I. MAJOR PRIMARY SOURCES

I.A. THE LIAO REGION, 1618–1644

I.A.1. Archival Documents, Published


b. MQCZ. I: Shenyang jiudang 瀋陽舊檔, items 26–28, 31–52, 54, 57; wai-guo shiliao 外國史料, item 2. II: pt. 2 (documents in old Manchu). III: Shenyang jiudang, items 1, 4, 9–22; Hong Chengchou shiliao 洪承疇史料, items 45–49. (On the “Shenyang jiudang” at the IHP, see Li Guangtao 1986: 65–79.)

c. QNMD, vol. 1. The extant Manchu-script monthly record books of the Palace Historiographic Academy (Gurun i suduri yamun; see also I.K.1.d) are here translated into Chinese for the period TC7/1 through CD8/12. The records for TC6 and CD6 are lost, and those for TC1–5 and CD1, because they are the same as in the “Old Manchu Records” (see below), are not included. Not all months are represented for the remaining CD years. The records, largely copies from the original documents, cover all aspects of the Manchu state’s official actions, particularly propaganda statements and military campaigns (Wu Yuanfeng 1994: 283). About two dozen items from these records were published previously, in Chinese translation, in Lishi dang’an 歷史檔案, 1982 no. 4: 15–24. The records for 1638 (earlier thought to have been part of the original Old Manchu records [d.i, below]; see Imanishi 1959b) have been separately translated by Ji Yonghai 季永海 and Liu Jingxian 劉景憲 from photocopies in the BUL and published as the Chongde sannian Manwen dang’an yibian 崇德三年滿文檔案譯編 (Shenyang: Liao-Shen shushe 遼瀋書社, 1988).

d. The “Old Manchu Records”

In the case of this important set of materials, explanation best precedes bibliographical information:

The “Old Manchu Records,” referred to variously in Chinese, are large sets of manuscript materials—originally very uneven in size, dimensions, condition, format, paper quality, and sequence, with many redundancies. They record all manner of events in the building of the Manchu state from WL35(1607)/3 through CD1(1636)/12. The script used in those volumes varies from “old Manchu” 老滿文, which Nurhaci ordered to be developed in 1599, to “new Manchu” 新滿文 (that is, “with circles and dots”), which was developed under Hungtaiji during the years 1629–1632, with mixed forms in between (as was common until the early KX period), plus the occasional use of Mongolian and Chinese writing. Evidence suggests that the compilation of those volumes did not begin until after 1629, and that Hungtaiji’s official historiographers effected some editorial changes from
the source-documents written before that year. However, such changes probably were minor compared to the frequent and sometimes perverting changes made in earlier records by later Qing official historiographers (Guan Xiaolian 1988: 163–69). In any case, no work seems to have been done on the volumes after the Qing court moved from Shenyang to Beijing in 1644, so they can be regarded as genuine, contemporaneous evidence from the period “before the pass was entered.” On the functional relation between those documents and the succeeding Manchu-script monthly record books of the Palace Historiographic Academy (I.A.1.c., I.K.1.d.), see Qiao Zhizhong 1994: 98–104.

At least from the completion of the Veritable Record of Hungtaiji’s reign during the SZ period (see III.A.2) until the very early QL reign, the “Old Manchu Records” seem to have fallen into temporary oblivion. By the time when they were rediscovered (apparently in the summer of 1741), “standard Manchu” 清文, which of course was different from old Manchu, had changed, mainly in vocabulary and usage, even from the new Manchu of the seventeenth century. So the old records were found very difficult to decipher. Since the 37 volumes that had been uncovered were in perilously fragile condition, the pages were remounted and rebound for preservation, and systematic study of the differences revealed between old Manchu and standard Manchu was begun. It was not until 1775, however, when the QL emperor was broadly engaged in recasting the Manchu heritage (Crossley 1987) and early Qing history, that he initiated a process, which took over three years, of making new copies: two facsimiles of the old records (one working copy and one clean copy), and two copies (one for working, one clean) in which the text was rendered into standard Manchu. (Those four sets are now held at the FHA.*) The difficulty of the latter task is still evident in the approximately 450 notes—written on slips of paper and affixed at appropriate points in the margins of the working copies—about words, phrases, and sentences that presented problems to the QL scholar-editors. In 1778 another pair of clean copies was imperially ordered for use by authorities in the former capital. Those arrived in Shenyang in 1780 and subsequently were stored in the Chongmo Hall of the former imperial palace 盛京故宮崇謨閣, where they remained until 1950 (Imanishi 1959a and 1959c; Guan Xiaolian 1987; Tong Yonggong 1989). Now they are held at the Liaoning Provincial Archives 遼寧省檔案館.*

After the 1780s, the original records, as well as all of the copies, again fell into oblivion, until 1905 when the renowned Japanese sinologist Naitō Torajirō 内藤虎次郎 saw some of the Shenyang set and realized its importance. In 1912, assisted by Haneda Tōru 羽田亨, Naitō was able to photograph the entire rendered copy of the old records at Shenyang and to take the negatives to Japan (Naitō 1912; duplicate sets of the resulting photos are now held at Kyoto U and Tokyo U*). The name that Naitō used to refer to the records he had found, Mambun rōtō 滿文老檔, subsequently became the standard name for the QL rendering. There ensued several decades of assiduous research and translation on the part of Japanese
scholars (Fuchs 1936: pt. 4; Kanda 1980 and 1988). The Shenyang rendered copy also was the basis of the first published attempt, in 1916–1918, to translate portions of the old records into Chinese—that organized by Jin Liang 金梁, a Manchu who held authority over Banner and Imperial Household Department affairs in Shenyang during the last years of the Qing dynasty and first years of the Republic (Wang Guohua 1989; see ii.甲, below).

As for the remounted documents, they were not rediscovered until 1931 and 1934, in one of the vaults of the former Grand Secretariat. More significantly, in 1935 curators in what had become the Palace Museum Documents Office 故宮博物院文獻館 discovered three volumes of unremounted original documents which had not been uncovered in the QL period—one volume respectively treating events of 1624, 1632, and most important, 1635, when Hungtaiji instituted broad reforms preparatory to proclaiming the dynastic title “Qing” in 1636. Added to the 37 volumes that were restored in the eighteenth century, they make up a set of original documents in 40 volumes (for a brief description of each volume, see Zhuang Jifa 1983: 353–56). The set was moved several times because of the instability and warfare that plagued China during the subsequent two decades. It now is held at the NPM.

Among the original documents are four volumes of undated materials. The dated ones do not represent all months in all years—1622, 1624, 1626, 1629, and 1633 having the largest lacunae; and there are no dated records at all for 1634. Years receiving the most complete coverage are 1628, 1630–1631, and 1635–1636, while coverage for 1607–1614 is essential but relatively thin. Moreover, the records often redouble on themselves inconveniently. Even with these limitations, however, the “Old Manchu Records” open an invaluable window on the Manchus’ self-conception as a people, and on the leadership’s own understanding of their enterprise, prior to the changes made prudent by rule over the whole Chinese empire after 1644. Since adversarial relations with the Ming were key in the Manchus’ evolving self-identity and their leaders’ assessments of progress, one finds a wealth of information in the old records about diplomatic ploys, military campaigns, and propaganda fusillades against the Ming state. These records constitute the most important single source of the Manchu-Qing perspective for the period prior to 1644 (see Qiao Zhizhong 1994: chap. 4).

Use of the original documents is desirable because they preserve phrases and passages that later were changed or omitted, and is especially important for the information contained in the extra three volumes. On the other hand, the QL rendered text, though naturally suspect because of errors or historically distorting changes that crept in, offers the advantage of having eliminated the many redundancies in the original documents and of being much easier to read. Guan Xiaolian 關孝廉 (1992) has transliterated and translated into Chinese 163 passages in the original documents that were omitted in the QL version so that scholars can more readily judge the import of such cuts. On the whole, textual differences between the originals
and the QL copies are more significant for linguistic and paleographical studies than for historical research. For comparisons, see Li Xuezhi 1971: App. 1 (with Guwanglu 廣祿); Weiers 1987; and Liu Housheng 1988. Of greater significance for historians are differences between the “Old Manchu Records” and later Qing official records of the period “before entering the pass,” especially the Veritable Records (shilu) of the reigns of Nurhaci and Hungtaiji. See III.A.2.

i. The Original Documents (called the yuandang 原檔 or the jiudang 輕檔)


乙. *Qing Taizu chao lao Manwen yuandang* 清太祖朝老滿文原檔. Trans. and annot. Guwanglu and Li Xuezhi 李學智. 2 vols. IHPJC, 58. [Taipei:] IHP, 1970-71. This gives a romanization of the Manchu text and both word-for-word and normal Chinese renderings of a portion of the original documents from Nurhaci’s reign, those for 1615–1620. Appended are extensive annotations and indexes to personal and place names. For criticisms of points in the Chinese renderings, see Wu Zhala and Qi Cheshan 1985.

丙. *Jiu Manzhou dang yizhu* 舊滿洲檔譯注. Trans. and annot. Zhang Wei 張葳. 2 vols. Taipei: NPM, 1977-80. Herein the work of 乙, above, is continued through the records of Hungtaiji’s reign until 1631. Vol. 1 consists of a romanization and separate Chinese translation of the jiudang records from TC1/1 through TC4/2; vol. 2 provides the same for records dating from TC4/1 through TC5/10.

丁. *Kyū Manshu tō—Tenchō kyūnen* 舊滿洲檔—天聰九年. Trans. and annot. Kanda Nobuo 神田信夫, Matsumura Jun 松村潤, and Okada Hidehiro 岡田英弘. 2 vols. Tokyo: Tōyō bunko 東洋文庫, 1972–1975. This provides a romanization of the Manchu text (from i.甲, above) of the records for 1635, as well as two renderings into Japanese—word-for-word and normal syntax. For an explanatory article, see Kanda 1972b. This supplements ii.乙.

戊. *Tiancong jiunian dang* 天聰九年. Trans. and annot. Guan Jialu 關嘉祿 and Tong Yonggong 佟永功. Tianjin: Tianjin guji chubanshe 天津古籍出版社, 1987. This is a Chinese translation of the 1635 records based on i.丁, which correspondingly
supplements ii. 丙. Appended are revealing analyses of differences from entries for the same year in the QL-period revision of the shilu of Hungtaiji’s reign (see III.A.2).

ii. The Qianlong Rendering (usually called the laodang 老檔)

甲. The following translations (the first into Chinese, the second two into Japanese), are now considered too partial or faulty to normally warrant use:


On these and other early, partial translations, see Kanda 1980; 1988.

乙. Tongki Fuka Sindaha Hergen i Dangse—“The Secret Chronicles of the Manchu Dynasty” 1607–1637 A.D. [usually referred to and cataloged as the Mambun rōtō]. Trans. and annot. Mambun rōtō kenkyūkai 滿文老檔研究會. Tōyō Bunko Publication Series C, No. 12. 7 vols. Tokyo: Tōyō bunko 東洋文庫, 1955–63. Vols. 1-3: Taizu 太祖, WL35/3 – TM9/6. Vols. 4–7: Taizong 太宗, TC1/1 - CD1/2. The entire text of the copy of the transliterated version held in Shenyang is romanized, with both word-for-word and normal Japanese translations, as well as textual annotations. Indexes to personal and place names (in romanized Manchu), and a glossary of Chinese characters used for those names, are appended to vol. 7. This is the standard, published text of the QL rendering for scholars who read Manchu. Even those who do not, and whose Chinese is stronger than their Japanese, should probably try to use this work rather than Chinese translations because of the much greater linguistic similarity between Manchu and Japanese than between Manchu and Chinese.

