CHAPTER 11

PIETY AND POLITICS

Religious Leadership and the Conflict in Kashmir

SUMIT GANGULY AND PRAVEEN SWAMI

In 1912 the revivalist poet Maqbool Shah Kraalwari published *Greeznama*, an extended lament about the subversive syncretism of the Kashmiri peasantry:

> *They regard the mosque and the temple as equal,*
> *seeing no difference between muddy puddles and the ocean,*
> *They know not the sacred, honourable or the respectable* (Kraalwari 1912, 5).

Less than a century ago, the landscape Kraalwari described has disappeared: as the ugly shrine-land conflagration that set the state ablaze in 2008 demonstrated, mass politics in Jammu and Kashmir appears to be driven almost exclusively by questions of religious identity. Yet the fact remains that clerics and religious authority have had only a peripheral role in this political mobilization—and, as our survey of some religion-linked crises in Jammu and Kashmir will show, in earlier ones, too. We are confronted by the apparent paradox of a religion-driven politics that has almost no space for religious leaders. It is all the more intriguing if one considers the central place of religion in the making of the Kashmir conflict itself. In this chapter, we examine three contrasting crises in an effort to find an answer to this question. Much of the work on religion and politics in Jammu and Kashmir has focused on the two-decade-long insurgency that began in 1988.

First among these is the Hazratbal crisis of 1963–64, which was provoked by the disappearance of a holy relic from what is arguably Jammu and Kashmir's most revered shrine. In December 1963 the *moe-e-muqaddas*, reputed to be a hair

of the Prophet Mohammad, disappeared from the shrine, provoking widespread violence and a generalized challenge to the legitimacy of Indian rule in Jammu and Kashmir. Indian investigators succeeded in tracing the relic and securing the imprimatur of prominent clerics for its legitimacy. However, a wide-ranging set of political reforms was needed to put the agitation to rest. Religious leaders had no role in this process whatsoever.

Second is the *Book of Knowledge* crisis, an Islamist mobilization that took place soon after the 1971 India-Pakistan war. In this case, a specific religious cause—the discovery of supposedly heretic images in an encyclopedia—provoked violence across Kashmir. However, the evolution of the crisis and its eventual outcome were shaped by politicians, not clerics or religious leaders. Political forces used the *Book of Knowledge* crisis as part of a competitive mass mobilization, and the eventual resolution of the crisis was brought about by elections.

Finally, we examine "Shrine war" of 2008—a dispute over the use of land by a trust managing a cave-temple in southern Kashmir, which led to a massive Hindu-Muslim conflagration that pitted Muslim-majority Kashmir and Hindu-majority Jammu against each other. Here too, we shall see, religious leadership had only a peripheral role, even though both the causes and the course of the mobilization centered on questions of faith.

We conclude that, historically, there has been no reason to turn to moderate religious heads for a resolution of political conflicts. Ever since the first decades of the last century, the mass political leadership in Jammu and Kashmir drew its legitimacy, at least in part, as a representative and champion of religious causes. Secular political mobilization and religious chauvinism were closely, often inextricably, enmeshed. Politicians—not priests—held the keys to the resolution of religion-driven conflicts, and continue to do so.

RELIGION AND THE KASHMIR DISPUTE

The origins of the Kashmir dispute are complex and can be traced to the decolonization process in South Asia.[1] It is of course well beyond the scope of this brief chapter to deal with the subject at any length. Instead only a synoptic account of its origins will be spelled out here. At the time of the close of colonial disengagement from the subcontinent, two classes of states existed under the aegis of the British Indian Empire. The first were the states of British India directly ruled from Whitehall through New Delhi. The second were the so-called princely states, which were nominally independent as long as they recognized the British Crown as the paramount authority in India. Some 562 in number, these rulers of these states had controlled all subjects barring foreign affairs, defense, and communications (see Ramusack 2004).

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In the aftermath of World War II, faced with two irreconcilable nationalist movements, one based upon secular nationalism and the other on putatively primordial ties of faith, the British chose to partition the subcontinent. Lord Mountbatten, the last British viceroy, gave the rulers of the princely states a choice: they could accede to either India or Pakistan based upon their location and demographic composition. However, he conceded that certain "geographic compulsions" would have to be taken into account.[2]

The state of Jammu and Kashmir posed a unique problem. It had a Muslim-majority population, a Hindu monarch, and shared borders with the emergent states of India and Pakistan.[3] The monarch, Maharaja Hari Singh, was loath to join Pakistan for obvious reasons. Yet he was equally unwilling to cast his lot with India because he correctly feared that the Indian state would confiscate his vast landholdings (Ganguly 1997). As a consequence, even after the independence of India and Pakistan in August 1947, he refused to accede to either state.

In early October 1947 a tribal rebellion broke out in the western reaches of his state. Within days the Pakistani state entered the fray and assisted the rebels with weapons, logistics, and military personnel.[4] Owing to Pakistani support and the pusillanimity of the monarch's forces, the rebels and their supporters reached the outskirts of the capital city of Srinagar toward the end of October. In a panic, Maharaja Hari Singh appealed to Prime Minister Nehru of India for assistance. Nehru agreed to provide aid after two conditions had been met: in the absence of a referendum, he would seek the imprimatur of Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, the leader of the largest popular and secular organization in the state, the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, and the maharaja would also have to legally accede to India.[5] Once these conditions were met, Indian Army units were airlifted into Kashmir, thereby stopping the tribal and Pakistani advance but not before they had managed to seize about a third of the state's territory. Indian and Pakistani forces fought a bitter war until India referred the case to the UN Security Council on January 1, 1948. Subsequently, India and Pakistan have fought two more wars over the disputed territory in 1965 and in 1999. (In 1971 the two countries had gone to war, but not over the status of Kashmir [Sisson and Rose 1990.])

Within the portion of Jammu and Kashmir that it controlled, the Indian state allowed local political authorities substantial leeway—including substantial political corruption as long as they did not hint at secession. As a consequence, a coterie of individuals came to dominate the politics of the state (see Bhattacharjea 1994). To its credit, no regime in New Delhi sought to flood the region with settlers from other parts of India to change its demographic composition. Also, in an attempt to win the support of the citizens of this Muslim-majority state, it poured in vast development funds to improve the state's infrastructure.

Since 1989 India has been embattled in fighting a vicious ethnoreligious insurgency that has wracked the part of the state under its control. Among other things, the insurgency stemmed from the emergence of a new, politically sophisticated generation of Kashmiris who, unlike previous generations, were unwilling to tolerate the rampant political malfeasances that had characterized local politics (Ganguly 1996). Many of this generation were drawn to Islamist organizations such as the Jamaat-e-Islami and its student wing, the Islami Jamaat-e-Tulba, which from the mid-1970s launched a program of neofundamentalist mobilization that provided a core of cadre and support to jihadist groups. Later, Pakistani support transformed this discontent into a long-running military confrontation with the Indian state (see Sikand 2004).

