];

8) The viewpoints of other participants were worth considering [CONSIDVIEW];

9) The discussions helped me [the subject] think more critically about the issues(s) [CRITICAL]; and

10) The discussions helped me [the subject] consider other sides of the issues [OSIDE].

Insert Table 4 about here

Potential Impact

Potential impact (IMPACT) measures the extent to which participants at Time 2 believed that the Town Meeting recommendations would be generally beneficial to and positively affect the community. The survey contains 10 questions that, based on face validity, appeared to measure perceived potential impact. Seven items are 5 point Likert scale questions with the anchors of 1 = *strongly agree* and 5 = *strongly disagree*. The remaining three items are 10 point Likert scale questions with the anchors of 1 = *no impact* and 10 = *great impact*. Responses to these 10 point questions were multiplied by .5 to transform them into a 5 point scale.

All of the items were loaded into an exploratory factor analysis. The results show that these 10 questions load into 3 components with Eigenvalues greater than one. The

first component has an Eigenvalue of 3.379 and explains 33.795 percent of the variance. The remaining two components have Eigenvalues of 1.620 and 1.017 respectively, and, together explain an additional 26.364 of the variance. In sum, the three four components explain 60.159 percent of the cumulative variance.

The rotated factor loadings for the items in only the first component were examined. Further assessment of convergent validity and reliability resulted in dropping 4 of the items. Among the remaining items, inter-item correlations are high, as are the factor loadings, which range from .663 to .752. In addition, the scale rates high for reliability with a Cronbach's alpha value of .825. Table 5 shows all of the items used in the initial factor analysis, as well as the items used in the final indices for potential impact.

In its final construction, the potential impact index is measured with six items, asking how strongly the subject agreed that:

1) The United Agenda for Children Town Meeting helped decision makers and elected officials better understand the concerns of average citizens [DMUNDER];

2) The United Agenda for Children Town Meeting produced information that will improve future decision making [FUTUREDM];

3) Local groups and organizations will work together to implement the recommendations from the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting [LOCWORK];

4) The United Agenda for Children Town Meeting will increase the capacity of local groups and organizations to work together [CAPACITY];

5) Decision makers were responsive to the recommendations of participants during the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting [DMRESP]; and,

6) Decision makers and elected officials will use information from the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting to make decisions [USEINFO].

Insert Table 5 about here

Demographic Variables

In addition to these indices, several demographic variables are used in the study.

Race (Race). In the survey, race is measured with categories of [1] Black/African American; [2] White/Caucasian; [3] Hispanic/Latino; [4] Asian/Asian-Indian; [5] Multi-Ethnic/Other; [6] Unknown. For purposes of analyses, the data were recoded into a binary variable such that 0 = White/Caucasian, and 1 = all other racial groups.

Age (Age). Age is measured with the categories of: [1] Under 18; [2] 18-21 years; [3] 22-34 years; [4] 35-44 years; [5] 45-59 years; [6] Over 60. For purposes of analyses, the data were recoded into a binary variable such that 0 = 18-44 years old, and 1 = 45 and older. Any survey completed by subjects that were under 18 years of age were eliminated from the analyses.

Gender (Gender). Gender is a dichotomous variable with the categories of [0] Male, and [1] Female.

Employment Status (Employ) is a dichotomous variable indicating whether the subject is employed. The categories are [0] No, and [1] Yes.

Parental Status (Parent). Parent is a dichotomous variable indicating whether the subject has children under the age of eighteen. The categories are [0] No, and [1] Yes.

Educational Level (Educ). Education level is measured with the categories of [1] Some High School; [2] High School Graduate (including equivalency); [3] Some College, No Degree; [4] Associate Degree; [5] Bachelor's Degree; [6] Graduate or Professional Degree. For purposes of analyses, the data were recoded into a binary variable such that 0 = no higher education degree, and 1 = associates, bachelors, or graduate/professional degree.

Socio-Economic Status (SES). Socio-economic status is measured with a question about total household income before taxes. Categorical responses included [1] Under $10,000; [2] $10,000 to $19,999; [3] $20,000 to $29,999; [4] $30,000 to $39,999; [5] $40,000 to $49,999; [6] $50,000 to $59,999; [7] $60,000 to $69,999; [8] $70,000 to $79,999; [9] $80,000 to $89,999; [10] $90,000 to $99,999; [11] 100,000 or More. For purposes of analyses, the data were recoded into a binary variable such that 0 = total household income of $49,999 or less, and 1 = total household income of $50,000 or more.[9]

Analyses

As noted above, this study is complicated by selection issues and the fact that individual responses to survey items cannot be linked among participants at all three times. Moreover, answering the research questions requires making and assessing several different comparisons between and among non-participants and participants at various

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[9] According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the median household income in 2004 in Charlotte, NC was $40, 863 (see: http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/37000.html)

points in time. Each subsidiary research question and its related hypotheses are addressed

separately using a series of analyses that follow similar logical progression. In general,

ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are conducted for each subsidiary research

question. OLS is used because all of the items that comprise the internal and external

political efficacy indices are approximately normally distributed.[10] Although OLS is not

the most sophisticated approach to regression analysis, it is the simplest and most readily

understood; therefore, its use allows for easy interpretation by the widest possible range

of readers. These OLS regressions are completed by additional analyses such as summary

statistics and t-tests. In addition, Heckman treatment effect models or propensity score

matching models are also used to generate estimators of the political efficacy differences

between groups.

Although each analytic series is discussed in detail below and in the next chapter,

it is useful to briefly outline their logical progression. In essence, each subsidiary

research question asks whether there is a difference in political efficacy between two

groups (i.e., non-participants and participants, or participants at different points in time).

Estimates of the difference between the two groups are presented using OLS regression,

where one's participation status (i.e., participant or non-participant, or participant at a

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[10] A skewness statistic was calculated for each item in the IPE and EPE indices. A skewness value of less than 1 suggests that the responses to the item are normally distributed. The skewness statistics for the items in each index are:

Index	Item	Skewness	
		Statistic	Std. Error
IPE	COMPLICATED	-.074	.125
	MEQUAL	.650	.125
	NOTSURE	-.162	.125
EPE	NOCARE	-.111	.125
	NOSAY	-.086	.125
	OFFVOTE	-.159	.125
	LOCRESP	.273	.125

certain point in time) is the only independent variable. However, the resulting OLS

estimates of the difference between the two groups are likely to be biased due to selection

issues. Moreover, it is highly probable that other variables besides participation status

affect political efficacy among the subjects in this study. For example, a significant body

of research indicates that political efficacy is correlated with demographic characteristics

and that demographic characteristics are related to participation (Abramson, 1983; Dowse

and Hughes, 1972; Kleiman, 1976; Lane, 1959; Lyons, 1970; Martinussen, 1972; Orum,

1989; Verba and Nie, 1972). If this holds in the samples under study here, then the data

face a selection on the observables problem.

Several additional OLS regression models are used to test for this selection

problem. In particular, analyses are conducted to determine whether demographic

variables have an impact on political efficacy among the subjects under study. To the

extent that demographic characteristics are related to subjects' perceptions of political

efficacy, probit regression models, completed by summary statistics, are used to

determine the demographic differences between the two sample groups under

investigation. With the information provided by these analyses, the next analytic steps

seek to find a consistent estimator of the differences in political efficacy between the two

groups. First, OLS regression models are conducted where internal and external political

efficacy are regressed as a function of participation status and demographic

characteristics. However, there is also the possibility of selection bias due to

unobservable variables (i.e., data not captured by the survey), which may affect

perceptions of political efficacy among subjects. Thus, the OLS estimators may be

biased. The final sets of analyses employ either Heckman treatment effect models or

propensity score matching models to statistically control for this potential selection problem. The following sections detail the analytic methods used to address each of the subsidiary research question and their related hypotheses.

Question 1: Do participants and non-participants differ in terms of political efficacy *before* participation in the Town Meeting?

The first subsidiary research question concerns a comparison of participants and non-participants. Specifically, it seeks to determine whether there are baseline differences in political efficacy between the two groups before the Town Meeting intervention takes place. At the heart of this question is whether those who choose to participate in deliberative processes have different perceptions of political efficacy than those who do not participate. This question is important because its answer will shed light on the make-up of the engaged (and disengaged) citizenry and help scholars to better understand the characteristics of those who are (and are not) engaged in deliberative processes. Five sets of analyses are performed to explore and answer this question. Within each set of analyses, internal and external political efficacy are examined in separate models.

First, OLS regression models are used to assess internal and external political efficacy among participants and non-participants. More specifically, IPE and EPE are explored as a function of participation, that is, whether one is a participant or non-participant. The resulting parameter on the participation variable will show whether participants and non-participants have different levels of IPE and EPE. These regression models are complemented by an independent samples t-test, which provides a more easily interpreted estimate of the magnitude and direction of differences in political efficacy between participants and non-participants. As noted above, however, this

estimate of the difference in political efficacy is likely to be biased, given the possibility of selection on the observables. Therefore, the second and third sets of regression analyses seek to determine the extent of selection on the observables in the samples.

Specifically, the second regression models assess the extent to which political efficacy varies in response to demographic characteristics, including race, age, gender, employment status, parental status, education level, and socio-economic status. The third regressions are probit models, which seek to determine whether the participant and non-participant samples differ on these same demographic characteristics. If these regression models show that demographics in the samples are not related to political efficacy, then the estimate from the first OLS model will be consistent. However, if the regression models show that political efficacy is a function of demographic characteristics and that the demographic characteristics of participants and non-participants differ, then this indicates that there is a selection on the observables problem in the samples. This problem means that the first estimate of the difference in political efficacy between participants and non-participants is biased, and additional analyses are needed to find a statistically consistent estimator of the difference in political efficacy between participants and non-participants.

The fourth and fifth set of analyses includes linear regression models and Heckman treatment effect models. The linear regression models can be thought of as a selection on the observables model as they examine the impact of both participation (i.e., whether one is a participant or non-participant) and all demographic characteristics on political efficacy. Even with this model, however, it is possible that there is selection on the unobservables, that the error term is capturing the effects on IPE and EPE of other

independent variables not included in the regression equations. To assess this possibility, Heckman treatment effect models are used.

The Heckman approach uses a two equation model that addresses several classes of selection bias, including bias due to self-selection (Briggs, 2004; Heckman, 1978, 1979; Heckman and Robb, 1985, 1986). One equation is a selection equation, which predicts some binary outcome. In this case, the binary outcome is participation (i.e., whether one is a participant or non-participant), as predicted by demographic variables (race, age, gender, employment status, parental status, education level, and socio-economic status) and variables that indicate previous political participatory activities (whether in the last year the subject had attended a neighborhood or town-hall meeting, a meeting involving school affairs, or contacted a local public official, and whether the subject voted in the November 2004 presidential election). The second equation is a structural equation, which examines the ultimate dependent variable(s) of interest. In this case, the dependent variables are internal and external political efficacy, which are regressed as a function of participation and demographic variables (race, age, gender, employment status, parental status, education level, and socio-economic status). Using these two equations, the marginal effects of participation on political efficacy are assessed. Moreover, the likelihood ratio test for independence will help determine whether the estimators from the OLS regression model or the Heckman model are more consistent.

Question 2: Do participants have a higher sense of political efficacy
***after* participation in the Town Meeting? If so, what variables affect**
perceptions of political efficacy?

The second subsidiary research question concerns differences between

participants at Time 1 and at Time 2. Specifically, it seeks to determine whether

participation in the Town Meeting has an immediate impact on subjects' perceptions of

internal and external political efficacy. This question is at the heart of the dissertation and

has the potential to make important contributions to both theory and practice. The

answers will inform our understanding of whether and how deliberative democracy

contributes to participants' perceptions of political efficacy. Numerous analyses are

performed to explore and answer this question, and within each set of analyses, internal

and external political efficacy are examined in separate models. The logical progression

of the analyses resembles that presented above, but with some important differences.

First, OLS regression models are used to assess internal and external political

efficacy among participants at Time 1 and Time 2. The resulting parameter on the time

variable will show whether participants have different levels of IPE and EPE after

participating in the Town Meeting. These regression models are complemented by an

independent samples t-test, which provides a more easily interpreted estimate of the

magnitude and direction of differences in political efficacy after participation in the Town

Meeting. Again, however, this estimate of the difference in political efficacy is likely to

be biased, given the possibility of selection on the observables. The second and third sets

of analyses test for this issue. The second regression models seeks to determine the extent

to which political efficacy among participants at Time 1 and Time 2 varies in response to

demographic characteristics including, race, age, gender, employment status, parental

status, education level, and socio-economic status. The third analyses are probit regression models that seek to determine whether the participant samples at Time 1 and Time 2 differ in respect to these same demographic characteristics. When combined, these three sets of regression models will help determine whether the samples suffer from selection on the observables, that is, whether political efficacy is a function of both demographic characteristics and participation in the process. If the selection problem exists, then two additional methods (linear regression analysis and propensity score matching) are used to find a statistically consistent estimator of the effect of participation in the Town Meeting on political efficacy. The regression models examine political efficacy as a function of time (i.e., participation in the Town Meeting) and demographic characteristics. Even with this model, however, it is possible that there is selection on the unobservables, that the error term is capturing the effects on IPE and EPE of other independent variables not included in the regression equations. To assess this possibility, propensity score matching (PSM) is also used.

PSM is a non-experimental method of sampling that deals with the problem of selection bias in research, and thus allows for more robust comparisons of two groups. PSM produces a control group whose distribution of covariates is similar to that of the treated group (Rosebaum and Rubin, 1983). Conditioning many covariates produces a problem of dimensionality that calls for a method of summarizing multi-dimensional covariates. PSM adopts one-dimensional propensity scores to achieve the "dimension reduction" (Hahn, 1998: 317; D'Agostino and Rubin, 2000). The PSM method consists of four steps: (1) estimating the propensity score; 2) checking the balance of covariates; 3) matching subjects either through pair matching or sub-classification; and 4) calculating

the average treatment effects (Becker and Ichino, 2002; Dehejia and Wahba, 1999, 2002; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983, 1984).

A binary probit model is employed to estimate the propensity score. The probit model uses demographic variables, including race, age, gender, employment status, parental status, education level, and socio-economic status, as well as variables that indicate previous political participatory activities, including whether in the last year the subject had attended a neighborhood or town-hall meeting, a meeting involving school affairs, or contacted a local public official, and whether the subject voted in the November 2004 presidential election. Participants at Time 1 are then "matched" to participants at Time 2 using one-to-one pair matching without replacement. Paired t-tests are then conducted to get consistent estimates of program effects, that is, to determine whether participation in the program had an impact on subjects' perceptions of political efficacy.

The final set of analyses pertaining to the second research question explores the impact of different variables on perceptions of internal and external political efficacy. Specifically, OLS models are used to regress internal and external political efficacy as a function of demographic and deliberative variables (quality of deliberation and perceived potential impact). Deliberative variables are not available for participants at Time 1; therefore, data used in these regression analyses include only participants at Time 2. These regression models show the relative influence of demographic and deliberative variables on internal and external political efficacy.

Question 3: If participants have a higher sense of political efficacy after participation in the Town Meeting, do those effects last over time?

The third subsidiary research question concerns the persistence of the efficacy effect, that is whether changes in perceptions of political effect last over time. This question is important because it allows for an assessment of the long-term impacts of deliberative participation on perceptions of political efficacy. Just as it is important to know and understand whether deliberation increases political efficacy, it is important to know whether the efficacy effect persists over time. To determine the persistence of the efficacy effect, several comparisons are made. First, participants at Time 3 are compared to participants at Time 2 and Time 1. Second, participants at Time 3 are compared to non-participants at Time 3. Finally, non-participants at Time 1 are compared to non-participants at Time 3.

The comparisons of participants at Time 3 to Time 1 and Time 2 follow the same methodological approach outlined above for the comparison of participants at Time 1 and Time 2. Likewise, the comparison of participants and non-participants at Time 3 follows the methodological approach outlined above for the comparison of participants and non-participants at Time 1. Finally, the comparison of non-participants at Time 1 and Time 3 is made with a paired t-test.

CONCLUSION

This chapter provided a detailed overview of the study. It examined the research questions and hypotheses that guide this study. It also discussed research design, subjects and procedures for data collection, survey instruments, and issues involving internal and external validity. Finally, the chapter explained variable measurement and construction,

and briefly discussed the methods of statistical analysis used to address the hypotheses

and answer the research questions. Further details about the statistical methodologies and

the results of the analyses are explored in the next chapter.

Figure 1: Diagram of Research Design

T_1 X T_2 T_3 (treatment/experimental group)
C_1 C_3 (comparison group)

where:
T = participants of the UAC 21st Century Town Meeting
C = community members who did not participate in the UAC 21st Century Town Meeting
X = intervention (i.e., the UAC 21st Century Town Meeting)

Figure 2: Potential Individual-Level Data Links between Surveys at Various Times

	Time 1	Time 2	Time 3
Participants	n = 138 response rate = 89.2% (random sample of pre-registrants for event)	n = 525 response rate = 47.6% (all participants at event)	n = 140 response rate = 16.2% (all participants at event who provided names and addresses)
Non-Participants	n = 299 response rate = 57.3% (random sample of community members)		n = 40 response rate = 32% (all those who provided names and addresses)

Note: A solid line shows that individual-level survey data can be linked for those times. A dotted line shows that individual-level data cannot be linked for those times.

TABLE 1: Items Measuring the Internal and External Political Efficacy Indices

Survey Item[*]	Status in Final Index
To what extent do you agree with each statement below?	
Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on. **[COMPLICATED]**	FINAL IPE
I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics. **[MEQUAL]**	FINAL IPE
I often don't feel sure of myself when talking about politics or government. **[NOTSURE]**	FINAL IPE
Elected officials don't care what people like me think. **[NOCARE]**	FINAL EPE
People like me don't have any say about what the government does. **[NOSAY]**	FINAL EPE
Elected officials are only interested in people's votes. **[OFFVOTE]**	FINAL EPE
Local government is responsive to citizen concerns. **[LOCRESP]**	FINAL EPE
It is important for people like me to have a voice in local government decisions. **[MYVOICE]**	DROPPED
Voting is the only way people like me can have a say about how government runs things. **[VOTESAY]**	DROPPED
Citizens should have more opportunities to participate in local government decision-making. **[MOREPART]**	DROPPED
Public policy decisions should be left to elected officials. **[OFFPP]**	DROPPED

[*] Note: text in the brackets [] represents variable name.

TABLE 2: Internal Political Efficacy – Rotated Factor Loadings and Alpha Scores

	Non-Participants and Participants at Time 1 (n = 437)	Non-Participants Time 1 (n = 299)	Participants Time 1 (n = 138)	Participants Time 2 (n = 525)
COMPLICATED	.728	.704	.571	.577
MEQUAL	.669	.676	.809	.766
NOTSURE	.809	.804	.750	.793
Cronbach's Alpha	.610	.622	.570	.232

TABLE 3: External Political Efficacy – Rotated Factor Loadings and Alpha Scores

	Non-Participants and Participants at Time 1 (n = 437)	Non-Participants Time 1 (n = 299)	Participants Time 1 (n = 138)	Participants Time 2 (n = 525)
NOCARE	.791	.806	.751	.834
NOSAY	.690	.710	.423	.689
OFFVOTE	.723	.708	.784	.658
LOCRESP	.583	.678	.402	.630
Cronbach's Alpha	.676	.706	.531	.249

TABLE 4: Items Measuring the Quality of Deliberation Index

Survey Item[*]	Status in Final Index
To what extent do you agree with each statement below?	
There was a diverse group of people at the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting. **[DIVERSE]**	FINAL
Participants represented a cross-section of the community. **[CROSS]**	FINAL
Participants worked toward consensus agreements on the issues. **[CONSENSUS]**	FINAL
A variety of policy alternatives were explored. **[POLALTS]**	FINAL
Participants suggested creative alternatives to the problems. **[CREATALT]**	FINAL
I had an adequate opportunity to express my opinions. **[EXOPIN]**	FINAL
The discussions identified shared values in the community. **[VALUES]**	FINAL
The viewpoints of other participants were worth considering. **[CONSIDVIEW]**	FINAL
The discussions helped me think more critically about the issue(s). **[CRITICAL]**	FINAL
The discussions helped me consider other sides of the issues. **[OSIDE]**	FINAL
A few people did all of the talking. **[FEWTALK]**	DROPPED
The costs and consequences of each alternative were evaluated. **[COST]**	DROPPED
My opinions were fairly reflected in the information shared with everyone during the Summit. **[MYOPIN]**	DROPPED
The discussions made me reconsider my opinions about the issue(s). **[RECONSIDER]**	DROPPED
The discussions changed my opinion about the issue(s). **[CHANGEOP]**	DROPPED
I encountered viewpoints that differed from my own. **[DIFFVIEW]**	DROPPED

[*] Note: text in the brackets [] represents variable name.

TABLE 5: Items Measuring the Potential Impact

Survey Item[*]	Status in Final Index
To what extent do you agree with each statement below?	
The United Agenda for Children Town Meeting will help decision makers and elected officials better understand the concerns of average citizens. **[DMUNDER]**	FINAL
The United Agenda for Children Town Meeting produced information that will improve future decision making. **[FUTUREDM]**	FINAL
Local groups and organizations will work together to implement the recommendations from the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting. **[LOCWORK]**	FINAL
The United Agenda for Children will increase the capacity of local groups and organizations to work together. **[CAPACITY]**	FINAL
Decision makers will be responsive to the recommendations of participants during the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting. **[DMRESP]**	FINAL
Decision makers and elected officials will use information from the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting to make decisions. **[USEINFO]**	FINAL
Decision makers and government representatives will not follow through with citizens' recommendations. **[DMFOLLOW]**	DROPPED
How much impact do you think the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting will have on you? **[IMPYOU]**[**]	DROPPED
How much impact do you think the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting will have on Mecklenburg County? **[IMPCHAR]**[**]	DROPPED
How much impact do you think the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting will have on policy makers? **[IMPPM]**[**]	DROPPED

[*] Note: words in the brackets {} represent the past tense version of the question that is used to measure perceived impact at Time 3. Text in the brackets [] represents variable name.

[**] Denotes that question was originally in 10 point Likert Scale format; however, responses were converted into 5 point Likert scale before analysis.

CHAPTER FIVE

RESULTS

My pain and confusion covary,
and my results look a bit scary.
My measures have error -
This gives me a terror
Oh statistics! I should have been wary.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the results of the study. The results are arranged in order of

the subsidiary research questions, and thus, are divided into three sections. The first

section compares participants to non-participants at Time 1. Specifically, it seeks to

determine whether participants and non-participants have different perceptions of

political efficacy before the Town Meeting. The second section compares participants at

Time 1 to participants at Time 2, and contains the most important analyses for the

purposes of this study. Specifically, it seeks to determine whether perceptions of political

efficacy increase among subjects after participating in the Town Meeting. It also seeks to

determine the variables that contribute to perceptions of political efficacy among

participants at Time 2. The third section examines the persistence of perceptions of

political efficacy. It examines differences in participants' perceptions of political efficacy

between Time 2 and Time 3, as well as between Time 1 and Time 3 to look for changes

over time. To allow for a fuller understanding of the effects of participation on political

efficacy, the third section also compares political efficacy among participants and non-

participants at Time 3, as well as between non-participants at Time 1 and Time 3. The

analyses and results for each section are presented below. In addition, there is a brief

summary of the results following each section. A full discussion of the results and their implications is provided in the next chapter.