丙. Manwen laodang 滿文老檔. Trans. Ren Shiduo 任世鐸 and Guan Xiaolian, ed. Guan Xiaolian 關孝廉 and Zhou Yuanlian 周遠廉, under auspices of the FHA and CASS. 2 vols. Beijing: ZH, 1990. This photo-reproduction of a clear, manuscript translation into Chinese is based on the working copy of the QL rendering held at the FHA. Vol. 1 covers the Nurhaci (Taizu) years; vol. 2, the Hungtaiji (Taizong) years. It gives readers Chinese
translations of the contents of the numerous appended paper-slip notes (for an earlier Japanese translation, see Imanishi 1959c). Also provided is a careful index of place names and personal names. The translators and editors have thoroughly consulted previous scholarship on and translations of the old records. Combined with i.戊, above, this work is the best recourse for scholars who read neither Manchu nor Japanese.

e. “Hou Jin xi Ming Wanli huangdi wen” 後金檄明萬曆皇帝文 [title assigned in (a), then in (b)]. Probably of 1619 (see [b], p. 289).
   (a) Original imprint held NLB (II: 346).*
   (b) In QRGQ, I: 289‒96. Based on (a).

This large-character printed pamphlet apparently was used to broadcast—among literate Chinese in the Liao region—the Latter Jin’s reasons, after suffering many wrongs from the WL emperor and his border officials, for taking up arms against the Ming state. It cites cases in Chinese history of success by righteous, smaller states against dynasties that had deservedly lost Heaven’s favor. The document bears on questions about Nurhaci’s and Hungtaiji’s intentions and ambitions at successive points in their careers.

f. Shiliao congkan chubian, fasc. 1. This collection includes an *rilu* 日錄 for TC2/1–12 and CD6/6, apparently transcribed from a DG-period copy, which bears comparison with entries for the same months in the Veritable Record of Hungtaiji’s reign. Aside from this, of particular value are a group of communications (*yutie* 諭帖) from Hungtaiji to the various Ming generals on Pi Island 皮島 under the general command of the controversial figure Mao Wenlong 毛文龍, aimed at luring them into Qing service (Mao’s letters to Hungtaiji can be found in the “Old Manchu Records” [I.A.1.a.] for TC2). These communications bear on the controversy over Yuan Chonghuan’s 袁崇煥 execution of Mao partly because of suspicion that the latter was having unauthorized contact with the enemy (see I.A.11 and I.A.37).

g. “Jinguo han Tiancong sinian zhengyue gong Yongping yiming qi dazui shishi wen” 金國汗天聰四年正月攻永平以明七大罪誓師文 [title under which entered in (b)].
   (a) Original document, formerly held Guoli Beijing daxue Ming-Qing shiliao zhengli hui 國立北京大學明清史料整理會, now apparently lost.
   (b) In Xie Guozhen 1931: 2/24a-26a.
   (c) In Meng Sen 1959, I: 209–11.

This woodblock-printed propaganda broadsheet is thought to have been one of those distributed by Hungtaiji’s forces when they attacked Yongping in 1630, on their way back to the Liao region after raiding extensively in No. Zhili during the previous year. Its content bears on questions of at what temporal points Nurhaci and Hungtaiji called themselves, their people, and their state by what titles and names (for a summary of discussions of these
questions, see Huang Pei 1990). It especially bears on determining the true nature of Nurhaci’s much-cited “seven great complaints” against the Ming, records of which appear to have been altered in Qing official texts as early as 1635.

h. “Ming yu Hou Jin Dalinghe cheng zhi zhan shiliao pianduan” 明與後金大凌河城之戰史料片段. Comp. Fang Yujin 方裕謹 for the FHA. Lishi dang’an 歷史檔案, 1981 no. 1: 19–30. Here we have nineteen documents (of CZ4/11–閏 11) which reflect the often faulty understanding of the Ming Ministry of War regarding the situation at the fortress 堡 on the Daling River, which was besieged and finally destroyed by Hungtaiji’s forces in 1631 (see I.A.2). The fortress was an important forward defense point for the crucial Ming garrisons at Jinzhou 錦州 and Songshan 松山. Its loss was a deathblow to the Liao-region strategy of Minister of War Sun Chengzong (see I.A.16), who had tried to reaffirm Ming territorial control west of the Daling River following the Ming court’s extremely self-damaging execution of the former minister of War, Yuan Chonghuan (see I.A.37). The documents contain much conflicting discussion of the actions of the fortress commander, brigade-general Zu Dashou 祖大壽 (ECCP: 769–70), whose surrender to Hungtaiji when the siege was successful began one of the most interesting personal sagas of the Liaodong theater.

i. “Tiancong chao chengong zouyi” 天聰朝臣工奏議 [title assigned by first editor].
   i. In Shiliao congkan chubian, fasc. 2-3.
   ii. In QCSL, no. 4. 1980. Based on i.
   iii. In QRGQ, pt. 2. Based on i.
Provided here are ninety-seven memorials, dating from TC6/1 to TC9/3 (1632–1635), submitted to the Latter Jin court by Ming officials and generals who had surrendered to and assumed posts under Hungtaiji. The memorials reveal how enormously useful such men were to the Manchu leader in reorganizing his regime along more imperial lines and formulating strategy for peace negotiations with the Ming, and how eager such men were to prove their commitment and earn merit by submitting proposals for defeating the Ming militarily. The documents originally constituted one (called zoushu gao 奏疏稿 or zoushu bu 簿) among five fascicles of Chinese-script documents from the TC period which were discovered early in the twentieth century in the former Qing imperial archive in Shenyang, the Chongmoge. The original five fascicles long since have disappeared. (The first, entitled “Gexiang gaobu” 各項稿簿, was supposed to have been published serially in Shien 史苑, 2.1–2 and 2.4–5 [1929]; however, the designated sections are missing from the copies of those issues that I have seen.) We have only the zoushu as they were slightly altered under editing by Luo Zhenyu 羅振玉, who published them in the Shiliao congkan chubian under the title given above. Ref: Xie Guozhen 1931: 2/2b–5a.
I.A. Liao Region

j. “Qing Chongde sannian Hanwen dang’an xuanbian” 情崇德三年漢文檔案選編. Comp. Fang Yujin for the FHA. *Lishi dang’an*, 1982 no. 2: 20–34. Chinese-script documents from the Manchu courts prior to SZ are especially rare. Most notable in this selection of 35 items from the year 1638 are several regarding peace negotiations with the Ming court (initiated by the Ming side), and several suggested strategies for breaking through Jinzhou and Ningyuan 宁遠 and seizing crucial Shanhai Pass 山海關. They reflect the range of options being considered by Hungtaiji in that year.

k. “Mingjun shouwei Songshan deng chengbao de liujian zhanbao” 明軍守衛松山等城堡的六件戰報. Comp. Fang Yujin for the FHA. *Lishi dang’an*, 1981 no. 2: 3–8, 47. Published here are six reports to the Ming Ministry of War from Liaodong Provincial Governor Fang Yizao 方一藻 and the eunuch troop-supervisor-in-chief Gao Qiqian 高起潛, concerning Qing attacks on Songshan in the 3rd mo. of 1639. Songshan was one of the three supporting guards of the frontline garrison at Jinzhou.


These volumes consist of reprints of clear, standard-script, punctuated, descended MS copies of the extant yearly records of the Korean Border Defense Council (Pibyŏnsa), which range, with lacunae, from 1616 through 1892. The Council was established by the Yi dynasty government early in the sixteenth century, and its size and functions increased thereafter, particularly in response to the military challenges that Korea faced in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Council was one of the most important organs of the Korean government, dealing with all matters that bore directly or indirectly on national defense or domestic security.

Unlike the better-known *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 承政院日記 (126 vols. Seoul: Kuksa pyŏnch’ŏn wŏnhoe, 1970; see Sin Sŏk-ho 1964b: 101–13), which provide a general wealth of information on Korea’s painfully constrained situation between the Manchus, on one hand, and the Ming court, on the other, the *Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok* concentrate on military affairs, including reports from Korea’s northwestern Pyŏngan provincial army command at Anju 安州. Like the *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi*, they served as primary material for compilation of the Yi dynasty Veritable Records, so many Council
documents that now are lost have been preserved in at least abbreviated form in the *sillok* (see III.A.3).

Unfortunately, the Council records up to 1592 were completely destroyed during the Japanese invasion of that year, and most of the records from then to 1636 did not survive the Manchu invasion of the latter year. Pertinent here are those from the reigns of Kwanghae Kun 光海君 (1608–1623) and Injo 仁祖 (1623–1649), the extant books of which cover the years 1616–1617, 1624, 1634, 1638, 1641–1642, and 1644–1649 (in vols. 1–2 of the Kuksa pyŏnch’ăn wiwŏnhoe publication). Of particular interest for the history of the Ming-Qing conflict are the records for 1624 (2nd year of Injo, fasc. 3). These show that the policy of the Injo court to support the maverick Ming general Mao Wenlong (see I.A.11) in his rear-attacks on important Manchu locations in Liaodong from his garrison on Pi Island (K. Kado 椵島), southeast of the mouth of the Yalü River 鴨綠江, was fraught with difficulties, ambivalences, and trepidation.


I.A.2.  
*Bianshi xiaoji* 邊事小紀, 4 j.  
Zhou Wenyu 周文郁 [Ziran Jiangjun 紫髯將軍]: Qian Qianyi 1929 (初): 73/12b–19a.  
Eds. Chen Jin 陳瑾 and Wang Wei 王亹 (contemporaries of author).  

Zhou Wenyu was one in a remarkable group of aides and subordinate officers who worked under Sun Chengzong (see I.A.16) during his tenures as Military Commissioner for Liaodong, Jifu 薊府-Yongping, and Dengzhou 登州-Laizhou 萊州 during the years 1622–1625 and 1629–1631 (see also Cheng Lun, I.A.9; Mao Yuanyi, I.A.15, I.A.31; and Lu Shanji, I.A.21–22, I.A.30). In the earlier period, Zhou served mainly in restoring control and defense readiness in the Shanhai-Ningyuan corridor (Guan-Ning 關寧), associating closely with Yuan Chonghuan (see I.A.37). In the later period his responsibilities were mainly naval, as he played an important role in attempts to deal with instability in the island-studded eastern Gulf of Zhili after the execution of Mao Wenlong (see I.A.11) in 1629 and the disruptive collapse of Mao’s command on Pi Island. In particular, Mao’s former subordinate generals Kong Youde 孔有德 (ECCP: 435–35) and Geng Zhongming 耿仲明 (ECCP: 416–17) caused considerable trouble for the coastal cities and island installations before defecting to the Manchus in 1633 (see I.B.10).

The *Bianshi xiaoji* is a collection of narrative accounts of all the actions in which Zhou Wenyu was personally involved. *Juan* 1 treats the restoration of defenses from Shanhai Pass out to the Ningyuan Guard after the loss of the Guangning Guard 廣寧衛 in 1622, the dramatic break of the siege of Jinzhou in 1626, and Yuan Chonghuan’s movement of troops westward to help defend the capital in 1629. Juan 2 concerns restoring the security of cities in Jifu and
Yongping after the Manchu raids of winter 1629–1630, and bringing back to loyal service the mutinous Liu Xingzhi 刘興治, one of the sub-commanders who had been left in charge of Pi Island after the execution of Mao Wenlong. Juan 3 deals with Kong Youde and Geng Zhongming in the process of their turn to rogue status: their effort to relieve a Manchu attack on Dalinghe Fort and the whole Guangning defense complex in 1631, their seizure of Dengzhou and expulsion therefrom in 1632, and their flight among ports and islands of the Liaodong Peninsula—with Zhou Wenyu in pursuit and trying to get Korean assistance—before they joined the Manchus in 1633. Juan 4 consists of accounts of discrete occurrences and prose portraits of certain figures, including Mao Wenlong.

Zhou’s style is straightforward, his record careful, his perspective astute. The edition is a fine specimen of late-Ming printing, punctuated not only with phrase-markers, but also with indicators of Chinese and non-Chinese personal and place names.


I.A.3. **Cangmizhai ji 藏密齋集.**

Wei Dazhong 魏大中: *Wei Kuoyuan xiansheng zipu 魏廓園先生自譜* in various editions of *Bixue lu 碧血錄* (e.g., CJC or ZNW); *Mingshi*, j. 244 (vol. 21): 6333-37; *Zuiwei lu* (II.46.b): 2101–04.

Author’s preface to his memorials, and postscript by his son, Wei Xueyi 學洢, to the author’s self-compiled *nianpu*, both 1625. One item of front matter 1628.

