FOUR PHILOSOPHICAL MODELS OF THE RELATION BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE

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Since music education straddles theory and practice, my purpose is to sketch the strengths and weaknesses of four philosophical models of the relationship between theory and practice. I demonstrate that none of them suffices when taken alone; each has something to offer and its own detractions. And I conclude with four suggested ways in which the analysis can be helpful to music teachers and those interested in their work.

Clarifying what is meant by theory and practice raises a nest of conceptual problems. Concerning theory, it may be tempting to equate the terms "theory" and "philosophy." Among their shared properties, these terms deal with conceptual and abstract entities that, from the Enlightenment at least, have been held to be distinct from the phenomenal world. They also clarify ideas and distinguish one concept from another. Among their different purposes, the object of philosophy is the asking of questions in a search for wisdom or truth whereas theory is formulated for explanatory purposes, especially within the frame of scientific propositions that can be refuted through empirical observations. The tests of philosophy are, therefore, those of symbolic logic evidenced in principles such as
internal consistency, correspondence with evidence (deductive, inductive, or analogical), and coherence within a unity or whole. Although logical criteria may also be important in formulating and testing theory, it is tested and refuted primarily through means of qualitative descriptions and quantitative assessments of observable phenomena.

Regarding practice, one is also confronted with an ambiguous construct that may be interpreted descriptively (what is done in the phenomenal world or taken to be the general state of affairs) or normatively (what is desirable or ideal). There is also the distinction between the practice of a seasoned performer and practice in the sense of striving towards the mastery of a competent and expert practice. In this regard, Vernon Howard distinguishes between “practice” (or the skills exemplified by proficient or expert performers) and “practise (or acquiring the level of mastery of proficient or expert performance).” For him, the ambiguous and paradoxical nature of artistic practice highlights the complexity of degrees of attaining mastery of skills or exemplary practice and the diverse array of skills ranging from habit to critical thinking involved in the practice of any art. Although each practice is distinguished by its own belief systems, rituals, expectations, and commonsense, boundaries between differing practices are sometimes “soft” or fuzzy, as one seeps into another. Consequently, it is often difficult to distinguish one from another at the margins where one practice becomes another.

DICHOTOMY

The notion of theory and practice as independent or a dichotomous relationship between the phenomenal world on the one hand and the mind and spirit on the other has its roots in the ancient world. For Plato, the world of “appearances,” referring to the phenomenal world understood by imagination (eikasia) and belief (pistis), should be distinguished from the higher, abstract “intelligible world” grasped through thinking (dianoia), knowledge (episteme), and intelligence (noesis). René Descartes’ later bifurcation of the inner and outer worlds and inversion of Platonic values and understandings resulted in the ascendancy of careful and deliberate observation of the phenomenal world over philosophical reflection. His ideas helped to set the stage for the Enlightenment and the Industrial, Scientific, and Information Revolutions. Empiricism, science, and technology gradually displaced philosophy as primary ways of knowing the phenomenal world and understanding the nature of mind, human cognition, feeling, and being. Making hard-boundaried distinctions between within and without one’s self, the phenomenal world and the world of spiritual things, and theory and practice were important insights. These distinctions provided for limits on the sorts of ways in which truth could be known. Reasoned deliberation
and imaginative thought have particular usefulness in the world of theory while sensory perception and careful observation are especially useful in the phenomenal world of practice. So while the scholar might speculate about phenomena, observational tools are also useful in coming to know and understand them. Reason and observation each have particular strengths, and it ought not be assumed that philosophy or scientific observation apply equally to the entire spectrum of knowledge. They each have different strengths and are appropriately used in pursuit of different questions and realms—philosophy to theoretical speculation and spiritual reflection, and science to phenomenal observation.