COMPARING PARTICIPANTS AND NON-PARTICIPANTS AT TIME 1

This section of analyses and results addresses the first subsidiary research question: do participants and non-participants differ in terms of political efficacy before participation in the Town Meeting? The question concerns baseline differences in internal and external political efficacy between the two groups before the Town Meeting intervention takes place. At the heart of the question is whether those who participate in deliberative processes have different perceptions of political efficacy than those who do not participate. In Chapter 4, I posited that participants will have higher perceptions of internal and external political efficacy than non-participants at Time 1 (H1a and H1b). To address the research question and related hypotheses, this section compares participants and non-participants at Time 1 using five analytic steps, including various regression models and Heckman treatment effect models. The results for each of these analytic steps are presented below and summarized at the conclusion of the section.

First, OLS regression models are used to assess internal political efficacy (IPE) and external political efficacy (EPE) among participants and non-participants. More specifically, IPE and EPE are explored as a function of participation, that is, whether one is a participant or non-participant. The model specification is:

$$IPE = a + bP + e$$
$$EPE = a + bP + e$$

where P is a binary variable representing participation, with 0 = non-participant and 1 = participant.

The results, displayed in Table 1, suggest that participation is significantly related to EPE (p < .001), but not to IPE (p < .115). In other words, there are statistically significant differences between participants and non-participants in terms of external political efficacy, but not internal political efficacy. However, a closer look at the values of the coefficients indicates that the direction of the differences between the two groups is not what expected. The coefficients indicate that participants have lower perceptions of IPE and EPE than non-participants. Independent samples t-tests are conducted to complement the regression analyses and to provide for an easier and more direct interpretation of the OLS results.

Insert Table 1 about here

The results of the t-tests are displayed in Table 2.[11] Due to the large difference in variance of two groups, the null hypothesis of equal variance was rejected in the F-test. Accordingly, the t-test uses the approximation of the degree of freedom, which is not necessarily an integer. A comparison of the means shows that on average, participants have lower perceptions of IPE and EPE than non-participants. The mean level of IPE for participants is -.1304. This value is .1671 lower than the mean of IPE for non-participants (.0367). Again, however, this difference is not statistically significant (p < .115). In contrast, the difference in EPE between two groups is statistically significant (p < .000). Participants' mean level of EPE is -.2270, or .3419 less than the mean level of EPE for non-participants (.1149).

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[11] IPE and EPE are both summative standardized indices; therefore, a negative number is not interpreted as a negative efficacy score.

Insert Table 2 about here

In short, the results of the regression models and t-tests suggest that non-participants and participants have statistically significant differences in terms of external political efficacy, but not internal political efficacy. A closer examination of the regression results, however, shows that neither model is well specified. The values for R^2 (.006) and adjusted R^2 (.004) indicate that in this sample, participation explains little of variation in IPE. Likewise, the values for R^2 (.025) and adjusted R^2 (.023) indicate that in this sample, participation explains little of variation in EPE. Moreover, it is likely that error term (*e*) is correlated with the independent variable for participation, resulting in biased estimates of the IPE and EPE differences between participants and non-participants. More specifically, there may be a problem with selection on the observables; it is likely that other variables besides participation status affect political efficacy among the subjects in this study.

A significant body of research indicates that political efficacy is correlated with demographic characteristics and that demographic characteristics are related to participation (Abramson, 1983; Dowse and Hughes, 1972; Kleiman, 1976; Lane, 1959; Lyons, 1970; Martinussen, 1972; Orum, 1989; Verba and Nie, 1972). If this holds in the samples under study here, then the data face a selection on the observables problem. The second and third analytic steps are used to test for this potential problem.

The second step in the analyses seeks to determine the extent to which efficacy in these samples is related to demographic characteristics. In other words, it explores how

the demographic characteristics of participants and non-participants impact IPE and EPE. The model specification is:

$$IPE = a + d\sum X_k + e$$
$$EPE = a + d\sum X_k + e$$

where $\sum X_k$ represents several demographic variables, including race, age, gender, employment status, parental status, education level, and socio-economic status.

The results, displayed in Table 3, indicate that among subjects in this sample, IPE and EPE vary with gender, education, and socio-economic status. Women feel more internally efficacious ($p < .005$), but less externally efficacious ($p < .013$) than men. Surprisingly, those with higher education degrees have lower internal ($p < .006$) and external ($p < .015$) political efficacy than those without higher education degrees. Likewise, subjects in higher socio-economic strata have lower internal ($p < .081$) and external ($p < .060$) political efficacy than those in lower socio-economic strata. These results are surprising, and stand in contrast to a significant body of research on political efficacy.

Insert Table 3 about here

The third step in the analyses seeks to determine whether participants and non-participants differ in terms of demographic characteristics. Table 4 provides summary statistics for the demographic characteristics of participants and non-participants. Specifically, the table shows the number and percentage of respondents for each sub-category within the demographic variables. A review of the table suggests that participants and non-participants are similar in terms of age, employment status, and

socio-economic status; however, there appear to be more minorities, more women, more

parents, and more educated individuals among participants than non-participants.

Insert Table 4 about here

Despite the descriptive value of the summary statistics, they do not provide

information about whether the apparent demographic differences between participants

and non-participants are statistically significant. To determine statistical significance, a

probit regression model is used. The model specification is:

$$P = a + d\sum X_k + e$$

where P is a binary dependent variable representing participation, with 0 = non-

participant and 1 = participant, and $\sum X_k$ = demographic variables including, race, age,

gender, employment status, parental status, education level, and socio-economic status.

The results of the probit regression, displayed Table 5, indicate that there are

significant demographic differences between non-participants and participants with

respect to gender (p < .004), parental status (p < .033), and educational status (p < .076).

In conjunction with the summary statistics, we see that there are more females among

participants (79.7%) than non-participants (60.6%), and more parents among participants

(54.9%) than non-participants (37.6%). In addition, more participants have a degree in

higher education (76.2%) than non-participants (62.7%). These differences are not

surprising given the context of the UAC Town Meeting. It is reasonable to expect women

and parents to participate in an event focused on youth policy. Moreover, the UAC is a

coalition of public, private, and third-sector organizations, and participants from the coalition groups are likely to be educated.

Insert Table 5 about here

The results from the first three analyses above provide a wealth of information. First, we know that participation is negatively related to perceptions of internal and external political efficacy. Second, we know that in this sample, IPE and EPE vary in relation to gender, education, and socio-economic status. Finally, we know that in this sample, participants and non-participant differ demographically in terms of gender, parental status, and education. Notice that two demographic characteristics, gender and education, covary with both of the dependent variables, IPE and EPE, as well as with participation. When viewed holistically, these results indicate that there is a problem with selection on the observables. Given the selection issue, the next analytic step is to find a statistically consistent estimator of the effect of participation on IPE and EPE. Two methods are used below in steps 4 and 5.

The fourth step in the analyses uses OLS regression models, which can be considered 'selection on the observables' models as they examine the impact on IPE and EPE of participation and demographic characteristics. These regression models tell us how IPE and EPE differ between participants and non-participants while holding demographic variables constant. The model specification is:

$$\text{IPE} = a + bP + d\sum X_k + e$$
$$\text{EPE} = a + bP + d\sum X_k + e$$

where P is a binary variable representing participation, with 0 = non-participant and 1 = participant, and $\sum X_k$ includes all demographic variables (race, age, gender, employment status, parental status, education level, and socio-economic status). It is important to note that although only gender and education covary with both of the dependent variables and participation, all of the demographic variables from the survey are included in the regression models to provide more detailed analyses.

The results, displayed in Table 6, indicate that when controlling for demographic characteristics, participants have significantly lower levels of IPE ($p < .032$) and EPE ($p < .037$) than non-participants. Note that these results differ from the results in step 1, where statistically significant differences between participants and non-participants were found only for EPE. Moreover, these results indicate that, all else held constant, gender, education, and SES are predictors of both IPE and EPE. These results echo those from step 2. Women have higher perceptions of IPE ($p < .002$), but lower perceptions of EPE ($p < .034$) than men. In addition, those who hold a higher education degree have lower perceptions of both IPE ($p < .012$) and EPE ($p < .026$) than those who hold no such degree. Likewise, those in higher SES groups have lower perceptions of both IPE ($p < .087$) and EPE ($p < .065$) than those in lower SES groups. As noted before, these results stand in contrast to the majority of research on demographics, political efficacy, and participation.

Insert Table 6 about here

Again, however, these regression models are not well specified. The values for R^2 (.115) and adjusted R^2 (.092) indicate that the model explains little of the variation in IPE. Likewise, the values for R^2 (.079) and adjusted R^2 (.055) indicate that the model explains little of the variation in EPE. Moreover, it is likely that the OLS estimates of the IPE and EPE differences between participants and non-participants are biased. More specifically, there may be a problem with selection on the unobservables, that the error term is capturing the effects on IPE and EPE of other independent variables not included in the regression equations and not available in the dataset. To assess this possibility, the final analytic step employs Heckman treatment effect models.

As noted above, even with this selection on observables model, it is still possible that the estimator of the efficacy differences between participants and non-participants is biased, that the error term is related to other variables not captured in the equation. Heckman treatment effect models (TEM) are used to handle the potential issue of selection on the unobservables. The Heckman approach uses is a two equation model that addresses several classes of selection bias, including bias due to self-selection (Briggs, 2004; Heckman, 1978, 1979; Heckman and Robb, 1985, 1986). The first equation is a selection equation, which predicts some binary outcome. In this case, the binary outcome is participation (i.e., whether one is a participant or non-participant), as predicted by demographic variables (race, age, gender, employment status, parental status, education level, and socio-economic status) and variables that indicate previous political participatory activities (whether in the last year the subject had attended a neighborhood or town-hall meeting, a meeting involving school affairs, or contacted a local public official, and whether the subject voted in the November 2004 presidential election).

The second equation is a structural equation, which examines the ultimate dependent variable(s) of interest. In this case, the dependent variables are internal and external political efficacy, which are regressed as a function of participation and demographic variables (race, age, gender, employment status, parental status, education level, and socio-economic status). Using these two equations, the marginal effects of participation on political efficacy are assessed. Moreover, the Wald chi-square statistic (a measure of goodness of fit), along with rho and the likelihood ratio test of independent equations (LR test, a measure of the relationship between the two equations), will show whether the regression models from step 4 or the Heckman models provide more consistent estimators of the efficacy differences between participants and non-participants. The model specification is:

$$\text{Equation 1}: \ P = a + bP + d\sum X_k + g\sum V_k + e$$
$$\text{Equation 2}: \text{IPE (or EPE)} = a + bP + d\sum X_k + e$$

where P is a binary variable representing participation, with 0 = non-participant and 1 = participant, $\sum X_k$ = demographic variables, and $\sum V_k$ = previous participatory activities.

The results of the Heckman TEM are displayed in Table 7. Before we assess the coefficients, however, it is useful to first examine the Wald chi-square statistic and the LR test for both the IPE and EPE models to determine whether the Heckman or OLS results provide better estimates of the IPE and EPE differences between participants and non-participants.

Insert Table 7 about here

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In terms of IPE, the chi-square statistic is fairly large and significant (52.40, p < .000), suggesting that the model fits well. Moreover, the LR test is significant (14.45, p < .0001), indicating that we must reject the null hypothesis that rho is zero. This means that the two equations are related and that there is self-selection in the samples. This result indicates that the OLS estimate for the IPE differences in participants and non-participants from Step 4 is biased; therefore, we need to examine the estimates from the Heckman TEM to find an unbiased estimate of the effect of participation on IPE. The structural model indicates that, holding all else constant, participation is related to IPE in a statistically significant way (p < .000), with participants feeling less internally efficacious than non-participants. Moreover, gender (p < .000) is also related to IPE, with women feeling more internally efficacious than men. Finally, holding all else constant, education is moderately related to IPE (p < .104).

In terms of EPE, the chi-square statistic is fairly small (21.49), but still significant (p < .006), suggesting that the model fits well; however, the LR test is not significant (1.26, p < .2611), indicating that we should not reject the null hypothesis that rho is zero. This means that the two equations are not related and that there is no self-selection in the samples. These results indicate that the OLS estimate for the EPE differences in participants and non-participants from Step 4 are not biased. In other words, the OLS estimate of the EPE differences between participants and non-participants is better than the estimate generated by the Heckman TEM.

Summary of Results Comparing Participants and Non-Participants at Time 1

This section provides a summary of the results comparing participants and non-participants at Time 1. The first step in the analyses indicated that there are statistically significant differences between participants and non-participants in terms of external political efficacy, but not internal political efficacy. However, given previous research, there was a possibility of a selection on the observables problem; steps 2 and 3 confirmed this suspicion. Therefore, two additional models, an OLS selection on the observables model and a Heckman TEM, were conducted. The estimates provided by these two models were evaluated, resulting in the conclusion that we should use the Heckman estimates for IPE and the OLS estimates for EPE.

These analyses produced three important and interesting results. First, the results of the Heckman TEM structural model indicate that, holding all else constant, participants have significantly lower perceptions of IPE than non-participants ($p < .000$). Second, the results of the OLS model indicate that, holding all else constant, participants have significantly lower levels of EPE ($p < .037$) than non-participants. While there are statistically significant differences between that participants and non-participants with respect to internal and external political efficacy, the direction of the differences is opposite of what was hypothesized. Therefore, hypotheses 1a and 1b are rejected: participants do not have higher perceptions of internal and external political efficacy than non-participants at Time 1. A third interesting result concerns the relationship between certain demographic variables and political efficacy. Specifically, the results from step 2 and step 4 suggest that education and SES are negatively related to internal and external political efficacy. These results stand in contrast to the wealth of empirical research on

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demographics, participation, and political efficacy. Each of these findings are discussed in more detail in the following chapter.

COMPARING PARTICIPANTS AT TIME 1 AND TIME 2

This section of analyses gets to the heart of the study, addressing the second set of subsidiary research questions: Do participants have a higher sense of political efficacy *after* participation in the Town Meeting? If so, what variables affect perceptions of political efficacy? In essence, this section searches for evidence of the efficacy effect. Accordingly, the analyses in this section compare participants at Time 1 to participants at Time 2. The results are relevant to the second and third sets of hypotheses presented in Chapter 4. Specifically, I hypothesized that participants at Time 2 will have higher perceptions of internal and external political efficacy than participants at Time 1 (H2a and H2b). In addition, and prompted by the second part of the research question, this section seeks to identify the variables that account for perceptions of political efficacy among participants at Time 2. Specifically, I hypothesized that the perceived quality of deliberation will be positively correlated with internal and external political efficacy (H3a and H3b) and that perceptions about the potential impact of the Town Meeting will be positively correlated with internal and external political efficacy (H3c and H3d). I also posited that demographic variables will affect perceptions of political efficacy.

Five analytic steps are used to compare participants at Time 1 and Time 2, including various regression models and propensity score matching. A sixth step uses an OLS regression model to assess the impact of deliberative and demographic variables on political efficacy among participants at Time 2. The results for each of these analytic

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steps are presented below and summarized at the conclusion of the section. A full

discussion of the results and their implications is presented in the next chapter.

First, OLS regression models are used to compare the levels of internal and

external political efficacy among participants at Time 1 and Time 2. More specifically,

IPE and EPE are regressed as a function of time, that is, before and immediately after

participation in the Town Meeting. The model specification is:

$$IPE = a + bT + e$$
$$EPE = a + bT + e$$

where T is a binary variable representing time, with 0 = participant at Time 1 and 1 =

participant at Time 2.

The results, displayed in Table 8 suggest that time is a significant predictor of

EPE ($p < .041$) but not IPE ($p < .362$). In other words, immediately after the Town

Meeting, participants experience a statistically significant increase in external political

efficacy, but not internal political efficacy. Independent samples t-tests are conducted to

complement the regression models and to provide for an easier and more direct

interpretation of the results.

Insert Table 8 about here

The results of the t-tests are displayed in Table 9. Due to the large difference in

variance of two groups, the null hypothesis of equal variance was rejected in the F-test.

Accordingly, the t-test uses the approximation of the degree of freedom, which is not

necessarily an integer. A comparison of the means suggests that on average, participants'

perceptions of IPE and EPE are higher in Time 2 than in Time 1. The t-tests show that the

mean level of IPE for participants at Time 1 is -.1364. This value increases by .0965 for a

mean IPE level of -.0399 among participants at Time 2. However, this difference is not

statistically significant (p < .362). In contrast, the difference in EPE between the two

samples is statistically significant (p < .029). Participants' mean level of EPE at Time 1 is

-.2318. At Time 2, this value increases by .2082 for a mean EPE level of -.0236.

Insert Table 9 about here

In short, the results of the regression models and t-tests suggest that immediately

after the Town Meeting, participants experience statistically significant increases in

external, but not internal, political efficacy. A closer examination of the regression results

shows that neither model is well specified. The values for R^2 (.002) and adjusted R^2

(.000) indicate that in this sample, time explains little to none of the variation in IPE.

Likewise, the values for R^2 (.011) and adjusted R^2 (.008) indicate that in this sample, time

explains little of the variation in EPE. Moreover, it is likely that error term (*e*) in the

regression model is correlated with time, resulting in biased OLS estimates of the IPE

and EPE differences between participants at Time 1 and Time 2. More specifically, there

may again be a problem with selection on the observables; it is probable that other

variables besides time affect political efficacy among the subjects in these samples. The

second and third analyses are used to test for this potential problem by first determining

the extent to which political efficacy is correlated with demographic characteristics in the

samples, and second, by determining how demographic characteristics vary in the two

participant samples.

The second analytic step seeks to determine the extent to which efficacy in the participant samples is related to demographic characteristics. In other words, it explores how the demographic characteristics of subjects impact internal and external political efficacy. The model specification is:

$$IPE = a + d\sum X_k + e$$
$$EPE = a + d\sum X_k + e$$

where $\sum X_k$ represents demographic variables, including race, age, gender, employment status, parental status, education level, and socio-economic status.

The results, displayed in Table 10, indicate that among participants at Time 1 and Time 2, age is a statistically significant predictor of IPE ($p < .017$), with older subjects feeling more internally efficacious than younger subjects. In terms of EPE, parental status is a statistically significant predictor ($p < .018$), with parents feeling more externally efficacious than non-parents. There are no other statistically significant predictors of IPE and EPE in these models. The next step is to determine whether the participant samples at Time 1 and Time 2 differ on these (and other) demographic characteristics.

Insert Table 10 about here

The third step in the analyses seeks to determine whether participants at Time 1 participants at Time 2 differ in terms of demographic characteristics. Table 11 provides summary statistics for the demographic characteristics of participants and non-participants. Specifically, the table shows the number and percentage of respondents for each sub-category within the demographic variables. A review of the table suggests that

participants at Time 1 and Time 2 are similar in terms of age, parental status, educational

status, and socio-economic status; however, there appear to be more Caucasians, more

women, and more unemployed subjects among participants at Time 1 than among

participants at Time 2.

Insert Table 11 about here

Despite the descriptive value of the summary statistics, they do not provide

information about whether the apparent demographic differences between participants at

Time 1 and Time 2 are statistically significant. To determine statistical significance, a

probit regression model is used. The model specification is:

$$T = a + d\sum X_k + e$$

where T is a binary dependent variable representing time, with 0 = participant at Time 1

and 1 = participant at Time 2, and $\sum X_k$ = demographic variables, including race, age,

gender, employment status, parental status, education level, and socio-economic status.

The results of the probit regression, displayed in Table 12, indicate that there are

significant demographic differences between participants at Time 1 and Time 2 with

respect to race ($p < .001$), gender ($p < .001$), employment status ($p < .011$), and parental

status ($p < .048$). When viewed in conjunction with the summary statistics, we can see

that there are more Caucasians (58.7%) among participants in Time 1 than in Time 2

(44.2%). Likewise, there are more women among participants at Time 1 (79.7%) than at

Time 2 (66.5). In addition, there are more unemployed participants at Time 1 (26.3%),

than at Time 2 (14.6%), and more parents at Time 1 (54.9%) than at Time 2 (50.2%).

Insert Table 12 about here

The results from the first three analyses above provide a wealth of information. First, they indicate that participants experience increases in external, but not internal, political efficacy immediately after participating in the Town Meeting. Second, they indicate that in the samples of participants at Time 1 and Time 2, age is significantly related to IPE, and parental status is significantly related to EPE. Finally, they indicate that participants at Time 1 and Time 2 differ demographically in terms of race, gender, employment status, and parental status. It is important to note that parental status covaries with both EPE and participation, suggesting that there may be a problem with selection on the observables. Given this selection issue, the fourth and fifth steps are used to find a statistically consistent estimator of the effect of participation on IPE and EPE.

The fourth analytic step employs OLS regression models, which can be considered selection on the observables models as they examine the impact on IPE and EPE of time and demographic characteristics. The model specification is:

$$IPE = a + bT + d\sum X_k + e$$
$$EPE = a + bT + d\sum X_k + e$$

where T is a binary variable representing time, with 0 = participant at Time 1 and 1 = participant at Time 2, and $\sum X_k$ includes all demographic variables (race, age, gender, employment status, parental status, education level, and socio-economic status). It is important to note that although only parental status covaries with EPE, all of the demographic variables are included in both of the regression models to provide for richer analyses.

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The results displayed in Table 13, indicate that when controlling for demographic characteristics, time has no significant effect on IPE (p < .506); however, it does have a statistically significant effect on EPE (p < .024). In other words, immediately following the Town Meeting, participants experience a statistically significant increase in external political efficacy, but not internal political efficacy. Moreover, the results indicate that, when all else is held constant, age is a significant predicator of IPE (p < .017) with older subjects feeling more internally efficacious than younger subjects. In addition, when all else is held constant, parental status is a significant predicator of EPE (p < .009) with parents feeling more externally efficacious than non-parents. Race is also a moderately significant predictor (p < .102) of EPE, with minority groups feeling less externally efficacious than Caucasians.

Insert Table 13 about here

Clearly, however, these regression models are not well specified. The values for R^2 (.031) and adjusted R^2 (.008) indicate that the model explains very little of the variation in IPE. Likewise, the values for R^2 (.056) and adjusted R^2 (.034) indicate that the model explains very little of the variation in EPE. Moreover, it is likely that the OLS estimates of the IPE and EPE differences between participants at Time 1 and Time 2 are biased. More specifically, there may be a problem in these samples with selection on the unobservables, that the error term is capturing the effects on IPE and EPE of other independent variables not included in the regression equations and not available in the

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data. To assess this possibility, the fifth set of analyses employs propensity score

matching to better estimate the effect of participation on political efficacy.

As noted in the previous chapter, propensity score matching (PSM) is a non-

experimental method of sampling that deals with the problem of selection bias in research

and allows for more robust comparisons of two groups. The general steps in PSM

include: (1) estimating the propensity score; 2) checking the balance of covariates; 3)

matching subjects either through pair matching or sub-classification; and 4) calculating

the average treatment effects (Becker and Ichino, 2002; Dehejia and Wahba, 1999;

Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1984). Similar to the Heckman selection model, PSM specifies

two equations. The first equation is a binary probit model, which predicts a propensity

score. The second equation examines the dependent variable(s) of interest. Subjects from

two groups are "matched" based on their propensity score, and paired t-tests are

conducted to test for between-group differences.

In this study, the probit model uses time as the binary dependent variable.