(a) 24 j. CZ-period imprints held SL and BUL (ZSB.集, #9888). Rep. (with some blackened characters) by author’s descendant, Wei Xinghao 行淏, 1843. SL copy of rep. adds, in manuscript on “Yingshan caotang” 影山草堂 paper, Wei Dazhong’s last instructions, a diary of his arrest and imprisonment, and prefaces to various sections of this collection.

(b) 25 j. CZ-period Wei-family imprint, held NCL (III: 1131). Features one additional j. of the author’s moral-philosophical teachings.

(c) 7 j. of selections in QK, j. 328–34 (rpt. vol. 25).

(d) Four selected items in HMJW, j. 496 (rpt. vol. 30).

Wei Dazhong, a student of the co-restorer of the Donglin Academy 東林書院, Gao Panlong 高攀龍, was deeply involved in the bitter factional politics of the early TQ reign. His stridently critical disposition, as a supervising secretary in the censorial Offices of Scrutiny for Works and Personnel, soon earned him the especially strong enmity of the powerful eunuch Wei Zhongxian 魏忠賢 (ECCP: 846–47), and he became one of the six Donglin martyrs who were arrested and died under interrogation and imprisonment during Wei Zhongxian’s reign of terror in 1625. The materials in this collection of Wei Dazhong’s writings apparently were put together by Wei himself as he was being transported under custody from northern Zhejiang to Beijing.
The items pertinent to the Ming-Qing conflict in Liaodong mostly are from TQ1(1621), when Wei expressed worry over the security of the capital if the imperiled Guangning Guard were lost. He particularly requested that extra funds be contributed from the emperor’s privy purse (see I.A.22) and that militia training (tuanlian 团练) be augmented. More shrilly, he insisted on the death penalty for those officials who had been found responsible for the defeats at Sarhu 薩爾滸 and the losses of Kaiyuan 開原 and Tieling 鐵嶺 in 1619.

While weighing in heavily against others who had been trying to lighten the derelicts’ sentences, he defended himself against counter charges that he was carrying on a personal vendetta. In TQ4(1624) Wei continued in this vein, insisting that military discipline be maintained by having all those responsible for Ming losses in Liaodong from 1619 through 1622 immediately executed in the marketplace.

These memorials (in j. 2–4 and 9) exemplify an element in court opinion that made military leadership especially hazardous and unstable in the last Ming reign-periods.


I.A.4. Ch’aekchung illok 柵中日錄; and Kŏnju mun’gyŏnok 建州聞見錄.

Editions:
(a) In the author’s Chaamjip 紫巖集 (prefaces 1741, 1745), j. 5–6. QL-period imprints held Kyujanggak Collection of Seoul National U (II: 1682), National Central Lib. (Seoul), and Academy of Korean Studies 精神文化研究院 (see Kosŏ mongnok, II: 2234).*
(b) MS copy of Ch’aekchung illok held Imanishi Collection 今西文庫, Tenri U Lib. 天理大學圖書館.* Rpt. in Chōsen gakuhō 朝鮮學報, 64 (July 1972): 125–80.
(c) QCSL, nos. 8, 9, 1978.

Yi Min-hwan completed the Korean civil service examinations in 1600 and served in the Korean equivalent of the Hanlin Academy 翰林院 before being appointed to secretarial duties in military administration. The following quotation, from the introduction to (c), by editor Xu Hengjin 徐恆晉, may suffice to briefly note these intriguing accounts from two eventful years in Yi’s career:

“In the 2nd mo. of 1619, Ming Military Commissioner Yang Hao 楊鎬 advanced his troops on four routes to attack the Latter Jin. The Korean King [Kwanghae Kun 光海君] had deputed Kang Hong-nip 姜弘立 as General Marshal of the Fifth Route to lead troops in aid of the Ming effort, particularly to coordinate with the commander of the Ming’s southern-route army, Liu Ting 劉𬘩, in doing battle. In the 3rd mo., Liu Ting’s army was decimated and the Korean army surrendered [to Nurhaci]. Yi Min-hwan, who had been serving as a staff secretary [to Kang Hong-nip] and had accompanied his forces in cross-
ing [the Yalu] River, was captured in [one of] those battles. In the 7th mo. of the following year, he was released and returned to Korea. In the Ch’aejung ilgi, Yi Min-hwan recorded in considerable detail his personal experiences from that troop movement and battle, through his surrender and incarceration [at the old Manchu capital, Hetu Ala, approx. modern Xinbin 新賓], to his release and repatriation. Thus, it constitutes a precious source for study of the Battles of Sarhu [K. Simhayŏk 深河役], of relations between the Latter Jin and Korea, and other matters.

“The Kônju mun’gyŏnnok is a report that Yi Min-hwan submitted to his king, Kwanghae Kun, after his release and return. The content is quite broad, including Latter Jin geographical conditions, folkways and products, social stratification, military organization, and the situations of prominent figures in the Jurchen nobility. It is an important source of the governance, economy, military affairs, and culture of Nurhaci’s time.”

The role and actions of the Korean army in the Battles of Sarhu were highly controversial in Korea, with implications for the tenure as king of Kwanghae Kun. The veracity of the Ch’aejchung illok in light of those controversies, and in comparison with other records, is discussed in Ray Huang 1981: 42–44. Inaba Iwakichi’s opinion is that the Kônju mun’gyŏnnok report is the earlier, and that the Ch’aejchung illok is a later memoir (1972: 189).


I.A.5. Chaonu yicuo 剿奴議撮, 11 pian 篇.
Eds. Chen Meigong 陳眉公 [Chen Jiru 繼儒] and Wang Yinglin 王應麟 (author’s contemporaries).
Editions:
(a) [Nanjing]: Zhongyang daxue guoxue tushuguan 中央大學國學圖書館, 1928. From WL-period ed.
(b) In QRGQ, I: 119–31. Based on (a).

This work is a careful, astute, well-informed post-mortem on the 1619 Battles of Sarhu: how China had come to have such a debacle; the importance of arriving at clear judgments about who really were at fault and who genuinely were martyrs; what pragmatic lessons could be learned for better performance in the future; and how the strategic issues not only in Liaodong, but in the greater region comprising Liaodong, Korea, and the Gulf of Zhili, should now be contemplated. Unlike others who indignantly demanded immediate chastisement of Nurhaci as though he were some feral cur, little different from other wayward, temporarily lucky, barbarian leaders, Yu Yi soberly recognized that in Nurhaci’s regime China faced an enemy the likes of which had not been seen during the Ming period on the northern frontiers. And he saw that the losses at Sarhu had fundamentally changed the balances of power to the north-east of China. Points of genuine prescience in this work make it even more regrettable that so little is known about the author.
I.A.6.  

**Chen taishi wumengyuan chuji** 陳太史無夢園初集 [cover title *Chen Mingqing xiansheng* 陳明卿先生 *wumengyuan chuji*], 34 j.

Author’s preface 1633.  
(b) Combined with *Wumengyuan yiji* 遺集 (preface 1635) in *Wumen- yuan quanji* 全集 [cover title]. Imprints held Naikaku (367; Hishi 146, v. 1126–43) and LC (II: 1022–23).*

Chen Renxi was a prolific intellectual of wide interests in the classics, literature, and especially history. In the *Wumengyuan* are collected his examination essays and miscellaneous writings, mostly from his relatively brief periods of official service in the late TQ to early CZ reigns. Though Chen’s positions were formal, scholarly ones, such as Participant in the Classics Colloquium and Companion to the Heir Apparent, his duties included traveling around the country delivering patents of nobility, imperial proclamations, and other official papers. Chen kept extensive notes on, and delved into the history of, a plethora of statecraft-related matters that came to his attention during such trips.

Among the fourteen parts of this collection, the “Haiji” 海集 is the most detailed and most important for study of the Ming-Qing conflict. It consists of Chen’s essays, subtitled “Youxuan jiwen” 輶軒紀聞, from an emissarial trip to Liaodong (that is, the Shanhai-Ningyuan corridor) in 1629. Topically, Chen treats the whole history of Ming involvement in the Liao region, the background and characteristics of the Manchu peoples, the beginnings of conflict with them, the strategic geography and military administration of both the Liaodong and Jifu-Yongping regions, hostilities since late WL times, and current conditions in the Guan-Ning area.

Other parts contain briefer but pertinent items. The “Zaji” 雜記 subsection of the “Manji” 漫集 treats matters of military supply, finance, colonization, training, weaponry, organization, morale, and horses, as well as border defense in particular regions, including the islands in the Gulf of Zhili and along the northern Shandong seacoast. Items in the “Laoji” 勞集, subtitled “Dazi fang fuyi” 答諮訪賦役, treat revenue collection, fiscal management, transport, and crop failures. And the “Cheji” 車集 contains more essays on the defense of certain locations, as well as a section on the seaborne shipment of rice to Liaodong. The KGSL reprints the “Haiji” and “Manji” only.

Chen’s trip to Liaodong occurred at a time of relative optimism, shortly after the accession of the CZ emperor, elimination of the worst of the “eunuch party,” and reappointment of Yuan Chonghuan (see I.A.37) to lead the Liaodong effort. Thus, we find Chen in favor of cautious, step-by-step advances to recover at least Western Liao 遼西. The *Wumengyuan* collection shows us the extent to which an interested court official who was not directly responsible for
military affairs could educate himself about the Liaodong situation and a broad range of related matters.


Comp. Cheng Kaihu 程開祜.
Editions:


This large collection of memorials on Liaodong affairs, by no less than 162 officials, dating from summer 1618 through fall 1620, clearly was published out of shock over the great loss of lives in the Battles of Sarhu, and out of hope for better handling of the Liaodong problem upon the accession of a new emperor (TQ) and the appointment of a new Liaodong Military Commissioner, Xiong Tingbi (see I.A.35). The first two j. consist of earlier memorials, by Xiong during his 1608–1611 tour of duty in Liaodong (some of which are not to be found in other Xiong collections), and by Zhang Tao 張濤, a former governor of Liaodong, both of whom the compiler felt had “prescience.”

If only in sheer number, these memorials from just two years cannot but impress the reader with how aroused Ming officialdom had suddenly become over the challenge from Nurhaci. And the fact that this collection was published from copies of *dibao* 邸報 (“Peking Gazettes,” see Part One, Chap. 1) by a man who either was not an official or who, at most, held only a very minor position, indicates the degree to which information about current governmental affairs was available to interested individuals in the secular sphere of late-Ming times.

Cheng Kaihu’s essay, “Dongyi Nuerhachi kao” 東夷努兒哈赤考, which prefaces this work, has also been published in *QRGQ*, I: 103–06.


Kang Shijue 康世爵: Biogs. app. to editions cited below.


(b) Punct. and annot., transcribed from privately-held copy of (a) and rep. under title “Chaoxian zu Tongzhou Kangshi shipu zhong de Ming-Man guanxi shiliao” 朝鮮族《通州康氏世譜》中的明滿關係史料, in *Qingshi ziliao*, no. 1 (1980), pp. 179–85.

In 1618 Kang Shijue was a young man of sixteen or seventeen, with a family background of both civil and military service to the Ming government,
who was accompanying his father, a former assistant prefect, during the latter’s penal military servitude in Liaoyang 遼陽. When his father was killed in the destruction of Liu Ting’s army during one of the Battles of Sarhu in 1619, Kang survived by disguising himself as a soldier in the surrendering army of the Korean general Kang Hong-nip (see I.A.4) and then slipping away. Subsequently he served as an army officer under the Liao-region military commissioners Xiong Tingbi (see I.A.35) and Xue Guoyong 薛國用, witnessing the bloody losses of Shenyang and Liaoyang to Nurhaci’s forces in 1621. Having escaped death again, through a series of extreme trials Kang made his way to Korea. There he lived to at least the age of eighty, when he wrote this distantly retrospective memoir, the closest we have to the testimony of a common soldier in the Ming-Qing conflict.


I.A.9. Cunbu 寸補
Cheng Lun 程崙.

