As outlined in the first section of this paper, an important distinguishing feature of anthropology is its ultimate aim to generalize about the nature of man and the human condition. Methodologically, it stipulates that these generalizations must derive from comparative, holistic analysis of cross-cultural data viewed both synchronically and diachronically. That is, any human manifestation, in order to be understood fully, must be viewed, in all its complexity, against similar or related phenomena either known to have existed in the past (distant or immediate) or known to exist at present.

A brief review of the history of anthropology illustrated its somewhat dialectic progression from evolutionism to diffusionism to functionalism and finally to structuralism, and these stages were characterized as "models." Each of these constructs, in its turn, illuminated a select aspect of the human condition: all human variety as it relates to macro-time; all human variety as it relates to macro-space; societies as dynamic micro-systems; and finally, societies as micro-systems with certain static features. Currently each of these models ("paradigms," if one chooses to adopt Kuhn's vocabulary) has a place in anthropology in one form or another. Crude as our characterization may be, it points out what seems to us a truism from a vantage-point comfortably padded with hindsight: any models will inevitably prove to have certain limitations, any model is best viewed as subject to amendment in accordance with new evidence. That is, they must be used with discretion. Here we advocate what we might phrase the "coordinate" or "complementary" use of models. A feature of our model, then, is the notion that approach to a field as complex as human experience must be multi-faceted.

Accordingly, we first suggested how certain facets of folklore studies might be polished by the use of a number of concepts of interest to anthropologists, and how new facets might be cut. Conversely, in this portion we will discuss certain concepts and opportunities for research in folklore which we feel would go a long way toward polishing certain facets of anthropology and help in shaping new ones. In other words, we discuss folklore as a medium of analysis.

**HISTORICAL STUDIES**

We have stated in the general introduction that an important feature of anthropology, as we view it, is its diachronic dimension. In one sense this dimension may be construed as history. And yet, paradoxically, the history available to anthropologists is of an unusually patchwork sort, since the pasts of the peoples with whom anthropologists most often concern themselves are not well-documented in written form. Then too, as a matter of fact, until very recently anthropologists have tended to neglect even those written source materials which might have proved useful. Rather, they have tended to rely very heavily on techniques of their own devising.
Foremost among these are, of course, archeology and its close kin, human paleontology. That is, the anthropologist ordinarily pieces together what he can of the past using as his raw data the material remains of the people he studies. What he knows of past events is a direct function of the quantity and quality of such material, and the analyst's skill. As a rule, inferences are limited to features of the physical environment, the techno-economic and biological adaptation to it; the human environment and relations with it (e.g. trade, war, etc.); sociopolitical organization and ideation - in roughly that order of reliability. The relatively recent development of apparatus and techniques making it possible to place certain items within an absolute temporal frame with varying degrees of accuracy has contributed greatly. Very frequently, too, one finds certain data generated by historical linguistics - mainly phonological, incidentally lexical - a valuable supplement, particularly as concerns those aspects of culture least accessible to archeology.

A striking feature of anthropological historiography (at least as outlined here) is its more or less problematic nature. Then too, it requires a great deal of patience, effort and care to derive what frequently proves to be a minimal amount of information of little substantive value. And yet these dilemmas are by no means exclusively endemic to anthropologists' efforts at historiography - at least not qualitatively. They are part and parcel of historical research in general. Of course, historical data is nevertheless vital if the anthropologist hopes to generalize concerning broad developmental trends through time - a problem which goes, nowadays, under the rubric "culture change." The precision of such generalizations is a direct function of the accuracy with which he can make historical inferences. Hence the question is one of how to improve these inferences. Were the anthropologist able to utilize the additional data latent and potentially derivable from oral tradition, he would have added a valuable tool to his kit.

Jan Vansina has made substantial progress towards ensuring the success of just such efforts. His book Oral Tradition, as its subtitle states, is essentially a work in methodology. It provides an array of propositions which may very well enable those interested in oral tradition to extract whatever relevant data may be preserved there with a minimum of "risk." Though Vansina's propositions will probably be revised and augmented once they are put into systematic use, it seems worthwhile to cite several which seem representative by way of illustration. The following are paraphrased:

Transmission is likely to be more accurate if traditions constitute esoteric knowledge, privy of some special group, rather than a part of the public domain. Among the Inca, for example, historians were carefully selected, trained, examined and supervised by the government. While it is true that official history tends to be subject to greater distortion than private history, what distortion there is tends to be more systematic.

