"Journalism Without Journalists"

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In 2006, Jay Rosen penned an astute observation about changing power relationships in the media industries in general and more specifically the world of journalism regarding the impact of internet. His analysis, titled "The People Formerly Known as the Audience" (TPFKATA)[1], pointed towards a shift in access to reporting tools (news gathering, editing, and publishing) to what used to be imagined by news workers as the audience. Rosen and many other industry observers noted how it is not just the tools of reporting now being available to TPFKATA (such as blogging, podcasting, vodcasting, and other forms of social or "We" media[2]), but also how emerging forms of legal protection (Creative Commons licensing[3]), and increasing uses of users by professional media organizations continue to give the former audience a semi-official status as competitor - colleagues. TPFKATA have become special competitors, in the sense that their role is not to do a better and cheaper journalism but to do something different and for free. In other words: they contribute to design another system that, as Shirky argues[4], has made the traditional system of information obsolete. Thus, TPFKATA become competitors despite their lack of willing to do so, since they do not have any interest to destroy the traditional newspapers or their websites. It is the publishers that have made them competitor-colleagues, by constructing them as playing this role.

The examples and arguments put forward by Rosen, Shirky and others are not stand-alone or otherwise marginalized cases. Indeed, it can be said that in most, if not all newsrooms today maybe more than yesterday an awareness of the productive behavior of TPFKATA is cultivated as an editorial and managerial strategy. However, many research carried out in Europe[5] show how faraway are usually the publishers (and the editors) in understanding how to manage the relationship with the audience on the economic and organizational level. Here, the majority of the press has been characterized by the lack of a true interaction with the audience and a situation of dissociate interactivity (that is interactivity mainly intra-audience and not between journalists and audiences). While journalists showed more sensibility to this issue and became available to do a lot of additional and volunteer work in order to respond to audience's needs, editors were rather deaf to the necessity of re-designing an organization of newsrooms based on this new role

played by TPFKATA. As consequence, departments or sections of the news organization charged with organizing (and filtering) the contributions of consumer-citizens tend to be under-funded and understaffed.[6]

The editorial approach seems in some cases prudent, in other cases obtuse, considering how numerous studies all over the world signal how especially younger media users tend to produce when they consume their media.[7] It seems to make sense, then, as a news organization and for journalism as a profession to increasingly shift towards a co-creative mode when engaging with contemporary society.

Flat Hierarchies

The power relationships between journalists, employers and audiences have been transformed in the course of time by a series of concauses. However the shift of the power from journalists towards publishers might be characterized by two stages: the first has seen jourrnalism domestication by publishers (and editors) who have subjected journalists to the macrophysics of power and made them becoming their "legitimators" and "guardians."[8] The second stage has seen the publishers destructuring journalism by using the internet and the utopia of the networked organization - redesigning the profession as simple, immaterial labor. This shift has been made possible by the particular features of the profession of journalism which might be described as a profession characterized by a double bind[9] and which conversely is emblematic of Foucault's analysis on power.[10] Generally, double bind theory explains a dilemma in the communication process in which an individual (or a group of individuals) receives two or more conflicting messages. Journalists represent a case of double bind since they receive two conflicting messages: on the one hand, their self-policed professional ethics and occupational ideology require that they exercise a right/duty of writing news, facts, events, as watchdogs of democracy[11]; on the other the feature of enterprise of the outlet for which they work may conflict with the interest to not publish some specific news, fact or event. In a nutshell, journalists are required to survey and denounce the power which gives them the money to live. While the first message is explicit (coming from schools of journalism and its much-celebrated history of professionalization), the second is implicit

and with the former message negating the latter. Thus, the essence of this double bind is two conflicting demands, *each on a different logical level* (the former on the level of freedom of information and the other on the level of obedience and loyalty to the employer), neither of which can be ignored or escaped. Journalists do not know how to respond to the conflict between journalistic ideology, rhetorics and ethics and the contrasting requests coming from their employers. If journalists succeed to respond to one message, this means failing with the other and vice versa. They can neither discuss publicly the conflict, nor resolve it, nor opt out of the situation. In this sense, journalists are no different from any other worker in the creative industries, perpetually caught between the competing claims of the market (and, in tandem, management), and the demands of artistic freedom (or professional autonomy).