Cheng Lun was one in a remarkable group of aides who served under Sun Chengzong during his first tenure as Liaodong Military Commissioner in 1622–1625 (see I.A.16). Like his associates Mao Yuanyi (I.A.15), Lu Shanji (I.A.21), and Zhou Wenyu (I.A.2), Cheng Lun was keenly interested in military techniques and tactics. Fasc. 1 of this work records Cheng’s recommendations of summer 1622—following the stunning loss of Eastern Liao to Nurhaci and just before Sun’s appointment as Military Commissioner—forremedying “nine faults” in Ming military affairs that had led to the current situation. Appended are his views on field tactics, unified command, mollifying barbarians with payments, the lack of cost-effectiveness in supporting Mao Wenlong (see I.A.11), and the Capital Training Divisions. Fasc. 4 offers Cheng’s opinionated notes on more than a dozen timely topics related to the military emergency of 1629–1630, when Sun Chengzong was reappointed Military Commissioner in response to Manchu raids on No. Zhili.

Of special interest is the section, subtitled “Yuyin” 渝吟 (Capital fasc. 2, Naikaku fasc. 4), which consists of poems by Cheng from his experiences with Sun et al. during 1622–1623 in the Shanhai-Ningyuan region, particularly at Shanhai Pass, also called Yu Pass 渝關. Through these poems one can understand the spirit among Sun and his committed group in ways that do not come through in official-documentary or narrative genres.


I.A.10. Dattan hyōryūki 鞑靼漂流記 [Dattan monogatari 物語; Ikoku 異國 monogatari; Hokutan 北靼 monogatari; Dattan hyōhaku oboegaki 漂泊覺書; Ch. Dadan piāoliú jì].
Testimony of Kunida Hyōemon 国田兵右衛門 and Uno Yosaburō 宇野與三郎, representing a group of fifteen Japanese sailors.


In the 5th mo. of 1644 a group of three Japanese commercial vessels was blown off course by a storm and beached just north of the mouth of the Tumen River 圖們江. There the sailors were massacred by a local tribe, only fifteen of the original fifty-eight surviving. Those men were taken into custody by the Qing authorities, who, after determining that they were not pirates, treated them as state guests. They were first transported to Shenyang (Fengtian 奉天), then to Beijing, where they remained for one year, then back through Shenyang to Seoul, where, with the aid of the Korean authorities, they were able to return to Japan. This work is a record of the testimony given by those surviving sail-ors to officials of the Tokugawa shogunal government in Edo.

Among their straightforward observations, most interesting for light shed on the Ming-Qing conflict are characterizations of some of the Manchu princes, as well as remarks about the strictness yet reasonableness of Manchu justice, the orderliness of Manchu society, the pervasiveness and compulsory status of military education, the Manchus’ amazing skill at archery, the endurance of their horsemen and mounts, and their tolerance of cold weather. Also notable is the men’s impression of the submissiveness of both northern and southern Chinese to Manchu rule.

Ref: Sonoda 1980; Pang 1996.

I.A.11. Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao 東江疏揭塘報節抄, 8 j.

With the loss of Eastern Liao to the Latter Jin in 1621, General Mao Wenlong fled to far northwestern Korea, from whence he temporarily was able to take back Zhenjiang Fort 鎮江堡, near the mouth of the Yalü River, in that same year. Subsequently, with Korean cooperation and Chinese supplies shipped from Shandong, Mao maintained a rough-and-ready garrison called Dongjiang 東江 on Pi Island (see I.A.1.m), from which he repeatedly challenged Latter Jin control in Eastern Liao at a time when other Ming commands were helpless to do so. Though resourceful and effective, Mao operated too independently for the comfort of many in both the Korean and Ming military administrations. Consequently, in the mid-summer of 1629, he was dramatically executed on Pi Island by Governor of Liaodong Yuan Chonghuan, who charged him with arrogation and pirating of supplies, among an array of illicit and deceptive practices (see I.A.37; on Mao’s correspondence with the Manchu
leadership as recorded in the “Old Manchu Records,” see Kanda 1966). Whether or not Yuan’s action was justified, the Ming court never was able to establish a more able leader on Pi Island. And Mao’s demise released into the Liaodong-Shandong conflict zone several of his subordinate generals who had difficulty accepting Ming command but eventually performed extremely well for the Manchus—most prominently Kong Youde, Geng Zhongming (see I.A.2, I.B.10, and II.33), and Shang Kexi 尚可喜 (see II.32).

Mao Wenlong’s role, actions, and character, and the propriety or wisdom of his execution, have been the subjects of controversy from his own time to the present. The Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao is a collection of Mao’s surviving memorials and reports, the precisely dated ones ranging from TQ3 (1623)/7/22 through CZ2(1629)/閏 4/18. It was compiled by his son and published by a former aide, presumably to document that the charges against Mao, and thus his execution, were wrong. This argument is presented explicitly in the appended Dongjiang kewen 東江客問 (1630, postscript 1633) by Wu Guohua 吳國華, a supporter from Mao’s home area. According to Wu’s postscript, he wrote the Dongjiang kewen in negative response to two publications, also in the form of answers to a guest’s questions, the Jisheng ji 磯聲紀 (1629, 12th mo.) and the Xuansheng ji 漩聲紀 (undated), by a former subordinate of Yuan Chonghuan, Cheng Benzhi 程本直 (Cheng Gengsheng 庚生), who lamented Yuan’s own recent execution on questionable charges and defended his career, including his liquidation of Mao Wenlong. These latter items can be found in the collection Yuan dushi shiji 袁督師事蹟, anon. comp. (in Lingnan yishu 嶺南遺書, pt. 9 [Baibu, ser. 93, case 10, fasc. 4]; CJC, shidi 史地 cat.; and I.A.37, pt. 3).

Especially in view of the loss of most of Mao’s reports from 1621–1622, another work can well be read in conjunction with the Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao: the Mao da jiangjun haishang qingxing 毛大將軍海上情形. Written in 1623 by Wang Ruchun 汪如淳, apparently one of Mao’s retainers, it lauds Mao’s accomplishments to that date in resisting Nurhaci. An MS copy of an earlier imprint, held Tōyō Bunko, is photo-reproduced and appended to Li Guangtao 1968.

For correspondence between Mao (as well as other generals based on Pi Island) and Hungtaiji, see I.A.1.f. The “Old Manchu Documents,” the Korean Veritable Records, early-Qing archival documents, and other sources have been used by recent scholars to show that Yuan Chonghuan was, indeed, justified in executing Mao for illicit contact with the enemy. See Chen Shengxi 1983; and Jiang Shoupeng 1984. On a JQ-period collection of materials on Mao, the Dongjiang yishi, comp. Wu Qian, see Part One, Chap. 3, pt. 3.


I.A.12. Dongshi shu 東事書, 1 j.
Guo Chang 郭昶: Xinxiang xianzhi 新鄉縣志 (1747), 30/12a–13b. Preface 1621.
Rpt. of TQ-period ed. in XLT, fasc. 106 (Taiwan rpt. vol. 22).
This collection consists of sixteen letters that Guo Chang, recently appointed to direct the Hanlin Academy in Nanjing, wrote to his youngest brother in Beijing and several important officials, including Sun Chengzong and Xiong Tingbi (see I.A.16 and I.A.35), offering his advice on how to deal with the Liaodong problem. The letters, dating from the 3rd mo. of 1619 through the 3rd mo. of 1622, generally question the idea of using Liao soldiers to fight Liao battles. Rather, Guo emphasizes attracting the best soldiers in the empire and rousing their ardor by assigning the most respected and charismatic generals and military officials to the Liao theater. This confidence in esprit and relative inattention to matters of organization, training, or logistics was an enduring element in literati opinion on military affairs throughout the Ming-Qing conflict.


I.A.13.  
**Dongyi kaolue** 東夷考略, app. **Dongshi dawen** 東事答問, Tiaoshang Yugong 苕上愚公 [pseud.; Mao Ruizheng 茅瑞徵]: Autobiog. app. to (a, b); DMB: 1041–42.

Editions:
(a) With *Wanli san dazheng kao* 萬曆三大征考 in TQ-period printings, held NLB and SL (ZSB.史, #2889–90; see also #2893).
(b) Author’s postscripts 1615 and 1621. Rpt. in XLT, fasc. 94–95 (Taiwan rpt. vol. 23).
(c) In *Qingchu shiliao sizhong*, 2nd wk. Same text as (b), omitting autobiog. and maps.
(d) In QRGQ, I: 43–88. Based on (c).

At the time of the Battles of Sarhu in 1619, Mao Ruizheng (cousin of Mao Yuanyi, see I.A.15) was a section director in the Bureau of Operations of the Ministry of War. As a consequence of the disastrous defeat at Sarhu (see I.A.4 and I.A.8), he was dismissed from that post. A man of mainly literary interests with no significant field experience in Liaodong, Mao nevertheless, in the course of his duties, was able to learn a good deal about the history and administrative geography of the region, and to gain insights on the problems inherent in conducting military operations there, especially given the bureaucratic and political conditions of his day.

The *Dongyi kaolue* is a history of the Jurchen-cum-Manchu peoples. To this are appended several fairly general maps—of Liaodong as a whole, the Kaiyuan-Tieling area, Shenyang, Liaoyang, Guangning, and particularly valuable, of the places important for the seaborne delivery of supplies to Liaodong from Shandong and No. Zhili—each with explanations by Mao. Also appended is the *Dongshi dawen*, an exposition of Mao’s views on dealing with the Liaodong situation, couched in dialogue form, and written just after the losses of Shenyang and Liaoyang in 1621.


I.A.14.  
**Dongzheng jilue** 東征紀略.
Song Youqing 宋幼清.

This brief account, by an apparent participant in the Ming campaign of 1619 that culminated in the disastrous Battles of Sarhu, offers sharp portraits of two of the four leading generals, Du Song 杜松 and Liu Ting (see I.A.4, I.A.8), and the relation between them. The detail about Liu Ting’s situation as he approached Hetu Ala confirms the view that lack of effective communica-tion between Du and Liu was an important factor in the debacle.


Editions:
(a) Ming-period (probably CZ) imprint held NLB (II: 346; ZSB.史, #2952).
(b) Punct. rep. of (a) in Mingshi ziliao congkan, no. 5. 1986.

Mao Yuanyi was an outstanding military scholar, technician, and tactician. His magnum opus, the Wubei zhi 武備志, 240 j. (preface 1621) is “probably the most comprehensive Chinese military compendium ever written” (Need-ham et al. 1986: 34). His keen interest in weaponry, military organization, and the techniques of troop management are fully apparent in the Dushi jilue, an expanded memoir of Mao’s service as an advisor to Sun Chengzong (see I.A.16) from 1623 through 1625, during the latter’s first tenure as Liaodong Military Commissioner. Mao was a spirited man with a quick, observant mind and a robust style of writing. What the Dushi jilue may lack in modesty, objec-tivity, or precision in dating it makes up for in absorbing revelations about political tensions, personal relations, and men’s character under duress—the sorts of things one often misses in reading official communications.

This work begins with the loss of the Guangning Guard early in 1622, which occasioned Sun Chengzong’s assumption of an active role in Liaodong affairs. It ends with Sun’s resignation as Military Commissioner in 1625, appending anecdotes about how Sun cared more for the well-being of his troops and aides than for himself. In between are rich observations on Sun’s relations with Wang Zaijin (see I.A.31) and the Liaodong governors Yan Mingtai 閻鳴泰, Zhang Fengyi 張鳳翼, and Yu Anxing 喻安性. Mao also shows us how Sun was caught up in, and hampered by, the dire developments at court attending the ascent to power of eunuch Director of Ceremonies Wei Zhongxian, who feared Sun’s potential to intervene militarily in the court situation. Also interest-ing are the means discussed of gaining intelligence on the enemy. Indeed, we find that the knowledge Mao and his associates were able to obtain about the uprisings and famine that weakened the Manchu position in 1623–1625 led Sun to approve forward advances and a campaign into Eastern Liao even without court authorization.
For a more limited memoir by another of Sun Chengzong’s aides during this period, Cai Ding 蔡鼎, see “Sun Gaoyang qianhou dushi lueba” 孫高陽前後督師略跋, in Jingtuo yishi, 15th wk. (rpt. BJ.4, vol. 7).


I.A.16. Dushi zoushu 督師奏疏, 16 j. [4 j. missing]
Sun Chengzong 孫承宗: 670–71; (Gaoyang taifu) Sun Wenzheng gong nianpu (高陽太傅)孫文正公年譜,* comp. (author’s son) Sun Quan 錕 (CZ, KX, QL editions); xingzhuang, Qian Qianyi 1929 (初): 47 上; Chen Zuorong 1988.