Fixed-text testimony is likely to be more reliable - especially when it is supplemented by linguistic or mechanical mnemonic aids and when it is both learned and distributed in conventionalized social contexts - than testimony in which the bearer has wording-options, etc.
(Speaking of free-texts) "Only persons interested in doing so transmit them, and since they are texts designed to teach, entertain, or edify the listener, those interested in transmitting them are persons of outstanding intelligence and full of artistic talent. A person of this kind has a strong personality. Moreover the amount of interest he can arouse in his audience largely depends on the way he tells the story and on the individual twist he gives it." (p. 109)

Memory failure is a primary source of distortion in the transmission process. The magnitude of its effects, for any given active bearer, may be roughly assessed by collecting the same texts from him on different occasions and comparing them. It is sometimes possible to estimate both the amount and kind of distortion that he introduces.

These propositions require testing, of course, and the possibilities are not so limited as they might appear. For instance, using identical sets of methodological propositions as their guides, analysts might independently interpret a single given body of data and then compare their results in order to determine which phases of inference are not well-controlled by the propositions. Then too, as Vansina himself suggests, interpretations based on oral tradition may often be checked against the findings of archeology, historical linguistics, physical anthropology, against interpretation for a historically related set of events of a different people using an entirely different body of data, and against whatever written evidence may bear (however indirectly) on the events in question. Additionally, re-studies of the same problem might be done in order to see something of the effects of elapsed time on the historian's interpretation. These are, of course, only a few of the possibilities, and so far as we know not all of them have been explored. Louis Dupree, though, has interpreted the disastrous British retreat from Kabul both on the basis of British records of the event and on the basis of the oral traditions collected from the Afghans whose forbears lived along the route.

There is yet another aspect of Vansina's treatment that seems to us very promising:

Cultural values colour testimonies in three main ways. Through the medium of the first informant, they determine the choice of what events to record and the significance attached to them. Through the medium of certain cultural concepts, chiefly those concerning time and historical development, they distort chronology and the historical perspective. Lastly, they make testimonies conform to cultural ideals, thus turning them into examples to be followed. All these are unconscious processes...the most potent of all the influences which tend to make testimonies into a mirage far removed from reality. (p. 108)

In regard to the first, he points out, a man may consider certain aspects of an event shameful, uninteresting or unimportant and so omit mentioning them. In regard to the latter, past time may be considered perhaps a golden age or a dark age and be thus reinterpreted. With regard to the middle class of factors: "historical development" may be understood as, say, a progressive, regressive or recursive process and the facts dis-
torted accordingly. "Time" may be measured, for example, ecologically (e.g. seasons, celestial phenomena, movements of animal populations), sociologically (e.g. periods between markets, reigns of kings, generations, etc.) or in terms of periods (e.g. exile, chaos, wandering of a people). "Historical truth" may be interpreted variously: e.g. what is accepted by the majority of people, what is told one by his ancestors.

What is suggested, then, is that a people's concepts and perceptions of their own history are likely to be unique and profoundly affect the contents of their oral traditions. Vansina's recommendation is that the investigator enquire into these concepts - of time, of the past, of historical truth, and any others which may seem relevant - in order to gain some understanding of the more or less systematic distortions these are likely to engender.

Along similar lines, Sturtevant suggests that it may be fruitful to write two separate histories of a given people: an "ethnohistory," an etic history, an account of their past as Western observers would view it, focusing on "what actually happened"; and a "folk history," derived emically, an account of their past as they themselves view it. In an elaboration of this idea, Hudson suggests that a full folk history would include not only what the people consider the event-content of the past, but also an account of whatever concepts they utilize in conceiving that past.

Folklorists, it would seem, are in an excellent position to conduct this kind of emic research. But of what significance would this be? Twofold, as we see it:

1) Certain anthropologists, like Hudson, wonder to what degree the behavior of people in present-time can be understood without an understanding of how they view their past and future, and themselves in relation to past and future. Even passing thoughts on milennial movements, nativist movements and even of current Afro-American efforts to furnish themselves with a "new" history should convince one that the question is by no means idle.