Since the onset of the insurgency, the Indian state has managed to restore a modicum of both law and order in the state through an amalgam of the use of military force and the promise of political accommodation. However, it has yet to drain a reservoir of discontent that still seethes within much of the Muslim population of the state.

RELIGIOUS IDENTITY AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN KASHMIR

No understanding of the relationship of modern politics and religious identity in Kashmir is possible without a careful engagement with its history. Economic discontent in the late nineteenth century prepared the ground for the emergence of mass politics in Jammu and Kashmir. In 1846 the East India Company signed the Treaty of Amritsar, which gave control of the territories that made up the preindependence state of Jammu and Kashmir to the Dogra monarch Maharaja Gulab Singh.

Less than a year after the Treaty of Amritsar was signed, Dogra tax policies led to a large-scale outflow of shawl workers to the Punjab plains, a development that decimated this economically vital industry. Widespread famine aggravated the situation and, in April 1865, Srinagar shawl workers rose in protest against the regime. "It was," F. M. Hassnain has argued, "perhaps the first organised demands day in the history of class struggle in India" (Hassnain 1988, 15). The shawl workers' revolt was brutally suppressed. Twenty-eight protestors were believed to have been killed by Dogra forces, and arrests and punitive fines were imposed on their leaders.

Despite some fitful efforts at administrative reform, working-class protests broke out with regularity in coming decades, mirroring trends in popular struggle across South Asia. The economic depression that followed the Great War of 1914–1918 further heightened these tensions. In 1924, for example, workers of

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Kashmir's clerical establishment was ill-poised to take advantage of these conditions to expand its influence. Walter Lawrence, a British colonial administrator who was appointed to bring about major administrative changes at the end of the nineteenth century, observed that the Kashmir valley's Sunni-Muslim majority

> do not strike me as zealous or earnest in the profession of their faith and, except in their quarrels with the Shiahs [Shi'a], they seem free from all forms of fanaticism. It is true that they observe very strictly the fast of Ramzan, but they do not keep Friday as a day of rest and very few Kashmiris make the pilgrimage to Mecca, though the journey is now easy and does not cost more than Rs. 340. In 1892, twenty-one Kashmiris went to Mecca and this was an unusually large number. I do not base my ideas as to the laxness of Kashmiris in religious duties merely on my own observations. Holy men from Arabia have spoken to me with contempt of the feeble flame of Islam which burns in Kashmir and the local Mullahs talk with indignation of the apathy of the people. (1996, 285)

Dogra Jammu and Kashmir, though its ruling dynasty drew its legitimacy from Hinduism, gave institutional form to the practice of Islam. State-appointed clerics regulated everything from marriage to inheritance rights. However, their power was at best peripheral to the political life of the community. Lawrence found that "the leading Mullahs of the city, and occasionally a Mullah in the villages, exert some influence, but as a rule the ordinary Mullah is a man of no power" (1996, 291). He wrote:

> In the villages the Mullah acts as a Mufti [magistrate] in small cases and gives a decree. Thus the village Mullah can decide petty questions relating to the lawfulness of food and sometimes, if he is a man of some learning, he will give a decree regarding the division of land between members of a family. I have often read decrees given by the city Kazis [judges]. In one case which came before me the plaintiff produced one for possession of land. The defendant produced another for the possession of the same land, granted by the same Kazi. There was nothing strange in this, as the Kazi hears no evidence. He merely listens to the statement of his client and assuming that the statement is correct he gives his opinion. (1996, 296)

Lawrence offered two explanations for the marginal influence of the clerical establishment. First, he noted, peasant shrines built around syncretic practices, such as

the veneration of holy relics and the worship of saints, had an influence "far greater than that exercised by mullahs in the mosque" (287). Second, he bluntly recorded that "the Mullah is ordinarily a man of no learning. In the *Lal Tahsil*, not one of the Mullahs can write" (290). People who could write—Indians trained in the new universities and colleges that had sprung up under imperial rule—thus emerged as leaders of the new mass politics in Kashmir.

By the time of the silk factory strike, the Dogra *durbar* (a court held by an Indian Prince) was under siege from this new class. Among its leading figures was Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, the son of a peasant family who would have a central role in shaping Jammu and Kashmir's political future. Like many of the new class of educated young men emerging from Jammu and Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah turned to Lahore for an education. He was influenced there by both secular-nationalist ideas and religious revivalism. Jammu and Kashmir, with its Hindu ruler and a predominantly Muslim population, was a place, historian Mridu Rai has noted, where "religion and politics became inextricably intertwined" (Rai 2004, 16–17).

Just before the silk factory strike, a group of Muslim clerical and business leaders submitted a memorandum that charged the Dogra monarchy with systematically excluding Muslims from governance and with obstructing their practice of their faith. It has been pointed out that Memorialists, as the authors of the 1924 memorandum were known, had overstated their case: Muslims did indeed occupy some positions of considerable influence, both in the coercive apparatus of the Dogra state and in its administrative organs, and there had been a considerable growth in the educational facilities available to them (Om 1982, 48, 107–8). Nonetheless, the fact remains that the traditional feudal elites, both Hindu and Muslim in the main the Hindu Pandit community but also some Rajput-caste notables of Jammu, were grossly overrepresented.

Abdullah, like many of his class and generation, cut his political teeth working on the Memorialist agenda. Among the most important of these was the Young Men's Muslim Association. Backed both by the new educated class and by influential clerics such as the Srinagar Mirwaiz Maulvi Mohammad Yusaf Shah, the Young Men's Association consisted of two major tendencies. One, represented by Abdullah, sought to use democratic and constitutional means to pressure the monarchy to bring about reforms for the advancement of Muslims. A minority, led by Ghulam Nabi Gilkar, sought to lead a revolution against Dogra rule intended to lead to the installation of a Muslim Sultan. In April 1931 an incident occurred that tipped the balance of power among the Young Men's Muslim Association in favor of the religious right. During Eid prayers that month, a Hindu police official in Jammu was alleged to have desecrated a copy of the Qu'ran. Gilkar pushed Abdullah to deliver a speech from a Srinagar mosque condemning the incident—after which violence broke out.