Covariates include demographic variables and variables that indicate previous political

participatory activities. The second equation examines IPE and EPE as a function of time

and demographic characteristics. The paired t-tests provide estimates of average program

effects on the treated, that is, whether participation in the program had an impact on

subjects' perceptions of political efficacy. The specification of the PSM models is:

$$\text{Equation 1}: \ T = a + d\sum X_k + g\sum V_k + e$$
$$\text{Equation 2}: \text{IPE (or EPE)} = a + bT + d\sum X_k + e$$

where T is a binary variable representing time, with 0 = participants at Time 1 and 1 =

participants at Time 2, $\sum X_k$ = demographic variables (race, age, gender, employment

status, parental status, education level, and socio-economic status), and $\sum V_k$ = previous participatory activities (whether in the last year the subject attended a neighborhood or town-hall meeting, a meeting involving school affairs, or contacted a local public official, and whether the subject voted in the November 2004 presidential election).

Table 14 displays the results from the PSM models. Using these covariates, the PSM matched 93 pairs of participants with similar propensity scores. The one-to-one pair matching suggests that after the Town Meeting, participants' perceptions of IPE increase by about 7.4%, although this increase is not statistically significant ($p < .55$). In contrast, however, EPE increases by over 31% after the Town Meeting; this result is statistically significant ($p < .0059$).

Insert Table 14 about here

The final set of analyses address the second part of the second subsidiary research question regarding the variables that contribute to perceptions of political efficacy. Specifically, OLS is used to regress IPE and EPE as a function of demographic variables (race, age, gender, employment status, parental status, education level, and socio-economic status) and deliberative variables (quality of deliberation [QD] and perceived potential impact [IMPACT]). Obviously, data for QD and IMPACT are not available for participants at Time 1; therefore, data used in these regression analyses include only participants at Time 2. The model specification is:

$$IPE = a + d\sum X_k + g\sum Q_k + e$$
$$EPE = a + d\sum X_k + g\sum Q_k + e$$

where $\sum X_k$ includes all demographic variables and $\sum Q_k$ includes both deliberative variables.

The results for these regression models are displayed in Table 15. In terms of deliberative variables, the quality of deliberation has no statistically significant impact on either IPE ($p < .799$) or EPE ($p < .860$). One possible reason for the lack of impact of QD on IPE and EPE may be a function of little variance in the measure. The range for QD is 5.69, and the variance is .963. In contrast, the perceived potential impact of the Town Meeting has a statistically significant effect on IPE ($p < .039$); participants who perceive greater potential impact also have higher perceptions of internal political efficacy. Perceived potential impact has no significant effect on EPE ($p < .853$). In terms of demographic characteristics, when all else is held constant, only age ($p < .029$) has an impact on IPE; on average, older participants feel more internally efficacious than younger participants. In contrast, when all else is held constant, race ($p < .013$) and parental status ($p < .014$) have an impact on EPE. Minorities feel less externally efficacious than Caucasians, and parents feel more externally efficacious than non-parents.

Insert Table 15 about here

Summary of the Results Comparing Participants at Time 1 and Time 2

This section provides a summary of the results comparing participants at Time 1 and Time 2. The analyses produced three important results. First, the initial step in the analyses indicated that there are statistically significant increases in EPE, but not IPE,

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among participants at Time 2. However, given previous research, there was a possibility of a selection on the observables problem; steps 2 and 3 indicated that only parental status covaries with EPE, suggesting little problems with selection on the observables. Nevertheless, additional models, including OLS regression models and PSM models, were conducted. The results from both of these analyses echo the results from the first set of analyses: EPE increases in a statistically significant way among participants after the Town Meeting, IPE does not. Given these results, hypothesis 2a, which suggested an increase in IPE after the Town Meeting, is rejected. Hypothesis 2b, which suggested an increase in EPE after the Town Meeting, is accepted.

Second, the results from the final OLS regression models inform us about the effect of deliberative variables on perceptions of political efficacy. The quality of deliberation has no statistically significant impact on either IPE or EPE. Therefore, hypotheses 3a and 3b are rejected. In addition, the perceived potential impact of the Town Meeting has a statistically significant effect on IPE; participants who perceive greater potential impact have higher perceptions of internal political efficacy. Therefore, hypothesis 3c is accepted. Perceived potential impact has no significant effect on EPE; therefore, hypothesis 3d is rejected.

Finally, in terms of demographic characteristics, when all else is held constant, only age has an impact on IPE with older participants feeling, on average, more internally efficacious than younger participants. In contrast, when all else is held constant, race and parental status have an impact on EPE, with minorities feeling, on average less externally efficacious than Caucasians, and parents feeling, on average, more externally efficacious than non-parents.

EXAMINING THE PERSISTENCE OF THE EFFICACY EFFECT

This section of analyses and results addresses the final subsidiary research question: do the effects of participation on perceptions of political efficacy persist over time? To determine the persistence of the efficacy effect, three sets of comparisons are made. First, participants at Time 3 are compared to participants at Time 2 and Time 1. I hypothesized that participants at Time 3 will have higher perceptions of internal and external political efficacy than at Time 1, but lower perceptions of internal and external political efficacy than at Time 2 (H4a and H4b). The first step is testing these hypotheses is to compare participants at Times 2 and 3. Since participants' responses at these times cannot be linked, this comparison follows the same methodological approach outlined above for the comparison of participants at Time 1 and Time 2. The next step is to compare IPE and EPE among participants at Times 1 and 3. As noted in the previous chapter, the research design allowed for the linking of subjects' responses at Times 1 and 3; however, due to poor response rates, only 17 participants at Time 3 can be linked to Time 1. This condition precludes the use of paired t-tests to check for IPE and EPE differences between participants at Time 1 and Time 3. Instead, the methodological approach used for the comparison of participants at Time 1 and Time 3 will follow the logic of all of the other comparisons of participants in different time periods.

Second, participants at Time 3 are compared to non-participants at Time 3. The purpose of this comparison is to assess the Time 3 efficacy gap and compare it to the Time 1 efficacy gap. I hypothesized that the IPE and EPE gaps between participants and non-participants would be smaller at Time 3 than at Time 1 (H4c and H4d). Finally, to further examine the persistence of political efficacy, non-participants at Time 1 are

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compared to non-participants at Time 3. The results from these three sets of analyses are triangulated to enable a better examination of the overall efficacy effect, as well as its persistence.

Participants Over Time

This first section compares participants at Times 1, 2, and 3 to determine the persistence of the efficacy effect. The logic of these comparisons follows that used in the comparison of participants at Time 1 and Time 2; however, for purposes of brevity and clarity, only steps 4 and 5 are conducted. In other words, only the OLS selection on the observables models and the PSM models are conducted. The differences between Time 2 and Time 3 are examined first, followed by an examination of the differences between Time 1 and Time 3.

Participants at Time 2 and Time 3

The first step in this comparison uses OLS regression models, which can be considered selection on the observables models as they examine the impact on IPE and EPE of time and demographic characteristics. The model specification is:

$$IPE = a + bT + d\sum X_k + e$$
$$EPE = a + bT + d\sum X_k + e$$

where T is a binary variable representing time, with 0 = participant at Time 2 and 1 = participant at Time 3, and $\sum X_k$ includes all demographic variables (race, age, gender, employment status, parental status, education level, and socio-economic status).

The results displayed in Table 16, indicate that when controlling for demographic characteristics, time has no significant effect on IPE ($p < .675$) or EPE ($p < .291$). In other words, 24 months after the Town Meeting, participants experience no statistically significant changes in either internal or external political efficacy. Clearly, however, these regression models are not well specified. The values for R^2 (.017) and adjusted R^2 (-.007) indicate that the model explains very little of the variation in IPE. Likewise, the values for R^2 (.045) and adjusted R^2 (.022) indicate that the model explains very little of the variation in EPE. Moreover, it is likely that the OLS estimates of the IPE and EPE differences between participants at Time 2 and Time 3 are biased due to selection on the unobservables.

Insert Table 16 about here

To assess the possibility of selection on the unobservables, the second set of analyses employs propensity score matching to better estimate the effect of participation on political efficacy. The specification of the PSM models is:

$$\text{Equation 1}: \quad T = a + d\sum X_k + g\sum V_k + e$$
$$\text{Equation 2}: \text{IPE (or EPE)} = a + bT + d\sum X_k + e$$

where T is a binary variable representing time, with 0 = participants at Time 2 and 1 = participants at Time 3, $\sum X_k$ = demographic variables (race, age, gender, employment status, parental status, education level, and socio-economic status), and $\sum V_k$ = previous participatory activities (whether in the last year the subject attended a neighborhood or

town-hall meeting, a meeting involving school affairs, or contacted a local public official, and whether the subject voted in the November 2004 presidential election).

Table 17 displays the results from the PSM models. Using these covariates, the PSM matched 115 pairs of participants with similar propensity scores. The one-to-one pair matching suggests that 24 months after the Town Meeting, participants experience no statistically significant changes in either IPE (p < .8108) or EPE (p < .6753).

Insert Table 17 about here

In summary, the results of both the OLS selection on the observables models and the PSM models indicate that internal and external political efficacy do not change in a significant way for participants between Time 2 and Time 3. Earlier results found a significant increase in IPE and EPE for participants between Time 1 and Time 2; the next step is to compare participants at Time 1 and Time 3 to assess the possibility of changes in political efficacy during this time period.

Participants at Time 1 and Time 3

The first step in this comparison uses OLS regression models, which can be considered selection on the observables models as they examine the impact on IPE and EPE of time and demographic characteristics. The model specification is:

$$IPE = a + bT + d\sum X_k + e$$
$$EPE = a + bT + d\sum X_k + e$$

where T is a binary variable representing time, with 0 = participant at Time 1 and 1 = participant at Time 3, and $\sum X_k$ includes all demographic variables (race, age, gender, employment status, parental status, education level, and socio-economic status).

The results displayed in Table 18, indicate that when controlling for demographic characteristics, time has a statistically significant effect on IPE ($p < .008$); however, time has no statistically significant effect on EPE ($p < .121$). In other words, 24 months after the Town Meeting, participants experience a statistically significant increase in internal political efficacy. Moreover, external political efficacy also appears to increase, but not in a statistically significant way. Clearly, however, these regression models are not well specified. The values for R^2 (.121) and adjusted R^2 (.090) indicate that the model explains very little of the variation in IPE. Likewise, the values for R^2 (.053) and adjusted R^2 (.020) indicate that the model explains very little of the variation in EPE. Moreover, it is likely that the OLS estimates of the IPE and EPE differences between participants at Time 1 and Time 3 are biased due to selection on the unobservables.

Insert Table 18 about here

To assess the possibility of selection on the unobservables, the second set of analyses employs propensity score matching to better estimate the effect of participation on political efficacy. The specification of the PSM models is:

$$\text{Equation 1}: \quad T = a + d\sum X_k + g\sum V_k + e$$
$$\text{Equation 2}: \text{IPE (or EPE)} = a + bT + d\sum X_k + e$$

where T is a binary variable representing time, with 0 = participants at Time 1 and 1 = participants at Time 3, $\sum X_k$ = demographic variables (race, age, gender, employment status, parental status, education level, and socio-economic status), and $\sum V_k$ = previous participatory activities (whether in the last year the subject attended a neighborhood or town-hall meeting, a meeting involving school affairs, or contacted a local public official, and whether the subject voted in the November 2004 presidential election).

Table 19 displays the results from the PSM models. Using these covariates, the PSM matched 115 pairs of participants with similar propensity scores. The one-to-one pair matching suggests that 24 months after the Town Meeting, participants experience a statistically significant change in EPE ($p < .09$), but no statistically significant change in IPE ($p < .4792$). Interestingly, these results are opposite of what was found in the OLS models above.

As noted previously, it is probable that there is significant endogeneity in these models; therefore, the OLS estimates are likely to be biased upward. Moreover, unlike in Heckman models, there is no test for endogeneity in PSM models. Earlier analyses, namely the Heckman TEM comparisons of participants and non-participants, indicate that the OLS estimates are consistent for EPE but not for IPE. In other words, the Heckman models found that there was significant selection bias for IPE. Given this, it is reasonable to assume that the PSM results are more consistent than those from the OLS model. Thus, it appears that only EPE increases in a statistically significant way among participants at Time 1 and Time 3.

Insert Table 19 about here

In summary, the results of the OLS selection on the observables models are expected to be biased; therefore, the results from the PSM models are used. The PSM results indicate that participants experience a statistically significant increase in external political efficacy between Time 1 and Time 3, but no significant increase in internal political efficacy. The next step in the comparison is to compare participants and non-participants at Time 3.

Participants and Non-Participants at Time 3

This section compares participants at Time 3 to non-participants at Time 3. The purpose of this comparison is to assess the Time 3 efficacy gap and compare it to the Time 1 efficacy gap. I hypothesized that the IPE and EPE gaps between participants and non-participants would be smaller at Time 3 than at Time 1 (H4c and H4d). This comparison follows the same logical order as the comparison of participants and non-participants at Time 1; however, for purposes of clarity and brevity, steps 1 through 3 are skipped. Only the OLS selection on the observables models and the Heckman treatment effects models are employed.

First, selection on the observables OLS regression models are used to examine the impact on IPE and EPE of participation and demographic characteristics. The models tell us how IPE and EPE differ between participants and non-participants while holding demographic variables constant. The model specification is:

$$IPE = a + bP + d\sum X_k + e$$
$$EPE = a + bP + d\sum X_k + e$$

where P is a binary variable representing participation, with 0 = non-participant and 1 = participant, and $\sum X_k$ includes all demographic variables (race, age, gender, employment status, parental status, education level, and socio-economic status).

Insert Table 20 about here

The results, displayed in Table 20, indicate that when controlling for demographic characteristics, there are no significant differences in IPE between participants and non-participants at Time 3. In contrast, however, EPE is significantly lower among participants at Time 3 than non-participants at Time 3 ($p < .085$). As noted previous, it is likely that the OLS estimates of the IPE and EPE differences between participants and non-participants are biased due to selection on the unobservables. To assess this possibility, the second step employs treatment effect models (TEM).

The equations used in the following Heckman TEM models are identical to the equations used to compare participants and non-participants at Time 1. The model specification is:

$$\text{Equation 1}: \ P = a + bP + d\sum X_k + g\sum V_k + e$$
$$\text{Equation 2}: \text{IPE (or EPE)} = a + bP + d\sum X_k + e$$

where P is a binary variable representing participation, with 0 = non-participant and 1 = participant, $\sum X_k$ = demographic variables (race, age, gender, employment status, parental status, education level, and socio-economic status), and $\sum V_k$ = previous participatory activities (whether in the last year the subject had attended a neighborhood or town-hall

meeting, a meeting involving school affairs, or contacted a local public official, and

whether the subject voted in the November 2004 presidential election).

The results of the Heckman TEM are displayed in Table 21. Before we assess the

coefficients, however, it is useful to first examine the Wald chi-square statistic, as well as

rho and the LR test for both the IPE and EPE models. These values will determine

whether the Heckman or OLS results provide better estimates of the IPE and EPE

differences between participants and non-participants at Time 3.

The chi-square statistic is small, but significant for IPE (19.24, $p < .0136$); it is

also small and insignificant for EPE (11.50, $p < .1751$). Moreover, the LR tests indicate

that we should not reject the null hypothesis that rho is zero for either IPE (1.18, $p < .2775$) or EPE (0.62, $p < .4328$). This means that in both the IPE and EPE models, the

two equations are not related, and that there is no self-selection in the samples. These

results indicate that the OLS estimates for the IPE and EPE differences in participants

and non-participants from the first step are not biased. In other words, the OLS estimate

of the IPE and EPE differences between participants and non-participants is better than

the estimates generated by the Heckman TEM.

Insert Table 21 about here

Non-Participants at Time 1 and Time 3

The final set of analyses compare non-participants at Time 1 and Time 3. Thirty-

six responses from non-participants at Time 1 and Time 3 can be linked; therefore, paired

t-tests are conducted to determine whether there are IPE and EPE differences between

non-participants during this time period. The results, displayed in Table 22, indicate that

between Time 1 and Time 3, there are no significant changes in non-participants'

perceptions of internal (p < .352) or external political efficacy (p < .840).

Insert Table 22 about here

Summary of Results Regarding the Persistence of the Efficacy Effect

This section provides a summary of the results regarding the persistence of the

efficacy effect over time. The analyses produced three important results. First, the results

of both the OLS selection on the observables models and the PSM models indicate that

IPE and EPE do not change in a significant way for participants between Time 2 and

Time 3. Second, PSM results indicate that participants have significantly higher

perceptions of EPE at Time 3 than at Time 1, but that there is no significant difference in

IPE between Time 3 and Time 1. Given these results, hypothesis 4a is rejected:

participants at Time 3 do not have higher perceptions of IPE than at Time 1. In contrast,

hypothesis 4b is accepted: participants at Time 3 do have higher perceptions of EPE than

at Time 1.

Second, OLS regression results indicate that there are no significant differences in

IPE between participants and non-participants at Time 3. Therefore, hypothesis 4c is

accepted, the gap between participants and non-participants for internal political efficacy

is smaller at Time 3 than at Time 1. In contrast, there are significant differences in EPE

between participants and non-participants at Time 3. At Time 1, participants felt .253 less

externally efficacious than non-participants. At Time 3, participants felt .367 less

externally efficacious than non-participants. Given these results, hypothesis 4d is

rejected. In contrast to what was hypothesized, the gap between participants and non-participants for EPE is larger at Time 3 than at Time 1.

Finally, the results show that there are no significant changes in non-participants' perceptions of IPE or EPE between Time 1 and Time 3. This is important because it demonstrates that the comparison group experienced no changes in political efficacy over time, and thereby adds strength to the findings regarding the effects of participation in the 21st Century Town Meeting on perceptions of political efficacy.

CONCLUSION

This chapter presented the results of the study, arranged in order of the subsidiary research questions. The first set of analyses compared participants to non-participants at Time 1 in terms of demographic variables and perceptions of internal and external political efficacy. The second section compared participants at Time 1 to participants at Time 2 with respect to demographic characteristics and perceptions of internal and external political efficacy. It also examined the impact of demographic and deliberative variables on perceptions of political efficacy. The third section examined the longevity of perceptions of political efficacy. It made three comparisons. First, participants at Time 3 were compared to participants at both Time 2 and Time 1. Second, participants at Time 3 were compared to non-participants at Time 3. Finally, non-participants at Time 1 were compared to non-participants at Time 3. Various statistical methods were used throughout the sections, including regression models, Heckman treatment effect models, and propensity score matching.

The results point to several major findings. First, before the Town Meeting, participants have significantly lower perceptions of both internal and external political efficacy than non-participants. This suggests that America*Speaks* is effective in engaging the less efficacious among the citizenry in the Town Meeting process. Second, after the Town Meeting, participants experience an increase in both internal and external political efficacy; however, only the increase in external political efficacy is statistically significant. These results suggest that the 21st Century Town Meeting can produce the efficacy effect, particularly with respect to external political efficacy. Moreover, the results indicate that the quality of deliberation has no impact on either internal or external political efficacy, and that the perceived potential impact of the Town Meeting is positively correlated with internal, but not external, political efficacy.

Third, the results indicate that there are no significant changes in internal or external political efficacy among participants at Time 2 and Time 3. These results suggest that the efficacy effect persists over time. Moreover, there are no statistically significant changes in internal political efficacy among participants at Time 1 and Time 3, although the difference in external political efficacy is statistically significant. Finally, the strength of the efficacy effect is evidenced by other results. First, there are no significant changes in non-participants' perceptions of IPE or EPE between Time 1 and Time 3. Second, unlike before the Town Meeting, there are no statistically significant differences in internal political efficacy between participants and non-participants at Time 3. However, there are significant differences in external political efficacy between participants and non-participants 24 months after the Town Meeting. Moreover, the efficacy gap is larger 24 months after the Town Meeting than it was before the Town Meeting. Because the

comparison group experienced no changes in political efficacy over time, the strength of the findings regarding the effects of participation in the 21st Century Town Meeting on perceptions of political efficacy increases. A full discussion of these findings and their implications is provided in the next chapter.

Table 1: IPE and EPE among Participants and Non-Participants at Time 1

Parameter	IPE			EPE		
	B (St. Err.)	Beta	t (Sig.)	B (St. Err.)	Beta	t (Sig.)
Intercept	.037 (.060)	…	.616 (.538)	.115 (.059)	…	1.948 (.052)
Participation	-.167 (.106)	-.078	-1.580 (.115)	-.342 (.105)	-.159	-3.269 (.001)
F-test (Sig.)	2.498 (.115)			10.685 (.001)		
SEE	.99937			.98852		
R^2	.006			.025		
Adj. R^2	.004			.023		

Table 2: Mean Scores on IPE and EPE for Participants and Non-Participants at Time 1

	F-test (sig)	Participants Mean (st. dev.)	Non-Participants Mean (st. dev.)	Difference	T-Stat (p-value)	*df*
IPE	1.341 (.248)	-.1304 (.9773)	.0367 (1.0094)	-.1671 (-0.0121)	-1.580 (.115)	410
EPE	19.229 (.000)	-.2270 (.8099)	.1149 (1.0613)	-.3419 (-0.2514)	-.3.601 (.000)	324.85

**Table 3: Relationship of Demographics to IPE and EPE
for Participants and Non-Participants at Time 1**

Parameter	IPE			EPE		
	B (St. Err.)	Beta	t (Sig.)	B (St. Err.)	Beta	t (Sig.)
Intercept	.275 (.202)	…	1.357 (.176)	.532 (.200)	…	2.663 (.008)
Race	.012 (.125)	.006	.098 (.922)	.076 (.124)	.037	.616 (.538)
Age	-.030 (.123)	-.015	-.247 (.805)	-.129 (.122)	-.065	-1.062 (.289)
Gender	.344 (.122)	.157	2.807 (.005)	-.302 (.121)	-.142	-2.497 (.013)
Employment	-.131 (.128)	-.057	-1.020 (.308)	.107 (.126)	.049	.847 (.398)
Parent	-.074 (.119)	-.038	-.622 (.534)	-.008 (.118)	-.004	-.069 (.945)
Education	-.364 (.132)	-.167	-2.755 (.006)	-.320 (.131)	-.152	-2.453 (.015)
SES	-.223 (.128)	-.107	-1.752 (.081)	-.238 (.126)	-.118	-1.887 (.060)
F-test (Sig.)	4.988 (.000)			3.068 (.004)		
SEE	.98524			.97316		
R^2	.102			.256		
Adj. R^2	.082			.065		

Table 4: Summary Demographic Statistics for Participants and Non-Participants at Time 1

	Participants n = 133	Non-Participants n=282
RACE		
White/Caucasian	74 (59.7%)	193 (70.2%)
Minority	50 (40.3%)	82 (29.8%)
AGE		
18-44	136 (49.5%)	69 (53.9%)
45 and Older	139 (50.5%)	59 (46.1%)
GENDER		
Male	27 (20.3%)	111 (39.4%)
Female	106 (79.7%)	171 (60.6%)
EMPLOYMENT		
Unemployed	35 (26.3%)	90 (31.9%)
Employed	95 (71.4%)	189 (67.0%)
PARENT		
No	57 (42.9%)	169 (59.9%)
Yes	73 (54.9%)	106 (37.6%)
EDUCATION		
No Higher Education Degree	30 (23.8%)	104 (37.3%)
Associates, Bachelors, or Graduate/Professional Degree	96 (76.2%)	175 (62.7%)
SES		
Total Household Income of $49,999 or Less	39 (38.6%)	89 (40.8%)
Total Household Income of $50,000 or More	62 (61.4%)	129 (59.2%)

* Percentages represent the percent of respondents from the sample in the sub-category.

* Totals may not equal 100% due to missing data.