There is also the recognition that practice is not the same as theory or vice versa. The world of theory can be constructed elegantly, according to definitive rule systems that apply under all the conditions that have been speculated. Boethian notions of the music of the heavenly bodies assumes that all is in delicate balance, that nothing goes awry, and that the mathematical ratios and principles that underlie this music are everywhere in evidence. The world of practice on the other hand is unpredictable, messy, and sometimes chaotic. Dreams of a Platonic republic were a far cry from the reality in Athens at the time. And the philosophical prescriptions of Descartes' day are distant from his learning by "going slowly," traveling to distant places, and seeing for himself how things were rather than relying on the book learning of his youth.

I am sympathetic to the Cartesian attempt to distinguish practice and theory because I notice that whenever philosophers first move into new territory or realize that something is awry and amiss and that a distinction needs to be drawn, they sometimes resort to formulating dichotomies. This is the case, for example, in the writings of Susanne Langer following the work of Ernst Cassirer who realized that a distinction needed to be made between the propositional symbols of discursive language and the musical, artistic, religious, and mythical symbols that function primarily in ways other than propositionally. She defined these artistic, religious, and mythical symbols in apposition to propositional discourse, labeled them as "non-discursive," and denoted them in relation to the world of thought-emotion she labeled "feeling" or what cannot be said discursively. One might wish that she had put her argument differently. Still, she had little truck with sloppy philosophical thinking and resting arguments in ambiguities in order to avoid the hard philosophical work of trying to deal with difficult issues. She wished to clarify a distinction and, notwithstanding any philosophical mistakes, her work has philosophical integrity and remains one of the major philosophical achievements of twentieth-century thought. Importantly, Cassirer and Langer opened an array of ways in which humans think other than propositionally in various fields.

However, postmodern and feminist thought has systematically exposed these
hard-boundaried distinctions as false dichotomies and perspectives that ought to be subverted, resisted, and displaced. Interestingly, Mary Reichling shows that Langer presages subsequent feminist thought in softening the boundaries between emotion and cognition in artistic meaning-making and taking in her classic twentieth century study of the nature of mind.8 The longer Langer wrote, the more she understood the seepage in the boundaries that she had originally set in more dichotomous terms. And as such, she is in the vanguard of those who came later to begin to undermine "hard-boundaried" thinking.

The problem with "hard boundaried" thinking, according to Claire Detels who has argued in opposition to it,9 is that it excessively specializes and alienates theories and practices. In driving a wedge between ideas and practices, it prevents recognizing the interconnections and cross-fertilizations that might otherwise be possible. In institutionalizing these differences, it balkanizes the resulting groups and institutions that form around ideas and practices, and causes alienation and conflict between those with differing vested interests. The worlds it creates become fragmented and too small, and the boundaries it fosters are often false or logically indefensible. As such, it may be antithetical to the pursuit of truth and ought to be resisted. Detels cites examples from the worlds of music and the other arts to show how the arts have become excessively divorced from one another and have lost an underlying sense of unity that once prevailed. And she recommends how the teaching of the arts ought to be reconstructed practically.

POLARITY

Construing theory and practice as polarities or "soft-boundaried," in the sense of a weak syndrome in which one seeps or blends into another along the continuum between two logical extremes, suggests the possibility of various sorts of theories and practices. There are those concerned with the theoretically extreme positions or polarities and others having to do with the ground between them. As Henry Zentner notes,10 empirical types describe clusters of instances along the continuum between the "ideal," logical, or theoretical types at each polarity. I prefer to replace Zentner's descriptor "ideal" because of its normative connotations and semantic difficulties with the notion of "theoretical" types that depict each of the comparative polarities. If one could say that a jug is full at one end and empty at the other, notions of full and empty might be construed as theoretical types. Both ideas (full and empty) can be compared systematically by means of a profile of constituent elements or characteristics, the one being the opposite or antithesis of the other. Between each polarity of fullness and emptiness, the jug may be said to be more or less full or more or less empty as the case may be. It might be observed that most jugs tend to be quite full, half full, or
almost empty. If this is the case, notions of quite full, half full, and almost empty may depict empirical types commonly found in the phenomenal world. And a researcher would have to decide how a particular cluster of instances of jugs with some water in them should be categorized in terms of these empirical types and the degree to which these empirical types fit the phenomenal evidence.