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Religion, it thus became clear to the new leadership, could be a powerful tool for mobilization. In June 1931 the Young Men's Muslim Association met to elect its leaders. Toward the end of the meeting, Abdul Qadeer Ghazi Khan, a member of a clerical family with long-standing links to the Islamist ideologue Jamal-ud-Din Afghani Astarabadi, delivered a speech demanding an uprising against Hari Singh. Astarabadi had repeatedly called for jihad, which would free the world from British imperial rule; Khan hoped to bring about something of the kind within Jammu and Kashmir. Incarcerated for his seditious speech, Khan became a focal point for anti-Dogra sentiment in the Kashmir valley. Abdullah claimed that the cleric was being persecuted "for the cause of Islam and for the Muslim masses," and called for his supporters to be "prepared to be sacrificed for the sake of Islam" (Hassnain 1988, 45). On the day of Khan's trial, July 13, 1931, a fight broke out between protestors and policemen outside Srinagar's jail. What started as a minor scuffle rapidly escalated, and twenty-eight protestors were killed in the showdown that followed.

For the first time, events in Jammu and Kashmir generated a major pan-India political response. Muslim leaders from across India met at Shimla to express their outrage at the jail massacre and decided to call for a day of action against the monarchy. On September 22, the day chosen for this protest, thousands of people gathered at the Jamia Masjid in downtown Srinagar demanding the release of Sheikh Abdullah and Mufti Jalal-ud-Din, who had been incarcerated for their role in the violence that followed Khan's trial. Another massacre followed. As the protestors shouted "Islam zindabad [long live Islam]," the Maharaja's troops opened fire, killing at least twenty-five people (Hassnain 1988, 58).

After this second massacre, the Islamist character of the protest sharpened. Rioting directed at Hindu-owned businesses in urban Kashmir grew in scale.[6] Mirwaiz Yusaf Shah called for a jihad, leading thousands of his supporters to mass at the shrine of Dastagir Sahib in Srinagar armed with knives, swords, and guns (Hassnain 1988, 58). Soon, however, it became clear that the cleric had no desire to allow events to spiral out of hand. Using the services of several Muslim notables loyal to the throne, the monarch was able to defuse this second phase of protests and arrive at an accommodation with the Srinagar clerical establishment.

By September 1931 Hari Singh had succeeded in strengthening his accommodation with Yusaf Shah. It marked the end of the alliance between new and old elites in Kashmir. Abdullah and his supporters now formed a new organization, the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference. Yusaf Shah regularly charged this organization with being a front for the Ahmadiyya sect, deemed heretic by orthodox Sunni Muslims. Abdullah in turn claimed that the cleric had sold out to the Dogra monarchy.

Over the coming decade, the distance between the two groups steadily expanded. Abdullah's linkages with the all-India anti-imperial movement grew

steadily, as did his attraction to the socialist ideas of the man who would become India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. In June 1939 Sheikh Abdullah changed the name of the Muslim Conference, dropping the word that denoted its communal affiliation. It was now called the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, signaling its commitment to represent all of the peoples of the state, irrespective of their faith. Over the next six years, the National Conference would increasingly align itself with the Indian National Congress. Abdullah's opponents, by contrast, would turn to the Muslim League, which was fighting for the creation of the state of Pakistan.

If the first decades of the twentieth century saw the emergence of new kinds of politics, they also witnessed the birth of a new form of faith. One major development was the arrival in Kashmir of the Jamaat Ahl-e-Hadis, a religious order that was created by followers of Sayyid Ahmad of Rai Bareilly. Ahmad died at Balakote in 1831, in what is present-day Pakistan-administered Kashmir, while waging an unsuccessful jihad against Maharaja Ranjit Singh's kingdom—a campaign that, the historian Ayesha Jalal has reminded us, still fires the imagination of numbers of Muslims in South Asia.[7]

Ahl-e-Hadith ideologues such as the clerics Siddiq Hasan Khan, Sanaullah Amritsari, and Nazir Husain rejected the accommodation Islam in India had made with its milieu. Muslims, they argued, must purge their practice of their faith of impious borrowings from Hinduism and return to the Qur'an and the Hadith—or traditions of the Prophet. Ahl-e-Hadith ideologues also called on Muslims to reject the four major schools of Islamic jurisprudence and instead model themselves on the companions of the Prophet.

Sayyed Hussain Shah Batku, a Delhi seminary student who carried the Ahl-e-Hadith message to Kashmir in 1925, denounced key practices of mainstream Islam in the state, such as the worship of shrines and veneration of relics. Along with his followers Anwar Shah Shopiani, Ghulam Nabi Mubaraki, and Sabzar Khan, Batku attacked traditionalists for following practices tainted by their Hindu heritage, such as the recitation of litanies before Namaaz. Not surprisingly, Batku came under sustained attack from traditionalist clerics who charged him with being an apostate and an infidel. The head priest of one of Kashmir's most revered shrines, the Khanqah-i-Maula, declared the Ahl-e-Hadith the *Dajjal*—or devil incarnate. Ahl-e-Hadith proselytizers faced a social boycott and were turned out of their mosques and neighborhoods. On some occasions, they faced violence (Wani 1997, 35–37).

Baktu's response was to cast himself as a defender of the faith, railing against heterodox Muslim sects such as the Ahmadis and the Shi'a, Hindu revivalists, and Christian missionaries, all of whom he claimed were working to expel Islam from Kashmir. Ahl-e Hadith clerics hit out at traditional Kashmiri mosques, say-

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Within years of its arrival, the impact of the Ahl-e-Hadith was evident. Lawrence noted that "Wahabbi doctrines" had registered in the south Kashmir town of Shopian, where some two hundred families accepted the new religion. He noted that practitioners of peasant religion "declare that Wahabbi ideas are gaining ground" (Lawrence 1996, 285). However, he also noted the existence of counter-Salafi mobilization. "One idea commonly attributed by the orthodox Kashmiris to the Wahhabis," he wrote, "is that they deny the individual and exclusive right of a husband in his wife" (285). Despite its limited popular reach, the Ahl-e-Hadith had enormous ideological influence. As historian Chitralekha Zutshi has pointed out in her work, the "influence of the Ahl-e-Hadith on the conflicts over Kashmiri identities cannot be overemphasised" (Zutshi 2004, 150). Among other things, Yusaf Shah was thought to be a supporter of the Ahl-e-Hadith—thus giving the neoconservative religious school a point from which to influence mainstream Islam in Kashmir (ibid.). But while religion—in particular, neoconservative Islam—would play a critical role in shaping Jammu and Kashmir's ideological culture, it would be politicians, not clerics, who shaped the course of history.

THE HAZRATBAL CRISIS

The Hazratbal mosque stands gleaming on the east bank of the Dal Lake in Srinagar. In the course of Jammu and Kashmir's freedom movement, the shrine was appropriated by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah—the Sher-i-Kashmir, or Lion of Kashmir, to his followers—as a counterweight to the Jamia Masjid mosque commanded by the cleric Mirwaiz Mohammad Farooq and his followers, the Bakras—so named for their goat-like long beards. It was home to perhaps the most revered holy relic in Jammu and Kashmir, the *moe-e-muqaddas*, a hair reputed to have belonged to the beard of the Prophet Mohammad. On December 27, 1963, the relic mysteriously disappeared from the shrine, provoking the first major crisis in Jammu and Kashmir since Pakistani irregulars had attacked it in 1947.

