ASPECTS
OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
IN
AFRICA

Mark W. DeLancey
Editor
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authors</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Study of African International Relations</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark W. DeLancey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependence or Interdependence: Africa in the Global Political Economy</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timothy M. Shaw and M. Catharine Newbury</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Relations in Southern Africa and the Global Political Economy</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ken W. Grundy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Quest for East African Unity: 'One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward'</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Gus Liebenow</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Origins of Boundary Conflict in Africa</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Barron Boyd, Jr.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The AFRICA Project and the Comparative Study of African Foreign Policy</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick J. McGowan and Thomas H. Johnson</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Several respondents to a 1975 survey on the teaching of African politics courses in U.S. and Canadian colleges and universities complained of various deficiencies in the reading materials available for their students. One of these complaints concerned the lack of a set of essays on the international politics of Africa; this book attempts to answer that complaint.

Each of these essays was written specifically for this book, and thus each was specifically designed for instructional purposes. We sought to provide a variety of viewpoints and methodological orientations as well as essays on a variety of subjects. Our organizing principle was the needs of a course on African politics, not a particular philosophical or methodological stance. Two of the essays contain discussions of the methodology by which the research was conducted and the data was analyzed. We hope that this will serve in a small way to assist students in bridging the gap between courses in methodology and area studies.

The preparation of this volume has taken somewhat longer than intended, due largely to the editor's two-year research and teaching visit to Nigeria and Cameroon in the middle of the process. Some of the essays were originally planned and written in 1975, but all have undergone revision in 1978.

I wish to thank Dr. Richard Walker, Director of the Institute of International Studies at the University of South Carolina, and Virginia DeLancey, the former for the provision of financial support and the latter for the provision of moral support.

Mark W. DeLancey
Columbia, South Carolina
December, 1978
J. Barron Boyd, Jr. is Assistant Professor and Chairperson of the Department of Political Science at Le Moyne College. His most recent publications include a chapter on southern African regional foreign policy in Cooperation and Conflict in Southern Africa, and an article, "International Studies and the Black Africa Handbook Data", in International Studies Notes. His major research interests are in southern African politics and African international relations.

Mark W. DeLancey is Associate Professor in the Department of Government and International Studies at the University of South Carolina and Associate Director of the International Studies Association. He has conducted research in Cameroon and Nigeria and is currently doing an analysis of Nigerian foreign policy. Recent publications include articles in the Journal of Modern African Studies, the Journal of Developing Areas, and Rural Africana.

Kenneth W. Grundy is Professor of Political Science at Case Western Reserve University. His books include Guerrilla Struggle in Africa (1971) and Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa (1973). He is also co-author of The Ideologies of Violence (1974). He is currently working on a study of the racial component of the South African armed forces.

Thomas H. Johnson (M.A. University of Southern California, 1976) is a doctorial candidate and lecturer in the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California. His areas of specialization include African international relations, peace research, and internation theory and methodology. His current research involves the analysis of competing models of the international and domestic effects of political-economic interdependence among developed and developing countries.

J. Gus Liebenow is Professor of Political Science at Indiana University and a founder and past President of the African Studies Association. He has been concerned with such topics as political and social modernization, and the structure of dependency relationships.
His publications include *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania and Liberia, the Evolution of Privilege*.

Patrick J. McGowan is an Associate Professor of International Relations and Political Science at The University of Southern California, where he has taught since 1974. His current research interests are in international political economy and African regional subsystems. He is co-editor of *The Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies*. Among his most recent publications are articles in *The Journal of Modern African Studies* (March 1976) and *International Organization* (Winter 1978) on international dependence in Africa.

M. Catharine Newbury is currently Visiting Assistant Professor of Government at Wesleyan University. Her research in Rwanda (1970-71) and among the Havu and Tembo of eastern Zaire (1973-75) focused on local level political change and internal aspects of dependency. She has published in *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines* and *Africa*.

Timothy M. Shaw is currently visiting Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University of Ottawa on secondment from Dalhousie University where he recently served as Director of the Centre for African Studies. Dr. Shaw specializes in the foreign policy and political economy of African states. He is author of *Dependence and Underdevelopment: The Development and Foreign Politics of Zambia* (1976) and, with Douglas G. Anglin, *Zambia's Foreign Policy: Studies in Diplomacy and Dependence* (1978). He is co-editor, with Kenneth A. Heard, of *Cooperation and Conflict in Southern Africa* (1976) and *The Politics of Africa: Dependence and Development* (1978).
Exciting and explosive events have taken place on the African continent in recent years. The internationalization of the struggle for the freedom of black people in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, the approaching success of the movement to break South West Africa/Namibia from the colonial rule of the Republic of South Africa, and the first visit to black Africa of the President of the United States are among the many happenings in the latter part of the 1970s that have attracted our attention as citizens and scholars to Africa's participation in international politics. The purpose of this essay is to introduce some of the major topics and trends in the study of the international relations of sub-Saharan Africa and to provide a brief survey of the most recent English-language publications on the subject. References to books, articles and other materials published in earlier years and in other languages may be found in the various bibliographies listed under each of the subject headings below. For more general discussions refer to Mark W. DeLancey "Current Studies in African International Relations," (1976)* and the very useful work by W.A.E. Skurnik, Sub-Saharan Africa: A Guide to Information Services (1977). This volume contains six chapters on major topics in African international politics. Each chapter begins with a "substantive introduction" or essay and is completed with a bibliography. Author, title and subject indexes are included. The beginner in African courses should refer to the excellent and very useful volume, Student Africanist Handbook (1974) by Gerald W. Hartwig and William M. O'Barr. This provides an introduction to Africa and brief bibliographies for each discipline and each African state.

There are several sources which are useful for keeping up with current publications. Africana Journal, published quarterly, contains bibliographic essays, book reviews and lists of new books on Africa. These lists are divided into subjects, such as economic development and politics, and countries. A Current Bibliography on African Affairs, published in Washington, D.C., contains research articles as well as bibliographic essays. Its lists of publications include journal articles and books. Materials published in Africa

*Full references to each item are contained in the bibliography at the end of this essay.
have not received sufficient attention in most of the bibliographic sources. However, The African Book Publishing Record, published quarterly in Oxford, England, now provides reliable coverage of all items published on the continent. In each issue there are thirty to forty book reviews and a lengthy bibliographic list.

There are several general studies on African international politics that provide a broad background. The volumes edited by Y. Tandon, Readings in African International Relations (1972 and 1974) contain numerous previously published articles. Ali A. Mazrui and H. H. Patel, eds., Africa in World Affairs: The Next Thirty Years (1973), includes fifteen essays published for the first time. Mazrui, a prolific writer on all aspects of African politics, has recently published Africa's International Relations: The Diplomacy of Dependency and Change (1977). A massive compilation of articles is contained in the annual production, Colin Legum, ed., Africa Contemporary Record. The contributions are all new material and they provide the best analysis of current events available. Reporting of current events is done most fully by the two monthly editions of Africa Research, Ltd (Economic and Political). D. H. Morrison, et al., Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook (1972) is a well-organized collection of statistics. These data are available on tape for use in computers. Adda B. Bozeman, Conflict in Africa: Concepts and Realities (1976) is an attempt to apply a "national character" analysis to the continent. Bozeman argues that there is a single African political culture or character and that the African conception of conflict is substantially different from that of Europeans. She concludes that this difference will cause difficulties between African and European statesmen.

Major Problems in African International Relations

A recent study of the ways in which African international politics is taught in Canadian and U.S. colleges and universities [Mark W. DeLancey, Teaching the International Relations of Africa (1975)] indicated that there was little general agreement among instructors about the way in which such courses should be organized. Some teachers used what we might call a "problem-oriented approach;" their courses were built upon analysis of selected problems in African international relations. Such topics might include, for examples, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, the various conflicts in the Horn of Africa, boundary disputes and refugees.

Rhodesia/Zimbabwe: The conflict in this territory was once viewed as a
domestic conflict between black and white people in a system where whites controlled most political and economic power. Today, the view is much more complex as many western and eastern powers have begun to provide moral and material support and as the black population has become divided, with some joining the white population in opposition to other members of the black population. The situation is made even more complex with the involvement of numerous transnational, non-state organizations such as church groups.

The domestic background to the present situation has been analyzed in several recent works including Larry W. Bowman, Politics in Rhodesia: White Power in an African State (1973); B. V. Mtshali, Rhodesia: Background to Conflict (1967); and Patrick O'Meara, Rhodesia: Racial Conflict or Co-existence (1975). Mtshali's contribution is an historical analysis and Bowman's book is a study of the major white political organization, the Rhodesian Front. O'Meara's volume, a comprehensive analysis, is the most up-to-date.

Since the white Unilateral Declaration of Independence (U.D.I.) in 1965, numerous means to bring full independence to all the people of this territory have been proposed and tried. The legal colonial power, Great Britain, has attempted negotiations and economic sanctions, but she has not used any military pressure. Robert C. Good, UDI: The International Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion (1973) provides analysis of the earlier years of negotiations. The author was at one time U.S. ambassador to Zambia. S. Wilmer, "Ten Years of Vain Negotiations," (1972) argues that nothing has been gained for the African population through these negotiations. Also see Marion E. Doro, "A Bibliographical Essay on the November 1971 Rhodesian Settlement Proposals," (1973).

Negotiations without pressure on the white government would never lead to change; Great Britain requested that the United Nations impose economic sanctions on Rhodesia in an effort to exert such pressure. The value of such sanctions has been the subject of much discussion, but certainly a final assessment cannot be made until the resolution of the conflict. G. V. Stephenson, "The Impact of International Economic Sanctions on the Internal Viability of Rhodesia," (1975) argues that sanctions have not altered the white government's policies. Yet the recently expressed desire of that government that sanctions should end suggests that some serious pressure does result. M. Doxey, "International Sanctions: A Framework for Analysis with Special Reference to the UN and Southern Africa," (1972); Leonard T. Kapungu, The United Nations and Economic Sanctions against Rhodesia (1973); M. Stephen, "Natural Justice at the United Nations: The
Rhodesia Case," (1973); Michael Williams and Michael Parsonage, "Britain and Rhodesia: The Economic Background to Sanctions," (1973); and Ralph Zacklin, The United Nations and Rhodesia: A Study in International Law (1974) provide a full background and a variety of viewpoints. The majority of authors argue that sanctions are ineffective and inappropriate, even that they are illegal. However, positive views are presented in Francis Nehwati, "Economic Sanctions against Rhodesia" (1973) and Guy Arnold, "Rhodesia: Increasing the Effectiveness of Sanctions" (1973).


South West Africa/Namibia: This territory, once a German colony, has been treated by the Republic of South Africa as if it were an integral part of South Africa. In legal terms, however, it has passed from the jurisdiction of the League of Nations, when it was a South African mandate territory, to the United Nations. South Africa refused to recognize the United Nation's rights in the area and extended her policy of apartheid to the territory. This has aroused international concern and a variety of tactics have been used in efforts to dislodge the Republic from South West Africa (or Namibia as it is called by the U.N. and African nationalists). One line of attack has been through the International Court of Justice in order to have the South African presence declared illegal. See Natalie K. Hevener, "The 1971 South-West African Opinion—A New International Juridical Philosophy," (1975); A. U. Obozuwa, The Namibian Question: Legal and Political Aspects (1973); I. Sagay, The Legal Aspects of the Namibia Dispute (1975); and Solomon Slonim, South West Africa and the United Nations: An International Mandate in Dispute (1973). The failure of the Court to reach a binding decision led to an increase of activity within the United Nations in opposition to South Africa. S. C. Saxena, "Namibia and the United Nations," (1975) discusses this activity and its effects. That the role of the great powers acting independently of the Court or the U.N. is of more importance than the actions of those two organizations in forcing the Republic to change its policies is suggested by developments since 1976.

The Republic of South Africa/Azania: Central to the political problems
of the southern third of Africa is the Republic of South Africa, a country in which the black majority remains under the domination of a wealthy white minority. In terms of military power, economic development and international concern, the Republic is the focal point of the region. The white government's policy of apartheid, separate development or whatever euphemism is currently being used for its policy of racial domination and divide and rule, is the key element in the conflict. Two new books provide detailed analysis of the history and development as well as the current status of the domestic political situation; see Gwendolyn Carter and Patrick O'Meara, *Southern Africa in Crisis* (1978) and Ian Robertson, ed., *Race and Politics in South Africa* (1977). Also refer to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Southern Africa: The Escalation of a Conflict* (1976). A more complete historical background will be found in Gideon S. Were, *A History of South Africa* (1974).

The foreign policy of the Republic is discussed in James Barber, *South Africa's Foreign Policy, 1945-1970* (1973) and Sam C. Nolutshungu, *South Africa in Africa: A Study of Ideology and Foreign Policy* (1975). The latter volume is a study of the Republic's attempts to woo the black-rulled states of Africa, especially her immediate neighbors. Also on this subject are a large number of essays, for examples refer to D. Hirschmann, "Southern Africa: Detente?" (1976); C. Legum, "Southern Africa: The Politics of Detente" (1976) and Vorster's Gamble for Africa (1976); and Agrippah T. Mugomba, "The Rise and Fall of 'Pax Suid Afrika': Historical Analysis of South Africa's Black African Foreign Policy" (1975). South African views are expressed in two articles by J. Barrat, "Detente in Southern Africa," (1975) and "Southern Africa: A South African View" (1976) and one by D. P. de Villiers, "Southern Africa and the Future" (1975). The latter item was published in the journal *South Africa International* which seems both in appearance and subject matter to be modeled after the U.S. journal *Foreign Affairs*. South Africa has made several attempts to open ties with African states. Listeners to the international broadcast of Radio South Africa receive the strong impression that South Africa intends to become a major power throughout the continent. Commercial investments, financial and technical aid, and surplus food are all promised to potentially friendly states. South Africa wishes to be in Africa what the United States wishes to be in Latin America. This role of continental or sub-continental leader is put in theoretical terms in much of the "dependency" literature, discussed below, and in the various articles using the sub-system concept. Examples of the latter include Larry W. Bowman, "The Subordinate State System of Southern Africa" (1968); Richard Dale, "President Sir Seretse
Khama, Botswana's Foreign Policy, and the Southern African Subordinate State System" (1976); Tim Shaw, "Southern Africa: Co-operation and Conflict in an International Sub-System," (1974); and T. M. Shaw and Kenneth A Heard, Co-operation and Conflict in Southern Africa: Papers on a Regional Subsystem (1976). The limits to South Africa's peaceful intentions in developing her regional role are analyzed in two essays describing her invasions of Angola: Robin Hallet, "The South African Intervention in Angola, 1975-76" (1978) and J. Barratt, The Angolan Conflict (1976). "Racism and Fascism in the Southern Atlantic" (1978), written by Sirgio Sierra, a member of the Communist Party of Uruguay, discusses the growing links between South Africa and fascist dictatorships in Latin America. At least as sinister are the implications suggested by Zdenek Cervenka and Barbara Rogers, The Nuclear Axis: Nuclear Collaboration between West Germany and South Africa (1977). It is now generally accepted that the Republic is capable of producing nuclear weapons. What is not yet clear is the role of Germany, the U.S.A. and other western countries in assisting the Republic in attaining that capability.

Three outstanding books analyze aspects of the international campaign to overthrow the racist regime of South Africa. Richard E. Lapchick, The Politics of Race and International Sport: The Case of South Africa (1975) describes the international campaign to isolate South Africa from all aspects of international athletics. This might be compared with Richard Thompson, Retreat from Apartheid: New Zealand's Sporting Contacts with South Africa (1976). Richard E. Bissell, Apartheid and International Organizations (1977) analyzes the campaign against apartheid in the United Nations and concludes that, although there has been much talk and numerous resolutions have been passed, the pressure exerted through the U.N. has had little effect on South Africa's policies. A much more optimistic view is expressed in George W. Shepherd, Jr., Anti-Apartheid: Transnational Conflict and Western Policy in the Liberation of South Africa (1977), an examination of the role of private international organizations (or "transnationals") in the campaign.

Further references may be found in Mark W. DeLancey, "The International Relations of Southern Africa: A Review of Recent Studies" (1976) and chapter 5 of Skurnik (1977).

The Indian Ocean and the Horn of Africa: Much of the discussion about southern African issues is involved in the larger debate over U.S. and western strategic interests in Africa, especially in respect of the important Cape, Indian Ocean and Red Sea maritime routes. With the decline in influence of the old European colonial powers - especially Britain, France, Belgium and Portugal -
some observers have argued that the United States must in some way "fill the vacuum" or replace in some manner the departing major powers in the area. Coupled with this is the suggestion that the Soviet Union is moving quickly to fill that vacuum and that they may preempt (or may have preempted) the western powers. Tom J. Farer, War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: A Crisis for Detente (1976); Michael A. Samuels, ed., The Horn of Africa (1978); and Peter Schwab, "Cold War on the Horn of Africa" (1978) provide a variety of viewpoints on the implications of the situation. C.A. Crocker, "The African Dimension of Indian Ocean Policy" (1976) argues that the U.S.A. had been complacent about events in this region until the Angolan civil war; the U.S.A. now seems to be becoming more competitive. M. Bezboruah, US Strategy in the Indian Ocean (1977) suggests that the Americans have inflamed competition in the area because of their exaggerated fears of Soviet expansionism. Geoffrey Jukes, The Indian Ocean in Soviet Naval Policy (1972) agrees. Also see J.B. Bell, "Strategic Implications of the Soviet Presence in Somalia" (1975). A Tanzanian diplomat expresses an African view in A.D. Hassan, "Big Power Rivalry in Indian Ocean" (1976).

Boundary Disputes and Refugees: When you look at a map of today's Africa you are seeing a collection of states the boundaries of which were mainly drawn by Europeans, to serve European purposes, on the basis of European power politics. Very little concern for African interests or needs was included in the process. As discussed in detail in the essay by Barron Boyd in this book, many analysts have suggested that the artificial nature of these boundaries, their lack of congruence with African political, economic and cultural realities, would lead to numerous cases of interstate conflict in Africa. R.L. Kapil, "On the Conflict Potential of Inherited Boundaries in Africa" (1966) establishes several useful categories of boundaries. Kapil then relates each type of boundary to its conflict potential. A.O. Chukwura, "Organization of African Unity and African Territorial and Boundary Problems, 1963-1973" (1975) describes the role of the major continental international organization in the boundary dispute problem. Two volumes are devoted to this problem: Saadia Touval, The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa (1972) and Carl G. Widstrand, ed., African Boundary Problems (1969). The latter volume is one of several that have resulted from annual conferences at the Scandanavian Institute of African Studies. Another volume in the same series, Zdenek Cervenka, ed., Land-Locked Countries of Africa (1973), is also relevant to this topic. Because of the unusual manner in which colonial boundaries were determined and because these became the borders of independent Africa, there is an unusually high number of states in Africa that have no access to the sea.
Much of African history has been characterized by large-scale movements of people over the continent. Such movements continue today, in part as a response to natural disasters such as the Sahelian drought of recent years and in part as a result of man-made disasters such as wars, economic upheavals and political strife. A brief introduction to this topic is N. Rubin, "Africa and Refugees" (1974). P.E. Chartrand, "The Organization of African Unity and African Refugees: A Progress Report" (1975) describes the efforts of the O.A.U. to improve the living conditions of refugees residing in its member states. The role of the U.N. is discussed in the comprehensive study by Louise W. Holborn, Refugees; A Problem of our Time: The Work of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (1975). An earlier work, Hugh C. Brooks and Yassin El-Ayouty, eds., Refugees South of the Sahara: An African Dilemma (1970) contains several essays on various aspects of the topic.

Rhodesia, the Horn, refugees and the other problems discussed in this section are only a few of the many situations of importance to the recent history of African international relations. T.A. Marks, "Spanish Sahara: Background to Conflict," (1976) discusses another. However, those considered in this section are the most important, both in terms of their significance to African politics and in terms of their significance to the published literature on African politics.

The Foreign Policies of African States

A major topic in any course on African international relations is the foreign policies of African states. Research and publication in this topic can be divided into two categories: studies pertaining to one state (case studies) and studies pertaining to several states (comparative studies).

Olajide Aluko, ed., The Foreign Policies of African States (1977) attempts to bridge the gap between case and comparative study. The volume contains analyses of the foreign policies of eleven states — Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia and Zaire — written by ten authors. But, the editor has also written a comparative essay drawing on the eleven cases as data.

Case Studies: Nigeria, with its large population, relatively broad resource base and large army, is one of the major powers on the continent. Although this state played a passive role in the early years of its independence, it has come to play an active leadership role in continental affairs, especially since the conclusion of its civil war. As a result of its position in African affairs and as a result of the relatively large number of Nigerian academics, there are

Zambia is another state that has received considerable attention from scholars. Her location as a land-locked state, partially surrounded by white-dominated regimes, and her border position between the eastern and southern African groupings of states are the causes of this attention. President Kuanda has made definite efforts to pull his country away from the influence and domination of the Republic of South Africa. For this move he is cheered by some writers but condemned for half measures by others. Two major books are available: Richard Hall, *The High Price of Principles: Kaunda and the White South* (1973) and Jan Pettman, *Zambia: Security and Conflict* (1974). The Pettman volume contains an extensive bibliography. Timothy Shaw, one of the contributors in this collection of essays, has conducted research on Zambia's foreign policy. In his "The Foreign Policy System of Zambia" (1976) he examines the processes whereby Zambian policy decisions are made. In "The Foreign Policy of Zambia: Ideology and Interests" (1976) he discusses the relationships between the national ideology of humanism and the content of Zambia's foreign policy. His comprehensive essay, "Dependence and Underdevelopment: The Development and Foreign Policies of Zambia" (1976) relates Zambian policies to the dependent position that country occupies in the international economic system. Shaw has also contributed an essay on Zambia to the volume edited by Aluko (1977). The essays by Shaw might be compared with the views expressed in Marion Bone, "The Foreign Policy of Zambia" (1973). Also see B. V. Mtshali, "The Zambian Foreign Service, 1964-1972" (1975) and Seidman and Seidman (1978).

Zambia's attempts to break away from South African domination might be compared to Malawi's policy of accommodation with her white neighbor as discussed...


Comparative Studies: These studies draw upon the experiences of more than one state in deriving conclusions. Most of the comparative studies listed here use statistics or "quantification" in making more explicit the comparisons and relationships they discuss. However, as is clearly shown in the following excellent essays, quantification is not necessary for good comparative studies: T. M. Shaw, "Discontinuities and Inequalities in African International Relations" and P. Wallensteen, "Dealing with the Devil: Five African States and South Africa" (1975). Shaw argues that Africa has become a continent of unequal actors and that the myth of equal states is now untenable. Wallensteen compares Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi and Zambia and their relationships with South Africa. Also see the excellent essay V.B. Khapoya, "Determinants of African Support for African Liberation Movements: A Comparative Analysis" (1976).

Patrick J. McGowan is one of the leading proponents and practitioners of the comparative study of foreign policy. His essay in this book presents his argument in favor of the comparative method and describes the quantitative data set, an "events" data set, that he has developed for this purpose. Barron Boyd's essay in this volume uses that data set. Further research based on this data is presented in P. J. McGowan and K. P. Gottwald. "Small State Foreign Policies: A Comparative Study of Participation, Conflict, and Political and Economic Dependence in Black Africa" (1975). R. Vengroff, "Neo-colonialism and Policy Outputs in Africa" (1975) tests the hypothesis that decision making in African governments
is circumscribed by foreign economic domination (neocolonialism). He finds that military and foreign policies are subject to external control and concludes that economic development and political independence are unobtainable goals for African states.

Two comparative, quantitative studies are concerned with the hypothesis that domestic instability is related to foreign policy behavior, but both find little support for the relationship: S.A. Gitelson, "Why Do Small States Break Diplomatic Relations with Outside Powers? Lessons from the African Experience" (1974) and R. Vengroff, "Instability and Foreign Policy Behavior: Black Africa in the UN" (1976). However, Raymond W. Copson, "Foreign Policy Conflict among African States, 1964-1969" (1973), finds that such a relationship exists. His study uses an events data set, although not the set developed by McGowan. These results should be compared with those of J.N. Collins, "Foreign Conflict Behavior and Domestic Disorder in Africa" (1973) and Copson's later essay, "African International Politics: Underdevelopment and Conflict in the Seventies" (1978).


Middle East Relations: The Middle East conflict has had ramifications throughout the African continent and there has been active competition between Israel and the Arab states for African diplomatic support. Z. Cervenka, "The Emergence and Significance of the African-Arab Solidarity" (1974) suggests that 1973 marks a major turning point in this competition. The Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.) came out in favor of the Arabs and many African states followed suit. The history of these changing relations is outlined in J.C. Miller, "African-Israeli Relations: Impact on Continental Unity" (1975). Two studies have relied on analysis of African votes at the United Nations to measure changes in African policies. Samuel Decalo, "Africa and the UN Anti-Zionism Resolution: Roots and Causes" (1976) and R. Kochan, S.A. Gitelson and E. Dubec, "Black African UN Voting Behavior on the Middle East Conflict" (1975) both argue that no simple, unicausal explanation of the African policy shift is satisfactory. V. J. Belfiglio, "Israeli Foreign Aid Programs to Africa" (1976) claims that there is a single cause for this change; he argues that Arab petrodollars have bought the Africans. Also see Michael
Curtis and Susan A. Gitelson, *Israel in the Third World* (1976) and E.P. Skinner, "African States and Israel: Uneasy Relations in a World of Crises" (1975). The author of the last piece is a scholar who has served as U.S. ambassador to Upper Volta.

Ali A. Mazrui, "Black Africa and the Arabs" (1975) is an outstanding essay on the relationships between the Arab world and black Africa. He states:

Black Africa and the Arab world have been linked by a fluctuating pattern of economic and cultural connections for at least 12 centuries. In the secular field the Arabs have up to this time played two major roles in black Africa: first as accomplices in African enslavement, and then in the twentieth century as allies in African liberation. In the past several years they have built this alliance into a comprehensive political partnership, aimed at maintaining a solid front, particularly with regard to the Middle East and Southern Africa. The critical question for the future is whether the Arabs will also become partners in African development. (p. 725).


**International Organization and Integration:** There are at least three aspects of international organization which are of great importance to the study of African foreign policy. First, for many African states, especially the smaller and poorer states, a very large proportion of foreign policy activity is carried out at the United Nations and, to a lesser extent, the O.A.U. Second, the O.A.U. plays an increasingly important role in continental affairs and in the development of an African policy for relations with the outside world. And, third, Africa has been a major location of experimentation with regional functional and political unity through international organization.

states use the U.N. as their major foreign policy instrument. Also see Bissell (1977) for analysis of the anti-apartheid campaign waged by African states at the U.N. Vengroff (1976) and Kochan, Gitelson and Dubek (1975) are the latest of a large number of analyses of African voting in the U.N.


For further references, see B. David Meyers, "The Organization of African Unity: An Annotated Bibliography" (1974); Ronald K. Nagel, "Documentary Resources of the OAU" (1970); and Skurnik (1977), Chapter 1.

In addition to the organizations at the continental or near-continental level, there have been numerous attempts to build at a smaller or regional level, both in political and economic affairs. Some impression of the number, the functional variety and the political implications of these regional experiments can be gained with a glance at the four volume work by Louis B. Sohn, African Regional Organization: History, Literature and Basic Documents (1971). L. K. Mytelka, "A Genealogy of Francophone West and Equatorial African Regional Organizations" (1974) provides such an insight for the French-speaking states of the continent. This essay provides brief descriptions of several organizations, a substantial bibliography and an analysis of the problems that such organizations face with the national self-interest of member states and competition between the members. For further analysis of one of the organizations Mytelka considers, see W. A. Ndongko, "Trade and Development Aspects of the Central African Customs and Economic Union" (1975).
The various institutions formed by three East African states - Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda - have been subjected to more thorough analysis than any of the other regional groupings of Africa. As described by J. Gus Liebenow in his essay in this book, these states have had a long period of involvement in and an usually diverse variety of regional institutions. For some years East Africa was viewed as progressing toward political as well as functional integration. Recent events have greatly disappointed observers. In addition to Liebenow's article, see Susan A. Gitelson, "Can the United Nations Be an Effective Catalyst for Regional Integration? The Case of the East African Community" (1973); F. I. Nixson, Economic Integration and Industrial Location: An East African Case Study (1973); and I. Sharkansky and D. L. Doresang, "International Assistance: Its Variety, Coordination, and Impact among Public Corporations in Kenya and the East African Community" (1974).

In the last few years, attention and hopes have focused on West Africa where the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has formed largely under the leadership of Nigeria. However, ECOWAS is so young that no research on it has been published. Description and commentary may be found in numerous notes in West Africa and other current events journals covering African events. Some background information is located in G. C. Abangwu, "Systems Approach to Regional Integration in West Africa" (1975) and Adebayo Adedeji, "Prospects of Regional Economic Co-operation in West Africa" (1970).

Many analysts studying regional integration use transactions between the states being considered as a measure of integration or disintegration. In the African case such measures are often difficult to use because of the lack of reliable statistics on legitimate transactions and the very large number of illegitimate transactions. For one aspect of the former problem refer to N. Sudarkasa, "Commercial Migration in West Africa, with Special Reference to the Yoruba in Ghana" (1974-1975). Suggestive of the importance of the latter problem is J. D. Collins, "The Clandestine Movement of Groundnuts across the Niger-Nigeria Boundary" (1976).

Underlying the activities of the O.A.U. and of the various regional organizations is a widely discussed philosophy of African unity, a belief that in some way at some time the numerous states of Africa must give up some or all of their sovereign prerogatives so that they work together from a position of strength. This plea for united action is put forth in Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite (1963). Colin Legum, Pan-Africanism (1965) is the best history of the development of this
philosophy. Also see Adekunle Ajala, *Pan-Africanism: Evolution, Progress and Prospects* (1973) and P.O. Esedebe, "What is Pan-Africanism?" (1977). Nkrumah's book is a politician's call to his people to take action, but R. H. Green and Ann Seidman, scholars influenced by Nkrumah, present the intellectual case to support that call in their important book, *Unity or Poverty? The Economics of Pan-Africanism* (1968).

Further references to this subject are found in Alice Hoover, "Pan-Africanism: A Selective Bibliography" (1971) and "Pan-Africanism, Unity, and Foreign Policy," chapter 1 of Skurnik (1977).

**The European Economic Community:** A major focus of interaction for an African state is its relations with the former colonial power. A special aspect of this has been the question of the appropriate relationship for an African state with the European Economic Community (E.E.C.). In the view of some politicians and scholars, association between an African state and the E.E.C. is valuable to the African Country because it will increase trade, aid and overall economic development. For others, however, such association is seen as injurious to the African state because it continues African dependence upon the European powers and, therefore, maintains the present international division of labor - which keeps Africa at the bottom of the international economic hierarchy. Among recent scholarly essays on this question are Adeoye Akinsanya, "The European Common Market and Africa" (1976); E. C. Djamson, *The Dynamics of Euro-African Co-operation* (1976); J. Galtung, "The Lomé Convention and Neo-Capitalism" (1976); R. H. Green, "The Lomé Convention: Updated Dependence or Departure toward Collective Self-Reliance?" (1976); I. V. Gruhn, "The Lomé Convention: Inching towards Interdependence" (1976); H. Hveem and O. K. Holthe, "EEC and the Third World" (1972); and W. A. Ndongko, "From Economic Domination to Association: Africa in the EEC" (1976).

**Dependency Theory and Neocolonialism:** Some instructors teaching African international relations have abandoned the "problem-oriented approach" and have organized their course around some theoretical approach. One of the most popular of these has been the application of systems analysis to the international relations of regions of the world as discussed in I. William Zartman, *Africa as a Subordinate System in International Relations* (1967) and in his "Africa" (1976). Some scholars have begun to use dependency theory, borrowed to a large extent from the study of Latin American politics. The Grundy and Shaw essays in this volume rely heavily on this conception. A key essay in the introduction of dependency theory to the study of African international relations is "Dependence in an Interdependent World:
The Limited Possibilities of Transformation within the Capitalist World Economy" (1974) by Immanuel Wallerstein.

The dependency theme has been developed by a number of authors, but Tim Shaw has perhaps been the most prolific of these. His articles stress the important interplay between African international (and domestic) politics and the international economic order. He argues that all of the African states are linked in a dependent relationship to the large capitalist powers of the west. Some African states play an intermediate role in this relationship, being exploited by the western powers but exploiting, in turn, the smaller and weaker states surrounding them. This theme is developed in his "Kenya and South Africa: 'Subimperialist States'" (1977). Also see Ken Grundy, "Intermediary Power and Global Dependency: The Case of South Africa" (1976). Other authors have suggested Nigeria, Ivory Coast and even Zaire as players of this intermediate role.

Shaw (1975b) and Shaw, "The Political Economy of African International Relations" (1975) present a general overview of African dependency. The latter essay is the shorter discussion.

In T. M. Shaw and M. J. Grieve, "The Political Economy of Resources: Africa's Future in the Global Economy" (1978) the authors "analyze Africa's place in the global economy - paying particular attention to the impact of the environment on its development prospects - and [they] examine different projections of its future problems and opportunities." An interesting companion to this essay is Ronald Prain, "Metals and Africa: Economic Power in an International Setting" (1978) in which Africa's mineral wealth is analyzed, Africa's importance as a supplier of minerals to the world is assessed, and Africa's potential for political-economic influence is considered. Also see Leslie L. Rood, "Foreign Investment in African Development" (1978).


Dependency theory suggests that African underdevelopment is a result of the structure of the world economy. This is related to the African and third world demand that there be a new international economic order. Zdenek Cervenka, "Africa and the New International Economic Order" (1976) and J. P. Renninger, "After the Seventh Special General Assembly Session: Africa and the New Emerging World Order" (1976) discuss this demand. I. W. Zartman, "Europe and Africa: Decolonization
or Dependency" (1976) in a highly controversial article argues that decoloni-
ization is a slow process, but a process that is making important progress.
African countries are not trapped in a permanent state of dependency; they are
working their way out.

The Africa Policies of European, American
and Asian States

For most of the period since African states gained their independence,
countries such as the United States and the Soviet Union have not been partic-
ularly active in the development of Africa foreign policies. Britain, France
and Belgium -- the ex-colonial powers -- were thought to be the states with the
greatest interest in the continent and were, therefore, the states with well-
developed Africa policies. The cold war encountered Africa only in a peripheral
way. But have times now changed? Viet Nam is over and the Americans are seek-
ing new outlets for their energies. The Portuguese have given up their wars in
Angola and Mozambique and U.D.I. in Rhodesia is floundering; all of southern
Africa is in a state of change. There has been a sudden realization in the U.S.A.
that African minerals are important to her economy. And, it appears that the
Soviets and their allies have become more interested in African affairs. Now
we find many states developing policies for Africa.

The United States: Recent comprehensive works on U.S. Africa policy in-
clude four books: Frederick S. Arkhurst, ed., U.S. Policy toward Africa (1975);
Edward W. Chester, Clash of Titans: Africa and U.S. Foreign Policy (1973);
Russell Warren Howe, Along the Afric Shore: An Historic Review of Two Centuries
of US - African Relations (1975); and P. William Yarborough, Trial in Africa:
The Failure of U.S. Policy (1976). Strong attacks are made on U.S. policy either
because it is too weak and is allowing the Soviets to dominate the continent or
because it is too supportive of American commercial interests and thus is involved
in American domination of the continent. See Stewart Smith, U.S. Neocolonialism in
Africa (1975) and M. Gurtov, "Kennedy and Africa" (1974) for expressions of the
latter view. American policy is bitterly attacked by the Nigerian writer Chinweizu
in his The West and the Rest of Us (1975).

Relations between the U.S. and specific African states are considered by a
number of scholars. The bulk of such attention has centered on American policy
toward the Republic of South Africa. American investments in that state are considered
to be supportive of apartheid in Dean McHenry, United States Firms in South Africa (1975); Ruth First, Jonathan Steele and Christabel Gurney, The South Africa Connection: Western Investment in Apartheid (1973); and Ann Seidman and Neva Seidman, South Africa and U.S. Multinational Corporations (1978).


The U.S. involvement in the Angolan Civil War has been subjected to much study, partly because that involvement was ill-advised and a failure but partly because it marked the beginning of a new era in U.S. policy, an era of more active participation in Africa. Colin Legum and Tony Hodges, After Angola: The War over Southern Africa (1976); Hodges, "The Struggle for Angola: How the World Powers Entered a War in Africa" (1976); and Legum, "The Soviet Union, China and the West in Southern Africa" (1976) analyze the complicated interplay of American, Soviet, Chinese and South African interests in the Angolan War. The U.S. involvement is further analyzed in Ernest Harsch and Tony Thomas, Angola: The Hidden History of Washington's War (1976); M. A. El-Khawas, "American Involvement in Portuguese Africa: The Legacy of the Nixon Years" (1975); and J. A. Marcum, "Lessons of Angola" (1976). A controversial best-seller, John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story (1978), is a discussion by one of the participants of the C.I.A. role in the American involvement in Angola. The Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs at that time was Nathaniel Davis. He presents his insights in "The Angola Decision: A Personal Memoir" (1978).


American foreign policy is often described as being highly influenced by domestic ethnic groups, as for example with respect to Israel. The biggest ethnic group in
the country is its black population, yet until recently this group has played only a minor role as an influence on policy-making. Three works describe and attempt to explain recent changes in that role: M. D. Morris, "Black Americans and the Foreign Policy Process: The Case of Africa" (1972); Abdul Aziz Said, ed., Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy (1977); and R. Wilkins, "What Africa Means to Blacks" (1974). The USSR: Have the Soviets decided to make major investments of their time and energy in Africa? Do they wish to dominate the area and move it into their sphere of interest? Do they wish to convert Africa to Communism? Or do they see Africa as an opportunity to cause great disarray in the western bloc at a low cost to themselves? Or are they simply a benevolent people who are willing to offer their assistance without strings or ulterior motives to those in need? Such questions, written perhaps in a more sophisticated manner, underlie much of the analysis and description of Soviet policy for Africa.

Edward Wilson, Russia and Black Africa before World War II (1973) presents clear evidence that Russian and Soviet interest in the continent has existed for many years. The most complete analysis for the present era is Christopher Stevens, The Soviet Union and Black Africa (1976). Stevens discusses political, economic and military relations between 1953 and 1972. He gives special attention to bilateral relations with Guinea, Mali, Kenya, Ghana and Nigeria. For the Soviet view, refer to I. D. Ovsgany, A Study of Soviet Foreign Policy (1975), especially Chapter III, "The Soviet Union and the Developing States." A distinctly different view, that of a Soviet plot to dominate Africa, is presented in Jan A. du Plessis, "The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy towards Africa" (1974); A. Z. Rubinstein, "The Soviet Union's Imperial Game in Africa" (1977); and Walter F. Hahn and Alvin J. Cottrell, Soviet Shadow over Africa (1976). The first two items appear in South African publications; South Africa stresses the communist threat to Africa in an effort to maintain western support for South African domestic and international policies. This argument is vividly stated in G. Poser, "Soviet Sea Power, Southern Africa and World Equilibrium" (1976).

As in the case of the U.S.A., the Angolan Civil War marks an apparent change in Soviet policy. C. Stevens, "The Soviet Union and Angola" (1976) considers Soviet participation in the Angolan War as a benchmark in the history of Soviet African policy. For further analysis see Legum (1976), Hodges (1976); and Legum and Hodges (1976). William E. Griffith, "Soviet Policy in Africa and Latin America: The Cuban Connection" (1975) argues that Soviet success in Angola may suggest further Soviet successes in southern Africa, but it does not suggest overall success in third world ventures for them.
Nigerian-Soviet relations have received attention, especially by Nigerian authors: O. Aluko, "Nigeria and the Superpowers" (1976); O. J. B. Ojo, "Nigeria-Soviet Relations" (1976); O. Igho Natufe, "Nigeria and Soviet Attitudes to African Military Regimes, 1965-1970" (1976); and Ogunbadejo (1976). In his most recent essay, "Ideology and Pragmatism: The Soviet Role in Nigeria, 1960-1977," (1978) Ogunbadejo describes post-Stalinist Soviet policy as "pragmatic" as opposed to its previous doctrinaire rigidity. It was this pragmatic character that opened the way for Soviet involvement in the Nigerian civil war.


Although most of the literature is concerned with Soviet political relations, there are additional studies of economic relations. Warren Weinstein, ed., Chinese and Soviet Aid to Africa (1975) and U.S., Central Intelligence Agency, Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World (1976) present useful data and comparative analyses. The broader view of Soviet economic policies can be found in several of the essays in Roger E. Kanet and Donna Bahry, eds., Soviet Economic and Political Relations with the Developing World (1975).

Most of the references mentioned above conclude that the Soviet Union is behaving like any other great world power in its African policy. For the most recent analyses see the articles by D. E. Albright and Colin Legum in the January 1978 issue of Problems of Communism. The Albright essay, "Soviet Policy," describes the "priorities, general approach, objectives and operating style that have shaped Soviet policy in the recent period." Legum, "The African Environment" analyzes changes in African attitudes toward the U.S.S.R. in recent years.

The People's Republic of China: As suggested by Robert Legvold, "Soviet and Chinese Influence in Africa" (1976) there is at least as much competition between the Soviets and the Chinese as between the Soviets and the Americans. Indeed, in recent years there has been a marked correlation between American and Chinese goals and tactics in offsetting the growth of Soviet influence in Africa. George T. Yu, "China's Impact" (1978) "examines the nature of Sino-Soviet rivalry on the continent and its implications for Soviet-African relations." Also relevant is George Ginsburgs, "The Soviet View of Chinese Influence in Africa and Latin America" (1976).

There are several comprehensive studies of China's policy. Among these are

Although China has formal and informal relationships with many African states, her attention has focused on Tanzania. George T. Yu, *China's African Policy: A Study of Tanzania* (1975) is the most complete study of this unusually firm bilateral relationship. The major symbol of this friendship, the important Tanzara Railroad between the Tanzanian coast and Zambia, is considered in Richard Hall, *The Great Uhuru Railway: China's Showpiece in Africa* (1976). A thorough description of Chinese foreign aid projects is available in Wolfgang Bartke, *China's Economic Aid* (1975). This catalog of Chinese aid includes forty-six country surveys.

Other Powers: There is surprisingly little recent publication in English about the Africa policies of either the former colonial powers - Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal and Spain - or of other non-major powers.


W. A. Ajibola, "The British Parliament and Foreign-Policy Making: A Case Study of Britain's Policy toward the Nigerian Civil War" (1974) is more a study of the British foreign policy process than it is a study of British Africa policy. K. Maxey, "Labour and the Rhodesian Situation" (1976) analyzes Harold Wilson's decision to take only weak action when Rhodesian whites declared independence.

Other ex-colonial powers are discussed in E. de Sousa Ferreira, *Portugal and her Former African Colonies: Prospects For a Neo-colonial Relationship* (1975);

R. O. Matthews, "Canada's Relations with Africa" (1975) reviews the history of Canadian policy since 1945. Matthews and D. G. Anglin have published several articles in the past ten years analyzing Canadian Africa policies. Brazil, a state with trade ties to Africa as well as ties as a Portuguese-speaking state and a major recipient of slaves in an earlier period, is thought by some observers to view Africa as a potential area for the expansion of Brazilian influence. Aspects of this are discussed in W. A. Selcher, "Brazilian Relations with Portuguese Africa in the Context of the Elusive 'Luso-Brazilian Community'" (1976). Selcher points out the difficulty that is caused by Brazil's friendship with South Africa. There is also a growing relationship between Nigeria and Brazil, but this has as yet not been analyzed in any scholarly work.

Other non-colonial powers are considered in R. A. Higgot, "Rhetoric and Reality: Australia's African Relations under Labour" (1976); Richard Thompson (1976); and Dieter Bielenstein, ed., Perspectives in Afro-German Relations (1975).

This essay has reviewed only a small proportion of the published items available for the study of African politics. We have limited ourselves to recent publications in the English language. Yet, even with these limitations, certain generalizations can be made. To a large extent, the literature is descriptive and prescriptive. It tells us what things do look like or what they should look like. But, very few publications are analytical. Too, very few studies are comparative; the majority of publications are based upon single case studies.

There is also a wide variety of subjects that have not received very much consideration. For examples, we know very little about the way in which foreign policies are formulated in African states. And, we have little knowledge about the foreign policy attitudes of either the African elites or the masses. Too, there has been only very limited research on the linkages between domestic and international politics in Africa. And, there is only a limited amount of publication on the South Africa policies of African states. Some data on the rhetoric of such policies is easily obtainable, but with the exception of a few studies of the "front-line" states, little has been done on the reality of such policies.

These are only a few of the weaknesses and lacunae in the scholarly production on African international relations. But one can clearly see that there remains much research, debate and writing to be done.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Drucker, P. F. "Multinationals and Developing Countries: Myths and Realities." Foreign Affairs, 53, 1, October 1974, 121-134.


_____. "African-Arab Solidarity: The Emergence of a New Alliance." Current Bibliography on African Affairs, 8, 2, 1975, 134-145.

_____. "American Involvement in Portuguese Africa: The Legacy of the Nixon Years." Ufahamu, 6, 1, 1975, 117-130, tabl.


Wilkins, R. "What Africa Means to Blacks." Foreign Policy, 15, Summer 1974, 130-142.


____. "Europe and Africa: Decolonization or Dependency?" Foreign Affairs, 54, 2, January 1976, 325-343.
DEPENDENCE OR INTERDEPENDENCE: AFRICA IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

Timothy M. Shaw, Dalhousie University
M. Catharine Newbury, Wesleyan University

The international relations and foreign policies of African states are becoming more complex and controversial. Their complexity relates to increases in the number of actors and issues in contemporary world politics and the diversity of interests that emerge as societies develop. The controversy arises from different definitions of international politics and foreign relations and from contrasting perspectives on the nature of national independence. Through attempting to describe and explain such complexities and controversies, this chapter will examine Africa's place in world politics and in the global political economy.

The complexity of Africa's participation in international affairs is twofold. Firstly, African states have to deal with a much longer agenda of issues and a wider set of actors than have existed before. Indeed, Africa and other Third World states have contributed to both of these phenomena: world politics is now concerned with questions of development and inequality as well as with war and peace; world politics now includes a vast range of actors--national and international, transnational and regional. These phenomena are, of course, interrelated: new states have drawn attention to their own problems and perspectives and have proceeded to create new institutions and forums in which to present them. They have insisted that their dominant concerns are economic and political rather than strategic or ideological; for them, exchange rather than war is "high politics." Africa constitutes a majority of the new states and a third of the votes in the United Nations (UN) system; it has advanced demands from the poor for a new and more equitable world order. The international system, then, has become more diverse both in terms of actors and issues because of Africa's participation.

The second aspect of the new complexity is internal, within African countries, and relates to the making of foreign policy. The response of African states to world politics involves a range of interests and institutions, both national and continental. As Africa develops, so its social structure becomes more complex; the unity of the nationalist period is
yielding to more specialized and stratified societies in which ethnicity and race, region and religion, education and profession produce a variety of institutions and interests. The making of foreign policy is rarely open in any state, but despite its exclusiveness, it is usually subject to some pressures. In Africa, foreign policy is no longer the preserve of presidents; rather, a range of ministries, parastatals and interest groups affect external relations. Outside pressures are also ingredients in foreign policy-making; such external relations and demands are particularly salient for new, weak and poor countries.  