Two MS copies of a CZ-period MS (separately preserved preface 1639) held NLB, rare (II: 392) and reg. The former and latter represent earlier and later stages in editing the text for projected, but unrealized, publication in the Qing period (DG or later). Unless one is particularly interested in the editorial changes from characters “avoided” under the Ming to those avoided under the Qing dynasty, the latter copy is preferable, being much cleaner and easier of access than the former.

Minister of War Sun Chengzong was one of the most vigorous, effective, and upright senior officials to serve in the Liaodong defense effort. He saw two periods of duty in that cause: First, as Liaodong Military Commissioner in 1622–1625 his main task was to restore Ming military installations and preparedness in the strategic corridor from Shanhai Pass to Ningyuan (see also I.A.31, I.A.36). Second, having been reappointed to his former positions after the downfall of the “eunuch-party” regime of Wei Zhongxian, in 1629 Sun additionally was made Viceroy for defense of the capital and surrounding region, in response to the Manchu raids on northern No. Zhili in 1629–1630. He was allowed to retire in 1631 and was martyred in resisting a Manchu attack on his home district, Gaoyang 高陽, No. Zhili, late in 1638. During both of his periods as military commissioner, Sun employed remarkably able men as subordinate officials and aides. They included Yuan Chonghuan (I.A.37), Mao Yuanyi (I.A.15, I.A.31), Lu Shanji (I.A.21–22, I.A.30), Zhou Wenyu (I.A.2), and Cheng Lun (I.A.9).

The 149 surviving memorials (out of 177 listed) in this collection are all from Sun’s first tenure as Liaodong Military Commissioner. Dating from TQ2/8/14 through TQ5/11/9, they give astute, detailed assessments of the defense needs of the Guan-Ning region—money, constructions, troop levels, food supplies, munitions, etc.—as well as descriptions of the various installations and their geographical conditions, the specific problems of each area, and the relative usefulness in each of certain tactics and weaponry. Juan 14–15 consist of very detailed closing reports on the state-of-command (including finances) that Sun had achieved, as he prepared to relinquish his post.

A separate item of related interest is the “Cheying baiba kou” 車營百八叩, in which Sun’s argues the virtues in the ancient and current uses of specially constructed carts in troop deployment and battle (see Needham et al. 1986:...
414–21). This item can be found in *Jingtuo yishi*, app. to 15th wk., and in *Jifu congshu* (*Baibu*, ser. 94, case 17, fasc. 3).


CZ-period imprint, latest prefaces 1633, held NLB (II: 390–91).

Bi Ziyan was first appointed Minister of Revenues in 1626, but he retired from office because of discomfort with the power aggrandizement of the eunuch Wei Zhongxian. He accepted reappointment after Wei’s demise in 1628, and he served diligently in that post, under an inhuman workload and equally great political pressures, until the spring of 1633. Though Bi seems always to have been a punctilious recorder of his official business, at least part of his motivation for publishing this huge collection of memorials from his term as Minister of Revenues may have been to dispel the cloud of corruption charges that led to his dismissal and temporary imprisonment.

Most of the materials in this corpus are organized according to the routine provincial subdivisions of the Ministry of Revenues (Huguangsi 湖廣司, Guangdongsi 廣東司, etc.) and, of particular relevance to the Ming-Qing conflict, the Bureau of [Revenues for] Border Supplies (Bianxiangsi 邊餉司) — the latter alone offering 141 items in 11 j. Even more interesting, however, are the two leading sub-collections: “Tanggao” 堂稿 (“Drafts from the Minister’s Desk”), 20 j. on every aspect of the seemingly impossible job of raising and dispatching revenues for the country’s overwhelming military needs; and “Xinxiangsi” 新餉司, 36 j. of memorials from the four years that this special bureau operated, under Bi’s tenure, to deal with the extra revenues that were raised from the supernumerary Liao-supply taxes 遼餉加派 which were levied repeatedly beginning in 1618.

Clearly the *Dushi zouyi* is a major body of source material for studying the late-Ming fiscal system in general, and military finance in particular.


I.A.18. *Fang Haiwei xiansheng ji* 方孩未先生集, 15 j., app. 1 j.

Fang Zhenru 方震儒: *Mingshi*, j. 248 (vol. 21): 6428–30; author’s self-composed nianpu app. to this work, with other biogs.


Editions:

(a) Pub. (author’s 7th-generation descendant) Fang Zhaoyuan 方肇煥. Latest preface 1817.

(b) Pub. author’s 9th-generation descendants. Shudetang 樹德堂, 1867.

When Shenyang and Liaoyang were lost to Nurhaci in 1621, Fang Zhenru, then an official in the Censorate, was especially vocal in demanding the aug-
mentation of Ming military strength in Liaodong. He successfully appealed for a large dispensation from the TQ emperor’s privy purse, which silver Fang himself took to the field and distributed as bonuses to the hardpressed soldiers in Western Liao. Bolstered by his experience on that tour, Fang strongly recommended trying to hold the most advanced positions possible in Western Liao and even to recover the eastern bank of the easternmost branch of the Liao River, the Sancha River 三岔河. As a result of his recommendations, Fang was appointed Regional Inspector for Liaodong, but his tenure was marked by strategy disagreements and personal disharmonies among himself, Liaodong Governor Wang Huazhen 王化貞 (ECCP: 823), and Military Commissioner Xiong Tingbi (see I.A.35).

Since the enthronement of the TQ emperor, Fang had been active among Donglin partisans who opposed the influence of the previous emperor’s nurse, Madame Ke 客氏, and her co-conspirator, the eunuch Wei Zhongxian. The Latter Jin invasion of Western Liao and the collapse of the Guangning Guard in 1622 provided Fang’s factional enemies with an opportunity to bring charges against him. Fang was imprisoned and not released until the accession of the CZ emperor in 1627.

Fang’s memorials concerning Liaodong affairs are printed in j. 2–4 of this collection. Though they are undated, sometimes appended to them are either imperial responses or comments by Fang’s close associate, the Donglin leader Zou Yuanbiao 鄒元標 (DMB: 1312–14).


I.A.19. Fu Jin shucao 撫津疏草, 4 j.; Duxiang shucao 督餉疏草, 5 j.; Xiangfu shucao 餉撫疏草, 7 j.

Bi Ziyun: See I.A.17.
Prefaces to the latter two collections 1623 and 1625, resp. Fu Jin imprint held NPM (NCL, I: 370); Duxiang and Xiangfu imprints held NLB (II: 390).

From 1618 onward, Dengzhou-Laizhou (Deng-Lai 登萊), at the southern end of the archipelago that links Shandong with the Liaodong Peninsula, and Tianjin 天津 at the juncture of the Grand Canal and the Yellow River, took on increasing importance in Ming efforts to deal with the situation in Liaodong. Under a specially established, high-ranking Commissioner of Liao Supplies, Dengzhou and Laizhou functioned as joint ports of embarkation for shipments of military supplies northward. And a new governorship was established at Tianjin in 1620 mainly to build up the Gulf of Zhili naval fleet, for both combat and logistical operations. Although Ming claims to most of Liaodong became rhetorical in 1622, Ming forces remained in control of Lüshun 旅順 (Jinzhou 金州), a crucial transshipment depot on the southern tip of the Liaodong Peninsula, until 1633.

In TQ1(1620), as Junior Vice Censor-in-Chief, Bi Ziyun was appointed to open the special governorship at Tianjin. The Fu Jin shucao consists of Bi’s own copies of his memorials in that post, from preparatory matters in TQ1/4
through the end of TQ2/7. These especially reflect the difficulties of obtaining materials for shipbuilding and of training effective amphibious units. In TQ2/5 Bi was pressured into taking on the coordination of Liaodong supplies through Tianjin and Deng-Lai, while the Tianjin governorship was assumed by Li Banghua (see I.A.20). But the following year, when Li stepped down, Bi formally assumed both the Tianjin governorship and the commissionership of Liaodong supplies (having also been promoted to Vice Minister of Revenues). The Duxiang shucao and the Xiangfu shucao are Bi’s memorials from those two later periods, TQ2/5 through TQ5/7, when he grappled with problems of both naval operations and supply transshipment. Of particular interest are the items concerning the reception of aid shipments from Korea. Among the more than 160 memorials in these three collections, over one-quarter attach the responses they elicited, a few from the emperor, but most from the ministries concerned—primarily War and Revenues. For more of this kind of material, see I.A.20.

Prohib: 440, 446.

I.A.20. Fu Jin zigao gongyi shucao 撫津咨稿公移疏草 [cover title], 10 fasc.
Li Banghua 李邦華: Donglin liezhuan, 9/1a–7a; Zuwei lu (II.46.b): 1512–14; Mingshi, j. 265 (vol. 22): 6841–46.
Undated imprint held LC (I: 182–83).

In TQ2(1622)/4 Li Banghua was appointed Junior Vice Censor-in-Chief and assigned to replace, in the special governorship of Tianjin, Bi Ziyan, who was taking on the supervision of supply shipments to Liaodong from Tianjin (at the juncture of the Grand Canal and the Yellow River) and Deng-Lai (at the southern end of an archipelago that links Shandong with the Liaodong Peninsula). In that governorship, Li succeeded to Bi’s responsibilities in overseeing naval affairs for the Gulf of Zhili. So this collection should be utilized as a sequel to Bi’s Fu Jin shucao (I.A.19).

The draft official documents printed in these ten fascicles are not in the usual order. The first fasc. consists of lateral, ministerial-level communications, zi 咨, the second, third, and fourth of instructions and exhortations, in the forms of xi 榜 and shi 示, to Li’s subordinate officers, and the fifth through tenth of memorials to the throne. Although only one item is dated, all of the (usually brief) imperial responses, which are appended to most of the memorials, are dated. They range from TQ2/7/23 through TQ/閏 10 (not in chronological order).

This collection reflects the difficulties Li encountered in feeding, sheltering, arming, and keeping track of the soldiers posted to Tianjin, who often absconded and became empty names on deliberately padded rolls. Particularly troublesome were insubordinate tendencies among troops brought in from other regions, and the fact that, when units from Fujian were assigned to naval duty in the Liao theater, their boats proved unseaworthy. Forces under Li’s authority did manage to quell a local White Lotus uprising, however. Li was promoted to
Junior Vice Minister of War, but he soon stepped down from that post to care for his father.


I.A.21.  

**Hou Dushi jilue** 後督師紀略, 10 j.

Lu Shanji 鹿善繼 [Lu Zhongjie 忠節]: *Mingshi*, j. 267 (vol. 22): 6889–90; biog. by Lu Xiangsheng (see I.B.9) in *Lu Zhongjie gong wenji* 盧忠烈公文集, j. 1 (QK, j. 335); nianpu by (Lu Shanji’s disciple) Chen Hong 陳鉉 in *Jifu congshu* (Baibu, ser. 94, case 17, fasc. 7) and in CJC, belles-lettres 文學 cat.

Comp. Du Yingfang 杜應芳 (period not known).

Qing-period (DG or later) MS copy held NLB (reg.).

When Sun Chengzong became Liaodong Military Commissioner in 1622 (see I.A.16), Lu Shanji resigned his position as a secretary in the Ministry of War to accompany Sun as a personal aide, in close association with Mao Yuanyi. Mao subsequently wrote an account of that, Sun’s first tenure as Military Commissioner, the *Dushi jilue* (I.A.15). So Lu later took it upon himself to write this work, the *Hou Dushi jilue*, concerning Sun’s second period in that office, 1629–1631. Though Lu Shanji, by then promoted to Vice Minister of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices, did not accompany Sun during that period, as a supporter of Sun’s policies at court he remained well informed about his former patron’s activities.

During Sun’s second period as Military Commissioner, much of his effort went into dealing with Manchu penetration of the Jizhou-Yongping defense zone (via Mongol territory), raids on the capital area, and consequent threats to Shanhai Pass from the west. But most of the *Hou Dushi jilue* concerns Sun’s work to restore order, strength, and morale in the Shanhai-Ningyuan corridor after the partial collapse of defenses in the winter of 1629–1630, when Sun’s close colleague Yuan Chonghuan (see I.A.37) was called southwestward to help defend the capital and was then imprisoned under charges of treason. The difficulty Sun had in the midst of controversy over Yuan’s indictment and eventual execution is portrayed in this work.