For the next seven days, a cross-party alliance of opposition figures known as the Action Committee emerged as the de facto administration of Jammu and Kashmir. Chaired by Maulana Mohammad Sayeed Masoodi, the Action Committee consisted both of National Conference figures, notably Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah's son, Farooq Abdullah—later chief minister—and also Islamists such as Mirwaiz Mohammad Farooq. Mobs attacked properties owned by the family of the New Delhi–backed chief minister, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad. Even as the state government retreated behind well-guarded doors, the Action

Committee ran "an unauthorized parallel administration, controlling traffic prices and commerce" (Singh 1994, 265).

Just as suddenly as it disappeared, the *moe-e-muqaddas* was discovered by Indian investigators and restored to the shrine. B. N. Mullik, then-head of India's domestic covert intelligence service, has provided one of the few detailed accounts of the disappearance of the *moe-e-muqaddas* and its mysterious reappearance. Even the spymaster, however, shied away from spelling out the details (Mullik 1971, 87). One popular but empirically unfounded version of events is that the disappearance was engineered by Bakshi himself. The chief minister had resigned from office that October as part of a reorganization of the party apparatus, to be replaced by a relative lightweight, Khwaja Shamsuddin. Thirty-eight charges of corruption were eventually brought against Bakshi by a judicial investigator, of which fifteen were proven (Schofield 2003, 97). In the popular rendition of events, Bakshi hoped to use the chaos to establish his indispensability to the Indian state. There are several other anecdotal variations on this theme, none supported by any actual evidence.

One consequence of the cloak-and-dagger retrieval of the *moe-e-muqaddas* was that few on the streets of Srinagar were at first willing to believe that the hair authorities had produced was in fact the genuine relic. Agitators demanded that a *deedar*, a special exhibition of the relic sanctioned by custom, be held to establish its authenticity. Nehru, by senior Indian bureaucrat Y. D. Gundevia's account, personally interceded and overrode senior officials in the Union Ministry of Home Affairs who opposed the holding of a *deedar*. Maulana Masoodi, a prominent cleric, declared the relic to be genuine at the *deedar*, defusing the crisis. Things could well have gone the other way, Gundevia recalled: "As we went back to our aircraft to fly back to Delhi that afternoon, after a long silence [Nehru's Cabinet colleague and successor as Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur] Shastriji said to me, half musing to himself: 'Gundevia, what would have happened if the Maulana Saheb had declared, at that moment, that the *bal* [hair] wasn't genuine?' 'Don't think of it, for God's sake,' I said, 'it is all over!'" (Gundevia 1974, 1–82).

Barring this exercise of clerical authority, Islamic religious figures were to have no real role in the management of the Hazratbal crisis. Instead, political actors in New Delhi and Jammu and Kashmir now began to work to address the causes of the conflagration.

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru understood that the crisis compelled him to "reconsider the basic premise and structure of the Kashmir policy" the Indian state had so far pursued (Behera 2000, 116). At an emergency subcommittee meeting of India's cabinet, he asserted that "if Kashmir is so destabilized that an ordinary incident of the theft of a relic provokes the people to the extent of trying to overthrow the government, it is time to adopt a new approach and to bring about a revolutionary change in our viewpoint" (Abdullah and Singh 1993, 147).

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Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq, a lieutenant of Bakshi who had broken ranks with the chief minister shared this assessment. One of the beliefs which had underpinned Indian policy, he argued, "is that the influence of Pakistan on the Kashmiri Muslims is fairly wide and firmly rooted" (Singh 1982, 267–68). From this assumption the government had developed "a primordial fear of the people." The *moe-e-muqaddas* agitation had torn apart the assumption that New Delhi could rule through "interested and self-seeking individuals."

One important outcome of the crisis was that it led New Delhi to release Sheikh Abdullah from jail. Abdullah had been arrested on charges of conspiring against the Indian state a decade earlier. However, Nehru now "realized that Sheikh Abdullah remained an important political force . . . [and that] it was necessary to release him to restore public confidence and reach a political accord" (Behera 2000, 116). Sadiq, who was chosen to succeed the effete Shamsuddin as chief minister in the wake of the crisis, supported this line of action, which he saw as part of a general "policy of liberalisation" (Bazaz 1978, 18).

Nehru, by some accounts, appears never to have been entirely convinced of the conspiracy charges in the first place, and saw Abdullah's release as the symbolic righting of an historic wrong. Gundevia has described the arrest and prosecution as a "coup," saying Nehru was never "convinced, at any stage, that Sheikh Abdullah was a communalist and was conspiring against India in league with the pro-Pakistan elements in Kashmir. . . . When I had the privilege of working very close to him, as Commonwealth Secretary and, later, as Foreign Secretary, I never heard Jawaharlal Nehru utter one unkind word against Sheikh, not to me and not in my hearing to anyone else," Gundevia recorded. He asserted that Nehru "never once maligned Sheikh Abdullah and never said one word against him" (Gundevia 1974, 118).

On April 8, 1964, Sheikh Abdullah became a free man. The Kashmir conspiracy case was withdrawn.[8] The prolonged delays had become an embarrassment; one mainstream Indian newspaper had even proclaimed that while "Sheikh Abdullah [was] on trial, India [was] in the Dock" (Abdullah and Singh 1993, 144). In a classified note, Indian police official Surendra Nath recorded that "the case was withdrawn by the Government as a measure of normalisation and liberalisation of the State['s] politics. It was hoped that this gesture would divert the attention and energy of a misguided section of people from clandestine and subversive activity to healthy political channels."[9]

In some senses, the *moe-e-muqaddas* crisis was just a metaphor for a larger crisis within Jammu and Kashmir politics. Its short-term resolution involved religious leaders, notably in the legitimization of the restored relic. However, the crisis itself was born of specific political conditions. Indian policymakers came to understand at an early stage that its resolution would require political action, in this case the release of Sheikh Abdullah and, eventually, his return to power.

THE *BOOK OF KNOWLEDGE* CRISIS

Early in the 1970s India appeared to have settled the crisis in Jammu and Kashmir in its favor, once and for all. Pakistan had been sundered in two in 1971, its eastern wing having become the new nation-state of Bangladesh. If the war that gave birth to Bangladesh had made clear the decisive superiority of Indian arms, the Bengali-nationalist uprising that proceeded it tore apart Pakistan's foundational principle, that South Asia's Muslims were a nation.

Soon after the war, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah set about finalizing the terms of Jammu and Kashmir's accession to India. Few doubted that the outcome of their talks would favor India. It was not a prospect that motivated the religious right in Jammu and Kashmir.