Foreign policy is a response to world politics; but no state can exclude external interests in its own decision-making. Moreover, any expression of the "national" interest involves bargaining among several domestic actors. So both the internal and international aspects of contemporary world politics are complex. However, the complexities should not divert attention from a few basic relationships, especially the balance between internal and external forces. The linkages between these are important in understanding Africa's international position. The analysis of independence, interdependence and dependence--of the proportion of domestic and foreign factors--raises questions of perceptions and controversy. These are unavoidable in any effort to explain behavior, particularly when issues of national security and development are involved. Nevertheless, in an attempt to go beyond description alone, we turn first to the nature of formal independence in Africa. This is a fundamental point in the analysis of African foreign policies; a degree of autonomy and power are essential in responding to international relations, especially if a state seeks to change its external environment.

**Political Economy of Independence**

Two very different perspectives have been identified and used through which to examine and explain Africa's position in world politics: the dependency and the decolonization approaches. The latter view emphasizes change rather than continuity, choices rather than constraints, symbols instead of structures, and ideals not economics; it is based on the premise that formal independence leads to real power to act in the international system. By contrast, the more critical dependence approach suggests that political and legal independence does not by itself produce a new political economy; it indicates instead that
internal underdevelopment and external dependence have been perpetuated despite any appearances to the contrary. The decolonization perspective implies that the foreign policies of African states are true reflections of their new national interests and that they are sufficiently independent to make their own decisions. But the dependence approach suggests that given Africa's subordinate place in the international hierarchy, its foreign policies are largely determined by external forces and tend to advance such interests. Decolonization implies, then, an evolution towards a new pattern of relations between Africa and the powers; dependency, however, suggests that given established inequalities any reduction in inequality is unlikely. These two distinct modes of analysis have profound implications for the way we see African foreign policy choices and for the assumptions with which African statesmen face the world.

The contradictions suggested by these two approaches may be resolved in part by making distinctions between policy and practice and by recognizing several different issue areas and levels of interaction. Firstly, Africa's ideologies of nationalism and PanAfricanism, non-alignment and self-reliance are responses to its inheritance of dependence and underdevelopment. If we examine only rhetoric and declarations, then Africa would indeed seem to enjoy the fruits of independence. If, however, we also analyze its external economic and strategic relations, a rather different and much less autonomous image emerges. This relates to the second point, that of issue areas. African states display all the trappings of independence in the diplomatic issue area--they establish overseas missions, participate in the UN, and bring pressure to bear through the Third World coalition. Yet in the economic, strategic and social spheres they are dependent and even penetrated; they are characteristically vulnerable to external economic fluctuations, strategic demands and social changes. So Africa's apparent political decolonization may be contrasted with its dependence in other issue areas, particularly those that involve the great powers.

African states interact at several levels--with their neighbors, in the continental system, and in the wider world system. Within Africa there appears to be a greater degree of equality and autonomy among actors than in the global system. In the latter, inequalities and asymmetries are substantial, with African states being concentrated at the lower end of the hierarchy. This
international dependence stands in contrast to continental interdependence. In addition to its established geographic and racial identity, Africa has its own regional organization and law, but it continues to be dependent on economic and military exchange with the world political economy. So although Africa has recaptured its political independence, its autonomy is still limited by continued dependence on external trade and investment, skills and technology, arms and assistance. There is thus a basic discontinuity between continental diplomatic interdependence and global economic dependence. As the leading African student of continental affairs has observed, African diplomatic thought distinguishes between two forms of supranationalism: firstly, continental supranationality in politics and, secondly, global supranationality in economics.6

Although the primary actor in the African international system is still the state, the number of non-state actors has increased rapidly since independence. These now cover a range of issues and functions and collectively create the potential for greater African autonomy, particularly if duplicative extra-African links are reduced. The most influential African organizations are economic or political in function, one indication of the imperatives of development and control. They are concentrated at the continental level, but the most-developed organizations exist at the subcontinental, regional level. There are some thirty continental organizations in the OAU/Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) system, including the African Development Bank and Fund, the Association of African Central Banks, the Association of African Airways, and the Inter-African Coffee Organization, and another seventy concerned with social issues, such as the All-African Conference of Churches, the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa, the Association of African Universities, and the All-Africa Trade Union Federation. A complex set of relations exists among this range of actors: that is, between the UN, its specialized agencies, the OAU, regional organizations in Africa, and African States. They exchange support proposals and are attempting to define their respective roles in order to increase their mutual compatibility.

In addition to interstate organizations there are also important transnational institutions on the continent. In pre-colonial Africa, traders, missionaries, and explorers affected international relations; in colonial Africa, metropolitan administrations and companies were dominant; and in contemporary Africa, a rich variety of transnational actors, from multinational
corporations to professional associations, are active in the continental system. So the mixed-actor system is not new to Africa; its diversity and complexity, however, have evolved over time. Thus the structure of the African international system has developed from a limited number of essentially bilateral relations into a complex web of bilateral and multilateral ties. Relations between traditional African nations were direct, limited, and bilateral. In the interregnum of the colonial period they became more formal, extensive, and multilateral. In contemporary Africa they are frequent, extensive, informal, and multilateral, involving both state and other actors. The impact of the latter on African development is ambiguous; some advance and some erode African unity and autonomy.

African norms have developed parallel to these institutional changes. Traditional rulers were concerned with their sovereignty in the face of external threats. Colonialism confronted African values and stimulated the development of nationalism and PanAfricanism. Independent Africa has created PanAfrican institutions and norms which combine traditional values with contemporary imperatives. African regional law is especially concerned with the protection of national sovereignty, mediation of disputes, treatment of refugees, and liberation of the continent. The international personality of African states was tenuous until the achievement of independence, but nonetheless existed in precolonial times; it is now unquestioned in world politics, although in the future it may have an increasing number of faces.

International relations in Africa have always been largely intergovernmental; they have involved national elites, located in major urban areas. They continue to be mainly 'official' and to involve few people other than political and administrative cadres, although institutions such as the Black Cultural Festivals, All-Africa Games, and All-Africa Trade Fairs may widen the interaction of some individual Africans with each other. The cause of African unity is now being championed by a multiplicity of regional and continental organizations. Their goals, however, are essentially conservative in that they serve to support, not erode, national sovereignty. For example, the OAU tends to advance the interests of regimes. It has recognized neither secessions nor changes in colonial borders; it regulates inter-state relations, but does not necessarily advance the interests of the African people.

The OAU system does, however, express Africa's racial identity in world
politics and encourages the intra-African resolution of disputes. PanAfricanism is expressed in the notions of "we are all Africans" and "try Africa first." Africa is still ambivalent about the acceptability of global norms and institutions; whilst it uses its voting strength at the United Nations to make demands on the international system, at the same time it has attempted to increase its continental jurisdiction over African affairs. It seeks support and assistance from the United Nations system; but it also encourages the peaceful settlement of local disputes through continental institutions rather than in the Security Council.

The OAU has helped to normalize relations after border, internal, or ideological disputes, but has insufficient authority to remove the causes of tensions. Consensus is reflected in the encouragement of "good neighborliness" among a variety of African states, but the OAU has been permissive about coups and domestic violence in Africa.

The in formality of the African state system stands in contrast to both imperial relations and contemporary world politics. Diplomatic initiatives or disputes are often the responsibility of influential leaders in Africa; their policies or agreements are later recognized and legitimized by the OAU, which has only a small secretariat and budget. The OAU system can bring about rapprochement, but is incapable of mounting sustained peacekeeping operations. Its approach to consensus and conciliation revives pre-colonial attitudes of compromise and coexistence. To date, however, regional and continental initiatives for cooperation in the economic and strategic issue areas have been less successful than those concerning less salient diplomatic or cultural questions.

The independence of African states has been, then, limited by relationships of both dependence and interdependence. Despite the characteristic adoption of policies of African socialism and self-reliance, these nations are still dependent on foreign trade and capital, external support and materiel. They are also increasingly interdependent in the African system, as reflected by participation in regional and continental organizations and, through collective diplomacy, in world politics. African states respond to these two types of constraint in distinctive ways; economic dependence is generally resented as a form of neocolonialism whereas diplomatic interdependence is encouraged as an expression of PanAfricanism. Most regimes accept interdependence but reject dependence, at least at the level of ideology. However, the continuation
of the dependence of African states—in practice and policy—affects progress towards interdependence on the continent.

Dependence has begun to be modified by some countries through diversifying production and partners and by adopting the "parastatal strategy" of partial state ownership. On a continental scale, African dependence on external trade and capital is being challenged by the development of intra-African exchange and by the collective bargaining strategies adopted by African states in multilateral institutions such as the European Economic Community (EEC) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The characteristic "vertical" pattern of trade and communications between African states and Europe is being supplemented and modified by the development of a "horizontal" continental exchange and infrastructure. For example, the ECA, in association with regional organizations, is advancing intra-African trade and communications through a variety of projects, such as the trans-Africa and trans-Sahara highways, the Tanzania-Zambia railway, and the Pan-African Telecommunications Network.

The creation of a continental diplomatic and economic infrastructure is a prerequisite for greater African independence. However, the infrastructure is still incomplete; moreover, its potential has been grasped by only a few leaders. The continuation and modification of Africa's dependence is symbolized by the evolution from "indirect rule" to "informal penetration." Colonial administrators, traders and missionaries may have been concerned not to disrupt established polities unduly. But external intrusion nonetheless changed the basis of the power of indigenous rulers. Similarly, Africa's continuing dependence on foreign exchange and capital perpetuates subordination and limits choice. Foreign entrepreneurs, diplomats, and experts may attempt to limit their impact on "national" decision-making and planning but in fact they have a profound effect on African societies. The choice of collaboration or confrontation is a continuing one in Africa, with important results for the development of the continent. African regimes have always been astute in adapting to external opposition and opportunities. Indeed, contemporary African leaders sometimes justify their strategies of confrontation and collaboration by reference to pre-colonial behavior. They selectively adopt or discard myths to legitimize their policies and control. But myths of equality both within and between states have been hard to sustain under the interrelated pressures of external dependence and internal underdevelopment.
Internal and International Inequalities

Ideals of sovereignty and unity in Africa are based on the assumption that its states are equal. Yet the resources and rates of growth among African countries continue to diverge. Moreover, formal independence tended to exacerbate latent internal inequalities as a few indigenous groups took control of the state apparatus. To date, Africa has been preoccupied by establishing national control and extending independence throughout the continent. In the future, however, the maldistribution of power and affluence both between and within states is likely to become a dominant issue. This tendency will be reinforced by trends in the global political economy towards scarcities of, and high prices for, raw materials and towards a redistribution of wealth internationally.13

Indeed, Africa may be returning to relations of realpolitik reminiscent of precolonial international politics. The bases of power continue to include qualities of leadership and ideology as well as possession of military and mineral resources. But in a world system characterized by shortages and inflation only a few African states are likely to achieve significant economic growth. The bases of such growth are either control over strategic products or acting as the center of regional integration; or both, given the relationship between national power and regional hegemony. Personal political leadership such as Presidents Nkrumah and Nyerere or ex-Emperor Haile Selassie achieved will continue to realize influence, but the impact of their states will tend to decline compared with the power of countries like Nigeria,14 Zaire, Algeria, Zambia and Angola. This group of states is likely to achieve continental dominance because each of them possesses both minerals and the potential to be a regional center. Other states, like Gabon, Niger, Guinea, Libya and Botswana may have significant mineral resources, but their potential as leaders of a region is minimal. States such as Kenya, Ivory Coast and Senegal have few minerals, but do possess sufficient administrative and industrial potential to act as catalysts for regional cooperation. The other states of Africa are primarily producers of agricultural commodities, dependent on a few crops and a small number of markets. If the mineral exporters and regional leaders achieve continental superiority, then the majority of African states will be subordinate. Only South Africa (and to a lesser extent Zimbabwe [Rhodesia]) now possesses significant mineral, industrial and administrative capacities.
So African states can be usefully distinguished along several criteria, other than whether they are one- or multi-party states, civilian or military regimes, Christian or Moslem, Arab or Black. Relevant categories would seem to be national attributes, external dependence and (as we suggest below) degree of internal stratification or underdevelopment. National attributes include size of territory, population, and military, and whether they produce oil, minerals, or agricultural products. In terms of external dependence, the states of Africa can be compared by their commodity and trading partner concentrations; that is, according to how many primary products they export and to how many states. Such categorization would indicate that Africa includes states which are both middle or regional powers and which belong to either the Third or Fourth Worlds. Africa, the largest regional grouping in terms of size and numbers of members, also contains the most land-locked and least-developed states. Further, these tend to be the most dependent on a few exports to a few states and to be those most affected by the energy crisis; they will also be most vulnerable to drought and to the new politics of food. By contrast, Africa includes several exporters of oil (Libya, Algeria, Nigeria, Angola and Gabon) and of other "strategic" commodities such as copper (Zambia and Zaire), uranium (Niger, Gabon and South Africa) and phosphates (Morocco and Tunisia). Over time, the development prospect and achievements of these different groupings have diverged, leading to new continental inequalities.

The larger and more affluent states have been subject to most external diplomatic and corporate pressures to be "open" to investment and to a "sub-imperial" role. The paradox of this small group of emergent "middle" powers in Africa is that they themselves remain dependent on external markets or support. Although the propensity of extra-continental powers for direct or overt intervention has decreased, structures of dependence continue. The collaboration between major African states and the great powers is no longer a simple relationship of domination; the middle powers of Africa benefit from their local hegemonies along with the great powers. States like Zambia and Zaire, for instance, are now able to play influential roles in southern Africa. This is exemplified by the involvement of Zambia in negotiations towards independence in Mozambique and Zimbabwe and the role of Zaire in events in Angola as well as vice versa. But the maintenance of these regional roles is dependent on relationships with the consumers of copper
and with the corporations which invest in the mines, industries, and infrastructures of the states in question. Similarly, the capacity of Libya and Nigeria to extend aid to the Sahelian states is a function of the high price of oil and the ability of these two states to spend their new income on international assistance as well as on industrial projects.

The regional powers of Africa not only possess important mineral or entrepreneurial resources, they have also become diplomatic centers for both the African and the global systems; most headquarters or regional offices of African and global organizations are located in their capitals. Further, they tend to have larger domestic products, armies, and populations than most African states. They receive aid from a wide variety of sources, especially from the United States, and are host to the largest number of corporate subsidiaries. Conversely, their balance of trade is most dependent on regional exchange because they are the dominant economies in their regions. This set of characteristics reveals the intermediate position of dominant African states in the global hierarchy; but on the continent their influence is becoming pervasive. Their relative affluence and prospects stand in stark contrast to the poverty and depression of most of Africa.

Africa has always been peripheral in the global economy, its proportion of world trade remaining stable at about 4 percent. Its exports have increased by about 10 percent in the fifteen years since independence, but their direction remains predominantly towards Europe. Half the continent's export earnings come from two commodities—oil and copper; these along with coffee, cotton and cocoa account for more than 60 percent of Africa's income from exports. The origin of these two major exports is concentrated—Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, Zaire and Zambia receive over half the continent's foreign earnings and are thus able also to be Africa's leading importers of foreign capital and consumer goods. Moreover, most African states produce only one or two commodities for export (e.g., iron from Mauritania, sugar from Mauritius, oil from Libya and copper from Zambia) so their balances of trade and payments are extremely vulnerable.

Africa's oil exporters participate in the cartel activities of OPEC and OAPEC, with Libya having started the trend to state control over, and high prices for, oil products. However, Africa cannot by itself, even if it were more united, maintain a high price for most of its primary products; it contributes only small proportions to the world trade in major raw materials. In any case, the prospects for producer power in most primary commodities are
slight: only in tin and bauxite, manganese, phosphate and copper, tea, cocoa and coffee could effective "trade unions" of the Third World operate, and then political will is essential.\textsuperscript{19} Africa produces 1/5 of the world's copper and 1/4 of its coffee, so it would stand to gain from producer power in these commodities.\textsuperscript{20} However, its experience in absorbing the high price for oil, fertilizers and manufactures is sombre: whilst a few, already relatively advantaged, African states would benefit from cartel operations in such commodities, most would stand to lose from world inflation, recession and restructuring.\textsuperscript{21} Other important industrial raw materials over which Africa exerts some potential leverage include most of the globe's cobalt, diamonds and gold, 1/3 of the world's chromium and manganese ore, 1/5 of its phosphate and uranium and 1/10 of its iron ore. Its exports of primary products for consumer goods are less potent: 1/2 the world's palm oil and sisal, 1/4 of its groundnuts, and just 1/10 of its sugar, tea, cotton and maize.\textsuperscript{22}

Not only does Africa produce minimal proportions of many commodities, the production of most is concentrated in a few states. Moreover, many of the minerals are located in Southern Africa and are at present controlled by white regimes and/or multinational corporations. Natural resources as well as national attributes continue, then, to produce a continental hierarchy in Africa.

Africa's international inequality is unlikely to change for two reasons. Firstly, in an era of shortages and depletion there are insufficient resources to enable all states and peoples to achieve affluence; the ecological imperative means that many African countries will never develop unless substantial universal redistribution occurs: "within a capitalist world-economy, all states cannot 'develop' simultaneously by definition, since the system functions by virtue of having unequal core and peripheral regions."\textsuperscript{23} And, secondly, interstate inequalities are perpetuated by linkages among ruling classes which share common interests in maintaining their own power and affluence; the leaders of Africa's "middle powers" receive support from external associates who become more important to them than their own internal constituency.

The increase in inequalities within African states is related to their unequal status in the global hierarchy and to the collaborative role of their elites. Indeed, the dependence of states is perpetuated by the interdependence of elites. The cooperative relationship between local elites and the multinational corporation has been characterized as a form of transnational
politics in which conspicuous consumption and foreign management techniques are transferred to and adopted in the Third World. From this perspective, it appears that the common interests of the rich states and the rich in the poor states have produced a dominant transnational association; this has conceived, implemented and controlled the characteristic parasitite strategy in Africa to advance both corporate and indigenous interests. This "radical" transnational approach focuses on the mutual gains of an empathetic and symbiotic relationship between external and local interests in the periphery. States in Africa may be dependent, but given shared interests, foreign and domestic elites have entered into a relationship amongst themselves approaching that of interdependence.

The "symbiosis" of the African state and multinationals leads to mutual benefits--investments, patronage, corruption and style for the new elites and markets, security and influence for the multinationals. The latter are adaptable, but the future of such "neocolonialism" depends on the acceptability of the bargain arranged between domestic and foreign ruling elites. Revolution is unlikely in the near future, either in African internal or international politics. However, new parasitite agreements may modify the attractiveness of the arrangement for either partner. Over time the "balance of power" in the relationship may shift away from the colonial inheritance and towards a greater degree of African influence and direction, especially if national resources or markets are of especial value to any particular corporation.

The ability of national elites to extract more benefits from the transnational relationship may be crucial for their ability to repress, divert or co-opt internal opposition. Competition between national and corporate decision-makers takes place in the context of political demands within African states:

In peripheral areas of the world economy, however, the primary contradiction is not between two groups within a state each trying to gain control of that state structure, or to bend it. The primary contradiction is between the interests organized and located in the core countries and their local allies on the one hand, and the majority of the population on the other.

It is the tension between classes and other social groups within African states
that leads to unstable foreign policies; transnational elite linkages perpetuate African states' ambivalence as revealed in the expression of their "national interests."

Foreign Policy: National or Class Interests?

The foreign and development policies of African states can be best explained by examining the linkages between "internal" and "external" actors; it is through relations at this interface that the foreign policy, international status and political economy of each state are largely determined. Independence involved a change of the dramatis personae of each country; it did not of itself lead to the re-establishment of national control over the economy. However, by vesting formal responsibility for foreign policy in indigenous hands independence did create the potential for a successful assertion of economic and cultural nationalism. But any attempt by a poor state to confront an unequal world system alone is largely doomed unless it possesses significant resources or strategic position. Collectively, African and Third World demands for redistribution and greater economic independence have greater potential; yet the maintenance of such unity is problematic as First World actions tend to magnify diversities and inequalities within such coalitions. Moreover, in the first decade of independence most new ruling classes, especially in the more dependent countries, were able to rule only through collaboration with external interests; to disengage meant isolation, intimidation and obscurity--a situation that most first-generation nationalist leaders sought to avoid. Foreign associations also offered the prospects--if not the reality--of aid and capital, technology and skills, markets and money. Uhuru meant new demands on leaders for visible growth and continual patronage; the external estate helped to satisfy these initial demands.

The elusiveness of real economic and social independence has led to coup d'etats, military regimes and one-party states, all designed to maximize control over the state and to achieve political order. Increased coercion and control have become imperative because of the process of underdevelopment and the inability of the new state in Africa to contain that process. To overcome the dilemmas of dependence, the new class could intensify its established external relations or change both its development and foreign policies to transform its inherited political economy. But the incumbents in most
African states have opted for collaboration; only the few have chosen to alter their external linkages. Indeed, in most states there has been a retreat from, rather than confrontation with, the problems of development. The primary reason for this is that the new class

... is not a class which is development-oriented ... It forms either an expensive façade for a nation remaining basically stagnant and deprived, or a de facto intermediary for, ally of, and expense upon, continued foreign economic penetration and domination. These characteristics go a long way ... towards explaining the fragility of African political systems .... An elite which preaches austerity, efficiency, and development, but which practices luxury (for itself and its government) combined with inefficiency, and which produces very limited social or economic advances for the vast majority of the population--is inherently unlikely to maintain broad domestic backing.28

Most "political change" in Africa to date has been within the ruling elite and has not often led to a significant redefinition of the state's role in the global political economy. In order to understand this phenomenon, it is necessary to go beyond the orthodox distinctions--such as those made between civilian and military regimes, one- and multi-party states--and examine the nature of a state's external and internal linkages. This dependency approach assumes that the relationship between the ruling elite, the labor aristocracy and the peasantry is conditioned by the former's place in world politics; or, in other words, the extent to which the new class is a "comprador bourgeoisie" is of great significance for the character of the "internal" political economy. As Leys asserts, "in post-colonial societies in Africa there can be little doubt that the dominant class is still the foreign bourgeoisie."29 It is important, then, to investigate the salience of relations between external actors and the new class and the importance of an external "constituency" for the domestic political economy. Hence the centrality of international relations in the study of Africa.

A crucial distinguishing motif for the two dominant types of political economy today on the continent would seem to be whether they are "state capitalist" or "state socialist" regimes. Both types reflect the trend towards a concentration of power and affluence around state structures. However, there is clearly a difference between those states that presently encourage private capital (e.g., Egypt, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal) and those that now insist on community ownership (e.g., Angola, Algeria, Libya, Mozambique,
Somalia, Tanzania). In both sets of cases the state exerts an increasing monopoly over decision-making, but in the former control, income and status are redistributed to individuals whilst in the latter they flow to new institutions established by the state. This distinction between state capitalist and state socialist governments tends to reinforce the distinction between middle and other powers in Africa. For Africa's "great" powers are largely those that are most permissive towards western external actors. Indeed, there tends to be a high coincidence of interest between state capitalist governments and external states, entrepreneurs and corporations.  

Although independence has had a minimal and delayed impact on the political economy of African states, it has made the "national interest," as defined by the ruling class, a legitimate concern in the bargaining process between regimes and foreign actors. In general, it is true that "the independent governments of Africa are far more efficacious 'indirect rulers' than the obas and mwamis of the colonial era," but a few states have begun to change both their external associations and their internal structures. There are, however, important obstacles to such efforts, which help to explain the primacy of state capitalist rather than state socialist regimes. 

As dos Santos notes: 

... if dependence defines the internal situation and is structurally linked to it, a country cannot break out of it simply by isolating herself from external influences ... The only solution therefore would be to change its internal structure -- a course which necessarily leads to confrontation with the existing international structure. 

Some African states have attempted this transformation of established externalities and internal structures, often with a lack of success (e.g., Egypt, Ghana, Mali and Sudan under different governments). Only a few regimes have had sufficient longevity, innovativeness and support to undertake a sustained, longer-term reassessment of their inherent dependence and underdevelopment; but these experiments have produced various contradictions inherent in state socialism rather than any progress beyond in the direction of a more democratic, decentralized, "African" socialism (e.g., Algeria, Congo(B), Guinea, Somalia, Tanzania and now Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and possibly Angola and Ethiopia). Progress beyond state capitalism and socialism is, of course, problematic because the redistribution of benefits and opportunities threatens established interests and institutions. 

In imperial systems, colonies and their administrators were clearly subordinate
to the metropole. In "neocolonial" Africa, new states and leaders have limited choice and autonomy, and yet "we have no fully adequate theory of the 'neocolonial state,' its relation to international capitalism and domestic classes and its consequent role in the production process." If we are to begin to explain the underdevelopment of Africa, its characteristic state capitalist systems, and its continued reliance on foreign aid, capital technology and markets, then we clearly need to develop a comprehensive theory of the state in Africa. Essential to any such definition is an understanding of the nature of parastatal structures and the activities of multinational corporations. The political economy of parastatals and multinational corporations is central because in most African countries these are the institutions through which the state and external interests come to terms.

The multinational corporation is a remarkably flexible institution and in the Third World it has secured access, profit and cooperation by permitting, even encouraging, national participation and limited regional integration. The corporation has maintained the flow of raw materials, perpetuated its monopolist position, and secured local advocates by entering into cooperative branch-plant arrangements with national regimes or shareholders; local incorporation and direction has enabled it to maintain its "global reach." However, parastatals, as local embodiments of multinational corporations, differ greatly in their nature and importance. In particular, some parastatals constitute an indirect way to develop state capitalism through individual share-holding, whereas in state socialist regimes the government usually holds the local shares on behalf of the people. There is a major distinction between the impact and potential of parastatals in Nigeria and Kenya, for instance, compared with those in Zambia and Zaire and those in Tanzania and Somalia. But in both types, independence creates the possibility of a more intransigent foreign policy, or at least for some disruption of stability. State control itself may at times be haphazard and unpredictable—both internal and international instability may upset the logic of dependence. As Cohen has argued, "... the imperial linkage is not so neatly facilitated nor so smoothly functioning as is sometimes assumed. There are real difficulties in guaranteeing the stability of the peripheral capitalist system..." At times, then, African foreign policies can disrupt established transnational class relations and more truly express a "national" interest.
The characteristic "parastatal strategy" of Africa may be an expression of nationalism (as in state-capitalist systems) or a step towards nationalization (as in state-socialist systems)--the "localization of capitalism" or a "socialist approach." The former strategy of state capitalism does not constitute a fundamental challenge to the inheritance of integration into the world economy, especially into corporate structures and unequal exchange with advanced capitalist economies. Partial nationalization through state socialism, on the other hand, does create the possibility of greater self-reliance and the potential for further moves towards a non-capitalist political economy, even if the transition to socialism itself is problematic. In the former, partnership with the multinational corporation is seen as the final stage of economic change--"the commanding heights" having been conquered; in the latter, the parastatal strategy is conceived as just one step towards other socialist measures such as more direct political or worker control, different operating criteria, and eventual full national ownership in some form of cooperative structure. Moves towards and beyond state socialism in Africa are unlikely because the interests of the new class are more vulnerable in a state socialist than in a state capitalist society. Further, given the pervasiveness of dependence and export-oriented economies, progress towards socialism necessitates more than confronting the multinational corporation. A foreign policy of both nationalism and socialism requires a simultaneous attack on several forms of dependence. It is inseparable from effective national planning and a strategy which does more than reinforce elite privilege: "Establishing a system of state ownership within a capitalist world economy does not mean establishing a socialist economy." Indeed, most moves toward national economic control in Africa are motivated more by internal demands--elite affluence and control over the process of class formation--than by a desire to upset external linkages. However, domestic opposition to the incumbent elite may incorporate criticism of its foreign relations as well as of its mismanagement and indulgence.

The interaction of global and internal constraints and opportunities has led to increased inequalities within Africa, amongst classes as well as between states. Political independence has tended to increase economic dependence because the new ruling elite has needed control over patronage and symbols. The new elite has adopted foreign incomes and tastes while most of the population has been largely forgotten and impoverished. The parastatal strategy has, thus far, tended not only to reinforce the state-corporate
relationship, but also to undermine any prospect of an indigenous entrepreneurial class developing in Africa. In most states, indigenous capitalism cannot compete with the established linkages of dependence, the "monopoly in international commodity markets and monopoly in industrial technology." Local services develop largely in response to corporate penetration, not as an alternative to dependent industrialization. The elimination of a national middle class serves the interest of both partners in the parastatal system. Internal "class" interests may explain much external behavior of African states.

Dependence reduces the foreign policy "choices" of most African states. The political economy of parastatal structures reveals a continued impact of multinational corporations on the content and direction of national development. These structures give foreign companies the opportunity to capture a market or source of supply, to export machinery or provide management and consultancy services. The "partnership" forged during the colonial period has been modified but not changed in its fundamentals: "The elites do not grow into an independent bourgeoisie because they cannot do so. They remain the junior partners of an external system upon which, at all decisive points, they must continue to depend." In both colonial and post-colonial times, elites which collaborated with external interests became "parasitic"; "indirect rule" led to reliance not on traditional ties or on an indigenous constituency, but rather on external associations.

As President Nyerere insists, there is only one rational choice for Africa--socialism: "Third World capitalism would have no choice except to cooperate with external capitalism, as a very junior partner." However, for some states being a junior partner in the global capitalist economy holds attractions. As several critiques of the development of the Ivory Coast and Ghana show, a semi-capitalist strategy can be highly profitable in certain circumstances, both for the state and for groups within the state. Nevertheless, the cost of class-formation is high over time, heightened dependence increases vulnerability, and for Africa as a whole only a few successful capitalist regimes are possible--some state participation or control is inevitable.

The other, controversial class which affects both the calculation of the benefits and costs of collaboration and the orientation of a state's
foreign policy is the "labor aristocracy." The emergence of a workers' elite in state, parastatal and private organizations has served to widen the distribution of gains from independence and state capitalism and to co-opt a further social group, thus reducing the immediate prospects for change in internal politics or external relations. Despite some recent skepticism about the usefulness of the concept, the approach is helpful in explaining the lack of militant worker activity in Africa. Indeed, the coexistence between the ruling class and the labor aristocracy helps to explain why the former's definition of the national interest has rarely been challenged. The ruling class practices co-optation internally while it performs collaboration externally.

Together then, the transnationalization and labor aristocracy theses go some way to explain the absence both of revolution in Africa and of international violence between Africa and the rich countries despite intensified inequalities and the paradoxes of state capitalism. Interstate dependence has benefitted a few in Africa; and together these few control the state machinery. Until other social forces demand participation in power and privilege, the external relations of the incumbent elites can be perpetuated. Even Leys admits that, despite the trend to monopoly and conflict in the political economy of capitalist African states such as Kenya, "... it would be dogmatic and mechanical to assert that neocolonialism and underdevelopment must inevitably lead to revolutionary change in Kenya as a result of inevitable social and economic crisis." Nevertheless, African leaders are concerned to increase their control and embourgeoisment. They have begun to redefine their collective ideology of nonalignment away from political non-partisanship and towards economic confrontation. As the international system has moved from bipolarity to multipolarity, from Cold War to détente, so Africa in its second decade of independence has transformed nonalignment away from a concern with politico-security matters and into a highly partisan demand for economic redistribution.

**Nonalignment and Dependence**

Africa constitutes the majority of new states in the nonalignment movement, and has played a major part in the activities of the movement. As
bipolarity gave way to detente and development to underdevelopment, so the Third World demanded economic change rather than political visibility. The new definition of nonalignment—which emphasizes economic opportunity rather than politico-strategic impartiality—and the new mood of confrontation were responses to the continuation of dependence. The novel ideology of "collective self-reliance" incorporates the national interests of a diverse range of states; it is both compatible with and supportive of the idea of nonalignment. However, each state's different positions and prospects make Third World unity problematic. As some countries benefit from close ties with major actors, different forms of dependence threaten the solidarity of the Third World, the very solidarity that is essential to escape from dependence.

Africa has tried to relieve its inheritance of dependence by the adoption of several international strategies: i) national non-alignment; ii) regional integration; iii) continental diplomatic interdependence; and iv) collective advocacy in international organizations and global conferences. The first and the last are usually compatible and constitute a significant and potent combination in an era of resource scarcities and high prices. Yet, the incidence of dependence and the prospects to reduce it are both uneven. In this section we first examine some more of the characteristics of dependence and then look at Africa's relations with the great powers. These are both the major sources of dependence and the primary concern of nonalignment, whether this strategy is defined in politico-strategic and/or economic terms.

African states are confronted with multifaceted and interrelated problems of dependence and underdevelopment which are intensified for many countries by their small size and land-locked status. Dependence can occur in different domains and so pose a variety of political and administrative dilemmas. William Demas has suggested that economic dependence is manifested in five ways in the Third World:

a) dependence through foreign ownership and control of key sectors of the economy,
b) dependence through foreign aid,
c) dependence through trade,
d) dependence through reliance on foreign human resources and foreign technical expertise, and
e) dependence through imported consumption and production patterns.55

To these we might add monetary policies, the multiple influences of the ubiquitous multinational corporation, and the phenomenon of transnational elite linkages. Outside the economic sphere, other forms of political, military, social and cultural dependence can be cited.

Clearly these may be ranked in a different order for each state. But the importance of each form lies not so much in tangible results (over which there is some dispute),56 but rather in their implications for foreign and development policy and planning. The empirical impact of various types of dependence may be less salient than perceptions of their strength: decision-makers may believe dependence to be inevitable even if there are some strategies and choices which they could adopt to reduce it. Such psychological dependence results from being affected by foreign values, education and tastes which cannot be realized in small, dependent political economies. Fatalism, insecurity and instability mean that longer-term options are neither recognized nor considered; inertia and poor information further reduce the prospects for the innovation and intransigence which would be needed for a successful escape from, or redefinition of, dependence: "there is a need for a basic minimum of national feeling and self-confidence before room for manoeuvre can be studied and exploited."57 The great powers, multinational corporations and international organizations have been able to penetrate African states through such elites.

The major source of dependence in Africa is still Europe. Unlike Asia and Latin America, Africa has been of relative political insignificance to the superpowers and China. Its peripheral status in the triangular Sino-Soviet-American rivalries stands in contrast to its importance for Europe, both for the ex-colonial powers as states and now for the European Economic Community (EEC) as a collectivity. Whilst African transactions with the socialist states and Japan have grown at a faster rate than those with Europe, they remain minute for most states compared with substantial exchanges with the EEC, which now includes all the ex-colonial powers whose administrative, educational and economic systems Africa inherited. Despite significant changes in some African states, many remain dependent on the values and structures which they assumed at independence. These bilateral links have now been strengthened by multilateral associations with other EEC members, including the economic center, West Germany. This crucial, complex and evolving relationship has
recently been formalized in the Lome Convention between the EEC and the associate states of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP).\(^{58}\)

Despite modifications and reservations, the EurAfrican relationship remains the most salient single factor in explaining the foreign policy orientations and development strategies of African states. Linkages between Europe and Africa are continual and pervasive, through the EEC as well as through the Commonwealth and Francophonie, and through bilateral, bicontinental and bilingual institutions. Although the concept of reciprocity has been abandoned and free-entry has been assured for most African products, Africa remains dependent on Europe. This is reflected in receipts from STABEX and EEC aid, in the fact that most foreign investment still comes from Britain and France, and that most of Africa's trade and technological exchange is with Europe. Moreover, Europe has its own favorites in Africa. In particular it has maintained close links whenever possible with those territories which in colonial times it had identified as administrative centers: "The four ACP countries with the largest and fastest-growing trade with the EEC are Nigeria, Zaire, Ivory Coast and Kenya."\(^{59}\) This group of states has also been courted by other external interests; a few African countries may be able to play off the competition but most are condemned to relative insignificance. Given the gross disparities between the EEC and Africa, the impact of the former on the latter is often uneven and unconscious. Further, the replacement of a set of bilateral links by multilateral ones does not by itself constrain Europe's dominance. Thus it is hard to accept William Zartman's optimistic conclusion that

From an evolutionary point of view . . . the Lome Convention is a welcome development. Neither a neo-colonial consolidation nor an institutionalization of dependency, it is a natural step in the process of decolonization, that at the same time strengthens the capabilities of developing African economies and polities while diluting their bilateral ties with the metropole.

The provision for advantages to African states in the Lome Agreement does not remove inequalities between the signatories but it helps reduce disparities among them.\(^{60}\)

The other major western actor in Africa is the United States, although Japan, Canada,\(^{61}\) Sweden and Norway have growing economic links with some states. The role of the United States in Africa has been minor compared to its activities
in other parts of the Third World, particularly those in Latin America, South East Asia and the Middle East. Moreover, its indirect and passive role until the 1960s, along with a marginal but fairly mutual economic exchange with a few states, means that Africa became an overt Cold War target late. Except for historical military or economic interests in states such as Morocco, Zaire, Ethiopia, Tunisia and Liberia. American concerns tended to be concentrated in Egypt and in Southern Africa; elsewhere the U.S. worked through European colonial intermediaries. In Egypt and Southern Africa, strategic, economic and ideological interests led to American involvement in attempting to mediate complex regional disputes. The association between the U.S. and Israel and South Africa prejudiced its prospects in the rest of Africa. Its actions in the Congo further reinforced images of it as a conservative, counter-revolutionary actor. No American administration has yet escaped from this image, although Henry Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy in Northern and Southern Africa and President Carter's links with America's black community and leadership may have moderated it somewhat.

However, whilst the U.S. has belatedly recognized the inevitability of change in the Middle East and Southern Africa, its economic penetration has both increased and become more controversial. In the relatively optimistic first development decade, western, especially American, ideas of externally induced growth were widely accepted; but the failure of this initial developmental ideology has led to a more skeptical and pessimistic mood in the present second development decade. Given the demands for a New International Economic Order, American investment in Africa is now both more opposed and more vulnerable. So, at the very time that Africa's criticism of America's political and strategic policies on the continent has become somewhat muted, economic conflict has prevented any general improvement in relations.

Nevertheless, given America's global dominance, several African states have been more permissive towards its economic, ideological and strategic penetration, particularly those with a capitalist orientation. U.S.-Africa trade is concentrated in a few products and with a few partners: the U.S. buys oil, copper, coffee and tea--those commodities identified above as most amenable to cartelization--from Nigeria, Libya, Ivory Coast, Zaire and Kenya. It also concentrates its aid in these raw material-producing states rather than in the poorest, which export and import little. U.S. private investment
has also been concentrated in this select group of states, in both oil
and mineral production and in the manufacturing industry:

The countries that receive the largest proportion of their imports
from the United States are also the ones that receive the largest
per capita amounts of grants, loans, and private direct investment.
These patterns are the context within which future economic rela-
tions between the United States and Africa are set.65

This concentration of U.S. interest and influence contributes to the growth
of inequalities in Africa and, as we note in the next section, to the rise
of sub-imperialism.

The ability of Europe and the United States to secure dependencies in
Africa is increasingly matched by that of the Soviet Union. Although the
U.S.S.R. lacks the wide range of instruments of statecraft--particularly its
own transnational organizations such as private corporations, interest groups
and religious institutions--it has established common cause with several
African countries, particularly with those alienated by the west (e.g., Guinea,
Libya, Uganda) and/or those seeking to establish socialist political economies
(e.g., Algeria, Mozambique, Somalia), a question to which we return in the
final section.

The varieties of dependence relations between the great powers and
Africa are wider than formal international links. Major intrusive actors
have encouraged transnational as well intergovernmental relations. The west
interacts with state managers and established interest groups; the socialist
states have relations with parties, workers and liberation movements. While
the capitalist countries develop transnational elite ties, the Soviet bloc
and China help to support a transnational counter-elite. African managers
go to corporate meetings in Europe and North America; African politicians
attend meetings of the Soviet Communist Party and tri-continental institutions.
But despite the range of possible linkages, external influence in Africa tends
to be unstable because of the characteristic instability of the continent's
own political economies.

The frequency of change and the difficulties of influence have led the
Soviet Union to adopt a more pragmatic approach to Africa; it has abandoned
its insistence on ties with national communist parties and on the adoption of
"scientific" rather than "African" socialism. The Soviet attitude to Africa
has evolved, then, from an ideological and universalistic one to a more pragmatic and particularistic stance. Its policies and relations have become more calculating and self-interested. Its capabilities are limited so overall its influence is weak. In particular its activities are challenged by diverse national and external interests, particularly the continuing western presence and the receptiveness to Chinese influence. As Africa is a more complex and unequal region than it was before the era of detente, any attempt at exerting continent-wide influence by any external power is likely to be problematic.

The rise and fall of Soviet-Egyptian relations is illustrative of the dilemmas facing any great power in Africa. Alvin Rubinstein concludes that Soviet influence over Egyptian foreign policy, even during the period of maximum Egyptian vulnerability, was limited .... Soviet policy seems to have made adjustments to Egyptian domestic politics more often than Egyptian policy-makers yielded to Soviet preferences .... The Soviet-Egyptian influence relationship is asymmetrical both as to its aims and accomplishments .... The dependent member of a relationship has the ability to undertake independent initiatives, to the detriment of the donor's interests.66

But Russia would not let itself be influenced by Egypt to the extent that it would risk war with the United States; its reservations about extending a carte blanche to Egypt to fight a third war with Israel not only upset the regional strategic balance, but led to the demise of the Soviet presence and to President Sadat's courtship of the Americans; astute leaders can still play the old politics of nonalignment. Egypt resisted Russian influence with greater determination after the October 1973 war: "The USSR has invested billions of dollars in Egypt, but so far, it has been able to exert little if any real influence over Sadat's foreign or domestic policies .... Soviet Egyptian relations have deteriorated sharply despite the massive Soviet aid during the war."67

Like other great powers, China has both widened its activities in Africa and concentrated them in particular states and parties, but its resources and interests are more limited and it is a late-comer to the race for influence. Following set-backs brought about by the Cultural Revolution, China has established diplomatic relations with most African countries, thus excluding Taiwan and also creating the basis for influence both within
the continent and against its own enemies. Like the Soviet Union, it has gradually shifted its priorities away from support for liberation movements and radical parties and towards regimes in power, especially when these are anti-Soviet. China has the advantage of being a non-white, non-European Third World nation, and tends to share more perceptions and policies with Africa than other intrusive actors. Through judicious, modest and generous economic and military aid, through appropriate models and technology, and through an exchange of political support it has come to secure friends, markets and materials in Africa.

China lacks the capabilities to act as a super-power in Africa so its goals in Africa are limited. Nevertheless, association with China can reinforce Africa's nonalignment, particularly its diversification of partners and disengagement from the world capitalist economy. African leaders are much less likely to fear Chinese hegemony than dominance from other sources, given its lack of resources and motivation; it is also part of the Third World itself. Moreover, it is no longer clear that China seeks continual revolution and social change in Africa: "the short-term, pragmatic, evolutionary, and non-disruptive components of Chinese foreign policy have governed her African policy."68 African leaders have emphasized those several interests which are compatible with China's rather than alienate a leading member of the Third World coalition; they often share an identity of interest rather than being the objects of influence.

It is indicative of China's modest ambitions and circumspect role in Africa that there is only one state with which it can be said to enjoy a "partial informal alliance"—Tanzania. This particular relationship among "unequal equals"69 may reflect a coincidence of world view and development goals rather than an expression of Chinese influence. To be sure, Tanzania sought support for its national development and security and for the liberation struggle in southern Africa in exchange for improving China's respectability and access in world politics. Its "rewards," especially aid for Tazara (a major railroad project),70 have been considerable, generous and timely; and yet there is little to suggest that China's "presence" in Tanzania is permanent or widespread. Its penetration of the Tanzanian society, polity and bureaucracy is minimal; the relationship is exclusively official, bilateral and intergovernmental.

George Yu has suggested that the close association with China advances
Tanzania's own policies and development, its nonalignment and nationalism, without leading to a new dependence.\textsuperscript{71} It is a reflection of common elite perceptions and shared goals within the grouping of non-aligned states; Tanzania also maintains important links with a variety of African and European nations, including Zambia, Kenya, Britain, West Germany, Japan, Sweden, etc.\textsuperscript{72} Alan Hutchison also remarks of this important dyadic relationship that, "A position of privilege, even of prestige, should not therefore be confused with one of influence."\textsuperscript{73} Moreover, although China and Tanzania share many perceptions, their interests in China's major aid project--Tazara--are not completely similar: China emphasizes its contribution to regional integration and liberation as well as to its own status and economic possibilities. Tanzania and Zambia attach more importance to the potential it creates for economic development, both agricultural and industrial, along the new line-of-rail.\textsuperscript{74} This asymmetry of power and interest generates misperceptions: "The misunderstanding about the friendship between Tanzania and China arises . . . because the benefits to China are intangible whereas those to Tanzania are tangible..."\textsuperscript{75}

The one issue area in which the impact of great power rivalry is very clear is that of the military. We turn to this question of strategic relations and the continental arms race before dealing with the broader subject of sub-imperialism. Inequalities continue to grow between African military forces, with a few major strategic centers emerging on the continent. The main sources of arms purchases, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, remain France, Britain and the United States rather than the socialist states. Africa's military might is concentrated in the north--particularly in Egypt, Algeria, Morocco and Libya--and in a few black states--Nigeria, Ethiopia, Zaire, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda.\textsuperscript{76} South Africa and Rhodesia maintain significant forces, of course, whilst those of Angola and Mozambique will have greater potential with their reorganization following their wars of liberation. Over time, Africa's militaries have become more sophisticated, larger and better equipped, although many continue to be diverted from an external role by internal security, political and economic activities.

African states maintain a diverse range of military associations and agreements which in general reflect their overall foreign policy orientation. The major links of the United States are with Morocco, Egypt, Ethiopia,
Zaire and Liberia; the Soviet Union has training, supply and other understandings with Algeria, Libya, Uganda, Mozambique, Angola and Guinea; France has a variety of military ties with the francophone states of West Africa, from Morocco to Congo(B) whilst Britain has a few remaining links with Kenya, Ghana and Malawi. China has understandings with a select group of countries such as Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and Tanzania, particularly with the latter; and Cuba has begun to supply training and support for Guinea and Angola. Some of those relations are long-standing (e.g., until 1976 U.S. military aid to Ethiopia, U.S.S.R. to Somali, France to Ivory Coast, Britain to Kenya and China to Tanzania) but many are more recent, modest and unpredictable; most African states continue to emphasize non-alignment in the strategic issue area and are cautious about dependence on military ties with just one great power. Several have preferred security relations with a group of foreign "middle powers" such as Italy, Yugoslavia and Canada. The next section is concerned with the rise of Africa's own middle powers and with their ability to dominate regions on the continent.

Regionalism and Sub-Imperialism

The present era of multipolarity, detente and resource depletion enhances the prospects for a few states within the Third World to increase their own growth and influence. The small group of middle powers in Africa may be able to seize these favorable circumstances to advance their international status and achieve dominance at the regional level. For the global hierarchy is not static; although inequalities are likely to persist, movement up and down the ladder is possible. The upward movement of a few African states has significance for other countries which are relatively subordinate and for the lingering dreams of continental unity.

Within the global system, a "sub-imperial" state is at the "center" of the periphery; it is a "client" which is able to exert dominance in one region. A sub-imperial state in Africa exerts a regional hegemony within the continent akin to the global dominance of an imperial power; it plays an important intermediate role in a sphere of influence while remaining subordinate itself to major external actors. Sub-imperial or "go-between" states no longer have simple cooperative relations with metropolitan centers; old dependence ties are evolving into new and more complex forms of asymmetry.
Nevertheless, it is clear that a group of leading African states have achieved both economic growth and military prowess because of their association with major world powers and interests.

The leading states of Africa are largely those most permissive towards international capitalism; they are characterized by a significant amount of external investment, collaborative parastatal institutions, dependence on regional exchange, and a trend towards domestic inequalities. They receive support from foreign investment and assistance agencies and are encouraged to play an intermediary role between the center and the periphery. However, their semi-peripheral status leads to ambivalence and opposition, especially from states in their region who are dependent both on semi-peripheral as well as core states.