Table 5: Demographic Differences among Participants and Non-Participants at Time 1

Parameter	Participation		
	B (St. Err.)	Beta	t (Sig.)
Intercept	-.009 (.094)	…	-.095 (.925)
Race	.067 (.058)	.069	1.152 (.250)
Age	.068 (.057)	.073	1.191 (.234)
Gender	.165 (.057)	.166	2.904 (.004)
Employment	.026 (.060)	.025	.435 (.664)
Parent	.119 (.055)	.133	2.142 (.033)
Education	.109 (.061)	.111	1.780 (.076)
SES	.022 (.059)	.023	.369 (.712)
F-test (Sig.)	2.831 (.007)		
SEE	.458		
R^2	.061		
Adj. R^2	.039		

Table 6: Regression Results for IPE and EPE among Participants and Non-Participants at Time 1

Parameter	IPE			EPE		
	B (St. Err.)	Beta	t (Sig.)	B (St. Err.)	Beta	t (Sig.)
Intercept	.272 (.201)	…	1.354 (.177)	.530 (.199)	…	2.666 (.008)
Participation	-.262 (.122)	-.119	-2.151 (.032)	-.253 (.121)	-.119	-2.095 (.037)
Race	.030 (.125)	.014	.239 (.811)	.093 (.123)	.045	.756 (.451)
Age	-.013 (.123)	-.006	-.102 (.919)	-.112 (.121)	-.056	-.923 (.357)
Gender	.387 (.123)	.177	3.137 (.002)	-.260 (.122)	-.123	-2.134 (.034)
Employment	-.124 (.127)	-.054	-.973 (.331)	.114 (.126)	.052	.904 (.367)
Parent	-.043 (.119)	-.022	-.360 (.719)	.022 (.118)	.012	.185 (.853)
Education	-.336 (.132)	-.154	-2.540 (.012)	-.293 (.131)	-.139	-2.242 (.026)
SES	-.218 (.127)	-.104	-1.716 (.087)	-.232 (.125)	-.115	-1.853 (.065)
F-test (Sig.)	4.994 (.000)			3.262 (.001)		
SEE	.97947			.96783		
R^2	.115			.079		
Adj. R^2	.092			.055		

Table 7: Heckman Treatment Effects Model for Participants and Non-Participants at Time 1

	IPE Coefficient (p-value)	EPE Coefficient (p-value)
Structural Model		
PARTICIPATION	-1.1879 (.000)	.2133 (.675)
GENDER	.5398 (.000)	-.3370 (.022)
EMPLOYMENT	-.0999 (.466)	.1016 (.426)
AGE	.0507 (.703)	-.1439 (.258)
PARENT	.0668 (.609)	-.0335 (.801)
RACE	.0919 (.495)	.0619 (.631)
EDUCATION	-.2343 (.104)	-.3437 (.016)
SES	-.1974 (.148)	-.2424 (.056)
CONSTANT	.2640 (.222)	.5342 (.008)
Selection Model		
GENDER	.4848 (.009)	.5268 (.006)
EMPLOYMENT	-.0922 (.618)	-.0739 (.704)
AGE	.0454 (.802)	.0517 (.786)
PARENT	.2030 (.250)	.2238 (.222)
RACE	.0712 (.701)	.0780 (.675)
EDUCATION	.0936 (.639)	.1831 (.414)
SES	-.1154 (.542)	-.1471 (.441)
SCHOOL	.8327 (.000)	.8549 (.000)
OFFICIAL	.8210 (.000)	.7960 (.000)
TOWNHALL	.0188 (.903)	-.0945 (.639)
VOTE	.0978 (.715)	.0153 (.960)
CONSTANT	-1.8616 (.000)	-1.8600 (.000)
Log likelihood	-585.64741	-588.47635
Wald Chi-Square (sig.)	52.40 (.000)	21.49 (.006)
Rho	.6365374	-.3437427
LR test of independent equations	14.45 (.0001)	1.26 (.2611)
Sample Size	315	315

Table 8: IPE and EPE among Participants at Time 1 and Time 2

Parameter	IPE			EPE		
	B (St. Err.)	Beta	t (Sig.)	B (St. Err.)	Beta	t (Sig.)
Intercept	-.136 (.085)	…	-1.598 (.111)	-.232 (.082)	…	-2.827 (.005)
Time	.097 (.106)	.047	.912 (.362)	.208 (.102)	.105	2.050 (.041)
F-test (Sig.)	.833 (.362)			4.203 (.041)		
SEE	.98479			.94553		
R²	.002			.011		
Adj. R²	.000			.008		

Table 9: Mean Scores for IPE and EPE among Participants at Time 1 and Time 2

	F-test (sig)	Time 1 Mean (st. dev.)	Time 2 Mean (st. dev.)	Difference	T-Stat (p-value)	*df*
IPE	.005 (.943)	-.1364 (.9714)	-.0399 (.9918)	-.0965 (-0.0204)	-.912 (.362)	380
EPE	6.202 (.013)	-.2318 (.8049)	-.0236 (1.0125)	-.2082 (-0.2076)	-2.196** (.029)	325.637

Table 10: Relationship of Demographics to IPE and EPE for Participants at Time 1 and Time 2

Parameter	IPE			EPE		
	B (St. Err.)	Beta	t (Sig.)	B (St. Err.)	Beta	t (Sig.)
Intercept	-.448 (.225)	…	-1.988 (.048)	-.390 (.212)	…	-1.840 (.067)
Race	.155 (.115)	.078	1.347 (.179)	-.136 (.108)	-.073	-1.259 (.209)
Age	.282 (.118)	.141	2.390 (.017)	.083 (.111)	.044	.753 (.452)
Gender	.003 (.121)	.002	.028 (.978)	-.120 (.114)	-.058	-1.051 (.294)
Employment	.192 (.142)	.075	1.354 (.177)	.207 (.133)	.085	1.556 (.121)
Parent	.137 (.114)	.070	1.200 (.231)	.256 (.108)	.137	2.374 (.018)
Education	-.020 (.145)	-.009	-.140 (.888)	.148 (.137)	.068	1.083 (.280)
SES	-.167 (.125)	-.081	-1.340 (.181)	-.062 (.117)	-.032	-.530 (.596)
F-test (Sig.)	1.496 (.168)			2.123 (.041)		
SEE	.98896			.93025		
R^2	.030			.042		
Adj. R^2	.010			.022		

**Table 11: Summary of Demographic Statistics for Participants
at Time 1 and Time 2**

	Participants Time 1	Participants Time 2
RACE	n = 126	n = 240
White/Caucasian	74 (58.7%)	106 (44.2%)
Minority	52 (41.3%)	134 (55.8%)
AGE	n = 128	n = 235
18-44	69 (53.9%)	127 (54%)
45 and Older	59 (46.1%)	108 (46%)
GENDER	n = 133	n = 245
Male	27 (20.3%)	82 (33.5%)
Female	106 (79.7%)	163 (66.5%)
EMPLOYMENT	n = 133	n = 246
Unemployed	35 (26.3%)	36 (14.6%)
Employed	95 (71.4%)	210 (85.4%)
PARENT	n = 133	n = 245
No	57 (42.9%)	122 (49.8%)
Yes	73 (54.9%)	123 (50.2%)
EDUCATION	n = 128	n = 241
No Higher Education Degree	31 (24.2%)	65 (27%)
Associates, Bachelors, or Graduate/Professional Degree	97 (75.8%)	176 (73%)
SES	n = 133	n = 241
Total Household Income of $49,999 or Less	84 (63.2%)	153 (63.5%)
Total Household Income of $50,000 or More	49 (36.8%)	88 (36.5%)

* Percentages represent the percent of respondents from the sample in the
demographic sub-category.
* Totals may not equal 100% due to missing data.

Table 12: Demographic Differences among Participants at Time 1 and Time 2

Parameter	Participation		
	B (St. Err.)	Beta	t (Sig.)
Intercept	.631 (.105)	…	5.986 (.000)
Race	.173 (.054)	.181	3.220 (.001)
Age	-.019 (.055)	-.020	-.351 (.726)
Gender	-.186 (.057)	-.176	-3.296 (.001)
Employment	.168 (.066)	.136	2.542 (.011)
Parent	-.106 (.054)	-.112	-1.981 (.048)
Education	-.029 (.068)	-.026	-.433 (.665)
SES	.026 (.058)	.026	.451 (.652)
F-test (Sig.)	4.616 (.000)		
SEE	.463		
R^2	.087		
Adj. R^2	.068		

Table 13: Regression Results for IPE and EPE among Participants at Time 1 and Time 2

Parameter	IPE			EPE		
	B (St. Err.)	Beta	t (Sig.)	B (St. Err.)	Beta	t (Sig.)
Intercept	-.496 (.237)	…	-2.095 (.037)	-.545 (.221)	…	-2.460 (.014)
Time	.077 (.116)	.037	.666 (.506)	.245 (.108)	.125	2.267 (.024)
Race	.142 (.117)	.071	1.212 (.226)	-.179 (.109)	-.095	-1.638 (.102)
Age	.283 (.118)	.142	2.400 (.017)	.088 (.110)	.047	.800 (.424)
Gender	.018 (.123)	.008	.145 (.885)	-.074 (.115)	-.036	-.643 (.521)
Employment	.179 (.143)	.070	1.249 (.212)	.166 (.134)	.068	1.241 (.215)
Parent	.146 (.115)	.074	1.263 (.207)	.282 (.108)	.151	2.616 (.009)
Education	-.018 (.146)	-.008	-.125 (.901)	.155 (.136)	.071	1.143 (.254)
SES	-.169 (.125)	-.082	-1.355 (.176)	-.069 (.117)	-.035	-.589 (.556)
F-test (Sig.)	1.362 (.212)			2.523 (.011)		
SEE	.98977			.92465		
R²	.031			.056		
Adj. R²	.008			.034		

Table 14: Average Effects of Participation on IPE and EPE among Participants at Time 1 and Time 2

	Pairs	Time 1	Time 2	Effect	Std. Err.	T-Stat	P-value
IPE	93	-.0710	-.1452	.0742	.1245	0.60	0.55
EPE	93	.0590	-.2522	.3112	.1105	2.82	.0059

Table 15: Impact of Deliberative and Demographic Variables on IPE and EPE for Participants at Time 2

Parameter	IPE			EPE		
	B (St. Err.)	Beta	t (Sig.)	B (St. Err.)	Beta	t (Sig.)
Intercept	-.116 (.283)	…	-.408 (.684)	-.272 (.280)	…	-.971 (.332)
Race	.030 (.149)	.015	.204 (.838)	-.370 (.147)	-.184	-2.514 (.013)
Age	.335 (.153)	.167	2.194 (.029)	.152 (.151)	.076	1.004 (.316)
Gender	-.125 (.147)	-.059	-.848 (.398)	-.120 (.146)	-.057	-.826 (.410)
Employment	.051 (.204)	.017	.252 (.801)	.132 (.202)	.044	.655 (.513)
Parent	.119 (.142)	.059	.836 (.404)	.347 (.141)	.173	2.466 (.014)
Education	-.149 (.182)	-.064	-.818 (.414)	.278 (.180)	.119	1.542 (.125)
SES	-.056 (.155)	-.027	-.360 (.719)	-.116 (.153)	-.056	-.756 (.451)
QD	.020 (.078)	.020	.254 (.799)	-.014 (.078)	-.014	-.177 (.860)
Impact	.163 (.079)	.165	2.075 (.039)	.014 (.078)	.015	.185 (.853)
F-test (Sig.)	1.809 (.068)			2.449 (.011)		
SEE	.98471			.97398		
R²	.070			.093		
Adj. R²	.031			.055		

Table 16: IPE and EPE among Participants at Time 2 and Time 3

Parameter	IPE			EPE		
	B (St. Err.)	Beta	t (Sig.)	B (St. Err.)	Beta	t (Sig.)
Intercept	.099 (.237)	…	.420 (.675)	-.243 (.230)	…	-1.058 (.291)
Time	.041 (.125)	.019	.326 (.744)	-.083 (.122)	-.040	-.685 (.494)
Race	-.080 (.120)	-.040	-.662 (.509)	-.118 (.117)	-.060	-1.009 (.314)
Age	.170 (.130)	.085	1.309 (.191)	.143 (.126)	.072	1.133 (.258)
Gender	.020 (.120)	.010	.171 (.865)	-.225 (.116)	-.108	-1.936 (.054)
Employment	.000 (.157)	.000	-.001 (.999)	.176 (.152)	.064	1.155 (.249)
Parent	.013 (.120)	.007	.111 (.911)	.190 (.116)	.096	1.632 (.104)
Education	-.184 (.162)	-.071	-1.135 (.257)	.227 (.157)	.090	1.449 (.148)
SES	-.168 (.133)	-.084	-1.261 (.208)	-.155 (.129)	-.078	-1.198 (.232)
F-test (Sig.)	.714 (.679)			1.970 (.050)		
SEE	1.00791			.97650		
R^2	.017			.045		
Adj. R^2	-.007			.022		

Table 17: Average Effects of Participation on IPE and EPE among Participants at Time 2 and Time 3

	Pairs	Time 2	Time 3	Effect	Std. Err.	T-Stat	P-value
IPE	115	-.0319	.0006	-.0325	.13283	-0.24	.8108
EPE	115	-.1037	-.0513	-.0524	.1260	-0.42	.6753

Table 18: IPE and EPE among Participants at Time 1 and Time 3

Parameter	IPE			EPE		
	B (St. Err.)	Beta	t (Sig.)	B (St. Err.)	Beta	t (Sig.)
Intercept	-.334 (.284)	…	-1.176 (.241)	-.244 (.261)	…	-.933 (.352)
Time	.370 (.137)	.186	2.697 (.008)	.196 (.126)	.111	1.556 (.121)
Race	.099 (.134)	.048	.738 (.461)	.241 (.123)	.132	1.963 (.051)
Age	-.184 (.145)	-.091	-1.265 (.207)	-.122 (.133)	-.069	-.918 (.360)
Gender	.493 (.146)	.215	3.387 (.001)	-.112 (.134)	-.055	-.837 (.403)
Employment	.197 (.146)	.085	1.345 (.180)	.222 (.134)	.108	1.651 (.100)
Parent	-.083 (.139)	-.042	-.599 (.550)	-.005 (.127)	-.003	-.037 (.971)
Education	-.183 (.192)	-.068	-.949 (.344)	-.133 (.177)	-.055	-.751 (.454)
SES	-.369 (.151)	-.184	-2.438 (.016)	-.054 (.139)	-.031	-.390 (.697)
F-test (Sig.)	3.983 (.000)			1.625 (.119)		
SEE	.95207			.87456		
R^2	.121			.053		
Adj. R^2	.090			.020		

Table 19: Average Effects of Participation on IPE and EPE among Participants at Time 1 and Time 3

	Pairs	Time 1	Time 3	Effect	Std. Err.	T-Stat	P-value
IPE	115	-.0319	-.1262	.0944	.1322	.71	.4792
EPE	115	-.1037	-.3012	.1976	.1158	1.71	.0900

Table 20: Regression Results for IPE and EPE among Participants and Non-Participants at Time 3

Parameter	IPE			EPE		
	B (St. Err.)	Beta	t (Sig.)	B (St. Err.)	Beta	t (Sig.)
Intercept	1.334 (.707)	…	1.885 (.061)	.395 (.698)	…	.566 (.573)
Participation	.164 (.215)	.065	.764 (.446)	-.367 (.212)	-.152	-1.733 (.085)
Race	-.189 (.191)	-.085	-.991 (.323)	.274 (.188)	.128	1.459 (.147)
Age	-.133 (.112)	-.120	-1.181 (.240)	-.007 (.111)	-.007	-.065 (.948)
Gender	.257 (.175)	.120	1.470 (.144)	-.427 (.172)	-.209	-2.480 (.014)
Employment	-.271 (.211)	-.108	-1.287 (.200)	.059 (.208)	.025	.284 (.777)
Parent	-.186 (.191)	-.090	-.977 (.330)	-.023 (.188)	-.012	-.125 (.901)
Education	-.461 (.273)	-.146	-1.692 (.093)	.224 (.269)	.074	.834 (.406)
SES	-.405 (.214)	-.174	-1.891 (.061)	-.210 (.211)	-.094	-.993 (.323)
F-test (Sig.)	2.490 (.015)			1.483 (.169)		
SEE	.97478			.96174		
R²	.126			.079		
Adj. R²	.075			.026		

Table 21: Heckman Treatment Effects Model for Participants and Non-Participants at Time 3

	IPE Coefficient (p-value)	EPE Coefficient (p-value)
Structural Model		
PARTICIPATION	-.2076 (.622)	-.7733 (.164)
GENDER	.2997 (.085)	-.4075 (.018)
EMPLOYMENT	-.2140 (.297)	.01514 (.940)
AGE	-.2749 (.213)	-.03663 (.867)
PARENT	-.1654 (.384)	-.0079 (.966)
RACE	-.0462 (.830)	.4390 (.058)
EDUCATION	-.3434 (.238)	.3669 (.231)
SES	-.3619 (.102)	-.1818 (.405)
CONSTANT	.9386 (.024)	.5499 (.220)
Selection Model		
GENDER	-.20758 (.536)	-.1628 (.641)
EMPLOYMENT	-.7284 (.087)	-.7311 (.096)
AGE	-.7430 (.068)	-.6446 (.120)
PARENT	-.6329 (.108)	-.6058 (.128)
RACE	1.6033 (.004)	1.6365 (.004)
EDUCATION	.9618 (.084)	.9574 (.097)
SES	.3164 (.430)	.3380 (.404)
SCHOOL	1.1701 (.004)	1.2136 (.003)
OFFICIAL	.0985 (.805)	.0213 (.958)
TOWNHALL	.9869 (.006)	.9410 (.021)
VOTE	-.5647 (.539)	-.6619 (.480)
CONSTANT	.3245 (.743)	.3451 (.729)
Log likelihood	-242.21564	240.07794
Wald Chi-Square (sig.)	19.24 (.0136)	11.50 (.1751)
Rho	.3135109	.3001917
LR test of independent equations	1.18 (.2775)	0.62 (.4328)
Sample Size	144	144

Table 22: Mean Scores on IPE and EPE for Non-Participants at Time 1 and Time 3

	Time 1	Time 3			
	Mean (st. dev.)	Mean (st. dev.)	Mean Difference (st. dev.)	T-Stat (p-value)	*df*
IPE	-.2253 (1.0814)	-.0709 (1.0019)	-.1544 (.9543)	-.943 (.352)	33
EPE	.0279 (1.1885)	-.0115 (1.0433)	.0394 (1.1311)	.203 (.840)	33

CHAPTER SIX

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

INTRODUCTION

In recent decades, the concept of deliberative democracy has seen a resurgence in popularity in the United States and in other Western nations. This increased interest is, in part, a function of claims about a democratic deficit and a citizenship deficit in the United States (e.g., Macedo et al., 2005; see also Elshtain, 1995; Frantzich, 2005; Putnam, 2000; Sandel, 1996; Skocpol and Fiorina, 1999). A democratic deficit refers to a situation where democratic organizations, institutions, and governments are seen as falling short of fulfilling the principles of democracy in their practices or operation (Chomsky, 2006; Durant, 1995). A citizenship deficit refers broadly to the erosion of civil society, and more specifically to an erosion of the skills and dispositions of citizenship among the general public (e.g., Macedo et. al, 2005). To many, deliberative democracy represents a potential remedy for these problems.

As noted in Chapters 2 and 3, numerous scholars have boasted the intrinsic value of deliberative democracy, praising its potential to enhance the skills and dispositions of citizenship, and thereby reduce the citizenship deficit (e.g., Elster, 1998; Fung, 2003, 2005; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 2004; Mansbridge, 1995; Pateman, 1970). In particular, advocates of deliberative democracy claim that deliberative processes can produce "better citizens" by increasing their political efficacy, sophistication, interest, participation, trust, respect, empathy, and sociotropism (Luskin and Fishkin, 2003; see also Benhabib, 1996; Cohen and Fung, 2004; Cohen and Rogers, 1995; Cooke, 2000;

Elster, 1998; Fearon, 1998; Fung, 2003, 2005; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 2004; Macedo, 1999; Manin, 1987). As yet, however, empirical research demonstrating the intrinsic benefits of deliberative democracy is lacking (Delli Carpini, Cook, and Jacobs, 2004). This study attempts to fill a part of this research gap by focusing on the impacts of participation in a deliberative democracy process on perceptions of political efficacy.

Political efficacy refers to the extent to which people feel they have an impact on, or exert some influence over, public affairs (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, 1954). More specifically, internal political efficacy reflects a person's feelings of competence to understand and participate in the work of government, and external political efficacy reflects a person's beliefs about the responsiveness of government to citizen demands (Craig, Niemi, and Silver, 1990). Although political efficacy is only one measure of the skills and dispositions of citizenship, it is a particularly important measure. Political efficacy is among the most frequently used measures of general political attitudes (e.g. Conway, 2000; Finkel, 1985) and is thought to be a key indicator of the overall health of democratic systems (Craig, Niemi, and Silver, 1990; Easton, 1965, 1975; Miller 1974). Moreover, recent decades have seen the steady and significant decline of political efficacy among Americans. This is problematic because political efficacy is a measure of citizenship that broadly signals regime support and legitimacy (Easton, 1965, 1975; Miller, 1974).

In theory, deliberation should increase perceptions of political efficacy, as well as other skills and dispositions of citizenship (e.g., Luskin and Fishkin, 2003). In fact, political efficacy is the key citizenship characteristic that is to be developed by democratic participation (Mansbridge, 1995; Pateman, 1970). This potential "efficacy

effect" is often used as a rationale for engaging in deliberative processes and institutionalizing deliberative democracy in the regular practices of government. Again, however, relatively little research has explicitly explored the effects of deliberative democracy on perceptions of political efficacy.

To better understand the relationship between deliberative democracy and political efficacy, this study examines the America*Speaks* 21ˢᵗ Century Town Meeting as convened by United Agenda for Children (UAC), a coalition of public, private, and non-profit organizations who joined to ensure a positive future for the children and youth of Mecklenburg County, North Carolina (UAC, 2006). The America*Speaks* 21ˢᵗ Century Town Meeting is a deliberative democracy process that enables thousands of citizens to deliberate in small groups about important community issues. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the design characteristics of the Town Meeting make it an exceptional process to examine for the potential intrinsic benefits of deliberative democracy (e.g., Fung, 2003, 2005; Williamson, 2004).

The primary research question in this study is: What impact does participation in the America*Speaks* 21ˢᵗ Century Town Meeting have on participants' sense of internal and external political efficacy? Three subsidiary research questions are explored, including:

1) Do participants and non-participants differ in terms of political efficacy before participation in the Town Meeting?

2) Do participants have a higher sense of political efficacy after participation in the Town Meeting? If so, what variables affect perceptions of political efficacy?

3) If participants have a higher sense of political efficacy after participation in the Town Meeting, do those effects last over time?

As explained in Chapter 4, this study uses a quasi-experimental, longitudinal research design and data from surveys collected at three points in times from two non-equivalent comparison groups, including participants (those who attended the UAC 21st Century Town Meeting) and non-participants (citizens of the greater Charlotte area who did not register for or attend the UAC Town Meeting). Participants were surveyed at three points in time: before the Town Meeting (Time 1), immediately after the Town Meeting (Time 2), and approximately 24 months after the Town Meeting (Time 3). Non-participants were surveyed at two points in time: before the Town Meeting (Time 1) and approximately 24 months after the Town Meeting (Time 3).

Chapter 5 addressed the research questions and their related hypotheses using an assortment of methodological approaches, including various regression models, Heckman treatment effect models, and propensity score matching models. The study has several major findings. First, before the Town Meeting, participants have significantly lower perceptions of both internal and external political efficacy than non-participants. Second, after the Town Meeting, participants experience an increase in both internal and external political efficacy; however, only the increase in external political efficacy is statistically significant. Moreover, the quality of deliberation is not correlated with either internal or external political efficacy. The perceived potential impact of the Town Meeting is positively correlated with internal, but not external, political efficacy.