The *Hou Dushi jilue* differs from the *Dushi jilue* in that Lu Shanji’s persona is much less evident than Mao Yuanyi’s. Here we learn more about the larger picture than in Mao’s heavily technical and intensely personal account. For more of Lu’s own views, see I.A.22 and I.A.30. For a shorter memoir by a personal aide, Cai Ding, who served during both Sun’s earlier and later periods as Military Commissioner, see I.A.15.


I.A.22.  

**Jiefa jinhua shimo** 借發金花始末 [Jinhua shimo (b)].

Editions:
(a) 2 j. In Lu Zhongjie gong shiwu zhong renzhen cao 鹿忠節公十五種認真草, 1st wk. Preface 1634. MS copy formerly held by Lu Shanji’s descendant, Lu Chuanlin 鹿傳霖, now held BNU (rare).
(b) 1 j., much abbreviated, in Renzhen cao 認真草, in Jifu congshu (Baibu, ser. 94, case 17, fasc. 8–12). Rep. in CJC, belles-lettres cat.

Incoming tax revenue that had been earmarked for the Ming emperor’s privy purse since 1436 was called “gold-floral silver” 金花銀. Specie held in any of the capital vaults was called tang 幡 or tangjin 金, and that held in the emperor’s personal vault often was referred to as nei 內 tang. This work concerns a controversy over emergency use of the emperor’s funds.

In 1619, in the wake of the disastrous Ming defeats at Sarhu, the Ministry of Revenue naturally became involved in demands from various officials that the WL emperor observe dynastic precedent and contribute silver from his personal treasury to supplement public funds in meeting extraordinary defense needs. When the emperor characteristically ignored those demands, Lu Shanji, then a secretary in the Ministry, with the initial approval of his superior, Minister of Revenue Li Ruhua 李汝華, ceased forwarding newly arrived gold-floral silver to the privy purse and began setting it aside for use in frontier defense. The emperor punished Li for this and dismissed Lu when he refused to relent on the issue, which was resolved with the emperor’s death in 1620. Thereafter, the privy purse was opened several times to meet military emergencies (see Ray Huang 1969: 89, 116).

Collected in (a) are twenty-five memorials, a few by Lu Shanji but most by other officials, concerning this case, plus a record by Mao Yuanyi (see I.A.15) of Lu’s reinstatement and Lu’s own narrative account of the affair. Edition (b) includes only five of those items. For more memorials on the matter of releasing tangjin, see I.A.7.


I.A.23. Jiushijiu chou 九十九籌, 10 j.
Ed. a group of Yan’s students.

This is an excellent example of what the Chinese derisively refer to as “a naive scholar purporting to discuss war on paper.” The author, apparently having gained most of his knowledge of Liaodong affairs from reading dibao, presents an elaborate array of prescriptions for strengthening defenses and defeating the Manchus based on principles and ideas derived from classical and other texts. His formulations often have abstract conceptual appeal but are too general to hold much applicability. They bear little relation to actual circumstances in Liaodong and overlook the practicalities of contemporaneous warfare. The work is interesting for what Yan, a non-official with no experience in the northeastern hostilities, has been able to learn about the Liaodong problem.
It is significant in representing a kind of “expertise” that carried considerable influence in the literati culture of Yan’s day.


Feng Yuan 馮瑗: 1595 js.; brother of Minister of Rites Feng Qi 琦 (DMB: 443–45).

Editions:

(a) Ming-period imprint held NLB (II: 782).* Four Ming-period MSS held in other PRC repositories (ZSB. 史, #11161–64),* including FUL.

(b) In XLT, fasc. 26–27 (rpt. vol. 5).

When this work was produced, some time between 1601 and 1619, Feng Yuan was serving as Junior Administrative Vice Commissioner for the Liaodong-Kaiyuan Military Defense Circuit. His prefatory and other remarks (most notably those following the “Kongzhi waiyi tu” 控制外夷圖 section) show his strong concern that higher officials were not sufficiently cognizant of the importance of the Kaiyuan Guard 衛, including its market town, in its crucial location between Mongol territory to the west and Manchu territory to the east, nor of the requirements for its effective maintenance. By providing extensive information on that guard, Feng hoped both to educate his superiors and to impress on them the consequences of chronic understaffing and supply shortages, as well as the unwisdom of instituting trade embargoes against the “barbarians” (as was done in 1609).

The bulk of this work consists of twenty-six maps of the Kaiyuan area and town, and of the surrounding defense lines and fortifications; detailed listings of offices, fighting units, bunkers, stockades, and communication lines among those (with Feng’s discussions of the strategic importance of each); and diagrams of firearms, training drills, and deployment patterns, as well as of the various surrounding tribal peoples’ lineages and encampments (with discussions of their mutual relations).

In view of this content, the ease with which Nurhaci seized Kaiyuan in the 6th mo. of 1619, directly after having destroyed or routed the numerically far superior Chinese armies in the Battles of Sarhu, takes on even more significance. For a similar range of information on the major guards of northern Shanxi and North Zhili prior to the Manchu raids on that region in the 1630s, see I.B.16.


Comp. attrib. Bi Ziyan: See I.A.17.

Ming-period imprint held NLB (II: 390).

In the 5th mo. of 1628, the soldiers of Ningyuan Guard, having recently come under severe threat from the Manchus and having received no rations for four months, revolted against their local superiors, severely injuring, among others, Vice Censor-in-Chief Bi Zisu (see I.A.27), who had recently been promoted from Military Defense Circuit Intendant to Governor of Liaodong.
Bi, who also was a younger brother of Bi Ziyan (see I.A.17), was rescued but, blaming himself for the mutiny, soon committed suicide.

In the *Liaobian huiyi shimo* are published documents from the subsequent court investigation of the Ningyuan mutiny, which cumulatively make it clear that blame lay in many quarters—least of all with Bi Zisu. Among the documents is a detailed report by Assistant Circuit Intendant Guo Guang of how he learned of the emergency, rescued Bi, and managed to calm the troops, as well as a memorial by Minister of Revenues Bi Ziyan praising his brother’s courage and defending his performance in the face of repeated “barbarian” attacks. It is reasonable to assume, as has a library cataloger, that these documents, dating from CZ1(1928)/8/1 through CZ2/9/14, were compiled by Bi Ziyan.


Preface 1628.
(a) Constitutes 10th j. in author’s *Quanbian lueji 全邊略記*, 12 j. Rpt. Taipei: Guangwen shuju 廣文書局, 1974. MS held NLB (II: 781).*
Published by that library in 1930.
(b) In QRGQ, I: 190–259. Based on NLB MS.

Fang Kongzhao was a close relative of one-time Liaodong Regional Inspector Fang Zhenru (see I.A.18) and also the father of well-known intellectual and Ming loyalist Fang Yizhi (see I.H.4). As a bureau director in the Ministry of War in 1626 and 1627, Fang seems to have seen a chance to advance his own career in the great defensive victories at Ningyuan and Jinzhou, the death of the TQ emperor, and the accession of the CZ emperor. He thereupon wrote the *Quanbian jilue*, a wide-ranging series of treatises mainly on the northern defense zones, within which the *Liaodong lue* is the most detailed. This chronicle of Liaodong affairs, from the beginning of the Ming dynasty to the successful defense of Jinzhou in TQ7(1627)/5, concludes with Fang’s promotion of an active restoration policy in Liaodong, in tune with the sentiments of Fang Zhenru.

Fang Kongzhao did gain higher appointments. In the latter part of the CZ period, he served as Governor of Huguang, in which capacity he was successful against the roving-rebel forces of Zhang Xianzhong 張獻忠.


### I.A.27. *Liaodong shugao* 遼東書稿, 4 j.
Bi Zisu 畢自肅: Biog. by brother and compiler Bi Ziyan (see I.A.17) prefaces this work.


With the temporary withdrawal of Governor Yuan Chonghuan from the Shanhai-Ningyuan theater (see I.A.37), in the 2nd mo. of 1628 Bi Zisu was ele-
vated from Military Defense Circuit Intendant to Governor of Liaodong. This followed a determined attack on the Ningyuan Guard complex by Hungtaiji in the 5th mo. of the previous year, which was resisted only with heroic leadership and utmost tenacity by the Ming forces. And it preceded by just three months a violent mutiny of soldiers at Ningyuan, which caused Bi serious injury and led to his suicide (see I.A.25). This collection consists of memorials that Bi wrote during the latter interval, from the announcement of his actual assumption of the governorship on CZ1(1628)/2/23 to his self-critical request to be punished and replaced in office after the mutiny, dated CZ1/7/21.

These memorials paint a picture of great insecurity born of very close pressures from an unpredictable enemy, on the one side, and unfinished defense constructions and repairs, longstanding supply shortages, and consequent troop restlessness, on the other. In short, we see several sources of worry that Bi’s units would suddenly have to fight hard in a state of serious unpreparedness. The collection can be viewed as a companion to I.A.25.


I.A.28.  **Liao-Guang shilu** 遼廣實錄, 2 j.
Fu Guo 傅國 [Fu Dingqing 鼎卿]:  *Mingshi*, j. 255 and 259 (vol. 22): 6574, 6690, 6696; MQY, pt. 2, 2/9a-b.

Editions:
(a) In *Dingchou congbian*, fasc. 2.
(b) In QRGQ, I: 138–89.

Fu Guo, a section director in the Ministry of Revenues, was serving as Supply Supervisor in Eastern Liao in the spring of 1621 when Nurhaci’s forces seized Shenyang and Liaoyang, where Fu was stationed. Because Fu appeared to have abandoned his post and fled when the fall of Liaoyang seemed certain, he came under severe indictment. But he was absolved and continued to serve in the same capacity as before, now in Western Liao.

The characters for “Veritable Record” in the title of this work are meant to suggest veracity but not any imitation of the official shilu. The work actually is an engrossing, anecdote-filled memoir of Fu’s concern about and involvement in Liaodong affairs. The first j. begins in the spring of 1618 when Nurhaci’s seizure of Fushun became a topic of discussion among Fu’s colleagues and friends. It proceeds through Fu’s service in the Ministry of Revenues in Beijing when shortfalls in defense tax receipts and prying open the emperor’s privy purse became issues (see I.A.22), through his work as Supply Commissioner in Eastern Liao under Military Commissioners Xiong Tingbi (see I.A.35) and Yuan Yingtai 袁應泰. Fu then comments on the sources of Ming military weakness, despite the appearance of strength, the consequent loss of Shenyang, and preludes to the loss of Liaoyang. In the second j., he recounts how his advice for saving Liaoyang was not followed by the befuddled Yuan Yingtai, the course of the fighting, how he was *sent away* by a superior official to report on developments, and how he subsequently performed the same supply super-
vision for the Guangning Guard until it was confusedly abandoned at the approach of Manchu forces in the early spring of 1622.

The latter part on Guangning provides a more sympathetic view of Liaodong Governor Wang Huazhen and his policies than one finds in the conventional historiography, which favors Wang’s nemesis of the time, Xiong Tingbi. In general, this work offers a valuable perspective and rich detail on both the Liaoyang and Guangning debacles, and on the personages involved.

I.A.29. *Lie huang xiaozhi* 烈皇小識, 8 j.


Editions:

(a) In MB, 1st wk.
(b) In ZNW, pt. 17. Rpt. in BJ. 10, vol. 3.

From WL through CZ times, military affairs in Liaodong and the north-northeastern border-defense zones continually were impaired by extremely distressing court politics and factional infighting. Sometimes those struggles led to neglect of Liao problems by occupying the attention of policy-setting officials and by making them prone to seek quick solutions when the Manchu challenge could not be ignored. At other times they led to interference, when one faction or another felt it needed to have its men in charge of armies near the capital region. In any case, the results—often at crucial junctures—were harmful to Ming military and diplomatic capabilities. Late-Ming court and factional politics is a large subject, bibliographical introduction to the primary sources of which can be found in Xie Guozhen 1981: chaps. 4–5.