In May 1973 a student in Anantnag was leafing through an old encyclopedia, Arthur Mee's *Book of Knowledge*, stored in the local college's library. He was appalled by one image he saw—a picture of the Archangel Gabriel dictating the text of the Qur'an to Mohammad. When clerics in Anantnag learned of the picture, it was denounced as blasphemous on the grounds that Islam prohibits the representation of the Prophet through graven images. College students in Anantnag went on strike, and the protests soon spread to Srinagar. Protestors demanded that the author of the encyclopedia be hanged—"a vain demand," Katherine Frank wryly noted, "since Arthur Mee had died in England in 1943" (Frank 2002, 365). The government of India banned sales of the encyclopedia, again a futile gesture, since it was no longer in print. However, protests continued, and the police eventually had to use fire to disperse violent crowds. At least four people died in the firing.

How does one account for the extraordinary outrage provoked by the *Book of Knowledge*? Some suspicion has always existed that the "discovery" of the encyclopedia cannot have been pure chance, for it had been in the town for decades, first in the collection of a school run by Christian missionaries and then at the Degree College's library. Whatever the truth, the fact is that the *Book of Knowledge* crisis must be read against a specific political circumstance: the steady growth of the Jamaat-e-Islami from the 1950s onward. Soon after independence, Yoginder Sikand has pointed out, the Jamaat-e-Islami had set up a wide network of schools to counteract what it believed was "an Indian onslaught in the cultural sphere" that caused "many young Kashmiris . . . to lose their Islamic moorings" (Sikand 2002, 733).

Jamaat schools—like its industrial-scale production of propagandistic literature—also represented a political project. Sikand cites one insider as suggesting that the schools were "set up in order to lead a silent revolution, to keep alive the memory of Kashmiri independence and of India's brutal occupation of the state." Moreover:

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> It was widely believed in JIJK [Jamaat-e-Islami] circles that a carefully planned Indian conspiracy was at work to destroy the Islamic identity of the Kashmiris, through Hinduizing the school syllabus and spreading immorality and vice among the youth. It was alleged that the government of India had dispatched a team to Andalusia, headed by the Kashmiri Pandit [politician] D. P. Dhar, to investigate how Islam was driven out of Spain and to suggest measures as to how the Spanish experiment could be repeated in Kashmir, too. Faced with what it saw as these menacing threats, the JIJK felt the compelling need for a comprehensive educational system of its own to save the Kashmiri Muslim youth from Indian cultural imperialism. (Sikand 2002, 733–34)

No hard evidence exists that Jamaat cadre spearheaded the *Book of Knowledge* riots: investigation records maintained by the Jammu and Kashmir police for this period are sketchy at best. For policymakers in both New Delhi and Srinagar, the message of the *Book of Knowledge* riots would have been unmistakable: while the war of 1971 may have proved the undoing of Pakistan, anti-India forces within Jammu and Kashmir were far from spent. As during the Hazratbal crisis, Islamists had demonstrated their ideological authority as well as the existence of an urban constituency who believed that their faith was under attack in India. All through 1974 the point was hammered home as cadre loyal to the Srinagar-based cleric Mirwaiz Mohammad Farooq clashed with workers of Sheikh Abdullah's Plebiscite Front rivals, claiming that their rival was on the edge of betraying Kashmir's claims to nationhood (Schofield 2003, 125).

Amid this street drama, Indira Gandhi began a series of closed-doors meetings with Abdullah in an effort to marginalize the Mirwaiz and the Jamaat-e-Islami. Her principal adviser on Jammu and Kashmir, G. Parthasarathi, held a parallel series of discussions with Abdullah's key lieutenant, Mirza Afzal Beg. Sheikh Abdullah pushed hard for fresh elections to be held in Jammu and Kashmir, hoping that a poll victory would enhance his bargaining position. Indira Gandhi would have none of it but offered him the chief minister's position in place of Syed Mir Qasim, who served as chief minister from 1971–75 (Frank 2002, 366). Sheikh Abdullah took the bait. Qasim resigned on February 23, 1975. The next day Indira Gandhi made public the six-point formula that Beg and Parthasarathi had signed in secrecy four months earlier.

The Beg-Parthasarathi Agreement, as it came to be known, affirmed that New Delhi would "continue to have power to make laws relating to the prevention of activities directed towards disclaiming, questioning or disrupting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India or bringing about cession of a part of the territory of India or secession of a part of the territory of India from the Union." While such laws already existed, the agreement represented a commitment by

Sheikh Abdullah that he would no longer seek independence. The Delhi Agreement went on to assert that Jammu and Kashmir was "a constituent unit of the Union of India." This, again, was not a novel formula; Sheikh Abdullah had said as much on several occasions. It did, however, mark a formal renunciation of the Plebiscite Front's raison d'être and paved the way for its return to mainstream politics. Critically, the Delhi Agreement mandated that "provisions of the Constitution of India already applied to the state of Jammu and Kashmir without adaptation or modification are unalterable" (Beg and Parthasarathi 1974).

In effect, this meant that Sheikh Abdullah concurred with the restructuring of Jammu and Kashmir's relationship with India, much of which had been carried out while he was in jail. No agreement could be arrived at on the sixth issue before Beg and Parthasarathi, Sheikh Abdullah's demand that the governor and chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir be called its sadr-e-riyasat and wazir-e-azam, or president and prime minister, as had been the situation prior to 1965. It was therefore "remitted to the Principals" and was never to be discussed again until the late 1990s.

From 1975 to 1977 Indira Gandhi's regime suspended India's democratic institutions and engaged in a brutal crackdown against political opponents (Hart 1976). Although the emergency had nothing to do with Jammu and Kashmir, the Jamaat-e-Islami had been proscribed along with several other communal organizations of both the Hindu and Islamist right. Much of the organization's leadership was jailed, and its publications were suppressed. As such, the Jamaat and its clerical allies had little opportunity to protest the Abdullah–Indira Gandhi deal. Not surprisingly, Indira Gandhi's crackdown on the Jamaat-e-Islami had Sheikh Abdullah's enthusiastic endorsement. In one speech he had described the Islamist organization's schools as "the real source for spreading communal poison" (Behera 2000, 143). Some 125 Jamaat-run schools, with more than 550 teachers and 25,000 students, were banned. So were another 1,000 evening schools run by the organization which reached out to an estimated 50,000 boys and girls (Sikand 2002, 736).

In March 1977, however, Indira Gandhi withdrew the emergency and called general elections. She was defeated. The coming to power of the Janata Party, a coalition spanning socialists, centrists, and Hindu chauvinists, provoked a crisis within the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly, and elections in the state had to be called early.