Third, the results indicate that there are no significant changes in internal or external political efficacy among participants between Time 2 and Time 3. These results suggest that the efficacy effect persists over time. Moreover, there are no statistically significant changes in internal political efficacy among participants at Time 1 and Time

3, although the increase in external political efficacy in these time periods is statistically significant.

Finally, unlike before the Town Meeting, there are no statistically significant differences in internal political efficacy between participants and non-participants at Time 3; however, there are significant differences in external political efficacy between participants and non-participants 24 months after the Town Meeting, Moreover, there are no significant changes in non-participants' perceptions of internal or external political efficacy between Time 1 and Time 3. In other words, the comparison group experienced no changes in political efficacy over time; therefore, changes in participants' perceptions of efficacy can be more strongly attributed to participation in the 21st Century Town.

This chapter reviews these and other results in more detail, offering substantive discussion about what the results mean. Following the discussion of results, several limitations to this study are noted, and directions for future research are provided.

DISCUSSION

The results of the analyses are discussed below in reference to the three research questions that guided this study. As such, the discussion is divided into three sections. The first generally focuses on the differences between participants and non-participants. The second examines the impact of participation on perceptions of political efficacy, as well as the variables that affect perceptions of political efficacy. The third section explores the persistence of perceptions of political efficacy. Implications for both theory and practice are noted in each section.

Differences between Participants and Non-Participants

The first question asks if participants and non-participants differ in terms of political efficacy before participation in the Town Meeting. In general, research shows that wealthy, educated individuals with professional careers tend to have higher perceptions of political efficacy (Abramson, 1983). Similarly, because most deliberative processes have elements of voluntary selection, those who participate are often not representative of the broader community; they tend to be wealthier, more educated, and professional (Fung, 2003). Given these potential differences, it was important to explore baseline differences in among participants and non-participants before the Town Meeting. The goal of the question was to better understand the composition of the engaged (and disengaged) citizenry. In other words, the question was designed to help better understand the efficacy and demographic characteristics of those who do (and do not) participate in deliberative processes.

The comparison of participants and non-participants before the Town Meeting produced three important results. First, the analyses showed that when demographic variables are held constant, participants had significantly lower perceptions of internal and external political efficacy than non-participants. While the efficacy differences between participants and non-participants are not surprising, the direction of the differences is. As noted in Chapter 3, a significant body of survey research on political efficacy and participation reports that those with high levels of political efficacy get involved in politics, while those with low levels of political efficacy do not (Abramson and Aldrich, 1982; Austin and Pinkleton, 1995; Balch, 1974; Blais, 2000; Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, 1954; Clarke and Acock, 1989; Converse, 1972; Craig, 1979; Craig

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and Maggiotto, 1982; Craig, Niemi, and Silver, 1990; Finkel, 1985; Fraser, 1970; Good and Mayer, 1975; Hawkins, Marando, and Taylor, 1971; Horwitt, 1999; Langton and Karns, 1969; Niemi, Craig, and Mattei, 1991; Orum, 1989; White, 1968).

The results of this study stand in contrast to the majority of efficacy research, and therefore, have important theoretical implications. Most notably, the results suggest a need to return to and reexamine the original hypothesis about political efficacy and participation. When scholars first began to study political efficacy and participation, they hypothesized that the less efficacious would be more likely to mobilize and participate in politics. The reasoning was that people who are efficacious do not have the need to participate, as they are more likely to feel confident that government officials will make decisions in their interest with or without their participation (Fraser, 1970; Gamson, 1968; Paige, 1971). In terms of this study, the logic is that if people believe that government is responsive to their interests, then they have no need to make themselves heard in a deliberative, participatory forum. In contrast, those who feel that government is not responsive might have viewed the 21st Century Town Meeting as an opportunity to express their interests and exact responsibility and accountability from government officials. This is especially likely since the Town Meeting has explicit, and publicized, links to decision makers.

Two possible explanations of these findings vis-à-vis the original efficacy hypothesis are worth noting. First, the majority of research regarding political efficacy and participation has examined traditional methods of political participation, such as voting, campaigning, and protesting. Maybe the deliberative nature of the 21st Century Town Meeting process, which is fundamentally different from the context and nature of

traditional political activities, attracted the less efficacious individuals among the citizens. Perhaps these individuals viewed the UAC Town Meeting as a non-traditional, innovative process, and believed that in such a forum they would have a better chance of making a difference. A second, and even more plausible, explanation is that the context and subject matter of the UAC Town Meeting (youth policy issues, including health, education, and safety) was important and controversial enough to motivate the less efficacious to participate. Thus, maybe political participation in such events is contingent on the subject matter of deliberation and on the context in which political participation is to take place. Whatever the explanation, it appears that in this case the America*Speaks* process was successful in engaging less efficacious citizens.

A second interesting result from the comparison of participants and non-participants concerns the relationship between demographic variables and political efficacy. Specifically, the results suggest that education and SES are negatively related to internal and external political efficacy; as education and SES increase, in this sample, political efficacy decreases. These results are perplexing and contradict a considerable amount of empirical research on demographics, participation, and political efficacy. Perhaps the results are a function of knowledge. With education and higher socio-economic status comes more knowledge. The more one knows and understands the policy issue under debate, the more one realizes how difficult addressing the problem will be. Such understandings may reduce one's perceptions about the political difference s/he can make in a deliberative forum, as well as reduce one's expectations about responsiveness of government.

Finally, a word should be said about the demographic characteristics of participants and non-participants. A probit regression model indicates statistically significant demographic differences between non-participants and participants with respect to gender, parental status, and educational status. There were more females, parents, and individuals with higher education degrees among participants than non-participants. These differences are not surprising given the context of the UAC Town Meeting. It is reasonable to expect women and parents to participate in an event focused on youth policy. Moreover, the UAC is a coalition of public, private, and third-sector organizations. Since the focus of this particular Town Meeting was on youth policy issues, it is not surprising that the process attracted women and parents. The difference in education levels between participants and non-participants is also interesting, but may be a function of the context of UAC Town Meeting. The major areas of policy discussion at the UAC Town Meeting were education, health, and safety; as such, personnel from all levels of the school system, as well as administrators and officials from a variety of community and government agencies were in attendance. Obviously, these participants will tend to be more educated than the citizenry at large. Nevertheless, it is interesting that participants and non-participants did not differ with respect to other demographic characteristics, including employment status, socio-economic status, age, and race. This result suggests that America*Speaks*' efforts at targeted recruitment pay off; they are successful in engaging participants that are demographically representative of the community.

In sum, the UAC Town Meeting process engaged a diverse cross-section of the community, and was successful in gaining the participation of the less efficacious citizens

in the community. These results, and particularly the results for political efficacy, have

important implications for both theory and practice. From a theoretical standpoint, the

results stand in contrast to wealth of research, and suggest that theorists need to return to

the ideas about who participates in such processes and why. It is possible that

participation is context-specific. Moreover, if the opposite result had been found, that

participants had higher perceptions of political efficacy, it would have suggested that the

21st Century Town Meeting was less effective than presumed in engaging all segments of

the citizenry. This finding would have raised a question about why deliberative

democracy efforts should be pursued if they are only further engaging the already

efficacious among citizens. The results presented here may abate this concern.

The Impact of Participation on Political Efficacy

The second set of research questions get to the heart of the study: whether

participation in a deliberative democracy process increases perceptions political efficacy,

and what variables contribute to those perceptions. Advocates of deliberative democracy

assert that deliberation should increase perceptions of political efficacy, and foster other

skills and dispositions of citizenship (e.g., Luskin and Fishkin, 2003). The theory

promulgated by many participatory and deliberative scholars is that such participation has

an educative effect on individuals in that it increases self-confidence and skill-

development which can generate and foster political efficacy (e.g., Barber, 1984;

Benhabib, 1996; Cohen and Rogers, 1995; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 2004; Hunold

and Young, 1998; Luskin and Fishkin, 2003; Mason, 1982; Pateman, 1970; Thompson,

1970). This potential "efficacy effect" is often used as a rationale for engaging in

deliberative processes and is a key feature in arguments to institutionalize deliberative democracy in the regular practices of government. Again, however, relatively little research has explicitly explored the effects of deliberative democracy on perceptions of political efficacy. To address the second set of research questions, participants at Time 1 (before the Town Meeting) are compared to participants at Time 2 (immediately after the Town Meeting). The analyses involved in these comparisons produced several important results.

First, there are statistically significant increases in subjects' perceptions of external politically efficacy after participation. Internal political efficacy also increases after the Town Meeting, but not in a statistically significant way. These results suggest that the Town Meeting is at least partially successful in generating the efficacy effect among participants. While these results will be reassuring to some deliberative scholars, they do present a challenge to the theory behind deliberative and participatory democracy. As noted above, participatory and deliberative theorists suggest that deliberation will have educative effects on participants. In general, these educative effects are articulated in way that more closely resembles internal, rather than external political efficacy. For example, Pateman (1970: 46, emphasis added) asserts that "*the acquisition of confidence* is part, at least, of what theorists of the participatory society saw as the psychological benefits that would accrue during participation." In other words, participatory and deliberative scholars tend to emphasize the effects of participation on internal political efficacy, or feelings about one's competence and ability to participate effectively in government and politics. This assertion is only weakly borne out by the findings of this study.

Rather, the results here suggest that participation has a stronger impact on external political efficacy, or feelings about the responsiveness of government and its authorities. In this sense, the results tend to buttress the mobilization of support theory, rather than deliberative and participatory theory; participation increases the belief that governmental authorities are responsive to attempted citizen influence. Certainly, this reflects the observation that effective participation requires the belief that participation matters, that government is listening and will be responsive (e.g., Mill, 1997). Indeed, external political efficacy has been linked to trust in political authorities (Balch, 1974), the concept of diffuse political support (Easton, 1965, 1975), and general support for the political system (Iyengar, 1980). Research has also shown that external efficacy is profoundly affected by political events (e.g., Clarke and Acock, 1989; Gurin and Brim, 1984), it evolves and transforms in response to changes in the political landscape. It follows that external efficacy is likely to be reactive to interventions that are explicitly supported by (and have the explicit support of) key political decision makers, as is found in the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting.

Whereas external efficacy is malleable, internal efficacy may be more stable. Internal efficacy is clearly a product of political socialization and all of its accompanying social, familial, educational, and other forces (Almond and Verba, 1963). Moreover, internal political efficacy is clearly connected to the concept of self-efficacy, as employed in social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1977, 1982). Self-efficacy reflects the belief that one can effectively manage situations and events that affect their lives. These feelings of self-efficacy are developed over the course of one's life in response to personal experiences, vicarious experiences, social persuasions, and physiological factors (Bandura, 1994).

Thus, while perceptions of internal political efficacy can change, it is not surprising that a one-time, eight-hour intervention did not change significantly the way people feel about their abilities to participate in politics. This then, may be the lynchpin on which the educative effects of participatory theory turns. It is not enough to have a singular deliberative experience; maybe deliberative events need to happen several times before internal efficacy will change in a statistically meaningful way.

In short, the results of this study suggest that participation in the 21st Century Town Meeting has an immediate, statistically significant impact on external political efficacy. Moreover, internal political efficacy also increases, just not in a statistically significant way. We should be clear, however, that these results do not mean that deliberation has no effect on internal political efficacy for at least two reasons. First, and most obviously, this study involves one example of one deliberative democracy process; thus, we cannot generalize these results to all processes of deliberative democracy. In other words, we cannot surmise the failure of deliberative democracy to affect internal political efficacy from this study alone. Second, there is clearly measurement error in internal political efficacy, as evidence by its low reliability score in this and other studies. Such error is an historical artifact of the way in which political efficacy is assessed and measured.

A second interesting result concerns the effect of deliberative variables on perceptions of political efficacy. Specifically, this study assessed the impacts of perception about the quality of deliberation and the potential impact of the Town Meeting on political efficacy. The quality of deliberation is thought to be an important characteristic in determining the impact of deliberative democracy on citizens (Cohen,

1989; Gastil, 1993, 2000, 2006; Habermas, 1989); however, the results of this study show that it is not significantly related to either internal or external political efficacy. This result is surprising and raises an important question: if the quality of deliberation is unimportant, then how can we speak of "deliberative" democracy? There are several possible explanations for this finding. First, there is relatively little variance in the measure used here, which could have an impact on its significance in the regression model. Second, scholars have not yet developed a survey instrument with which to measure the concept of the quality of deliberation. The research survey used in this study was designed with numerous questions that capture various ideas from the literature about the quality of deliberation. For example, the quality of deliberation index used here resembles the discourse quality index created by Steenbergen, Bächtiger, Spörndli, and Steiner (2003). Although the quality of deliberation index has high reliability, it is possible that the index does not capture the elements of deliberation that matter in the fostering of political efficacy. Third, it is possible that the quality of deliberation is an intervening variable; perhaps it does not directly influence political efficacy, but rather is important in the development of other skills and dispositions of citizenship. For example, it is reasonable to assert that deliberative quality would impact trust, empathy and/or political knowledge, and through the development of these characteristics, would assist in the development of efficacy. Finally, it is also possible that deliberative quality does not matter. Maybe it is simply the opportunity to participate that counts in fostering political efficacy.

Similarly, the perceived potential impact of the Town Meeting has no effect on external political efficacy, although it is a statistically significant predictor of internal

political efficacy. Participants who perceive greater potential impact have higher perceptions of internal political efficacy. This result is a little bit surprising. One would think that greater perceived impact would be correlated with perceptions about governmental responsiveness. Instead, the results here suggest that the greater one perceives the potential impact to be, the more one feels confident about his or her political abilities. However, it is reasonable to assume that those who are internally efficacious will also believe that an event in which they participation will also have an impact. This result supports theorists' assertion that empowered participatory forums (e.g., Fung and Wright, 2003) are needed in order for deliberation to produce citizenship benefits.

Finally, it is important to briefly discuss the impact of demographic characteristics on political efficacy. When all else is held constant, only age has an impact on internal political efficacy, with older participants feeling, on average, more internally efficacious than younger participants. In contrast, when all else is held constant, race and parental status have an impact on external political efficacy, with minorities feeling, on average less externally efficacious than Caucasians, and parents feeling more externally efficacious than non-parents. These results are generally in accord with theory and other research on political efficacy and participation (see Chapter 3).

The Persistence of the Efficacy Effect

The final research question asks about the persistence of the efficacy effect: do increased perceptions of political efficacy last over time? This is among the first studies to assess the long-term impacts of deliberative participation on political efficacy in a

systematic, empirical manner. Just as it is important to know and understand how deliberation increases political efficacy, it is important to know whether the efficacy effect has longevity. The potential value of deliberative democracy as an antidote to the democratic and citizenship deficits increases to the extent that deliberative processes result in long-term and sustainable benefits.

The results of this study show that among participants, internal and external political efficacy do not increase or decrease in a significant way 24 months after participation (i.e., between Time 2 and Time 3). Moreover, the results indicate that external political efficacy is significantly higher at Time 3 than at Time 1. Internal political efficacy also increases between these time periods, although not in a statistically significant manner. These results indicate that the increases in perceptions of external political efficacy persist over time after participation.

Two additional results from this section are worth noting. First, there are no significant differences in internal political efficacy between participants and non-participants at Time 3. Statistically significant differences in internal political efficacy between participants and non-participants did exist at Time 1; therefore, the results at Time 3 are evidence that participation does impact internal political efficacy, albeit not in a statistically significant manner. Significant differences in external political efficacy between participants and non-participants at Time 3 remain. Second, the results show that there are no significant differences in non-participants' perceptions of internal or external political efficacy between Time 1 and Time 3. This is important because it demonstrates that the comparison group experienced no changes in political efficacy over time. When

viewed holistically, these results add strength to the findings regarding the effects of participation in the 21st Century Town Meeting on perceptions of political efficacy.

A summary of the main results regarding the efficacy effect is in order. First, participants had lower perceptions of internal and external political efficacy than non-participants before the Town Meeting. Second, immediately following the Town Meeting, participants experienced a statistically significant increase in external political efficacy; internal political efficacy did not change in a statistically significant way. Third, 24 months after the Town Meeting, participants' perceptions of internal and external political efficacy did not change in a statistically significant way from the levels reported immediately following the Town Meeting. However, external political efficacy, but not internal political efficacy, was significantly higher at Time 3 than at Time 1. Thus, the gains in perceptions of external political efficacy persisted for at least two years after the Town Meeting. Fourth, non-participants experienced no significant changes in political efficacy during the same time span. This suggests that history, or other external events, were not responsible for participant changes. All-in-all, it appears that the 21st Century Town Meeting is successful in generating a partial efficacy effect – participation in the Town Meeting significantly changes participants' perceptions of external political efficacy. While participation also impacts perceptions of internal political efficacy, the differences are not statistically significant.

LIMITATIONS

At least three limitations to this study are worth noting. First, this study looks at one manifestation of a singular deliberative democracy process. This raises an issue about

the generalizability of the findings. Although the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting has many of the design features on would expect from an "ideal" deliberative process (Williamson, 2004), it is still very specialized and highly unique. The Town Meeting process involves lengthy and elaborate preparation, significant use of new technologies, and varying modes of deliberation. It is a highly managed process, from the development of a neutral statement of the issue (including issue definition), to intensive facilitation and deliberation, to the writing of outcomes and recommendations for decision makers. The process is intensive for participants, especially when compared to many other deliberative processes, involving at least 8 full hours of deliberation and discussion. When coupled with the design elements of the 21st Century Town Meeting, these features raise important questions about the generalizability of findings from this study.

I believe, however, that the findings are generalizable to other manifestations of the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting. America*Speaks* conducts several Town Meetings a year. Although the Town Meetings occur in different communities and focus on different issues, the format of the Town Meeting process stays the same, increasing the likelihood of generalizability in these settings. Nevertheless, it is plausible that the effects of participation on political efficacy may change depending on the subject matter of deliberation. This will be a matter for future research.

Although the findings are not generalizable across the spectrum of all deliberative democracy processes and applications, they may also hold in studies of deliberative democracy where the observed process shares similar procedural elements or structural characteristics with the 21st Century Town Meeting. Regardless of limited

generalizability, the research findings still inform the study of deliberative democracy

and have theoretical and practical importance. The results give much needed indications

about the impacts and outcomes of deliberative democracy processes, in this case, the

America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting. Scholars can use this information to refine

theory, enhance practice, and design better research studies.

This suggests a second limitation, namely that the study uses rolling cross-

sectional data; therefore, individual respondents cannot be linked over time. The linking

of respondents over time would be a feature in the ultimate deliberative democracy

research design, as it would readily allow scholars to assess the individual level changes

that accrue as a result of participation. Given that individual responses cannot be linked,

we must be wary in asserting the overall impact of the process on perceptions of political

efficacy. Having such individual-level data would greatly improve the type and strength

of analyses that can be done.

Finally, and on a similar note, it is important to recognize that the dependent

variables for internal and external political efficacy have measurement error. This fact

may raise questions about the strength of the results reported here. Despite the

measurement error, the effects of participation on external political efficacy were

significant above the 90% confidence level.

FUTURE RESEARCH

These limitations give rise to several interesting directions for future research. In

regard to this particular dataset, I will undertake additional research to assess the impacts

of participation in the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting on the other skills and

disposition of citizenship. I have data that captures various other aspects of citizenship, such as social capital, political trust, political engagement, and political interest and knowledge. In addition, the survey contains measures of other procedural characteristics, particularly with regard to distributive, procedural, and interactional justice. Incorporating these elements into future analyses will allow for a more robust assessment of the impacts of participation in the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting on the skills and dispositions of citizenship.

My additional suggestions for future research are broader and applicable to a wide variety of scholars in the field. First, it will be useful for future research to examine multiple examples of a singular deliberative democracy process or engage in comparative studies of two or more deliberative democracy processes. The goal of such research designs would be at least threefold: 1) to better assess the impacts of participation in deliberative democracy processes on perceptions of political efficacy; 2) to assess impact of participation in deliberative democracy processes on other skills and dispositions of citizenship, such as political sophistication, interest, knowledge, trust, empathy, respect, and participation and engagement; and 3) to empirically examine the impact of particular deliberative design choices on these functional outcomes.

The ultimate design would include the use of panel data, whereby subjects' responses can be tracked over time. Such a design would rule out the possibility of confounding influences. Moreover, experimental work in this area can certainly be conducted and be useful (e.g., Morrell, 1998). Experiments would allow researchers to control and manipulate design choices, including the subject matter of deliberation, and in doing so, might enable the further development of theory with respect to design

choices and functional outcomes. Despite the potential value and contributions of experiments, a considerable amount of field research is also necessary. These events happen in real-world situations and are theorized to make real-world differences. If this argument is to be tested, then it follows that we must explore the design and impacts of such processes on real people, in real settings, who are dealing with real and important issues. The scope of deliberative processes is quite large; scholars will not run out of such research opportunities anytime in the near future.

Second, it is imperative that scholars devise better measures of internal and external political efficacy. If political efficacy is the key characteristic to be developed by participation, then it necessary to have reliable, consistent measures for the concept. It is shocking that in the sixty-plus years since the first articulation of political efficacy, scholars still rely on inadequate measures. While some work in this area is progressing, particularly with respect to internal political efficacy (e.g., Morrell, 2003, 2005), a considerable amount of additional work is needed. On a related note, scholars also need to develop reliable and consistent measures of other indicators of citizenship skills and dispositions. For example, researchers need to develop measures for political empathy, trust, sophistication, respect, and sociotropism. Until these measures are developed and tested, the impacts of deliberative democracy on the skills and dispositions of citizenship cannot be fully understood and appraised.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the field of deliberative democracy needs to move beyond normative speculation about the intrinsic benefits of deliberative democracy to theoretical development and empirical assessment. Scholars need to better articulate the theory of deliberative democracy, and develop specific ideas about how

various deliberative features and practices contribute to outcomes. Until such theorizing and testing is complete, we cannot determine whether institutionalizing deliberative democracy in the regular practices of government is warranted. In working toward this goal, it will be important to integrate theory from related disciplines into the theory of deliberative democracy. Several well-developed areas of theory (and research and practice) could be useful to this endeavor. For example, conflict/dispute resolution theory sits in the penumbra of deliberative democracy. There is a wealth of scholarship in the area of conflict and dispute resolution that may enlighten us about the relationships among deliberative structures, participation, and outcomes. Similarly, the social psychology literature on organizational justice, including distributive, procedural, and interactional justice, may inform the relationship between deliberative designs and outcomes. Finally, self-efficacy and social cognition theory may inform our study and research of the intrinsic benefits of deliberative democracy processes on individuals and their skills and dispositions as citizens.

CONCLUSION

Deliberative democracy, also sometimes called discursive democracy, is the idea that public decisions should be made by discussion among free and equal citizens. One goal of deliberative democracy is to infuse government decision making with reasoned discussion among, and the collective judgment of, citizens (Chambers, 2003; Cunningham, 2002; Elster, 1998; Gutmann and Thompson, 2004). Deliberative democrats see public deliberation as the source of legitimate lawmaking, and view it in contrast to the traditional economics-based theory of democracy, which uses voting as the

central institution for identifying and aggregating preferences (Mansbridge, 1980; Young, 2000).