This endless yet essential conflicting situation as the benchmark for journalistic work begs different solutions, all located outside the newsroom: going out of the system and becoming free lance, opening a blog (or other social media publishing platform), becoming an entrepreneur. If a journalist wants to continue to work in a typical newsroom, the reporter has to resolve this discomfort by modifying or renouncing his/her personal identity and integrity, applying self-censorship and pleasing the employer. This self-censure is realized to prevent the censure by the editor and to apply in advance the editorial strategy of the outlet. Self-censorship in the journalists' world is a typical mechanism of the adaptation to the microphysics of power. Actually journalism can be seen as the locus where self-discipline, as it has been described by Foucault, has been applied with more vehemence given that journalists work for the entrepreneur who controls them.

The decline of journalists' power should, as many scholars have argued (particularly since the mid-1990s), push them to build a new relationship and alliance with audiences. At the heart of the argument towards a co-creative relationship between professional journalists and TPFLATA lies the recognition of a new or modified power relationship between news users and producers, as well as between amateurs and professional journalists. It can be heralded as a democratization of media access, as an opening up of the conversation society has with itself, as a way to get more voices heard in an otherwise

rather hierarchical and exclusive public sphere. In this scenario, some of the traditional and generally uncontested social power of journalists now flows towards publics, and potentially makes for a flatter hierarchy in the gathering, editing, publication and dissemination of news and information of public interest. In fact the power of journalists was based on the complex labor they did, which required a high degree of specialization. The decline of communication costs provoked by the use of the internet by a mass of well-educated users has undermined this exclusive status for the profession. Forums, blogs, social networks and so on do not are only other means of news dissemination, but they represent also an alternative to the traditional publication of news.

By all means, this is an important intervention on the audience side. But what Rosen and others tend to neglect or underestimate, is another equally if not more powerful redistribution of power taking place in the contemporary media ecosystem: a sapping of economic and cultural power away from professional journalists to what can be called "The People Formerly known as the Employers" (TPFKATE).[12]

TPFKATE

Employers in the news industry traditionally offered most of their workers permanent contracts, included healthcare and other benefits (near the end of the 20th century sometimes even including maternal leave), pension plans, and in most cases even provisions sponsoring reporters to retrain themselves, participate in workshops, and serve on boards that gave them a formal voice in future planning and strategies of the firm.[13] Today, most if not all of that has disappeared - especially when we consider the youngest journalists at work.

Today, the international news industry is contractually governed by what the International Federation of Journalists in 2006 euphemistically described as "atypical work", which means all kinds of freelance, casualized, informal, and otherwise contingent labor arrangements that effectively individualize each and every workers' rights or claims regarding any of the services offered by employers in the traditional sense as mentioned.[14] This, in effect, has workers compete for (projectized, one-off, per-

story) jobs rather than employers compete for (the best, brightest, most talented) employees.

Furthermore, news work in particularly English, Italian, Spanish, and German-speaking countries gets increasingly outsourced: to subcontracted temporary workers or even off shored to other countries, where the TPFKATE practice what has been called "Remote Control Journalism."[15] Journalists today have to fight with their employers to keep the little protections they still have, and do so in a cultural context of declining trust and credibility in the eyes of audiences (the few "audiences" that still exist given the Rosen formula), a battle for hearts and minds that they have to wage without support from those who they traditionally relied on: their employers. Journalists now pay the price to not have included in these struggles the young journalists paid 25 euros per article, the trainees, and so on. Without all these people they do not have the sufficient critical mass to win the battle against the publishers.

Power shift

If one tries to look more deeply at the radical changes that are occurring in the news world are, according to Agostini[16], the result of a power shift among the social actors who in the past had different levels of power and who, in this stage, see the quantity and quality of this power radically changing. Behind the restructuring of power relationships between publishers, journalists and audiences there is a series of trials of strength on a variety of issues. Central to these issues are the uses of (new) technologies, labor laws, and even the definitions of what "news" is in the service of power redistribution. Emplyers can take advantage of IT technology in the newsroom in order to reduce journalists' power and social prestige by introducing massive outsourcing and other forms of precarious labor, as reported by scholars in Europe, North America, and Australia in particular.[17]; the possibility for employers to diminish and discourage unionization among journalists[18], as unions contribute to shaping a class of journalists not sufficiently obedient towards editorial policies established by directors and management; and the arrival to the end of the line of the classical conceptualization and format of news, which is traceable in the decrease of newspaper sales and television news viewership in the old industrialized countries.