Zentner's distinction between theoretical and empirical types helps clarify the point that in the case of weak syndromes, some theories and practices serve primarily to stake out the logical extreme positions of a continuum. One position is systematically compared with another, and these are adjudicated chiefly with reference to logical criteria. Others serve to describe and categorize phenomenal instances that fall along a continuum between two polarities. These are evaluated primarily with reference to how accurately and effectively empirical evidence is organized.

The ambiguity of educational and professional theory and practice has been argued persuasively by Joseph Schwab, Israel Scheffler, and Donald Schön.11 Schwab sees theory and practice as discontinuous or disjunct worlds, and argues for the ambiguity of theory and practice. For him, a theory may give rise to a range of differing specific practices and a practice may derive from a range of differing specific theories. According to Schwab, it requires "arts of eclectic" to move between these worlds. By arts of eclectic, he refers to the imaginative, intuitive, and rational selection of elements of a particular theory or practice that are only ever known partially. Each particular application of a theory or theoretical foundation of a practice contains only a fraction of the whole it represents. Eclecticism is inevitable seeing that the more aspects that are represented, the potentially richer and more inclusive of diverse instances the resulting theory and practice. And the selection of appropriate theoretical or practical elements is, for him, an artistic process.

Scheffler criticizes Schwab's view of the relationship between theory and practice as construing too extreme a gulf between the two.12 He points to the interconnections between them, noting that theory is not entirely abstract but draws from and feeds into practice just as practice has within it the seeds of theoretical assumptions. Still, he supports Schwab's contention that the relation between theory and practice is discontinuous and ambiguous.

Evocative of Schwab's earlier distinction between theory and practice, Schön describes the difference between theory and professional practice as that between the high ground of simple, abstract, and elegant ideas and explanations and the surrounding swamp of complex, practical, and messy realities of the phenomenal world to which theoretical formulations apply only approximately or roughly.13 His metaphor of the high ground surrounded by swampland evokes the historical pre-eminence of theory which is regarded as normative notwith-
standing its discontinuity with the conditions of the surrounding swamp. The high ground is considered to be a desirable place—a world of clarity, lightness, and fresh air conducive to health and well-being. The swamp is less valued—a world of disorder, darkness, and water breeding disease and debilitation. Yet, within this metaphor Schön recognizes the ambiguity of theory and practice, the interrelatedness, as it were, of high land and surrounding swamp. The upshot of these arguments is that one should not expect to find a theory perfectly translated into a particular practice or a practice drawing entirely and fully on one particular theory.

Two nineteenth- and twentieth-century examples from music education serve to illustrate this ambiguity between theory and practice. John Curwen’s method of tonic sol-fa turns out to be an amalgam of ideas and procedures derived from such sources as Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, Sarah Glover, Edouard Jue de Berneval, Lowell Mason, J. J. Waite, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Aimé Paris, William Hickson, Joseph Mainzer, and Charles and Elizabeth Mayo. Likewise, the ideas of Bennett Reimer translate into or are consistent with a variety of practical applications of which the Education for Aesthetic Awareness: The Cleveland Area Project, and Silver Burdett Music—a music textbook series—constitute two.

While Schwab seems to view the relationship between theory and practice as asymmetrical in the sense that theory tends to lead to practice rather than the reverse, the notion that practice ought to give rise to theory also needs to be emphasized. Such a view would regard practice bubbling up into theory just as theory bubbles up into practice. Instead of a hierarchical world view in which the world of theory is above that of practice, or vice versa, there is a reciprocity in which both theory and practice are valued and integrally interrelated. For example, June Tillman goes into the classroom, collects natural evidence of how children compose, and develops a theory of children’s compositional development which she then uses to hypothesize about music instruction. As she does this, she dignifies practice, demonstrates the value of naturalistic research, and shows how practice ought to generate theory just as theory generates practice. This symmetry and reciprocity between theory and practice suggest that descriptive research involving teacher and researcher observations and reflections in their classrooms, studios, and all the other places they teach needs to be encouraged and validated as of equal if also different worth than scientific and experimental research.