As noted throughout this dissertation, deliberative democracy has seen a resurgence in popularity and taken on new meaning in Western nations, and especially in the United States, in recent decades. One reason for this is that advocates believe deliberative democracy is an antidote to the ills of the democratic deficit and citizenship deficit in the United States and elsewhere (e.g., Macedo et al., 2005; see also Elshtain, 1995; Frantzich, 2005; Putnam, 2000; Sandel, 1996; Skocpol and Fiorina, 1999). Advocates assert that deliberative democracy can ensure accountability and quality service delivery and produce improved policy outcomes while simultaneously reversing the trends of declining political participation and the erosion of civil society. The basic argument is that the nature and characteristics of deliberative democracy have both instrumental and intrinsic value. The instrumental value of deliberative democracy enables it to better deal with the problems of modern governance, while its intrinsic value enables it to produce better and more efficacious citizens.

The focus of this study is on the intrinsic value of deliberative democracy – its potential to enhance the skills and dispositions of citizenship. Specifically, this study examines the impact of one deliberative process, the AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting, on perceptions of internal and external political efficacy. Political efficacy is an important area of research for several reasons. First, internal and external political efficacy are among the most frequently used measures of general political attitudes and are highly correlated with political participation and mobilization (Conway, 2000; Finkel, 1985). Second, internal and external political efficacy are thought to be key indicators of

the overall health of democratic systems (Craig, Niemi, and Silver, 1990). Third, recent decades have seen the steady decline of political efficacy among Americans. Finally, deliberation is thought to increase perceptions of political efficacy among participants (e.g., Luskin and Fishkin, 2003), and is in fact, the key citizenship characteristic that is to be developed by democratic participation (Mansbridge, 1995; Pateman, 1970). This potential "efficacy effect" is frequently touted as a rationale for engaging in deliberative processes and institutionalizing deliberative democracy in the regular practices of government.

The findings here provide partial support for the idea that deliberative democracy can produce the efficacy effect. Specifically, external efficacy, which regards perceptions about the responsiveness of government to citizen demands, increased in a statistically significant way following participation in the UAC Town Meeting. Internal political efficacy, which regards perceptions of one's competence to engage in politics and is the characteristic that most closely resembles theorists' articulation of the educative effects of participation, also increased after participation, although not in a statistically significant way. These results provide some support for the claims that deliberative democracy produces the efficacy effect; however, the results also suggest a need for additional theorizing and testing. Other findings from this study may be more comforting to deliberative scholars. Most notably, the results suggest that the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting is effective in getting the participation of those who are less efficacious in the community. In addition, the process is able to gather participation from a diverse cross-section of the community. Finally, the process seems to produce gains in external political efficacy that persist over time.

Clearly, more research is needed, both in terms of theory development and rigorous empirical testing. The time is ripe for such research, especially as the deliberative democracy movement gains momentum. The prospective impact of deliberative democracy on public administration continues to grow as interest in the field increases and as more groups and organizations seek to implement and institutionalize such processes in the regular practice of governance. Until such additional research is conducted, however, we cannot adequately determine whether the claims and calls for institutionalization are warranted.

Despite the need for additional research, it is clearly becoming increasingly important for the field of public administration to understand both the theory and practice(s) of deliberative democracy. Current research on deliberative democracy spans the fields of public management, public policy, planning, political science, sociology, communications, and related disciplines; public administration, with its multi-disciplinary nature and perspectives, is a logical and natural home for deliberative democracy research. Moreover, integrating citizens into policy and decision-making processes is a major challenge for governance in the 21st century (see generally, O'Leary, Bingham and Gerard, 2006; see also Collaborative Democracy Network, 2005, 2006). As is evident from the history of citizen participation practices in the United States (and elsewhere), the brunt of responsibility for the creation, development, implementation, and management of such efforts falls squarely on the shoulders of public administrators. To the extent that scholars and practitioners want to institutionalize deliberative democracy in the regular practices of government and governance, it is necessary that both public administrators

and scholars of public administration understand and care about deliberative democracy

processes and practices.

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Non-Participant/Participant Telephone Survey
(Time 1)

The first set of questions deals with media use.

1. How many days a week do you read a newspaper?

_____ DAYS

_____ DO NOT READ A NEWSPAPER → **GO TO QUESTION 3.**

2. How much attention do you pay to newspaper content dealing with:

	VERY LITTLE ATTENTION									VERY CLOSE ATTENTION	DON'T READ
a. International affairs	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0
b. National government and politics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0
c. Local government and politics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0
d. Editorials and letters to the editor	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0
e. Youth issues in the Charlotte area	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0

3. How often do you watch:

	RARELY									ALL THE TIME	DON'T WATCH	DON'T KNOW
a. Network evening news	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99
b. Local evening news	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99
c. News magazines (like 20/20 or PrimeTime Live)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99

(If respondent says "0" for all responses above, skip to Q5)

4. How much attention do you pay to the following content on TV?

	VERY LITTLE ATTENTION									VERY CLOSE ATTENTION	DON'T WATCH	DON'T KNOW
a. International affairs	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99
b. National government and politics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99
c. Local government and politics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99
d. Editorials and letters to the editor	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99

5. People rely on different sources for political information. How much do you rely on the each of the following sources?

		VERY LITTLE									VERY MUCH	NOT AT ALL	DON'T KNOW
a.	Newspapers	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99
b.	Magazines (like Time, Newsweek, U.S. News and World Report)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99
c.	Network Television News	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99
d.	Local Television News	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99
e.	News Magazines (like "Nightline" or "20/20"	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99
f.	Political Talk Radio	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99
g.	The Internet	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99
h.	Friends, Family, Neighbors, and Colleagues	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99

The next set of questions deals with government and politics.

6. In general, how interested are you in:

		NOT AT ALL INTERESTED									EXTREMELY INTERESTED	DON'T KNOW
a.	International Affairs	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
b.	National Government and Politics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
c.	Local Government and Politics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
d.	Youth Issues	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
e.	Youth Issues in the Charlotte Area	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

7. Regardless of how interested you are, how much would you say you know about:

		KNOW NOTHING									KNOW A LOT	DON'T KNOW
a.	International Affairs	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
b.	National Government and Politics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
c.	Local Government and Politics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
d.	Youth Issues	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
e.	Youth Issues in the Charlotte Area	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

8. In the past year, have you:

a.	Attended a neighborhood or town-hall meeting?	[1] YES	[0] NO
b.	Attended a meeting involving school affairs?	[1] YES	[0] NO
c.	Written a letter to an editor?	[1] YES	[0] NO
d.	Called in to a local radio station?	[1] YES	[0] NO
e.	Circulated a petition?	[1] YES	[0] NO
f.	Worked for a local political campaign?	[1] YES	[0] NO
g.	Contacted a local public official?	[1] YES	[0] NO
h.	Called other people to raise funds for local organizations?	[1] YES	[0] NO
i.	Volunteered for a local organization or cause?	[1] YES	[0] NO
j.	Contributed money to local organizations?	[1] YES	[0] NO

9. Did you vote in the November 2004 presidential election?

[0] NO

[1] YES

10. How much of the time do you think you can trust local government to do what is right?

[1] JUST ABOUT ALWAYS

[2] MOST OF THE TIME

[3] ONLY SOME OF THE TIME

11. Which statement below comes closer to how you feel?

[1] THE GOVERNMENT IS RUN BY A FEW BIG INTERESTS LOOKING OUT FOR THEMSELVES.

[2] THE GOVERNMENT IS RUN FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL THE PEOPLE.

12. Which statement below best describes how you feel about others?

[1] MOST PEOPLE WOULD TRY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF YOU IF THEY GOT THE CHANCE.

[2] MOST PEOPLE TRY TO BE FAIR.

13. To what extent do you agree with each statement below?

	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	NEUTRAL	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW
a. Elected officials don't care what people like me think.	1	2	3	4	5	99
b. People like me don't have any say about what the government does.	1	2	3	4	5	99
c. It is important for people like me to have a voice in local government decisions.	1	2	3	4	5	99
d. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.	1	2	3	4	5	99
e. Voting is the only way people like me can have a say about how government runs things.	1	2	3	4	5	99
f. Local government is responsive to citizen concerns.	1	2	3	4	5	99
g. Elected officials are only interested in people's votes.	1	2	3	4	5	99
h. I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics.	1	2	3	4	5	99
i. I often don't feel sure of myself when talking about politics or government.	1	2	3	4	5	99
j. Citizens should have more opportunities to participate in local government decision-making.	1	2	3	4	5	99
k. Public policy decisions should be left to elected officials.	1	2	3	4	5	99

14. Now I am going to read a list of issues affecting youth in Mecklenburg County. How interested are you in each of these issues?

	NOT AT ALL INTERESTED									EXTREMELY INTERESTED	DON'T KNOW
a. Education	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
b. Public Safety	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
c. Family Support	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
d. Health Care	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
e. Substance Abuse	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
f. Community Activities	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
g. Economic Security	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
h. Community Support	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

15. Regardless of your interest, how confident are you in your knowledge of each issue?

	NOT CONFIDENT									EXTREMELY CONFIDENT	DON'T KNOW
a. Education	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
b. Public Safety	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
c. Family Support	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
d. Health Care	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
e. Substance Abuse	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
f. Community Activities	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
g. Economic Security	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
h. Community Support	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

16. Are there any youth-related issues not listed above that you think are important?

[0] NO [GO TO QUESTION 17]

[1] YES [GO TO PART B]

B. If yes, what are the issues?

17. In your opinion, how effective have local groups been in ensuring that all children in Mecklenburg County are healthy, safe and well-educated?

NOT EFFECTIVE									EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE	DON'T KNOW
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

18. How much responsibility do you think each of the following entities has for improving the quality of life for young people:

	NO RESPONSIBILITY									A GREAT DEAL OF RESPONSIBILITY	DON'T KNOW
Businesses	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Foundations and charities	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Individuals	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Local Government	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Not-for-profit organizations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Religious associations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Schools	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

19. Regardless of how much responsibility you feel each group has, how much power and influence do you think each group has to actually improve the quality of life for young people:

	NO POWER AND INFLUENCE									A GREAT AMOUNT POWER & INFLUENCE	DON'T KNOW
Businesses	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Foundations and charities	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Individuals	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Local Government	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Not-for-profit organizations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Religious associations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Schools	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

[IF RANDOM DIAL PARTICIPANT, SKIP TO QUESTION 25]

[IF REGISTRANT BUT NOT ATTENDING ASK ONLY QUESTIONS 20, 23, 24 c-i)

The next set of questions deals with the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting.

20. How did you hear about the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting?

[1] NEWSPAPER STORY

[2] TELEVISION STORY

[3] ON THE RADIO

[4] NEWSPAPER ADVERTISEMENT

[5] FROM SOMEONE ELSE

[6] OTHER (PLEASE SPECIFY) _____

21. Do you think you will be comfortable expressing your opinions on the issues at the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting?

[1] I do not expect to express myself at all.

[2] I will express how I feel, and let it go after that.

[3] I will express how I feel, and try to persuade others to accept my viewpoint.

[4] I don't know.

22. If everyone else agrees on an issue, but you disagree, would you feel free to speak out?

[0] NO
[1] YES
[2] DON'T KNOW

23. How much impact do you think the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting will have on:

	NO IMPACT								GREAT IMPACT	DON'T KNOW
a. Yourself	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
b. The Charlotte Community	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
c. Policy Makers	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

24. To what extent do you agree with each statement below? (Circle one)

	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	NEUTRAL	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW
a. I am prepared to participate effectively in the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting.	1	2	3	4	5	99
b. My participation will not make a difference in the outcome of the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting.	1	2	3	4	5	99
c. Other participants will consider my opinions.	1	2	3	4	5	99
d. Decision makers will be responsive to the recommendations of participants during the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting.	1	2	3	4	5	99
e. Decision makers and government representatives will not follow through with citizens' recommendations.	1	2	3	4	5	99
f. I was aware of this kind of process before I registered for the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting.	1	2	3	4	5	99
g. The United Agenda for Children Town Meeting will help decision makers and elected officials better understand the concerns of average citizens.	1	2	3	4	5	99
h. The United Agenda for Children Town Meeting will produce information that will improve future decision making.	1	2	3	4	5	99
i. Local groups and organizations will work together to implement the recommendations from the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting.	1	2	3	4	5	99
j. The United Agenda for Children will increase the capacity of local groups and organizations to work together.	1	2	3	4	5	99

k. It is important that participants in the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting do what they can to accomplish the recommendations.	1	2	3	4	5	99
l. It is important that you personally to do what you can to accomplish the recommendations.	1	2	3	4	5	99

The last set of questions deals with you. These questions are optional, but remember, <u>all information is confidential and anonymous</u>.

25. What is your gender?

  [0] MALE   [1] FEMALE

26. Are you employed?

  [0] NO   [1] YES

  (If respondent says "0" for Q26, skip to Q28)

27. If you are employed, do you work for:
    [1] PRIVATE BUSINESS
    [2] GOVERNMENT
    [3] K-12 EDUCATION
    [4] NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION
    [5] OTHER

28. Are you part of a group or business that is working already to achieve one or more of the United Agenda for Children goals?
  [0] NO   [1] YES

              (If respondent says "0" for Q28, skip to Q29)

If yes, which group(s):

29. What is your age?

[1] UNDER 18
[2] 18-21 YEARS
[3] 22-34 YEARS
[4] 35-44 YEARS
[5] 45-59 YEARS
[6] OVER 60
[7] REFUSED TO ANSWER

30. Do you have children under the age of 18?

[0] NO   [1] YES

31. What is your race?

[1] BLACK/AFRICAN AMERICAN
[2] WHITE/CAUCASIAN
[3] HISPANIC/LATINO
[4] ASIAN/ASIAN-INDIAN
[5] MULTI-ETHNIC/OTHER
[6] UNKNOWN
[7] REFUSED TO ANSWER

32. What is your level of education?

[1] SOME HIGH SCHOOL
[2] HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE (INCLUDING EQUIVALENCY)
[3] SOME COLLEGE, NO DEGREE
[4] ASSOCIATE DEGREE
[5] BACHELOR'S DEGREE
[6] GRADUATE OR PROFESSIONAL DEGREE
[7] REFUSED TO ANSWER

33. What was your 2003 total household income before taxes?

[1] UNDER $10,000
[2] $10,000 TO $19,999
[3] $20,000 TO $29,999
[4] $30,000 TO $39,999
[5] $40,000 TO $49,999
[6] $50,000 TO $59,999
[7] $60,000 TO $69,999
[8] $70,000 TO $79,999
[9] $80,000 TO $89,999
[10] $90,000 TO $99,999
[11] $100,000 OR MORE
[12] REFUSED TO ANSWER

Participant Survey (Time 2)

You must be at least 18 years old to complete this survey.

Please clearly circle, mark or write in your answers.

The first set of questions deals with media use.

1. How many days a week do you read a newspaper?

_____ DAYS

_____ DO NOT READ A NEWSPAPER → **GO TO QUESTION 3.**

2. How much attention do you pay to newspaper content dealing with:

	VERY LITTLE ATTENTION									VERY CLOSE ATTENTION	DON'T READ
a. International affairs	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0
b. National government and politics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0
c. Local government and politics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0
d. Editorials and letters to the editor	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0
e. Youth issues in the Charlotte area	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0

3. How often do you watch:

	RARELY									ALL THE TIME	DON'T WATCH	DON'T KNOW
a. Network evening news	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99
b. Local evening news	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99
c. News magazines (like 20/20 or PrimeTime Live)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99

4. How much attention do you pay to the following content on TV?

	VERY LITTLE ATTENTION									VERY CLOSE ATTENTION	DON'T WATCH	DON'T KNOW
a. International affairs	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99
b. National government and politics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99
c. Local government and politics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99
d. Editorials and letters to the editor	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99

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5. People rely on different sources for political information. How much do you rely on the each of the following sources?

	VERY LITTLE									VERY MUCH	NOT AT ALL	DON'T KNOW
a. Newspapers	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99
b. Magazines (like Time, Newsweek, U.S. News and World Report)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99
c. Network Television News	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99
d. Local Television News	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99
e. News Magazines (like "Nightline" or "20/20"	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99
f. Political Talk Radio	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99
g. The Internet	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99
h. Friends, Family, Neighbors, and Colleagues	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99

The next set of questions deals with government and politics.

6. In general, how interested are you in:

	NOT AT ALL INTERESTED									EXTREMELY INTERESTED	DON'T KNOW
a. International Affairs	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
b. National Government and Politics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
c. Local Government and Politics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
d. Youth Issues	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
e. Youth Issues in the Charlotte Area	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

7. Regardless of how interested you are, how much would you say you know about:

	KNOW NOTHING									KNOW A LOT	DON'T KNOW
a. International Affairs	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
b. National Government and Politics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
c. Local Government and Politics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
d. Youth Issues	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
e. Youth Issues in the Charlotte Area	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

8. In the past year, have you:

a. Attended a neighborhood or town-hall meeting?	[1] YES	[0] NO
b. Attended a meeting involving school affairs?	[1] YES	[0] NO
c. Written a letter to an editor?	[1] YES	[0] NO
d. Called in to a local radio station?	[1] YES	[0] NO
e. Circulated a petition?	[1] YES	[0] NO
f. Worked for a local political campaign?	[1] YES	[0] NO
g. Contacted a local public official?	[1] YES	[0] NO
h. Called other people to raise funds for local organizations?	[1] YES	[0] NO
i. Volunteered for a local organization or cause?	[1] YES	[0] NO
j. Contributed money to local organizations?	[1] YES	[0] NO

9. Did you vote in the November 2004 presidential election?

[0] NO

[1] YES

10. How much of the time do you think you can trust local government to do what is right?

[1] JUST ABOUT ALWAYS

[2] MOST OF THE TIME

[3] ONLY SOME OF THE TIME

11. Which statement below comes closer to how you feel?

[1] THE GOVERNMENT IS RUN BY A FEW BIG INTERESTS LOOKING OUT FOR THEMSELVES.

[2] THE GOVERNMENT IS RUN FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL THE PEOPLE.

12. Which statement below best describes how you feel about others?

[1] MOST PEOPLE WOULD TRY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF YOU IF THEY GOT THE CHANCE.

[2] MOST PEOPLE TRY TO BE FAIR.

13. To what extent do you agree with each statement below?

	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	NEUTRAL	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW
a. Elected officials don't care what people like me think.	1	2	3	4	5	99
b. People like me don't have any say about what the government does.	1	2	3	4	5	99
c. It is important for people like me to have a voice in local government decisions.	1	2	3	4	5	99
d. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.	1	2	3	4	5	99
e. Voting is the only way people like me can have a say about how government runs things.	1	2	3	4	5	99
f. Every citizen's voice counts in the political process.	1	2	3	4	5	99
g. Local government is responsive to citizen concerns.	1	2	3	4	5	99
h. Elected officials are only interested in people's votes.	1	2	3	4	5	99
i. If elected officials are not interested hearing what the people think, there is no way to make them listen.	1	2	3	4	5	99
j. I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics.	1	2	3	4	5	99
k. I often don't feel sure of myself when talking about politics or government.	1	2	3	4	5	99
l. I feel competent to speak with government officials about local issues.	1	2	3	4	5	99

m. Citizens should have more opportunities to participate in local government decision-making.	1	2	3	4	5	99
n. Public policy decisions should be left to elected officials.	1	2	3	4	5	99

The next few questions deal with the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting.

14. How did you hear about the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting?

[1] NEWSPAPER STORY

[2] TELEVISION STORY

[3] ON THE RADIO

[4] NEWSPAPER ADVERTISEMENT

[5] FROM SOMEONE ELSE

[6] OTHER (PLEASE SPECIFY) _____

15. What were your expectations in attending the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting?

_____

_____

_____

16. Below is a list of issues affecting youth that might have come up at the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting. How interested are you in each of these issues?

	NOT AT ALL INTERESTED									EXTREMELY INTERESTED	DON'T KNOW
a. Education	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
b. Public Safety	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
c. Family Support	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
d. Health Care	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
e. Substance Abuse	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
f. Community Activities	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
g. Economic Security	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
h. Community Support	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

17. Regardless of your interest, how confident are you that you understand each of these issues?

		NOT CONFIDENT									EXTREMELY CONFIDENT	DON'T KNOW
a.	Education	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
b.	Public Safety	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
c.	Family Support	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
d.	Health Care	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
e.	Substance Abuse	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
f.	Community Activities	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
g.	Economic Security	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
h.	Community Support	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

18. Were there any issues not discussed at the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting that you think should have been discussed?

[0] NO

[1] YES

If yes, what are the issues? _____

_____

_____

_____

19. Do you think you will talk with others about these issues after the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting?

[1] I WON'T TALK ABOUT THESE ISSUES AT ALL.

[2] I WILL TALK A LITTLE BIT ABOUT THESE ISSUES.

[3] I WILL TALK A LOT ABOUT THESE ISSUES.

20. Were you comfortable expressing your opinions on the issues?

[1] NO, I DID NOT EXPRESS MYSELF AT ALL.

[2] YES, I EXPRESSED HOW I FELT, AND LET IT GO AFTER THAT.

[3] YES, I EXPRESSED HOW I FELT, AND TRIED TO PERSUADE OTHERS TO ACCEPT MY VIEWS.

21. If everyone else agreed on an issue, but you disagreed, did you feel free to speak out at the Town Meeting?

[0] NO

[1] YES

22. Thinking about community leaders in the room, list some of those that you know were present at the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting.

_____

_____

_____

_____

23. In your opinion, how effective have local groups been in ensuring that all children in Mecklenburg County are healthy, safe and well-educated?

NOT EFFECTIVE									EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE	DON'T KNOW
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

24. In your opinion, what are the barriers to ensuring that all children in Mecklenburg County are healthy, safe and well-educated?

_____

_____

25. How much responsibility do you think each of the following entities has for improving the quality of life for young people?

	NO RESPONSIBILITY									A LOT OF RESPONSIBILITY	DON'T KNOW
Businesses	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Foundations and Charities	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Individuals	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Local Government	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Not-for-Profit Organizations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Religious Associations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Schools	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

26. Regardless of how much responsibility you feel each group has, how much power and influence do you think each group has to actually improve the quality of life for young people?

	NO POWER AND INFLUENCE									ALOT OF POWER AND INFLUENCE	DON'T KNOW
Businesses	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Foundations and Charities	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Individuals	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Local Government	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Not-for-Profit Organizations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Religious Associations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Schools	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

27. How much impact do you think the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting will have on:

	NO IMPACT									GREAT IMPACT	DON'T KNOW
Yourself	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Mecklenburg County	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Policy Makers	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

28. Did you stay for the entire day?

[1] YES

[2] NO

29. To what extent do you agree with each statement below?

	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	NEUTRAL	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW
a. I was prepared to participate effectively in the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting.	1	2	3	4	5	99
b. Others were prepared to participate effectively in the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting.	1	2	3	4	5	99

c. My participation did not make a difference in the outcome of the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting.	1	2	3	4	5	99
d. Other participants considered my opinions.	1	2	3	4	5	99
e. Decision makers were responsive to the recommendations of participants during the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting.	1	2	3	4	5	99
f. Decision makers and government representatives will not follow through with citizens' recommendations.	1	2	3	4	5	99
g. I was aware of this kind of process before I registered for the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting.	1	2	3	4	5	99
h. The United Agenda for Children Town Meeting helped decision makers and elected officials better understand the concerns of average citizens.	1	2	3	4	5	99
i. The United Agenda for Children Town Meeting produced information that will improve future decision making.	1	2	3	4	5	99
j. Decision makers and elected officials will use information from the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting to make decisions.	1	2	3	4	5	99
k. I have a better understanding of community issues after participating in the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting.	1	2	3	4	5	99

l. The United Agenda for Children Town Meeting increased my knowledge about other citizens' issues and concerns.	1	2	3	4	5	99
m. This process is appropriate for dealing with local policy issues.	1	2	3	4	5	99
n. This process is appropriate for dealing with national policy issues.	1	2	3	4	5	99
o. Local groups and organizations will work together to implement the recommendations from the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting.	1	2	3	4	5	99
p. The United Agenda for Children will increase the capacity of local groups and organizations to work together.	1	2	3	4	5	99
q. It is important that participants in the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting do what they can to accomplish the recommendations.	1	2	3	4	5	99
r. It is important that you personally to do what you can to accomplish the recommendations.	1	2	3	4	5	99

The following set of questions deals with <u>THE DISCUSSIONS</u> at the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting.