Among those sources, none matches the *Lie huang xiaozhi* for placing references to Liaodong and capital-defense affairs in the general context of court and factional politics—in this case during the CZ reign. Another well-known work by Wen Bing, the *Xianbo zhishi* 先撿志始, 2 j. (see ZCZ, II: 318), which covers the period from late WL through the destruction of Wei Zhongxian and the Donglin counter-attack on Wei’s eunuch party in 1627–1628, is more typical of the partisan histories in making only a few such references. (For Wen’s history of the HG court, see I.C.11)

The author, whose father Wen Zhenmeng 文震孟 (DMB: 1467–70) and maternal cousin Yao Ximeng 姚希孟 were leading figures in the Donglin partisan struggles of the TQ and CZ periods, certainly cannot be called an unbiased recorder, but his sources of information were intimate. Wen Bing briefly held a sinecure as an office manager in the Left Chief Military Commission at the height of his father’s ministerial status, ca 1635. His presence in Beijing during the CZ period, when the capital region suffered repeated threats from Manchu raiding parties, may somewhat account for the attention given Liao defense matters in the *Lie huang xiaozhi*. See also II.34.

I.A.30.  
Lu Zhongjie gong ji 鹿忠節公集 [one MS title, Lu Fengchang ji 鹿奉常集], 21 j.
Comp. Mao Yuanyi: See I.A.15.
Editions:
(a) Qing-period imprint, largely from KX blocks, held FUL and Hangzhou U Lib. (as well as Anhui and Hubei prov. libraries*; ZSB.集, #9846).
(b) In QK, j. 337–357. Excludes prefaces and tables of contents.

Though the memorials in j. 1–4 of this collection are not dated, those in j. 1 (Lu’s own) concern the controversy of 1618–1622 over using funds from the emperor’s privy purse for Liaodong supplies (see I.A.22). In j. 2 are memorials Lu wrote or drafted for others: Those for Minister of Revenues Li Ruhua concern the shortfall in Liao-supply revenues and the need for a special imperial dispensation, ca. 1618–1620; those for Minister of War Cui Jingrong 崔景榮 concern the need for greater discipline in meeting the challenge of the loss of Eastern Liao, ca. 1620; and for Sun Chengzong (see I.A.16), observations and proposals that resulted in the appointment of Sun as Liaodong Military Commissioner in 1622. Juan 3–4 contain items concerning the restoration of Ming control out to Jinzhou, ca. 1623–1624, as well as several about the security of Guan-Ning and the capital, ca. 1628–1629. Also of interest are several “discussions” 議 in j. 11 of battlefield tactics and methods of military supply.

I.A.31.  
Sanchao Liaoshi shilu 三朝遼事實錄, 17 j.; Zonglue 總略, 1 j.
Ed. (author’s son) Wang Huibi 王會苾.
Editor’s prefatory col. 1639.
(b) Rpt. in KGSL, pt. 3, vols. 1–3.
(c) In the MS collectanea Mingdai congchao 明代叢鈔 (n.d.). Held BUL (ZSB.史, #2900).

Wang Zaijin was serving as Director-General of the Grand Canal in 1618–1619 when he apparently took special interest in the preparations of General Liu Ting to participate in the chastisement of Nurhaci. (The decimation of Liu’s army and his suicide at Sarhu [see I.A.4 and I.A.7] occasioned Wang’s composition of the “Dudu Liu jiangjun zhuan” 都督劉將軍傳, in XLT, fasc. 95 [rpt. vol. 23].) Subsequently Wang became Senior Vice Minister of War. With the collapse of Ming defenses in Western Liao in 1622, he was appointed Minister of War with primary duties as Military Commissioner for the Liaodong-Jifu-Tianjin-Dengzhou-Laizhou strategic zone, to replace Xiong Tingbi (see I.A.35). His proposals to withdraw all Chinese military installations down to Shanhai Pass were openly opposed by subordinates such as Yuan Chonghuan (see I.A.37). Wang’s plans, and thus his competence, were soon
brought under serious question by Grand Secretary and Minister of War Sun Chengzong (see I.A.16). Consequently, he was transferred to a post in Nanjing, and Sun himself assumed Wang’s former position as Liaodong Military Commissioner. Wang’s career never fully recovered from this perhaps deserved humiliation.

The voluminous *Sanchao Liaoshi shilu*, though composed in the “Veritable Record” form, is actually a vehicle for restoring Wang’s pride and reasserting his credibility. The copious information it presents—from Nurhaci’s seizure of Fushun 撫順 in 1618 (WL46/4) to the belittling of Yuan Chonghuan’s successful defense of Ningyuan at the end of 1627 (TQ7/CZ1)—should be used judiciously in cognizance of its biased selection and numerous cases of disinformation, all intended to detract from the ideas and actions of Wang’s nemesis Sun Chengzong and his cohort. Especially crass was the publication of this work shortly after Sun and his male household members were killed resisting a Manchu raid on their home district late in 1638. MS edition (c) appends the *Fu Liao bianyi* 復遼砭囈 (cover title Liaoshi 遼事 bianyi), 6 j., by Sun’s protégé Mao Yuanyi (see I.A.15), which contests approximately fifty-nine passages in the *Sanchao Liaoshi shilu* and appends materials in defense of Sun’s record.

A collection of Wang Zaijin’s works, the *Baoshantang ji* 寶善堂集, is said to contain his memorials on administrative policy for Liaodong in j. 32–40.*


I.A.32. *Shenmiao liuzhong zushu huiyao* 神廟留中奏疏彙要, 40 j.
Completed 1624.
[Beijing]: Yanjing daxue tushuguan 燕京大學圖書館, 1937. From MS copy now held BUL (ZSB.史, #3692).*

Among the practices of the WL emperor that most infuriated his ministers was to routinely table (“retain Within”—liuzhong 留中) memorials that came to his desk. Because no action was taken on them and they never received imperial rescripts, the usual copies were never made of those memorials for reference or historical use. This made even more difficult the task of officials who were assigned to compile the Veritable Record (see III.A.1) of the WL emperor’s very controversial reign, after his death in 1620.

Dong Qichang was one of those assigned to this task, which was combined with that to compile a shilu for the one-month TCh reign in 1620. In TQ2 (1622)/8, Dong received permission to travel to Nanjing in order to supplement the compilers’ materials by having extensive copies made from a large collection of dibao held in a government office there. Unexpectedly, he found the prefectural office of the southern auxiliary capital chocked with routine copies of memorials that had been sent up to Shenzong but had never come down again. Since the copying of those records was not a part of Dong’s official assignment, he had it done at his own expense, in the end producing 300 books of copies for his fellow court historians to use.
The *Shenmiao liuzhong zoushu* is a selection from that trove, for presentation to the TQ emperor, of the 296 memorials that Dong found most important. Ranging from WL13(1595)/3 through WL48(1620)/9 (i.e., through TCh), the memorials are organized first by ministry-of-origination, then chronologically (only the Ministry of Punishments being unrepresented). Of the 43 memorials from the period WL46–48, about 26 pertain to Liaodong affairs and to problems of revenue-raising, mobilization, and imperial leadership that were exacerbated by the emergencies in Eastern Liao. The majority of those are from the ministries of War and of Revenues, though Personnel, Works, and even Rites are represented. The 1937 edition provides a handy listing of all the memorial titles in chronological order (編年總目), indicating the ministry, j. number, and commencing page number of each.


I.A.33. *Simyang ilgi* 沈陽日記.
Anon. official recorders for the Korean crown prince Sohyŏn Seja 昭顯世子: Tagawa 1934; Yamaguchi 1931.

Copy and editions:
(a) MS in 10 fasc. held Kyujanggak Collection (I: 145), Seoul National U Lib.*

Useful abridgement: *Simgwannok* 瀋館錄:
(i) In MS collection *Kwangsa* 廣史, pt. 5 (see *Kosen sappu*, I: 521).*

Note: Although this work is listed among the contents of the *Man-Mŏ sŏsho* (ZCZ, I: 675), it never actually was published in that collection.

When the Korean court sued for peace in the face of Hungtaiji’s invasion of 1636, one of the treaty articles stipulated that Korea recognize Qing suzerainty by sending as hostages to Shenyang King Injo’s 孝宗 sons, Crown Prince Sohyŏn and the Prince of Pongnim 鳳林大君 (the future King Hyojong 孝宗), as well as the sons and brothers of other high-ranking Korean officials. This work is an official diary of the activities and observations of Crown Prince Sohyŏn and his party beginning CZ10(CD2, 1637)/1/30, when they departed from Seoul, and ending CZ17(SZ1, 1644)/6/18, when they returned to Shenyang after having been taken to Beijing.

Most informative concerning the Ming-Qing conflict is the last section of the *Simyang ilgi*, subtitled “Sŏhaeng ilgi” 西行日記, which covers the period when the prince’s party was taken by Dorgon on what turned out to be the last Qing campaign to penetrate Shanhai Pass. Commencing on 4/9 of 1644, it tells...
of the rigors of camp-travel through Western Liao, receipt of news of the fall of
Beijing and Wu Sangui’s offer of collaboration, and scenes in Jinzhou and
Ningyuan, before vividly describing the horrendous battle to defeat Li Zi-
cheng’s 李自成 forces inside the Pass. It then tells of accompanying certain
Qing units, under very trying circumstances, as they pursued the roving rebels
to Tongzhou 通州, of the welcome given the Qing army by the common people
of Beijing, and of circumstances in the city, including the charred remains of
the imperial palace. The crown prince stayed in Beijing until 5/4, when he was
allowed to return to Shenyang. Conditions in Liaoxi again are observed, along
the way back.

Ref: Prefatory haesŏl 解說 to (b); Xie Guozhen 1931: 6/1b-3a.

I.A.34.  
*Tao zhongcheng yiji* 陶中丞遺集, 2 j.; *Haiyun zhaichao 海運摘抄*, 8 j.
Tao Langxian 陶朗先: *Donglin dangji kao*: 120–21; several biogs. by
contemporaries app. to the *Yiji*.
In *Mingji Liaoshi congkan 明季遼事叢刊*, fasc. 1 and 2–5, resp. The *Yiji* is
from a Tao family MS in the author’s own hand; the *Zhaichao* is from a
late-Ming movable-type edition.

In the late WL period, Tao Langxian had gained experience in the water-
borne transport of military supplies and in the operation of coastal military
installations, especially as governor of the commandery at Dengzhou, Shan-
dong, and then as intendant of the military defense circuit at Dengzhou. In
those capacities he improved the reliability of grain shipments to his forces and
established agriculturally productive military colonies not only in Dengzhou
but also on islands in the Miaodao 廟島 archipelago. His work greatly facil-
itated the transport of military supplies to Liaodong by sea, which was much
faster and cheaper than by land. When serious hostilities with Nurhaci began in
1618, Tao was appointed Surveillance Vice Commissioner for Shandong, with
particular responsibility for naval defense and seaborne transport at Dengzhou
and for supervision of military colonies under the Dengzhou-Laizhou juris-
diction.

Though a handful of memorials from the latter period of service (dated 5th
mo. 1619 to 8th mo. 1621) can be found in the second j. of the *Tao zhongcheng
yiji*, many more (approximately ninety) are available in the *Haiyun zhaichao*.
The *Zhaichao* memorials (dating from WL46[1619]/12/22 to WL48[1620]/7/19)
convey a great sense of urgency, especially under the severe draught conditions
of 1619 which adversely affected the availability of grain. These works should
be read in conjunction with I.A.19–20. See also I.A.13 for a relevant map.

I.A.35.  
*Xiong Xiangmin gong ji* 熊襄愍公集, 10 j., appended material.
Xiong Tingbi 熊廷弼: ECCP: 308.; autobiog. in j. 8 of (a); Sun Yuchang 1994.
Ed. Bao Guixing 鮑桂星 (1764–1826) et al.