Having emerged more or less unscathed from the emergency, and wearing the halo of political martyrdom, the Jamaat-e-Islami sought to capitalize on the new situation. It allied itself with the Janata Party both at the national level and in Jammu and Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah responded to the threat with unconcealed appeals to communal sentiment. A vote for the Jamaat-e-Islami, Sheikh Abdullah claimed, was a vote for the Jana Sangh, a Hindu chauvinist constituent of

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the Janata Party whose "hands were still red with the blood of Muslims" (Behera 2000, 143). Islam, National Conference leaders insisted, would be in danger if the Jamaat-Janata alliance took power. Beg went one step further and appropriated the pro-Pakistan position traditionally taken by Mirwaiz Farooq. At rally after rally, he produced a green handkerchief with Pakistani rock-salt—as opposed to Indian sea-salt—wrapped in it, signaling support for that country to his audience (Schofield 2003, 125). National Conference cadre administered oaths on the Qur'an to potential voters, through which they pledged their commitment to the party. Clerics were imported from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar to campaign in Muslim-majority areas of Jammu. Sheikh Abdullah, wary of the consequences of pushing New Delhi too hard, was carefully to assert that "Kashmir was a part of India and Kashmiris were Indians," but added that "if we are not assured of a place of honour and dignity in India, we shall not hesitate to secede" (Behera 2000, 140).

Sheikh Abdullah's incendiary campaign paid off: the National Conference won forty-seven of seventy-five seats in the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly, a decisive majority. Moreover, the National Conference secured more than 46 percent of the popular vote, an exceptionally high proportion in Indian elections. By contrast, the Jamaat-e-Islami could secure just one of the nineteen seats it contested and received only 3.59 percent of the statewide vote (Election Commission of India, n.d.). This was a poorer performance than even the fledgling Janata Party, which picked up thirteen seats and secured 23.7 percent of the popular vote. However, Sheikh Abdullah's victory had come at a price. His aggressive use of Islamist themes and images during the campaign had cost him support in Jammu, particularly among Hindus. Just one of the seven seats the National Conference picked up in Jammu, that of Ramban, had a Hindu majority (ibid.). In effect, the National Conference had abandoned its historic project of building itself into a spokesperson for the entire state and had retreated instead to its heartland in the valley. More importantly, the party had opened the gates for the large-scale use of religion in mass politics, a weapon that, in time, others would also learn to use.

For the moment, however, Sheikh Abdullah's rule seemed unshakable. Despite the anger of Islamists such as Mohammad Farooq and the despair of figures such as Altaf Khan, Sheikh Abdullah's return to political center stage put an end to visible anti-India protest. While the Sher-i-Kashmir himself was to regret his capitulation to New Delhi and his decision to ally with the congress, on the substance of the agreement there could be no withdrawal (Schofield 2003, 122). Until Sheikh Abdullah's death in 1982, the secessionists would continue to stage an unhappy retreat.

As with the Hazratbal riots, the *Book of Knowledge* crisis was also centered on a religious theme. However, both its genesis and its resolution were political. Clerics played some role in precipitating the early violence that characterized the movement, but the principal actors who gave it shape and content—Indira

Gandhi, Sheikh Abdullah, and his Jamaat-e-Islami opponents—were all political groupings. In the short term, the crisis was resolved by the use of the state's coercive instruments, specifically the use of lethal force against rioters. In the long term, though, New Delhi made concessions to a political ally in Kashmir, which it empowered against its Islamist opponents.

In both of the crises we have examined so far, Islam in the Kashmir valley was the sole religious force driving major political mobilizations. We shall now turn to a third crisis, in which the Jammu region's Hindus were pitted against the Kashmir valley's Muslims, to see if even this confrontational religious dynamic gave religious leaders a significant role in politics.

KASHMIR'S "SHRINE WAR"

Pakistani flags fluttered from the top of the clock tower in Srinagar's Lal Chowk on India's independence day in 2008. In the worst years of the two-decade-long Pakistan-backed jihad, Indian forces in Srinagar had ensured the national flag flew from Lal Chowk each independence day. As usual, Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel hoisted the Indian flag on the clock tower on the morning of August 15. Later that afternoon, though, Islamist protestors marched on Lal Chowk. With strict orders not to fire on unarmed protestors, and without backup to block the march, CRPF personnel brought down the Indian flag and withdrew (Ghosh 2008). Elsewhere in Srinagar, mobs destroyed police and CRPF posts, attacked police stations, and burned down the offices of pro-India politicians (Irfan 2008a). Six weeks of protests had succeeded in bringing about what a two-decade jihad in Jammu and Kashmir had not achieved. How did this come about, and who were the actors who achieved it?

If nothing else, the genesis of the shrine-land war demonstrates that seismic consequences can result from the smallest of causes. In the summer of 2004 Jammu and Kashmir's chief minister, Mufti Mohammad Saeed, and its federally appointed governor, S. K. Sinha, locked horns over the management of the Amarnath Yatra—an annual pilgrimage to a cave-temple in the mountains above the town of Pahalgam. Saeed shot down Sinha's decision to extend the pilgrimage to eight weeks from four. Five Hindu cabinet ministers from the Jammu region—all members of Saeed's coalition partners, the congress—submitted their resignations in protest (Puri 2005).

Amid this feud, the Jammu and Kashmir High Court ordered the government to give the Shri Amarnath Shrine Board (SASB), which manages the pilgrimage, the right to use forestland to provide shelter and sanitation for pilgrims. It took another two years of legal wrangling, though, before the SASB was finally given permission for "raising pre-fabricated structures only for camping purposes of pilgrims without going in for construction of permanent structures." The

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Islamist patriarch Syed Ali Shah Geelani of the hardline Tehreek-i-Hurriyat, though, mobilized against the order, claiming it was part of a conspiracy to settle Hindus in the region. At one press conference, he warned that Sinha had been working "on an agenda of changing the demography of the state." He warned, "I caution my nation that if we don't wake up in time, India and its stooges will succeed and we will be displaced" (Majid 2008). Later he asserted that the land-use rights granted to the SASB were part of a covert enterprise code-named Operation Yatra, which was "devised on the lines of Israel's strategy of settlement in Palestine" (Irfan 2008b). The SASB, he went on, was "pursuing the similar method to settle Hindus here." He was later to hold out dark hints that a genocide of Kashmiri Muslims, modeled on the Partition of India pogroms, was being planned (Fayyaz 2008a).