30. To what extent do you agree with each statement below?

	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	NEUTRAL	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW
a. There was a diverse group of people at the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting.	1	2	3	4	5	99
b. Participants represented a cross-section of the community.	1	2	3	4	5	99
c. Participants worked toward consensus agreements on the issues.	1	2	3	4	5	99
d. A few people did all of the talking.	1	2	3	4	5	99
e. A variety of policy alternatives were explored.	1	2	3	4	5	99
f. Participants suggested creative alternatives to the problems.	1	2	3	4	5	99
g. The costs and consequences of each alternative were evaluated.	1	2	3	4	5	99
h. My opinions were fairly reflected in the information shared with everyone during the Summit.	1	2	3	4	5	99
i. I had an adequate opportunity to express my opinions.	1	2	3	4	5	99
j. The discussions identified shared values in the community.	1	2	3	4	5	99
k. The discussions made me reconsider my opinions about the issue(s).	1	2	3	4	5	99
l. The discussions changed my opinion about the issue(s).	1	2	3	4	5	99
m. I encountered viewpoints that differed from my own.	1	2	3	4	5	99
n. The viewpoints of other participants were worth considering.	1	2	3	4	5	99
o. The discussions helped me think more critically about the issue(s).	1	2	3	4	5	99

		STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	NEUTRAL	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW
p.	The discussions helped me consider other sides of the issues.	1	2	3	4	5	99
q.	The discussions helped me develop stronger communication skills.	1	2	3	4	5	99

The following questions deal with <u>THE PROCESS</u> of the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting.

31. To what extent do you agree with each statement below?

		STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	NEUTRAL	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW
a.	The recommendations produced in the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting promote the common interests of the community.	1	2	3	4	5	99
b.	The United Agenda for Children Town Meeting increased my trust in government.	1	2	3	4	5	99
c.	The recommendations produced at the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting are better than if they had been left to the experts.	1	2	3	4	5	99
d.	The recommendations produced at the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting are better because citizens participated in creating them.	1	2	3	4	5	99
e.	I am satisfied with the recommendations produced in the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting.	1	2	3	4	5	99
f.	The United Agenda for Children Town Meeting process was adequately explained to me.	1	2	3	4	5	99
g.	I would participate in this kind of process again.	1	2	3	4	5	99
h.	The United Agenda for Children Town Meeting process was fair.	1	2	3	4	5	99

	1	2	3	4	5	99
i. I was treated with respect at the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting.	1	2	3	4	5	99
j. My facilitator was neutral.	1	2	3	4	5	99
k. This kind of process could be valuable for making other kinds of community decisions.	1	2	3	4	5	99
l. This type of process should become a regular part of how government works in this community.	1	2	3	4	5	99
m. Taxpayer dollars should be used to fund more processes like this.	1	2	3	4	5	99

The last set of questions deals with you. These questions are optional, but remember, <u>all information is confidential and anonymous</u>.

32. What is your gender?
[0] MALE
[1] FEMALE

33. Are you employed?
[0] NO
[1] YES

34. If you are employed, do you work for:

[1] PRIVATE BUSINESS
[2] GOVERNMENT
[3] K-12 EDUCATION
[4] NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION
[5] OTHER

35. Are you part of a group or business that is working already to achieve one or more of the United Agenda for Children goals?
[0] NO
[1] YES

If yes, which group(s):

36. What is your age?

[1] UNDER 18

[2] 18-21 YEARS

[3] 22-34 YEARS

[4] 35-44 YEARS

[5] 45-59 YEARS

[6] OVER 60

37. Do you have children under the age of 18?

[0] NO

[1] YES

38. What is your race?

[1] BLACK/AFRICAN AMERICAN

[2] WHITE/CAUCASIAN

[3] HISPANIC/LATINO

[4] ASIAN/ASIAN-INDIAN

[5] MULTI-ETHNIC/OTHER

[6] UNKNOWN

39. What is your level of education?

[1] SOME HIGH SCHOOL

[2] HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE (INCLUDING EQUIVALENCY)

[3] SOME COLLEGE, NO DEGREE

[4] ASSOCIATE DEGREE

[5] BACHELOR'S DEGREE

[6] GRADUATE OR PROFESSIONAL DEGREE

40. What was your 2003 total household income before taxes?

[1] UNDER $10,000

[2] $10,000 TO $19,999

[3] $20,000 TO $29,999

[4] $30,000 TO $39,999

[5] $40,000 TO $49,999

[6] $50,000 TO $59,999

[7] $60,000 TO $69,999

[8] $70,000 TO $79,999

[9] $80,000 TO $89,999

[10] $90,000 TO $99,999

[11] $100,000 OR MORE

Thank you for your time.

Please return this survey to your table facilitator. If you have left the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting, please mail your survey to:

Tina Nabatchi
The Indiana Conflict Resolution Institute
SPEA 324, 1315 East 10th Street
Indiana University,
Bloomington, IN 47405

Participant Survey
(Time 3)

You must be at least 18 years old to complete this survey.

Please clearly circle, mark or write in your answers.

The first set of questions deals with media use.

1. How many days a week do you read a newspaper?

_____ DAYS

_____ DO NOT READ A NEWSPAPER → **GO TO QUESTION 3.**

2. How much attention do you pay to newspaper content dealing with:

	VERY LITTLE ATTENTION								VERY CLOSE ATTENTION	DON'T READ
a. International affairs	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10									0
b. National government and politics	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10									0
c. Local government and politics	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10									0
d. Editorials and letters to the editor	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10									0
e. Youth issues in the Charlotte area	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10									0

3. How often do you watch:

	RARELY								ALL THE TIME	DON'T WATCH	DON'T KNOW
a. Network evening news	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10									0	99
b. Local evening news	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10									0	99
c. News magazines (like 20/20 or PrimeTime Live)	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10									0	99

4. How much attention do you pay to the following content on TV?

	VERY LITTLE ATTENTION								VERY CLOSE ATTENTION	DON'T WATCH	DON'T KNOW
a. International affairs	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10									0	99
b. National government and politics	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10									0	99
c. Local government and politics	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10									0	99
d. Editorials and letters to the editor	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10									0	99

5. People rely on different sources for political information. How much do you rely on the each of the following sources?

		VERY LITTLE									VERY MUCH	NOT AT ALL	DON'T KNOW
a.	Newspapers	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99
b.	Magazines (like Time, Newsweek, U.S. News and World Report)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99
c.	Network Television News	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99
d.	Local Television News	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99
e.	News Magazines (like "Nightline" or "20/20"	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99
f.	Political Talk Radio	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99
g.	The Internet	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99
h.	Friends, Family, Neighbors, and Colleagues	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99

The next set of questions deals with government and politics.

6. In general, how interested are you in:

		NOT AT ALL INTERESTED									EXTREMELY INTERESTED	DON'T KNOW
a.	International Affairs	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
b.	National Government and Politics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
c.	Local Government and Politics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
d.	Youth Issues	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
e.	Youth Issues in the Charlotte Area	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

7. Regardless of how interested you are, how much would you say you know about:

		KNOW NOTHING									KNOW A LOT	DON'T KNOW
a.	International Affairs	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
b.	National Government and Politics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
c.	Local Government and Politics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
d.	Youth Issues	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
e.	Youth Issues in the Charlotte Area	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

8. In the past year, have you:

a.	Attended a neighborhood or town-hall meeting?	[1] YES	[0] NO
b.	Attended a meeting involving school affairs?	[1] YES	[0] NO
c.	Written a letter to an editor?	[1] YES	[0] NO
d.	Called in to a local radio station?	[1] YES	[0] NO
e.	Circulated a petition?	[1] YES	[0] NO
f.	Worked for a local political campaign?	[1] YES	[0] NO
g.	Contacted a local public official?	[1] YES	[0] NO
h.	Called other people to raise funds for local organizations?	[1] YES	[0] NO
i.	Volunteered for a local organization or cause?	[1] YES	[0] NO
j.	Contributed money to local organizations?	[1] YES	[0] NO

9. Did you vote in the November 2004 presidential election?

[0] NO

[1] YES

10. How much of the time do you think you can trust local government to do what is right?

[1] JUST ABOUT ALWAYS

[2] MOST OF THE TIME

[3] ONLY SOME OF THE TIME

11. Which statement below comes closer to how you feel?

[1] THE GOVERNMENT IS RUN BY A FEW BIG INTERESTS LOOKING OUT FOR THEMSELVES.

[2] THE GOVERNMENT IS RUN FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL THE PEOPLE.

12. Which statement below best describes how you feel about others?

[1] MOST PEOPLE WOULD TRY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF YOU IF THEY GOT THE CHANCE.

[2] MOST PEOPLE TRY TO BE FAIR.

13. To what extent do you agree with each statement below?

	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	NEUTRAL	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW
a. Elected officials don't care what people like me think.	1	2	3	4	5	99
b. People like me don't have any say about what the government does.	1	2	3	4	5	99
c. It is important for people like me to have a voice in local government decisions.	1	2	3	4	5	99
d. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.	1	2	3	4	5	99
e. Voting is the only way people like me can have a say about how government runs things.	1	2	3	4	5	99
f. Every citizen's voice counts in the political process.	1	2	3	4	5	99
g. Local government is responsive to citizen concerns.	1	2	3	4	5	99
h. Elected officials are only interested in people's votes.	1	2	3	4	5	99
i. If elected officials are not interested hearing what the people think, there is no way to make them listen.	1	2	3	4	5	99
j. I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics.	1	2	3	4	5	99
k. I often don't feel sure of myself when talking about politics or government.	1	2	3	4	5	99
l. I feel competent to speak with government officials about local issues.	1	2	3	4	5	99

m. Citizens should have more opportunities to participate in local government decision-making.	1	2	3	4	5	99
n. Public policy decisions should be left to elected officials.	1	2	3	4	5	99

The next few questions deal with the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting.

14. How did you hear about the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting?

[1] NEWSPAPER STORY

[2] TELEVISION STORY

[3] ON THE RADIO

[4] NEWSPAPER ADVERTISEMENT

[5] FROM SOMEONE ELSE

[6] OTHER (PLEASE SPECIFY) _____

15. What were your expectations in attending the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting?

_____

_____

_____

16. Below is a list of issues affecting youth that might have come up at the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting. How interested are you in each of these issues?

	NOT AT ALL INTERESTED								EXTREMELY INTERESTED		DON'T KNOW
a. Education	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
b. Public Safety	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
c. Family Support	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
d. Health Care	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
e. Substance Abuse	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
f. Community Activities	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
g. Economic Security	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
h. Community Support	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

17. Regardless of your interest, how confident are you that you understand each of these issues?

	NOT CONFIDENT									EXTREMELY CONFIDENT	DON'T KNOW
a. Education	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
b. Public Safety	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
c. Family Support	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
d. Health Care	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
e. Substance Abuse	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
f. Community Activities	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
g. Economic Security	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
h. Community Support	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

18. Were there any issues not discussed at the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting that you think should have been discussed?

[0] NO

[1] YES

If yes, what are the issues? _____

_____

_____

19. Do you think you will talk with others about these issues after the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting?

[1] I WON'T TALK ABOUT THESE ISSUES AT ALL.

[2] I WILL TALK A LITTLE BIT ABOUT THESE ISSUES.

[3] I WILL TALK A LOT ABOUT THESE ISSUES.

20. Were you comfortable expressing your opinions on the issues?

[1] NO, I DID NOT EXPRESS MYSELF AT ALL.

[2] YES, I EXPRESSED HOW I FELT, AND LET IT GO AFTER THAT.

[3] YES, I EXPRESSED HOW I FELT, AND TRIED TO PERSUADE OTHERS TO ACCEPT MY VIEWS.

21. If everyone else agreed on an issue, but you disagreed, did you feel free to speak out at the Town Meeting?

[0] NO

[1] YES

22. Thinking about community leaders in the room, list some of those that you know were present at the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting.

_____

_____

23. In your opinion, how effective have local groups been in ensuring that all children in Mecklenburg County are healthy, safe and well-educated?

NOT EFFECTIVE									EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE	DON'T KNOW
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

24. In your opinion, what are the barriers to ensuring that all children in Mecklenburg County are healthy, safe and well-educated?

_____

_____

25. How much responsibility do you think each of the following entities has for improving the quality of life for young people?

	NO RESPONSIBILITY									A LOT OF RESPONSIBILITY	DON'T KNOW
Businesses	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Foundations and Charities	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Individuals	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Local Government	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Not-for-Profit Organizations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Religious Associations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Schools	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

26. Regardless of how much responsibility you feel each group has, how much power and influence do you think each group has to actually improve the quality of life for young people?

	NO POWER AND INFLUENCE									ALOT OF POWER AND INFLUENCE	DON'T KNOW
Businesses	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Foundations and Charities	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Individuals	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Local Government	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Not-for-Profit Organizations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Religious Associations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Schools	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

27. How much impact do you think the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting had on:

	NO IMPACT									GREAT IMPACT	DON'T KNOW
Yourself	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Mecklenburg County	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Policy Makers	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

28. Did you attend the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting?

[1] YES

[2] NO

29. To what extent do you agree with each statement below?

	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	NEUTRAL	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW
a. I was prepared to participate effectively in the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting.	1	2	3	4	5	99
b. Others were prepared to participate effectively in the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting.	1	2	3	4	5	99
c. My participation did not make a difference in the outcome of the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting.	1	2	3	4	5	99
d. Other participants considered my opinions.	1	2	3	4	5	99
e. Decision makers were responsive to the recommendations of participants during the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting.	1	2	3	4	5	99
f. Decision makers and government representatives have not followed through with citizens' recommendations.	1	2	3	4	5	99

g.	I was aware of this kind of process before I registered for the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting.	1	2	3	4	5	99
h.	The United Agenda for Children Town Meeting helped decision makers and elected officials better understand the concerns of average citizens.	1	2	3	4	5	99
i.	The United Agenda for Children Town Meeting produced information that has improved decision making.	1	2	3	4	5	99
j.	Decision makers and elected officials have used information from the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting to make decisions.	1	2	3	4	5	99
k.	I have a better understanding of community issues after participating in the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting.	1	2	3	4	5	99
l.	The United Agenda for Children Town Meeting increased my knowledge about other citizens' issues and concerns.	1	2	3	4	5	99
m.	This process is appropriate for dealing with local policy issues.	1	2	3	4	5	99
n.	This process is appropriate for dealing with national policy issues.	1	2	3	4	5	99
o.	Local groups and organizations have worked together to implement the recommendations from the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting.	1	2	3	4	5	99

		STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	NEUTRAL	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW
p.	The United Agenda for Children has increased the capacity of local groups and organizations to work together.	1	2	3	4	5	99
q.	It is important that participants in the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting do what they can to accomplish the recommendations.	1	2	3	4	5	99
r.	It is important that you personally to do what you can to accomplish the recommendations.	1	2	3	4	5	99

The following set of questions deals with <u>THE DISCUSSIONS</u> at the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting.

30. To what extent do you agree with each statement below?

		STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	NEUTRAL	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW
a.	There was a diverse group of people at the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting.	1	2	3	4	5	99
b.	Participants represented a cross-section of the community.	1	2	3	4	5	99
c.	Participants worked toward consensus agreements on the issues.	1	2	3	4	5	99
d.	A few people did all of the talking.	1	2	3	4	5	99
e.	A variety of policy alternatives were explored.	1	2	3	4	5	99
f.	Participants suggested creative alternatives to the problems.	1	2	3	4	5	99
g.	The costs and consequences of each alternative were evaluated.	1	2	3	4	5	99
h.	My opinions were fairly reflected in the information shared with everyone during the Meeting.	1	2	3	4	5	99

i. I had an adequate opportunity to express my opinions.	1	2	3	4	5	99
j. The discussions identified shared values in the community.	1	2	3	4	5	99
k. The discussions made me reconsider my opinions about the issue(s).	1	2	3	4	5	99
l. The discussions changed my opinion about the issue(s).	1	2	3	4	5	99
m. I encountered viewpoints that differed from my own.	1	2	3	4	5	99
n. The viewpoints of other participants were worth considering.	1	2	3	4	5	99
o. The discussions helped me think more critically about the issue(s).	1	2	3	4	5	99
p. The discussions helped me consider other sides of the issues.	1	2	3	4	5	99
q. The discussions helped me develop stronger communication skills.	1	2	3	4	5	99

The following questions deal with __THE PROCESS__ of the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting.

31. To what extent do you agree with each statement below?

	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	NEUTRAL	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW
a. The recommendations produced in the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting promote the common interests of the community.	1	2	3	4	5	99
b. The United Agenda for Children Town Meeting increased my trust in government.	1	2	3	4	5	99
c. The recommendations produced at the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting are better than if they had been left to the experts.	1	2	3	4	5	99

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d. The recommendations produced at the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting are better because citizens participated in creating them.	1	2	3	4	5	99
e. I am satisfied with the recommendations produced in the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting.	1	2	3	4	5	99
f. The United Agenda for Children Town Meeting process was adequately explained to me.	1	2	3	4	5	99
g. I would participate in this kind of process again.	1	2	3	4	5	99
h. The United Agenda for Children Town Meeting process was fair.	1	2	3	4	5	99
i. I was treated with respect at the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting.	1	2	3	4	5	99
j. My facilitator was neutral.	1	2	3	4	5	99
k. This kind of process could be valuable for making other kinds of community decisions.	1	2	3	4	5	99
l. This type of process should become a regular part of how government works in this community.	1	2	3	4	5	99
m. Taxpayer dollars should be used to fund more processes like this.	1	2	3	4	5	99

The last set of questions deals with you. These questions are optional, but remember, <u>all information is confidential and anonymous</u>.

32. What is your gender?

[0] MALE

[1] FEMALE

33. Are you employed?

[0] NO

[1] YES

34. If you are employed, do you work for:

[1] PRIVATE BUSINESS

[2] GOVERNMENT

[3] K-12 EDUCATION

[4] NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION

[5] OTHER

35. Are you part of a group or business that is working already to achieve one or more of the United Agenda for Children goals?

[0] NO

[1] YES

If yes, which group(s):

36. What is your age?

[1] UNDER 18

[2] 18-21 YEARS

[3] 22-34 YEARS

[4] 35-44 YEARS

[5] 45-59 YEARS

[6] OVER 60

37. Do you have children under the age of 18?

[0] NO

[1] YES

38. What is your race?

[1] BLACK/AFRICAN AMERICAN

[2] WHITE/CAUCASIAN

[3] HISPANIC/LATINO

[4] ASIAN/ASIAN-INDIAN

[5] MULTI-ETHNIC/OTHER

[6] UNKNOWN

39. What is your level of education?

[1] SOME HIGH SCHOOL

[2] HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE (INCLUDING EQUIVALENCY)

[3] SOME COLLEGE, NO DEGREE

[4] ASSOCIATE DEGREE

[5] BACHELOR'S DEGREE

[6] GRADUATE OR PROFESSIONAL DEGREE

40. What was your 2003 total household income before taxes?

[1] UNDER $10,000

[2] $10,000 TO $19,999

[3] $20,000 TO $29,999

[4] $30,000 TO $39,999

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[8] $70,000 TO $79,999

[9] $80,000 TO $89,999

[10] $90,000 TO $99,999

[11] $100,000 OR MORE

Thank you for your time.

Please return your completed survey in the enclosed stamped envelope and mail to:

Tina Nabatchi
The Indiana Conflict Resolution Institute
SPEA 322, 1315 East 10th Street
Indiana University,
Bloomington, IN 47405

Non-Participant Survey (Time 3)
You must be at least 18 years old to complete this survey.

Please clearly circle, mark or write in your answers.

Did you attend the December 2004 United Agenda for Children Town Meeting?
    [1] YES   [2] NO

The first set of questions deals with media use.

1. How many days a week do you read a newspaper?
    _____ DAYS
    _____ DO NOT READ A NEWSPAPER → **GO TO QUESTION 3.**

2. How much attention do you pay to newspaper content dealing with:

	VERY LITTLE ATTENTION								VERY CLOSE ATTENTION	DON'T READ
a. International affairs	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10									0
b. National government and politics	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10									0
c. Local government and politics	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10									0
d. Editorials and letters to the editor	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10									0
e. Youth issues in the Charlotte area	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10									0

3. How often do you watch:

	RARELY								ALL THE TIME	DON'T WATCH	DON'T KNOW
a. Network evening news	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10									0	99
b. Local evening news	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10									0	99
c. News magazines (like 20/20 or PrimeTime Live)	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10									0	99

4. How much attention do you pay to the following content on TV?

	VERY LITTLE ATTENTION								VERY CLOSE ATTENTION	DON'T WATCH	DON'T KNOW
a. International affairs	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10									0	99
b. National government and politics	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10									0	99
c. Local government and politics	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10									0	99
d. Editorials and letters to the editor	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10									0	99

5. People rely on different sources for political information. How much do you rely on the each of the following sources?

		VERY LITTLE									VERY MUCH	NOT AT ALL	DON'T KNOW
a.	Newspapers	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99
b.	Magazines (like Time, Newsweek, U.S. News and World Report)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99
c.	Network Television News	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99
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e.	News Magazines (like "Nightline" or "20/20"	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99
f.	Political Talk Radio	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99
g.	The Internet	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99
h.	Friends, Family, Neighbors, and Colleagues	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	99

The next set of questions deals with government and politics.

6. In general, how interested are you in:

		NOT AT ALL INTERESTED									EXTREMELY INTERESTED	DON'T KNOW
a.	International Affairs	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
b.	National Government and Politics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
c.	Local Government and Politics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
d.	Youth Issues	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
e.	Youth Issues in the Charlotte Area	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

7. Regardless of how interested you are, how much would you say you know about:

		KNOW NOTHING									KNOW A LOT	DON'T KNOW
a.	International Affairs	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
b.	National Government and Politics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
c.	Local Government and Politics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
d.	Youth Issues	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
e.	Youth Issues in the Charlotte Area	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

8. In the past year, have you:

a.	Attended a neighborhood or town-hall meeting?	[1] YES	[0] NO
b.	Attended a meeting involving school affairs?	[1] YES	[0] NO
c.	Written a letter to an editor?	[1] YES	[0] NO
d.	Called in to a local radio station?	[1] YES	[0] NO
e.	Circulated a petition?	[1] YES	[0] NO
f.	Worked for a local political campaign?	[1] YES	[0] NO
g.	Contacted a local public official?	[1] YES	[0] NO
h.	Called other people to raise funds for local organizations?	[1] YES	[0] NO
i.	Volunteered for a local organization or cause?	[1] YES	[0] NO
j.	Contributed money to local organizations?	[1] YES	[0] NO

9. Did you vote in the November 2004 presidential election?

[0] NO

[1] YES

10. How much of the time do you think you can trust local government to do what is right?

[1] JUST ABOUT ALWAYS

[2] MOST OF THE TIME

[3] ONLY SOME OF THE TIME

11. Which statement below comes closer to how you feel?

[1] THE GOVERNMENT IS RUN BY A FEW BIG INTERESTS LOOKING OUT FOR THEMSELVES.