In these trials of strength between media groups, journalists and audiences, the weakest actors are the journalists, since they are the workers of the situation. Media groups have the capital and own the means of production, so they have command over the news organizational process; audiences are fragmented and dispersed, so they do not have the power to require a commodity tailored as they need or like, but they have purchasing power (that they are strongly exercising), so the power to not buy a commodity if they do not like it or have other alternatives. In the end, journalists have only their labor force to sell, and in addition they are forced to sell it at an increasingly lower price.

In this picture we must recall that an anomaly has developed. Audiences have exercised not only their purchasing power towards news (which has decreed the death of several newspapers), but have also summoned the right to directly create "their" news. Becoming owners of the production means in the IT socio-technical system (as predicted by McLuhan and others in the 1960s), they use these tools in order to access online news for free first, and secondly move on to make news about, and for, themselves. In other words: audiences take the advantage to change their status in the "marketplace of ideas" and have become also producers, instead of only consumers. The anomaly, articulated by Terranova in 2000[19] and Manovich in 2001[20], is that audiences, by producing news for free, have began to supply unwaged labor. This had the effect that audiences began to work for free throughout the news system (starting with letters to the editor, and moving via talk radio and opinion polls on TV to forms of public or civic journalism in the 1980s to todays' so-called "citizen" news). This unwaged labor is beneficial (because free) towards media groups, but at the same time it changes the inner logic of news and of the journalists' job, taking from media groups' hands the exclusive right to produce news and the prerogative to dictate the rules of the game.

Yet this unwaged labor is apparently also beneficial for journalists, who find on the web a precious source of information, of stories, and expertise. In reality journalists today enter in competition with the unwaged labor of TPFKATA for a chance to tell stories (and earn a living). The socio-technical system of news in fact takes advantage of this competition, with the consequence that the unwaged labor serves to de-valorize the waged labor of news. As employers, if you can have news for free on the part of audiences, you try to

pay increasingly less for journalists' news (including the work of photographers, sound engineers, and other production-realted labor in the journalism industry). It is a competition that makes both worse instead of empowering them. This situation sees journalists loosing a lot of power and prestige and audiences winning very few assets and only a few media groups earning a lot of money. This is not a process particular to the current post-industrial new media age, as journalists started to lose their battle as early as the 1970s and 1980s. In fact while until the 1960s many intellectuals such as writers, academics and journalists were "engaged" in the Sartrian sense or organic intellectuals as Gramsci proposed[21] so they were part of the lifebelt organized around the working class and the weakest social subjects, in the 1970s and 1980s they reacted to the reflux of struggles and mobilizations by serving the powers that be – often in the name of the market and reaching a more "general" audience.[22] In doing so, they were increasingly co-opted by the power and from watchdogs of democracy they were transformed into lapdogs (or at the very least, "ambivalent" watchdogs[23]). At the same time, today many media groups are not better off. They go through a financial and organizational crisis since they do not have clear business or industrial models of producing news in a profitable way in the context of an increasingly participatory digital culture.[24]

This power shift from journalists to media groups and audiences has been favored also by the fact that much of the news as produced today is a commodity that people have either come to expect as "free" (through free daily newspapers or online via services like Google News), or that people tend to reject as irrelevant to their individual interests. Beyond this, the traditional approach to the market by news firms – outsourcing of stories to news agencies (such as AP and Reuters), and more emphasis on topics and themes in the realm of entertainment and lifestyle (genres generally covered much better by other media) – has not worked. It is therefore also the emergence of news as a commodity without value that threatens the jobs and the overall creative process of journalists.

Immaterial labor workers

If we call publishers "The People Formerly known as the Employers" (TPFKATE), and citizens TPFKATA, how can we call journalists? Just employees? We prefer to not use this term since it is an old Fordist category which refers to a world which hardly exists in

the precarious context of labor today. But they are also not exclusively journalists anymore, as today more and more news companies call their audiences journalists as well – for example by starting divisions or segments labeled as such (as mentioned earlier in this chapter). This unwaged form of journalism is conceptualized by Andrew Keen[25] as an amateurs' activity, which produces for free a commodity that media groups use without paying anything. We propose to use a more pertinent category to define today journalists: immaterial labor workers.[26] This category might have the merit to situate journalists inside the large stratum of workers who have to deal with abstract labor.[27] Producing news is situated inside the variegated production of immaterial commodities, such as information, communication, education, entertainment, learning and so on. All these workers are subjected to a very strong policy of legal compression of their normative profile, economic impoverishment and loss of social status.[28]