Contributing to the partiality, ambiguity, and reciprocity of theory and practice are the various levels of generality at which both are cast and the different frameworks or perspectives, whether physical, psychological, institutional, societal, cultural, or historical, from which both can be viewed. Harold Fiske notes
that tensions, dialectics, discontinuities, and paradoxes observed in music education can sometimes be dissolved or resolved by taking into account different levels of causation or generality.\textsuperscript{17} His analysis evokes earlier notions of "integrative levels of analysis" employed in the social sciences.\textsuperscript{18} As one moves from the specific to the general, each progressively higher level of causation or generality at which the analysis is cast integrates those at more specific levels resulting in increasing complexity and ambiguity. Aside from questions of generality, there are also the various frames of reference or lenses through which ideas and practices are viewed and the multiplicity of descriptions and explanations that result. Each lens of inquiry provides a particular perspective on what is known conceptually and phenomenally. Each asks specific questions, employs special methods, and seeks particular objectives that help shape what is known about self, world, and whatever lies beyond. For these reasons, ideas and practices framed at different levels of generality or in the context of disparate lenses of inquiry may be disjunct and in tension one with the other. And practically speaking, the educational policy-maker may encounter difficulties in moving from one level of generality to another or one perspective to another either conceptually or practically, and from practice to theory or theory to practice.

**FUSION**

A more revolutionary model than a "soft boundaried" approach to the relationship of theory and practice is Paulo Freire's notion of praxis in which theory and practice are purposefully transcended and forged into one.\textsuperscript{19} For Freire, theory without practice is mentalism, devoid of the applications that reflect it and bring it to life. Practice without theory is activism or instrumentalism bare of guiding principles.\textsuperscript{20} Praxis for Freire is transformative in that it is forged with reference to ethical and moral principles of justice, inclusiveness, equality, and freedom in which the individual's conscience is awakened to those things that need to be changed in practice, and she or he acts in the phenomenal world in a concerted effort to change those things that need to be changed. Rather than simply transmitting practices from one generation to the next, it is avowedly liberatory and change-oriented towards realizing certain ethical principles, namely those directed towards freedom and justice.

Music education that is normatively praxial in the service of renewing musical traditions and transformative in its impact on individuals, culture, and society is quite a different matter from praxis construed descriptively as articulating and transmitting from one generation to the next what people actually do or have done in the past.\textsuperscript{21} As Nell Noddings, Maxine Greene, Jane Roland Martin, and bell hooks observe, past and present practices may go counter to ethical principles of justice, freedom, inclusivity, and caring.\textsuperscript{22} The music teacher may be
constrained to actively transgress past and present practice by subverting and transforming it in particular ways. Practice construed descriptively may not always constitute a good, especially if one sees music education as a profoundly moral and ethical undertaking in the service of transmitting and transforming musical traditions from one generation to the next.

Such an ethical view of music education opens Pandora's box of how ethical and moral principles are to be framed and articulated, whose perspectives are to prevail, and how dissenting views are to be negotiated. While a philosopher may be tempted to revisit the Aristotelian virtues by way of deciding which particular goods should obtain, my own perspective is forged in terms of democratic ideals. Although imperfect, these potentially represent the most humane arrangements I have seen for organizing and governing society. As Martha Nussbaum shows, the ancients have much to teach us about the importance of finding commonalities across the borders of class, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, color, language, religion, and political affiliation. Still, Nussbaum glosses over the impact of powerful vested interests in silencing and marginalizing different others, the contentiousness of various positions, the difficulties of forging resolutions that foster diversity of thought and practice. There are also possibilities of hostility and conflict which these differences engender, and the role of education as a site for a contest of positions and practices—issues about which Henry Giroux so eloquently writes.