[2] THE GOVERNMENT IS RUN FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL THE PEOPLE.

12. Which statement below best describes how you feel about others?

[1] MOST PEOPLE WOULD TRY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF YOU IF THEY GOT THE CHANCE.

[2] MOST PEOPLE TRY TO BE FAIR.

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13. To what extent do you agree with each statement below?

	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	NEUTRAL	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW
a. Elected officials don't care what people like me think.	1	2	3	4	5	99
b. People like me don't have any say about what the government does.	1	2	3	4	5	99
c. It is important for people like me to have a voice in local government decisions.	1	2	3	4	5	99
d. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.	1	2	3	4	5	99
e. Voting is the only way people like me can have a say about how government runs things.	1	2	3	4	5	99
f. Local government is responsive to citizen concerns.	1	2	3	4	5	99
g. Elected officials are only interested in people's votes.	1	2	3	4	5	99
h. I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics.	1	2	3	4	5	99
i. I often don't feel sure of myself when talking about politics or government.	1	2	3	4	5	99
j. Citizens should have more opportunities to participate in local government decision-making.	1	2	3	4	5	99
k. Public policy decisions should be left to elected officials.	1	2	3	4	5	99

14. The follow is a list of issues affecting youth in Mecklenburg County. How interested are you in each of these issues?

		NOT AT ALL INTERESTED									EXTREMELY INTERESTED	DON'T KNOW
a.	Education	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
b.	Public Safety	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
c.	Family Support	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
d.	Health Care	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
e.	Substance Abuse	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
f.	Community Activities	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
g.	Economic Security	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
h.	Community Support	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

15. Regardless of your interest, how confident are you in your knowledge of each issue?

		NOT CONFIDENT									EXTREMELY CONFIDENT	DON'T KNOW
a.	Education	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
b.	Public Safety	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
c.	Family Support	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
d.	Health Care	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
e.	Substance Abuse	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
f.	Community Activities	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
g.	Economic Security	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
h.	Community Support	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

16. Are there any youth-related issues not listed above that you think are important?

[0] NO [GO TO QUESTION 17]

[1] YES [GO TO PART B]

B. If yes, what are the issues?

_____

_____

17. In your opinion, how effective have local groups been in ensuring that all children in Mecklenburg County are healthy, safe and well-educated?

NOT EFFECTIVE								EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE	DON'T KNOW
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9 10	99

18. How much responsibility do you think each of the following entities has for improving the quality of life for young people:

	No Responsibility									A Great Deal of Responsibility	Don't Know
Businesses	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Foundations and charities	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Individuals	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Local Government	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Not-for-profit organizations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Religious associations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Schools	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

19. Regardless of how much responsibility you feel each group has, how much power and influence do you think each group has to actually improve the quality of life for young people:

	No Power and Influence									Great Amount power & Influence	Don't Know
Businesses	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Foundations and charities	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Individuals	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Local Government	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Not-for-profit organizations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Religious associations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Schools	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

The last set of questions deals with you. These questions are optional, but remember, <u>all information is confidential</u>.

25. What is your gender?

   [0] MALE   [1] FEMALE

26. Are you employed?

   [0] NO   [1] YES

   (If respondent says "0" for Q26, skip to Q28)

27. If you are employed, do you work for:
   [1] PRIVATE BUSINESS
   [2] GOVERNMENT
   [3] K-12 EDUCATION
   [4] NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION
   [5] OTHER

28. Are you part of a group or business that is working already to achieve one or more of the United Agenda for Children goals?

[0] NO   [1] YES

29. What is your age?

[1] UNDER 18
[2] 18-21 YEARS
[3] 22-34 YEARS
[4] 35-44 YEARS
[5] 45-59 YEARS
[6] OVER 60

30. Do you have children under the age of 18?

[0] NO   [1] YES

31. What is your race?

[1] BLACK/AFRICAN AMERICAN
[2] WHITE/CAUCASIAN
[3] HISPANIC/LATINO
[4] ASIAN/ASIAN-INDIAN
[5] MULTI-ETHNIC/OTHER
[6] UNKNOWN

32. What is your level of education?

[1] SOME HIGH SCHOOL
[2] HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE (INCLUDING EQUIVALENCY)
[3] SOME COLLEGE, NO DEGREE
[4] ASSOCIATE DEGREE
[5] BACHELOR'S DEGREE
[6] GRADUATE OR PROFESSIONAL DEGREE

33. What was your 2003 total household income before taxes?

[1] UNDER $10,000
[2] $10,000 TO $19,999
[3] $20,000 TO $29,999
[4] $30,000 TO $39,999
[5] $40,000 TO $49,999
[6] $50,000 TO $59,999
[7] $60,000 TO $69,999
[8] $70,000 TO $79,999
[9] $80,000 TO $89,999
[10] $90,000 TO $99,999
[11] $100,000 OR MORE

Thank you for your time.

Please return your completed survey in the enclosed stamped envelope and mail to:
Tina Nabatchi
The Indiana Conflict Resolution Institute
SPEA 322, 1315 East 10th Street
Indiana University,
Bloomington, IN 47405

TINA NABATCHI
Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs
Syracuse University
Syracuse, New York 13244

Education

Ph.D.   **School of Public & Environmental Affairs, Indiana University**
Public Affairs, July 2007
Fields: Public Management, Public Policy, Law

MPA   **University of Vermont**
Public Administration, May 1999
Fields: Public Policy, Organization Theory
Comprehensive Examinations passed with High Honors

BA   **The American University**, Washington, DC
Political Science, May 1994
Concentrations: Communications, Sociology, Economics

DISSERTATION

Deliberative Democracy: The Effects of Participation on Perceptions of Political Efficacy
Committee: James Perry (chair), Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Evan Ringquist, John
Applegate, Rosemary O'Leary

My dissertation examines the role of deliberative democracy in policy making and analysis. Deliberative democracy is the idea that public decisions should be made with the reasoned discussion and collective judgment of citizens. Proponents of deliberative democracy assert that it has many benefits, including the enhancement of citizenship. My dissertation empirically examines one aspect of this claim. Specifically, it investigates the "efficacy effect," the idea that participation in a deliberative process increases citizens' perceptions of political efficacy. The study is applied to the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting, a process that enables large groups of citizens (100-5000+) to deliberate about public issues and make recommendations to policy makers and government officials. The study uses a quasi-experimental pre-post-post test design with a treatment and comparison group. The dissertation assesses: 1) differences between the groups prior to the Town Meeting, 2) the effects of participation on perceptions of political efficacy and the variables related to those perceptions, and 3) whether the efficacy effect is sustained by participants over time.

PEER REVIEWED PUBLICATIONS (JOURNAL ARTICLES)

T. Nabatchi, L. B. Bingham, & D. Good (forthcoming 2007). Organizational Justice & Dispute Resolution: A 6-Factor Model for Workplace Mediation. *International Journal of Conflict Management*, __:__-__.

T. Nabatchi (2007). The Institutionalization of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Government. *Public Administration Review*, 67(4): 646-661

L. B. Bingham, T. Nabatchi, & R. O'Leary (2005). The New Governance: Practices and Processes for Stakeholder and Citizen Participation in the Work of Government. *Public Administration Review*, 65(5): 528-539.

L. B. Bingham, R. O'Leary, & T. Nabatchi (2005). Legal Frameworks for the New Governance: Processes for Citizen Participation in the Work of Government. *National Civic Review*, 94(1): 54-61.

R. O'Leary, T. Nabatchi, & L. B. Bingham (2005). Assessing and Improving Conflict Resolution in Multiparty Environmental Negotiations. *International Journal of Organization Theory and Behavior*, 8(2): 181-209. (Special symposium issue on negotiation).

R. K. Christensen, R. Clerkin, L. Davis, S.P. Gray, T. Nabatchi, B. Nesbit, B. Never, R. Twu, A. Workman (2002). The Dark Side of Non-Profits. *ARNOVA Abstracts*, 25(2).

T. Nabatchi & L. B. Bingham (2001).Transformative Mediation in the USPS REDRESS™ Program: Observations of ADR Specialists. *Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal*, 18(2): 399-427.

EXPERT REVIEWED PUBLICATIONS (BOOK CHAPTERS)

T. Nabatchi & M. E. Keller (forthcoming 2007). Environmental Mediation: A Primer. In: B. McKinney and J. Bagnell (eds.), *A Reader in Mediation: Case Studies and Practitioners' Viewpoints*, ____-____. Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company.

T. Nabatchi (2006). Assessing Sustainable Development Administration: A Framework and Implications for Organizational Structure. In: A. Farazmand & J. Pinkowski (eds.), *The Handbook of Globalization and Public Administration*, 799-820. New York, NY: Marcel Dekker Inc.

C. Ventriss & T. Nabatchi (2006). Subnational Governments and Globalization: The Changing Face of Federalism. In: A. Farazmand & J. Pinkowski (eds.), *The Handbook of Globalization, Governance, and Public Administration*, 921-942. New York, NY: Marcel Dekker Inc.

T. Nabatchi & L. B. Bingham (2004). Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes. In: J. Rabin (ed.), *The Encyclopedia of Public Administration and Public Policy* [online]. New York, NY: Marcel Dekker, Inc.

T. Nabatchi & L. B. Bingham (2004). Ombuds and Ombuds Programs. In: J. Rabin (ed.), *The Encyclopedia of Public Administration and Public Policy* [online]. New York, NY: Marcel Dekker, Inc. [online].

R. O'Leary, T. Nabatchi, & L. B. Bingham (2004). Environmental Conflict Resolution. In: B. Durant, D. Fiorino, & R. O'Leary (eds.), *Building Common Purpose: Challenges, Choices, and Opportunities for Environmental Governance in the 21st Century*, 323-354. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

K. Emerson, T. Nabatchi, R. O'Leary, & J. Stephens (2003). The Challenges of Environmental Conflict Resolution. In: R. O'Leary & L. B. Bingham (eds.), *The Promise and Performance of Environmental Conflict Resolution*, 3-26. Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future.

T. Nabatchi (2003). The United States Postal Service. In: D. Schultz (ed.), *The Encyclopedia of Public Administration & Public Policy* [online]. New York, NY: Facts on File, Inc.

T. Nabatchi & L. B. Bingham (2003). Grievance Procedures and Administration. In: J. Rabin (ed.), *The Encyclopedia of Public Administration and Public Policy*, [online]. New York, NY: Marcel Dekker, Inc.

L. B. Bingham & T. Nabatchi (2003). Dispute System Design in Organizations. In: J. Killian & W. Pammer (eds.), *The Handbook on Conflict Management*, 127-150. New York, NY: Marcel Dekker, Inc.

MANUSCRIPTS IN REVIEW

T. Nabatchi, L. B. Bingham, J. M. Senger, & M. S. Jackman. Improving Efficiency and Effectiveness in Resolving Public Disputes: An Empirical Comparison of Litigation and Alternative Dispute Resolution. In review at *The Journal of Dispute Resolution*.

MANUSCRIPTS IN PROGRESS

T. Nabatchi. Game Theory and Dispute System Design: Making Mediation a Dominant Strategy in the United States Postal Service. Target journal yet to be identified.

T. Nabatchi, L. B. Bingham, & D. Good. The Determinants of Outcomes in Transformative Mediation. Target journal is *Academy of Management Journal*.

T. Nabatchi, Y. Moon, & L. B. Bingham. Transformative Mediation: The Practice of Mediators. Target journal is *Conflict Resolution Quarterly.*

B. Nesbit, T. Nabatchi, & L. B. Bingham. Disputants' Sense of Interactional Justice: Comparing How Employees and Supervisors Interact in Mediation. Target journal to be identified.

FELLOWSHIPS

John H. Edwards Fellowship, Indiana University, 2004
  For superior scholastic ability and intellectual capacity, good citizenship and character, especially toward Indiana University, community service as demonstrated by actual public service, and the likelihood of future usefulness to society.

Keller-Runden Fellowship, Indiana University, 2002
  To support research and internship opportunities for alternative dispute resolution.

AWARDS & HONORS

Award for Excellence in Doctoral Research, School of Public & Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, 2005

Outstanding Empirical Paper Award, International Association for Conflict Management, 17th Annual Conference, Pittsburgh, PA, June 2004.
  For: B. Nesbit, T. Nabatchi, & L. B. Bingham. "Disputants' Perceptions of Interactional Justice: Comparing How Employees & Supervisors Interact in Mediation."

Award for Excellence in Teaching, School of Public & Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, 2004

Award for Excellence in Doctoral Research, School of Public & Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, 2004

Award for Excellence in Doctoral Research, School of Public & Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, 2003

Pi Alpha Alpha, National Honor Society for Public Affairs and Administration, University of Vermont, 1999

Marshall E. Dimmock Student Award, University of Vermont, 1999
  For outstanding academic and scholarly activities, commitment and vision, professional achievement, and advancement of ethical principles within public administration.

RESEARCH PROJECTS (conducted with the Indiana Conflict Resolution Institute)
Deliberative Democracy: The AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting
(on-going)
  With America*Speaks*
National REDRESS® Evaluation Project of the United States Postal Service
(on-going)
  With the U.S. Postal Service
Alternative Dispute Resolution in the U.S. Department of Justice
(2004)
  With the U.S. Department of Justice

Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Government
(2004)
    With the U.S. Department of Justice

Alternative Dispute Resolution in the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(2003)
    With the U.S. Department of Agriculture

Environmental Conflict Resolution in the Federal Government
(2003)
    With the U.S. Institute for Environmental Conflict Resolution

Evaluation of the OSHRC E-Z Trial Program
(2001)
    With the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission

Evaluation of the OSHRC Settlement Part Program
(2001)
    With the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission

CONTRACT RESEARCH REPORTS

T. Nabatchi & L. Napoli (2006). *Restorative Justice: An Evaluation*. Report to the Indiana
    Department of Corrections, South Bend Juvenile Facility. On-file with the authors.

T. Nabatchi (2005). *United Agenda for Children: A Profile of Participants*. Report to
    America*Speaks*. Report available at:
    www.americaspeaks.org/lab/research/docs/uac_participant_rept_082205.pdf

T. Nabatchi & D. Schontz (2001). *The Use of ADR in Federal Agencies: A Report to the U.S.
    Department of Justice*. Report to the U.S. Department of Justice. On-file with the
    Indiana Conflict Resolution Institute.

T. Nabatchi, M. S. Jackman, & L. B. Bingham (2001). *Evaluation of the Occupational Safety
    and Health Review Commission E-Z Trial Program*. Report to the Occupational Safety
    and Health Review Commission. Report available at:
    [http://www.spea.indiana.edu/icri/oshrc_eztrial.pdf]

T. Nabatchi, M. S. Jackman, & L. B. Bingham (2000). *Evaluation of the Occupational Safety
    and Health Review Commission Settlement Part Program*. Report to the Occupational
    Safety and Health Review Commission. Report available at:
    [http://www.spea.indiana.edu/icri/oshrc_eval.pdf]

CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS
T. Nabatchi, L. B. Bingham, & D. Good. "The Determinants of Outcomes in
    Transformative Mediation." Presented at the International Association for Conflict
    Management (IACM) 19th Annual Conference, Montreal, Canada, June 2006.

T. Nabatchi, Y. Moon, & L. B. Bingham. "Transformative Mediation: The Practice of Mediators." Poster presented at the International Association for Conflict Management (IACM) 19th Annual Conference, Montreal, Canada, June 2006.

T. Nabatchi, L. B. Bingham, &R. O'Leary. "Legal Frameworks for Collaborative Governance." Presented at the Association for Conflict Resolution Annual Conference, Minneapolis, Minnesota, September 2005.

T. Nabatchi. "Teaching the Concept of Neutrality in Conflict Resolution Education." Presented at the Association for Conflict Resolution Annual Conference, Minneapolis, Minnesota, September 2005.

T. Nabatchi, L. B. Bingham, & D. Good. "Organizational Justice and Dispute Resolution: A 6-Factor Model for Workplace Mediation." Paper presented at the International Association for Conflict Management (IACM) 18th Annual Conference, Seville, Spain, June 2005.

L. B. Bingham, R. O'Leary, & T. Nabatchi. "The New Governance: Practices and Processes for Stakeholder and Citizen Participation in the Work of Government." Paper presented at the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management (APPAM), Atlanta, GA, October 2004.

L. B. Bingham, R. O'Leary, & T. Nabatchi. "The New Governance: Practices and Processes for Stakeholder and Citizen Participation in the Work of Government." Paper presented at Civic Engagement in the 21st Century: Toward a Scholarly and Practical Agenda, University of Southern California School of Policy, Planning and Development and Jesse M. Unruh Institute of Politics, Los Angeles, CA, October 2004.

T. Nabatchi. "Game Theory and Dispute System Design: Making Mediation a Dominant Strategy in the United States Postal Service." Paper presented at the International Association for Conflict Management (IACM) 17th Annual Conference, Pittsburgh, PA, June 2004.

B. Nesbit, T. Nabatchi, & L. B. Bingham. "Disputants' Sense of Interactional Justice: Comparing How Employees and Supervisors Interact in Mediation." Paper presented at the International Association for Conflict Management (IACM) 17th Annual Conference, Pittsburgh, PA, June 2004. Recipient of *Outstanding Empirical Paper Award.*

T. Nabatchi. "Evaluating the Impact of the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996." Paper presented at the Mid-West Political Science Association (MPSA) Meeting, Chicago, Illinois, April 2004.

T. Nabatchi. "Game Theory and Dispute System Design: Making Mediation a Dominant Strategy in the United States Postal Service." Paper presented at the School of Public and Environmental Affairs Young Researchers Conference, Bloomington, Indiana, April 2004.

T. Nabatchi, R. O'Leary & L. B. Bingham. "Environmental Dispute Resolution." Paper presented at the American Society for Public Administration (ASPA) National Conference, Portland, Oregon, March 2004.

T. Nabatchi & L. B. Bingham. "The Frontiers of Employment Dispute Resolution: Research on the USPS." Paper and research presented at the American Society for Public Administration (ASPA) National Conference, Washington D.C., March 2003.

T. Nabatchi. "Expanding our Models of Justice in Dispute Resolution: A Field Test of the Contribution of Interactional Justice." Paper presented at the International Conflict Management Association (IACM) Conference, Park City, Utah, June 2002.

T. Nabatchi. "United States Federalism in a Globalized World: A Case Study of the Massachusetts-Burma Law." Paper presented at the School of Public and Environmental Affairs Young Researchers Conference, Bloomington, Indiana, March 2002.

Bingham, et. al. "Mediation at Work: The Report of the National REDRESS™ Evaluation Project of the United States Postal Service." Prepared as conference materials for the Association of Conflict Resolution (ACR), Toronto, Canada, October 2001.

Bingham, et. al. "Mediation at Work: The Report of the National REDRESS™ Evaluation Project of the United States Postal Service." Panel presented at the American Bar Association (ABA) Section of Dispute Resolution Conference, Washington, D.C. April 2001.

T. Nabatchi. "Transformative Mediation in the USPS: Observations of ADR Specialists." Paper presented at the International Association for Conflict Management Association (IACM) Conference, St. Louis, MO, June 2000.

T. Nabatchi. "A Multi-Dimensional Framework for Assessing Sustainable Development Administration." Paper presented at the School of Public and Environmental Affairs Young Researchers Conference, Bloomington, Indiana, March 2001.

INVITED COLLOQUIA AND WORKSHOPS

T. Nabatchi. "Conflict Prevention and Victim-Offender Mediation." Workshop presentation at Indiana Commission on the Social Status of Black Males, Indianapolis, Indiana, October 2004.

L. B. Bingham, R. O'Leary, & T. Nabatchi. "The New Governance: Practices and Processes for Stakeholder and Citizen Participation in the Work of Government." Paper presented at Dispute Resolution Colloquium, Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis, Indiana, October 2004.

L. B. Bingham, R. O'Leary, & T. Nabatchi. "The New Governance: Practices and Processes for Stakeholder and Citizen Participation in the Work of Government."

Workshop presentation at Non-Profit and Civil Society Colloquium, School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Bloomington, Indiana, October 2004.

T. Nabatchi & L. B. Bingham (2002). "Expanding our Models of Justice in Dispute Resolution: A Field Test of the Contribution of Interactional Justice." Contract Research Presentation to the United States Postal Service National Meeting of Area Coordinators, Atlanta, GA, June 2002.

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Instructor, School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University

K300: Statistical Techniques (Fall 2006)

V263: Public Management (Fall 2005)

V435: Negotiation and Alternative Dispute Resolution (Spring 2003-Spring 2004)

V453: Ethical Dilemmas in Public Affairs (Fall 2002)

- Winner of topics course competition for doctoral students in the School of Public and Environmental Affairs.

Guest Lectures, School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University
"ADR: Government and Governance."

- Law and Public Affairs (graduate course). Professor Lisa B. Bingham. October 2004.

"ADR in the Workplace."

- Introduction to Public Management. Instructor G. Leah Davis. March 2004; November 2004.

"An Introduction to Alternative Dispute Resolution."

- Negotiation and Alternative Dispute Resolution. Professor: Nan Stager. September 2002.
- Introduction to Public Management. Instructor: Mete Yildez. October 2001.

"Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Government."

- Introduction to Public Management. Instructor: Autumn Workman. November 2001.

"Environmental Conflict Resolution."

- Environmental Management. Instructor: Sean Svendsen. April 2004.
- Negotiation and Alternative Dispute Resolution. Instructor: Lisa Marie Napoli. March 2002.

"Ethics in Public Administration."

- Introduction to Public Management. Instructor: Mete Yildez. February 2004.
- Managing Behavior in Organizations. Instructor: Adam Lederer, February 2002.

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Research Coordinator, Indiana Conflict Resolution Institute
Indiana University, Bloomington, IN   (Aug. 1999 – July 2007)

Professional Programs Developer, Division of Continuing Education
University of Vermont, Burlington, VT   (June 1998 – July 1999)

Assistant Coordinator, Champlain Initiative
United Way of Chittenden County, Burlington, VT   (Jan. 1998 – July 1999)

PROFESSIONAL SERVICE EXPERIENCE

Trainer and Mediator, Community Justice and Mediation Center   (2001 - 2007)
- 32 Hour Basic Mediation Training
- Conflict Resolution and Prevention. For: Indiana State Department of Corrections
- Collaboration and Consensus Building. For: Leadership Program of Greene County, IN
- 24 Hour Peer Mediation Training. For: Indiana University Peer Mediation Program

Facilitator, Forum on Race, Equity, & Human Understanding in Education (2005 - 2007)
    Monroe County Community School Corporation and the Bloomington Commission on the Social Status of Black Males.

PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS
Academy of Management
American Society for Public Administration
International Association for Conflict Management

SERVICE ACTIVITIES

Community Justice and Mediation Center, Board Member, Committee Chair, Mediator (2001-Present)
Association of SPEA Ph.D. Students, Member of Executive Committee and Conference Committee (2001–2003)
Indiana Achievement Awards: Best Practices Seminar, IU Center of Philanthropy & Indiana Grantmakers Alliance (January - June 2000)
Public Administration Student Association (PASA), Executive Board, MPA Program, University of Vermont (January 1998–May 1999)
MPA Taskforce, Student Representative, MPA Program, University of Vermont (August 1997–May 1999)
The Changing Workplace Taskforce, University of Vermont (January 1998-January 1999)