Regional integration may be either a voluntary or a coercive process; cooperative arrangements in Africa to date have been largely based on consensus, but regional exchange is now becoming an imperative for the manufacturing centers of Africa such as Egypt, Kenya and the Ivory Coast. Increasingly, therefore, regional cooperation may come to reflect the interests of national and foreign elites in a few African states and capitals; it may perpetuate the uneven development of Africa rather than advance continental development.

Regional integration in Africa was first practiced by colonial governments to increase administrative efficiency and economic opportunities. In contemporary Africa it has been widely advocated as both a path to peace and as a strategy for development. The continued incidence of regional conflict and the perpetuation of regional decay lead to skepticism, however, about its inevitable efficacy. Moreover, although regional organizations in East, West and Southern Africa have adapted to the impact of decolonization they are now threatened by a revival of nationalism based on the uneven distribution of gains from economic cooperation. The major beneficiaries from the East African Community, the Entente, and the Southern African Customs Union have been the leading manufacturing and service centers of the regions--Kenya, Ivory Coast and South Africa, respectively, or rather the industrial complexes of Nairobi, Abidjan and the Witwatersrand. The maldistribution of industrial plants, infrastructure and services characterizing most regional organizations helps to explain the fluidity of such organizations in Africa; African states attempt to establish new organizations to avoid dominance from within Africa as well as from the global system.
Regional integration does not always provide an escape from Africa's inheritance of subordination. Instead, regional integration in its present form may promote both the underdevelopment and disunity of the continent. For regional integration in Africa is unlikely to produce self-reliance or integrated economies when some of its major advocates are foreign actors or collaborationist elites. Rather than advancing disengagement from the global economy, such regional integration tends to encourage the establishment of regional spheres of influence serving the interests of a few African and external states and elites. The master-plan of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) to create five sub-regions on the continent may further legitimize such sub-imperialism. It would seem that the "second scramble" for Africa is not among colonial powers but among African states, each of which is significantly affected by external interests.

Political independence in Africa has tended to increase, rather than limit, economic dependence; economic growth has also declined and become more uneven. Most African states have very open economies and have been rather uncritical in their acceptance of corporate plans and activities to date. One result of development plans based on the parastatal strategy and association with external interests has been the heightening of internal and interstate inequalities in Africa: a few African states and elites can exploit the overall relationship of dependence to their own benefit. For example, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is but the latest in a series of attempts to secure both integration and dominance, in this case by a triumvirate of Nigeria, Senegal and the Ivory Coast.

The concept of sub-imperialism is not only relevant for the analysis of western powers in Africa; it may also be applied to the close relationships already developed with a few African regimes by the Soviet Union. It may, in time, be appropriate to examine the dependencies of China and Japan in this way as well, but their interests are not yet sufficiently developed. Whilst the former seeks international respectability and acceptability the latter is primarily concerned with exchanging raw materials for manufactures; neither have wide-ranging interests in Africa to date. But the caution and modesty of China's Africa policy may be transitory given the intensity of the Sino-Soviet split; Soviet-Chinese competition may come to replace the Soviet-American struggle in being the dominant contemporary external catalyst. In its quest for "influence," the character of
Soviet objectives is broader than that of the Chinese both in scope (Soviet objectives have traditionally been more differentiated) and in domain (they have also been pursued among a more diverse set of states)."87 Nevertheless until Angola and Ethiopia and the dramatic display of Soviet ability to intervene in a distant civil war, the western states remained dominant in Africa--"the Soviet and Chinese ability to influence Black African regimes has remained marginal."88

However, the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, China have identified a few states or parties which appeared to offer improved prospects for influence or identity of views over a range of issues such as development strategies and great power politics.89 Because of the greater time since its revolution and its more advanced economy, Russia has had a significant lead over China in the development of its policy towards and penetration inside Africa; it has been able to build on an established Tsarist interest in northern Africa, whereas China's pre-colonial contacts with the East African coast occurred much earlier and were more fitful.90 Russia has abandoned its dogmatic Stalinist insistence on Third World states following "scientific" socialism and the Soviet model. Under the impact of resistance and failure in the immediate independence period its policy became more pragmatic and realist, favoring non-alignment and a non-capitalist path, especially disengagement from the international capitalist economy.91 The Soviet Union is concerned, then, not only with Africa's external relations but also with its internal class structures and development strategies. This combination of interests serves to justify its "penetration," or its "transnational" association with "progressive" forces. Having abandoned its earlier insistence on the establishment of communist parties in every country, the Soviet Union has tried to identify and support "popular" or "radical" regimes, parties or factions. Having rejected the possibility of a "Third Way" in the Third World, it now supports "African" socialism when it is advocated by a "national democratic" state.92 Its belated recognition of the tenuousness and distinctiveness of class formation in Africa led the Soviet Union to encourage a variety of strategies aimed at national economic control, one-party states, industrialization and working-class power. Its list of "revolutionary" states in Africa has changed under the impact of coups, but has included Ben Bella's Algeria, Nkrumah's Ghana, Keita's Mali and Nasser's Egypt. At present, according to Soviet scholars and bureaucrats,
the select group of African states embarked on a non-capitalist path consists of Guinea, Somalia, Congo (Brazzaville), Mozambique and Angola. The Soviet Union exhibits considerable ambivalence about Tanzania (in part because of that country's close association with China) and hesitation over Algeria; it has also encouraged rather cynical ties with two African gadflies--Amin of Uganda and Gadafi of Libya. In general, the Soviet Union has supported moves towards domestic socialism and external diversification, especially when these policies have been expressed in a "Marxist-Leninist" language.

The Soviet Union's pragmatism and "national interest" are often mixed with a concern for ideological affinity and compatibility. As a great power it has significant geo-political interests; where these coincide with political empathy--as in contemporary Angola, Mozambique and Guinea--it tends to concentrate resources. To be sure, it remains flexible and proper in its dealings with "moderate" African regimes, providing aid and investment for a majority of countries; indeed, "seeing the search for allies as almost chimerical in the rapidly changing African political arena, the Soviet Union became primarily concerned with pure strategic interest." It has also come to realize that as classes are as yet embryonic in Africa and are not always the dominant social force, so the advance of capitalism and inequalities may generate class conflict and more orthodox class struggles. Much of its strategic interest in Africa has been derivative, based--like Britain's in the nineteenth century--on the centrality of Egypt in its "imperial" ambitions. Further, it is also an expression of its superpower role and the continuation of cold war realpolitik. As the USSR's capacity to intervene grows, so African perceptions of it as another great power--perhaps even in collusion with the other, American, colossus--increase, coinciding with Chinese views of Soviet imperialism.

The consensus among Africanists and Sovietologists for the decade 1965-1975 was that "the Soviets are keeping a low profile in Africa." Similarly Hall and Peyman recently asserted "that by 1975 China was more influential in Africa than the United States or the Soviet Union, not to mention former colonial powers..." Clearly these evaluations must now be considerably revised in the light of Russia's potential for further intervention in southern Africa through sub-imperial states like Cuba, Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia. Sub-imperial states may not only create regional integration, dominance and order; they may also act "by proxy" in regional conflicts.
Just as a few African regimes come to play a go-between role on behalf of external economic interests in advancing regional integration, so can they serve as intermediaries in regional wars and arms races. Political and military clients maintain their own interests as well as those of their protectors; there may be tensions and disagreements between them as well as collaboration. Nevertheless, through military and political support a poor state can become dependent on its supplier of arms, personnel and advocacy, as suggested in the previous section. The different external strategic associations of African states have intensified regional tensions and turned border conflicts and so-called "local" wars into targets of great power attention. Thus the disagreements between Morocco and Algeria, Ethiopia and Somalia, Libya and Egypt, Tanzania and Uganda, for example, tend to escalate—in terms of visibility, intensity, destruction and salience—because of the considerable stakes which both African and external states have in the outcomes. Some of the political and security aspects of dependence are illustrated by the continuing complex confrontations in the Horn of Africa.

Tensions in the Horn have included the attempts by Eritrea to gain independence from Ethiopia, demands for Somalia irredentism against Ethiopia and Kenya, civil war in the Sudan (which involved neighboring black and Arab states as well as Israel), the struggle for independence from France in Djibouti, the tensions between the three partners in the East African Community, and disagreements between Egypt, Sudan and Libya. This set of traditional, border, liberation, racial and ideological conflicts has been exacerbated and intensified by partisan external support. The Americans have withdrawn their underwriting of Ethiopia and have established new links with Kenya and Egypt; the Soviets have shifted their commitment from Somalia to Ethiopia and have increased support to Uganda under Amin and Libya under Gadafi, but have been rebuffed by Sadat's Egypt and by Sudan after an attempted coup; the British continue to provide military assistance for Kenya and are again cooperating with the Sudan and Egypt; the Chinese have become the sole suppliers of materiel and training for Tanzania; and a complex set of Arab and external interests have supported the liberation movements in Eritrea and the Affars and Issas. As Tom J. Farer concludes in his study of the strategic and political issues of this region: "The Horn is not an especially hospitable setting for human habitation. But as a venue for confrontation by proxy, it now shows real promise".
Although regional integration does often involve cooperation and mutual benefit, when associated with regional imperialism, it may also constitute a form of structural violence for peripheral African states. The weaker states of Africa may become reluctant to "try Africa first" if continental mediation means accepting solutions imposed by a small group of more powerful African countries. They may either appeal for more disinterested dispute resolution from outside the continent or attempt to establish new coalitions with foreign powers to challenge the dominance of a few African nations in continental affairs. In other words, African unity and autonomy may now be vulnerable not so much because of direct international imperialisms but because of the impact of inequality on the continent. Moreover, any trend towards a new diversity of interests among the states of Africa may lead to a revival of ideological disputes and new varieties of foreign policies. Notions of African socialism and unity, self-reliance and non-alignment may be threatened by disparate national interests in Africa. New coalitions both within the OAU and the UN may come to reflect the growing diversity of interests among both African states and the wider non-aligned grouping. In the final section we turn to an evaluation of continuities and discontinuities on the continent, particularly to an analysis of the prospects for greater interdependence and coexistence both in Africa and between it and the world.

The Prospects for Self-Reliance and Interdependence

Given the limited prospects of development for many African countries in the present world order, a strategy of self-reliance might be an appropriate response. Such a strategy involves attempts to avoid the problems of both class formation and external dominance, to go beyond nonalignment and dependence on a great power or sub-imperial state, by trying to implement unilaterally some of the rhetoric of the New International Economic Order. The attractions of sub-imperialism cannot be realized by most African states. For them especially, self-reliance may be the only alternative to continued, even perpetual, dependence. Self-reliance consists of policies and behaviors designed to maximize national autonomy and to avoid having external actors decide the development goals and strategies for Africa. There are a few examples on the continent of states which have oriented themselves towards such a strategy of self-reliance. These states have started to change both their development and foreign policies and to forge new linkage structures,
to put national interests above externally-determined goals and roles. They have declined to have the character of their political economies designed for them by external interests and they have largely rejected the legacy of "deformed development."

Self-reliance is related to a foreign policy of confrontation which seeks to change both external conditions and internal inequality by dealing with the two sides of the linkage; as such, it constitutes a reaction to dependence and an attempt to escape from it. The strategies of state capitalism and state socialism examined above are evolutionary forms of decolonization; a more critical view of dependence leads to advocacy of disengagement and isolation rather than diversification or sub-imperialism. Soviet scholars and diplomats have encouraged this more comprehensive response of self-reliance and have advocated it as a non-capitalist path. Despite its attractions for Russian policy-makers, it does deserve serious consideration as a strategy which abandons orthodox prescriptions and puts national interests above international integration.

The possibilities of non-capitalist development are clearly aided by the prospects of increased exchange with the more industrialized socialist states, but such interaction is not necessarily characterized by interdependence just because it takes place between "similar" systems. To be sure, socialist economies make different demands on the global economy and do not create the same imperatives for foreign exchange as do capitalist states and corporations. Nevertheless, we remain cautious about equating integration into the emerging socialist "world system" with non-capitalist development. Soviet scholars in particular claim that Russia's internationalist policies "afford the young states which have chosen socialism as their goal the opportunity to develop in that direction". Yet their definition of a socialist-orientation is wide and uncritical--foreign investment and aid are encouraged as is "modern" technology, while external exchange within the world capitalist economy is considered to be inevitable.

Africa needs to feel free to examine alternative formulations of national and collective self-reliance. Given the imperative of the environment it might also usefully examine intermediate and appropriate technology rather than the capital-intensive modes of production advocated both by the multinational corporation and by the Soviet Union. Africa itself has to begin to choose between state capitalism, state socialism and non-capitalist
development whilst recognizing that the choices are neither clear nor readily
attainable. The present ruling classes on the continent will likely resist
any demands for a radical restructuring of Africa's political economies. The
established modes of cooperation between national and international elites
are quite well entrenched, and this is likely to make any transition from
dependence to interdependence both difficult and protracted.

In the absence of significant international and internal redistribution
increased conflict and coercion are likely in the mid- to long- term future.\textsuperscript{109} Because the ruling class in Africa is essentially dependent, it tends to rely
on external support rather than on its domestic constituency. Because it is
often unresponsive to internal inequalities and demands, it comes to rely
on coercion as well as patronage for control. Yet Africa's leaders still seek
short-term gains through external association, despite the long history of
dilemmas inherent in such collaboration. It is understandable that instant
panaceas appear so attractive. But it is important to recognize the rami-
fications of such an orientation. In the absence of national development
strategies adapted to local needs, integration into the global economy tends
to promote foreign policies of compromise and domestic regimes of repression.

Africa (including Tanzania\textsuperscript{110}) lost its innocence in its first decade
of recaptured independence. In its present second decade, with the failure
of optimistic solutions and predictions, critical analyses and better-defined
development strategies are beginning to produce more informed and appropriate
proposals, such as self-reliance. However, the new elites of Africa remain
unprepared for any radical change that upsets their comfortable relationship
with the external estate. To be sure, they are concerned to maximize benefits
for themselves from foreign associations but they are not yet willing to
restructure both their political economies and external linkages. Opposition
to this new class has been limited or contained to date. In the future authori-
tarianism and regime violence, rather than revolution and socialism, are likely
to characterize African politics.\textsuperscript{111} Africa has experienced false starts and
the absence of either growth or redistribution. These conditions as well as
the underdeveloped class structures of African states are encouraging a trend
now toward "departicipation"\textsuperscript{112} or centralization along with coercion. Pro-
spects for change, participation and redistribution to benefit the many seem
increasingly slim. External actors are likely to supply the means for such
control necessary. These trends throw doubt on the utility of concepts such
as "modernization" or "development" which imply that change is ultimately good for the many as well as the few. In any case, the benefits to be gained from dependence vary between states.

The advantages to be secured from participation in the transnational elite differ between Third and Fourth World regimes in Africa. The Third World by definition has some resources to offer in exchange for a continued collaborative relationship; the Fourth World has little or nothing to offer. The Third World can as a group insist on a new pattern of interdependence in which all partners gain and participate as near equals; the Fourth World can only appeal to ideals of humanity and equality in any demand it makes for the relief of dependence. The Third World has orchestrated, and can benefit from, claims for a New International Economic Order; the Fourth World can only participate as a poor partner in the Group of 77 recognizing that any new deal between First and Third Worlds is likely to be disadvantageous to it. Despite the rhetoric in international forums and organizations and among aid agencies about special attention for the problems of the poorest, least-developed states, in practice the middling-rich now receive more. Unless very generous and much increased aid and commodity agreements are implemented, the Fourth World will continue to be impoverished while resources are redistributed between First and Third Worlds.

Africa stands to benefit less than most regions of the Third World from any new world order. A few of its burgeoning middle powers will gain as their sub-imperial role is reinforced. The identity of this minority of countries may change over time as their leadership changes or their fortunes are affected by relations with the world economy. But the future Pax Africana will consist of a new continental hierarchy of increasingly unequal actors rather than a mythical PanAfricanism of equal states. The continent is returning to a multipolar structure in which a few regional powers dominate, as in the pre-colonial system.

The multipolar global system has ambivalent implications for Africa. On the one hand the multiplication of power centers has enhanced the prospects for diversifying external relations; but it has also made the original conception of nonalignment vestigial. On the other hand, multipolarity has increased the number of potential sources of external penetration; it has also tended to exacerbate international competition, particularly the cleavage between the two leading socialist states, the Soviet Union and China. The
current world order, then, poses problems as well as opportunities for African decision-makers. With skill, they can turn the contemporary system, its norms and institutions, to good advantage; but a naive approach to external intentions and issues will serve to intensify both dependence and underdevelopment.

A few African leaders and organizations have been able to enhance their visibility, power and development by recognizing current threats and opportunities; but the majority of actors and states have been unable to respond to the revival of realpolitik. The divergent reactions of African countries and institutions to contemporary world politics further enlarges inequalities on the continent. Until Africa establishes a truly consensual foreign policy in response to its common inheritance of dependence and underdevelopment it is unlikely to achieve either development or independence; even the benefits of decolonization and interdependence may be elusive. Meanwhile, the tendency towards inequalities in Africa perpetuates complexities and insures that African foreign policies remain controversial in both practice and analysis.
END NOTES

1 For a succinct introduction to these see Seyom Brown, *New Forces in World Politics* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1974).


9 See Vincent Bakpetu Thompson, *Africa and Unity: The Evolution of PanAfricanism*

The "parastatal strategy" in Africa consists of a set of arrangements between the state and multinational corporations. It characteristically involves a 51% state shareholding combined with a 49% corporate stake, with the corporation largely determining management and production goals and controlling patents, distribution and external links. The mutual understanding based on partial nationalization and foreign participation generates symbiotic relations between host state and corporation in which security and access are exchanged for technology and capital.


On the analogies between the contemporary hierarchy of states and that of corporations as expressed by the "Law of Increasing Firm Size" and characterized by the concentration of production and decision-making in global and regional centers see Stephen Hymer, "The Multinational Corporation and the Law of Uneven Development," in Bhagwati, ed., Economics and World Order, pp. 114-132:

... A regime of North Atlantic Multinational Corporations would tend to produce a hierarchical division of labor between geographical regions corresponding to the vertical division of labor within the firm. It would tend to centralize high-level decision-making occupations in a few large cities in the advanced countries, surrounded by a number of regional sub-capitals, and confine the rest of the world to lower levels of activity and income, i.e., to the status of towns and villages in the new Imperial system. (p. 114).


But it produces only 6% of the bauxite. See the useful table on "Africa's Share of World Mineral Production" in Arkhurst, ed., U.S. Policy toward Africa, p. 249.


25 In his essay on "Europe and Africa" Zartman argues that "the dependency approach at best describes a static moment, while the decolonization theory accounts for changing relations by showing the origins and ingredients of the present state of affairs" (p. 340). We would suggest that decolonization has brought few benefits because of continuing dependence; dependence is perpetuated because of common elite interests expressed through the transnational association. On the limited prospects for manoeuvre and economic decolonization see Robert L. Curry, Jr. and Donald Rothchild, "On Economic Bargaining between African Governments and Multi-national Companies," Journal of Modern African Studies 12 (June 1974): 173-191.


46 For a comprehensive case study see Justinian Rweyamamu, Underdevelopment and Industrialization in Tanzania (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1973).


52 Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya, p. 274.

53 For useful introductions to dependence and underdevelopment from a variety of perspectives consult Henry Bernstein, ed., Underdevelopment and Development: The Third World Today (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973);

54 On the pervasive economic dependence on external capital, trade and skills see Barbara Stallings, "Economic Dependency in Africa and Latin America," Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics 3 (1972).


57 Percy Selwyn, "Introduction: Room for Manoeuvre?" in the collection on Development Policy in Small Countries, p. 18.


60 Zartman, "Europe and Africa," pp. 342 and 343.


Robert O. Freedman, "The Soviet Union and Sadat's Egypt" in ibid., p. 230; see also his Soviet Policy toward the Middle East Since 1970 (New York: Praeger, 1975): "given the overall Soviet goal of expelling western influence from the Middle East, the Soviet leadership seems willing to continue to provide large amounts of military and economic aid as well as diplomatic support to Arab regimes that often oppose the USSR, in the hope of spurring anti-western trends in the region...the Soviet leaders seem willing to pay the costs involved in pursuing such a policy because they have made the basic decision that the Middle East is a region of major importance to the Soviet Union." (p. 179)


Ibid., pp. 87-91.


These different emphases are reflected in Hugh and Peyman, *The Great Uhuru Railway* who place more importance on its strategic and political impact on African and international politics and Bailey, *Freedom Railway* who stresses its economic and integrative potential.


See *Arrighi and Saul, "Nationalism and Revolution in Sub-Saharan Africa," in their Essays on the Political Economy of Africa*, pp. 49 and 76.


See Ghai, "Perspectives on Future Economic Problems and Prospects in Africa" and "Africa, the Third World and the Strategy for International Development".


Ibid., p. 167.


On the dilemmas which Africa poses in terms both of tactics and ideology, and on the trend towards pluralism, diversity and conservatism in the socialist world's relations with the continent see Zbigniew Brzezinski, ed., Africa and the Communist World (Stanford: Stanford University Press for Hoover Institution, 1963).

The Soviet Union distinguishes countries in the Third World along three basic indicators: 1) the class or classes that are in power; 2) the type of foreign policy that is pursued; and 3) the nature of the domestic policies that are implemented." Roger E. Kanet, "Soviet Attitudes toward Developing Nations since Stalin," in his collection on The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1974), p. 44.


Ibid., pp. 51-77. In general, however, this essay is an unfortunate, polemical attack reminiscent of the cold war period. Klinghoffer asserts, for instance, that "a class analysis of African society is not particularly insightful," p. 76 and that "Africa may become anti-westernized and socialized, but it is unlikely to become sovietized or communized," p. 77.


See J. Bowyer Bell, The Horn of Africa (New York: Crane, Russak for National Strategy Information Center, 1973); John H. Spencer, Ethiopia, the Horn of Africa, and U.S. Policy (Cambridge: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1977); and Legum and Lee, Conflict in the Horn of Africa.

External interests become more complex and indirect if one takes into account Soviet interests in Libya, Yemen and Iraq and American support of Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states and Iran, all of which are involved in wider Red Sea and Indian Ocean issues. See Timothy M. Shaw, "Inequalities and Interdependence in Africa and Latin America: Sub-Imperialism and Semi-Industrialization in the Semi-Periphery," paper presented at a meeting of the African Studies Association, Houston, 1977.


On the problems of involuntary and unequal regional integration among socialist as well as capitalist states see Richard A. Falk, "Zone II as a World Order Construct," in James N. Rosenau, Vincent Davis, Maurice A.


113 Cf. recent writings in the tradition of the established paradigm, for example, Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, "Modernization and Political Development in Africa," Journal of Modern African Studies II (March 1973): 1-19 and


It is impossible to understand international relations in a dependent region of the world (or for that matter domestic politics in their broadest outline) outside of the context of the total global constellation of wealth and power. The immediate purpose of this chapter is to discuss the nature of international relations in Southern Africa and the place of the region in the international political system. Differing perceptions of which state is dominant in the region, if one includes nonregional powers, of what forces determine dominance, and of what effects these factors have on the global distribution of power have made debatable what, on the surface, had once looked to be rather clear cut. Conditions of dominance and submission, super and subordination, imposition, penetration, accommodation and resistance characterize regional and global affairs regarding Southern Africa. It is our task here to sort out these relationships in systematic terms.

The first part of the essay consists of some wide-ranging impressions of the structural character of the dependent political-economic relations between the developed and the less developed world. Near the end of that part we shall focus particularly on the impact of intermediary forces in the structures and techniques of dependence. In the second section, we home in on Southern Africa, and especially on the pivotal place of South African settler colonialism in the region. This is followed by a descriptive section providing a picture of contemporary regional relations. An analysis of the most current events provides the substance of the last part of the essay as we seek to establish whether the region is becoming unglued. We move, in short, from the general to the specific, to provide the reader with an analytical and interpretive framework by which "new" events and developments can be understood.

The Structural Character of World Politics - Economic Relations

The world's states are monstrously unequal in wealth, strength, size and any number of other criteria relating to general living conditions and the relative ability to make autonomous decisions and to carry our policies relating
to these conditions. Just as importantly, within these states there is an unequal distribution of the assets of power and living conditions. In rough terms, the world is composed of "have" and "have not" states that are, in turn, made up of "have" and "have not" groups of people. Too many theories of international relations and of imperialism in particular ignore the intra-state features of inter-state relationships. They tend to deal with states as holistic entities. Since data usually is compiled on a statewide basis, the state often by default becomes the effective unit of analysis.

Seen from one perspective, the international system consists of core (powerful) and periphery (weak or marginal) states. The core states occupy dominant positions in the global economic systems, possess dominant or near dominant military structures global in scope, and boast commanding technological and cultural structures. The periphery states are those that must, for various reasons, adjust and adapt to decisions and structures controlled by the core. Each state is likewise made up of a center (the power wielders) and a fringe (the objects of power). Depending on the issue to be decided the center consists of the political and economic elites that can at any given time expect or see to it that their wishes will be honored. The fringe includes the workers, small farmers, the unemployed, the uneducated and generally those disadvantaged. It is because of the inequities in the distribution of the assets of power and wealth, and because of a widespread resistance to any given pattern of distribution that dominance relationships are asserted and reinforced by structural arrangements.

To be sure, this introductory statement overlooks various intermediary actors, both within and between states. In addition, because of its crudity, it underplays divisions and competition among groups within the "have" and "have-not" elements of a state. But we shall return to these concerns shortly. There is also the danger that this type of analysis may take on the flavor of a conspiratorial theory. Nothing like this is intended. Rather, it is fully understandable that people should want to increase their material well-being and their sense of personal worth and security, and to do so in concert with others with similar values and interests. They would, for obvious reasons, be more likely to appreciate their own interests and more willing to take risks to protect and improve them, at the expense of others, especially when limited resources are being contested. Such a perspective hardly qualifies as a
conspiratorial theory of political behavior, although it does not immunize political actors or their policies from criticism based on moral arguments. There is also the danger, particularly in discussing the centers and fringes of states, to infer that behavior is generally planned, just because structures exist that indicate regular patterns of interaction. Again, this would be reading too much into descriptive impressions that may appear to indicate stability and continuity. To freeze a descriptive model in this fashion would be to deprive it of much of its analytical utility.

Although many of the terms and metaphors used in the following discussion derive from economics, it should be made clear at the outset that dependence as used here is not strictly an economic phenomenon. On the contrary, it is an aggregate phenomenon consisting of economic, political, strategic and cultural determinants and aspects. Words like asset, benefit, loss, cost, exchange, market, liability and interest, for example, should be considered in their broadest, figurative context.

Though it may be useful at times to conceive of a form of domestic dependence (e.g., the "homelands" policy of South Africa), since our chief concern in this chapter is international relations, we will regard dependence as a dominance relationship between states, and one that, in its contemporary form, depends upon super and subordination within state boundaries. When domestic dominance patterns weaken, external governments and organizations sometimes find it necessary to construct new structures to serve as their agents or points of penetration, and to facilitate the process of unequal exchange. Thus, dependence is founded on the symbiotic, although by no means equal, relationships that have been established between the center of the core state and the center of the periphery state. Both centers profit from this relationship; however, the center of the core profits more. The fringe elements of both states are disadvantaged by the relationship, but the fringe of the periphery state suffers more. Contemporary imperialists, although they may not have created them, exploit these internal inequalities and fortuitously encourage them by establishing harmonies of interest between center elements in different states, and conflicts of interest between the fringe segments in various states, between the center elements and the fringe elements in each state, and, ultimately, between the core and the periphery states themselves. It is this final antagonism, the disharmony of interests between the core and
the periphery states, that is the usual subject of analysis in most studies of
dependence and international relations. But this is, in many ways, only the
formal manifestation of the subject. It is a symptom of the phenomenon of
dependence, not its cause.

The major potential source of instability in the system is the fringe
in the periphery, for it consists of those most disadvantaged. If ever the
two fringes should realize the similarity of their interests and if fringe
alliances should be formed, the two centers would have to resort to more direct
forms of violence to secure the imperial system. Core states have often found
it necessary to rush to the rescue of periphery governments. This is as much
an indication of the incomplete or inefficient operation of a complex, jerry-
built contemporary dependence system as it is an indication of imperialism in
full flower. Dominant states and their allies (the center of the periphery
states) are willing and able to revert to the direct use of violence to sustain
the status quo and their privileges within it. This implies that systemic
structures work imperfectly.

Stratified relationships are not solely a product of particular economic
or ideological systems. Although some economic or ideological modes may be
more adaptable to dominance and dependence, no single world economic system
has a monopoly on imperialistic behavior and none can exclude its own behavior
from being designated as imperial when it involves super and subordination
reinforced by structural ties. What matters is the character and quality of
the relationships between states and between groups therein, and the effects
these relationships have on various peoples.

In essence, dependence relationships are exchange relationships. Whether
the exchange between the core and the periphery is economic, political, military
or cultural, the relationship is asymmetrical. The character of the relation-
ship is one that usually redounds to the benefit of the core at the expense
of the periphery, particularly to the fringe groups of the periphery. This
is not to say that all such relationships between core and periphery always
work to the advantage of one side over the other. But it is normally an unequal
exchange chiefly because the value of goods exchanged is inequitable between
the actors, that is, the values exchanged have little relationship to the
human efforts involved in creating the goods, or because the effects or spinoffs
within the respective actors are asymmetrical. It is also unequal because the
market in which the exchange occurs is controlled by the core, and hence is
stacked in the core's favor. With regard to the asymmetry of spinoffs, the social implications of the relationship are, on balance, disadvantageous to the periphery state and particularly to its inhabitants. Even should prices for goods exchanged be increased to the advantage of the periphery state, the effects of the relationship within the periphery state would still be negative if its social spinoffs yielded depleted resources, continued dependence on finished products manufactured in core states, distorted economic and social infrastructures, and a society that displays marginal skills, a psychological sense of inferiority and dependence, and the maintenance of a privileged center in league with the center of a core state. In such a situation, the periphery is poorly equipped to resist the pressures and blandishments of the core. The consequences of these exchanges eventually have political overtones which give the core immense leverage in dictating future relations.

Dependence is a matter of degree. Some states and groups are more or less dependent than others, and more or less involved in the system, depending on the inequalities of exchange, and the structural stabilities that underlie their behavior. There is even the possibility and the likelihood that as conditions constantly change, some state's behavior may simultaneously reflect characteristics of both the core and the periphery. Portugal, for example, had been dominant in the context of its own colonial system at the same time that it was part of the periphery of a North American-West European economic system.

The governments of some periphery states may perceive that their role in the larger system is to serve as an intermediary between the core and other, still more marginal states. This role may be particularly lucrative if, for one reason or another, (e.g., the existence of more than one empire, the division of labor and levels of status in the productive process, or the complications of ideological, ethnic, racial or geopolitical factors), there is increased room for maneuver in the interstices between systems and between components of the systems. It is to such alternatives that we now turn.

Despite the possibilities or tendencies for powerful forces to concert in defense of the global order, the facts that there are different and competing core powers, that within the centers of core states there are conflicts of interests, and that each element's principal concern is to maximize its particular advantages, not just in relation to the periphery but, if need be, in relation to the other core actors, do provide elements of the centers in the periphery states (and the fringes in the core and periphery) with opportunities for maneuver.
One might pursue this still further by noting that some geopolitical factors (location, topology and the uneven distribution of the world's scarce resources) might also be parlayed into the rise of intermediary forces. Given ideological blindspots and racial and ethnic hang-ups, additional flexibilities and rigidities are introduced into an already complex system. The effect is to provide interstices in which ostensibly less powerful states can find space to provide intermediary services to more powerful actors in the system. The price exacted for these services is enhanced stature and influence and even a competitive role within the system. At the same time an intermediary state may assist the imperialists on other issues. It may even go so far as to construct an embryonic mini-empire in its own right, usually, however, with the encouragement or at least acquiescence of core groups. This mini-empire, far from being an object of derision and scorn, may eventually challenge a larger core state, at first in regional terms (perhaps beginning with only a single issue) and then, conceivably in even broader terms. This would be the case particularly if it could exploit its own hinterland more efficiently than it was being exploited by the dominant core. Just as a strict dichotomy between center and fringe is too crude for social analysis at the intra-state level, so the distinction between core and periphery must be hedged with reservations, exceptions, qualifications and contingencies in trying to understand the workings of the international system. In a world of some 150 states, it stands to reason that there is room for at least a few such intermediary actors.

Southern Africa and Settler Colonialism

South Africa displays many of the characteristics of an intermediary state. The South African economy, partially industrialized and partially a producer of primary products and raw materials, might be said to be one or two steps ahead of most periphery states in the productive ladder, yet still a couple of steps behind core states. South Africa imports unskilled labor from its less developed neighbors, yet it still depends heavily on products and technology emanating from the core. It exports finished products and to a much lesser extent investment capital to its neighbors, yet must still secure capital and reinvested profits and sell its raw materials to more advanced economies. It is, in short, located in the middle of the
production process, and hence, in between the core and periphery in the global system. This has led to a rather ambiguous combination of foreign and domestic policies, some of which reflect a harmony of interest between South Africa and the imperialist core, and some of which reflect conflicts of interest and competition with the core. But that it is part of the dependence system, a crucial link in the productive and control chain, is undeniable.

South Africa and to a far lesser extent, Rhodesia occupy intermediary places in the Euro-American global system for another reason, too, one that underlies how and why they managed to achieve their role of economic middle-ranking. This reason related directly to the peculiarities of their own centers, for a crucial intermediary force in the dependence system has been colonial-settlers, especially when they are able to establish minority regimes. The term colonial-settler, as used here, must include not only settlers, but all the administrative machinery associated with the expatriate mercantile-extractive complex -- the local staffs of metropolitan-based companies, the colonial civil service at the lower (less mobile) grades, and the agents and backers of these interests in the metropolitan core. This group has emerged as a "third element", an "independent factor" insinuating itself between the core governments and the indigenous peoples of periphery states. By asserting their independence, colonial-settler governments may both strengthen and challenge the established imperialist order.

How and why do such colonial-settler elites come to be relatively independent? To answer this we have to look into the history of colonial expansion. Without raising the important question of what propelled or initiated the nineteenth century imperialist thrust, it is necessary to admit that one seminal factor was the colonial-settlers themselves. They came in most instances from the mother country and often were the direct administrative agents of the metropolitan government and of companies based in and financed by capital from the metropole. Nevertheless, there was never a precise coincidence of interests between this colonial element and the government in the metropolis. Because of the structural evolution of modern imperialism, a point was reached at which the core's center decided that direct administration of colonial territories did not add to the advantages derived from a territory in relation to the costs involved.

Imperialist governments realized that it was not necessary, indeed in certain contexts actually detrimental, to be saddled with the responsibilities,
costs and stigma of being a colonial power. This was not a unilateral decision. Domestic and international pressures, plus the increased costs of colonial government resulting from nationalist independence pressures in the colonies contributed to such policy decisions. But it was determined that old advantages might actually be more effectively maintained and managed by an indigenous "self-governing" elite tied to the ex-metropole by other, non-official links.

In contrast, at some different point in the evolution of the colony, some colonial-settlers began to realize that: (1) they could benefit to a greater extent if they were to sever or at least re-arrange their links with the metropole; and/or (2) ultimate self-government for the fringe majority (and even for an indigenous elite tied to the ex-metropole) might jeopardize the colonial-settlers' preferred position in the colony. Hence, it became clear that their own interests conflicted with those of their mother country, or at least with the governing elements there. This left them with basically three alternatives. In order of probable preference to the colonial-settlers these were: (1) independence with government in the hands of the colonial-settlers, usually a minority government except in cases of the earlier classical colonies; (2) continued colonial rule with the colonial-settlers in legal surrogate but still privileged positions; or (3) independence under an indigenous government. It was possible, although risky, to attempt a fourth alternative, somewhere between alternatives two and three, that is, to create an airtight alliance with key elements of the indigenous elite and support their bid to independence. This is not unlike the way that the colonial-settlers in Katanga (Shaba) championed Moise Tshombe. But this provided littler security since, ultimately, both the imperial powers and the indigenous majority would seek to annul this marriage of convenience. It is wrong, therefore, blindly to regard colonial-settlers as nothing but spokesman for the imperial core state.

Thus, the presence and pressures of the colonial-settlers may help explain why some imperial powers have been unwilling or have had a difficult time divesting themselves of certain territories. The colonial-settlers themselves and their allies and agents in the metropole proved to be a tenacious and formidable political force in metropolitan politics. Their lives were meaningless outside of their own portion of empire. They benefited directly from their colony. Therefore, they promoted their colony. Ironically, this is why they were sometimes found opposing the core's center when decisions of empire were in the balance. They challenged the mother country whenever it
appeared that the latter was making policy based upon considerations of the wider, total empire. No matter how paradoxical this may appear, it is conceivable and likely that the contemporary imperial relationship (i.e., the unequal exchange relationship) no longer needs colonial-settlers. Hence, empire might actually be advanced by policies that on the surface seem to represent a retreat from formal or juridical empire. This has been an era when the formal institutional trappings of empire are a liability. Because colonial-settlers' horizons are limited or because their field of maneuver is provincial, not global, colonial-settlers resist their "sell-out" by pursuing what they try to promote as "anti-imperial" policies that are in their immediate interest, but in conflict with the long-run interests as conceived by the core's center. They become, in short, anti-imperialists in the global context in order to facilitate, prolong and strengthen their own domestic "imperial" system. The colonial-settlers, then, come to be a middle force, exploiting and denigrating the indigenous territorial or regional population, slowing down the process of independence for an indigenous government, and also, occasionally, resisting the policies of the great corporations and their governmental spokesmen back in the metropole. Settler communities, unlike the big capitalist enterprises, have by and large been unable to come to terms with even the indigenous elite. Only by seceding from the empire could the colonial settlers be free to repress and exploit more completely the majority fringe in their territories, the element that to them represents the greatest threat. It appeared, with South Africa's outward policy, dialogue about dialogue, and detente, that South Africa's leaders were ready to accommodate themselves to bourgeois black regimes on their boundaries. But there are built-in limits as to how flexible they can be.

The core's center and especially the core's fringe do not easily abandon their colonial settlers. Racial attachments, family and psychological ties of "kith and kin" do not evaporate on signal. For these reasons the abandonment is seldom total, and may in fact only take place on one level, the governmental.

South Africa's complexities, with racial affinities confused by Afrikaner against English-speaker in turn further baffled by class sympathies and identities, prompted the Afrikaner government to regard Great Britain not as the mother country but as the imperial enemy. But there were also powerful British-rooted economic interests in turn-of-the-century South Africa that
saw an opportunity to enlarge profits if they could involve the British govern-
ment and military in their own cause. Britain "won" the ensuing Boer War but "lost" the peace. While the British and English-speaking South Africans took
firm hold of the economy the political system was turned back to the Afrikaners. **Boer against Great Britain is an unusual case because of the nationalistic split that accounted for important economic contradictions among the colonial-settlers in South Africa. Far more frequently colonial-settlers derive from the metropole itself, and usually are only a generation or two or three removed from the "home country". In Rhodesia, Algeria, Kenya, Angola, Mozambique and Katanga this has been the case. Race and ethnicity are convenient code groupings that may, of course, be raised to the level of causal factors, as in South Africa. But they are reinforced and made important because of the economic and political ramifications they entail.**

As the colonial-settler community took root it began to establish institu-
tions and interests that, depending on their size and character, became increasingly independent of the metropole. Even nominally metropolitan institu-
tions displayed fissiparous tendencies. It did not take colonial officials in the territory long to realize that only one thing stood between them and uninhibited power, the metropolitan government. So they began with appeals for more decisional latitude, followed them with arguments for the efficiency and "democracy" of greater decentralization and territorial autonomy, and ended up with demands for and finally declarations of independence. The speed with which this process moved depended on a number of factors, not the least of which were the degree to which the administrative machinery depended on metropolitan revenues and military might to assure their station, the extent of settler pressure behind them, and the determination of the metropolitan government to resist such trends. Settler colonies were more inclined to move along this road than purely administrative colonies. If colonial settlers felt that they might add to their economic privileges as well as their power by moving away from the mother country, they did not hesitate, arguing as did the Rhodesians, that it was the mother country that disowned them, not the other way around. **Likewise, settler employees and officials of metropolitan-based enterprises also manifested independent tendencies, especially if they reasoned that their local operations were self-sufficient and could compete in the total world economy and that they might thereby inflate their psychological and material**
rewards by assuming total control rather than exercising subordinate administrative roles. Moreover, other fully or principally local enterprises were competitors of metropolitan interests, and hence suffered from ultimate authority being in the hands of the core's center. They were not especially sympathetic to the interests of the imperial whole. Indeed, since they were anxious to maximize their immediate advantages by exploiting the indigenous labor pool more ruthlessly, they constituted the most aggressive segment of the colonial-settler opponents of continued imperial rule.

In some African colonies, for various reasons, the imperial power allied, albeit not always enthusiastically, with the indigenous bourgeois nationalists whom they regarded as the best bet to prolong the imperial pattern of unequal relationships without the albatross of juridical empire. No force in the issue supported the indigenous masses. In some cases, the hasty retreat from legalistic colonialism can be explained by a desire on the part of imperial decision makers to move before the colonial settlers could consolidate their positions and snatch independence for themselves. It was not an altruistic desire to allow majorities to be self-governing. Rather, legalistic decolonization was simply an evidence of long-term flexibility. There was the danger that racial minority regimes in former colonies were unstable and increasingly independent of the former metropole. The core's center had already chosen the indigenous bourgeois bureaucrats to replace the often irascible, sometimes demanding, potentially independent colonial-settler officials. The process frequently led to the colonial-settler regime being ostracized as a pariah by neighbors and often the wider global community. By thus being isolated the regime gains added incentive to solidify its independence by pursuing autarchic policies designed to make it economically and militarily self-sufficient.

There is, of course, no reason why at some point indigenous bureaucrats cannot reason as do the colonial-settlers. In the future they too may begin to think that they possess the skills and resources to "go it alone", and by so doing avoid the necessity of sharing power and profit with metropolitan interests. In addition, their own domestic political insecurity may compel them at least to appear to break with the core states. This would require that they somehow transcend a dependent colonial mentality that had been carefully cultivated by imperial experience. This is not impossible, however, to some extent it has already occurred in some territories, as in Tanzania.
In most cases the relationship between the centers of core and periphery is dynamic with each side testing the limits of control and autonomy. However, the periphery's centers usually look upon revolutionary autonomy as premature or "unrealistic".

Indicators as to why the imperial powers oppose the independence of colonial settler governments might be found in the policies that these governments followed once they secured juridical independence. The case of South Africa and, although the time factor makes this difficult, the case of Rhodesia, are instructive. South Africa, for example, has moved in the past thirty years from a state almost entirely dependent on economic and other ties with the former metropole to one that, although still dependent on core economic forces, has learned to exploit these relationships more fully. In so doing South Africa, not the ex-metropole, has begun to define the terms of contact. It, more than the ex-metropole, has begun to exercise regional economic hegemony, and it is being re-integrated into the global capitalist system on far more favorable terms.

Without reviewing the economic evolution and most notably the industrialization of South Africa, we can appreciate that the government in Pretoria today defines the terms of foreign investment and trade in that country. In the past South Africa had been principally a supplier of gold and raw materials for European and North American finance and industry. But its government has taken conscious steps to reshape this relationship of dependency. By creating governmental corporations, especially in "vulnerable" and strategically important economic and military sectors, by investing in infrastructure, by direct government investment in foreign-based private firms, by requiring sales of stock locally, by forcing or encouraging foreign capital to accept increasing degrees of local participating and control, by forcing industrialization through regulations demanding increased local content of products assembled in South Africa, and by redefining the terms of trade with other core countries through adjustments in tariff and licensing policies, South Africa has asserted its independence of Great Britain. The result has been not only a consolidation of the instruments of domestic colonialism, but the creation of a South African imperialism of its own. The South African government has not only dominated key sectors of the economy, but it has "domesticated" many that, in the context of other countries, had been heretofore fairly rapacious and self-contained foreign enterprises.
One gets the impression that there has not been much resistance from executives and directors in the core, largely because this enables them to plead innocence regarding apartheid social policies that they have not really tried to change or modify, and from which they profit. An attitude of self-imposed isolation growing out of South Africa's inability to deal with external and internal criticism and ostracism, combined with regional strategic vulnerability, contributed to this policy direction. External and internal threat were real enough to harden their resolve to maximize their defensibility, independence and autarky.

All of this is not to argue that the Republic of South Africa is a totally independent entity in world politics, divorced from the wider capitalist economic system. It is sufficient, however, to give rise to discussion as to whether, at least in terms of Southern Africa, the South African tail is wagging the U.K. dog, or at least is doing pretty much as it pleases without much more than verbal resistance from U.K. or U.S. governments and investors. Since peripheral relationships are a matter of degree, it must be admitted that South Africa is significantly more independent of Great Britain today that twenty-five years ago, and considerably more than most ostensibly "independent" former colonies. Moreover, although today there is more contact between various European capitalist interests and their South African counterparts, it must be added that what is vital in exploring imperial relationships is not solely the extent or volume of these links, but their qualitative nature, in terms of super and subordination. To be sure, extensive linkages can contribute to the perception and the reality of dependence. But in itself it is not explanatory. The more important questions relate to the character of those relationships and the extent of their inequality. Who benefits and who loses and to what extent? Certainly there is a great deal more trade between the United States and Europe than there is between the United States and Latin America. But in one case the effect of that trade yields dominance and dependence; in the other case, the relationship is more debatable. The same might be noted with regard to investments, technical exchanges, cultural and communications contacts and political ties. Or take the case of South Africa. Less than eight per cent of its trade is with Africa, but the asymmetry lies essentially in its favor. In contrast about seventy per cent of its trade is directed to Europe and America. In the latter arrangement, however, the relationships are considerably more equitable. Structurally the spin-offs still benefit the industrial states and the center of the intermediary state. Hence volume and quality (in monetary
and structural terms) must be considered in any analytical equation. It is not enough to argue that since return on investment is higher in South Africa than practically anywhere else in the Commonwealth, then British and American capital is exploiting South Africa. Rather the better argument is that outside investors are exploiting the indigenous population (the fringe) and the natural resources of South Africa, but so is the colonial settler minority, even to a greater degree. Exploitation, it must be remembered, is not a zero-sum game. One side's gains do not necessarily cancel out the other party's losses. Rather certain organizational and structural changes may inflate the sum total of gains, rendering exploitation no less real, but nevertheless altering the magnitude and character of the relationships. The apartheid policies of the South African regime have rendered a situation where there is more than enough for the centers in both the core and the intermediary. Some of the excess may be distributed to the fringe in the core -- almost none goes to the indigenous fringe in Southern Africa. Hence it is not so much that the colonial settlers are against finance imperialism in principle. Rather, there seems to be a kind of love-hate relationship founded on a conflicting yet complementary economic partnership and a positive community of security interests. The core supplies the capital, the technology, the trade, the long-term protection and strategic support and the ideological legitimation in the world at large, and the center of the intermediary state provides the political structure for controlling and exploiting indigenous labor, access to the raw materials and the ruthlessness and muscle to maintain local order. They need one another, but they still do not trust one another, since each can conceive of arrangements that might be preferable, and even more profitable to itself.

The decisional center of gravity has been shifted by determined and conscious governmental policy by the center of the intermediary state. Insofar as profits continue to flow to the core's center, new investments (which in most cases are re-investments of locally generated profits) and increased trade will accrue to South Africa. But the structural instruments for greater independence from the core are being established despite and because of the extension of these contacts.