Geelani's position stemmed from his long-standing belief that Islam and Hinduism were locked in an irreducible civilizational opposition. At an October 26 rally in Srinagar, Geelani had made clear this position, saying that "the people of state should, as their religious duty, raise voice against India's aggression." This duty, he argued, stemmed from the fact that to "practice Islam completely under the subjugation of India is impossible because human beings in practice worship those whose rules they abide by" (Dar 2007). Geelani had long located the legitimacy of the secessionist movement in Jammu and Kashmir in the supposed oppositional dualities of Hindus and Muslims. In matters of faith, belief, and customs, he argued in his prison diaries, Hindus and Muslims are set irrevocably apart because they are divided by such matters as food, clothing, and lifestyles. He described it as being as difficult for Muslims to live in a Hindu milieu as "for a fish to stay alive in a desert." Muslims, he argued, cannot live harmoniously with a Hindu majority without their own religion and traditions coming under a grave threat, one major factor being Hinduism's capacity to assimilate other religions. For Islam to be preserved and promoted in Kashmir, it is necessary for it to be separated from India (Sikand 1998).

Matters came to a head when Saeed's People's Democratic Party (PDP), whose ministers had supported the land-use orders in the state cabinet, threw their weight behind Islamist calls for them to be revoked. PDP leaders were driven by the fact that a significant part of their constituency was affiliated with Kashmir's religious right. However, their congress coalition partners were unable to meet their demand, afraid it would undermine their position among their core constituency of Jammu Hindus. Sinha's successor as governor, N. N. Vohra, in his capacity as head of the shrine board, attempted to resolve the stalemate. He offered to surrender the land-use rights if the state government itself would provide all facilities to pilgrims, as it had been doing since 1979. Hoping to avert a

showdown with the PDP, Chief Minister Ghulam Nabi Azad agreed. Later, under pressure from the party's central leadership in New Delhi to save the congress's alliance with the PDP, Azad revoked the land-use order altogether. However, the PDP pulled out of government days before a deadline it had set to resolve the crisis (Dogra 2008).

Now a second phase of the crisis began as Hindu chauvinist groups in Jammu began an agitation demanding the land back. Elements among them threatened to blockade traffic to Kashmir. It is unclear that there was, in fact, a significant blockade.[10] But the threat itself provided leverage to Geelani, and Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, a Srinagar-based cleric who chairs the rival All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC).

Acting on a call from the Pakistan-based United Jihad Council, both groups organized a march across the Line of Control, which divides Indian-administered and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, saying the economic blockade necessitated the opening of traffic from Srinagar to Muzaffarabad.[11] India had, in fact, been calling for free trade along the route, a demand Pakistan had rejected. However, the defiance of the Line of Control was an act the state simply could not countenance. To no one's surprise, force was used to stop the marchers: three people were killed, including a mid-ranking APHC leader. More than twenty other people died in subsequent clashes between police or soldiers and the protestors, often a consequence of attacks on the bunkers of police and army personnel by enraged mobs (Fayyaz 2008b).

Ever since 2002, when levels of jihadist violence in Jammu and Kashmir began to decline, Indian policymakers had assumed that the anti-India movement in the region would also slowly disappear. It was a seismic error of judgment. Faith and xenophobia became the twin poles of a long-running and powerful effective Islamist campaign that began in 2005, after it became evident to Islamists that the jihad on which their political position had been predicated was in terminal decline. Economic change and the social dislocation it had brought about provided the firmament for their revival. Islamists began to make the wider case that the secularization of culture in Kashmir—in turn the consequence of economic growth—constituted a civilizational threat.

Later Islamists leveraged the uncovering of a prostitution racket in Srinagar to argue that secularism and modernity were responsible for and an Indian conspiracy to undermine Jammu and Kashmir's Islamic character. Pro-Islamist scholar Hameeda Nayeem even claimed the scandal pointed "unequivocally towards a policy-based state patronage [of prostitution]" (Nayeem 2006). Significantly, the prostitution protests saw the first large-scale Islamist mob violence that went unchecked by the state. Geelani's supporters were allowed to gather at the home of alleged Srinagar prostitution-ring madam Sabina Bulla and raze the

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United Jihad Council, both groups
which divides Indian-administered
ie economic blockade necessitated
ffarabad.[11] India had, in fact, been
d Pakistan had rejected. However,
the state simply could not counte-
op the marchers: three people were
r. More than twenty other people
soldiers and the protestors, often a
ce and army personnel by enraged

violence in Jammu and Kashmir
med that the anti-India movement
s a seismic error of judgment. Faith
ng-running and powerful effective
t became evident to Islamists that
d been predicated was in terminal
ocation it had brought about pro-
began to make the wider case that
turn the consequence of economic

of a prostitution racket in Srina-
vere responsible for and an Indian
ir's Islamic character. Pro-Islamist
e scandal pointed "unequivocally
stitution]" (Nayeem 2006). Signifi-
large-scale Islamist mob violence
pporters were allowed to gather at
; madam Sabina Bulla and raze the

home to the ground. Mobs also attacked the homes of politicians charged with having used her services (Swami 2008e).

In the summer of 2007, the rape and murder of north Kashmir teenager Tabinda Gani was used to initiate a xenophobic campaign against the presence of migrant workers in the state. Addressing a June 24, 2007, rally at the town of Langate, Geelani said that "hundreds of thousands of non-state subjects had been pushed into Kashmir under a long-term plan to crush the Kashmiris."[12] He claimed that "the majority of these non-state subjects are professional criminals and should be driven out of Kashmir in a civilised way." His political ally, Hilal War, claimed that migrant workers' slums were "centres of all kinds of illegal business."[13] Language such as this inspired a serious of terrorist attacks on migrants, the last of which was the bombing of a bus carrying workers from Srinagar just as the shrine board protests began (Swami 2008e).

From these events Islamists learned that the objective conditions existed for xenophobic politics to succeed. Even on the eve of the shrine board protests, Islamists mobilized against a career counselor who, they claimed, had been dispatched to Srinagar schools to seduce students into a career of vice. An Anantnag schoolteacher also came under attack after a video surfaced showing that a group of his students had danced to pop film music on a holiday in Anantnag (Swami 2008d).

Part of the reason for Geelani's success was the absence of secular voices—either in political life or among public intellectuals—to challenge his contentions. No political group condemned his actions. Indeed, elements in the congress made opportunistic use of his mobilization. The PDP politicians, too, sought to appropriate Geelani's rhetoric in an effort to draw the electoral endorsement of his supporters. So, too, did the National Conference. All parties, as events have shown, miscalculated, to be swept away by the Islamist tide they failed to stem when it was just a trickle.

Across the Pir Panjal Mountains in Jammu, a near-identical chauvinist mobilization was under way—one that was even more invisible to analysts and the government than its Islamist counterpart. In the build-up to the 2002 elections, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) found itself discredited by its failure to contain terrorism. Much of the Hindutva movement's cadre turned to a new grouping, the Jammu State Morcha (JSM). JSM leaders wanted a new, Hindu-majority state carved out of Jammu and Kashmir. In the end, both the JSM and the BJP were wiped out in the elections, winning just one seat each.