Examples of a theory/practice construct in music and music education are found particularly within the growing feminist literature in these fields. For example, Marianne Kielian-Gilbert's conception of musical theory/practice explodes the historical bifurcation between musica theoretica and musica practica and presses musical analysis into musical practice and vice versa. Her view situates music in the "eye of paradox," at once a state of being, believing, and behaving. Propelling such a positionality into the service of liberation from self- and other-imposed constraints toward the fullest growth and expression of human potential (construed in the sense not only of having the desire and opportunity but also exercising the choice to do such-and-such) in the cause of freedom, engages one in a conceptual and performative act of knowing/making/receiving. From this perspective, theoretical analysis constitutes a fusion of knowing one's self, the other, this music in and around which learners gather, and the creative acts of making and taking music. And this music constitutes a small yet interrelated part of a wider context framed societally, culturally, and globally. Likewise, in music education, Reichling's and Eleanor Stubley's notions of play in music education puncture the typical bifurcations of work and play, serious and pleasurable undertakings, and instrumental and self-sufficient activities and purposes. In effect, play serves to integrate things that may other-
wise become disjunct and fragmented, and in so doing, potentially unifies and transforms musical education.

I am not quite comfortable with the metaphor of fusion in which theory is melded into practice and practice into theory. To suggest this would be to deny the possibility or usefulness of distinguishing theory and practice. To argue that they are inextricable would be philosophical nonsense for the following reason. Philosophers have long debated conceptual matters irrespective of their practical applications and their inquiries have been very useful to musicians and educators. Likewise, many (maybe most) music teachers have gone about their work very effectively in largely intuitive ways without the benefit of explicit theoretical or philosophical understandings.

The fusion metaphor can also be challenged for its static and simplistic qualities. Once fused in a particular time and place, there is not the openness for other different interactions from time to time and place to place. And the fusion metaphor seems too simple because it suggests that only one option is open at any time. Once things are fused, they become essentially different, and this need not always be the case. Sometimes educational policy-makers flirt with an idea and eventually discard it for another as they search for particular solutions at a given time. Throughout the twentieth century, for example, the music education profession embraced one idea after another in search of the best ways to do music education. One would also have to ask, “Fused how?” “By whom?” and so on. Are there certain privileged persons or groups who recommend or mandate particular fusions? And what of those whose views on the relationship of particular theories and practices are marginalized? Notions of contest of particular perspectives on what to fuse and how it should be undertaken are important to preserve because they suppose education to be a place in which theories and practices are analyzed, evaluated, and sometimes synthesized. There needs to be room for differing points of view and negotiation among them.

DIALECTIC

The word dialectic is an old idea that Plato employed to signify the person who can see connections between things and the One and the Many—a quality of thinking that I. A. Richards regards as “the highest form of REASON.” Various twists have been put on this idea in the intervening millennia. My own view is a “this is with that” approach implying tension between things that, practically speaking, do not normally go together and sometimes cannot be put together. I use a dramatic metaphor in which people on the stage move about, one coming into the foreground and the other back; sometimes embracing, other times distant, sometimes speaking, other times silent. Such a dynamic view pictures the ways in which teachers and researchers act in relation to the theories and
practices they consider. Rather than an ontological view of theory and practice, my focus is epistemological and functional, on how people work their way through the theories and practices of which they are aware, how they adjudicate them, and how they decide to act in their particular lived situations. This is also an improvisatory and rhapsodic view of teaching and learning because it suggests that these situations are dynamic rather than static, ends cannot be accurately foreseen, and teachers and their students interact in ways that are "in the moment," often serendipitous and unexpected.

Such a view has the advantages of allowing theory and practice to co-exist more-or-less distinctly, and understanding that rapprochements between particular theories and practices are sometimes difficult to achieve. The challenges that these tensions create and the sometimes messy realities with which teachers and their students deal are part and parcel of the worlds of music education that practitioners understand. This dialectical perspective, born out of experience in the world of practice, seems particularly useful as a way of understanding the relationship of theory and practice in the phenomenal world. As a fallibilist perspective, it also offers a way of ascertaining and evaluating the relationships between theory and practice as they apply in particular situations that do not prematurely foreclose alternatives.