South Africa's relations with the core are in an important transitional state. Its governing elite senses this. Earlier, South Africa's leaders sug-
gested that they might serve as "bridges" between black Africa and Europe. But later views became more assertive and independent of Europe. As the African states were about to be granted formal independence, Foreign Minister Louw gratuitously warned African statesmen of the dangers of dealing with Europe. He spoke of "self-appointed advisors" from "outside" who sought only profit for themselves and the countries that sent them. Moreover, he cited the dangers of "foreign financiers" seeking valuable concessions and guaranteed profits. Finally, he told them that with foreign aid "a political quid pro quo will be demanded (or at least expected)." Not bad advice, and coming from one whose people, earlier in its history suffered some of these same imperial machinations. He clearly meant the European powers, but latter-day warnings have substituted the spectre of communist rather than European capitalist imperialism.

Louw's words might well have served as early caution regarding South Africa's "outward looking" policy. Later Pretoria became fully aware of the opportunities that its growing economic power affords it in black Africa. White South Africans draw the parallels between their role in the rest of Africa and the United States' domination of the Americas. Insofar as this could be realized the result would be an intense struggle between EuroAmerican interests and those of South Africa for hegemony in Southern Africa. It has already begun in some places, such as Malawi, Rhodesia and the former High Commission Territories, to the extent that the indigenous governments permit and encourage it. But though South Africa is anxious to assert its independence of Europe and America in economic terms, it is still keen on falling back on these powers as strategic elements in the global contest, and even in the regional contest, especially since the tenuous balance of forces has been altered.

Even though the control mechanisms may be slipping from the hands of the ruling elements in the metropole, the new relationships are so lucrative as to neutralize some core protest and resistance and to produce acquiescence if not enthusiastic collaboration from various elites, notwithstanding sporadic public outcries of righteous indignation. But the structural changes are central.

Much current discussion of imperialism flows from the common sense proposition that whoever pays the piper calls the tune. Things are not that simple in practice. We have arrived at a situation in Southern Africa (and
elsewhere, too) where there is a widening "non-correspondence between the nationality of capital and the nationality of effective state power." For example, the core may be prevented, because of domestic political problems or external pressures and risks, from applying full military and financial power everywhere. Even should this be attempted, success is not guaranteed. Hence, in regional affairs the core may, by necessity, defer to governments that on one hand may appear to be junior partners but on some questions effectively become equal or even senior partners. South Africa had been carving out such a relationship before the Portuguese fall and the growing effectiveness of black revolutionary forces in the region forced the core to search for newer arrangements.

We have presented an overview of relations in Southern Africa. It remains to describe current aspects of regional relationships in order to analyze and interpret events as they unfold.

**Contemporary Regional Relations**

The economic might of the Republic of South Africa (RSA) continues to cast a shadow over the entire region and the spectre of South Africa's armed forces hovers nearby. In many ways white South Africa is both the glue holding the region together as an embryonic economic unit and the irritant that might precipitate its dismemberment. South Africa produces sixty-six per cent of the region's gross domestic product. Virtually all economic indicators (in colonial times) and the basic economic infrastructure reinforced this situation. Transport routes, voluntary and recruited migratory labor flows, the economic and geopolitical ramifications of being land-locked, electrical grids and transfers of technology and investment served to strengthen the dominance relationships favoring the settler and colonial regimes, especially of South Africa and Portugal.17

It has not been easy for leaders in independent African states to sever these linkages. Indeed, there is serious question regarding their commitment to re-structure these dependent economic relationships, and their capacity to do so even if they desired. The burdens of subordination do not fall evenly on all peoples and governments. To appreciate the complex reality of uneven levels of dependency, it is necessary to review the extensity and intensity of regional linkages of the specific territories concerned.

**South West Africa/Namibia.** This territory occupies a unique position in
During World War I, South West Africa, which had been a German colony, was occupied by South African troops. This was legitimized by the Allied and Associated Powers which, under terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations, designated South West Africa a Class C Mandate to be administered by South Africa. With the demise of the League and its replacement by the United Nations, South Africa, rather than allow the UN to oversee its administration of the area as a Trust Territory, approached the General Assembly for permission to incorporate the territory into the Union. The General Assembly denied this request in December 1946. Following this rebuff, South Africa continued to administer South West Africa as a part of South Africa, claiming to do so under terms of the Mandate. Although the General Assembly passed a resolution in 1966 terminating South Africa's mandate, and subsequent advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice and resolutions of the General Assembly and Security Council maintain that the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia (as it is now officially designated outside of South Africa) is illegal, South Africa still rules the vast territory.

South West Africa is integrally a part of the South African economy, using the same currency, the same tariff structure, regulated from Pretoria, and with trade and productivity data being incorporated officially into common statistics. But despite the apparent effective occupation and integration, there is growing evidence of popular discontent and of a reluctant South African willingness to readjust its relationship with the underpopulated, mineral-rich land in order to secure the success of its detente policy and its long-range stabilization as a white regime in a black continent. Nonetheless, by a series of fortuitous (for South Africa) circumstances, the conquest and absorption of South West Africa represented the first success of the expansive policy of the independent government in the Union of South Africa. It was a harbinger of the outward policy and of South Africa's budding challenge to Great Britain for control of the region.

With the increased international pressures regarding Namibia, South Africa cannot continue to occupy the territory much as before. Rather South Africa is moving to modernize the dependency relationship. Realizing that accommodations must be made if South Africa is to escape being drawn into an international war over Namibia, and if the white inhabitants of Namibia are to be protected and South African business interests are to continue to operate profitably in the territory, South Africa has sought to arrive at an internal
settlement with various conservative ethnic interests in Namibia. South Africa has permitted the U.N. Secretary-General and his deputies to visit Namibia where they have met with petitioners of diverse viewpoint and nationality.

Realizing as well, as did other colonial powers before it, that it was not imperative to administer a dependency directly, South Africa wants to emplant a cooperative, indeed pliable indigenous government, one that would exclude the revolutionary liberation movement (SWAPO) from participation. If SWAPO cannot be totally excluded, South Africa hopes to neutralize or isolate them in the domestic Namibian political process. At present, South Africa intends to grant independence to a racially mixed government by the end of 1978. Such a step, it is hoped, would deflect international criticisms and blunt the appeal of revolutionaries. To South Africa it is a dynamic and gradual adjustment (they would see it as an initiative) to an already explosive and unmanageable issue.

Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. On November 11, 1965, the white minority Rhodesian Front Government declared its independence of Great Britain. After 33 years of being administered by the British South Africa Company (BSAC, Cecil Rhodes's concessionary corporation), Rhodesia had been annexed as a British colony in 1923. The predominantly white Rhodesian electorate on October 22, 1922, had voted 8,774 to 5,989 to reject amalgamation with the Union of South Africa in favor of responsible government under the British crown. The choice was a setback for South Africa, Britain and the BSAC, all of whom urged Rhodesians to join South Africa. But as Rhodesia grew and greater and greater resources were discovered, competition between Britain and South Africa for control mounted.

Colonial status for Rhodesia gave British capitalists and settlers certain advantages over their South African counterparts. So when UDI was declared, the stage was again set for more open competition between the two powers vying for regional dominance.

South Africa had the advantage of location. Its proximity plus road and rail links with Rhodesia were crucial. Likewise, its ports (although already crowded) gave it an opportunity to help Rhodesia evade the sanctions imposed by the UN. Rhodesian dollars could be exchanged for South African Rands. South African "police" units (upwards of 4,000 men) bolstered the Rhodesian anti-guerrilla forces.19 And South Africa's sympathetic whites and their government facilitated the life of a pariah state in an otherwise hostile world. Portugal, through its colony of Mozambique, also provided similar "services".20
Far away Great Britain, in contrast, by the ill-chosen device of economic sanctions (the government had earlier ruled out the use of force), had virtually severed the most effective links it had with Rhodesia, i.e., cultural, trade and monetary contacts and tariff arrangements. In effect Rhodesia became for South African businessmen a captive market. The overall impact of the rearrangement of dependencies is that the white minority regime, though conscious of its drift southward, became heavily dependent for the maintenance of its domination on South Africa. Military, economic, strategic and cultural contacts with South Africa expanded as those with Great Britain contracted or were severed. The result was that by around 1972 Rhodesia could be referred to figuratively as South Africa's "Sixth Province". Even the Zambian Foreign Minister, in explaining his country's dealing with South Africa to gain the peaceful liberation of Zimbabwe and Namibia, argued that "The de facto position is that South Africa is the colonial authority we have to deal with." Certainly, there is an important distinction between colonial status and that of a province, but the message with regard to the ultimate locus of power is clear. Nonetheless, for diverse reasons South Africa's leaders have chosen to reconsider this tendency.

Angola. Even though in the later years of Portuguese rule more whites (almost 500,000) resided in Angola than in any part of the region except South Africa, this territory was never especially close to South Africa. Infrastructural links were never developed, and trade and investment relationships were marginal. The Cunene River scheme (hydroelectric and irrigation), now under construction, was the first major tangible linkage southward. In fact, the British had more profound economic ties with Angola through their Portuguese connections and their investments in the Benguela railway and in various mineral and plantation developments. For the bureaucrats, business interests and the white citizens of Angola, the structural linkages of dependency headed northward through Lisbon. The Benguela railway, in turn, inflated Angola's strategic importance for the copper mines of Zaire and Zambia. Rather, Portugal (in Angola) and South Africa stood united as ideological and psychological bastions of resistance to majority rule and black nationalism. They also collaborated in military-intelligence-strategic activities and reinforced one another in Western and international forums.

But the April 1974 overthrow of the Portuguese government by dissident young officers, and the ultimate rise to power of leftist elements in the armed forces
changed this. After thirteen years of revolutionary war in three African territories the Portuguese sought to terminate the wars by withdrawing from Africa. The coup leaders at first did not advocate a total abandonment of their territories in Africa. General Antonio Spinola, who led the military junta until his forced resignation on 30 September 1974, favored a policy of continued federation or association with Angola and Mozambique in order to protect the large Portuguese minorities in these territories and to maintain the profitable economic links on which the fragile Portuguese economy depended. This, coupled with the prospects of a right-wing military coup, external manipulations and attempted assassinations, led the younger militant officers in the Armed Forces Movement to force Spinola from office and into exile, and to divest Portugal (as they had originally planned) of its African holdings. The pace of decolonization in Mozambique quickened, for Mozambique was blessed by the presence of only one effective African nationalist movement, the widely popular Frelimo. Angola still remained a question as no single liberation movement (the MPLA, the FNLA or UNITA) had asserted ascendancy. Collaboration among them in a transitional government, encouraged by Portugal, the OAU and by various African governments, continually faltered. Eventually a full scale civil war erupted and in mid-1975 a coalition of FNLA (based in northern Angola and assisted by Zaire, the United States and China) and UNITA (eastern and southern based and assisted by the United States and South Africa) fought against the MPLA (supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba), entrenched in the capital and in control of many key cities, coastal regions and ports.

Zaire has long dreamt of re-establishing the historic Congo kingdom by annexing northern Angola. Although such an irredenta may frighten some Angolans, it frightens them even more since it leaves unsettled the fate of Cabinda, the oil-rich enclave on the north side of the Congo River, heretofore administered as part of Angola and coveted by Zaire and others. There in late 1974 a subsidiary of Gulf Oil was lifting 300,000 barrels a day and far more in prospect. One can quickly see a possible explanation for the cooperation of Zaire and the United States with the FNLA. The MPLA's occupation of Cabinda threatens Gulf interests and thwarts Zaire's and the FNLA's desire to secure those oil revenues for themselves.

Because of domestic unrest and indecision the Portuguese government had been unable to act in Angola. They favored the MPLA, which also seemed most effectively in control in the field. But Portugal wanted to achieve a smooth
transition to self-government before independence was granted on November 11, 1975. It was difficult for them simply to cut Angola adrift before a resolution of the civil war was assured, especially in that Portugal might be effectively abandoning a large number of Portuguese still in Angola. But as the civil war became more unmanageable, Angolan whites fled the territory. By the scheduled independence of Angola in November 1975, a mass exodus left only 30,000 whites out of some 500,000 there before the coup.24 And the Portuguese armed forces, which once numbered as many as 70,000, withdrew totally by independence. Angola became, for the white Portuguese, an abandoned land. Portugal's role in the Angolan war became basically insignificant once the Armed Forces Movement let it be known that Portugal intended to withdraw.

Despite the MPLA's control of the capital and its heavy military assistance from the Soviet Union and Cuba, the FNLA with Zairian and mercenary assistance did not fold in its northern home base.25 And UNITA, in uneasy alliance with FNLA in the south, and supported by mercenary forces and South African regulars (officially set at up to 2,000 men) attached to UNITA units, slashed through southern and coastal Angola taking key cities and ports. MPLA with massive Cuban military aid repulsed this thrust and eventually asserted an uneasy governmental control over Angola,26 but UNITA still harrasses the government forces through large stretches of territory. South Africa, the United States, Zaire and China still dabble in Angola, as do the latter and Cuba in Zairian affairs.

Mozambique. In contrast to the Angolan situation, South Africa's ties with Mozambique have been extensive, intensive and long-standing. It has been estimated that in 1971, for example, approximately forty-two per cent of Mozambique's GNP was derived from South African links.27 Particularly vital are South Africa's use of the port of Maputo (Lourenco Marques) for the shipments of the Witwatersrand (Johannesburg and vicinity). Mozambique also secures the hard capital earned by her railways and ports; the per capita fees, wages, and taxes paid and collected by South Africans for mine labor; exports to South Africa; and in the past the tourist trade generated by South Africans and Rhodesians. The supply of laborers to the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association is, by governmental agreement of 1901 and updated in 1928, tied into the use of the port of Maputo. In return for the exclusive right to contract for up to 100,000 workers per year in Mozambique, South Africa agreed to ship at least 47.5 per cent of the Transvaal's exports and imports through
the port. More modern linkages, particularly the Caborra Bassa hydroelectric project, have intensified South African interests in continued good relations with whomever controls Mozambique and vice versa.28

Where doubt and pessimism marked the march to independence in Angola, euphoria and optimism characterized the process in Mozambique, even among some whites remaining in the country. The announcement of a new constitution set the tone. The fundamental objective of the new state would be to eliminate the structures of oppression and colonial exploitation, to extend and reinforce democratic popular power and, in terms of foreign affairs, to carry on "the struggle against colonialism and imperialism." In addition foreign capital would be allowed to operate only within the framework of the economic policy of the state. Such a course is to be followed even though other socialist countries are to be the "natural allies" of Mozambique.29

President Samora Machel, in the weeks before and after independence, fleshed out these dicta regarding Mozambique's regional policy, although he did so with a desire to keep as many options open as he could. He said, for example, that Mozambique was firmly committed to backing Zimbabwe nationalists in their bid for majority rule. On South Africa he has taken a less militant line, despite expressions of solidarity with the masses in South Africa and Namibia.30 Rhodesia and Ian Smith are excoriated regularly in the press, but John Vorster is treated more civilly. At first, relations continued without major hitch. Until early 1978, South Africa acted as Mozambique's agent by selling on the open market the gold heretofore usually transferred to Portugal at the official rate to cover the deferred payments to Mozambican workers on the South African mines. The hard currency at windfall profits thereby gained was sent to Mozambique, one early result of the coup. The South African consulate general in Maputo, closed before independence, has been replaced by a visa office, although the Mozambicans have not established a similar office in South Africa.

On the supply of mine laborers, Frelimo Vice President Marcelino dos Santos has said, "In principle we are against recruiting workers for imperialism. However, we must also be realistic. We cannot assume our full responsibilities in relation to South Africa in a month or even a year."31 But it is just this blend of principle and realism that has marked Frelimo's rule and which keeps the South Africans guessing and hopeful. Policies, by and large, have involved only moderate change. But it is the implication that changes will occur and
the real meaning of the cryptic "our full responsibilities in relation to South Africa" that loom in South Africa's future.

Rhodesians were even more the target of Frelimo bombast. Nonetheless, despite Britain's offer to subsidize Mozambique's losses from closing the border with Rhodesia, the government did not close Rhodesia's access routes by rail or road to the Indian Ocean ports of Beira and Maputo until March 1976. Since then there have been major border incursions and a virtual state of war prevails.

Zambia. Before independence in 1964, Zambia's long-standing relations with the white settler regimes were intense, extensive and ambiguous. Dependence upon transport routes southward to export copper was until recently almost complete. For example, as late as 1972 over fifty per cent of Zambia's exports went by rail through Rhodesia and almost fifty per cent of its imports came via Rhodesia. A good many Zambian businesses had been subsidiaries of Rhodesian and South African firms, or of British firms managed from regional offices in Johannesburg or Salisbury. Zambia's own white population (nearly 74,000 at independence, around 30,000 today), so crucial for important technical and managerial skills, originated in large part in the south, or at least it had imbibed a heady slug of the social philosophy of segregation and racial supremacy from colonial settler societies. Historically, Zambia has traded heavily with Rhodesia and South Africa. In 1964, for example, some sixty per cent of Zambia's imports came from the white south, where it sold about twelve per cent of its exports. By 1975 this had been considerably reduced and South Africa had fallen to sixth place as Zambia's source of imports, mostly in the critical grain, mining and equipment sectors. The years since Zambian independence and Rhodesia's UDI (1965) have seen Zambia consciously attempt to reorient its economy and cultural life away from white settler Africa.

Symbolic of the reoriented economy has been the celebrated Tanzara (the Tan-Zam Railway) which links the copper belt to Dar es Salaam 1,860 kilometers away. Despite manifold problems (changing gauges, inadequate port facilities in Dar, the lightness of construction that necessitates half-loaded cars), it provides Zambia with a vital alternative lifeline and thereby increases its bargaining power with Rhodesia and South Africa.

In another sense Rhodesia is responsible for Zambia's ability to redirect its trade and transport. In January 1973, Prime Minister Smith closed the
border with Zambia, hoping to force President Kaunda to stifle Zambabwean liberation movement activities in Zambia. Instead, the Zambians completely rejected Smith's demands and closed their side of the border. They then utilized alternative routes for all shipments. Rhodesian Railways thus lost around $1,200,000 monthly in revenues from Zambia. This, coupled with hostile political measures (UN votes, sanctuary for political exiles and nationalist leaders, leadership in efforts to isolate minority ruled southern African regimes), have imparted a sense of independence heretofore absent from Zambian foreign policy.

Still, the Zambian economy (and hence the Zambian government of Kenneth Kaunda) is in deep trouble. It is partially the old problem of unequal exchange, and of markets for primary commodities being in the hands chiefly of the consumer corporations and countries. The demand for copper (which used to account for ninety-eight per cent of Zambia's foreign exchange earnings) is down. This has led to an extended slump in prices and a forty per cent reduction in sales. Transportation difficulties still exist (largely because of the warfare in Angola and border closures) and have led to the two giant mining corporations declaring a forty per cent force majeur because they have been unable to fill orders. Such developments, coupled with inflated import prices (especially of oil), and inefficiencies and misdirections in domestic development priorities have left Zambia with massive balance of payment deficits. Such internal difficulties may have partially led President Kaunda to seek to resolve the nagging Rhodesian issue.

Malawi. Since Malawian independence in 1964, President H. Kamuzu Banda has not nearly so consciously moved to terminate links with the white south. Despite appearances that lead critics to draw attention to newsworthy contacts, many of which (in diplomatic and strategic terms as well as in investments and financial aid) are undeniable and expanding, Malawi trade with the white south has shrunken since 1964 when twenty-two per cent of exports and forty-six per cent of imports were in that direction. By 1972 these figures had been reduced to 7.7 per cent and 34.4 per cent respectively. But South Africa's share rose from six per cent of exports and imports in 1964 to 5.5 per cent of exports and 29.5 per cent of imports in 1976. The supply of Malawian labor for South African mines has been cut back from a peak of around 130,000 miners per year. A 1974 Malawian order to suspend recruitment had led to a drop to
only 207 by 1977. That year recruitment was resumed and by early 1978 the number of Malawians on the gold mines had risen to 20,000. It is not likely to go much higher. This South African pressure fulcrum has been eroded. One must not discount the deep involvement of Malawi with the white south. President Banda's panache at a time when the rest of black Africa sought to bury white rule in the region had an impact beyond mere trade and commercial contact. This data must be seen in its total context, that of a state that had not depended upon, but has chosen to link its economic future with South Africa.

It is in the field of aid and investment that South Africa makes a greater impact. The secondment of South African governmental officials and private individuals to Malawi government offices, the financial assistance to build the new capital at Lilongwe and the Nacala rail link through Mozambique, increased bidding by South African firms on contracts in Malawi, and other projects supported by loans from the quasi-public Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa etch the design of contact and mutual support deeper. In a way both the British and South Africans see it as a form of competition for influence in the country.

Ironically, President Banda, who most vocally and consciously led the pro-"dialogue" with South Africa forces during the late 1960s and early 1970s, has kept a low profile during the "detente" phase of regional affairs from 1974 to 1976. He has been consolidating his position domestically and seeking to normalize relations with his new neighbors (Frelimo) and his old ones. President Banda dealt openly and cordially with the Portuguese forces and had made major territorial claims on Tanzania and Zambia, among other less than friendly gestures. His earlier pragmatic opening southward has evolved into an equally pragmatic re-association with black Africa.

Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. The former High Commission Territories are reluctantly but integrally a part of South Africa's economic hinterland. All are land-locked, completely surrounded (except for a geometrical contact point between Botswana and Zambia in the middle of the Zambezi River and Swaziland's sixty miles of border with Mozambique) by white-governed territories. But being land-locked is not the sole cause of their economic vulnerability and their intimacy with South Africa. Early in their respective histories as separate protectorates, it was widely assumed in South Africa, in Great Britain and in the territories themselves that eventually they would be absorbed by
South Africa. Their total economic infrastructure and their financial, monetary and commercial affairs were an appendage of South Africa. They participated in a common currency system, a common tariff structure, common banking and commercial services and saw their communications and transport systems integrated into those of South Africa. Botswana's economic lifeline, the railway, is still owned and operated by Rhodesian Railways, and its capital had been located at Mafeking in South African territory. All three territories export labor to South Africa (mostly for work on the mines). Lesotho is most profoundly affected; some 40-45 per cent of all adult Basuto males are employed in South Africa. For Swaziland and Botswana the figure is approximately fifteen per cent. This occurs with the full knowledge and cooperation of the respective governments. Wages, remittances and deferred pay are sent home by the employers' organizations and the workers. This, combined with recruiting fees, taxes and revenue from customs and excise, all paid directly by the South African authorities to the "exporting" governments, render these governments dependent upon revenues generated in South Africa.

While all three are, on paper, dependent on South Africa for their economic well-being, they do evidence varying degrees of vulnerability and varying perspectives on their independence. Lesotho is perhaps the most dependent and Swaziland the least. Leaders of each are aware of the circumstances and all pay lip-service to the twin imperatives of living at peace with their neighbors and yet broadening their alternatives (both economic and political). President Khama of Botswana has been most consistent since independence in his desire to maintain political independence in the face of economic isolation and constraint. Swaziland, less critical of South Africa and less revolutionary in its determination to break South Africa's economic stranglehold, has been relatively cordial in its dealings with and about South Africa. But Swaziland has an added dimension of vulnerability, and this refers to Mozambique. The monarchy of King Sobhuza has little in common with the radical Frelimo government that presently controls Swaziland's vital access to the sea. Simply because both are black-governed should not hide deep differences in purpose, social bases of support and governmental style. Lesotho, under Chief Jonathan Leabua, oscillates between periods of intense collaboration with South Africa (1966-1972) and vocal hostility (1972 to date). In the cases of all three governments, however, the short-term options are few if the regime is to maintain itself and the economy not revert to abject subsistence. There are various
limited or incremental alternatives (especially those pursued by Botswana) that prepare the peoples and their governments for a more independent economic line and that lay the groundwork for future development, but in all instances choices are limited and risks are great.

**Tanzania.** Depending on one's perspective, Tanzania and Zaire may or may not be included in Southern Africa. I happen to think they belong. In the case of Tanzania, although historical and economic ties southward are marginal, they seem to be growing. Tanzanian support for liberation movements, particularly Frelimo in Mozambique, led to continuous interaction with a hostile Portugal, with sympathetic inhabitants of Mozambique and now with a friendly government there. The furtherance of Tanzanian efforts has also contributed to greater coordination of her sanctuary role with Zambia. The oil pipeline between Dar es Salaam and the Zambian Copperbelt, new all-weather roads, and the Tan-Zam railway now link the two countries economically, as well as politically and strategically. So Tanzania, although geographically not a part of Southern Africa and historically tied to East Africa, is coming to play a role in regional affairs. Diplomatic interaction regarding initiatives to achieve a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia expand this role.

**Zaire.** Zaire has long had economic ties southward. The Copperbelts of Shaba (Katanga) and Zambia were intimately tied in infrastructural terms. Katanga's copper, moreover, was shipped out via the Benguela Railway and Lobito, and her imports entered through that route. The capital city, Kinshasa, was in Bakongo country, and the continual flow of these peoples across the border (in both directions) linked Angola and Zaire. Today, with Zaire coveting the petroleum of Cabinda and Zaire's intimate involvement in the internal warfare in Angola (through its support of the FNLA) and vice versa, its impact on Southern African affairs continues to be undeniable.

Contemporary Events: Is the Region Becoming Unglued?

There are two conflicting impulses vying for ascendancy in regional affairs -- the impulse to atomism and the impulse to regional integration. Each is currently identified with important political forces. The atomists are largely those black political forces that seek independence in Namibia, and majority rule in the cases of Zimbabwe and South Africa. Included as well are leaders in already independent black states that wish to extricate their economies and
policies from the pervasive tug of South African economic power. They have been atomists simply because to foster regional integration, given today's distribution of power and wealth, means to acquiesce in if not to contribute to South African dominance. In many ways these people are seeking to undo a pattern of interaction that has prevailed and been reinforced for decades and to resist the continued economic dynamism of the industrialized white South. We should not assume, however, that this attitude toward regional integration will always prevail among the nationalist governments. The regional balance of forces is shifting, especially with Portugal's departure. Selective integrative measures are proposed and implemented that involve independent black governments. The Zambian about-face on issues like Caborra Bassa and the Nacala rail link after the establishment of a Frelimo government illustrates a flexibility on the issue. On the other hand, given the eventual establishment of a majority government in South Africa, it would be likely that neighboring black states may still wish to avoid the centralizing and hegemonial tendencies associated with uneven development and economic asymmetry.

Aligned against these forces are the predominant economic interests in South Africa who view the outward movement as an opportunity to establish what they, and others before them, have regarded as a logical role for South Africa in the region, the industrial heartland of an increasingly cooperative and ultimately integrated economic entity characterized by continued minority rule in South Africa itself. Proposals to institutionalize these aspirations, as a Southern African Common Market or Free Trade Area, are legion. Ironically, Afrikanerdom has itself been ambiguous about its role -- to lead the region and thereby solidify the ascendance of die Volk, or to withdraw behind the laager and thereby guarantee the integrity of the culture. English-speaking South Africans have for long held the commercially-motivated viewpoint personified in Cecil Rhodes, the empire builder, whose drive northward into his "hinterland" has since marked the philosophy of those who came after him. It is in this ambiguous and dichotomous context that the pull and tug of regional affairs occurs. And as if such a kaleidoscope of pressures were not enough, extra-regional intrusive actors, anxious to see Southern Africa conform to their own global image, provide added dimensions to the analysis.

The collapse of the Salazar-Caetano regime in Portugal in April 1974, and its replacement by a military government of uncertain ideological texture has done more to unsettle Southern African affairs than any single event since
Rhodesian U.D.I. Indeed, in terms of the reality and profundity of the change it portends, UDI was merely a rear guard action, delaying trends set in motion with the British retreat from colonial empire. The military takeover, in contrast, led to the independence of two regional states dominated by revolutionary movements intent on redrawing the constellation of power in the region. So the military-strategic configuration of Southern Africa has shifted. Rhodesia and South Africa have lost an important ally. The "Front" has arrived at the Limpopo. Rhodesia's borders have been even more penetrable. And contrary to traditional patterns of interactions, this is just not another European event with a spillover into Africa. What is also important is that the Portuguese government fell because its African wars became such a burden on its people, its economy and its military forces. Africa in this fashion has had an impact on Europe quite different than most would have contemplated. The rise of black governments tempered in revolutionary armed struggle provides a new ingredient in regional affairs. Heretofore, African governments in the region ascended to power in relative tranquility. They were, to a large extent, the chosen agents of liberal colonial authorities anxious to designate successor governments that would be willing to cooperate in the transition without too radically dismantling the colonial/neo-colonial structures. Both the Frelimo and MPLA governments are making revolutionary policies. Whether or not the exigencies of short-term economic stability will tone down the revolutionary ardor and yield pragmatic policies is still open to question. Frelimo must pace itself carefully as it strives for self-reliance and economic independence. But it would also appear that the government is determined to achieve greater self-reliance soon. South African analysts who contend that realism will prevail and who thereby assume continued business as usual simply do not understand that it is just as realistic (although over a far longer time perspective) for Mozambique to sever links until it can deal from a position of internal political and economic strength. There is at least as much evidence that the South African government and people have been sobered by the events of the past two years, and that South Africa has become more realistic and pragmatic when faced with the fait accompli of Frelimo power in Maputo.

In line with the sort of analysis developed earlier, it could be argued that Prime Minister Vorster sensed the fundamental instability of the Smith government in Rhodesia. Given South Africa's contemplated role as the dominant
regional power, a determination had apparently been made that it would be futile and costly to try to prop up an inherently weak regime even though the racial and cultural affinities are evident. Hence, the reasoning in Pretoria probably runs like this. Let's try to serve as midwife for the birth of an African or racially mixed regime that would, at least, cooperate in the continued economic patterns and growth of the region. Ideally this new government would be led by bourgeois nationalists who, although outwardly critical of South Africa and apartheid, would be willing to maintain economic links and diplomatic ties with Pretoria, and who would not provide support for military actions against South Africa. Finding candidates for such a government, however, is almost as challenging as selling it to all important parties, i.e., white Rhodesians, black nationalists and peoples, and Zambia and other key black governments in the region and the OAU. Whether the Muzorewa-Sithole-Chirau combination is such a force is currently being argued. It may be that Vorster is banking on the basic proposition that the assumption of state and governmental responsibility by even less than ideal candidates will have a moderating effect on their performance in power. In other words, once in power, the black government will easily slip into old habits of pragmatism and reluctant cooperation and thereby become a status quo force, ideology and rhetoric notwithstanding. Such a government, it may be further felt, would be more difficult to displace than a white regime with a narrow internal base of power which draws the opprobrium of the world. In class terms, the new bourgeois regime, despite its nationalistic tendencies, can become accustomed to the perquisites of office and the blandishments of continued relations, and serve to deflect the half-hearted criticism of liberalistic bourgeois governments elsewhere.

Contributing to this reasoning is the fall-back realization that the Smith government would have eventually collapsed, and if it had done so in the crucible of revolutionary violence, a government committed to the total destruction of white power in the subcontinent would likely emerge. Such a government may yet prevail. But adaptable South African whites say, let's at least try to usher into power the right kind of government at a much more measured and manageable pace than others may wish, and by so doing demonstrate our flexibility and goodwill in order to gain credit with neighboring black governments (who themselves are not noted for their radicalism), the general international community and the new government we help to come to power. Such an "enlightened" inclination to ride the waves of change, albeit not the roughest surf on the
beach, nonetheless shows an unusual courage for a South African government in foreign affairs. For the stakes, as South Africa sees it, are the very continuation of white rule in South Africa. If they lose this game, there may be no rematch other than direct military conflict. Despite South Africa’s professed commitment to non-intervention in the affairs of neighboring states, South Africa began the difficult task of trying to open contacts with Zambia on the Rhodesian issue and thereafter to try to persuade Ian Smith to make concessions to Zimbabwe nationalists in order to bring the two parties to the negotiating table.39

But white Rhodesia is exposed and untenable. The prospects of continued civil war in Zimbabwe are real as essentially two black nationalist groups again (as they did in the early 1960s) seek to assert their predominance. The problem, however, is that essential power in Zimbabwe is the issue, and it hardly looks negotiable to either nationalist force. Situations, however, can change, depending on how long the internal settlement can remain glued.

Although South Africa would appear to be showing some initiative and flexibility in its foreign policy, it must be remembered that South Africa’s military expenditures continue to grow, amounting to nineteen per cent of State expenditures and 5.1 per cent of the gross national product in 1977-78.40 The growth in absolute and relative terms is unmatched in the region and has led to virtual self-sufficiency in small arms and material. Evidence abounds that the South African government has not hesitated to use its military forces if they perceive that the protection of their interests demand it. Repeated incursions into Angola, the most spectacular in the Fall of 1975 and again in May 1978, have taken place.

So the carrot is accompanied by the reality of the stick. And South Africa's domestic policies with regard to dealing with those who reject and seek to alter the policy of separate development by any but the most ineffectual parliamentary means are no less repressive than in the days when South Africa did not seem to care to adjust to the realities of independence for colonial Africa. The feeling in Pretoria is that if South Africa can continue to grow economically, and can relate to neighboring governments in such a fashion that they also become committed to economic growth at the expense of economic development and independence, and if South Africa can maintain a high level of domestic control, then South Africa can even weather the establishment of black governments on its borders.
Portugal, or at least key segments of Portuguese and the military forces, could not withstand the pressure and opted out of southern Africa. White Rhodesia may just be learning to adapt, yet it comes at a time when adaptation may not be enough; revolution is demanded. South Africa's rulers contemplate stabilizing a tolerable regional order in a few years. A modus operandi, they contend, can be contoured. But forces beyond their control, notably African nationalism and revolutionary socialism, are abroad in the region and for South Africans and others to seek to control them indirectly through hand picked or lesser of evil black candidates is a policy born of desperation. Steadily South Africa's alternatives are being constricted. White South Africa's chosen path may be the only serious dynamic defense of the status quo open to them. It may deflect, delay, indeed even reverse temporarily the trends that seem so obvious today. But in the long run, as Coloured novelist Richard Rive put it: "The end [of White dominance in South Africa] is inevitable, but not predictable."
END NOTES

1 The reader is urged to consult my book, Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa: The Limits of Independence (Berkeley & Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1973), for basic background data on international affairs in the region of Southern Africa.


3 Samir Amin argues, for instance, that "outward-oriented development" (integration into the world economy by concentration on production for export) "is not development but development of underdevelopment." Thus Gabon with a $600 per capita per year GDP "is not less but more underdeveloped" than Rwanda with $70, because the "structural characteristics of underdevelopment" as described above are more marked in Gabon: Development and Structural Change: The African Experience, 1950-1970," Journal of International Affairs, 24 (1970): 217.


9 For historical background and interpretation of the Anglo-Boer Wars, see:


11 For example, the state-capitalist sector of the economy has grown immensely since 1948. It now covers all major segments of the infrastructure. Among other results, the state now accounts for some seventy-five per cent of steel output. It is involved in the manufacture of ammunition, weapons and war materiel, synthetic fuels and fertilizers, and other diverse products. For a history of this process, see: Earl Phillips, "State Regulation and Economic Initiative: The South African Case to 1960," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 7 (1974): 227-54.


14 For example, Barbara Rogers argues that the balance of advantage in the economic links between Britain and South Africa lies "very much in South Africa's favour," *South Africa's Stake in Britain* (London: Africa Bureau, 1971).


The Star (Johannesburg), weekly air edition, 1 November 1975, p. 15.


An official South African military account bears the revealing title, "How We Swept Cubans and MPLA Aside with Contemptuous Ease," *Paratus* (Pretoria), 28 (March, 1977). South Africa contends that their forces were not repulsed, but withdrew only after initial encouragement and expected support from the United States had not materialized. In some measure this would confirm the Stockwell account of U.S. involvement.

Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 21 June 1974.


The Constitution is reproduced in *Facts and Reports* (Amsterdam) 5 (4 October 1975): item 2230. See particularly Arts. 4, 14 and 22.

Ibid., 5 July 1975, p. 17.

32 Financial Times (London), 12 May 1975; and Guardian (London), 14 May 1975.


THE QUEST FOR EAST AFRICAN UNITY: 'ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO STEPS BACKWARD'

J. Gus Liebenow, Indiana University

In April, 1977 the Tanzanian Minister for Home Affairs announced that the 450 mile border separating Tanzania from Kenya would be "permanently sealed". This action was the culmination of a long series of disputes between the two states over transport, trade, taxes, tourism and a range of political issues. Concurrently with this action relations between Uganda and its two East African neighbors had reached a new low in the continuing crisis which has raged since Idi Amin seized power in 1971. The significance of these events has had ramifications far beyond the three states directly involved. For indeed, they constituted devastating, if not fatal, blows to the continent's most dramatic case of regional integration.

Throughout history attempts to create political community at an increasingly larger scale have been recurrent phenomena. Within the present generation people on each of the major continents have witnessed efforts to expand the limits of political community. In many instances these goals have been pursued by those whose primary motivation has been the domination of one's neighbors -- as in the cases of Germany and Japan during the second quarter of this century. Attempts to enlarge the scope of political community, however, are also being pursued today in Western Europe, Central America, Southeast Asia and parts of Africa by those with goals that are less subject to challenge. These goals would include mutual defense, the maximizing of economic opportunities within a region for the benefit of all parties, or the creation of a political system which sublimates or balances potentially hostile differences of a linguistic, religious, racial or cultural nature.

In many respects Africa is an excellent laboratory for the study of peaceful efforts to expand the notion of political community beyond the limits of the existing nation-states. By an informal count, over two dozen plans for some form of integration involving two or more African states have been advanced in the past two decades. Indeed, under the banner of Pan-Africanism, the commitment to cooperation or consolidation above the state level has become an article of political faith among the overwhelming majority of Africa's leadership in the post-colonial era. In its least politically operational version, Pan-Africanism merely assumes the psychological, racial, cultural or spiritual identity of all
the people of the continent as well as their dispersed off-spring in the New World. It is an identity based upon their shared experience as victims of the slave-trade and European colonial rule. Increasingly, however, acceptance of Pan-Africanism as an ideology implicitly assumes the need for administrative or political structures through which citizens of the African states can achieve tangible benefits from economic, cultural and political cooperation.

The variety of structures created or proposed in Africa can be instructive for other areas of globe. In terms of numbers of geographic units involved the African evidence covers a broad spectrum. At one extreme is the bilateral posture as exemplified in the Mano River Customs Union between Liberia and Sierra Leone or in the collaborative efforts of Tanzania and Zambia to construct and operate a railway line from the copperbelt to Dar es Salaam. Multilateral cooperation on a regional basis is evidenced in the East African Common Services Organization, the economic cooperation among fifteen states of West Africa, and in UDEAC -- the cooperative effort of several former French dependencies in Central Africa. At the far end of the spectrum is the continental approach, which was so ardently espoused by the late Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and which has seen limited fruition in the creation of the Organization of African Unity.

The quality of approaches attempted in Africa within the bilateral, regional and continental frameworks also gives the African experience universal significance. The political model, emulating the experience of the thirteen American states in 1887-89, has had mixed reception. Indeed, Nkrumah, who advocated not only continental unity but the imperative of the political approach as well, frequently referred to the American example in his proposal for a United States of Africa. This model assumes the necessity of creating system-wide political institutions as a requisite in achieving coordination of economic, cultural and other affairs among previously independent or autonomous entities. As in the American experience, the participating units would have to surrender or agree to share their previous monopoly over the use of domestic and external force, over taxation, over direct contacts with the individual citizen and over relationships among the states and with external powers.

The political model has been largely rejected at the continental level, with the OAU being largely a consultative body rather than a political collectivity. Similarly, political integration at the regional level has remained a hope rather than a reality. Kwame Nkrumah's various plans for the political union of Ghana with, inter alia, Guinea, Mali and even Liberia, never advanced beyond the blue-
print stage. Furthermore, the heroic gesture of Julius Nyerere -- in suggesting a delay in Tanganyikan independence so that it could be coordinated with the simultaneous independence of Kenya and Uganda within the framework of a politically unified East African state -- also failed to reach fruition. The only other efforts at regional political integration took place under the aegis of European imperialism: the union of the four provinces of South Africa in 1910 and the short-lived Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which was dissolved as Zambia and Malawi achieved independence as separate entities.

It has only been at the bilateral level that political consolidation has managed to alter the boundaries established by the European colonial powers at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. In most of the cases of bilateral consolidation the idea was launched, if not consummated, prior to one or both of the parties attaining independence. This is particularly true of the former United Nations Trust Territories, with British Togoland being absorbed by Ghana, Italian-administered Somalia being united with British Somaliland at independence and the northern and southern sectors of British Cameroon opting respectively for union with Nigeria and the former French Cameroon as independence approached. Three other examples of pre-independence political union have witnessed, or are now experiencing, disaster. The Mali Federation, for example, which had united the former French territories of Senegal and the Soudan, lasted only two months beyond independence. The decision of the Four Powers at the end of the Second World War to integrate Italian Eritrea into the Ethiopian Empire is now being effectively challenged by various Eritrean liberation groups. Similarly, the division of the Spanish Sahara between Morocco and Mauretania is also being contested by "liberation" groups supported by Algeria. The only example of post-independence political integration has been the 1964 union of Zanzibar and Tanganyika. It was only 1977, however, that the Tanzania experiment began to have substantially more than symbolic value. It is true that both units had recognized Julius Nyerere as President and that Zanzibar, however, continued to control its own domestic and military matters and even conducted its foreign relations outside the framework of the Tanzanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There was also, until 1977, the anomaly of two parties -- one for the mainland and the other for Zanzibar -- existing within a single party state!

The converse of the political model is the functional approach to transnational integration. Essentially, it has been this model that has been followed in Western Europe today and is currently being pursued by the leaders of fifteen West African states as well as by the leaders of several former French territories in Africa where transnational cooperation is being sought in fiscal matters, transportation, customs duties, research and other "non-political" fields.
Advocates of the functional approach to integration argue that political unity -- whether explicitly or implicitly recognized as an end goal of cooperation -- can only be accomplished on the basis of a prior demonstration of the feasibility and the value of cooperation in non-political matters. The surrender of state sovereignty is such an emotional issue that the participants must be convinced that the gains will offset the losses. Interstate cooperation \textit{per se}, however, does not inevitably lead to political integration. If the latter is the implied goal, cooperation must cover a complex of non-political issues. Secondly, the quality of cooperation is a factor. The areas singled out must be regarded by the parties as critical to the functioning of their respective societies. They must be of such a character that once the benefits of cooperation begin to be realized it would be difficult for any of the parties to advocate a return to the previously autonomous situation. Hence, this was the strategy of the West Europeans in initiating integrative efforts in the areas of coal and steel production. Thirdly, the process of integration leading to political unity must remain a dynamic one. Accomplishments in a series of endeavours must lead to demands for cooperation in other areas in order to sustain the drive to political unity. To paraphrase the historian Seeley, political unity would be achieved thereby, in "almost a fit of absence of mind."

It is against this background that we undertake an analysis of the problems of functional integration on a regional basis in East Africa. The three states directly involved -- Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda -- have a combined population of 36 million inhabitants and cover an area somewhat larger than that of the nine states included in the European Economic Community. Unlike the West European situation, however, the economies of the East African states are based largely upon agriculture and mineral extraction, with some beginnings of industrialization in Kenya. Curiously, however, the introduction of functional integration in East Africa in 1948 antedates the launching of serious efforts towards European economic integration by three years.

\textbf{The Origins of East African Dreams of Unity}

Like many of the schemes for functional cooperation which have emerged in Africa during the independence era, cooperation in East Africa has largely taken place within a framework laid down during the colonial period and was in fact the
inspiration of the former colonial officials. Proposals for the political integration of Britain's territories in East Africa began to be floated as early as the First World War. Indeed, the German expulsion from Tanganyika made possible the realization of Cecil Rhodes' dream of a great red swath on the map from the Cape to Cairo. Although belatedly the most persistent advocates of this idea during the colonial period were the Kenya white settlers, initially it was British officials in London and colonial administrators on the local scene who advanced and sustained the concept. At several stages, moreover, the unification of East Africa was viewed as part of a greater scheme to unite all British territories between the Sudan and the Zambezi River. This would have provided Nyasaland (now Malawi) and Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) with direct access to the Indian Ocean and lessened the dependence of these two territories on the white-dominated regimes in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Sir Harry Johnston, a longtime colonial officer who had been responsible for the extension of British rule in both Nyasaland and Uganda, saw this grand scheme of East and Central African closer union as a device for eliminating "balkanization" -- the popular European political scapegoat as the cause of war in the post-World War I era.

An even more persistent advocate in official circles, however, was Mr. L.S. Amery, a staff officer who ultimately assumed the post of British Colonial Secretary in the mid-1920s. Even before the British forces under General Jan Smuts had defeated the Germans in Tanganyika, Amery had allied himself with Smuts in pressing for the inclusion of Tanganyika in a federation of British dependencies. Amery felt not only that the larger territory would be easier to administer but that it would more efficiently contribute to the needs of the empire. He was supported in this position by a member of the Economic Commission of the East Africa Protectorate in 1919 who argued that strategically, financially and ideologically (that is, the superiority of the British presence in Africa) closer union of East and Central Africa was a necessity.

It was not until 1924, in response to a British House of Commons resolution, that any official action was taken on the idea of closer union. A commission under the chairmanship of W. Ormsby-Gore was dispatched to East Africa to investigate economic conditions and development plans and to recommend policies for the coordination of transport, agriculture and medicine in the several territories. To the chagrin of Amery, who had become Colonial Secretary upon the fall of the Labour government in 1924, the Ormsby-Gore Commission did not recommend closer union. The
commission instead argued that the expense and difficulties of communication made such a move impractical.\textsuperscript{5} Undaunted, Amery persisted in his goal by having his nominee for the governorship of Kenya, Sir Edward Grigg, champion the idea. Subsequently another commission, under the chairmanship of Sir Hilton Young, was appointed to investigate closer union, and still a further inquiry into the idea was conducted in 1929 by the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Sir Samuel Wilson.\textsuperscript{6} Ultimately the series of recommendations were submitted to a Joint Select Committee of both Houses of Parliament. The committee's recommendation was that closer union of a political or constitutional character, while in many respects desirable, was inappropriate at that time. The best that could be hoped for was greater cooperation and coordination through periodic meetings of the governors of the three territories.\textsuperscript{7} This recommendation was accepted by the British government in 1931, and there the matter of political union rested.

During the decade of pressure from Amery and others at the official level, it was apparent that the idea of closer political union had few advocates among the permanent residents of East Africa. The Africans in general were a poorly organized political force at that time. Individual Africans, nevertheless, did give testimony in opposition to the idea, arguing that the first consequence of closer union would be further alienation of land in Uganda and Tanganyika to Europeans along the lines followed in Kenya. The most vociferous organized African opposition came from the Baganda. This largest of the twenty ethnic groups in Uganda suspected that their privileged position as an 'agreement state' within the Uganda Protectorate would be jeopardized through their participation in any federal legislative arrangement which would find them enjoying minority status. Similarly, the Asians in the three territories for the most part opposed closer union, unless they could be accorded equality of representation with the dominant European group.

For differing reasons, the Europeans in the three territories were not initially enthusiastic about federation. The Kenya settlers feared that it would complicate their plans to make Kenya a European-managed self-governing colony. The Europeans in Uganda, already chaffing over customs charges and the cost of operating the railroad which inexorably linked landlocked Uganda to Kenya's seaport at Mombasa, feared further domination by the commercial interests in Nairobi; Tanganyika settlers were equally suspicious of their neighbors in Kenya, particularly after it was proposed that the agriculturally-rich area around Moshi and Arusha in northern Tanganyika should be ceded to Kenya.
In the end, one of the most effective opponents of the idea was not a resident of the region, but Sir Donald Cameron, who had become Governor of Tanganyika in 1925. He based his fear of Kenya settlers not only on their coveting of the Arusha-Moshi area, but also upon their opposition to the construction of the Mwanza-Tabora railway link, which would divert some traffic away from Lake Victoria and the Kenya-Uganda Railway. His greatest concern, however, was that closer union would undermine his implementation of 'indirect rule,' a philosophy of colonial administration of which he had become enamored while serving under Lord Lugard in Nigeria. He feared that the Kenya practice of appointing warrant chiefs would be applied throughout the region under closer association.