A new generation of Hindutva leaders then took control of Hindu neoconservative politics in Jammu. Soon after the congress–PDP government came to power, this new Hindutva leadership unleashed its first mass mobilizations. PDP leader and former chief minister Mufti Mohammad Saeed's calls for demilitarization

and self-rule, Hindutva leaders claimed, pointing to the expulsion of Pandits from Kashmir at the outset of the jihad, proved that Saeed was now preparing the ground for the expulsion of Hindus—and Hinduism—from Jammu.

From 2003 Hindutva groups sought to forge these anxieties into a concrete political mobilization around the issue of cattle slaughter. Hindutva cadre would interdict trucks carrying cattle and use their capture to stage protests. It was not as if the anti-cow-slaughter movement had stumbled on a great secret. For decades, cow-owning farmers—generally Hindus—had sold to traders from Punjab and Rajasthan old livestock that no longer earned them an income. In turn, the traders sold their herds to cattle traffickers on India's eastern border, who fed the demand for meat among the poor of Bangladesh. But Hindutva groups understood that the cow was a potent—and politically profitable—metaphor. In December 2007, for example, Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP, a Hindu organization) and Bajrang Dal cadre organized large-scale protests against the reported sacrificial slaughter of cows at the villages of Bali Charna, in the Satwari area of Jammu, and Chilog, near Kathua District's Bani town.[14] Riots had also taken place in the villages around Jammu's Pargwal area in March 2005, after Hindutva activists made bizarre claims that a cow had been raped.[15]

It should be noted, however, that religious leaders had a peripheral role in these mobilizations. For example, south Kashmir-based Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadis neofundamentalist activist Maqbool Akhrani mobilized against migrant workers in 2006; the workers were part of a campaign by India's intelligence services to "divert attention from real issues and that is why new things like country made liquor are pushed into the valley" (Bhat 2006). As noted earlier, similar xenophobic claims informed the shrine war. However, Akhrani and the Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadis, although they participated in the anti-shrine-land mobilization, were at best marginal to its course. Indeed, senior Ahl-e-Hadith leaders continued to engage with the Jammu and Kashmir government to build a denominational university and refused to condemn Gov. S. K. Sinha (Swami 2008c). Kashmir's quasi-official grand mufti, Maulvi Mohammad Bashir-ud-Din, also made interventions in the course of the shrine war.[16]

However, it bears note that—like the Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadis leadership—Bashir-ud-Din did not address a single rally of consequence. That task was left to leaders of the Tehreek-i-Hurriyat and APHC, none of whom bar Mirwaiz Farooq was a religious leader—and even in this one case, a religious leader with influence only in a small part of Srinagar. Hindu religious leaders, such as Swami Dinesh Bharati, who played roles in the Hindu chauvinist agitation there, were also leaders of obscure denominations and temples and had no real clerical authority.[17] No figure associated with major temples, such as the priests of the Mata Vaishno Devi or Raghunath Mandir, appear to have participated in the protests.

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Although it is still unclear just what consequences the shrine war might have for Jammu and Kashmir, though, this much is clear: politicians, not priests, both initiated the conflict and controlled its working. It is clear there were no clerics with influence of an order who could have prevented its outbreak or tempered its course.

CONCLUSIONS

Our examination of the three cases leads us to three inexorable conclusions. First, religion and politics are inextricably intertwined in Jammu and Kashmir. The ethnoreligious demography of the state, its fraught history in the context of Indo-Pakistani relations and its significance for a constitutionally secular Indian polity ensures that most political issues will inevitably take on a religious coloration.

Second, both secular and religiously oriented politicians have on many occasions exploited and manipulated religious sentiments to advance personal political agendas. This propensity to exploit religious issues to advance short-term and parochial agendas has proven to be explosive and has had deleterious consequences for political development in the state.

Finally, it is far from clear that religious authorities have played a central role in either promoting or dampening religious tensions, even though the neofundamentalist religious movements they lead have contributed significantly to the sharpening of ethnic-religious group boundaries. Their roles, for the most part, have been on the margins of these conflicts. They have rarely, if ever, precipitated in any of the crises that have wracked the state and have played very limited roles in containing them once they ensued. As a consequence, and despite the salience of religion in the politics of Jammu and Kashmir, it appears that in many ways this case constitutes an important outlier in this volume.

NOTES

1. For two discussions, see Brines (1968) and Ganguly (2001); for some historical background to the conflict, see Hodson (1969).
2. Namely, that if a princely state was well within one of the two emergent states, it would be forced to accede to the relevant state regardless of the monarch's preferences or its demographic composition. On this subject, see Campbell-Johnson (1953).
3. In recent years a controversy has arisen about whether or not the state shared borders with the two emergent states. The controversy stems from the writings of Alastair Lamb, see Lamb (1994); for an Indian rejoinder to Lamb see Jha (1996); for a careful assessment of the evidence and a refutation of Lamb's claims see Illahi (2003).

4. The evidence of Pakistani involvement in the rebellion can be found in Khan (1975).
5. On the significance of Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, see Das Gupta (1968).
6. For an account of the rioting, see Swarup and Aggarwal (1992, 72–74).
7. For the origins of the Ahl-e-Hadith, see Jalal (2008, 64).
8. Contrary to the assertion of one scholar, Sheikh Abdullah was not actually exonerated of the charges against him, at least in a legal sense see (Schofield 2003, 91). The state merely dropped the prosecution against him, leaving the question of his guilt unresolved. See [SECRET], *Report on Pakistani Organized Subversion, Sabotage and Infiltration in Jammu and Kashmir* (Jammu and Kashmir: Criminal Investigation Department, 1966), 27–28; also see Gundevia (1974, 118).
9. [SECRET], *Report on Pakistani Organized Subversion.*
10. "Centre: No Economic Blockade of Valley, Pak Cashing in on Turmoil," *Indian Express* (New Delhi), August 17, 2008. www.indianexpress.com/printerFriendly/349694.html. Also see Singh (2008).
11. "March towards Muzaffarabad: UJC," *Rising Kashmir* (Srinagar), August 7, 2008.
12. "Non-Kashmiris Should Be Seen Off: Geelani," *Greater Kashmir* (Srinagar), July 25, 2007, 3.
13. "Construction Works to Be Hit by Labourers Exodus," *Daily Excelsior* (Jammu), August 4, 2007, 1.
14. "Tension over Cow Sacrifice," *Daily Telegraph* (Kolkata), December 23, 2008. www.telegraphindia.com/1071223/jsp/nation/story_8700385.jsp.
15. "'Unnatural Act' with Cow Leads to Protests in Akhnoor," *Expressindia.com*, March 28, 2005. www.expressindia.com/news/fullstory.php?newsid=44002.
16. "Lift Blockade or We Lift Durbar," *Rising Kashmir* (Srinagar), August 3, 2008.
17. "Dinesh Bharti's Detention under PSA Ordered," *Daily Excelsior* (Jammu), August 26, 2008, 1.

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