Considering journalists as immaterial labor workers puts what is happening in newsrooms in perspective. Journalists belong to those professionals, like academics, researchers, other media professionals and artists whose professional profiles, labor content and skills are re-shaped by new media, digital culture, and ICTs. While an increasing part of the working population is joining these professionals in doing immaterial labor (public servants, services workers and so on), it becomes a priority for post-modern economic systems to break their power and reorganize all the sectors on a transnational scale (as that is the scale on which the industry operates in terms of financing and ownership) as a huge, horizontal working class sector.

Beyond the cult of amateurs

We do not share the approach advanced by Andrew Keen, already mentioned, who sees audiences as news producers like amateurs and criticizes them for doing this. We see his argument primarily serving as a self-defense elaborated by one of the professionals who are already on the way of decline. Keen's analysis, however, has several thoughts that are sharable. As news produced outside of a salaried and otherwise professionally sanctioned context, news production by bloggers, independent news websites owners and so on is an activity supplied during the spare time, after the work day, and on the basis of voluntary engagement. This type of activity can be configured as an affective activity - done when

one can and wants, for the period one decides, in the way one decides. Of course, not being regulated by a waged work relationship which establishes duties and rights, this activity has boundaries, meanings and purposes which may be not standard. News provided in this framework might reach a very high quality, might be a bulwark of the truth and so on, but it has also many limits. Second, this unwaged newswork is a journalism that might work well locally, but, generally not being based on a financial investment, does not guarantee the structural production of news from abroad or from faraway (while we recognize the successes of individual entrepreneurs and traveling reporters served by donations). The problem is not to choose between amateur and professional journalism, because they are both necessary in the current world of information. They represent polarities of power, of different interests, but they are obliged to negotiate a new type of relationship between them, in which the power is less asymmetrically divided or aligned.

This widespread behavior to provide unpaid labor has been exported in many industrial sectors from the domestic sphere, where reproductive labor (making children, reconstructing the energy of labor forces, cleaning the house, cook, taking care of family members and so on) has traditionally been supplied by unpaid subjects (mainly women)[29]. But how to interpret this behavior? One could argue it represents a kind of rebellion against the current capitalistic system, based on the salaried social relationship. This system has in recent decades increasingly been experienced directly by women entering the creative industries workforce and generally finding it hostile to inclusivity and diversity concerns, unfair regarding salarization (as female media professionals get paid significantly less than their male colleagues of equal rank and standing). From this point of view, unwaged work escapes from the formal and informal rules imposed at the socio-economic level, but in a way in which it pays all the prices of rebellion. In its final outcome –unpaid news labor - it summons the freedom to frame the news in an autonomous way at the cost of serving to the survival of media groups.

Pareto's principle and the web

The debate on the online production of news by audiences and on the real or perceived participation of people in the (or a) public sphere can be analyzed in the light of Pareto's

principle[30]. According to Pareto's principle, 80% of effects come from the top 20% of sources and conversely the remaining 20% of effects come from the lower 80% of sources. This means that not only online production follows this principle, also online consumption is readable inside the framework of Pareto's principle. It was Clay Shirky who in 2003 noted that few blogs had many links going into them, while "the long tail" of millions of blogs had only few links going into them. This "long tail'"concept was further developed by Chris Anderson who in October 2004 published in *Wired* magazine an article describing the effects of the long tail on current and future business models. [31]

Although this proportion is variable and generally does not follow the 80-20 rule neatly, what remains valid is that the majority of the effects come from a minority of sources. If we look at what happens on the web, it emerges that probably both production and consumption follows Pareto's principle. Research by web observers tends to show that this principle describes with sufficient approximation online production and participation. In fact, if we compare lurkers (those who simply surf, watch and go back)[32] with those who do not limit themselves to watch but actively contribute something such as posting a message in a forum or actively participating in a mailing list and so on, very probably we risk to find the same proportion. The proportion 80 20 has been corrected as regards the contemporary online content by Jakob Nielsen who termed this inequal participation as the "90-9-1" rule: "in most online communities, 90% of users are lurkers who never contribute, 9% of users contribute a little, and 1% of users account for almost all the action."[33] Overall, then, one can conclude that fairly straightforward power laws determine online (as well as offline) levels of participation.