In any event the British government in the decade following the rejection of closer union by Parliament gave a very low priority to reopening the question. The government was much more concerned with battling the worldwide depression and coping with the growing political and military crisis in Europe. Concurrently, however, the previously hostile Kenya settlers under Lord Delamere began to view closer union with enthusiasm. Sensing that eventually the ideas of Amery just might prevail, Lord Delamere decided to strengthen the bargaining position of the Kenya settlers. He began insisting that Nairobi would have to be the capital of any future East African federation and that the whites in Kenya would have to have an elected majority in that colony's legislative council. Delamere managed, moreover, to convene two conferences of white settlers from several East and Central African territories in 1925 and 1926 in order to galvanize the Europeans into presenting a united front in dealing with any proposals for political reorganization. What ultimately did propel the Europeans in Kenya and Tanganyika into a more positive posture with respect to closer union was the spectre of Tanganyika being sacrificed to Nazi Germany's demands for colonial lebensraum. The indecisiveness on the part of both the Baldwin and the Chamberlain governments in the 1930s convinced the settlers that their fears were well-grounded. A series of petitions were made to the British government demanding closer union as an assurance that Tanganyika's place in the British Empire would be assured. The petitions were apparently ignored, but Tanganyika remained under British control.

During the Second World War the idea of closer union was again bruited about in various forms. One proposal emanating from Kenya was that a Joint East African War Council be established to provide for common policy under a unified command.
Both administrators and residents in Uganda and Tanganyika rejected the idea. Also rejected was the revival of one of Amery's pet projects, the naming of the Governor of Kenya as the High Commissioner for all British areas between the Sudan and the Zambezi. The only regional proposal that did bear fruit was the establishment of a Joint Economic Council to coordinate economic and commercial planning for six territories in East and Central Africa (including Zanzibar, but excluding Southern Rhodesia). Created in 1940, the Council did not survive the war, and it was constantly criticized for favoring Kenya's economic development and welfare at the expense of its neighbors.11

Creation of the East Africa High Commission

Of greater significance than the wartime cooperation were the statements made in London towards the end of the Second World War which indicated that the British coalition government of Conservatives and Labourites was thinking in terms of amalgamation -- either administratively or politically -- of colonial units. The purpose of amalgamation would be to carry out the provisions of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 in a more effective fashion and to rationalize defense planning within the British Empire. With respect to East Africa the British government insisted that it was only advocating economic and technical cooperation rather than political union. The statements, nevertheless, were viewed with suspicion by members of all races.12 First of all, the post-war proposals regarding the creation of an East Africa High Commission seemed to give a pre-eminent role to Kenya by virtue of the Governor of Kenya being chairman of the Commission, with the other two governors as his colleagues. Secondly, the creation of an executive authority and a Central Legislative Assembly were regarded as the thin edge of a wedge in creating political institutions. Fears were not allayed by the claim that the High Commission had only limited authority with respect to specified economic and technical functions and was expressly denied authority to deal with basic administration, police services, education, agriculture, forestry, veterinary services, health, labor and other matters which would be left to the territorial governments. Thirdly, the various formulae regarding racial representation in the Assembly seemed to displease everyone except the Indians. Despite the many expressed misgivings, the proposal was pushed through by the British government, and the East Africa High Commission came into existence on January 1, 1948.13
The final grounds for suspicion of the High Commission was that pari passu with events in East Africa the British Labour government was initiating the proposals for the political amalgamation of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland. This was taking place without substantial consultation with the African majorities in any of the territories. It was against this background that the 'Kabaka Crisis' of 1953 in Uganda must be evaluated. The event which triggered the political turmoil in Buganda was a remark of the Colonial Secretary in London on June 30, 1953, in which he praised the Central African Federation and suggested that the idea might well be extended to East Africa. There was immediate fear in Buganda that federation would threaten the privileged position of the Baganda within East Africa and subordinate their interests to those of the Kenya white settlers. Accordingly, a broad spectrum of political groups in Buganda compelled Kabaka Mutesa to take a firm stand not only against federation but also against submerging of Buganda's distinct political identity within a unified Uganda. In a heated reaction to the situation Governor Sir Andrew Cohen took the extraordinary step of deporting the Kabaka, thereby plunging Buganda into political chaos. Although much more was involved in the 1955 settlement which ultimately brought the Kabaka back to Buganda, it was clear that closer political union under the colonial umbrella had been dealt a deathblow by the intransigence of the Baganda -- at least insofar as European settler or British Colonial Office initiative was concerned.

There was, however, one further attempt made at political union in East Africa under the aegis of the colonial umbrella. The inspiration, however, was African in origin. This was the offer of Julius Nyerere in 1961 to delay the scheduled independence for Tanganyika if there could be immediate progress on plans for the political federation of East Africa, with Africans in control of the process. This was an attempt to give concrete action to the words he had prophetically uttered the year previously, indicating that

> the feeling of unity which now exists could be whittled away if each country gets its independence separately and becomes too open to the temptations of nationhood and the intrigues of those who find their strength in the weakness of small nations . . . . Further the leaders of each state will become so preoccupied with the problems of their own government that the long-term advantages which can come from the establishment of a federation will get crowded out of consideration.

Unfortunately, the British Colonial Office failed to respond positively to
Nyerere's remarkable offer, and the African leadership in both Kenya and Uganda was unable to respond due to the great domestic political problems that each of them faced. Independence, thus, came to each country without the assumed benefits of political federation.

Economic and Technical Cooperation under Colonial Rule

Despite difficulties encountered on the political front, the economic and technical integration of East Africa under colonial rule had rapidly proceeded. The economic interdependence of two of the territories, Kenya and Uganda, had in a sense been forged much earlier when the British decided in the nineteenth century to add Buganda and the other Uganda kingdoms to the British holdings in Kenya, and, secondly, when the decision was made to construct the railway linking Uganda to the Kenya port of Mombasa. During the first two decades of the twentieth century, however, the links served as an irritant to elements in Uganda rather than an unmitigated blessing. Indeed, the designation of the customs union in 1917, permitting the free flow of domestic commodities between Kenya and Uganda and standardizing customs collections for the two countries, at first only further aggravated the situation. The Uganda commercial interests chafed under what they regarded as the unfair division of the customs receipts and of the railway charges and revenues. Some lessening of the hostility occurred in the early 1920s when a new formula was devised for distributing customs receipts and Uganda was included on the membership of the newly created Railway Council, which supervised the operation of the Mombasa-Kampala line. A similar history of suspicions arose in Tanganyika after the First World War, particularly when plans were developed to have the produce of the Moshi-Arusha area routed through the Kenya port of Kilindini rather than through Tanga or Dar es Salaam. It was not until 1927 that the free trade aspects of the common market were extended to Tanganyika, and the common customs administration only took effect in Tanganyika in 1949, after the creation of the High Commission.

Parallel with the proposals for closer political union during the 1920s and 1930s, a series of recommendations were made for the extension of cooperation in economic and technical matters. For example, the Grigg scheme of 1927 -- ultimately rejected by the British cabinet -- envisioned a federal council for East Africa entrusted with control of transportation, customs, defense, communications and research throughout the region.
Perhaps due to the League of Nations Mandate status of Tanganyika, which gave it special international significance, most of the constructive economic cooperation among the three territories during the inter-war period was brought about informally and without specific legal authorization from the British government. Obviously, the Colonial Office in London was aware of these developments. I refer to the schemes for cooperation and coordination which emerged from the annual meetings of the East African governors which took place during the 1930s. These conferences produced agreements -- or agreements in principle -- regarding uniform taxation policy with respect to Africans, elementary education in the vernacular, transport and communications, and industrialization. One very concrete move -- objected to by the German member of the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission -- was the 1932 amalgamation of the East African postal services. The decisions of the Governors' Conferences, however, were not always subjected either to public discussion or to the consent of the territorial legislative councils. In many instances the agreements could have been unconstitutional.

At the end of the war the Labour government, in the name of greater efficiency, was committed to some form of inter-territorial cooperation. Recognizing the fears in East Africa regarding closer political union, the East Africa High Commission was advanced as a mechanism for furthering economic and technical cooperation. The organization which came into effect in 1948 provided for a series of new or reorganized agencies that would provide common services throughout the three territories. The areas specifically covered were posts and telecommunications; railroads, harbors, and inland steamers; tourism; East African Airways; scientific research in a broad range of fields; joint customs and tax systems; shared currency; common immigration controls; an integrated university system; and the framework for a common economic market. These agencies were in addition to the other supra-territorial institutions of cooperation such as the East African Navy and the East African High Court of Appeals.

Despite the initial misgivings of the African political leaders in Uganda and Tanganyika regarding the East Africa High Commission, the technical services were handled in an even-handed fashion and did contribute to the development of the region as a whole. Kenya, it is true, enjoyed a favored position as the most prosperous of the three territories and had the headquarters of the High
Commission established in Nairobi. The Colonial Office, nevertheless, managed to supervise the operations of the High Commission and resolve points of conflict among the three governors. Indeed, the system worked so well that Julius Nyerere and TANU were resolved that -- in the absence of federation prior to independence -- the cooperative arrangements with Kenya and Uganda should persist after Tanganyika received its independence in December 1961. Accordingly, the High Commission was transformed into the East African Common Services Organization. The High Authority for the Organization consisted of the heads of government of the three units involved. Gone, however, would be the staying power of an external body, such as the Colonial Office, to resolve controversy. Each state could exercise a veto with respect to policies it regarded as prejudicial to its best interests.17

The Framework of Cooperation in the Post-Independence Period

The failure of the Ugandan and Kenyan nationalist leaders to respond to Nyerere's offer regarding federation prior to independence did not indicate hostility towards the idea of political union. It was apparently attributable to the matter of timing and the serious internal problems both Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya and Milton Obote in Uganda faced. Indeed, once the Baganda crisis in Uganda had been resolved and Uganda achieved independence as a federal state, the call for federation was again made. Although this may have been timed to force the British to set an early date for Kenyan independence, the three leaders did make a public announcement in June 1963 of their intentions to achieve federation of the three East African states by the end of that year.18

Federation did not in fact take place by the end of 1963. Kenya did achieve its independence with its leaders openly committed to the concept of political unity. A conference held in 1964 at Kampala, however, clearly brought out the economic considerations which were to complicate the political question for the ensuing decades. Indeed, the situation had so altered that the original champion of cooperation, Tanganyika, threatened withdrawal from even the informal common market arrangements already in existence. It was apparent that it was no longer sufficient to argue that increased complementarity among the three partners would ultimately be of benefit to all. Efficiency could not be the sole criterion in making decisions regarding the location of new industrial and other forms of development opportunities in the region. For there was a genuine insistence on the part of the two less developed participants -- Tanganyika and Uganda -- that
the benefits of development be distributed more quickly and more widely throughout the region. Otherwise employment opportunities, revenues from trade and the generation of wealth through industrialization would accrue to the more privileged Kenyan economy, to the neglect of Tanganyika and Uganda.

As matters stood in 1964, Kenya -- and Nairobi in particular -- enjoyed distinct economic advantages over the rest of East Africa. The rationale for this economic advantage is complex. Partially it is a matter of geography. Kenya serves as the transit route not only for landlocked Uganda but also for the most prosperous region of Tanzania, the area around Moshi and Arusha. The harbor at Mombasa is superior to anything along the Tanzanian coast. Given Kenya's varying altitudes and climatic conditions, moreover, its agricultural products are more diversified than those of its neighbors. During most of the twentieth century, it has had a well educated and relatively prosperous European population that introduced many technological innovations in agriculture as well as commencing industrial development. Being a Crown Colony, moreover, external investors felt far more secure in putting their funds into Kenyan development rather than risking them on the Uganda protectorate or the Tanganyika Mandate (later Trust) Territory. Over time, Uganda and Tanganyika had become the consumers of Kenya's manufactured goods which were protected by the common market's tariff wall. Trade relations were not reciprocal, for the cotton, sisal, coffee, tea and other bulk commodities of Uganda and Tanganyika were sold abroad rather than in Kenya. Finally, Nairobi enjoyed distinct advantages with respect to the concentration of manpower skills, banking and other commercial facilities, transportation, electrical and other power needed for industrialization, and other factors. Thus both foreign and domestic East African investors found the situation compelling to opt for Kenya in the expansion of existing -- or the location of new -- industrial and commercial enterprises.

The Kampala Agreement of 1964 attempted to correct the imbalances between Kenya and its two neighbors by resort to several devices: (1) compelling beer, footwear, cement and other firms operating in all three countries to increase production in the deficit countries as a way of reducing imports from Kenya; (2) providing the deficit countries with monopolies in new industries, such as fertilizers in Uganda and tires and tubes in Tanzania; (3) bolstering production of a commodity produced in more than one state by allowing the deficit state or states to apply quotas on imports from the surplus country or
countries; (4) increasing sales generally from deficit to surplus states; and (5) reaching an early agreement within the East African common market on more equitable distribution of industrial development by way both of positive inducements as well as arbitrary allocations of new industries to certain states.

The Kampala Agreement obviously favored Tanganyika and Uganda and perhaps accounts for the failure of Kenya to ratify it. Nevertheless, despite the lack of formal acceptance, the first provision was carried out through pressure being exerted on local firms with headquarters in Kenya. The quota provision, moreover, was all too liberally implemented by Tanzania with respect to an expanding list of items imported from Kenya. Curiously, although it did reduce the trade deficit between Tanzania and Kenya, Tanzania was compelled to import the needed items from abroad, frequently at even higher prices. This action neither helped Tanzania's overall balance of payments problems nor encouraged complementarity within East Africa. The allocation of new industries to deficit countries, moreover was not entirely a sacrifice on Kenya's part since these firms had not yet decided to locate within East Africa.

The informal ad hoc implementation of the "disengagement" features of the Kampala Agreement was followed by other actions which threatened the tenuous progress already made within the East African common market. The first was the break-up of the East African Currency Board by virtue of Tanzania's decision in 1965 to issue its own currency. This was followed two years later by the nationalization of banking and other monetary institutions and the announcement of the Arusha Declaration. The latter provided Tanzania with a distinct political-economic ideology which effectively set Tanzania on a separate path of development from that followed by its neighbors. These developments came on the heels of even earlier actions which eliminated supra-national institutions. Tanganyika, for example, had opted out of the East African Navy shortly after independence. Uganda, upon achieving its independence, withdrew from the East African tourist board on the grounds that it paid 25 per cent of the costs of the agency but received only nine per cent of the tourist revenues within East Africa.

Realizing these actions were eroding the community, the three leaders returned to Kampala in June 1967 to consider steps for strengthening the common market and for the first time giving a legal and comprehensive basis to the many steps that had been taken since the 1917 customs union between Kenya and Uganda had been introduced. The 1967 Treaty for East African Coopera-
tion stressed the need not only for economic growth of the region, but for the "accelerated, harmonious and balanced development" of East Africa. While retaining the common customs tariff for East Africa and striving for the long-term objective of free trade within the region, the Treaty did provide for short-term quantitative limits being imposed on industrial products (as well as exemption of agricultural products) in order to protect infant industries. For a period up to fifteen years, transfer taxes -- a euphemism for tariffs -- could be levied against Kenya products to encourage industrial development in the deficit states. Although restrictions were imposed on the use of transfer taxes, this has constituted the most serious inroad on the concept of East African free trade. Three additional provisions of the Treaty were the fiscal incentives to new industries; the establishment of an East African Development Bank, designed particularly to assist Tanzania and Uganda; and the provision for extending the East African Community to other nations in Africa, such as Zambia, Zaire, Mozambique and Ethiopia.

The new Community perpetuated most of the state sovereignty features of the Common Services Organization, for each of the heads of state, who collectively constitute the East African Authority, can exercise a veto. But there was an attempt to create a bureaucracy with a commitment to the region as a whole. A further effort to equalize the involvement of the three participating states was the decision to locate the headquarters of two major operations within each of the states involved. Thus the Community headquarters was located at Arusha, the Harbors Corporation in Dar-es-Salaam, the Bank and also Posts and Telecommunications were to go to Kampala and Railways and the Airways Corporations would remain in Nairobi.

Assessment of Cooperation in the Post-Independence Era

In the fourteen to sixteen years of independence and the decade since the 1967 Treaty establishing the East African Community, the progress of functional integration has been -- to paraphrase Lenin -- "one step forward; two steps backward". There is still a vigorous verbal commitment on the part of Presidents Nyerere, Kenyatta and Amin to the vital necessity of East African cooperation. Yet, instead of economic and technical cooperation drawing the members of the Community closer together politically, the states have barely been able to maintain diplomatic relations with each other. Most acerbated have been the relations
between Tanzania and Uganda, which since 1971 have been in a virtual state of war. This situation stemmed initially from the political and military support which Nyerere attempted to provide Milton Obote following his ouster by General Idi Amin. The conflict has been a constant source of friction, with recurrent raids across the Uganda-Tanzania border and the massing of troops having brought most interstate trade and other forms of contact to a standstill. Similarly, relations between Uganda and Kenya have flared-up from time to time over issues such as the trans-shipment of Russian tank ferries to Uganda over Kenya roads, the rash "historic claims" of Idi Amin to large areas of western Kenya in 1975, and the support given by Kenya to the Israeli commandos following their 1976 raid on Entebbe airport. Such conflict has led to the temporary closing of borders or demands by Kenya that Uganda pay for oil and other essential goods in foreign currency and pay in advance of the actual sale. To complete the circle, the "permanent sealing" of the Kenya-Tanzania border in 1977 was but the culmination of a series of border closings, mutual deportations of each others' citizens and fiscal harrassment which has plagued relations between Kenya and Tanzania. The absence of a healthy set of diplomatic relations among the leaders of the three states, however, is not the only problem which has checkered the path to integration.

Ideological Postures. In part the diplomatic and military confrontations have been attributable to the divergences in ideology which have developed in the period since independence. Admittedly difficulties can and do arise even among leadership groups with similar ideological view points when each is attempting to consolidate its position within a relatively unstable political milieu. When the divergences are as great as they are in East Africa today, however, the possibility of discord becomes more of a certainty. In many respects Tanzania and Kenya are almost polar opposites in terms of development models.

Tanzania has taken perhaps the most radical departure from the legacy of political culture developed or imposed during the later years of British colonial rule. It is one of the few states in Africa where a serious effort has been made to translate the easy rhetoric of socialism into a concrete program of action. In contrast, too, with other states where the single dominant party has either become moribund or been replaced by a military government, the dominant party -- TANU (or the Revolutionary Party, as it was restyled in 1977) -- has become the spearhead of mobilizing the citizenry with respect to the new society. Nyerere's version of development is labelled agrarian
socialism. It recognizes the dual fact that upwards of ninety per cent of Tanzania's population lives in the rural areas and -- in the absence of significant mineral resources -- that the costs of modernization will ultimately come from the surplus from agricultural production. There are several key elements in Nyerere's program. The first is an emphasis upon increased crop production and processing of agricultural commodities at the expense of instant industrialization. This is not a rejection of industrialization per se; it accepts the fact that industrialization is capital intensive and tends to further aggravate the problems of urban unemployment. Secondly, as a matter both of social justice and economic efficiency, Nyerere's program would direct a significant portion of the profits of growth back to the rural sector. This would improve not only the means of production in the area of greatest promise but it would also improve the lot of those who are contributing most to development -- the rural peasant. The concrete manifestation of this policy is the implementation of the ujamaa vijijini, or the villagization scheme. It has been the aim of TANU to get as many people as possible organized into self-help rural communities, where the services of government can be provided in a more efficient way and where the citizenry is provided with a mechanism for participating in decision-making on national development. Thirdly, Nyerere's program attempts to reduce the impact of historic and geographic accident which have contributed to the unequal distribution of the benefits of modernization. Hence, he has limited the salaries and other perquisites of the civil servants, lawyers and others who have had the privilege of a better education, and he has removed from the private sector such occupations as that of doctor, private shopkeeper and others which contribute to the emergence of an incipient capitalist class. Also, in terms of "betting on the weak", he has attempted to redirect development funds to the regions of the country that were relatively neglected during the colonial era. Finally, Nyerere's socialism emphasizes self-reliance. This means not only that each person must contribute his full measure of talents to national development, but that the society must avoid becoming so dependent on external funds and personnel for development purposes, that one surrenders freedom to determine one's own fate.

At the opposite end of the pole is Kenya, whose leadership in public proclaims a commitment to African socialism, but which in fact has provided one of the most vigorous examples of African development based upon massive infusions of external capital and personnel. Although its critics charge that Kenya has become subservient to the foreign capitalists upon whom the economy is dependent, Kenya leaders argue...
that the major directions of growth are determined by the state and not by foreigners, that Kenyans are coming into full control of the major economic enterprises, that the surpluses from growth allow for training programs which put Kenyans in positions of control in the economy, and that the ultimate test of an economy is how well it produces. On the last point, it is true that the growth rate in Kenya has been phenomenal. Kenya has witnessed not only industrial development but its improvement in the agricultural sector makes it a more effective competitor in the world market than Tanzania or Uganda. Kenyans claim, moreover, that the diversification of sources of external aid and personnel give no single power the ability to control events. However, it must be acknowledged that the benefits of development are distributed in a highly uneven fashion within Kenyan society. The major concentration of industrial growth has taken place in the vicinity of Nairobi, with some auxiliary development in and around the port of Mombasa. One ethnic group -- the Kikuyu -- have reaped an extraordinary share of the new wealth as great private fortunes are being made. The involvement of the masses in political and economic decision-making has been minimal, with KANU (Kenya African National Union) becoming more and more a machine party which serves the electoral and patronage objectives of the elite.

The ideological position of the third member of the community is difficult to classify. Uganda has undergone three changes of government since independence, and each represents a change in ideology. The first government, under the presidency of the Baganda Kabaka, represented a form of ideological neutrality as the leadership tried to balance the interests of the various historic kingdoms and the series of competitive parties. This gave way in 1966 to Milton Obote's brand of socialism within a highly centralized Uganda state, following the second exile of Kabaka Mutesa and the collapse of Baganda separatism. Although Idi Amin since his coup of 1971 has retained the centralized state, one could hardly classify his frenetic and capricious brand of personalized military rule as even an aberrant form of socialism. Reginald Green, a former economic adviser to Nyerere, has characterized Uganda development as a "commitment to inegalitarian, right-wing, xenophobic populism."20

Reasons of State. Even if the ideological commitment of the three states had been the same, the political demands of each new society would in any event have resulted in some measure of separate development. Once the decision had been made to reject political integration within the framework of a coordinated independence program, it became necessary to move rapidly in developing distinct national institu-
tions and economic development plans within the three states. Each is a con-
siderable entity ranging in size from Uganda's 91,134 square miles (roughly
comparable to Pennsylvania) to Tanzania's 363,708 square miles (the size of
Texas, Oklahoma and Louisiana), with Kenya's 224,960 (the size of Texas alone)
placing it in between. They range in population from fourteen million in
Tanzania, to twelve million in Kenya, and ten million in Uganda. The geographic
development of each territory under colonial rule was very uneven, with northern
areas of both Kenya and Uganda and the southeastern section of Tanganyika being
relatively out of touch with the main economic, educational and political changes
in their respective territories. Despite all the British pride in accomplishment,
the educational systems under colonial rule did not leave behind a sizeable cadre
of trained manpower to run the government, the economy, the universitie., the
military and other institutions. The political system at the state level, furthermore,
really only acquired significance for the African majority during the last
few years or months of colonial rule. So unstable was each of the three East
African political systems that it was only the hasty return of British paratroopers
in 1964 that saved each of the regimes from rebellious military forces.

With this in mind, it is understandable why two European observers of the
East African scene concluded in 1965 that the time was not ripe for political
federation. They concluded that the problem had two main aspects:

First, the 'political system' in each East African state -- its
members, its modes of operation, its balance of power -- is new
and only imperfectly understood by those who are operating it;
and the dominant characteristic of politics is the extreme deli-
cacy of the balance of forces which goes to make up the new
political system, the extreme fragility of the structures which
the national leadership is creating for solving problems and
mobilizing support for policies. The leaders are ceaselessly
preoccupied with the problem of sustaining the system so that
relations between different groups can become more steadily and
clearly defined, avenues of political action become legitimated,
new elements admitted into the top leadership and old ones eased
out -- all without fundamental crises . . . .

In relation to this fundamental political fact the prospect
of federating -- involving a partial surrender of sovereignty --
may introduce on the scene an unknown factor of unknown magnitude.
No one knows what its effect on the system precariously emerging
in their own country will turn out to be.21

The various schemes for East African federation did not envision the
elimination of the state political apparatus; the leadership in Tanzania, for
example, would still be responsible to that constituency within the East African
community which had only recently started to consider itself Tanzanian rather
than Chagga, Sukuma or Makonde. It would be the immediate, rather than the long-range, consequences of economic cooperation which would motivate the masses to support or reject the incumbent leadership at the state level. It would hardly provide satisfaction to the starving or the unemployed to inform them that an agricultural processing industry could not be established within their district because that industry had been allocated to a neighboring country. Moreover, since it was firmly believed in Tanzania that money was a significant element in development, and since most of the money in East Africa seemed to be flowing to Kenya, the way to reverse the situation was for Tanzania to print its own currency, nationalize the banks and keep the money within Tanzania. Thus, it was not surprising to find the East African Currency Board going out of existence and each state being encouraged to set its own policies regarding money supplies, taxation and interest rates, as well as manipulating the economy for broad social, economic and political goals. Planning was to be carried out on a national basis, not regional.

Similarly, since doctors, engineers, lawyers and other professionals might tend to stay in the countries where they were trained rather than serving their countries of origin, it is perhaps also understandable why the agreement on assignment of separate teaching functions among Makerere University, the University of Dar es Salaam and the University of Nairobi hardly lasted till the ink was dry. The effective dissolution of the University of East Africa shortly after the Community came into existence merely confirmed the reality of the situation, namely, that the national plans of each state projected differing needs for doctors to eradicate malaria, engineers to plan the construction of roads and dams, and lawyers to frame the unique legal system developing in each country. Despite the continued existence of an Inter-university Committee for East Africa, less than two hundred students were exchanged among the three states in 1974. The use of external examiners and the holding of joint research conferences are among the few remaining vestiges of educational cooperation.

Divergences were also the product of the freedom of action available to each member to formulate external relations best suited to its own developmental, ideological or other interests. Outside the African context, Kenya -- in keeping with its modified capitalist development -- has very strong links with the West. Tanzania's approach to socialism makes it less fearful than its neighbors of relying heavily upon economic support from China. And Muslim General Amin -- politically isolated from most of his black African neighbors
and the West -- has forged ties with the Arab world and revolutionary Libya, in particular. This complicates the problem of regional solidarity in dealing with world-wide and even continental issues. It also directly affects the economic future of the common market since many of the trade arrangements link an East African state with a non-African economy. Tanzania, for example, must pay off its share of the Chinese loan for the Tanzara Railway by buying Chinese, rather than Kenyan, manufactured goods. In selling its cotton to Czechoslovakia, Uganda may be forced to buy Czech rather than Kenyan-made shoes.

Indeed, the problems of regional solidarity are also affected by the separate relationships established by members of the Community with other African states. Nyerere, for example, has been one of Africa's most vigorous opponents of white rule in southern Africa and has insisted that liberation must remain high on his priority list regardless of any repercussions this may have on East African unity. Hence, he was prepared -- no matter what the cost to his involvement in the East African Community -- to lessen the dependence of Zambia on white-dominated Rhodesia and South Africa. The decision on the Tanzara Railway was negotiated without reference to Uganda and Kenya, which together with Tanzania collectively had administered the other railway system in East Africa. Since there was already controversy regarding the cost of operating the existing East African railways, the Tanzara Railway had to be built and operated outside the East African Railways Corporation. The Kenyans may yet be proved correct that the new line is a "white elephant", particularly if independence of Mozambique, majority rule in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the ending of civil strife in Angola lead the Zambians to reestablish their transit trade through the shorter rail links to the sea. In the meantime, a complication of the problem arose in 1974 when a quasi-private Kenyan transport firm had persuaded Zambia to have some of its exports and imports transported by road between Mombasa and Lusaka. The rationale for this was that the crowded conditions and escalating surcharges at Dar es Salaam harbor demanded an alternative route. This arrangement, however, clearly threatened the ultimate fiscal solvency of the Tanzara Railway and the new port facilities at Dar es Salaam. In addition, it put an additional financial burden on Tanzania, since it was its roads which were being severely damaged by the heavy trucks transporting the copper and oil. It was this situation which led the Tanzanians to temporarily close the border with Kenya in 1974 and at periodic intervals thereafter until the "permanent sealing" in 1977. The completion of the Tanzara Railway and
the improved efficiency of Dar es Salaam cargo handling led the Zambians themselves to abandon road transhipment through Mombasa. Indeed, by 1976 Dar Es Salaam was actually handling more tonnage than Mombasa and over eighty per cent of Zambia's copper was being exported from the Tanzanian port. Hence a considerable economic alliance was diverting Tanzania's attention southward, away from its common market neighbors.

Common Services Corporations. A number of the organizations which jointly served the three states fell victim to the demands of political sovereignty once independence had been achieved. In this category was the early demise of the East African Navy, the High Court of Appeals, the University of East Africa and -- somewhat later -- the Currency Board. Certain other agencies which lacked an elaborate infrastructure were more easily dissolved as soon as one or more of the partners decided there was more to be gained by operating separately rather than jointly. Such was the fate of the Tourist Association. There were a few common services, such as the railways, harbors, the air line and postal services, where it was initially assumed that the costs of separate operations by each state would be prohibitive and the benefits of collaboration were substantial. Consequently, the partners agreed not only to continue co-operation in these areas, but actually to expand the enterprises.

Each partner, unfortunately, tended to view the functioning of the common services from a national perspective. Uganda and Tanzania, the two economically poorer members, expected that the more profitable Kenya operations of the railroads, airways, harbors and other enterprises would pay for the development of services in those areas which had been relatively neglected during the colonial era. Conversely, the Kenyans chafed at having to subsidize what they regarded as the less efficiently managed and less productive operations in Tanzania and Uganda.

Fiscal affairs also plagued the functioning of the corporations. According to the original formula each partner state was to share in the cost of operating the services, and the locally collected revenues of each corporation were to be forwarded to its central headquarters. Here again, however, Tanzania and Uganda found themselves at a disadvantage. The headquarters of the two largest corporations -- Railways and Airways -- were located in Nairobi, and the conflict with General Amin delayed both the establishment of the Development Bank in Kampala and the transfer of Post and Telecommunications to that city. Tanzania did have one revenue-earning corporation with the relocation of the Harbours Corporation in Dar es Salaam. Its second operational head-
quarters -- that of the Economic Community at Arusha -- did not entail significant revenue transfers from the other two states. Thus, the imbalance of payments within the Community, which was already distorted in favor of the superior Kenyan trading position, was further aggravated by the transfer of corporation revenues to Nairobi. While Tanzania's reluctance to transfer funds was largely economic and related to the fluctuations in the value of the Tanzanian shilling, Uganda's obstinacy was more overtly political. General Amin used the revenues issue as a form of hostage in his efforts to secure his official recognition as Uganda chief of state by Nyerere. In any event the failure of revenue transfers left the corporations with serious cash flow problems in meeting payrolls and purchasing fuel. The failure of the governments to contribute their pledged assessments, moreover, prevented the repairs and replacement of obsolete equipment.

The East African Railways Corporation was the first of the corporations to encounter the threat of dissolution. The three states quarreled about the scarcity of rolling stock, which Tanzania and Uganda charged was being kept in Kenya for more profitable runs. Tanzania objected, moreover, to the freight from the Arusha-Moshi area of Tanzania being shipped out of Mombasa instead of contributing to the further development of the port facilities at Dar es Salaam. Even more irritating to the Tanzanians was the diversion of some of the more profitable railroad cargo to the quasi-state Kenatco trucking firm in which many Kenyan politicians had substantial personal interests.

Faced with the refusal of the other two states to transfer corporation revenues to Nairobi, Kenya attempted to deal with the problem by insisting that all service on the Kenya portion of the railroads be paid for in Kenya currency. This was a harsh blow to landlocked Uganda whose economy was in dire straights under General Amin. Tanzania, however, was able to retaliate by halting all passenger service to Kenya in February 1975 and later that year removed sections of the track, thereby bringing all inter-territorial freight service to a halt as well. From that point onward the railroads ceased to operate as a coordinated enterprise, the headquarters of the corporation was dissolved and the only discussions which took place thereafter were over the distribution of the rolling stock, the lake steamers and other assets as well as the parcelling out of responsibility for the debt service.

A similar fate befell the Harbours Corporation, which had hived off from the Railways in 1969, with the headquarters being moved from Mombasa to Dar es
Salaam. Kenyans were upset with having to use revenues collected at the more profitable Mombasa port to retire the World Bank loan for the expansion of facilities at Dar es Salaam. It was particularly annoying since the Kenyans felt that they should have had a second port of their own to relieve congestion at Mombasa. In this instance it was Kenya that refused to remit revenues of the corporation to its headquarters in Tanzania. By mid-1976 the controversy had led to the decision that each country would operate its own port facilities, and a year later Tanzania froze the bank accounts of the corporation and fired the Kenyan and Ugandan employees. The demise of the corporation was complicated by the fact that international loans to the Community were premised on the continuation of regional cooperation in operating the seaports.

The history of the Posts and Telecommunications Corporation followed a similar course. The dispute with Amin was not merely an inter-governmental controversy; the Kenyan and Tanzanian employees of the Corporation objected to having to live in the climate of fear which pervaded the Uganda capital. The Kenyan and Tanzanian governments alike were reluctant to transfer corporation funds to Uganda, which was experiencing spiraling inflation under Amin's erratic economic policies. Ultimately each country began printing and selling its own stamps and handling its own telegraphic services. In any event, the difficulties experienced by both the railways and the airways made the coordinated shipment of mail and parcel post impossible to accomplish.

The coup de grâce to the aspirations for unity, however, was the demise of the East African Airways and the events preceding and following the decision. Although Airways had frequently operated at a deficit, as recently as 1974 it enjoyed a period of record-breaking profits. Given the high cost of each country purchasing separate equipment and paying the salaries of pilots and other professional staff, it was long predicted that Airways had the best prospects for survival within the Community. There were, however, long-standing controversies over both its foreign and domestic operations. Tanzania and Uganda, which have the more impressive game parks in East Africa, had chafed at the fact that over eighty per cent of the international flights were directed in and out of Nairobi. Thus, the mounting number of camera safaris would book tours and accomodations in Kenya and travel by private vehicles to the game parks in the neighboring states. Not only did this mean that most of the tourist revenues remained in Kenya, but it meant that Tanzania's impressive international airport at Moshi-Arusha and Uganda's Entebbe airport were almost redundant. A further aggravation with East African Airways was Tanzania's insistence that the
more profitable international service should help subsidize the network of feeder runs which were regarded as vital factors in maintaining internal communications and trade in the largest of the three states.

As in the case of the other corporations, the crisis with Airways came to a head over the issue of revenue transfers to the headquarters in Nairobi and the shared responsibility of purchasing new equipment. Although the demise came in stages, by February 1977 Airways was formally dissolved after thirty years of existence. Each state scrambled to retain whatever equipment and assets of the corporation were physically present in the country at the time of dissolution. Kenya was left with the unpaid bills of the corporation, and during the ensuing months great wrangling took place over the distribution of the assets and debt obligations. In the meantime Kenya and Uganda each set up separate national airlines, and Tanzania turned southward to Mozambique and secured a bilateral agreement to establish and operate a single public airline. This further accelerated the redirection of Tanzania's economic interests away from the East African Community.

With the non-functioning or formal demise of the Community corporations, all that has remained of system-wide institutions has been the General Fund Services. This comprises the Central Secretariat, which continues to function in Arusha and has responsibility for meteorology, customs and research on industrial development, natural resources and medicine.

The Fate of the Common Market Arrangements

The complementary feature to the Community's technical services corporations has been the common market arrangements. The Treaty which was fashioned at Arusha in 1967 was to be the lynch-pin in the quest for political unity via the functional route. Indeed, the enthusiasm of the three East African partners was so infectious that several of the neighboring states almost immediately applied for membership or registered an interest in an expanded economic community in eastern Africa. Of the three participants, Kenya stood to gain the most from the common market arrangements, thus counterbalancing the advantage in benefits that the other two states were to have received from an upgrading of the technical services. The edge which Kenya enjoyed in industrial growth under colonial rule would be further enhanced by its ready access to markets close at hand. Its economic hegemony within East Africa could further serve as a springboard for the establishment of even more significant markets
in Zambia, Zaire and even West Africa as well as the expansions of non-African trade and investment linkages.

The 1967 Treaty, nevertheless, was designed to be of benefit to all three parties by permitting the less developed partners to improve their industrial standing relative to Kenya. The decision, however, to locate the Community headquarters at Arusha -- the geographic center of East Africa -- did little to counteract the economic dominance of Nairobi. Foreign investors, the World Bank, American aid and foundation officials and others early recognized that Nairobi was the vital center, whereas Arusha had lost even the dynamism it had enjoyed in the later days of the colonial era.

Efforts to redress the trade imbalance within the Community consisted primarily of giving monopolies in certain manufacturing fields to Tanzania and Uganda to protect their fledgling industries. The arrangements did not work. Kenya early violated the agreement to leave the textile industry to the other two states, and even in the agricultural sector Kenyan production was becoming more efficient in those key areas, such as sisal and coffee, where the other two had enjoyed the competitive edge. Kenya complained that the two neighbors abused the transfer tax arrangements whereby tariffs were levied against Kenya industrial products to protect fledgling enterprises. By 1975 the situation had so deteriorated that Tanzania began to prohibit the importation of any goods from Kenya that could be manufactured in Tanzania even if Tanzanian firms could not meet the domestic demand. The duplication of industrial functions had been further accelerated by resort to exchange controls, the imposition of import licensing and the use of industrial licensing in proliferating activities which could have more efficiently been confined to a single factory.23

By the mid-1970s the erosion of the free trade aspect of the Community was plainly apparent. Instead of the three states becoming each other's best customers, imports and exports among the three had suffered a drastic decline during the first half of the decade. In 1975 alone, the Tanzanian exports to its East African partners suffered a decline of 39 per cent from the 1974 situation, with a roughly similar slide in its imports from Uganda and Kenya. The deterioration in relations with President Amin and the "permanent sealing" of the Kenya-Tanzanian border in 1977 could bring the inter-trade relationship among the three close to the zero point. The three former partners are clearly looking elsewhere for economic ties. Tanzania, in addition to the long-term link with China resulting from the Tanzara Railway loan, is shifting its attention southward in Africa, fashioning
stronger bonds with Zambia and Mozambique. Kenya, now cut off from its road links with Zambia and Zaire, is casting its economic net on a worldwide basis, with Mexico, Japan and other non-African states figuring prominently in its trade and investment patterns along with other African states outside the eastern Africa region. Uganda has become more and more reliant on aid and trade with Russia, Libya and an assortment of other states.

If the problems of the common market were dealt with in purely economic terms, it would be apparent that all three countries are the losers by the break-up of the East African Community. Each state is faced with the prospect of a balance of payments problem as its foreign reserves are drained to the more industrialized areas of the world rather than remaining within East Africa. The demise of cooperation in the transport field and the search for external economic links has increased the ultimate cost of both imported and exported products -- a situation further aggravated by the increased price of oil. Finally, the failure of trade and transportation within the region has contributed substantially to the inflationary spiral in each of the three countries.

Prospects for the Future of East African Unity

It became all too apparent that if the East African Community were to achieve even its more limited goal of economic cooperation -- to say nothing of its larger goal of political federation -- there had to be some sacrifices made with respect to state sovereignty. The Community needed an authority that could act independently of the total membership. While not lamenting the passing of colonial rule, this is precisely what the imperial government provided the region prior to independence. Whenever the deliberations among the three colonial governors had reached an impasse, the Colonial Office could step in and provide a solution, however unsatisfactory it may have been to one or more of the parties. The colonial system was able to stimulate growth in selected areas, based on the needs of the British empire as a whole. The system could also work in reverse. That is, a territory might be prevented from developing a crop or an industry which would put it into competition with another territory within the colonial system. Since independence, no super-territorial authority has been able to impose cooperation.

The rule of unanimity which obtained in the operation of the various institutions within the East African Community, moreover, was not likely to be
surrendered easily, given the state of underdevelopment in Tanzania, the vagaries of the military regime in Uganda and the reluctance of the Kenyans to have their limited prosperity subsidize what they regarded as the mismanaged or ideologically misguided economies of their two neighbors. Any national regime in Kenya, Tanzania or Uganda which voted to surrender a portion of its sovereignty might find itself threatened with ouster at the first sign of economic hardship for its people.

The history of events in East Africa seems to confirm that there must be a constant momentum forward and a continuing surrender of state authority in increasingly complex areas -- if only to preserve existing achievements in cooperation. East African leaders since independence have faced a considerably more difficult situation than that faced by American leaders in 1787 or West European statesmen at the end of the Second World War. Instead of the East African economies being basically complementary, they are competitive with respect to their main source of production, agriculture. They lacked, moreover, complementarity with respect to the basic ingredients of industrialization, which proved to be the initial binding element in West European cooperation.

Instead of closing the industrial gap which had given Kenya a relative advantage over its neighbors, the gap had considerably widened. Each was compelled, by virtue of the diversity of its external trade commitments and investment opportunities, to engage in transactions which weakened, rather than strengthened, regional economic unity. Indeed, no real effort had been made to engage in regional economic planning, despite the provision for it in the 1967 Treaty. Far from breaking down the separate nationalist feelings, each state had been pursuing a different approach to national language policy and the development of disparate symbols of nationalism. Attempts to develop a common citizenship remained dormant. Even the efforts to develop a regional civil service committed to East African cooperation were undermined by delays in transferring the headquarters of Posts and Telecommunications to Uganda, the expulsion of Kenya workers on East African Railways assignment in Tanzania and other acts which made few want to risk the relative security of national employment. Even before the closing of the borders, the erection of customs and immigration checkpoints at each inter-territorial crossing, moreover, hindered the free flow of individuals throughout the region. No country was immune to demands that "foreign Africans" be expelled to provide more jobs for the local population. Certainly there was no group of "federationists" who could politically challenge the leadership of the three separate states.
What could have reversed this process of retrogression? Perhaps internal changes in one or more of the member states could have provided the basis for closer cooperation. One could not pin much hope on the three states achieving a level of economic parity through the pursuit of nationally-directed economic plans; therefore, the changes would had to have been political. This could have come about, for example, through the emergence of a more socialist-oriented leadership in Kenya, through Tanzania adopting a less antagonistic attitude towards capitalist development or through Uganda being liberated from the personalized rule of General Amin.

Alternatively, increased cooperation could have been the consequence of external pressures, such as a military threat to the freedom of the three states, from whatever source. Indeed, the closest thing to external pressure was the decision of the World Bank in 1976 to suspend its $50 million worth of loans to the Community after Uganda had reportedly withheld its portion of the repayments. It was unofficially hinted that the move was calculated to pressure the three states to improve relations with each other. The effort of the World Bank, however, was both muted and short-lived, and it eventually lifted the suspension without a substantial change in relations among the three partners.

One further mechanism which might have contributed to successful functional integration would have been the expansion of the Community along the lines envisioned in the 1967 Treaty. This might have led to a reduction of tensions among the original participants. The inclusion of Zambia, for example, might have had the dual effect of convincing the Kenyans that another relatively prosperous state would be making a contribution to the development of poorer areas while at the same time reassuring Tanzania through the inclusion of an ally who is closer to itself both in ideology and commitment to southern African liberation. The addition of Malawi, Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi, Ethiopia and Somalia could conceivably have led to a relaxation of the unanimity rule in decision-making. Unanimity is more difficult to achieve in a union of only three members, when there is the possibility of two partners forming a continuing coalition against the third. There might have been one drawback. The broader-gauged approach, which is currently being considered by fifteen states in West Africa, would perhaps have limited cooperation to economic and technical matters for some time to come. Increasing the diversity of the Community would have diminished even further the prospects for an early consideration of political federation.

Until the break-up of the East African Airways Corporation in February of
1977, there were many who continued to take great comfort in small things regarding the prospects for regional integration. After all, the leaders of the three East African states continue even today to make public pronouncements regarding their commitment to the concept of unity. Despite the failure of the heads of state to meet as the collective executive of the Community since October 1971 there had, nevertheless, been frequent meetings of officials at the ministerial level. The Ministers of Finance as well as the ministers in charge of power and communications, for example, met at fairly frequent intervals. There have even been bilateral negotiations between Kenyan and Tanzanian officials following the demise of the joint airways. None but the most blatant optimists, however, could assume that it was possible to reconstitute the East African community in the form that it existed at independence or at the signing of the Treaty of 1967.

The Theoretical Significance of the East African Experience

Admittedly some of the experience with functional integration in East Africa is sui generis and has no relevance to the analysis of efforts elsewhere to achieve a higher plane of cooperation among previously autonomous political units. There are, however, a number of general propositions which do emerge from this study which may have significance for students interested in the problems of trans-national integration.

Proposition 1 ("Mutual Benefits"): Although in the initial states of integration, one or more partners may be willing to forego immediate advantages or even to suffer minor disadvantages, in the long run there must be steady, demonstrable and substantial benefits to the major units in the partnership in order to sustain integrative efforts.

Proposition 2 ("Quality of Cooperation"): In functional integration the quality of cooperative efforts (that is, the critical importance of the activity to the participants and the degree of increased interdependence and complementarity it establishes) is more important than the mere quantitative increase in the number of areas of cooperation.

Proposition 3 ("Dynamic Process"): Functional integration is a dynamic process which requires continuous forward movement into new and related areas of cooperation in order to prevent the initial areas of cooperation from becoming politicized in terms of the separate interests of the participating states.

Proposition 4 ("Irrevocable Transactions"): Functional integration which is
designed to lead to political unity must be based upon transactions which are by their nature irrevocably binding on the political units involved.

Proposition 5 ("Numbers and Relative Strength"): In any integrative effort which goes beyond limited cooperation in narrowly specified areas, the number of participating units and their strength relative to one another become critical to the sustained success of the venture.

Proposition 6 ("Shifting Coalitions"): In cases of increasingly complex functional integration, there must be sufficient diversity to enable the formation of shifting coalitions on major issues. On each new issue there must at least be the presumption that any one of the partners could serve as a potential ally.

Proposition 7 ("Supra-national Authority"): Sustained functional integration requires the existence of a supra-national institution having authority to make binding decisions on a basis other than unanimity rule.

Proposition 8 ("Individual and Group Contacts"): Functional integration designed to lead to political integration must go beyond intergovernmental relationships and involve significant and sustained contact among private individuals and groups which transcend political boundaries.

Proposition 9 ("Increased Inner Direction"): Functional integration designed to lead to political integration requires that increasingly the importance of the collective effort to each of the participating units comes to outweigh the importance attached by the members to external political units and relationships.