This view suffers from the criticism that it may problematize the situations that teachers face rather than provide a road map for them to follow. It advocates a particularistic perspective in which decisions are best taken by those closest to the music instructional situation, namely, the teachers themselves. In reply, I suggest that teachers can and ought to develop their own policies in regard to music instruction. They ought not be technicians who follow the directives of others in every particular of their work because a central work of teaching and learning necessitates professional judgments on their part about the interests and needs of particular students in a given location. Curricula that they develop for and with their students are important marks of their professionalism and central to their teaching. In countries such as the United States in which public education is a state and local responsibility, the role of music supervisors or coordinators needs to be resurrected from the oblivion into which it has all too frequently sunk. Historically, such personnel acted as leaders of local teachers, and their relative absence leaves too many teachers bereft of musical and educational leadership in making these crucial decisions.

The criticism that the dialectical view does not go far enough, that it is insufficiently radical especially in view of the growing body of wholistic approaches to music education is a serious one. I have responded to this criticism elsewhere because I think it a fair and important issue. My response is that the quarrel between a wholistic and dialectic approach to music education can be resolved...
when one interprets a wholistic approach in terms of the ontological character of theory and practice whereas the dialectical approach is employed to describe what these living people do and how they function in their decision-making, that is, the epistemological nature of the theory-practice relationship. Seeing theory and practice as polarities rather than dualities and the resulting interaction as a "weak syndrome," rather like Howard's notion of "arty craft" or "crafty art," also allows me to sidestep the criticism of "masked dualities." And resolving this dilemma by focusing on the particular and evident limits of this view of theory and practice can also be applied to each of the foregoing philosophical models. Each may have its role and may serve a particular purpose, yet each is limited or flawed in one way or another.

The criticism concerning the particular theories and practices to be employed and their potential whether for good or evil suggests underlying ethical criteria that need to ground music education. This recognition takes music education in all of its forms beyond the realm of a purely aesthetic phenomenon (if such a thing were ever envisaged or possible) into a vital concern with political and ethical matters. This reality has yet to be fully mined in the philosophy of music education although a philosophical conversation concerning the aesthetic, ethical, and political dimensions of music education has begun. So I reply that a criticism is appropriately launched concerning the nature of criteria whereby music educators and those interested in their work adjudicate the claims of theories-practices, and that ethical, political, religious, commercial, and professional values need to be among those that are addressed.

The criticism brought that a dialectical approach to music education remains necessarily theoretical and cannot translate into practice or is difficult to translate into public policy can be met by suggesting that dialogue is an appropriate mechanism that facilitates a movement from theory to practice or vice versa. By the word dialogue I mean a special sort of conversation that meets particular criteria. These include an open-minded, empathetic, respectful interchange between participants in a community of fellow learners. Dialogue can be transformative when it enables participants to see what they might not otherwise see, and it emboldens them to concerted action to bring theory into practice or practice into theory. In music education, it can be a vehicle whereby transformation of theory and practice can occur.

PUTTING THIS ANALYSIS TO WORK

How are these ideas helpful to music educators and those interested in their work? There are at least four ways in which they can be useful. First, the analysis shows the great care that needs to be taken in examining sometimes taken-for-granted words in common use in the field. It problematizes the ways in
which the words "theory" and "practice" and the relationships between them are used in professional discourse and research.