2) There is a growing awareness of the fact that interpretations of history and attitudes toward it reflect patterns of social organization. Vansina, as a matter of fact, goes so far as to posit correlations between certain kinds of history and the kinds of sociopolitical organization (pp. 171-3). This raises questions like: What place do history and conceptions of history hold in social life? Is it possible, for instance, that in certain circumstances particular conceptions might be highly adaptive or disastrously maladaptive? Why the conflicting truisms: "history is bunk" vs. "ignorance of history condemns a people to repeating the mistakes of the past"?

Questions such as these have received even less attention than the problems associated with extracting historical fact from oral tradition. This may be partially due to the fact that until very recently it was not believed that concepts, per se, could be systematically investigated and described. One could gain an understanding of such concepts, but such an understanding would have to remain essentially uncommunicable and no two investigators might reasonably be expected to arrive at identical understandings. Essentially the only avenues toward forming such understandings were a thorough (i.e. long-term) familiarity with the lives of the people and an intimate knowledge of their language - procedures which Vansina emphatically advocates.
A relatively new procedure is developing, however. Called "ethnoscience" (see Sturtevant, Frake) or "formal semantic analysis" (see Casagrande), it is a (more or less) emic technique for eliciting and depicting meanings of items of vocabulary, an objective eschewed by descriptive linguists in the past. Whatever rigor it possesses — and this varies according to details of procedure — depends largely on 1) the fact that language "encodes" or marks many — though not all — of the meanings which are important to people, and does this in a fairly systematic way, and 2) the procedures for eliciting these meanings are overt, bringing one somewhat nearer to the ideal of "replicability" in fieldwork — so that researcher A can get the same results as researcher B by doing what B did.

Linguistic symbols occur in stable distributions relative to one another, and the resulting relations between words may be expressed as logical relations. One sort of logical relation is inclusion, the most thoroughly investigated by ethnoscientists to date. Stated simply, for most readers the words "mother" and "father" are related to "parent" by inclusion, as is "parent" to "relative." A father "is a kind of" (inclusion) parent, a parent "is a kind of" relative. For most readers, anyone referred to as "father" could also be called a "parent" or a "relative"; but not everyone called a "relative" could be called a "parent," a "mother" or a "father."

\[
\text{RELATIVE}
\]

parent

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{uncle} \\
\text{father} & \quad \text{mother} \\
\text{aunt}
\end{align*}
\]

In other words, in all contexts where a given word can meaningfully occur, all those higher than it in the taxonomic hierarchy can also — but not all those lower than it. Since it is the case that the contexts in which either "mother" or "father" can occur, taken together, exhaust the contexts in which "parent" can occur, it may be said that "mother" and "father" constitute a contrast set. As an ethnoscientist, one would ask questions like "Is a mother a kind of parent?"..."Yes"; "Is every parent a mother?"..."No." By applying a technique known as componential analysis (see Goodenough), the ethnoscientist can determine the significant differences that distinguish members of contrast sets from one another — "What is the difference between a mother and a father?" — and the similarities which qualify them as members of the same set — "What is the difference between a parent and an uncle?" — for any speaker who uses the set. For the present purposes, ethnoscience may be defined as a technique for discovering and specifying the nature of contrast sets.

Might it be possible to research concepts of history in such a manner? We learn, for instance, that the Nunamiut Eskimo distinguish three stages of history, each of which is named. We know, too, that criteria used in judging the credibility of any event, for the Nunamiut, differ according to the stage in history during which it is said to have occurred. Be-
yond this, the Nunamiut say that the kinds of implications an event has for their lives at present depends upon the stage in history to which it belongs. Similar rather superficial data exist for a variety of other peoples. One cannot help but wonder, as an anthropologist, how these concepts are reflected in the historical oral traditions of the Nunamiut, and what sorts of implications they have for their social behavior in general. Would ethnoscience be of help in further defining these stages of history? Since no one has addressed any of these issues, we can only speculate.

STRUCTURAL STUDIES

A technique very much analogous to ethnoscience may be applied to items of folklore such as narratives. This is, at least, what the work of such investigators as Vladimir Propp and Claude Levi-Strauss would seem to indicate. They do not confine themselves to discovering categories which are named, however. The occasion for this sort of analysis is familiar to collectors of folklore within a given genre: confrontation with items of folklore which differ from one another in respect to a virtual myriad of details, yet are quite similar - at times seeming identical - in virtue of certain hard-to-delineate "patterns" they have in common.