Proposition 10 ("Ideological Compatibility"): Functional integration is neutral with respect to ideology. Functional integration, however, cannot proceed where the ideological divergences among the participating units regarding strategies of development, participatory democracy and other issues are too basic to the areas in which cooperation is being pursued.
END NOTES


8 Sir Donald Cameron, My Tanganyika Service and Some Nigeria (London: Allen and Unwin, 1939), passim.


11 Ibid., pp. 375-376.


16 Cameron, My Tanganyika Service, pp. 224-225.


21 Leys and Robson, *Federation in East Africa*, pp. 185-186.


THE ORIGINS OF BOUNDARY CONFLICT IN AFRICA

J. Barron Boyd Jr., LeMoyne College

Because boundaries define an important segment of the environment within which decision makers must function, they have had a multifaceted and complex impact upon the dynamics of African foreign policy. Boundaries in Africa have served the traditional, geopolitical role of partially determining the capabilities, resources and perhaps even power which the African states can employ in support of their foreign policy. Boundaries define the extent of territory under the sovereign control of a group of decision makers and the presence of certain non-human components of the power equation will depend upon the quality or character of that territory included within the national boundaries. The natural resources at a state's disposal, the ease or difficulty with which it can engage in intercourse with the rest of the world, the presence or absence of natural barriers against invasion, the heterogeneity or homogeneity of the state's population, to mention but a few characteristics, are all determined by the shape and location of its physical boundaries.

This function of boundaries is obviously not unique to Africa and holds equally in all areas of the world. The factors which make the role of boundaries in African foreign policy particularly worthy of note and investigation derive from the process by which the contemporary African borders were defined and the rather unique set of pressures which are consequently present in the foreign policy environment of the African states.

The importance of boundary related issues in African international relations is often attributed to the supposed arbitrary and artificial nature of the continent's modern territorial boundaries. It has frequently been maintained that the states which now dot the continent were created during the great scramble for Africa by alien diplomats who knew little of, and cared less for, the social, political and topographical realities of Africa. European diplomats were commonly depicted sitting about green baize tables in their respective capitals with ruler and blue pencil in hand carving up the continent without regard for the disruptive effects that their efforts at partition would have on Africa. For example, Lord Salisbury, in a humorous moment, observed that
We have been engaged in drawing lines upon maps where no white man's foot ever trod; we have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, only hindered by the small impediment that we never knew exactly where the mountains and rivers and lakes were.\(^2\)

The ramifications of these actions are seldom depicted in such a humorous manner. To the contrary, partition grouped together peoples who shared little sense of common identity, separated ethnic and linguistic groups whose traditional patterns of trade and interaction were thereby disrupted by a relatively impermeable barrier, and created political units whose size and composition were in some cases incompatible with the goals of economic and political development.

On the basis of this boundary artificiality, many authors have postulated that colonialism laid the base for frequent conflict between the African states once they gained their independence.\(^3\) In particular, it was felt that after independence the African community would be plagued with efforts by the individual states to readjust the boundaries, through forceful means if necessary, to make them more congruent with the ethnographic landscape. The following observation by I. William Zartman is typical of the viewpoint which prevailed during the early and mid-1960s:

> Any African state can have boundary problems if it wants. The newness of African states and the frequent irrelevance of their geographic frames to their economic, social and political lives make the continent more potentially susceptible to territorial disputes than any other.\(^4\)

Because of the obvious importance of boundary disputes in an environment where, because of the colonial legacy, "any state can have boundary problems if it wants," a thorough and systematic evaluation of the forces which lead to boundary conflict would be an important project in itself; but since there are several other issues of more general importance which are linked to the dynamics of boundary conflict, such an investigation would be of wider relevance.

As we have mentioned, contemporary African boundary conflicts are often felt to be a direct and immediate product of the continent's colonial heritage. If Africa's modern boundaries had been allowed to evolve in a more natural manner, or if the colonial powers had based their partition on a more thorough appreciation of the socio-cultural mosaic of the area, it is assumed that the international environment in Africa would be less conducive to boundary
disputes. A systematic empirical study of the origins of boundary conflict in Africa would therefore help to indicate the extent to which current problems on the continent are linked to the colonial past.

Moreover, because boundary related foreign policy is a part of the overall phenomenon of African foreign policy formulation, an assessment of the factors which serve as a catalyst to the outbreak of territorial conflict could indirectly indicate some of the more general causes of intra-African conflict. An analysis of the dynamics of boundary conflict could at least provide some interesting hypotheses about why African states fight.

**Boundaries and Foreign Policy**

Political boundaries mark sharp discontinuities in political jurisdiction. No matter what the degree of physical proximity of individuals on either side of the boundary line, the fact that a political border separates them means that their national political orientations, duties and obligations will be sharply divergent. When the national political environment does not coincide with traditional patterns of ethnic affinity, subnational political contact or traditional forms of social and economic relations, some disruption will be the result. This disruption will occur because both the ethnic group and the national government will be placing simultaneous and often conflicting demands—for respect, primary allegiance, deference, etc.—upon the people. While the central government may have a monopoly on the use of coercive means to force the people to give it primary loyalty, ethnic ties may be deeply ingrained and difficult to break. As a consequence of the fact that such cross-cutting and sometimes irreconcilable pressures are placed upon them, some disruption will plague the people.

When discussing the relationship between political boundaries and those of the socio-cultural setting, it has been customary to make a distinction between antecedent, consequent and superimposed boundaries. Antecedent boundaries are those which are established before human settlement patterns are established, and therefore before the socio-cultural environment of a state has coalesced. The disruptive effects of such political boundaries are at a minimum for their antecedent status will insure that they play a major role in guiding and shaping the evolution of subsequent socio-cultural groupings. Because the political boundaries are established before the people arrive,
they will play an integral part in determining what patterns of interaction will develop at a later time.

Consequent boundaries are those which are established after human settlement patterns, affinity groups, markets and other relationships have solidified, but this type of boundary coincides with those socio-cultural patterns. When one refers to natural boundaries, it is generally this type which is cited. Like antecedent boundaries, consequent ones have a low potential for disruption since the political and socio-cultural environments mesh.

The final category in this crude typology is the superimposed form of boundary. Superimposed boundaries are similar to consequent ones in the sense that they are developed, or imposed, after the socio-cultural environment is solidified but the crucial difference between the two is that superimposed boundaries do not mesh with the outlines of the socio-cultural setting. When boundaries are of the superimposed type, ethnic groups are often bisected by political boundaries, and competitive or hostile social entities are often lumped together within the same administrative or political jurisdiction. When this is the case, the disruption mentioned earlier can be expected to pose a problem for both the affected individuals and the central government.

As most African boundaries are of the superimposed type, and as it is this form of political boundary which causes the greatest discontinuity between the political and socio-cultural frames of reference for the people, the domestic disruption in Africa can be expected to reach severe levels. Similarly, because the bisection of ethnic groups by national boundaries places part of the same group in different states, the presence of superimposed boundaries can have international implications as well. However, to agree that superimposed boundaries like those in Africa will cause domestic and perhaps transnational disruption is not sufficient to specify the manner in which this disruption is translated into the policy of the various states. It is not boundaries per se which cause conflict, but rather it is state policy which causes it. And while the friction which is a product of artificial, superimposed boundaries may be a factor which goes into the generation of conflict, it is only one of the many stimuli which help determine the course of a state's policy.

In order to more fully understand the relationship between the presence
of superimposed boundaries and African foreign policy conflict the following strategy will be adopted. First, an effort will be made to present a number of possible explanations for the outbreak of boundary conflict. These possible explanations are derived from a thorough overview of the existing literature on boundary conflict and as such represent the "traditional wisdom" on the topic. Unfortunately, this traditional wisdom does not provide us with the clear answers which we seek for the explanations it offers are complex, confusing and often contradictory. Therefore in order to more effectively determine the validity of such propositions an attempt will be made to use modern methods of data analysis to test them with data derived from the actual behavior of the African states.

One manifestation of boundary related conflict has a purely domestic impact. Upon having their traditional patterns of socio-cultural relationships disrupted by the superimposition of political boundaries (first by the colonial powers and later by the modern independent African states which adopted the colonial divisions of the continent with little alteration), the affected domestic groups can be expected to make demands upon the government for alleviation of the disruption. Such demands can take various forms ranging from pressure to relax the sanctions against free movement across the border to calls for cession of the affected territory to another state. But no matter what form the demands take, the aim is to elicit a change in government policy to permit the continuation of traditional patterns of relations. When faced with such demands, the central government has essentially two options in domestic policy: it can ignore its vested interest in maintaining the sanctity of the borders and increase its permeability, or it can attempt to strictly enforce the present boundaries hoping that eventually ethnic boundaries will come to conform to the national ones. Given the jealousy with which many African states guard the trappings of sovereignty after the prolonged colonial domination, and the potential chain reaction of separatist claims which might be set off by acquiescence to any particular ethnic group's demands, the second option seems to be the most likely solution. The result of attempting to force closure of the border is, if feelings run deep enough, some form of domestic conflict.

This same basic pattern of demands can have international as well as
domestic ramifications when none of the above options are available to the acting state. If the challenged government is reluctant to allow the permeability of its borders to increase and is simultaneously unwilling, or unable, to apply domestic sanctions, it has the option of trying to ease domestic demands through foreign policy pressure on other states. The aim of the government which adopts this tactic is to adjust the boundary through pressure on a neighboring foreign power.

The emergence of this pattern of interstate conflict is generally predicated upon the existence of a situation where ethnic groups are bisected by state boundaries with parts of the same group being placed on either side of a state border. This phenomenon is termed ethnic population overhang. The proposition that such ethnic population overhang is a catalyst to international conflict on territorial issues is perhaps one of the most obvious and straight-forward explanations of the linkage between boundary artificiality and conflict, and it has received a great deal of support in the literature. The following comment by a student of African boundary problems is typical of the importance attached to the ethnic population overhang hypothesis, "... the commonest situation in Africa [is] to find ethnic groups who wish to be united with their fellow men across the border and whose desires are used by the government to justify boundary changes."

The Horn of Africa is felt to be one area where the overhang effect has been most pronounced and hence where it has had the most impact upon boundary conflict. As a result of the colonial partition of Africa the Somali people were widely dispersed throughout the entire Horn area. While the Somali Republic is the center of Somali habitation, members of this general ethnic group also occupy extensive territory in both Kenya and Ethiopia. It would seem that as a basic consequence of this severe ethnic fragmentation (itself a product of the colonial partition of the continent) the Somali government has issued claims on some 80,000 square miles of Ethiopian and 45,000 square miles of Kenyan territory since gaining independence.

While there are, as we shall see in subsequent pages, many facets to this problem, Somalia's irredentist claims to Kenyan and Ethiopian territory have been based upon a cultural rationale. The Somali Republic claimed that since the colonial divisions of Africa were an archaic legacy which had little relevance for modern African nationalism, the Somali people could not be considered
fully independent until that legacy was eradicated and all Somali people were united under the same political jurisdiction. In support of their claims to territory the government of the Somali Republic maintained at the Pan African Summit of 1963 that all Somalis were members of a single Somali nation, Somali is our language, spoken from the Gulf of Aden to the Northern Frontier District [of Kenya]. Islam is our culture, pastoralism our way of life. We want to reunite with our brothers with whom we can evolve an administration suited to our way of life.9

As might be expected, Somali claims to Kenyan and Ethiopian territory were not welcomed by the governments of those states and political friction ensued. In the period between the early 1960s and the present the Horn of Africa has been the scene of much boundary related conflict as the Somalis continued to level claims to territory and Kenya and Ethiopia reacted to those claims.

Many authors have isolated this situation and asserted that it is the most overt and obvious manifestation of Africa's artificial boundaries leading to the fragmentation of an ethnic group which in turn resulted in boundary conflict between the several affected states. For example:

The circumstances of Kenya's connections with Somalia and many of the conflicts and problems which beset the Horn are founded in the present day distribution of Somali speaking peoples and in the ways in which they have become divided among several different states and powers. The anomalies and inconsistencies of territorial boundaries in north east Africa provide classic examples of the problems which arise with a strong sense of national unity among a people who have been divided among several different territories in the past.10

While the Horn area may be the most noted example, the impact of ethnic population overhang is not confined to that region. The disputes between Ghana and Togo (1956-1966) also seem to have been a product, at least partially, of ethnic population overhang. During the period of colonialism the Ewe ethnic group was divided between British and French jurisdictions. With the coming of independence the Ewe nationalist leaders in the former French territory of Togo claimed the Ewe occupied territory in formerly British Ghana. Initially the Togolese based their claims on cultural criteria maintaining that they, like the Somalis, sought to reunify the Ewe group. When this argument proved to lack support in international and African forums,
the government altered its tactics and used an historical argument to buttress their claims. During the period of German colonial occupation the Togolands were united, and it was this boundary configuration that the Togolese asserted should be the basis for post-independence boundaries.

Ghana, then led by Nkrumah, did not accept Togolese claims to its territory and in fact turned Togo's argument around. Since Ghana was then strongly committed to Pan African, anti-colonial ideology, Nkrumah could not easily argue that the colonial borders were sacrosanct. He therefore chose to counter-attack from a Pan African position. He asserted that the best way for the Ewes to be reunited was by union with Ghana. A Ghanaian annexation of Togo would thus both remove a potentially disruptive boundary problem and be consistent with Nkrumah's interpretation of Pan Africanist dogma. While the boundary conflict was raised to a higher level-- that of a debate over ideology--the initial catalyst for conflict lay in the ethnic population overhang between the two states and the demands placed upon the government of Togo as a result of that situation by the Ewes.

These are but two of the many examples of territorial conflict which seem related to ethnic population overhang. However, as these cases are more thoroughly investigated, it often appears that other factors have at least equal importance in the generation of boundary conflict.

One of these factors is the degree of ethnic homogeneity which obtains in the domestic environment of the conflict prone state. It has been suggested that domestic pressure on a government will be more likely to elicit a response of foreign policy conflict if the acting state is not ethnically fragmented. For example, it has been asserted by many authors that one reason for the fervor of Somalia's boundary agitation is the fact that it is an apparently cohesive state. Because of this, Somalia's irredentist policies do not risk opening a "Pandora's Box" of claims to external territory by other ethnic groups in the domestic scene. Similarly, it has also been suggested that Somalia could afford to annex territory without worrying about upsetting whatever ethnic balance might be at work in the domestic political environment. Also, in a uni-ethnic state there would be little chance that cross-cutting, competing demands from other groups in society would offset and moderate the demands of any one group. Thus it has been maintained that Somali demands could be more clearly articulated than would have been the case if they were only one of many ethnic groups competing for the limited attention of the central government.
There also seem to be situations in which the importance of ethnic criteria in the domestic political environment lead to boundary conflict. If an ethnic group has a particularly significant or pivotal place in the political environment, the likelihood that its demands for some form of alteration in the boundary status quo will result in the formulation of government policy is greater. It may well be that politically unimportant ethnic groups, or ethnic groups which operate in a political environment where ethnicity is not an important factor, have their demands ignored while those with greater political clout will be more successful in their claims. In this case, the presence of population overhang may be of initial importance, but the factor which is crucial in the generation of boundary conflict is the salience of ethnicity in internal politics.

Once again the Somali situation is cited as a case where this set of circumstances has led to boundary conflict. As was mentioned, while all citizens of the Somali Republic are of the same general ethnic unit, the Somali ethnic group is not a cohesive one. It is highly fragmented into kinship groups which compete, through party organizations, for political power and influence. In Somalia, then, ethnicity can be considered to be a salient political variable. An important explanatory force in Somalia's problems with Ethiopia, therefore, was the fact that the politically important Daarood group was most strident in its agitation for the reunification of "Greater Somalia".14

Because the Daarood depended heavily on grazing and water rights in Ethiopia, they frequently criticized the government for not taking active steps to reunite the Somali people-- and to thereby annex the Somali occupied territory in Ethiopia which the Daarood depended upon so heavily. For example, in 1959 the Daarood deputies in the National Assembly vociferously challenged Ethiopia's provocative "acts of aggression along the frontier," and demanded that the government take definite action on the Greater Somalia issue.15

Such demands seem to have had considerable impact upon the tempo of the Somali Republic's claims to Ethiopian territory, and since the Daarood group was an integral element of the complex ethnic balance which then influenced Somali politics, it is reasonable to surmise that it was the political salience
of the affected ethnic group which accounted, at least partially, for the impact of its demands on Somali policy.

A different type of hypothesis links general domestic unrest and the pressure of domestic problems to interstate conflict. Much as the specter of neo-colonialism and continuing colonialism were seen by some as an enemy against which the African states (no matter how strong their particular differences) could unite, the fomentation of boundary conflict could serve to create an external enemy to unify contentious elements of a population. A boundary dispute could act as a safety valve for domestic turmoil by letting domestic groups which are at odds with one another vent their hostility against a real or imagined external enemy rather than against each other. The "safety valve" hypothesis seems to enjoy at least face validity for in those states plagued with domestic dissention the inherent artificiality of boundaries presents the government of the African state with an easily manipulated issue about which to rally support.

Because the causes of domestic disruption may be diverse, the demands placed upon the government cannot all be presented as having their origin in the boundary issue area. Economic discontent, inter-ethnic friction, governmental inefficiency, etc., can each contribute to internal problems, but these factors may have little or nothing to do with the discontinuity between modern and traditional boundaries which was at the root of our previous set of hypotheses. No matter what the cause of the domestic turmoil, the central government has chosen to act within the boundary issue area, to foment boundary conflict, as it seeks a solution for the turmoil. Given this situation, the observation that "any African state can have boundary problems if it wishes" assumes added significance and the ease with which boundary problems can apparently be fabricated works to the advantage of the state which wants to divert attention away from its internal problems.

This tactic seems to have been adopted on several occasions. In 1963 Dahomey (now named Benin) began a boundary dispute with Niger. The conflict has been blamed upon the fact that there was a considerable amount of turmoil in Dahomey after the overthrow of President Maga, and it could be that the new ruler of Dahomey sought to foment boundary conflict with Niger in order to defuse this domestic dissent. Similarly, when the Somali National Assembly was threatened with a no confidence vote in April 1962, it was rescued, at least partially, by an escalation in the tempo of the border conflict with
Ethiopia. And again in 1964 when the general election in Somali was approaching there was a serious outbreak of fighting with Ethiopia.

In the preceding cases the stimuli which elicited boundary conflict arose, directly or indirectly, from domestic actors within the states. There are also examples of boundary conflict which do not seem related to domestic factors but rather seem to emanate from either the overall foreign policy stance of interacting states or from sources internal to the governing elite of a belligerant state itself.

Several instances of conflict appear to indicate that if a pattern of generalized hostility exists between a group of states, the artificiality of African boundaries will make them convenient points for the articulation of that general hostility. When African governments want to demonstrate, in a tangible and direct fashion, their displeasure with or hostility toward another state, boundary issues are ready made for such a purpose.

In this case the forces which generate boundary conflict may arise outside of the boundary issue area— in the larger foreign policy environment of states— but the policy which is formulated in response to such stimuli is clearly pursued within it. Domestic actors here are of peripheral importance in the manifestation of boundary conflict, and while they may be affected by the policy, or even cited as the cause of it, their substantive impact upon policy formulation is negligible.

The Niger-Dahomey dispute has already been noted in support of the hypothesis which isolates domestic unrest as a primary factor in the outbreak of boundary conflict. But if the evidence is interpreted in another manner, this case can also support the hypothesis which places primary emphasis on general foreign policy hostility as a cause of boundary conflict. After the overthrow of President Maga the new regime in Dahomey accused the Niger Republic of supporting a counterrevolutionary plot. In retaliation for this accusation, for the arrest of a number of its citizens by the Dahomians, and because Niger suspected Dahomey of aiding the subversive Sawaba Party, the Niger National Assembly announced that it would expel all Dahomians living on the northern side of the Niger River. Dahomey then closed its borders and effectively sealed landlocked Niger off from the outside world.

This series of events signaled a dramatic downturn in the tone of foreign policy relationships between the two governments. In this context it is interesting
to note that as diplomatic relationships soured, the long standing discussions on the status of Lete Island were transformed into rancorous debates. When the overall foreign policy position of the two states turned hostile, a previously dormant boundary issue flared up as well. It is also interesting that once relations improved the Lete Island issue lost importance and a compromise was quickly worked out.

The Ghana-Upper Volta dispute of 1963-1966 was presented as a disagreement over an interpretation of evidence used in the definition of the border which separated the two countries. But the dispute seems to have had its origin in a more general friction between the states. From 1961 onward Ghana had attempted to forge close links with Upper Volta, but Nkrumah had been rebuffed in 1963. At the same time as it was turning away from Ghana, Upper Volta had begun to pursue a rapprochement with the Ivory Coast. Nkrumah was quite piqued at this policy shift by Upper Volta, and when Upper Volta began to suspect that Ghana was attempting to subvert its government, relationships between the two states reached a low ebb. It was at this juncture that the ongoing boundary discussions became an important means through which each country tried to influence the other. Ghana sought to demonstrate, through manipulation of the boundary issue, that it could cause considerable trouble for an uncooperative neighbor, and Upper Volta attempted to damage Nkrumah's credibility by portraying his state as expansionist. Again, it appears that in this case boundary problems were simply a function of a more general and deep-seated pattern of antagonism between a set of states.

Several other examples could be given in support of this proposition (for example the Tanzania-Malawi dispute of 1967) but the major justification for its validity is the observation that those states which have experienced little foreign policy conflict and which share a common ideological perspective - Upper Volta and Niger, Chad and the Central African Empire, Mali and Algeria - have had little or no boundary conflict.22

Another perspective attributes the origin of some boundary disputes to the governing elites of the various states. This perspective tends to downgrade the importance of both external influences and domestic factors. Rather, from this viewpoint, boundary disputes are explained by the perceptions, desires and motives of the governing elites in any country. Zartman suggests, for example, that the desire for status in the African community could motivate
leaders to embark upon an expansionist course. As evidence of this process he cites a remark by a Moroccan ambassador that his country needed more territory "to look as big as Algeria". He further argues that one factor in Ghana's claims to Togolese territory was Nkrumah's continental aspirations to status which were "far greater than the size of the country."

A similar view stresses the fact that changes in government leadership seem to be related to the outbreak of boundary conflict. It was previously noted that boundary conflict followed closely upon the heels of Maga's downfall in Dahomey. The same pattern can be discerned in the flareup of conflict between Sudan, Ethiopia and Chad after the 1964 revolution which overthrew the regime of General Abboud in Sudan. Boundary problems were dormant until the coup, but after the regime change they grew rapidly in intensity.

Instability within a country's governing elite could potentially affect boundary issues in several ways. A regime change often marks a far reaching shift in the ideology, guiding assumptions and the norms of conduct for the unstable state. This could, in turn, reverse any pre-existing friendly relationships with neighboring states and facilitate the outbreak of boundary tensions. Also, since a regime change fosters suspicion, uncertainty and fears on the part of contiguous states about the intentions of the new leaders, the initial period after a coup could be a time of testing and probing the new regime through the fomentation of boundary troubles. Or finally, it could be that the newly installed elite in a country will foment boundary conflict as a means of generating popular support and solidifying their domestic position. This final explanation appears to be a modification of the "safety valve" hypothesis alluded to earlier.

At this point it should be obvious that the "traditional wisdom" about the causes of boundary conflict provides the analyst with a complex, confusing and often contradictory set of propositions from which to chose. Indeed, several different explanations are often given for the same case of conflict. Plausible explanations of the Somali-Ethiopian dispute are offered by referring to the "safety valve" hypothesis, the ethnic population overhang factor or the salience of ethnicity in domestic politics. How then are we to determine which of these propositions gives the most satisfactory general answer to the puzzles of boundary conflict?

To adequately answer this question some means must be devised to subject
each of these ideas to thorough and systematic empirical testing. We must compare each of the propositions to "real world" data and see which are confirmed by the evidence and which do not stand the test of empirical analysis. This is necessary because at their present stage of development the insights presented in the various models represent little more than a set of ideas which previous analysts have gleaned from isolated incidents of boundary conflict and which further specify factors which might be at the root of such conflict. For the most part, moreover, these insights have been based upon case studies of boundary conflict and consequently we have little idea of their general validity. To illustrate, ethnic population overhang may indeed prove to be a significant factor in the generation of boundary conflict in the Horn of Africa, but such a conclusion will tell us little about the impact of ethnic overhang in the whole of Africa. To make a judgement about the universal validity of the postulated causes of conflict on a continent-wide scale, a multicase analysis must be conducted. We must look at the impact of such things as ethnic population overhang in as many cases as is possible before any definitive statement can be rendered.

Thus if our knowledge about the factors which are related to boundary conflict is to move beyond conjecture, some means must be devised to subject our propositions to systematic multicase empirical testing. As a first step in that effort the propositions heretofore presented must be transformed into a group of formal hypotheses, the prerequisite of rigorous testing.

Hypotheses

1. The greater the ethnic population overhang between a set of states, the greater the conflict between them.

As was mentioned, this hypothesis enjoys the greatest support in the traditional literature. It posits that when an ethnic group is bisected by an artificial border there will be domestic disruption. This disruption will cause demands to be placed upon the central government of the state for redress of the situation, and these demands will elicit some form of boundary related foreign policy formulation. The aim of the foreign policy will be to force an adjustment of the border so that the disrupted ethnic group will limit its demands. If this proposition is sustained, some evidence will be provided to the effect that the African states have been directly affected by the legacy of
colonialism and owe much of their current conflict to the artificiality of their boundaries.

2. The greater the level of domestic ethnic fragmentation, the lower the level of boundary conflict.

This hypothesis begins to address the important relationship between domestic attributes and foreign policy behavior. It has been suggested that those states which suffer from excessive ethnic fragmentation cannot afford to engage in foreign policy activities, such as conflict over boundaries, which could be interpreted as being favorable to any single domestic ethnic group for fear of upsetting the domestic political equilibrium. Further, it has been suggested that ethnically fragmented states engage in irredentist activities only at the risk of opening a "Pandora's box" of subsequent claims to territory in neighboring states. Thus this hypothesis seeks to determine the extent to which a domestic attribute, ethnic fragmentation, acts to inhibit boundary conflict.

3. The greater the salience of ethnic criteria in domestic politics, the greater the levels of boundary conflict.

This hypothesis, like the previous one, seeks to inject domestic variables into the analytic process. Integral to this statement is the idea that in a domestic political environment where ethnic considerations are of prime importance the demands stemming from the presence of a superimposed border will have a greater impact upon policy than would have been the case if ethnic criteria were not important political variables. Whereas decision makers could perhaps afford to ignore the demands of an ethnic group if it was not politically important, this tactic would hinder political stability if a premium was placed upon ethnic identification in domestic politics.

4. The greater the degree of domestic instability, the greater the levels of boundary conflict.

This is a formal expression of the "safety valve" hypothesis. In essence it posits that when domestic instability becomes a problem for a state's leaders those leaders will seek to divert attention from internal tensions by creating an external enemy to unify the population. In this case the widespread awareness of the artificiality of boundaries on the continent makes boundary issues particularly likely points for the creation of an external enemy. All leaders realize that their boundaries were created by alien diplomats during the colonial
period and share a certain amount of consensus about the conflict potential inherent in such a situation. Consequently, when they need an issue to manipulate boundary questions are particularly useful.

5. The greater the level of non-boundary foreign policy conflict for a state the greater the level of boundary conflict.

This proposition seeks to test the validity of those observations which postulate a linkage between the factors of general foreign policy and boundary disputes. It would seem only natural that ideologically hostile states would engage in conflict over boundaries and that there would be some spill-over from the more general domain of non-boundary issues to those of territorial concerns. Given the easily manipulated character of boundary questions, one might even presume that boundary conflict would be more intense than that found in non-boundary areas.

6. The greater the disparity between size and desire for status, the greater the levels of boundary conflict.

This hypothesis assumes that those states which have pretensions to high status in Africa but whose physical capabilities are not commensurate with those pretensions will attempt to increase their size, and hence their capabilities, through expansionist activity. It could also be that a successful spate of boundary agitation will serve a symbolic function, i.e., that it will demonstrate to others in Africa that although a country may be small it still has the capability to influence others and is thus worthy of high status.

7. The greater the level of elite instability, the greater the level of boundary conflict.

This hypothesis posits a linkage between the elites in a state and its foreign policy. Different analysts have provided various explanations about the manner in which turmoil at the elite level could lead to the development of boundary conflict. But in spite of this explanatory diversity, many agree that this linkage is an important one.

Before attempting to deal directly with the problems posed by the need to empirically and systematically test these hypotheses, it is essential to isolate some of the basic patterns which are implicit in the statements. It appears that boundary conflict and the stimuli which are thought to motivate it could be linked in two different ways. Several of the hypotheses suggest a direct linkage between stimuli and policy, while others propose that the relationship is more indirect.
In the group which suggests a direct linkage, the presence of artificial boundaries serves as an immediate catalyst to conflictual policy. To develop this theme let us expand upon a few points made earlier. Superimposed boundaries create a discontinuity between the boundaries of the modern state and those of the traditional ethnic or ascription groups in a society. This discontinuity creates tension as the affected individuals are torn between the demands of their traditional groups and those of the modern state. These individuals will, as a consequence of that tension, issue demands on the central government to relieve either the discontinuity itself or the pressures which derive from it. When faced with a situation where significant elements of the polity are making demands for boundary adjustments, a government obviously has a plethora of means through which it can attempt to answer the demands, but three general options stand out. A government can try to lessen the popular pressure by relaxing the stringency of its control over the border, increasing its permeability, and thus easing the disruptive impact of the boundary. While this option is one solution to the problem, a number of factors would seem to blunt the viability of such a tactic. While the objective fact of independence may exist for the African states, the psychological realization of full independence may not yet have been achieved. As a consequence, governments of the black African states are generally quite jealous of the trappings of sovereignty. The premium placed upon symbolic aspects of independence derives from the state's insecurity and lack of confidence in its genuine autonomy. Respect for the symbolic aspects of sovereignty thus serves to give evidence that these states are indeed fully independent, legitimate political entities. As control over its territory is one of the most overt manifestations of independence, it can be assumed that the first option, increasing the permeability of the border, will not be a very attractive policy gambit.

The second option available to a state which is faced with domestic boundary demands is that of stifling dissent through coercion. Once again, this option may not appear to be particularly attractive. In a very real sense the limited capabilities of the African states to apply widespread sanctions will militate against this policy. While the military and police establishments of the various states often consume a disproportionate amount of total government expenditure, these organizations are, in absolute terms, of small size. A widespread campaign of coercive pressure could well overtax the military or police. This is particularly true when one realizes that to stifle boundary discontent and its consequent demands upon the government more than temporarily, the coercive measures would have to be
implemented over a long period of time until new identification patterns had time to form and replace the traditional ones. To be truly effective the application of force could not be a one time affair, but rather would have to be a continuous process.

African governments might also shy away from the coercive maintenance of boundaries due to the disruptive effect that such a policy could have on the domestic scene. It is a well established postulate of African politics that major threats to security for a regime are not external but rather emanate from the domestic environment:

It is not the country that is in danger of attack of conquest, but the government that is in danger of overthrow or collapse. Insecurity is thus endemic, inherent, and political rather than specific, external and military.25

As a consequence, the use of domestic sanctions in response to demands might appear to be too dangerous a tactic if any other options remain since it could result in an escalation of dissent, aggravate an already disruptive situation and have the effect of increasing discontent rather than ameliorating it. This action could thus pose a greater threat to the government's stability than the original problem.

In contrast to the two previous ploys, the third option which is open to the African leaders--that of engaging in some form of foreign policy interaction with a neighboring state to alleviate the situation--seems to have a number of positive advantages. This alternative is relatively cheap to adopt. The spectrum of foreign policy activity is quite broad and ranges from verbal activity to actual physical contact. By confining policy action to verbal activity alone problems can be addressed without the allocation of funds or the use of scarce resources. Further, foreign policy activity has great symbolic value, and the awareness of a population that the government is, through the medium of foreign policy, attempting to adjust a situation can serve to blunt the intensity of demands. This indirect satisfaction of demands can be effective whether or not any substantial alteration in the situation actually occurs. As long as the population believes that the government is attempting to look out for its interests the fervor of its demands, in the short run at least, may diminish.

Thus for those hypotheses which posit a direct linkage between the presence of disruptive, superimposed boundaries and conflict the pattern is clear. Boundaries cause disruption. This disruption leads to demands being made upon the government. And the government chooses to respond to those demands through the medium of foreign policy conflict with a neighbor. As a consequence the hypotheses which fall within
this general category include variables which are the product of the peculiar sort of boundaries which are found in Africa: ethnic population overhang, ethnic fragmentation and the salience of ethnic politics.

Another set of statements specify a more indirect relationship between boundaries and policy. For this group conflict derives not so much from the specific impact of boundaries upon the lives of individuals or the environment as from the impact that the boundary situation has had upon the perceptions and views of African decision makers. Boundaries in Africa are recognized by policy makers to be the creation of alien diplomats, and the potential for disruption felt to be inherent in such a situation is also widely accepted. Thus the subjective awareness of the artificial character of Africa's boundaries is a major component of an African leader's view of continental affairs. Believing boundaries to be artificial, and aware of the disruption inherent in this situation, the African leaders see boundary issues as ones which are quite easily seized upon when conflict with other states can help in the pursuit of their individual, domestic or international goals.

Therefore when the African states need an issue to manipulate, for whatever reasons, the objective fact of the existence of artificial, superimposed boundaries as well as the wide-spread subjective awareness of this situation make boundary questions a most likely focal point for the articulation of that issue. Within this category the relationship between boundaries and policy is obviously much less direct than was the case in the previous group since the stimuli which elicit foreign policy activity are not necessarily directly related to the presence of artificial boundaries. Hence the variables which are included in this group are such factors as elite instability, domestic instability, non-boundary conflict and the size-status relationship.

Hypothesis Testing

With these comments in mind it is necessary to address the problems presented when attempting to test, in an empirical manner, the previously elaborated hypotheses. The first step in a testing process requires that the variables in the hypothesis be operationalized; that is that they be transformed into a measurable form. For example, to assess the relationship between ethnic fragmentation and boundary conflict for a set of states it is necessary to develop a numerical index of the level of ethnic fragmentation within each country and to construct a similar index for the level of boundary conflict in each case. Once this has been done it will
be possible to correlate ethnic fragmentation with conflict and let the strength of the observed relationship indicate the validity of that hypothesis which links the two variables.

To this end the independent variables in the hypotheses were given numerical values by following well established procedures for the construction of composite measures of such variables. Briefly, several quantitative indicators were selected as potential measures for each independent variable. The statistical technique of factor analysis was then used to determine which of these potential indicators appeared to be valid representatives of each variable, and then those which did demonstrate their relationship to the underlying independent variable were combined to give a composite numerical value for all variables in each African state. For example, the number of riots, the number of anti-government demonstrations and the number of deaths resulting from domestic unrest were taken as indicators of domestic instability. By aggregating these values for each country, it was possible to develop a measure for that concept in all cases. The same process was repeated for each independent variable in the hypotheses, and we were thus able to arrive at an explicit numerical value for each African state on each of the factors specified above.

A different strategy had to be adopted in the operationalization of boundary conflict since foreign policy activity does not have any readily apparent quantitative indicators. Fortunately, an innovative form of data generation, events data, has been developed which allows scholars to specify the volume and content of foreign policy interaction between a set of states. Students of African foreign policy are fortunate that one of the most elaborate and complete events data collections yet constructed, the AFRICA data file*, uses the black African countries as its sample group. With this data it was possible to categorize and measure the frequency of African boundary conflict.

The AFRICA events data also gives us a more thorough inventory of boundary conflict than would have been the case if a more traditional technique had been adopted. Most analyses of boundary conflict isolate only the extreme, highly visible acts of overt physical or verbal conflict. However, it would seem that there is more to boundary conflict than just the spectacular event. We need to look at the routine event as well as the spectacular one--the negative comment

as well as the armed clash-- and events data will tap more of these routine events. We thus have a more thorough and adequate representation of boundary conflict with events data than would have otherwise been the case.

Once the independent and dependent variables found in the hypotheses were operationalized the relationships in them could be empirically tested using simple bi-variate correlation. Correlation analysis indicates the degree to which a pair of variables in an hypothesis co-vary. That is, it shows the degree to which a rise in for example, ethnic fragmentation, is accompanied by a rise in boundary conflict. If the correlation coefficient (which ranges from +1.00 to -1.00) is larger than +.30 or -.30, a relationship of moderate strength is indicated and our confidence in the validity of the hypothesis is increased. It is also important to note the direction of the correlation which is indicated by the sign of the coefficient. If we have a moderate-to-strong positive relationship (+.30 to +1.00) it means that a rise in the level of the independent variable is accompanied by a rise in the level of the dependent one. Conversely, a moderate-to-strong negative relationship (-.30 to -1.00) indicates that a rise in the level of the independent variable is associated with a fall in the level of the dependent variable. The results of the hypothesis testing process are presented in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable (A)</th>
<th>Dependent Variable (B)</th>
<th>Hypothesis Category</th>
<th>Correlation (A) with (B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Population Overhang</td>
<td>Boundary Conflict</td>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>+.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fragmentation</td>
<td>Boundary Conflict</td>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>+.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Instability</td>
<td>Boundary Conflict</td>
<td>Indirect</td>
<td>-.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-boundary Conflict</td>
<td>Boundary Conflict</td>
<td>Indirect</td>
<td>+.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size-Status Relationship</td>
<td>Boundary Conflict</td>
<td>Indirect</td>
<td>-.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite Instability</td>
<td>Boundary Conflict</td>
<td>Indirect</td>
<td>+.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salience of Ethnic Politics</td>
<td>Boundary Conflict</td>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>+.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The results indicate that four of the seven hypotheses could be verified at moderate levels of confidence. Domestic instability, the size-status relationship, elite instability and the salience of ethnic politics all seem to have a relationship to boundary conflict. The remaining variables, while mentioned in the traditional literature on boundary conflict, do not show much relationship to conflict when evaluated in an empirical, systematic, multi-case manner.

The strength of the relationship between conflict and the salience of ethnic politics indicates that there is a slight tendency for states that have politically important domestic ethnic groups to engage in boundary conflict. This would seem compatible with an intuitive assessment of the dynamics of boundary conflict since it is reasonable to expect that a state whose domestic environment places a premium on ethnicity would be more likely to respond to demands issued by such a group. Moreover, the relative weakness of this correlation is not surprising, for while there may be a number of African states where ethnicity is an important political factor, it is not likely that there are many in which an ethnic group is both politically important and directly affected by boundary disruption. Were we to confine the analysis to those states where key ethnic groups are bisected by a national border, such as Somalia or Togo, the strength of the relationship would probably be much greater.

In this regard it is interesting to note the lack of correlation between population overhang and conflict. It appears that it is not the specific magnitude of ethnic population overhang which is the causal factor in the generation of boundary conflict, but rather the crucial variable seems to be whether the demands of the affected group are deemed to be politically salient. This is an important point which seems to have been missed by many previous analysts of boundary conflict.

Our analysis also indicates that there is a moderate correlation between the size and status of an African state and its propensity to engage in boundary conflict. While the magnitude of the correlation signals a moderately strong relationship between the two factors, the direction of the correlation (negative) implies that our original hypothesis—which posited that the high-status, small-size states would be prone to engage in boundary conflict—is in error. Instead, it appears that large states which have little status in the African community are more likely to foment boundary conflict. A more valid proposition linking the two variables would thus read: "Large states with little status in Africa are more likely to engage in boundary conflict."
It could be that those large African states which are given little status by their fellow states on the continent seek to increase their status by initiating expansionist policy. Such policy might be calculated to demonstrate the power of the large state and to convince other African nations that it deserves greater recognition in African affairs. In any case, while this finding contradicts the traditional literature on African boundary conflict, it is consistent with at least one other investigation of the impact of size and status on state behavior. Maurice East has found that large, underdeveloped (and hence low status) nations tend to engage in more general foreign policy conflict than any other type of state. Thus, the African states differ little from others in the international system in this regard.

The strongest of the correlations was between elite instability and boundary conflict. A number of possible explanations for this phenomena were offered earlier in this chapter. The question then arises, which of the possible explanations are the most viable? Changes in African leadership are often accompanied by an alteration in the prevailing ideologies, attitudes and views of the decision making elites in the unstable states. We have mentioned that such an alteration in the status quo could lead to a reversal in any pre-existing climate of foreign policy amity. However, there seems to be one major flaw in this explanation. It may well be that elite changes transform peaceful relationships into conflictual ones, but would elite instability not also transform conflictual relationships into peaceful ones? In the long run it would seem that such changes in the tone of foreign policy caused by elite instability would cancel each other out and the strength of the correlation would diminish accordingly.

The two remaining explanations therefore seem more plausible. Turmoil at the highest levels of government reduces the predictability of an unstable state's foreign policy. When an established elite is removed from power, by whatever means, those states which have been interacting with the outgoing elites are no longer dealing with a known quantity whose probable reaction to any policy initiative can be gauged with accuracy. A need may thus arise for testing and probing the newly established government in order to discern their mode of operation and to determine the limits of acceptable foreign policy action. Neighboring countries may therefore seize upon such an opportunity
to foment boundary conflict, an issue which is quite amenable to manipulation when the exigencies of the times demand, in order to test the new elites.

It is also possible to postulate that the "safety valve" hypothesis has some relevance for elite instability as well as for general social unrest. As elites change, new leaders could seek to secure the support of their population by creating an external enemy with the manipulation of boundary issues. A good deal of credence is lent to this explanation by the fact that the hypothesis linking domestic turmoil and conflict was also confirmed by the data analysis. If leaders of a state have used the fomentation of boundary issues to offset one form of instability, it is quite likely that the same strategy would be used by elites in an attempt to secure their position of power. The convergence of these two verified hypotheses seems to provide added empirical support to the safety valve proposition in both situations.

Before attempting to draw some general conclusions from the analysis, it is important to consider the hypotheses which were not verified. The lack of support for the ethnic population overhang hypothesis has already been cited, but how could it be that an apparently invalid hypothesis could generate enough support to become almost axiomatic in the literature as an explanation for conflict? Of course there are a multitude of possible explanations for this, but the most straightforward one involves a comparison of the data base in this study with those of previous analysts.

Whereas the present work has attempted to base its conclusions on a thorough and systematic analysis of the 32 black African states, most previous studies have been idiographic in nature; that is, they have formed conclusions on the analysis of a single case of boundary conflict. When a single case forms the sole base for analysis it is often possible that factors unique to that case are accorded general validity. This seems to be a particularly acute problem in the ethnic population overhang example since previous works have not only been based upon a single case, but the majority of them have also been based upon the same case, that of the relations between Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa. It is this particular case where ethnic population overhang, by the Somali people, appears to have had the most immediate impact upon policy. Therefore these studies have tended to reify the importance of population overhang and this factor has been accorded almost universal validity.
It is also interesting to note that conflict in the general sense has little relationship to boundary conflict. It is almost intuitively obvious that if states engage in general foreign policy conflict they will also tend to conflict over boundaries, but again this does not seem to be the case. Perhaps such a finding indicates that African leaders make an implicit or explicit distinction between boundary conflict and other types of foreign policy conflict. Besides providing additional justification for an investigation of boundary conflict, this also seems to partially verify our contention that the politics of boundaries occupies an important and unique place in the cognitive and operational milieux of African leaders. It also indicates that when conflict over boundaries is fomented, such action is designed to further very special needs and goals of the state.

We now have a rather comprehensive inventory of the factors which serve as specific catalysts for boundary conflict, and we have also been able to discard some of the variables which have incorrectly been surmised to cause conflict. We can say, with some confidence, that elite instability, general domestic turmoil, the salience of ethnicity in domestic politics and the desire for status by large states are determinants of boundary conflict. Conversely, ethnic population overhang, ethnic fragmentation and non-boundary conflict have little relationship to boundary tensions. But what larger generalizations are possible from these results? What overall patterns are discernable in the data?

It is possible to make a tentative judgement about the relative potencies of internal and external sources of boundary policy. At independence it was widely assumed that domestic factors would be of paramount importance to African leaders as they formulated foreign policy. In the immediate post-independence era it was felt that the most pressing problems for the African states would lie in the areas of domestic consolidation, national integration, institution building and the like. As a consequence, when foreign policy was initiated, it would be designed to support and further these pressing domestic goals and priorities:

The determinants of foreign policy in the new African states are often obscured because the distinction between foreign and domestic policy is often difficult to establish. Activities and decisions which on the surface fall within the realm of foreign policy may well be designed as much or more for internal consumption as for their effect on relations with other states.32

The personalization of African politics was also thought to reinforce the salience
of domestic factors in foreign policy formulation. As the African states moved toward one-party government, decision-making authority for both domestic and international questions became centralized in the hands of a single leader or a small coterie of his followers. These leaders had a primary concern with securing their positions of power within the state, and foreign policy thus was more likely to be a reflection of that domestic concern.

Similarly, the lack of bureaucratization within the foreign policy establishments of the new African states was felt to increase the salience of domestic factors. The lack of a well-developed foreign policy bureaucracy made the gathering of accurate information about the external environment difficult to accomplish. Without a clear view of the external situation, those factors which could be more easily gauged—domestic forces—assumed greater importance.

While such arguments seem compelling, not all analysts shared these conclusions, and some concluded that external factors were of equal if not greater importance in determining the content of African foreign policy. Zartman succinctly summarizes this viewpoint in the following statement:

"Although there may be some relation between domestic and foreign politics, there is frequently too little relation between domestic and foreign policies. Western African relations are anything but "domestic policy pursued by other means . . . carried out beyond the boundaries of the state...." For the most part, intra-African foreign policy has little to do with domestic needs or purposes. Instead, it is often an exercise in pure politics—a struggle for external influence for its own sake...."

Thus this author would seem to discount the linkage between domestic factors and foreign policy. Instead, he stresses the leader's desire for power in the international environment as a motivating force.

Fortunately, our research sheds some light upon this controversy and, for boundary politics at least, indicates that internal factors do indeed exhibit the greatest correlation with foreign policy. While only one of the three hypotheses which include external variables could be confirmed, three of the four remaining internal factors produced significant correlations. We can thus affirm the accuracy of those who have isolated domestic factors as crucial in the generation of foreign policy activity.

Perhaps the most significant general conclusion to be drawn from the data analysis concerns the nature of the relationship between the colonial heritage and contemporary problems. Recall that the various hypotheses were dichotomized
into direct and indirect groupings. Hypotheses in the direct category represented immediate linkages between the artificiality of African boundaries and contemporary conflict. If the many previous assumptions about the magnitude of colonialism's impact upon the foreign and domestic policies of the African states are to be sustained, one would expect that the majority of valid hypotheses about the correlates of boundary conflict would fall within this group. To sustain the proposition that colonial actions are at the root of current problems, it must be demonstrated that an artifact of colonialism (like artificial boundaries) served as a specific catalyst to modern intra-African conflict. Because the direct hypotheses represent this immediate linkage between boundary conflict and artificial boundaries-- because the variables specified in the direct hypotheses impel the various African states to act-- it is these propositions which must be confirmed to validate the suspected link between colonialism and modern problems. Among the original hypotheses there is a rather even split between the two categories (four hypotheses in the indirect group and three in the direct) but three of the four verified statements fell within the indirect group. Such a finding seems to indicate that rather than being compelled to engage in boundary conflict by the endemic disruption of boundary artificiality, African leaders tend to manipulate the potentiality for conflict latent in the boundary situation when the exigencies of the times demand. If faced with elite instability, domestic turmoil or a perceived need to increase their status, the African leaders seize upon boundary questions as a means of attempting to improve their various positions. Further, it is possible to conclude from this that the impact of colonialism on the modern African scene is more indirect than heretofore suspected. In the case of boundary problems and conflict the impact of the colonial legacy has not compelled the states of Africa to fight, but rather it has created a situation in which the African leaders can exercise a wider latitude of policy choice than would have been the case if the continent's boundaries were of a more natural configuration.