Coming back to news production and consumption, it emerges that people online do not consume, as Mattew Hindman shows[34], what they have produced as bloggers or forumers, but what corporate media groups (online newspapers, only mainstream news websites, and so on) produce and offer as news. The dichotomy between news production and consumption must be taken always into account when we talk about prosumers, the famous word launched almost 30 years ago by Alvin Toffler[35], since this term risks to be misleading.

The long tail offers to various suppliers opportunities to introduce news in the niche category and this encourages the diversification and pluriformity of news. Amongst the hundreds of millions of bloggers worldwide, there are several who have a link authority superior to that of the majority of online newspapers. These niche news platforms open opportunities for suppliers while concomitantly satisfying the demands of many individuals.

Is there a long tail for news?

To what extent is Pareto's principle and its subsequent correction applicable to online news or is it better instead to recur to the long tail approach? In a 2006 working paper titled "Goodbye Pareto Principle, Hello Long Tail", Erik Brynjolfsson, Yu (Jeffrey) Hu and Duncan Simester found that the internet, by lowering search, distribution and inventory costs, could increase the share of hard-to-find products and create a longer tail in the distribution of sales.[36] They found that a significant amount of Amazon.com's sales come from obscure books, and that products with a low sales volume can collectively make up a market share that competes and sometimes exceeds that of bestsellers. In other words, the total volume of low popularity items exceeds the volume of high popularity items. Anderson has explained the term Long Tail as a potential market in which people that purchase a large number of "non-hit" items are the demographic group called the Long Tail, and has referred it to the tail of a demand curve.

If we look at the Long Tail from the producers' side, it seems that it has made possible a spreading and development of creativity across all fields of human endeavour. But when there is not a market relationship and regulation between users and consumers as in the case of the unpaid labour of producing news, does the Long Tail, as it is described by Chris Anderson, work? And if yes, in which terms? We argue that the Long Tail works also in the case of online news produced in the tail where the costs of production and distribution are low, since the immaterial labour done by millions of bloggers is apparently for free. In reality, there is another form of payment that might be as much motivating as the money: reputation and visibility. If we measure a product in terms of the quantity of attention that it attracts, reputation and visibility can be then converted in many other things: contracts, an occupation, public and so on. Given the diminishing

cost of communication and information sharing and the reduction in search costs and given the indirect gains that can derive to long-tailed news producers and users, this activity will gain importance for businesses. On their part journalists, in following a long-tailed news production strategy, can use the model to tap into a large section of the people formerly known as the audience that is in the low-intensity area of the distribution. It is their collaboration and aggregated work that results in an informative effort. News communities formed by large groups of prosumers can perform rapidly the process of verification of, sharing, and diffusing information. Let us apply to the news sector the analysis that Von Hippel applies in his book *Democratizing Innovation* where he defines the user-led innovation model. As information becomes more user-centered it needs to flow freely, in a more democratic way, potentially creating a "rich intellectual commons" and "attacking a major structure of the social division of labor", thus empowering journalists operating outside the boundaries of the traditional waged working environment.

News and social networks

The thing that is more in crisis in the journalistic world is the most important commodity they produce: the identity and the essence of news. Nietzsche's reflections on the need to be untimely are like ghosts in the history of news.[37] News until the last two decades has been the result of a system which unilaterally decided what could become a news (gate-keeping, most memorably reflected in the New York Times tagline: "All The News That's Fit To Print", implying that the journalists of the newspaper can and should be the sole arbiters of what indeed is fitting). Given that media have always been part of the power system, in the tradition of news there has always been a concern about legitimating power (and being part of the powerful), to use a Weberian expression, and a certain level smugness towards it. This for example is reflected in the way the informal hierarchy of the profession is organized around its most celebrated practitioners: those closest to (political) power, such as White House correspondents in the US and parliamentary specialist reporters elsewhere.

It has always been as if the news were produced, framed and addressed to power, but with the secondary, although important aim, to leave people outside to consume it. The

relevant point was that people could not understand current affairs but instead should have a certain version and interpretation of what happened, which essentially served to occult reality. News thus acted to construct a specific kind of reality – but never a reality subject to consensus, as Luhmann would argue.