Certain observations made by Lord in Singer of Tales elucidate the source of the folklorist's dilemma in part. Collecting heroic epics in Serbia, he reports that his informants are conscious of the fact that they do not carry about "in their heads" highly detailed, specific whole narratives. Their repertoire, rather, consists of a wide variety of highly detailed, specific components of narratives which they proceed to assemble or recombine on the occasion of any particular performance. For example: having selected the "theme" "captivity and escape" from an array of themes, they must then determine whether to expound it in terms of a rescue, a return from exile, a wedding, or the capture of a city; having selected, say, rescue, the singer must then select a particular story of rescue from among the several at his disposal; and finally has several options as to which particular hero he wishes to have act out that story. For the sake of the argument, this account is exaggerated somewhat toward the mechanical, of course.

In attempting to analyze this process the investigator must abstract from the texts of specific performances. He may, for example, encounter a tale in which so-and-so's cow is destroying a maize field, and may characterize the action on that level. Taking into account a wider range of texts he may find incidents in which other sorts of animals are destroying other sorts of crops or even the same crop, and then characterize these instances as well as the original one he encountered in a category of action "animals do crop damage." Expanding his corpus to include yet a wider variety and greater number of tales he may choose to class the instances in "animals do crop damage" (including those in "cow damages maize field") in a yet more comprehensive category called, perhaps, "villainies." The instances included in any given category are grouped together in virtue of the fact that they may all occur within identical contexts on different occasions. What one has, finally, is several levels of categorization which presumably reflect the categorizing processes of the active bearers of the tales and of their audiences, held in common by them.

In delineating such patterns of substitutability one is, in fact, de-
fining certain units of narrative meaning. The fact that this is possible led Propp, for example, to assert that all Russian folktales were patterned variations of a single tale form. He further asserted that it was possible to write rules which would enable one to transform a set of categories at a very general level ("captivity and escape," "villainy") - far abstracted from the specifics of individual texts - into actual performance-texts collected in the field. It would seem, judging by Lord and Parry's evidence, that informants themselves possess such rules on the occasion of any given recitation - or at least act in such a way that they may be described in terms of such rules.

Anyone familiar with transformational grammar, as applied in linguistics, will recognize its contours in those of the model just presented. The more generalized, abstract categories would be termed components of deep structure, operant at the level of competence. This level is then related to the other levels in the categorization scheme via certain rules of transformation. The more concrete, specific, smaller categories - constituting the surface structure at the performance level of human behavior - may be generated by applying the rules to the categories of deep structure.

Perhaps even more interesting features of the formulation provided by Propp and Lord and Parry, as we see it, are: 1) the number of categories at what we will now term the deep structure level of their analyses appear to be finite in number, though no single performance manifests them all, and 2) the order of presentation of these categories is identical in all performances.

The implications of findings such as these as concerns the potential contribution of folklore studies to anthropology are considerable. The question simply put, is this: what significance do these deep-structure categories have for the people who share them? Whatever the nature of that significance, it would certainly seem to be profound in light of the pervasive and systematic manner in which they are represented. More specifically, for example, could further research on this basis tell us anything about the cognitive content and processes of these people? For a start one might wish to enquire whether or not people are aware they exist, whether or not they can verbalize about them. If so, what do they perceive as their relation to other aspects of their lives?