In all probability boundary disputes and the politics of boundaries will continue to be an important aspect of intra-African foreign policy activity. If past patterns hold up, boundary problems may be an outgrowth of domestic turmoil as the decision makers attempt to create a set of external enemies
against which to rally the population. In a similar manner, when elites in a country become unstable, when rulers have reason to suspect that their tenure in power is threatened, boundary troubles could follow as those leaders seize upon the ever present boundary situation as a means of generating support for their leadership. It is also probable that if politically important ethnic groups demand a boundary adjustment, foreign policy conflict will be the result. And finally, it is quite likely that large states which feel that they are not accorded sufficient status in the African community will attempt to use boundary issues as a means of demonstrating their capabilities in hopes that such action will convince other states that they are worthy of greater consideration in continental affairs.

In a more general vein, it is likely that domestic factors will continue to have primacy in this facet of African foreign policy. Perhaps as the foreign policy bureaucracies of the states become more entrenched and sophisticated, or if African politics should become less personalized, external factors will come to exert a greater influence on the formulation of policy.

And finally, while the impact of the colonial past on contemporary Africa cannot be denied, the immediacy of the linkage between the past and the present problems of foreign relations is likely to be less apparent than some analysts would have us believe. If boundary politics are in any way typical of the full range of African foreign policy behavior, the colonial legacy will not cause modern conflict as much as it will provide a rationale, or perhaps an excuse, for action when the situation demands.
END NOTES


8 Zartman, "Politics," p. 82.


13 Not all analysts accept this contention. Indeed many deny that Somalia is a cohesive state. While all of its citizens are Somalis, and while the government does justify its irredentist claims by saying that it wishes to unite all Somalis, close observers have noted that there are several kinship groups in the Somali Republic which function as competing and conflicting ethnic groups. As shall be seen in the next few pages, these analysts explain Somalia's policy on the basis of domestic ethnic political competition. See, for example, A. A. Castagano, "The Somali-Kenyan Controversy: Implications for the Future," Journal of Modern African Studies 2 (1964): 165-188.

14 Ibid., p. 165.

15 Ibid.


23 Ibid, p. 87.

24 Ibid.


26 The two-step factor analysis method was used to demonstrate the convergent and discriminant validity of the indicators for each variable. See Donald T. Campbell and Donald W. Fiske, "Convergent and Discriminant Validation by the MultiTrait-MultiMethod Matrix," Psychological Bulletin 56 (March 1959), for a discussion of this approach. See Patrick McGowan and P. Lewis, "Culture and Foreign Policy Behavior in Black Africa," (Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, 1973), for an application of this technique. And see J. Barron Boyd, Jr., "The Determinants of Boundary Related Foreign Policy in Africa," (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of South Carolina, 1975), for a complete discussion of the methodology used in this particular operationalization process.


28 Data for the operationalization of the variables domestic instability, ethnic fragmentation, the salience of ethnic politics and elite instability was selected from Donald G. Morrison, et. al., Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook (New York: Free Press, 1972). The specific indicators for these variables are as follows:

Domestic Instability;
Communal instability
Turmoil
Intensity of violence

Ethnic Fragmentation;
Largest ethnic unit as a % of total population
Principles of reckoning descent
Settlement patterns
Hierarchy above family
Type of authority system

Salience of Ethnic Politics;
Number of political parties
Legislative fractionalization
Percentage vote cast for winning party in pre-independence election.

Elite Instability;
   Cabinet resignations and dismissals
   Elite instability.

Non-boundary conflict was measured through a factor analysis of Patrick McGowan's AFRICA events data project. The entire data set was factor analyzed and those events which appeared on a conflict factor were combined to form the final index. Ethnic population overhang was measured by a close analysis of the ethnic patterns tables for contiguous countries found in the Black Africa Handbook. Evidence of ethnic population overhang was noted and the number of individuals on either side of the border was recorded. The population figures for groups transcending state borders were transformed into a total population overlap index with the following formula:

\[ POI = \frac{E_1 - E_S}{E_1 + E_S} \]

where

- \( POI \) = population overhang index
- \( E_1 \) = the larger ethnic unit
- \( E_S \) = the smaller ethnic unit
- \( N \) = the total number ethnic units bisected by the border.

Status was measured by computing the ratio of foreign policy events sent to those received by a state. This method of measuring status is based upon a communications model and assumes that those states with greater status will tend to receive more communications, through the medium of foreign policy, than they send. See Steven J. Brams, "The Structure of Influence Relationships in the International System," in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 583-599. Once status was measured, it was a rather simple matter to construct a size to status ratio figure for each state. These independent variables were intercorrelated, and no evidence of multicollinearity was observed.

A composite index for boundary conflict in each case was constructed by factor analyzing the boundary conflict data in the AFRICA file. Those acts which appeared on a conflict dimension were used in the computation of a boundary conflict index for each state.

The analysis is based upon the 22 black African states which had some form of boundary conflict during the 1964-1961 period.


Zartman, International Relations, p. 53.
THE AFRICA PROJECT AND THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Patrick J. McGowan, University of Southern California
Thomas H. Johnson, University of Southern California

In this chapter we wish to describe the methods and some findings of the African Foreign Relations and International Conflict Analysis (AFRICA) Project as they relate to the comparative study of African foreign policy. Because the AFRICA project uses a research strategy based on recent advances in research methods for the comparative description and explanation of foreign policy behavior, it is important to discuss briefly a number of the assumptions and technical aspects of our approach before we review the contributions of this project to our understanding of African international relations.

Methodological and Conceptual Concerns

Among the major objectives of the discipline of international relations (IR) are the description, explanation and evaluation of the behavior of international and transnational actors within the multidimensional international system. Unlike many physicists and chemists in their laboratories, the international relations scholar cannot observe first-hand or experimentally manipulate most of the more intriguing and important events that occur in the world. In addition, international phenomena are highly dynamic--process and change are the essence of IR. The analyst of international relations is therefore confronted with a dilemma of considerable magnitude - how do we know what we claim to know about the behavior of international actors such as African states? How one answers this question, we would argue, has a great impact on one's preferred research strategy for creating knowledge and the uses one is willing to make of the knowledge once it is created.

A common response to this dilemma made by many students of world politics is based on the notion that international phenomena are non-repeatable and unique and must be treated as such. If an analyst adopts this belief, he will likely choose to describe and explain a particular aspect of international relations by undertaking a detailed case study that attempts to exhaust every relevant facet of the problem at hand. The knowledge produced by such case studies is often ideographic, that is, knowledge of the particular and the unique. Thus case studies can provide very rich descriptions of selected
events but they often fail to produce knowledge that is replicable, verifyable and general. Without general, or nomothetic knowledge, it is difficult and perhaps impossible to explain and evaluate international behavior.\footnote{This is so because every explanation makes reference to generalizations. To "explain" the death of a relative, for example, one may say that the deceased died from a heart attack. The specific and unique event of one person's death is "explained" by reference to our general knowledge that when the normal functioning of the human heart is interrupted, death generally follows. In a similar fashion, we may explain conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia by showing how it is a particular instance of a general pattern of border disputes that occur frequently in Africa because of the arbitrary nature of most African boundaries. Hence, while we do think that case studies of the foreign policies of particular African states are descriptively useful\footnote{Thus, the AFRICA project has adopted a "scientific" approach in its research}, we have chosen a research strategy that we feel is a more direct route to general knowledge about African international behavior.}

The AFRICA Project is based upon the assumption that international phenomena are repeatable and not necessarily unique. If they are filtered through useful conceptual categories, these phenomena can be grouped and analyzed in a systematic fashion. Among the highly repeatable aspects of African foreign policy are voting at the United Nations, visits among heads of state and government, the receipt of foreign economic and military assistance, border conflicts and denunciations of South African apartheid. Moreover, while each vote, visit, aid contract, border closure and verbal condemnation are unique in that they happen only once at a specific time and place, they can also be conceived of as types of foreign policy behavior. To do so, one must have a useful typology of categories of action exchanged between states and other international and transnational actors that permits the classification of each action as to its type. Once classified and coded, the particular, unique foreign policy action retains these characteristics but it also acquires new attributes for it has been explicitly characterized as representing a certain type of foreign policy behavior. These types may be compared along a variety of dimensions such as their origin, their targets, their frequency over time, their relations to other types of behavior, their "causes" and "consequences" and their evaluative implications for the acting state and its regional international system.

Thus, the AFRICA project has adopted a "scientific" approach in its research
because we assume that African foreign policy behavior is repeatable and not necessarily unique and because we want to create nomothetic knowledge about this behavior that is reliable, valid and general. This approach is necessary if we are to claim to be able to explain why African leaders behave the way they do in the international arena. Moreover, the type of knowledge produced by the AFRICA project is essential for an understanding of where particular African states, as described in ideographic case studies, fit into the more general patterns of African international behavior.

As a research strategy the scientific approach has many varied applications. Physicists, geologists, medical researchers and international relationists use a wide variety of different techniques, yet we would argue that all scientific research is characterized by explicit conceptualization, careful measurement usually leading to the quantification of data and the comparison of as many cases as possible and appropriate. These features of the scientific approach have the consequence of creating what has been called "intersubjectively communicable knowledge" because the methods and findings are created and reported in such a fashion as to make them relatively independent of the personal values and ideologies of the researcher.4 Findings can be shown to be independent of their originator's values by replication wherein other researchers with presumably different values are able to repeat or perhaps modify the original knowledge base. For replication to occur the original data must be available to other researchers. The AFRICA project data are available to readers of this chapter for research uses or for the purpose of replicating any of the findings we shall subsequently report.5 In the remainder of this section we shall focus on the issues of comparison, data-making and measurement, and conceptualization.

The Cases-for-Comparison

The central idea in comparative analysis is to make inferences about the truth of hypotheses using several instances of the phenomenon in question. For example, if a student is interested in explaining the dependency on France of its former African colonies, he would examine relations between France and all these territories rather than merely studying the foreign policy of a single former French territory. By identifying similarities and differences in France's relations with a large number of African states the analysis moves beyond a particular case to higher levels of generalization.
Because our research seeks to produce general knowledge about the sources, types and consequences of African foreign relations, the AFRICA project created a large-scale, quantitative and comparable data set. Thirty-two independent states of sub-Saharan black Africa (as listed on Table 3) or their forty-three political regimes between January 1, 1964, and December 31, 1966, represent our cases-for-comparison. These states and regimes were selected for a number of reasons. First, the states represent a cluster of countries that for various reasons (e.g., newness of statehood, lack of appropriate data, Western ethnocentrism, etc.) have been to a large extent neglected in previous comparative research concerning foreign policy behavior. Second, these states represent a relatively homogeneous subset of African states, excluding the quite different white minority controlled territories of Southern Africa and the North African Arab-speaking states that previous research had shown to be rather distinct in their international behavior. Third, these states are identical to the countries included in the Northwestern and York Universities African National Integration Project which has gathered a very extensive data set on historical and domestic characteristics of each state of black Africa. This is especially advantageous considering the special interest of the AFRICA project in examining the relationships between domestic factors such as political regime change or modernization and the external behavior of these states.

Let us be clear what these cases represent. In talking about African foreign policy behavior one may be thinking about the foreign relations of African states. If that is the case, then with our AFRICA project data one may look at the behavior of the thirty-two states during the three year period 1964-66. Upon occasion, however, when we talk about this topic we mean the foreign policies of certain governments or political regimes. Thus, between the beginning of 1964 and the end of 1966 the state of Ghana had two different governments, that of President Kwame Nkrumah and then a military-based government that took power in an anti-Nkrumah coup d'etat on February 23, 1966. This fact creates "two" Ghanas and it may well be that the foreign policies of these two quite different regimes were different as well. Hence, if one is thinking of the foreign policy behavior of governments, the AFRICA data are also organized in a fashion to permit comparisons among the forty-three different regimes that governed these thirty-two states between 1964 and 1966.

The time period selected, 1964-66, was chosen because it represents
the first period of political unrest for these thirty-two African countries after receiving independence. During this period, military-led coups d'état replaced civilian rulers with military-bureaucratic governments in one-quarter of these countries. This instability in some but not all states in this one region and during this short expanse of time provides an ideal focal point for an inquiry into the relationships between political regime change and foreign policy behavior.

This time period is also advantageous because it enables the researcher to evaluate the effect of the initial stages of nation-building in most of these countries. Twenty-two of these states had been independent less than four years by 1964. Therefore, special attention can be given to the analysis of political development in its earliest stages and its possible effect on the foreign policies of African states.

Conceptualization, Data-making, and Measurement

Given the AFRICA project's decision to study the foreign policy behavior of thirty-two black African countries and their forty-three regimes we turned to "events data" for comparable indicators of external behavior. Events data, which were developed by Dr. Charles A. McClelland and associates at the University of Southern California, refer to verbal and physical actions that international actors direct toward their external environments. Put simply, events data serve as an indicator of a state's behavior by recording "who says or does what to whom." Thus, events data are historical materials and, actually, very "traditional." The main difference between the traditional, case-study scholar and the quantitative analyst of foreign policy is that the latter is dealing with historical events in terms of quantity and at a higher level of abstraction while the case study analyst focuses on individual or small groups of narrative, historical accounts. The rapid growth of events data as a research technique can be attributed to the rediscovery that the study of international relations is largely an historical subject and the availability and utility of electronic computers for the storage, retrieval and analysis of such data.

Our use of events data makes our basic unit-of-analysis the foreign policy acts that are exchanged among African states and governments. Between any three African states, for example, there are six possible linkages:
For the thirty-two black African states there are 992 possible intra-African "dyadic" linkages. This means that in order to understand black African intra-state behavior the researcher must look beyond the conventional view of thirty-two states and concentrate on the conception of relational flows or action among African states.

The notion of relational flows counters the idea that a state has a single, uni-dimensional, foreign policy. Instead states or regimes have many different foreign policies that are constantly shifting and changing according to a wide variety of factors. One variable that plays a central role in this repertory of behavior and action is the target of a foreign policy action. The AFRICA project defines foreign policy actions or events as "the official, nonroutine, deliberate, overt actions of governmental representatives, directed at external actors for the express political purpose of modifying the behavior of those targets." The target of the action will influence the action itself. For example, Nkrumah's Ghana did not act the same way towards the Soviet Union and the Ivory Coast. Not only did the target, be it the U.S.S.R. or the Ivory Coast, evoke variation in Ghana's foreign policy, but actions also vary according to "issue areas." Put simply, different kinds of subject matters lead to different types of action and reaction on the part of the nations involved. Hence, each African state has multiple foreign policies that cannot be viewed in a static way but rather as a flow of behavior that changes direction and speed according to many variables.

To operationalize this conception of foreign policy acts, the AFRICA project relied on McClelland's notion that international interactions are "single action items of a nonroutine, extraordinary, or newsworthy character that in some clear sense are directed across a national boundary and have, in most instances, a specific target." Three points are worth mentioning concerning this idea that directly influenced our data collection process. First, the assumption that action is of a "newsworthy character" led the AFRICA project to search for a news source that could serve as a reliable
basis for the identification and abstraction of African foreign policy acts. The Africa Research Bulletin (Political and Economic Series) was selected to fulfill this purpose. This single source was chosen not only on the basis of "face validity," that is, it has the reputation among African area specialists as being the most comprehensive and accurate chronology of African political and economic affairs currently available, but also because it is a regionally specialized source. Africa Research Bulletin was viewed as much more appropriate for our research purposes than a world-wide data source such as the New York Times because research has shown such sources to report little African behavior.20

The second assumption concerning McClelland's notion of international interactions that directly influenced the AFRICA project's data gathering operations dealt with the idea that the interactions were "single action items." The AFRICA project followed this notion by operationally defining a foreign policy act as "a simple declarative sentence about an activity undertaken by a state or its official representative(s), wherein it may be inferred that the actor undertook the action in order to affect the behavior of the external recipient of the act."21 By concentrating on simple declarative sentences, the AFRICA project operationally employed a linguistic unit of analysis which represents the most discrete unit conveying information about foreign policy behavior.22

The last point to be noted about this conceptual definition is that it conceives of foreign policy behavior as being carried out by means of both discrete verbal and physical (non-verbal) control attempts by an actor directed at a target.23 Although the distinctions are often ambiguous, concrete differences can be seen between verbal and physical acts. For example, most threats in international relations are usually conceived of as verbal acts with contingent intent directed from one actor to another, but tacit threats are also possible. Physical acts, such as border closures or troop movement, often signal threats by non-verbal communication. In fact, if we are to understand foreign policy behavior in a thorough, complete fashion, we should attempt to observe regularities in the relationships between the use of verbal and physical means in undertaking foreign policy.

The AFRICA project utilized three separate stages in the collection and management of its foreign policy data. The first state of the process involved the identification and abstraction of individual events from the
text of Africa Research Bulletin. After identifying behavior that satisfied our codebook's definition of a foreign policy act, a trained abstractor then translated the act onto a code sheet in the subject-verb-object form of a simple declarative sentence, such as "Guinea signed a trade agreement with Hungary".

Once the act was identified and abstracted, the second stage of the data-making process took place. This phase of the procedure dealt with the numerical coding of the previously abstracted event across thirty substantive variables and nine "bookkeeping" type codes used by the AFRICA project.24 The number of variables coded is much more substantial than similar data sets. The WEIS25 project, for example, coded only five variables: date, actor, action, target and arena. It was felt that the wide variety of variables that were coded for each event would enable a researcher to examine comparatively a wide variety of questions associated with foreign policy behavior.

The last stage of the data-making process dealt with the storage and management of the data. To effectively handle a data set of this size it was vital to utilize an electronic computer. Before this was done, however, the data had to be made "machine readable." Hence, each of the 14,669 coded foreign policy actions had to be keypunched on computer cards so that they could be read, stored and retrieved by the computer. Following our rules, the event "After the overthrow of President Nkrumah, Ghana expels Soviet technicians" would be translated in "machine readable" language for the first four of our variables in the following way: 452 660315 7200 365, where 452-Ghana (actor), 660315-March 15, 1966 (date), 7200-the event of expelling personnel, groups, or organizations (action), and 365-the Soviet Union (target).

The reliability of the coding was judged quite adequate with an average inter-coder reliability coefficient for all five coders across all thirty variables of .87.26 This value is quite impressive considering that each act represented thirty separate substantive coding decisions. Obviously, each individual user of the data will have to make his own decisions as to the reliability levels that are viewed acceptable and, therefore, which parts of the data to use. It is our conclusion, however, that the overall reliability of the data is good to excellent.27
Having explored a number of methodological and conceptual concerns of the AFRICA project, let us return to the main objective of this chapter—the description and explanation of some patterns of the foreign policy behavior of tropical African states. As stated earlier, our entire data set consists of 14,669 foreign policy actions. These actions can be broken down into a subset of actions which represents only intra-African behavior or, in other words, actions initiated by African states toward other tropical African states. There were 4802 such actions identified, representing thirty-three per cent of the total behavior of the thirty-two states in question during the time period. Another twenty-seven per cent of the behavior was directed at African non-state targets such as the O.A.U. (6.5%), U.N.E.C.A. (1.6%) and O.C.A.M. (1.3%) and states not part of independent black Africa—Rhodesia (2.4%), Egypt (1.2%), South Africa (1.1%) and Tunisia (0.8%). Only forty per cent of tropical African foreign policy behavior was directed at non-African targets in Europe and elsewhere.

These figures describe the average behavior for all thirty-two African states. In the comparative study of foreign policy we are less interested in average or typical behavior and more interested in variation around such averages. For example, Liberia directed fifty-one per cent of its foreign policy behavior toward other tropical African states and Upper Volta sent forty-six per cent of its behavior to these same targets. In comparison, Tanzania sent only twenty-seven per cent of its actions toward other black African states and Ghana thirty-one per cent. Why did Upper Volta and Liberia pay more attention to the rest of Africa than did Ghana and Tanzania? Conversely, why were Tanzania and Ghana more interested in a "world role", as indicated by the extent of their extra-African activity? It is the exciting job of research to frame answers, often called hypotheses, that can then be tested against the facts. A possible explanation of these differences is that land-locked and/or relatively small states will focus their behavior on their neighbors because of weakness and geographical vulnerability. Our AFRICA data help us think of such questions and are, of course, indispensable in attempting to answer them.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VERBAL (&quot;words&quot;)</th>
<th>NON-VERBAL (&quot;deeds&quot;)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actor's Evaluation,</td>
<td>7220 FORCE (forceful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of Past or Current Action by</td>
<td>or violent use of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>military resources,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>equipment to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>achieve objectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>engagement, non-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>military de-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>struction, non-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>injury destruction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) 1140 DENY (deny accusation,</td>
<td>7180 DEMONSTRATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attributed action, or policy)</td>
<td>(armed force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mobilization,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>movement,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>exercise, boycott,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>or walk out)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>demonstration,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>meeting, display.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7230 INCREASE MILITARY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAPABILITY (increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>military spending,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>troop levels;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>develop weapons,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>authorize military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>action, reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>call-ups)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7240 AID OPPONENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(give military aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to opponent of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>target)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) 1120 ACCUSE (charge, criticize,</td>
<td>7190 REDUCE RELATION-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blame, disapprove, denounce, denigrate)</td>
<td>ship (cancel or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>postpone planned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>event, reduce routine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>international</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>activity, recall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>officials, halt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>negotiations, break</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>diplomatic relations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7210 SEIZE (seize</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>position or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>possessions, detain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>or arrest personnel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7200 EXPEL (expel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>organization, group,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>or personnel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) 3150 DEMAND (order, command,</td>
<td>7280 SUBVERT (aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>insist, demand compliance)</td>
<td>to insurge-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>nts, non-verbal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>attempts to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>influence internal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>politics of target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>undesired by target)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) 3130 PROTEST (make formal or</td>
<td>5170 THREATEN (threaten to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>informal complaint)</td>
<td>take Future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>action undesired by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>target, with or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>without specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>negative sanctions:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a urge, suggest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>action, contingent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;if ...then</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>statement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5160 WARN (warn of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a future situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>or action undesired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VERBAL (&quot;words&quot;)</td>
<td>NON-VERBAL (&quot;deeds&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VERBAL (&quot;words&quot;)</strong></td>
<td><strong>NON-VERBAL (&quot;deeds&quot;)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) 2020 POSITIVE COMMENT (comment on situation, explain policy desired by target)</td>
<td>(8) 8010 YIELD (surrender, submit retreat, evacuate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2040 APPROVE (praise, hail, applaud, support, thank)</td>
<td>8030 CONSULT-VISIT (make official visits, participate in a meeting involving foreign travel for at least one participant, consult with some foreign official at home or abroad)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) 4090 POSITIVE REQUEST (appeal, ask for action, aid, information, policy in context desirable to target)</td>
<td>8060 GRANT (end negative sanctions, end conflictful action, end threat of conflictual action; express regret, apologize; give invitation, asylum, privilege, diplomatic recognition, release, return persons property)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4100 POSITIVE PROPOSE (offer proposal, urge, suggest action, policy desired by target)</td>
<td>8070 REWARD (give economic, technical, military aid)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4250 NEGOTIATE (participate in substantive talks, negotiations on specific issue or interest area)</td>
<td>8260 REDUCE MILITARY CAPABILITIES (reduce military spending, troops levels, reduce readiness for military action)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) 6020 POSITIVE INTENTION (explain future policy desired by target)</td>
<td>8270 CARRY OUT AGREEMENT (implementation by actor of a previous agreement, e.g., a diplomatic economic, cultural or military agreement. Host conferences)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6100 OFFER (offer to take future action desired by target)</td>
<td>8290 INCREASE RELATIONSHIP (increase economic, diplomatic relations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6050 PROMISE (assure of future action desired by target)</td>
<td>8300 ACCEPT (accept or receive official visits, economic, financial, cultural, military aid or support)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6080 AGREE (accept proposal, agree to meet or negotiate, agree to future action, substantive agreement)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As the other chapters in this book illustrate, one of the prime concerns of international relations is to describe and explain patterns of cooperation and conflict among states and other international actors. In order to do this, however, one must have some means of distinguishing between cooperative and conflictful behavior. In the AFRICA data set we do this by coding each foreign policy event/action into one and only one cell of Table 1. For example, take the events (1) "Ghana President Nkrumah denied that his government was involved in attempts to overthrow the government of Niger" and (2) "President Obote of Uganda began an official visit to West Germany."

In order to code correctly each event, we ask and answer a series of questions. First, is the behavior verbal or physical? Nkrumah's denial was clearly verbal and Obote's visit was physical. We then ask with regard to the verbal behavior whether it represents an evaluation/perception, a desire or a statement of intent. Nkrumah did not express an intention toward Niger nor did he state a desire for action by Niger, so it must be an instance of an evaluation. We now know that the first event goes in column 1 of Table 1 and the second event in column 4.

In order to get the correct row we ask how the target might typically view the action in question. Ordinarily states welcome officials' visits, indeed if they did not the visit could not occur, so Obote's visit is classified in the bottom, cooperative row. Ordinarily, governments do not appreciate subversive behavior and denials of what they claim to be true, so Nkrumah's behavior is placed in the first, or conflict row. Now note that by asking and answering this series of interrelated questions we have classified each event. We have decided that Nkrumah's denial is an instance of conflictful verbal evaluation, cell 1, and must be either a "negative comment", an "accuse", or a "deny". We then read the description of each of these three types of actions and conclude that 1140, DENY, best describes Nkrumah's action. Following a similar logic, Obote's trip to West Germany is considered to be best described as an instance of 8030 CONSULT-VISIT, behavior and is so coded. Each of our nearly fifteen thousand foreign policy acts has been coded in this fashion, permitting us to describe patterns of African foreign policy cooperation and conflict.

Table 2 describes the types of foreign policy behavior tropical African states undertook vis-a-vis the international system and the Intra-African system respectively. The thirty-nine action types of Table 1 have been grouped into nine broader categories that range from conflictful behavior (I, II, III,
TABLE 2
TYPES OF TROPICAL AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type and Categories of Action</th>
<th>Intra-African Behavior</th>
<th>Total Behavior</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Military Incidents &amp; Subversion:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Actions of Military Force (722)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Subversive Actions (7280)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Actions Aiding Opponents of Target Regime (7240)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBTOTALS</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Coercion:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Actions Increasing Military Capability (7230)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Seizures of Personnel and Property (7210)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Expulsions of Individuals, Organizations (7200)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Demonstrations (7180)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Threat Actions (5170)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Warnings (5160)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Demands for Action (3150)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBTOTAL</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Pressure:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Actions Reducing Relations (7190)</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Rejections (5110)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Statements of Negative Intention (5020)</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Protests (3130)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Hostile Proposals (3100)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Hostile Requests for Action (3090)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Denials of Action (1140)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBTOTAL</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Accusations:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Accusations (1120)</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Hostile Comments on Actions of Others (1020)</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBTOTAL</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type and Categories of Action</td>
<td>Intra-African Behavior</td>
<td>Total Behavior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Communication:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Neutral Requests for Action (9090)</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Neutral Proposals (9100)</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUBTOTAL</strong></td>
<td>584</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Consultation:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Negotiate (4250)</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Consult-Visit (8030)</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Accept Visits and Assistance (8300)</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUBTOTAL</strong></td>
<td>918</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Support:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Positive Comments on Actions of Others (2020)</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Approve Actions of Others (2040)</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Positive Requests for Action (4090)</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Positive Proposals (4100)</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Statements of Positive Intention (6020)</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Offers of Positive Action (6100)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Promise Positive Action (6050)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. Reward with Assistance (8070)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUBTOTAL</strong></td>
<td>1425</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Agreement:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. Agree to Action (6080)</td>
<td>708</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. Carry Out Agreements (8270)</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUBTOTAL</strong></td>
<td>799</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X. Reconciliation and Disengagement:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. End Hostile Actions (Grant) (8060)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. Actions Increasing Relations (8290)</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. Yield Positions (8010)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. Actions Reducing Military Capability (8260)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUBTOTAL</strong></td>
<td>191</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL (N)</strong></td>
<td>4802</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IV) through rather neutral behavior (V, VI) to cooperative behaviors (VII, VIII, IX). If one aggregates the behavior into these three broad categories one sees a strong tendency for the foreign policy of African states to be of a friendly-cooperative type for both total behavior (45.6%) and intra-African behavior (50.4%). Although there may be many explanations for this pattern, a few are obvious. First, African states have the least developed capacity to engage in violent conflict in comparison to all states. This limited capability for violent conflict is especially prevalent in the low frequencies for nonverbal conflict behavior (I and II) where military capabilities may play a role in the formulation of this type of foreign policy. Actions involving small scale military operations, such as Military Incidents and Subversion, aimed at "destablizing" another African regime were very rare during this time period.

Conflict did occur over Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence in 1965 and between Ghana and her neighbors involving alleged Ghanaian subversion, but in general it appears that African statesmen may have viewed inter-state conflict during this early stage of economic and political development as dysfunctional. The only two forms of conflict that occurred fairly frequently in African states' foreign policy were verbal conflict behaviors--Pressure and Accusation--representing 16.4 per cent and 15.4 per cent of the behavior directed respectively within the region and the international system as a whole. These patterns of action depict many of the sanctions used most frequently among African states to influence each other via rejection or mild hostile action such as closing borders, withdrawing diplomats, breaking off negotiations and cancelling or postponing planned events such as international conferences. Conflict such as this involves influence attempts based purely upon verbal charges and criticism centered on accusations of misbehavior, as in violating norms of non-interference enshrined in the O.A.U. Charter, and criticism of others' behavior via hostile comments. These forms of behavior are significant within Africa because they represent about the most violent types of conflict African states can undertake toward each other.

A second possible explanation of the dominance of cooperative behavior in the foreign policies of these states may be attributed to the fact that the years 1964-66 represent the initial period of good will between African countries.
following the formation of the O.A.U. This dimension of behavior is seen clearly in Figure I which depicts only intra-African interactional data (N=4802). The O.A.U., which represents common African goals, provides a useful forum in which African states can establish and maintain informal contacts (communication) and involve themselves in formal consultation and presentation of positions on international and intra-African issues. Over thirty percent of intra-African foreign policy behavior was produced by the communication and consultation activities of commenting on the behavior of others, visiting and negotiating. The amount of visiting and commenting behavior within tropical Africa is really quite high in comparison to the behavior of all states as reported in the WEIS file, for example.30

This suggests that during 1964-66 African statesmen were involved in creating an African international subsystem via linkage building among the newly independent states of the continent.31 During the colonial period there was minimal contact across the Sahara and among African territories belonging to different empires as a consequence of imperial divide-and-rule policies. Beginning in the 1950s with the achievement of independence by Tunisia, Morocco, Sudan, Ghana and Guinea and intensifying in 1960 with Nigeria's independence and the numerous former French colonies' decolonization, the African continent soon comprised nearly forty states with few existing contacts. Such contacts had to be established if an African international subsystem autonomous from the colonial powers and other non-African states and consistent with Pan-African aspirations was to come into existence. The creation of the O.A.U. in 1963 was a turning point in this process, but our data also suggest that linkage-building continued at a high level after that date.32

The single most frequent type of behavior engaged in by tropical African states was Support type behavior wherein African states undertook mainly verbal support and received material assistance. Much of this support activity arises from sentiments of Pan-African solidarity vis-a-vis the ex-metropolises and white regimes of the South and from explicit attempts to support allies and friends engaged in conflict with other African states such as the Entente states (Ivory Coast, Niger, Togo, Upper Volta and Dahomey) vs. Nkrumah's Ghana or Ethiopia and Kenya vs. a then irredentist Somalia. During the middle 1960s, our data clearly show the basically pacific nature of tropical African foreign relations.
Figure 1: Frequency Histogram of Types of Intra-African Foreign Policy, 1964-66.
The Action Category, Agreement, represents actions involving the reaching or carrying out of international agreements. African states reach agreements on a variety of issues far more frequently than they are reported to be implementing previous agreements as shown in Table 2 by the differing frequencies of these two types of behavior under the general Agreement category (VIII). The general level of agreement by and among tropical African states was relatively high and, hence, impressive.

Finally, Reconciliation and Disengagement involved actions that retract or amend hostile or negative statements or actions and that close military hostilities through withdrawal or surrender. Given the limited nature of military engagement by tropical African states, no behavior yielding position was observed and only one instance of the reduction of military capability was recorded. Thus, while disarmament did not characterize African relations in this period, periodic detentes represented by ending hostile actions and increasing relationships did occur in intra-African relations. Examples of this pattern were the reconciliation between the Entente states and Ghana after the fall of Nkrumah and the increasing integration of Sekou Toure's Guinea into the West African state system after 1962-63.

Black Africa as a Set of Regional Subsystems

One of the great advantages of events data is their great flexibility for use in different research contexts. Remember that each of our 14,699 actions reports who said or did what to whom during the three year period 1964-1966. Examples already mentioned are:

(a) Guinea signed a trade agreement with Hungary.
(b) Ghana President Nkrumah denied that his government was involved in attempts to overthrow the government of Niger.
(c) President Obote of Uganda began an official visit to West Germany.
(d) After the overthrow of President Nkrumah, Ghana expels Soviet technicians.

As Table 2 showed, 4,802 of these events or thirty-three per cent were initiated by one of our thirty-two African states and directed at one of the other black African states studied in our project. Thus, one may create
a 32 x 32 matrix where each row represents a foreign policy actor and each column is a foreign policy target. This is done in Table 3, which represents a quantitative description of the tropical African regional subsystem during 1964-66.

Let us first of all explain the organization of Table 3. Our thirty-two African states are not listed alphabetically or by size, rather they are grouped by geographical region. The fourteen states from Gambia to Nigeria represent "West Africa"; the eight states from Cameroun to Zaire are "Central Africa"; the six states from Uganda to the Sudan are "Eastern Africa"; and the four states from Zambia to Lesotho represent "Southern Africa". We have used this method of organization in order to better illustrate the regional character of intra-African relations. Second, each cell in Table 3 represents the actions by a row-member toward a column-member. Thus, the intersection of the Nigeria row and Senegal column shows that during this period of time Nigeria sent twelve foreign policy actions to Senegal whereas the Senegalese row and Nigerian column shows that Senegal sent sixteen acts to Nigeria, a roughly balanced relationship. Finally, the row and column totals give, for any state, the number of foreign policy acts sent or received and the number of targets of behavior and initiators of actions received. Thus Ghana, which played a leading role in intra-African affairs during this period, sent 374 acts to twenty-eight other African states and received 473 acts from twenty-nine states on the continent.

There are 32 x 31 or 992 cells in Table 3 and only 433 or 43.6 per cent recorded any behavior during this period of time. This is a consequence of the fact that the average number of actions initiated and received was only 150 and that the average number of states that each state interacted with was only thirteen. By this measure of cohesiveness, tropical Africa was not a well-linked international subsystem between 1964 and 1966. There are, of course, few reasons to expect Chad to direct behavior at Lesotho, some 2,900 miles away or for Somalia to interact with Gabon, 2,500 miles away. It must be stressed, however, that because we show no exchange of behavior between any two states this does not mean that nothing happened between them for three years. It does mean, however, that nothing "news-worthy" happened as far as our source was concerned.33 But overall, Table 3 seems to contradict the claim that tropical Africa represented an international subsystem during 1964-66 because one of the necessary conditions for the existence of such subsystems, regular and intense contact, is missing.34
TABLE 3

I N T R A - A F R I C A N FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR MATRIX

ACTOR

GAMnT A
S t t.11 GAL

rn

z

m

-3

--

MTIIJR ITAN IA

m
0
ru

WL I
G(J INEA
SICHf4 L.
LlUtRIA
GtIAfJA
lVOI(Y COAST
UPPtK VOLTA
TOGO
DtlIiOME Y
NIGER
NIGFI(1A
CAME ROUII
GAt3Olil
CHA[)
CAR
COfIGO, U.
f3UR(JFlrll
H\.JP f l nA
7AIKE
U(;API [)A
hi NYA
T A I i /AIJ IA
SOMAL IA
LTtiIOPIA
SIJIIAII
IAMBI A
MALAWI
GOTSWAPiA
LF5IlTIIO
TOTAL ACTS
r

-

(:ILLS

LZ
z

<
a

LLJ

-4

10
27
14
1

7

1
1

1
2
3

1
12
6

5

2
1
1

1

4

15
7

9;)
14


Quite clearly, what Table 3 does show is the very powerful influence of geographical proximity in intra-African relations. By listing the states next to their geographical neighbors we see that most behavior clusters near the diagonal of the table, permitting us to identify a series of partially overlapping regional subsystems:

1. Senegal River states—Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, and Guinea;
2. The West African coast—Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ghana, and the Ivory Coast;
3. The Conseil de l'Entente and its rivals—Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Togo, Dahomey (Benin), Niger, Ghana, and Nigeria;
4. Equatorial Africa—Cameroon, Gabon, Chad, Central African Republic, and Congo, Brazzaville;
5. The Congo Region—Zaire, Burundi, and Rwanda;
6. East Africa—Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia; and

The highest cell frequencies in Table 3 are the actions of Somalia toward Kenya (115) and Ethiopia (147). During this period the government of the Somali Republic had an openly irredentist foreign policy seeking to unify all Somali-speaking people under one government. This policy was opposed by Kenya and Ethiopia because if the Somali minorities in these two states were joined to Somalia this would have, in their view, represented an unacceptable loss of population and territory. Out of this conflict of interest, the Horn of Africa regional subsystem took shape.

The second most important factor during this early post-independence period was colonial heritage. Not only did the territories of the French, British, and Belgian colonial empires tend to cluster together, but specific economic, political, and cultural patterns were imposed that enhanced interaction possibilities for some African states and hindered interaction for others. The most fundamental cleavage in tropical Africa was linguistic, dividing the continent into English and French-speaking states—at least among the elites who formulate and implement foreign policy. Particularly for the francophone African states Table 3 shows a tendency to interact with each other.

A third general factor is the existence or creation during 1964-66 of a functional regional organization serving the interests of regional members.
states. Senegal, Mauritania, Mali and Guinea interact because they are members of the Organization of Senegal River States and Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda interact because of their membership in the East African Common Services Organization which was during this time frame in the process of becoming the East African Community. While continent-wide Pan-African unity remains a noble ideal, in the practical day-to-day affairs of development and interstate relations Africa is a continent of regions and regional organizations and this fact is reflected in foreign policy behavior.

Finally, Table 3 reflects the existence of "diplomatic constellations" arising out of intra-African conflicts. Ghana under President Kwame Nkrumah stood for militant Pan-Africanism, state socialism and anti-imperialism aiming at the removal of European influence and colonialism from the continent. The Ivory Coast under President Houphouet-Boigny and the allied states of the Conseil de l'Entente--Upper Volta, Togo, Dahomey and Niger--opposed Ghana's policies and there thus arose a system of foreign policy action and reaction in West Africa centering on these six states.

Since the foreign policy acts in each cell may be further broken down into types of behavior, such as cooperative or conflictful, Table 3 provides ample opportunity for the detailed analysis and comparison of intra-African foreign policy. A second research opportunity highlighted by the table is the analysis of deviant cases--states that do not fit the general pattern. Four tropical African states--Ghana, Nigeria, Zaire and Ethiopia--were well linked as actors and targets to most of the other states of the continent. Why was this the case? While these four countries are among the largest or wealthiest on the continent, we do not think that these variables were operative, except for Nigeria, the most populous of African states. Under President Nkrumah Ghana conducted an active foreign policy in support of its Pan-Africanist and anti-imperialist policies. Thus, Ghana had more embassies throughout the continent than any other black African state. These policies and diplomatic network are reflected in Table 3. Ethiopia, on the other hand, was a center of foreign policy because of its role as host to the O.A.U. and because of the personal prestige of its Emperor, Haile Selassie I. Zaire, then known as Congo, Kinshasa, was a focus of intra-African foreign policy because of its instability and the various foreign interventions from within and without the continent in its internal affairs.

A feature of measuring foreign policy behavior we have not yet discussed
Figure 2. Intra-African Foreign Policy Behavior by Month and Type.
is the fact that each of our foreign policy actions is coded as to the date at which it occurred, permitting us to make time-series profiles of foreign policy behavior. Figure 2 takes the same 4,802 intra-African foreign policy actions of Table 3 and graphs them as a frequency histogram by month. As is normal in histograms, the height of the line above each month represents the number of foreign policy acts of that type undertaken during the month in question. We have grouped behavior based on the distinctions introduced in Table 2: conflict behavior (categories I-IV), neutral behavior (category V), and cooperative behavior (categories VI-IX). Thus, thirty-six months of intra-African foreign policy are described in the figure.

No apparent trends in any of the four types of behavior are revealed by Figure 2 over the entire three year time span. It is true that both 1965 and 1966 manifest more behavior of all types than 1964, but 1966 was not significantly more active than 1965. The one feature of considerable theoretical interest is the apparent correlation overtime of conflict and cooperative types of behavior. Note that periods of conflict behavior such as March-June 1965 and March-July 1966 are also periods of high amounts of cooperative behavior. This pattern also is revealed elsewhere in the figure where as conflict declines so does the level of cooperation. This pattern of behavior is not exclusively common to states of tropical Africa. It would appear that international crises and conflicts call forth both conflict behavior (by definition) and cooperative behavior as statesmen consult and support one another in efforts to cope with and control events.35

From January 1964 to October 1964 a clear downward trend occurred in intra-African foreign relations activity. Some conflict was registered in August 1964, the second month of Moise Tshombe's premiership in Zaire and the month during which Stanleyville (Kisangani) fell to supporters of Gizenga and Gbenye. From November 1964 through June 1965 the trend of activity moved sharply upward as a consequence of four intra-African issues: (1) the rebellion in Eastern Zaire; (2) the Fourth Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference in Ghana (May, 1965) which was attended by three hundred delegates representing more than seventy political organizations; (3) renewed hostilities between Ethiopia and Somalia in March 1965 and the continued struggle by Kenya against Somali "shifta"; and (4) the diplomatic offensive launched against Nkrumah's Ghana by Niger, the Ivory Coast and other West African states charging Ghana with supporting preparations for revolutions in these countries.
The period July 1965 to January 1966 was not marked by much conflict and generally we see less behavior of all types than in early 1965 or 1966. Of course, Rhodesia's UDI did take place in November 1965, but this crucial event generated cooperative behavior among black African states in October 1965 within the context of the OAU Assembly and the Council of Ministers meetings. Conflict behavior, which did occur, was directed outside tropical Africa to the white-ruled South and Great Britain.

Beginning in February 1966 the trend again turned upward as a consequence of coups d'etat in Nigeria (twice) and Ghana and the constitutional crisis in Uganda (February) where Obote suspended the constitution because of an alleged "coup". In the case of the fall of power of Kwame Nkrumah in February 1966, large amounts of cooperative behavior were directed toward Ghana by Nkrumah's former opponents while Sekou Toure's Guinea, where Nkrumah came to reside, conflicted heavily with Ghana and to a lesser extent the Ivory Coast for the remainder of the year. After July 1966 the trend again turns downward until the end of our time period is reached in December.

There does seem to be some periodicity in Figure 2 in that the first six months of each year register more behavior than in the last six months. Why this is so is not clear, for while the U.N. General Assembly meets each fall in New York and may thus draw attention away from intra-African problems, the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government also meets in the fall, which one would expect to produce intra-African behavior. There is, of course, a danger in positing trends or regular periods of high and low activity levels based on relatively short time series. We would need data covering ten or more years before we would be willing to make general statements about the behavior of African foreign policy overtime.

While space limitations prevent us from so doing in this chapter, readers should recognize that figures such as Figure 2 could be created for any single African state or for any subset of these states and since the AFRICA data were collected on a daily basis the time interval used can be days, weeks, months, quarters or whatever time unit is of interest to the researcher. We view this time-series aspect of foreign policy event data to be one of its principal advantages because it permits us to ask and answer basic questions relating to stability and change in foreign policy behavior.
Having explored the dimensions of black African foreign policy and the regional subsystems within tropical Africa, we will not attempt to answer a number of questions concerning general patterns in their behavior. As Albert Camus once noted, there is no truth, only truths. This is certainly the case when one attempts to answer inquiries about a state's foreign policy. No single explanatory scheme, such as "power politics" or Marxist dialectical materialism, can cover all aspects of this phenomenon. This is so because the foreign policy of a nation is an extraordinarily broad and complex happening. Thus, in what follows we encourage readers to come up with their own explanations of African foreign policy behavior which, as hypotheses, they can test and compare to our findings.

Table 4 reports the absolute and relative frequency of the foreign policy behavior of each of the thirty-two states in the AFRICA project. The first columns represent total behavior directed to all targets and the columns on the right report behavior directed toward other tropical African states. Thus, Tanzania was the most active state, initiating 1,233 foreign policy acts over this three year period, fifty-three times more behavior than the least active state, Botswana. Tanzania's behavior represents 8.4 per cent of all behavior observed and Botswana's actions are only 0.2 per cent of all behavior. The most active state in intra-African relations was Ghana with 374 actions, 7.8 per cent of the total intra-African behavior and Botswana, which only became independent in September 1966, was again the least active.

Table 4 clearly neither distinguishes between the types of foreign policy actions each state undertook, nor does it inform us about who were the targets of their actions. However, even at this aggregate level, the table does permit us to distinguish between active and passive states. The ten most active states, from Tanzania to Zaire, account for 57.6 per cent of all behavior and 56.1 per cent of intra-African behavior. The ten most passive states, from Malawi to Botswana, represent only 8.4 per cent and 9.9 per cent of the same behaviors. This means that Tanzania or Ghana individually initiated nearly as much foreign policy actions as the combined totals of these ten least active states.

Now, why is it that some African states are comparatively active in foreign affairs and others are relatively passive? Note that such a question could neither be asked nor could it be answered without comparative foreign policy
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>Total Behavior (n = 14669)</th>
<th>Intra-African Behavior (n = 4802)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>absolute frequency</td>
<td>relative frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1233</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1188</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>969</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>967</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>837</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomey (Benin)</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroun</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo Republic</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.A.R.</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| mean  | 458     | 3.1     | 150    | 3.1     |
| std. dev. | 320     | 2.2     | 100    | 2.1     |
data as provided by the AFRICA project data set. Second, such a question is just what the comparative analysis of foreign policy is designed to answer. We have here a variable, the frequency of foreign policy behavior of each African state during 1964-66, given in the left hand column of Table 4. Can we think of other variables that may be related to this measure of activity so that we can "explain" foreign policy activity by demonstrating such a relationship? Scientific or comparative research on foreign policy represents nothing more complicated than establishing relations between variables and developing theoretical explanations of why they exist.36

Let us be "deductive" and attempt first of all to theorize about what may "cause" some African states to be active and others passive in foreign affairs. Frequently, scholars attempt to explain foreign policy variables on the basis of features of the individual leaders of nations. Hence, President Kwame Nkrumah's Pan-African proposals for a "continental union Government" for Africa probably had an impact on Ghana's foreign policy as did Emperor Haile Selassie's longevity and prestige on Ethiopia's foreign actions. Explanations of foreign policy that use the characteristics of leaders involve what James N. Rosenau has called "individual" variables.37 In our view, because the individual characteristics of leaders are so difficult to measure,38 a better starting point is the character of the acting state, such as its size, wealth or political system. When one uses such variables in an effort to explain foreign policy one is involved with "national attributes" as explanatory factors. In cost-benefit terms we suggest that students should attempt to explain the foreign behavior of states by these national attribute characteristics of states and then look at individual variables only when attributes fail to do the job.39

What features of African states, then, may "cause" them to be comparatively active or passive in foreign policy? Quite often answers to a question such as this are suggested by thinking about the nature of the phenomenon we are trying to explain. To be "active" in foreign affairs implies that the state has the capacity or capability to act frequently. That is, while a state may have the capacity to undertake an active foreign policy and choose not to use this capacity and thus be passive, if a state has an active policy profile it must have the capacity to produce such frequent behavior. All other things being equal, then, the greater a state's capability to conduct foreign policy, the more active will be its foreign policy. Now capability
may take various forms, but certainly the extent of available resources and an extensive diplomatic network contribute to a state's capacity to undertake foreign policy. We can "measure" resources by recording each black African state's Gross Domestic Product in 1965 and its diplomatic network by the number of diplomats it sent abroad in 1963-64. Our measure of foreign policy activity is taken from Table 4.