The only thing to which people could aspire was to buy news without being able to intervene in any other way than as consumers. The big power consisted in the fact that the mass was huge enough to make media a lot of money, but fragmented enough to not becoming able to build a power as consumers, separated inside it, one from the other. The big novelty of the last two decades has been not only user-generated content, the coming to light of prosumers, but also the advent of *networked audiences,* so of audiences which are not necessarily separated anymore, but can be (and often are) connected.

The advent of networked publics[38] represents an important development in the framework of media systems, since it is a public(s) which can overcome fragmentation and isolation inside it, and interconnect in a variety of ways. This element increases the power of audiences because it increases their possibility to speak with each other. Social networks are the ideal tool to develop an informed, "informational" (using Schudson's phrase), as well as informing audience, and to develop a bottom-up public opinion formation process. Of course these are processes which are in their infancy.

Beyond these crucial considerations lies another aspect that has not yet been stressed up to now and which instead is very important: a shift in the register of news. Up to now we are used to get mainly written information in print and online newspapers or multimodal information in TV and audio information in radio. But this division of the different linguistic registers is currently subjected to a restructuring towards new forms of convergent, crossmedia, or multimedia (i.e. transmedia and cross-media) storytelling. We are passing from a culture of written online to a culture of multimodal web coupled with read/write (instead of read-only) media literacies. This shift too inevitably will influence the culture of news, both online and offline.

Conclusion

Hierarchies, both within the profession of journalism as well as between journalism and its audiences are flattening. Employers in the news industry turn their organizations into "shell" or "zombie" institutions: alive with production, but dead with (waged) producers. The work that journalists do has become immaterial, and must be seen in conjunction with the "free labor" of news and information-producing "networked publics," suggesting the emergence of a "long tail" for news. Amplified by trends online, a journalism without journalists is, in a traditional sense, a source of concern indeed. However, when seen through the critical lens of journalisms' cosy relationship with society's elite institutions (including itself) and the potential of re-engagement with a self-organizing and self-producing citizenry, perhaps a journalism without journalists is exactly what we need.

Endnotes

[1] See URL: http://journalism.nyu.edu/pubzone/weblogs/pressthink/2006/06/27/ppl_frmr.html

[2] See Dan Gillmor's (2004) "*We the media*" at URL: http://www.authorama.com/book/we-the-media.html

[3] See Lawrence Lessig's (2004) book "Free culture" at URL: http://free-culture.cc/

[4] Clay Shirky (2008) Here Comes Everybody. The Power of Organizing without Organizations. New York: Penguin Press.

[5] Leopoldina Fortunati, Lilia Raycheva, Halliki Harro-Loit, John O' Sullivan, (2005) Online News Interactivity in Four European Countries: a Pre-Political Dimension. Comparing Practices in Bulgaria, Estonia, Ireland and Italy. In Pere Masip and Josep Rom (eds.) *Digital Utopia in The Media: from Discourses to Facts. A Balance*, Barcelona: Blanquerna Tecnologia I Serveis, vol. 1, pp.417-430;

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[6] Mark Deuze, Axel Bruns, Christoph Neuberger (2007). Preparing for an Age of Participatory News. In: *Journalism Practice* 1(4), pp.322-338.

[7] We refer here to the 2007 extensive report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on what they call the "Participative Web", available in PDF at URL: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/14/38393115.pdf.

[8] David Edwards & David Cromwell (2006) The Myth Of The Liberal Media. London: Pluto Books.

[9] On this cf. Bateson, Gregory, Jackson, Donald D., Haley, Jay & Weakland, John, 1956, *Toward a theory of schizophrenia.* (in: 'Behavioral Science', vol.1, 251-264) and Bateson, Gregory (1972). *Steps to an Ecology of Mind: Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution, and Epistemology*. University Of Chicago Press.

[10] Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, translation of *Les mots et les choses* (New York: Vintage Books, 1973); cf. also *Microphysique du pouvoir*, edited with an introduction by Donald F. Bouchard; and *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*,translated by Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977).

[11] Mark Deuze (2005). What is Journalism? Professional Identity and Ideology of Journalists Reconsidered. In: *Journalism Theory Practice & Criticism* 6(4), pp.443-465.

[12] See an earlier version of this argument: Mark Deuze (2009). The People Formerly Known As The Employers. In: *Journalism Theory Practice & Criticism* 10(3), pp.315-318.