If not, then what? A start might be the inspection of other genres in order to determine their deep structures, then to compare them with one another and with that of the folktale. Another gambit might be an effort to correlate aspects of surface structure variation with aspects of the performance-contexts in which the genres occur - what might motivate the performer to render the generic folktale deep structure in one manner or another? The bearer's own experience with various surface structures of the genre, whom the man learned the tale from, his relationships to the various people in the audience, his knowledge of their preferences, his own preferences, on-the-spot audience reaction to his rendition, the versions offered by himself or other bearers during the session or which he expects to be rendered before the session is finished? In short, all manner of variables and topics might be studied in this context - particularly small group interaction (a favorite pursuit of social psychologists: Brown, 656-708) and a rapidly growing field known as praxeology, the science of decision-making (a mathematical theory, for any of you who may be prone, see: Edwards, Kaufmann).
The immediately foregoing has concerned only the sociocultural condition of the Russian folk itself. One might well enter the cross-cultural arena, and consider what such a formulation might be able to say about the relation of folklore to human cognitive and social organization in general. For example, if the same or an overlapping set of such deep-structure categories were found in some group bearing no known historico-genetic relationship to the Russian folk one would be virtually impelled to enquire what aspects of experience they have in common - especially if the surface structures in the two areas were not equally congruent. It being something of a truism in historical linguistics that deep-structure features are relatively less susceptible to diffusion than are those of surface structure.

Then, again, if a comparative study under such circumstances turned up no such congruence, one might follow Levi-Strauss and take the view that Propp's analysis simply had not penetrated deeply enough - that at yet more general levels congruence might appear. If such were the case this would document the pan-human existence of certain significant dimensions of contrast which are now only hypothetical: space (here-there); time (remembered-anticipated); number (one-many, more-less); direction (up-down, before-behind, right-left); boundary (confining-excluding, open-closed); identity (self-other); affiliation (one-of-us, one-of-them, us-them); biology (old-young, male-female, fertile-sterile); value (approach-avoidance, pleasure-pain, good-bad). Narrative forms seem a rather apt medium in which to study a problem like this because, by definition as we understand it, such forms must involve what (for want of better terms) might be called an increase in "tension" followed by a decrease. Interesting variables might be the degree to which the polar extremes are depicted clearly, whether they clash or are complementary, whether they do so only sporadically or continually in the folklore of a given people. Little is known of the relations of such dimensions of contrast to human behavior. If folklorists could shed any light on such questions their services would be very welcome.

Then too, there is an aspect of the structural problem which we, at least, find quite perplexing. In Propp's formulation, categories at the deepest extreme occurred in a fixed temporal sequence, while those at the surface did not. What implications does this fact have? Is it only an artifact of Propp's analytic methods, an attempt to rectify the belief that time is unidirectional and irreversible, that all events must be located in time discretely?

FUNCTIONAL STUDIES

The primary question toward which this portion of the paper is directed might be phrased: What can functional studies clarify, using folklore as our medium of analysis? William Bascom has given us a valuable summary as a basis on which to work (and John L. Fisher's article raises essentially the same points):

1) escape (wish-fulfillment, compensation) from the restraints imposed by nature, society and human biology (p. 290)

2) education, in that it contains "practical rules for the guidance of man" (p. 293), "detailed descriptions of sacred ritual, the codified belief or dogma of the religious system" (p. 294) and may often serve as "a didactic device to sharpen the wits of young children" (p. 294)
3) validation of culture, "a pragmatic charter of primitive faith and moral wisdom" (p. 292)

4) social control, acting to either discourage or encourage certain ways of behaving and feeling, whether internalized by the individual or applied to him by others (p. 294)

Bascom also mentions "amusement" (p. 290) as a function of folklore, but seems to dismiss it as superficial, and Fisher does not mention it at all. In particular, Bascom implies that this function has too often served as a simplified answer to a very complex question: How can one explain the fact that folklore is a universal phenomenon? To what features of folklore and of human beings, may we refer in attempting to account for its pervasiveness?

At a theoretical level the functionalists phrased the questions above: What functions does folklore serve in human society? What are its purposes, what needs does it satisfy? As we have seen, questions phrased in this manner tend to generate propositions of the form: The function of A is such-and-such. As it has been practiced, functional inquiry does not go beyond this point. In effect, its answers have been terminal.

On the other hand, at the level of methodology, the functionalist questions have caused investigators to notice the consequences of folklore, and to define its effects on people's lives. In conducting this search for effects, functional studies have had the very fertile and salutary tendency to reveal - to one degree or another - the frequently subtle interrelations among the diverse elements of any sociocultural order. But these interrelations have been of relatively little moment when it comes to the statement of research results.

Even though functional studies as originally conceived have more or less exhausted their potential, it would seem that their products might serve as a valuable baseline for further inquiry. We might ask questions of two sorts: First, in any given case, how is the function at hand accomplished? Second, considering any particular function, in what does it consist...what is its nature?