(a) Printing blocks held Tuibuzhai 退補齋, latest col. 1813. First 7 j. rpt.
Xiong Tingbi saw three periods of service in the Liao region: During the years 1608–1611, as Regional Inspector he vigorously advocated strengthening the region’s defenses. From 1619 (6th mo.) to 1620 (9th mo.) he was Liaodong Military Commissioner, appointed to save the situation in the wake of startling Ming losses at Sarhu, Kaiyuan, and Tieling. But his efforts were hampered by severe instability at the Ming court attending the death of the uncooperative WL emperor and the suspicion-arousing death, after only one month on the throne, of the TCh emperor. And from 1621 (7th mo.) to 1622 (2nd mo.) he again served as Military Commissioner, now with primary responsibility only for the area from Shanhai Pass to Guangning, because of the lightning-fast seizure of Shenyang and Liaoyang (in effect, all of Eastern Liao) by the Latter Jin early in 1621. Memorials and other official communications by Xiong from these three periods of service are printed in this collection, j. 1–7 in edition (a).

Xiong was a no-nonsense disciplinarian of scant political finesse. His commitment to policies of holding and strengthening, rather than of advance for recovery or chastisement, did not appeal to elements at court, occupied with factional struggles, who preferred promises of quick solutions to the Liao problem. This underlay Xiong’s conflict, during the period 1621–1622, with Governor of Liaodong Wang Huazhen. The sudden loss of the whole Guangning Guard region (where Wang was stationed) to Nurhaci’s forces in early 1622 was blamed primarily on Xiong, who was executed for that in 1625.

The 10-j. edition (a), from which (b) derives, being an early 19th-cent. result of the QL emperor’s magnification of Xiong’s martyrdom, bears comparison with three late-Ming collections of Xiong’s writings, all probably generated in 1620 to promote Xiong’s reinstatement as Military Commissioner: An Liao shugao 按遼疏稿, 6 j., held NPM (NCL, I: 320; also LC microfilm); Xiong Tingbi zougao 奏稿, 6 j., held NCL (I: 320; 2 j. ed. held Hangzhou U Lib.); and Jinglue Xiong xiansheng quanji 經略熊先生全集, 11 j., held NCL (III: 1123).*

Of particular interest in (a) is j. 8, which consists of a long but regrettably unfinished, third-person autobiography by Xiong, “Xingqi xiansheng zhuan” 性氣先生傳, and the “Dongshi dawen” 東事答問, a purported exchange between Xiong and a guest in which Xiong puts forth his policy recommendations in view of the loss of Western Liao. See also I.A.28.

Prohib: 421.

I.A.36. Xue Gongmin gong zoushu 薛恭敬公奏疏, 14 j.
Xue Sancai 薛三才: MSGLZ, 102/18a–19b.
Comp. Xue Shiheng 薛士珩, (author’s nephew).
MSS, apparently of Ming date, held NLB (II: 389) and NPM (NCL, I: 371).
Latter rpt. in Mingji shiliao jizhen, pt. 2, vols. 1–2.

In January of 1618, Xue Sancai was appointed Minister of War to Supervise the Capital Training Divisions 兵部尚書協理京營戍政, and despite
repeated attempts to resign because of illness, he soon was obliged to assume acting authority as Minister of War proper. Just then, in the 4th mo., Nurhaci stunned the Ming court by seizing the crucial market town of Fushun in eastern Liaodong, as well as numerous forts to the north and south of that location. This advance culminated in the 7th mo. with the conquest of Qinghe Fort. Ming losses, both in situ and to expeditionary forces, were very heavy. Though Xue came to his duties as Minister of War from previous experience as Governor of Xuanfu and as Viceroy for Jifū, Liaoning, and Baoding, this challenge proved too much for him. He died in office almost exactly one year after Nurhaci’s seizure of Fushun.

Xue’s multiple responses to the Liaodong emergencies of 1618 are documented in the memorials of j. 9–12 in this collection. Also of interest are those in j. 5–8, which indicate his perception of Jianzhou problems during his tenure as viceroy ca. 1613. Appended to the Mingji shiliao jizhen reprint of the 14-j. MS are reprints of eleven additional MSS of Xue’s memorials (vol. 3, no j. divisions), all from that earlier service as Ji-Liao-Bao Viceroy, specifically during WL 41/8–11.

Ref: Franke 1968: 149.

I.A.37. Yuan Chonghuan ziliao jilu 袁崇煥資料集錄.
Yuan Chonghuan: ECCP: 954–55; Li Shaoqiang 1983; Yan Chongnian 1994; see also biogs. in this collection.
Comp. Yan Chongnian 闞崇年 and Yu Sanle 俞三樂 (PRC).

In 1622 Yuan Chonghuan began his stellar service in the recovery of Western Liao territory as a secretary in the Ministry of War. Yuan’s proposals to regain and hold the strategic corridor from Shanhai Pass to and beyond Ningyuan immediately placed him in conflict with his superior, Liaodong Military Commissioner Wang Zaijin (see I.A.31), who, in view of the collapse of Ming defenses in all of Western Liao earlier that year (see I.A.35), advocated simply holding Shanhai Pass. Yuan got his way, and promotion to Circuit Intendant, when Minister of War Sun Chengzong (see I.A.16), who strongly supported Yuan’s proposals, removed Wang and assumed the post of Liaodong Military Commissioner himself in 1624 (8th mo.). Cooperating closely, Sun and Yuan undertook a year of intense restoration and strengthening of the Ningyuan Guard, its surrounding commanderies, and its advance-defense forts all the way to Dalinghe.

This progress was almost cancelled, however, when Sun came into conflict with the eunuch faction at court and was replaced as military commissioner by Minister of War Gao Di 高第, who ordered the complete dismantling of all defenses down to Shanhai Pass. Because of Yuan’s courageous refusal to obey Gao’s order, he and his stalwart subordinates were able to resist a concerted Latter Jin attack on Ningyuan in February of 1626. This not only was the first significant Ming victory in Liaodong since the Manchu advances began in 1618,
it also is thought to have contributed to the death of Nurhaci in the autumn of 1626.

Although Yuan then was elevated to Governor of Liaodong, he retired in the face of partisan criticism. With the accession of the CZ emperor and elimination of the eunuch dictator Wei Zhongxian, Yuan was reappointed in 1629. In the mid-summer of that year he somewhat treacherously executed the maverick general Mao Wenlong (see I.A.11) in Mao’s own stronghold on Pi Island. When Yuan’s response to the Manchu raids on the capital region in the winter of 1629–1630 displeased the emperor, he was charged with treason, among other things, and cruelly executed in the autumn of 1630.

The heroic example Yuan set in the TQ period, the controversiality of some of his actions in early CZ, and the mystery surrounding his seemingly unjust condemnation and execution, have generated many writings about Yuan, from his own time to the present day. This collection consists mainly of material about Yuan in various Ming-, Qing-, and Republican-period sources. Extant writings by Yuan himself are few and brief. Republished here (II: 130–65) are twenty-six prose items, mostly memorials, and eleven poems from Yuan’s tenure in Liaodong. Some of these writings are rep. from the MQSL (pts. 甲, 乙, and 丙). Others first came to light in an anonymously compiled collection, the Yuan dushi shiji 袁督师事跡, first published in the DG-period Lingnan yishu collectanea (see I.A.11). They were later republished in the Yuan dushi yiji 遺集 (comp. Zhang Bozhen 張伯楨, in Canghai congshu 滄海叢書 [1932–1934], pt. 1, fasc. 2–3). Also provided are five items (II: 99–100) from the Yuan dushi yigao yishi huiji 遺稿遺事匯輯 (comp. Zhang Cixi 張次溪 [n.p., 1941]), mostly Yuan’s letters to Hungtaiji exploring the latter’s suggestion of terms for peace with the Ming—no doubt originally revealed to counter charges that Yuan had engaged in illicit contact with the enemy. (For a study of the Yuan-Hungtaiji correspondence in historical context, with comparisons of the letter texts in different Chinese and Manchu sources, see Kanda 1962.)

One of the works reprinted in this collection, Yuan dushi kan Mao Wenlong shimo 袁督师斬毛文龍始末 (I: 33–37), long attributed to Li Qing (see I.C.18), appears to be a truncation of the Dongjiang shimo 東江始末, attributed to a Ming author, Bo Qizong 柏起宗 (most commonly available in Jieyue shanfang huichao 借月山房彙鈔 [ed. Zhang Haipeng 張海鵬, 1812; Baibu, ser. 48, case 3], fasc. 7; beware of typesetting errors in ZNW, pt. 3 [rpt. in BJ.10, vol. 2]). These give a detailed, romance-like account of Yuan’s execution of Mao Wenlong.


I.A.38. Zoudu 奏牘, 8 j.
Ling Yiqu 凌義渠: Donglin liezhuang, 9/8a–12a; Zuwei lu (II.46.b): 1514–17; MSGLZ, 147/18b–20a.
Preface 1638. CZ-period imprint held NLB (II: 395).

Ling Yiqu served virtually his whole career, spanning the middle CZ reign, as a censorial official in the Offices of Scrutiny for the Ministries of Rites,
Personnel, Revenues, and War. He was vocal on a wide range of matters, including Liaodong defense. In j. 1 of this collection of Ling’s memorials, we find him concerned about the fall of Dalinghe Fort to Hungtaiji, in the 11th mo. of 1631, and the fate of chief defender Zu Dashou. In j. 3 he is alarmed at delays in the dispatch of revenues for border defense in 1635–1636. And in j. 4 he is unhappy about the slowness and inaccuracy of reports concerning the Qing invasion of Korea in 1636, and about unsubstantiated rumors, which have been causing popular unrest, of imminent further Qing raids on No. Zhili. Items in j. 5, all dating from 1637, address the consequences of the Qing subjugation of Korea for the security of Dengzhou and islands in the central and eastern Gulf of Zhili.

Among Liaodong matters, Ling concerned himself most with the deterioration of conditions on Pi Island after the execution of Mao Wenlong (see I.A.2 and I.A.11). In j. 5–7 are his memorials anticipating and then responding to a combination of Qing attack and troop mutiny on Pi Island in the spring of 1637, which resulted in mass defections and loss of Ming control over the island. Repeatedly throughout this collection Ling shows strong interest in intelligence matters—in gaining information on Manchu capabilities and intentions and reducing their chronically superior knowledge of the Ming side.

I.A.39. Zufeng shilue 阻封事略; Maojue bianzhen 冒爵辨真.
Former work by Chen Zhilin 陳之遴: Qingshi liezhuan 清史列伝, 79/30a–31b.
Latter work anon., probably also by Chen Zhilin.

These two works aim to set the historical record straight about the obscured merit of Chen Zhilin’s father, Chen Zubao 陳祖苞, who in 1626 had been the chief judicial officer at Shanhai Pass. The author implies a parallel between Chen Zubao and Yuan Chonghuan (see I.A.37) in that both men earned the enmity of Director of Ceremonies Wei Zhongxian by resisting the extension of “eunuch party” control over the northeastern defense complex, and both men performed heroically when Nurhaci, coming from the east and aided by an incursion of Mongols from the northwest, laid siege to Jinzhou and Ningyuan and seriously threatened the security of Shanhai Pass. Also, in the aftermath of what was considered a great defensive victory for the Ming, neither Chen nor Yuan received the recognition he deserved (in the author’s view, conferment of noble titles was in order), while others of lesser or no merit, especially those in the eunuch party, were grandly rewarded. Upon the accession of the CZ emperor, when Wei and his cohort still had not been removed, Chen Zubao courageously tested the waters, we are told, by putting this case of injustice before the throne. The favorable outcome, for both Chen and Yuan, occasioned the publication of these accounts.
Though Chen Zubao consequently was promoted to Governor of Shuntian, he ran afoul of the CZ emperor’s temper in connection with the Manchu raids on No. Zhili and Shandong in the winter of 1638–1639. Imprisoned, he committed suicide. Chen Zhilin, also detained in his father’s case, surrendered to the Manchus in 1645 and went on to achieve prominence as a Qing grand secretary. These accounts show one kind of frustration that underlay the willingness of many late-Ming officials to accept service under Qing rule.


See also: I.B.1.g, Chongzhen cunshi shuchao; I.B.1.k, Selections from the Ming Documents of the FHA; I.B.16, Yang Wenruo xiansheng ji; I.C.26, Xingcun lu; II.19, Huang Ming tongji jiyao; II.32, Pingnan wang yuanrong chuifan; II.34, Sanchao yeji; and III.C.1, Baqi tongzhi chuji.