Second, the foregoing analysis furthers the ground for a critical examination of the word praxis—a paradigm first coined in music education by Philip Alperson and invoked by David Elliott in his book, Music Matters. A philosophical dialogue has been opened on the nature of praxis, its relationship to aesthetics, and its role in music education. A thorough-going analysis of the word praxis as it is variously employed in music education lies outside the scope of this paper, has not been my own philosophical project, and is probably premature at this time given the ambiguities, disagreements, and unresolved interpretations presently being worked out in the philosophical community. How these notions are elaborated will determine the extent to which notions of praxis challenge traditional ideas and practices in the field of music education construed descriptively and normatively. What is important for the community of music education scholars is that this important philosophical discussion is ongoing and that, for the first time in my memory, the conversation is a genuinely open and communal one. This is not the case of an individual philosopher propounding an idea that is unchallenged, but a critical and careful examination of her or his claims (and the claims of others). This conversation is of enormous significance to the field of music education because it signifies that not only is an important philosophical literature in the field emerging, but no longer can one look to a single philosopher for one's raison d'être. And this reality must ultimately affect practice by suggesting that there is in the final analysis no one right way to go about the work of music education.

Third, dialectical views of theory and practice offer means of negotiating the various models of dichotomy, polarity, fusion, and dialectic. As a way of understanding the intersections of theories and practices, a dialectical approach offers a way of working through philosophical and practical options that may or should be considered. It provides an approach to doing philosophy and considering practical alternatives, and it makes possible an understanding of the wholes and parts that comprise the work of music education. As such, it offers a means of creating alternatives that constitute hallmarks of transforming music education and of thinking imaginatively about the "what might be" as well as the "what is." A curriculum expresses ideas in the phenomenal world. It constitutes the site of debate about and between ideas and practices, the vanishing point, if you will, between theory and practice. In a practically-oriented field such as music education, in which ideas need to be translated into action as musical instruction, philosophical models ultimately impact the nature of practice. And the specific ways in which the foregoing models potentially
affect the nature of instruction, while hinted at above, is the subject of inquiry that must remain for another day.

CONCLUSION

Four philosophical models of the relationship between theory and practice—dichotomy, polarity, fusion, and dialectic—have each been briefly described and evaluated. Each has its strengths and weaknesses. None is without its flaws or limitations. Varieties of each model might be identified that may be similar to and different from the particular cases I have described. Each has a distinct perspective to bring to bear on how theories and practices are articulated and negotiated. Making clear distinctions is the work of philosophy, and a dichotomous approach helps clarify the differences between theory and practice, between one theory and another and one practice and another. Polarities giving rise to weak syndromes and soft boundaries between theory and practice also draw attention to the ground between extreme theoretical positions. Fusion highlights the unity that might characterize one's approach to the human beings faced with making sometimes difficult decisions. And dialectic focuses on the ways in which people can make decisions with integrity without prematurely foreclosing their options.

At least four ways have been suggested in which these models can be helpful to music educators. The analysis problematizes theory and practice, grounds an analysis of praxis, necessitates negotiating various philosophical models, and plays out in music curricula. The specific implications of each model in practice is an open question generating possibilities for further reflection on the intersections of music education theory and practice.

NOTES

1For example, Laird Addis, Of Mind and Music (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999) employs logical tests of philosophical "theories." Here, he employs the term "theory" in the sense of an integrated set of propositions and explanations concerning the way things are. Presumably, he would expect his theory to be tested empirically as well as logically.


3Claire Detels, Soft Boundaries: Re-Visioning the Arts and Aesthetics in American Education (Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey, 1999) makes the point that it is important to recognize this ambiguity between artistic practices as among the arts themselves and the arts and other school subjects.

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9Detels, Soft Boundaries.


12Scheffler, Reason and Teaching, 181–197.

13Schor, Educating the Reflective Practitioner, 3.


20Ibid., 68.


32 Jorgensen, *In Search of Music Education.*

33 This criticism is mounted by Iris M. Yob, “Theory into Practice and Practice into Theory: A Philosophical Conversation,” presented at the Research in Music Education Conference, University of Exeter, United Kingdom, April 2001.
Jorgensen, "A Dialectical View of Theory and Practice."

Howard, Artistry.


Jorgensen, In Search of Music Education.

Jorgensen, "A Dialectical View of Theory and Practice."


Jorgensen, Transforming Music Education, ch. 5.