Having decided how to measure or "operationalize" our concepts of capacity and foreign policy activity, we may state our research hypotheses:

- **H₁**: The greater the resources a state possesses, the more active will be its foreign policy.
- **H₂**: The more extensive a state's diplomatic network is, the more active will be its foreign policy.
- **H₀**: There is no relationship between resources or diplomatic networks and foreign policy activity.

This last hypothesis is the "null hypothesis". If we can show that it is false, this implies that H₁ and H₂ are probably correct for these African states during this time period.

There are many procedures that can be used to "test" hypotheses such as ours; Table 5 represents one such approach known as cross-tabulation. We have converted our quantitative information on the number of foreign policy actions, the dollar value of G.D.P., and the number of diplomats abroad into rank orders. Thus, the Sudan had a comparatively "large" G.D.P. in 1965 and was "moderately active" in foreign policy between 1964 and 1965. When each of our thirty-two states is given the appropriate score on G.D.P. and foreign policy activity it may be classified into one and only one cell of the 3 x 3 table. Study of Table 5 should convince any reader that there is a clear pattern with twenty-one of thirty-two states in the three diagonal cells running from large and active to small and passive. Eleven states do not fit the pattern exactly, with the Somali Republic being the most "deviant case", in that it had a small G.D.P. but was in the top ten most active state category. It should be clear, then, that cross-classification tables such as Table 5 permit researchers to see patterns--resources are positively related to foreign policy activity -- and to identify exceptions to our generalizations that require further research, possibly of a case study sort.40

How "strong" is the relationship between resources and activity described
TABLE 5
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RESOURCES AND FOREIGN POLICY ACTIVITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gross Domestic Product, 1965&lt;sup&gt;(a)&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Large</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Small</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extent of Activity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>GHANA</td>
<td>UGANDA</td>
<td>SOMALIA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ETHIOPIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ZAIRE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TANZANIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KENYA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SENEGAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ZAMBIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately Active</td>
<td>SUDAN</td>
<td>CAMEROUN</td>
<td>CONGO, B.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IVORY COAST</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NIGER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DAHOMEY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UPPER VOLTA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GUINEA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MALI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passive</td>
<td>SIERRA LEONE</td>
<td>BURUNDI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MALAWI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHAD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LIBERIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BURUNDI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GABON</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GAMBIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RWANDA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LESOTHO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BOTSWANA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N  | 10  | 11  | 11  | 32|


NOTE: Gamma = .80.
in Table 5? Descriptive statistics permit us to answer such questions. One such statistic is Gamma, a measure of the degree of association or correlation between two rank ordered variables. The formula for Gamma is

\[ G = \frac{P - Q}{P + Q} \]

where

\( P \) represents the number of rank agreements and \( Q \) the number of rank disagreements. For example, there are eight cases in the large-active cell and twenty cases in the four cells below and to the right of this cell. Multiplying 8 x 20 gives 160, which is the first element of \( P \). To get the first element of \( Q \) note that there are only two cases in the two cells below and to the left of Uganda's cell, giving 1 x 2 = 2. Working our way through Table 5 in this fashion (rather than having the computer do it for us which is normal) produces the following calculations:

\[ G = \frac{(160 + 10 + 22 + 42) - (2 + 12 + 12)}{(160 + 10 + 22 + 42) + (2 + 12 + 12)} \]

\[ G = \frac{234 - 26}{234 + 26} = \frac{208}{260} = .80 \]

Thus, for Table 5 Gamma is .8. Gamma can range from .0 indicating no relationship to +1.0 or -1.0 indicating perfect direct or indirect associations; we may conclude that the relationship between resources and activity is strong and direct as predicted by our first hypothesis.

Table 6 repeats this exercise for the second of our hypotheses, that diplomatic networks will be directly related to foreign policy activity. The pattern is not as evident as in the previous test and this is reflected in the low value of Gamma, .32. The reason we find little support for our second hypothesis is that the newly independent Eastern African states had few diplomats but active foreign policies (the few-active cell) and because the "old" African state of Liberia had many diplomats but a cautious and passive foreign policy during this time period.

It would appear, then, that our first hypothesis is strongly supported but that our second hypothesis receives only weak support. What about the null hypothesis of no relationship between capability and foreign policy activity? We hope, of course, to show that this null hypothesis is false so that we may infer that our two research hypotheses are true for these states during this time period. The way we try to show that null hypothesis is wrong is by calculating the level of statistical significance of each of our observed Gammas,
### TABLE 6
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIPLOMATIC NETWORK AND FOREIGN POLICY ACTIVITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extent of Activity(a)</th>
<th>Many</th>
<th>Some</th>
<th>Few</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Active</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moderately Active</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Congo, B.</td>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>Dahomey</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Passive</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Gamma = .32**

**Sources:**
(a) Calculated from Table 4.

**Note:** Gamma = .32.
What this means is quite simple. Look again at Table 5 where resources and activity are related. The strength of this relationship as measured by Gamma is .80. Now, what "caused" this relationship to be as it is? We would like to believe that the association exists because our reasoning was correct and our first hypothesis is true, resources "cause" foreign policy activity. However, another possible "cause" of the pattern shown in Table 5 is mere chance. That is to say, for these thirty-two states during this time period resources are not causally related to foreign policy activity and therefore, the association we see and index by calculating Gamma is the simple consequence of a random distribution of the cases into the nine cells. Another way of stating this is that if countries are assigned to each cell on a random basis, then each cell will receive one-ninth or between three and four countries. This obviously did not happen in Table 5, so when we do a test of significance on Gamma we determine the probability that mere chance produced the observed distribution. If this probability is quite small, say less than .05, we may say the null hypothesis of no relationship is false.

The calculation of the significance of Gamma is too lengthy for this chapter, so we merely report that for Table 5 it is .0004 and for Table 6 it is .19. Thus, only four times in ten thousand would chance produce the relationship seen in Table 5. We may therefore reject the null hypothesis for resources and regard our first hypothesis as "true" until new evidence shows it to be "wrong". For Table 6, on the other hand, random assignment could produce this pattern nineteen times in a hundred. While chance apparently does not seem to be a big factor, it is greater than the conventional five times in one hundred, so we cannot reject the null hypothesis and we must conclude that our second hypothesis concerning diplomatic networks is probably "wrong".

We have now shown how the AFRICA project data may be used to do comparative or scientific studies of foreign policy. We began with an observation—that some African states were active and others were passive in their overall foreign policy behavior. We then asked why this was so and proposed a theoretical explanation based on the notion that states with the capacity to undertake an active foreign policy would have such policies. We then "operationalized" our concepts by using frequency of actions to measure foreign policy activity and Gross Domestic Product and diplomats abroad to measure two different aspects of capacity—resources and diplomatic networks. The next step was to observe the relationships among these three variables by constructing Tables 5 and 6.
and calculating Gamma. Having found a "strong" relation between activity and resources and a "weak" relation between activity and diplomacy, we evaluated the null hypothesis via tests of statistical significance. We concluded by determining from the accumulated evidence that resources probably do facilitate an active foreign policy (accepting $H_1$) but that diplomatic networks probably play no role in fostering an active foreign policy (rejecting $H_2$).

All of this should be treated as an example, in that many readers are probably not interested in what explains differences between active and passive African states. The point is to encourage you to create foreign policy variables that interest you and to get you then to attempt to explain African foreign policy behavior in the comparative manner we have just illustrated. As one of us has shown elsewhere, this process of asking and answering comparative questions about foreign policy behavior can produce important advances in our understanding of international relations.

Let us now look somewhat more briefly at three more patterns of black African foreign policy during the middle 1960s: intra-African conflict, the targets of African foreign policy behavior, and the individual and organizational initiators of this behavior. Table 7 reports the frequency by country of conflict behavior among our thirty-two states. During 1964-66 these states initiated 885 conflict acts, or 18.4 per cent of the 4,802 total intra-African actions. The Somali Republic was by far the most conflictful state during this period because it undertook forty-four more conflict actions than Ghana, the second ranking state, and particularly because forty-six per cent of its behavior was of the conflict type, the next highest percentage being Burundi's 29.3 per cent. Tanzania is an interesting exception. By volume its thirty-six conflict events make it one of the ten most conflictful states, but this was only 10.8 per cent of Tanzania's total intra-African behavior, which is considerably below average for all thirty-two states.

Again, Table 7 suggests many questions, one of which is why do some African states undertake more foreign policy conflict behavior than others? There are two explanations that are frequently cited in the literature on foreign policy behavior. The first is that domestic conflict fosters external conflict. The idea here is that elites confronted with internal instability and violence will attempt to reduce within-group conflict by undertaking conflict with out-groups, i.e., other states. Elites do this, often called "scapegoating", because it is frequently observed that when members of a group are conflicting
### TABLE 7: INTRA-AFRICAN CONFLICT BEHAVIOR, 1964-66

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Absolute Value</th>
<th>% of Total Intra-African Conflictual Behavior</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>46.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Zaire (Congo, K.)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Dahomey (Benin)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>Congo, Brazzaville</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>Central African Rep.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>Cameroun</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL 885 100.0%

AVERAGE 27.7 15.3%
with an external enemy they limit or end conflict within the group. A second possible explanation is based on a simple stimulus-response model called "tit-for-tat". According to this argument, if states receive conflict behavior from other states they will then respond in kind. Foreign policy elites behave in this fashion for a variety of reasons--because the most effective counter to force is superior force, because such behavior has been learned and agrees with the rules of the diplomatic game, and because they lack sufficient imagination to do otherwise.

We thus have two competing hypotheses designed to explain foreign policy conflict behavior among African states:

- \(H_1\) The greater the domestic conflict an African state experiences, the more foreign conflict it will undertake.
- \(H_2\) The greater the foreign conflict an African state receives, the more foreign conflict it will undertake.

We also have the null hypothesis:

- \(H_0\) There is no relation between domestic conflict or received foreign conflict and foreign conflict behavior among African states.

We shall use the first column of Table 7 to measure foreign conflict behavior sent to other African states and another part of the AFRICA data to measure the extent of conflict received. Domestic conflict is measured by the total number of deaths from domestic violence in the five year period, 1961-1965.46

Tables 8 and 9 present the results of our test of the preceding hypotheses. There is at best only a moderate relationship between domestic conflict and foreign conflict, for only sixteen of thirty-two states are on the expected high-high to low-low diagonal. Deviant cases are Togo and Guinea that had little domestic conflict between 1961 and 1965 but had high foreign conflict and Rwanda and Cameroun where the reverse pattern is observed. Gamma equals .43 which is in the correct direction, but it is not significant at the .05 level, so we cannot reject the null hypotheses as regards domestic conflict and decide that \(H_1\) is probably "wrong". Two points should be made with regard to Table 8. First, our finding agrees with considerable previous research that found little or no relationship between domestic and foreign conflict when states other than African countries were studied.47 Second, our hypothesis would have been supported if the four deviant cases had not occurred. The
### TABLE 8
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOMESTIC CONFLICT AND FOREIGN CONFLICT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Actions Sent, 1964-66</th>
<th>Deaths From Domestic Violence, 1961-65</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KENYA</td>
<td>SOMALIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAIRE</td>
<td>GHANA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETHIOPIA</td>
<td>NIGER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGANDA</td>
<td>TANZANIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BURUNDI</td>
<td>DAHOMEY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>CHAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUDAN</td>
<td>SENEGAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAMBIA</td>
<td>CONGO, B.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWANDA</td>
<td>GABON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAMEROUN</td>
<td>LESOTHO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Note:** Gamma = .43, p = .07.
TABLE 9
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FOREIGN CONFLICT RECEIVED AND SENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Actions Received, 1964-66</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOMALIA</td>
<td>UGANDA</td>
<td>TOGO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHANA</td>
<td>NIGER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KENYA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAIRE</td>
<td>ETHIOPIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANZANIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUINEA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BURUNDI</td>
<td>IVORY COAST</td>
<td>UPPER VOLTA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUDAN</td>
<td>DAHOMEY</td>
<td>CHAD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONGO, B.</td>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>SENEGAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ZAMBIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MALAWI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>C.A.R.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BOTSWANA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SIERRA LEONE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LEBERIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MAURITANIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAMEROUN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GABON</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GAMBIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LESOTHO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
\text{Gamma} = .82 \\
p \leq .001
\]
question naturally arises as to why Rwanda, Cameroun, Togo and Guinea do not fit the overall pattern. Comparative case studies of Rwanda and Cameroun on the one hand and Guinea and Togo on the other hand are clearly suggested by Table 8. Therefore, if a hypothesis fails to receive support this result is not necessarily "bad". Often the most we can hope to achieve is the rejection of plausible but factually incorrect hypotheses. Such results unquestionably do enhance our understanding of foreign policy behavior.

Table 9 provides striking support for our second hypothesis that conflict received is associated with conflict behavior undertaken. The value of Gamma is positive and large, twenty-one of thirty-two cases are on the diagonal, and chance could produce such a distribution less than once in a thousand times. Our only sharply deviant case is again Togo which received little foreign conflict (one act) but undertook a high level of conflict behavior (thirty-six acts). This may be explained when we note that seventy-eight per cent of Togo's conflict activity was directed at its neighbor to the west, Ghana. A border dispute with Ghana over the Ewe people who live in both countries and charges of Ghanaian interference in Togolese domestic affairs led Togo to be a relatively high conflict initiator. It would appear, then, that our second hypothesis, the "tit-for-tat" theory, is supported for these states during this time period.

Since it would appear that there is a strong tendency for African states to send conflict to other African states on the basis of the conflict actions they receive from these same states, let us look somewhat more deeply at this pattern. Table 10 presents the twenty-one pairs or dyads of African states that recorded ten or more conflict behaviors between 1964 and 1966. Thus, Somalia sent sixty-nine conflict acts to Ethiopia, making this the single most conflictful dyad whereas Zambia sent ten such acts to Ghana. Table 10 tells us a great deal about intra-African foreign policy conflict in the middle 1960s.

First, these twenty-one dyads account for sixty-five per cent of all the conflict behavior within tropical Africa at this time, a very large proportion when we remember that there are 992 such pairs of states. Second, note that sixteen out of twenty-one dyads are contiguous, illustrating the fact that African states mainly conflict with bordering states. Conflict at a distance, particularly the most intense forms such as military incidents, subversion and coercion, is infrequent. Third, examination of the AFRICA data indicates that during this time period there were two main types of conflict behavior--border issues and interference in internal politics. Some states, such as Somalia
TABLE 10  
DYADIC CONFLICT IN TROPICAL AFRICA, 1964-66

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dyad</th>
<th>Contiguous States</th>
<th>Incidents, Subversion, And Coercion</th>
<th>All Conflict Acts</th>
<th>Type of Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somalia Ethiopia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>Border, irredentist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia Kenya</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>Border, irredentist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana Guinea</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>Interference, defensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia Somalia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Border, defensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya Somalia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Border, defensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger Ghana</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Interference, defensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo Ghana</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Interference, offensive &amp; defensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta Ghana</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Interference, defensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire Congo, B.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Interference, defensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda Zaire</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Interference, offensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea Ghana</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Interference, offensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi Rwanda</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Interference, offensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire Burundi</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Interference, offensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast Ghana</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Interference, defensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomey Niger</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Border, irredentist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad Sudan</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Border, defensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi Tanzania</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Interference, defensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana Zaire</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Interference, offensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda Burundi</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Interference, defensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast Guinea</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Interference, defensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia Ghana</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Interference, defensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>61</td>
<td>578</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AS % OF ALL SUCH ACTS DURING 1964-1966  
63% 65%
and Dahomey, claimed territory or populations "belonging" to neighboring states and thus were irredentist. Others, such as Ethiopia, Kenya and Chad, defended their possessions. We see here in tropical Africa the classical pattern of territorially revisionist vs. territorially status quo powers.

The most frequent high conflict issue, fifteen out of twenty-one cases, was over sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs. This arose from two somewhat different processes. First, certain states such as Ghana and Burundi sought to change the domestic and foreign policies or personnel of neighboring states via conflict of an offensively interfering sort which tended to provoke defensive conflict by Niger, Togo, Upper Volta, Zaire and the Ivory Coast. The second pattern was when internal instability or a coup d'etat created situations where other African states got involved in an effort to bring to power friends or to attack those who removed from power friends and allies. This explains Guinea's conflict with Ghana after the overthrow of President Nkrumah and most of Zaire's conflict linkages. We think, then, that Table 10 illustrates well the fundamental question asked in comparative research on foreign policy—"of what larger pattern is this behavior an instance?" Each time this question receives a plausible answer students and researchers will have achieved considerable progress in understanding and explaining the foreign policy behavior being studied.

There were 220 targets toward which our thirty-two African states sent behavior between 1964 and 1966. Table 11 reports in a rank order fashion the forty-six targets that received one hundred or more foreign policy actions during this period. Note that nearly seventy-four per cent of African foreign policy behavior was sent to just twenty-one percent of the targets, illustrating the concentrated nature of this foreign policy behavior. The targets fall into several meaningful categories. First are the "top dog" nations including the major colonial powers and their political and economic allies such as the United States, West Germany and Japan. It has been suggested that dependent, "underdog" nations will interact more with powerful metropolitan top dog nations than with each other. Our data certainly do not contradict this proposition, even though the second most important category of targets is other African states ranging from Ghana to Burundi.

The third category comprises the two major communist states—the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. Together they received nearly five per cent of African foreign policy behavior during this time period whereas the
## Table 11
THE TARGETS OF AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR, 1964-1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Acts</th>
<th>f</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>&quot;Africa&quot;</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>People's Republic of China</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Rhodesia</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>O.A.U. Heads of State Conference</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>O.A.U. Council of Ministers</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>U.N. Economic Com. for Africa</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>O.C.A.M.</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Egypt (U.A.R.)</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>United Nations Organization</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>Conseil de l'Entente</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>East Africa</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>Republic of South Africa</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Nations</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35.</td>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36.</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.</td>
<td>&quot;Western&quot; countries</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38.</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41.</td>
<td>U.N. misc. organs</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42.</td>
<td>Dahomey</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43.</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44.</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>East African C.S.O.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unclear Targets</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other Targets (N = 173)</td>
<td>3659</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14669</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Total number of targets = 220.
western capitalist countries, including the former colonial powers, received nearly fifteen per cent. This ratio of 3:1 indicates the absence of non-aligned foreign policies in tropical Africa during the middle 1960s. African states were "pro-Western" in their behavior patterns.\textsuperscript{50} The fourth type of target comprises international organizations of a universal type (U.N.), continental type (O.A.U.) and regional type (O.C.A.M.) of importance to African states. One of the major sources of African states' power and influence in international affairs is their role in international organizations and this is reflected in their behavior. Finally, the fifth category contains other African states not part of independent black Africa during 1964-66 such as Rhodesia, South Africa, Egypt and Tunisia. Action was, of course, directed at the white minority regimes of Southern Africa as part of the struggle for majority rule and decolonization in that region. Arab-speaking northern African states received attention from sub-Saharan African states because of the Arab role in the O.A.U. and in intra-African linkage building.

It should be remembered that Table 11 summarizes the behavior of all thirty-two African states in our project. Working with the AFRICA data, students and researchers could construct a series of such tables for individual African states which would permit a whole series of fascinating comparative research questions to be asked and answered. We again stress that in this chapter we can only illustrate the character and a small part of the research potential of the AFRICA data, primarily in an effort to stimulate students to do comparative studies of African foreign policy behavior themselves.

The final variable we shall present from our data is information on who actually initiated each foreign policy action. Table 12 reports this information for all behavior and for intra-African behavior. One weakness of event data is immediately apparent in the table, the fact that sources of events frequently do not report which office or member of a government undertook the action. Rather, they say

"Guinea signed a trade treaty with Hungary."

or

"Ghana closed its border with Togo."

In such circumstances we can only code that the "State or Society" initiated the behavior, which represents 29.3 per cent of all behavior in our data set. However, for the remaining 70.7 per cent of behavior we do know who it was that acted for the state.
### TABLE 12
FOREIGN POLICY ACTOR CATEGORY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Event</th>
<th>Total Behavior</th>
<th>Intra-Africa Behavior</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Absolute Frequency</td>
<td>Relative Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of State</td>
<td>5492</td>
<td>37.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State or Society</td>
<td>4294</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Minister</td>
<td>921</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misc. Minister</td>
<td>846</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov't. as a Whole</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official Delegation</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance Minister</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomat Ambassador</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified Individual</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exec. Department</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official of Exec.</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Minister</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Individual</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislature as a Whole</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Forces</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of Legislature</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group of Individuals</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group of Organizations</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Official</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Party Officer</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>14669</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In tropical Africa where the bureaucratic organizations that manage foreign affairs are small and new, individuals, particularly heads-of-state and foreign ministers, take most foreign policy actions. Organizations, groups and other individuals are far less important, except that in intra-African affairs official delegations are used frequently as foreign policy actors. Also note that finance ministers are not very important within Africa but rather frequent representatives of their states in general foreign affairs. Why is it then, that official delegations are important in one arena and finance ministers in another? Why is it that heads-of-state initiate nearly forty per cent of all African foreign policy behavior? Why is it that executive departments such as foreign ministries are relatively unimportant actors? Studies of the bureaucratic politics and organizational process aspects of foreign policy behavior are designed to provide answers to such questions. We shall neither summarize that literature nor attempt answers to the above questions at this time. We do, however, invite students to read into this literature, to use the AFRICA data to construct tables like Table 12 for sets of African states of interest to them, and then to ask and attempt to answer comparative questions about this intriguing aspect of African foreign policy.

Conclusion

As we noted at the outset of this chapter, the foreign policy behavior of a nation is an extremely complex matter to describe and explain in a systematic fashion. If we think of a state's foreign policy as the external goals its leaders establish and the actions they take to achieve these goals, then we are confronted with great difficulties in gathering information about goals and actions. There are, however, a variety of types of data that may be used to achieve this purpose:

1. votes in international organizations;
2. memberships in organizations, alliances and treaties;
3. transactions of goods (trade and aid), people (tourism and students) and ideas (news service subscriptions, book translations, letters);
4. surveys of mass and elite attitudes on foreign affairs;
5. networks of diplomatic representation;
6. thematic perceptions as revealed in speeches of leaders;
(7) simulations of behavior by nationals of the countries involved;
(8) decisions made by leaders; and
(9) actions actually undertaken by the states.

While all of these data types are useful, the AFRICA project chose to work with actions as described in "newsworthy" events reported in a public chronology--Africa Research Bulletin. Event data are clearly most directly related to the foreign policy actions of states and since many events report verbal desires and intentions (see Tables 1 and 2), they are a good source of information on goals as well.

Most of this chapter has involved a description of how the AFRICA event data were made and illustrations of how these data can be used to describe African foreign policy behavior and to explain that behavior as well. Since our data include 14,699 events by thirty-two states or forty-three political regimes, each event being coded for thirty different variable attributes, we could only scratch the surface of the AFRICA project data in this report.

Other uses that have been made of the AFRICA data involve descriptions of basic foreign policy patterns, studies of how national cultural attributes relate to behavior, the analysis of foreign conflict, participation and dependence among African states, and tests of status-field theory. Since the AFRICA data are public, anyone may acquire them for their own research. The study of African international relations does not merely involve reading textbooks such as this. Students should not just consume knowledge about African foreign policy, they should try to produce such knowledge themselves. If this chapter has stimulated some readers to use the AFRICA data in their own research, we will have achieved our purpose and we wish you luck in your research!


5. All requests for the AFRICA data should be sent to: The Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, P.O. Box 1248, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 48106, U.S.A., attention I.R. Archive.

6. See McGowan and Shapiro, The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy, for the few comparative African studies published up to 1973.


8. Part of these aggregate data have been published in Donald G. Morrison,


10. The AFRICA data are being updated (for the years 1967-1969) by Ms. Martha Gephart with the support of a National Science Foundation doctoral research grant. Ms. Gephart's data should soon be available from the Consortium address given in footnote 5.


15. That is, there are n(n-1) or 32 x 31 = 992 directional or A → B pairs of states and n(n-1)/2 or 496 non-directional pairs, where A ↔ B.


20. Gary Hoggard, "Differential Source Coverage in Foreign Policy Analysis,"


22. Burgess and Lawton, Indicators of International Behavior, p. 43.


27. Ibid.


33. Behavior may have occurred, but it was either so routine as to have been
ignored by the editors of our source, Africa Research Bulletin, or it was secret, covert behavior that will not be known, if ever, until the relevant national archives are opened. As regards classified or secret behavior, it may be estimated to involve only five to ten per cent of all behavior, and when it is significant, such as the recent U.S. "covert" intervention in Angola, it often becomes known publicly after the fact and is thus recorded in an event data collection.


36. Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research 2nd ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston 1974), argues that such activity is common to all branches of the social sciences.


38. For genuinely innovative work in attempting to measure psychological traits of leaders see Margaret G. Hermann, "Leader Personality and Foreign Policy Behavior," in J.N. Rosenau, ed., Comparing Foreign Policies, pp. 201-234.

39. That is, for readers who know some elementary statistics, all we are saying is that national attribute variables should be used to explain statistically as much variance as possible in foreign policy behavior. The variance not explained by such variables, when it is large, should then be considered as a consequence of leaders' characteristics.

40. Reasons why Somalia was so active, despite its small G.D.P., have been mentioned earlier on in this chapter. A useful exercise would be to frame an explanation of activity based upon factors other than resources and then do a case study of Somalia to see if it fits your explanatory model.


42. Ibid., pp. 162-175.


44. McGowan and Shapiro, The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy, passim.

1956); and L. Coser, Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict (New

46. Taken from C.L. Taylor and M.C. Hudson, World Handbook of Political and
110-115.

47. R.J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior within and between Nations," 
General Systems Yearbook 8 (1963): pp. 1-50; Rummel, "Some attributes and
196-206; R. Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior within and between


49. Johan Galtung, "International Relations and International Conflicts: A 
Sociological Approach," a paper presented to the International Sociological
Association, September 1966; Marshall R. Singer, Weak States in a World 
of Powers (New York: Free Press, 1972); and Singer, "The Foreign Policies of 
Small Developing States," in J.N. Rosenau, et.al., eds., World Politics: An 

Diplomacy."

51. Published studies of African foreign policy decision making and organization 
are: T.M. Shaw, "The Foreign Policy System of Zambia," African Studies Review 
ments on Inter-African Affairs," Journal of Development Studies 2 (January 
Review 1 (September 1971): 102-136; M.A. East, "Foreign Policy Making in 
Small States: Some theoretic Observations Based on a Study of the Uganda 
(Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1975); S.A. Gitelson, "Why 
Do Small States Break Diplomatic Relations with Outside Powers? Lessons 
from the African Experience," International Studies Quarterly 18 (December 
of Foreign Service Cadres in Black Africa," in K. Ingham, ed., Foreign Re-
Phillips, Jr., The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy (Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 1964); and B.V. Mtshali, "The Zambian Foreign 

52. As in, for example, Henry A. Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign 
Policy," Daedalus 95 (Spring 1966): 503-529 and Graham T. Allison, "Con-
ceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," American Political Science 
Review 58 (September 1964): 689-718.

Search of Dependence," AFRICA Research Report, no. 3. Syracuse: Department 
of Political Science, Syracuse University, 1972. (Mimeographed.)

54. P.J. McGowan, R. Lewis and H. Purkitt, Culture and Foreign Policy Behavior:


57. As described in footnote 5.
INDEX

ACP States. See European Economic Community
Africa, Central, as a subsystem, 208-211
Africa, East. See also Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda
   as a subsystem, 208-211
      conflicts in, 141-153
      regional integration in, 126-156
Africa, Equatorial, as a subsystem, 210
Africa, Southern
   as a subsystem, 208-211
   Angola in, 108-110, 118
   Botswana in, 114-116
   Lesotho in, 114-116
   Malawi in, 113-114
   Mozambique in, 110-112
   Namibia in, 105-107
   regional relations in, 90, 105-121, 146-147
   Republic of South Africa in, 105-121
   Rhodesia in, 107-108
   Swaziland in, 114-116
   Tanzania in, 116
   Zaire in, 116
   Zambia in, 112-113
Africa, West, as a subsystem, 208-211
AFRICA Project. See African Foreign Relations and International Conflict Analysis
Africa Research Bulletin, as a data source for the AFRICA project, 196
African Foreign Relations and International Conflict Analysis (AFRICA),
   178-179, 190-241
      coder reliability of data in, 197
      coding rules for, 199-201
      data collecting procedures for, 196-197
      data set for, 193-201
      data source, 196
      operationalization of data for, 195-196
      updating of data for, 237n
African unity. See Pan-Africanism
Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference (May, 1965), 213
Amery, L.S., on unification of East Africa, 130-131, 133
Amin, Idi, 126, 140, 141, 143, 145, 147, 149, 151, 154
Angola
   and Cuba, 109-110
   and the USA, 18
   and the USSR, 19
   civil war in, 109
   in Southern African subsystem, 107-110, 118
Apartheid. See Republic of South Africa
Arab states, relations with Africa, 11-12
Armed Forces Movement (of Portugal)
   Africa policy of, 109-110
Arusha Declaration, 139
Azania. See Republic of South Africa
Baganda, 137, 143
- opposition of, to East African integration, 131, 134
Balkanization, 130
Banda, H. Kamuzu, 113-114
Benguela Railway, 108, 116
Benin. See Dahomey
Botswana
- foreign policy of, 215
  in Southern Africa subsystem, 114-116
Boundaries. See also Conflict, boundary
  and domestic conflict, 162, 163, 175-176
  and international conflict, 159-186
  antecedent, 161-162
  artificial nature of, in Africa, 7, 159-160
  consequent, 161-162
  derivation of, in Africa, 7, 159-161, 163
  functions of, 159-160
  superimposed, 161-186
Bourgeoisie, comprador. See Elites
Britain. See Great Britain
British South Africa Company, 107
Burundi, foreign policy of, 223-228
Cabinda, 109, 116
Caborra Bassa Hydroelectric Project, 111
Cameron, Sir Donald, 132
Cartels, international, 48-49
Case study
  examples of, 8-10
  methods of, 172, 182, 190
Center, as power elite of state, 91-95
  defined, 91
Central African Federation, 128
  creation of, arouses fears in East Africa, 134
Central Legislative Assembly (East Africa), 133
Chad, and conflict with Ethiopia and Sudan, 171
China, Peoples Republic of. See Peoples Republic of China
Cohen, Governor Sir Andrew, and the Kabaka Crisis, 134
Colonial - settlers
  defined, 96
  in conflict with metropolitan government, 96-101
  in Kenya, 130-132
  in South Africa, 98-99, 101, 103
  role in dependency relations, 96-103
Comparison
  examples of, 10-12
  in the study of foreign policy, 192-203, 198, 215-217, 222-223
Conference of East African Governors, 136
Conflict, boundary, 161-186, 228-230. See also individual countries
  involved in
    and ethnic population overhang, 164-168, 172-173, 180
    and sub-imperialism, 71
    elites as a cause of, 170-171, 174, 180-182
general foreign policy hostility as a cause of, 169-170, 174, 183
"safety valve" hypothesis or domestic instability as a cause of, 168-169, 171, 173-174, 180, 182

Conflict, international, 74. See also Conflict, boundary
and interference in domestic affairs, 228-230
domestic instability as a cause of, 223-228
elites as a cause of, 223-228
in East African integration, 141-153
"tit-for-tat" theory of causation of, 225-230

Conseil de l'Entente
and conflict with Ghana, 205, 207, 211, 213, 214
and conflict with Guinea, 214
as part of a subsystem, 210-211
problem of uneven gains by core state in, 67

Core state, 91-95
defined, 91

Correlation
bi-variate, 179
coefficient of, 179

Cross-tabulation, in testing hypotheses, 218-219

Cuba, and Angola, 109-110
Cunene River Scheme, 108

Daarood, 167-168

Dahomey (Benin), and conflict with Niger (1963), 168-170

Decolonization, 16-17, 73
definition of, 40-41
Zartman on, 60, 80n

Delamere, Lord, 132

Dependency, 5, 15-17, 40-121, 122n
and non-alignment, 58-66
cause of instability in, 93
characteristics of, 58-59
definition of, 40-41, 92-94
effects of, on political development, 51-52
empirical studies of, 16, 83n
psychological, 59
Zartman on, 80n

Development, non-capitalist, 70, 73

Dyadic linkages, 195

East Africa High Commission, 132-137. See also East African Common Services Organisation

East African Airways, 136, 140, 147
denise of, 149-150

East African Authority, 140

East African Common Services Organization, 127, 211. See also East Africa High Commission
break-up of, 147-150
creation of, 137
state sovereignty and, 140

East African Community, 140, 150, 152, 211
and problem of uneven gains from association, 67

East African Currency Board, 139
denise of, 145, 147
East African Development Bank, 140, 142
East African Harbors Corporation, 140, 147
demise of, 148-149
East African High Court of Appeals, 136
demise of, 147
East African Navy, 136
demise of, 139, 147
East African Posts and Telecommunications Corporation, 136, 140, 147
demise of, 149
East African Tourist Board
demise of, 139, 147
East African Railways Corporation, 140, 146, 147
demise of, 148
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), 45
and sub-imperialism, 68
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 14, 127, 128, 154
and sub-imperialism, 68
Egypt, and the Soviet Union, 63
Elites
as a cause of boundary conflict, 170-171, 174, 180-182
transnational, 49-53, 57, 59, 62, 74-75, 92-93
Entente. See Conseil de l'Entente
Entebbe Raid, 141
Ethiopia
and conflict with Somali Republic, 71, 164-170, 182, 205, 210, 213
and conflict with Sudan and Chad, 171
foreign policy of, 209, 211
Ethnic population overhang
as a cause of international conflict, 164-168, 172-173, 180, 182
defined, 164
EurAfrica concept, 15, 60
European Economic Community (EEC), 45
functional integration and the, 129, 153
relations of African states with, 15, 59-60
Events data, 10-11, 178-179. See also African Foreign Relations and
International Conflict Analysis
analysis of, 198-235
Charles A. McClelland and, 194-196
definition of, 194-195
inclusiveness of, 238n
Factor analysis, 178
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. See Central African Federation
FNLA, 109-110
Foreign policy, African, 39-41. See also Non-alignment and individual
states
and the AFRICA project, 185-236
and the Middle East, 11-12
bibliography of studies of, 8-22
boundaries and, 161-186
conflict in, 204, 213-214, 223-230
cooperative behavior in, 204-207
dependency and, 51-57, 59
influence of colonial experience on, 184-186, 210
influence of domestic factors upon, 163-186
influence of external factors upon, 163-186
international organization as a focus of, 12-15
patterns of, 198-235
self-reliance and, 72-73
time-series profiles of, 212-214
types and frequencies of interactions in, 201-207, 215-223

Foreign policy, the study of, 190-235
and concept of multiple foreign policies, 195
and explanatory value of "individual variables", 217
case study method for, 8-10, 190-191, 194
comparative study method for, 10-17, 191-193, 198, 215-217, 222-223
need for intersubjectively communicable knowledge in, 192
role of typologies in, 191
scientific approach to, 191-192, 217

France, and arms sales in Africa, 65-66
Frelimo, 109, 115, 116, 118

Fringe of state, 91-95
defined, 91
Gamma, as a measure of association, 220
General Fund Services (East Africa), 150

Germany. See also West Germany
as colonial power in Togoland, 166
complaints of, against formation of common postal arrangements in
Eastern Africa, 136
demand for return of Tanganyika by, 132

Ghana
and conflict with Entente states, 205, 207, 211, 213
and conflict with Togo, 165-166, 170, 228
and conflict with Upper Volta, 170
foreign policy of, 198, 209, 211, 215, 223-228

Great Britain
Africa policy of, 21
and Angola, 198
and arms sales in Africa, 65-66
and army mutiny in East Africa, 144
and Rhodesia, 107-108
colonial policies of, in East Africa, 129-137, 144

Guinea
and conflict with Entente states, 214
relations of, with West African states, 207, 230

High Commission Territories. See Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland

Horn of Africa. See also Ethiopia and Republic of Somalia
as a subsystem, 210
as an example of ethnic population overhang as a cause of conflict,
164-168
conflict in, 71, 87n, 164-168, 182
Soviet Union's interest in, 7
United States' interest in, 6-7

Hostility, as a cause of boundary conflict, 169-170, 174, 183
Hypothesis
methods of testing, 177-180, 218-222, 228
null, 218-222

Idiographic studies. See Case study method

Indian Ocean
Soviet Union's interest in, 7
United States' interest in, 6-7

Indirect rule in Kenya, 132

Inequalities. See also Middle powers and Sub-imperialism
between states, 46-51, 55, 62, 66-68, 75-76, 90-101
within states, 49-51, 55, 67, 91, 143-144

Integration, bilateral, 128
Integration, regional, 58, 126-128. See also names of specific
regional organizations

Inter-University Committee for East Africa, 145
Interdependence of African states, 42, 44-45, 58, 72-76
Intermediary power. See Middle power
International Court of Justice, and South West Africa, 4, 106
International law, African, 43
International organization. See also names of specific organizations
as a target of African foreign policy actions, 231-232
bibliography of studies on, 12-15
functional, and African regionalism, 210-211
in Africa, 42-43
Israel, 63
and Entebbe Raid, 141
relations of, with African states, 11-12, 13
Japan
and sub-imperialism, 68
frequency of interactions of, with African states, 230-231
Johnston, Sir Harry, on unification of East Africa, 130
Joint Economic Council (East Africa), 133
Kabaka Crisis (of 1953), 134
Kabaka Mutesa, 134
Kampala Agreement of 1964, 138-139. See also Treaty for East African
Cooperation
Kenatco trucking firm, 148
Kenya, 126-156
and conflict with Somali Republic, 164-168, 182, 205, 210, 213
and conflict with Tanzania, 126, 141-152
and conflict with Uganda, 141-152
as economic center of East Africa, 16, 136-140, 150-151
conditions in, 144
foreign policy of, 145, 149
ideological views of government of, 141-143
white settlers in, 130-132
Kenya African National Union (KANU), 143
Kenyatta, Jomo, 137, 140
Khama, Sir Seretse, 115
Kikuyu, 143
Kuanda, Kenneth, 9
Labor. See Migration
Labor aristocracy, 52, 56-57
Land-locked states, 7, 47, 58, 114-115, 130, 138
foreign policies of, 198
Leabua, Chief Jonathan, 115
League of Nations
and South West Africa Mandate, 106
and Tanganyika Mandate, 136
Lesotho, in Southern Africa subsystem, 114-116
Lete Island, and the Niger-Dahomey conflict (1963), 170
Libera, foreign policy of, 198
Libya, and Uganda, 145-146
Linkage, between domestic and foreign policy, 183-186
Machel, Samora, 111
Malawi
and conflict with Tanzania (1967), 170
foreign policy of, 9-10, 215
in Southern Africa subsystem, 113-114
Mano River Customs Union, 127
McClelland, Charles A., and events data, 194-196
Middle East, and Africa, 11-12
Middle powers, 16, 46-49, 53, 58, 66-67. See also Inequalities
and Sub-imperialism
characteristics of, 94-95
economic relations of, with core states, 102-103
Republic of South Africa as a, 95-105, 116-121
Rhodesia as a, 96
role of bourgeois nationalists in, 100-101
role of colonial settlers in, 96-100
U.S. relations with, 62
Migration, 8, 14
labor, in Southern Africa, 105, 110-112, 113-114, 115
Mombasa-Kampala Railway, 135
Mozambique, 109
and Tanzania, joint air services, 150
economic policy of, 111
in Southern Africa subsystem, 110-112, 118
relations of, with Swaziland, 115
Rhodesia policy of, 111-112
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (MNC). See also Parastatals
and African elites, 49-50
and parastatal strategy, 54-56
Mutiny, of East African armies, 144
Nairobi, as center of economic development in Kenya, 143
Namibia. See South West Africa
Nationalism, African, 121
Neocolonialism, 44, 50, 54
New International Economic Order, 16, 75
and self-reliance, 72
and U.S. policy in Africa, 61
Niger, and conflict with Dahomey (1963), 168-170
Nigeria
foreign policy of, 8-9, 20, 209, 211
relations with the Soviet Union, 20
Nkrumah, Kwame, 166, 170, 171
effects of loss of power of, on West African politics, 214
foreign policy views of, 211
views on African Unity, 127-128
Nomothetic knowledge, defined, 191-192
Non-alignment, 41, 57-66, 72
changes in content of, 57-58
lack of, in African foreign policies, 232
Northwestern and York Universities African National Integration
Project, 193
Nyerere, Julius, 56
and agrarian socialism, 141-152
desire to unify East Africa at independence, 134-135, 137, 140
views of, on Southern Africa, 146
Obote, Milton, 137, 141, 143
Operationalization of variables
defined, 177-178
procedures for, 183n - 184n
Organization of African Unity (OAU), 43-44, 127. See also Pan-
Africanism
and African diplomacy, 205
bibliography of studies on, 13
role of, 12
Organization of Senegal River States, 211
Ormsby-Gore W., on unification of East Africa, 130-131
Ormsby-Gore Commission, 130-131
Pan-Africanism, 41, 43-44, 72, 166, 211
bibliography of, 14-15
definition of, 126-127
Parastatals, 67. See also Multinational corporation
strategy of, in African development, 45, 50, 54-57, 68, 78n
Peoples Republic of China
Africa policy of the, 20-21, 63-65, 71
and military relations with African states, 66
and sub-imperialism, 66
and Tanzania, 21, 64-65, 140-146
frequency of interaction of the, with African states, 230-232.
Peripheral state, 91-95
defined, 91
Political economy, 40-89, 90-121
bibliography of studies of, 16-17
Portugal
Angola policy of, 108-110
attempts of, to aid white Rhodesian government, 107
effect of revolution in, on Southern African affairs, 117-118
Railway Council (East Africa), 135
Refugees, 7
Republic of Somalia. See also Somali
and conflict with Ethiopia, 71, 164-170, 182, 205, 210, 213
and conflict with Kenya, 164-168, 182, 205, 210, 213
Daarood ethnic group in, 167-168
foreign policy of, 223
Republic of South Africa
Africa policy of, 104
and Angola, 108-110, 120
and Botswana, 114-116
and Lesotho, 114-116
and Swaziland, 114-116
and the U.S.A., 17-18
as a middle power, 16, 95-105, 116-121
bibliography of, 4-5
colonial settlers in, 98-101, 103
foreign policy of, 5-6
international campaign against, 6
Malawi policy of, 113-114
military expenditures of, 120
Mozambique policy of, 110-112
Namibia policy of, 105-107
nuclear weapons and, 6
Rhodesia policy of, 107-108, 118-121
Revolution, possibility of, in African states, 50-51, 57, 74
Rhodes, Cecil, 107, 117, 130
Rhodesia
as a middle power, 96
bibliography of, 2-4
civil war in, 4, 120-121
in Southern Africa subsystem, 107-108, 118-120
international sanctions against, 3-4, 107-108
Rhodesian Railways, 113, 115
Rosenau, James, and "individual variables", 217
"Safety valve" hypothesis
as a cause of international conflict, 168-169, 171, 173-174, 180, 182
defined, 168
Sahel, 8
Salisbury, Lord, on artificial nature of African boundaries, 159-160
Sanctions, international
   and Rhodesia, 3-4, 107-108
   and the Republic of South Africa, 6
Sawaba Party, 169
Selassie, Haile I, foreign policy of, 211
Self-reliance, 41, 44, 58, 68, 72-76
   defined, 72-73
   in Tanzanian socialism, 142
Senegal River states, as a subsystem, 210-211
Settlers. See Colonial-settlers
Smuts, General Jan, 130
Sobhuza, King of Swaziland, 115
Socialism. See also State socialism
   African, 44, 62, 69, 72, 74, 121
   agrarian, in Tanzania, 141-142
Somali ethnic group, 164-168, 182, 187n. See also Republic of Somalia
Somali Republic. See Republic of Somalia
South Africa, Republic of. See Republic of South Africa
South West Africa
   bibliography of, 4
   relations of, in Southern Africa, 105-107
Southern African Customs Union and problem of uneven gains from association, 67
Soviet Union
   Africa policy of, 19-20, 62-63, 68-71, 86n
   and communist parties in Africa, 62, 69
   and Egypt, 63, 68
   and sub-imperialism, 68-71
   Angolan policy of, 19, 109-110
   frequency of interactions of, with African states, 230-232
   military relations of, with African states, 66
   Nigerian policy of, 20
   policy of, in the Horn of Africa, 7, 71
Spanish Sahara, conflict in, 8
Spinola, General Antonio, 109
State capitalism, 52-57, 73
   in the Republic of South Africa, 123n
State socialism, 52-56, 73. See also Socialism
   in Ghana, 211
Sub-imperialism, 66-73. See also Middle powers
   and inter-African conflict, 71
   defined, 66
Sub-system, 5-6, 15
   and African regions, 207-214
   and African relations, 205, 208
Sudan, and conflict with Ethiopia and Chad, 171
Swaziland, in Southern Africa subsystem, 114-116
TANU, 141-142
Tanzam Railway, 21, 64-65, 112, 116, 127, 146-147, 151
Tanzania, 126-156. See also Tanzam Railway
   and conflict with Kenya, 126, 141-152
   and conflict with Malawi, 170
and conflict with Uganda, 71, 141-152
and Rhodesia, 116
and the People's Republic of China, 21, 64-65, 145-146
Arusha Declaration of, 139
conditions in, 144
foreign policy of, 145-147, 198, 215, 223
German demands for return of, 132
ideological views of, 141-152
in Eastern Africa subsystem, 116
in Southern Africa subsystem, 116, 145-147, 150-152
joint air services of, with Mozambique, 150
union of, with Zanzibar, 128
Testing, empirical
compared to case study method, 172, 182
need for, 172
Togo, and conflict with Ghana (1955-1966), 165-166, 171, 228
Tourism. See also East African Tourist Board
in East Africa, 149
Transnational organization, 42-43. See also Multinational corporations
See also Kampala Agreement
Typology, and the comparative study of foreign policy, 191
Uganda, 126-156
and conflict with Kenya, 141-152
and conflict with Tanzania, 71, 141-152
conditions in, 144
Ujamaa, 152
Union Douaniere et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale (UDEAC), 127
UNITA, 109-110
United Nations
African foreign policy and, 11-13, 232
and South West Africa, 4, 106-107
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 45
United States of America
Africa policy of, 17-19
and Israel, 61
and the Republic of South Africa, 17-18, 61
Angolan policy of, 18, 109-110
arms sales of, to Africa, 65-66
as model of political integration, 127, 153
economic policy of, 61-62
frequency of interaction of, with African states, 230-231
policy of, in the Horn of Africa, 6-7, 71
relations of, with African middle powers, 62
role of, in Africa, 60-62
University of East Africa, dissolution of, 145, 147
Upper Volta, foreign policy of, 198
Vorster, Prime Minister, 118-120
West Germany, frequency of interactions of, with African states, 230-231
Witwatersrand Native Labour Association, 110
World Bank, loan to East African Community, 149, 154
Zaire
desire of, to annex parts of Angola, 109-110, 116
conflict between, and African states, 230
foreign policy of, 209, 211, 215
in Southern Africa subsystem, 116
Zambia. See also Tanzam Railway
and Rhodesia, 112-113
and Tanzania, 116, 146-147
and the Republic of South Africa, 112
and the Tanzam Railway, 65
economy of, 113
foreign policy of, 9-10, 113
in Southern Africa subsystem, 112-113
Southern Africa policy of, 108
Zimbabwe. See Rhodesia