[13] See for example a cross-national study investigating the working conditions for journalists in several European countries one of the authors conducted with Jan Bierhoff and Claes de Vreese in 2000, titled "*Media innovation, professional debate and media training: a European analysis*", available at URL: http://www.ejc.nl/pdf/pub/mi.pdf.

[14] The full ILO report is available at URL: http://www.ifj.org/pdfs/ILOReport070606.pdf.

[15] The term is used in an overview story on the topic of outsourcing in the news industry by Doreen Carvajal at the *International Herald Tribune* of November 20, 2006, see URL: http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/11/19/business/outsource.php.

[16] Agostini, Angelo (2004) Giornalismi. Media e giornalisti in Italia [Journalisms. Media and Journalists in Italy]. Bologna: Il Mulino.

[17] See for example: Michael Bromley (1997) The end of journalism? Changes in workplace practices in the press and broadcasting in the 1990s. In Bromley, Michael, O'Malley, Tom (eds.), *A journalism reader*. London: Routledge; Gall, Gregor (2000), 'New technology, the labour process and employment relations in the provincial newspaper industry', New Technology, Work and Employment 15, 2, 94-107.

[18] See for the situation in the US and Canada: Catherine McKercher (2002), Newsworkers unite: labor, convergence and North American newspapers, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

[19] Terranova, Tiziana (2000) Free labor: producing culture for the digital economy. *Social Text* 18(2), pp.33-57. URL: http://www.uoc.edu/in3/hermeneia/sala_de_lectura/t_terranova_free_labor.htm.

[20] See Lev Manovich (2001) *The Language of New Media*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT.

[24] Cf the notion of committed intellectual formulated by Jean-Paul Sartre in his book Critique de la raison dialectique (Gallimard: Paris, 1960) or the notion of organic intellectual proposed by Antonio Gramsci in the book Quaderni del carcere, edited by Valentino Gerratana**,** 4 voll**.** Torino: Einaudi, 1975.

[25] For this argument in the US, see for example: Schudson, Michael (1978). *Discovering the news: a social history of American newspapers*. New York: Basic Books.

[26] Kees Brants and Hetty van Kempen (2002), The ambivalent watchdog: the changing culture of political journalism and its effects, in: Raymond Kuhn, Erik Neveu (eds.), Political Journalism: New Challenges, New Practices, pp. 168-186. London: Routledge.

[27] Henry Jenkins (2006) *Convergence culture. where old and new media collide*. New York: New York University Press.

[28]Andrew Keen (2008) *The Cult of the Amateur*. London: Nicholas Breadley Publishing.

[29]One of the authors (Fortunati) discussed this theme with more detail in a number of papers, published in open access-journals such as *First Monday* (http://firstmonday.org/issues/special11_9/fortunati/index.html) and *Ephemera. Theory & Politics in Organization*, (http://www.ephemeraweb.org/journal/7-1/7-1fortunati.pdf)

[30]Cf Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000) *Empire*. Cambridge, Massachusetts**:** Harvard University Press; Lazzarato, Maurizio (1997) *Lavoro immateriale* [Immaterial labor]. Verona: Ombre corte.

[31]Mark Deuze (2007), *Media work*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

[32] See Arlie Hochschild, (1983) The Managed Heart: The Commercialization of Human Feeling, Berkely and Los Angeles, University of California Press.

[34] Chris Anderson later developed this analysis in the book *The Long Tail: Why the Future of Business is Selling Less of More.* New York: Hyperion Books, 2006.

[36] Sally Wyatt, Graham Thomas, Tiziana Terranova (2002) They came, they surfed, they went back to the beach: Conceptualizing use and non-use of the Internet. In Steve Woolgar (ed.)Virtual Society?: Technology, Cyberbole, Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[37] Quote from Jakob Nielsen (October 9, 2006), Participation Inequality: Encouraging More Users to Contribute. URL: http://www.useit.com/alertbox/participation_inequality.html.

[33]Mattew Hindman (2008) The Myth of Digital Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

[35]See Alvin Toffler (1980) The Third Wave. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc.

[38] This paper "Goodbye Pareto Principle, Hello Long Tail: " by Erik Brynjolfsson, Yu (Jeffrey) Hu and Duncan Simester in *Social Science Research Network*, November 2007, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=953587

[39] Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm (1987) Untimely Meditations, edited by Daniel Breazeale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[40] See: http://networkedpublics.org.