In this section of our paper we will attempt to demonstrate that folklore may prove an appropriate medium of analysis for pursuing both kinds of questions. For any single function, at the outset at least, our lack of any sufficiently abstract concepts will make it impossible to present the answers in analytically distinctive ways. At the very concrete level at which we must work, the questions thoroughly overlap. For this reason our tentative approaches to the questions mentioned will be presented in terms of different functions.

A model for answering our first question is provided by the Swiss clinical psychologist Jean Piaget, whose special concern is education. In The Moral Judgment of the Child, not surprisingly, he considers the process of development - acquisition of moral concepts in children up to about fourteen years of age. What interests us, in particular, is his methodology:

Children's games constitute the most admirable social institutions. The game of marbles, for instance, as played by boys, contains an extremely complex system of rules, that is to say, a code of laws, a jurisprudence of its own...If we wish to gain any under-
standing of child morality, it is obviously with the analysis of such facts as these that we must begin. All morality consists in a system of rules, and the essence of all morality is to be sought for in the respect which the individual acquires for these rules. (p. 13)

His procedure is entirely observational - he plays marbles with the children and talks with them about marble-playing; and his generalizations, at least on the explicit level, are derived largely by induction, reasoning from the very concrete to the abstract. He formulates hypotheses about morality and its genesis by watching the performance of its analog - the rules of the game of marbles. The following are some of his generalizations in paraphrase form:

STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT

Practice (application) of the rules:
1) "Rules" consist in the ritualized handling of marbles according to the dictates of an individual's own particular motor habits.
2) Upon exposure to some of the codified rules used by the older players, a youngster will attempt to imitate this example. He will do so in a characteristically egocentric way, however, either playing by himself or paying no attention to what any other players are doing, and in no way attempting to win. (ages 2-5)
3) Play is in groups, and each player attempts to win. In any given group, entirely contradictory accounts of the rules of the game may be collected. Sporadically there will be cooperative attempts within the group to agree upon a uniform set of rules. (ages 7-8)
4) Every detail of the game is fixed, and the rules known to each player in any given group may quite properly be said to be codified. (ages 11-12)

Consciousness of the rules:
1) Rules are either entirely unconscious (during motor stage) or if conscious (beginning of egocentric stage) are incidental.
2) Rules are regarded as absolute and immutable (height of egocentric and first half of cooperative). They are external to the individual, and may be transgressed.
3) The rules are regarded as mutable, pending consensus among players, but are binding and internalized.

Piaget makes it clear that these stages are schemata arrived at by abstracting from the welter of detail. Empirically one is confronted by a non-linear continuum of complicated variation, in which these broad patterns are discernible. (pp. 26-28) When Piaget takes these hypotheses (deductively) outside the game of marbles, into the sphere of moral development in general, he finds them replicated. Adults are treated as analogs of older children in the play groups; the entire group of children under fourteen are viewed as analogous to that peer-group of youngsters who are not yet capable of direct formal participation in the marble-play of the older children. In Piaget's conclusions it is interesting to note his emphasis on the importance of communication between age-inferior peers in play-groups as the social milieu in which the perception of social activity as a game - a system of rules - develops, thus succeeding the stage at which rules are perceived as sacred and unalterable. Thus, mature marble-players learn to be immature adults and immature marble-players learn to be mature ones in their play-groups.
Beyond this, of course, Piaget's conception of games as virtual micro-

cosms - as models of reality - is very exciting. Clearly the function

of folklore as an instrument of education is extremely important and

worthy of careful attention by folklorists as well as social scientists

in general. Of course, there is no reason to believe that games as a

genre of folklore are unique in this respect...but an analysis comparable

to Piaget's is yet to appear, so far as we know, for other materials.

One cannot help but wonder, for example, what other sorts of folklore

children, in any culture, are exposed to during their pre-adult years.

The question at hand here, to reiterate, has been: How does folklore

accomplish its educational function?

Now we shift to a more direct focus on a function per se: what Bascom
calls "amusement." Since it appears to have been heavily relied upon,
though with few attempts to understand its nature, it seems an appropriate

object of analysis.

The particular body of folklore to be used as the medium for this analy-

sis remains to be chosen. In the meantime, however, a very stimulating
model for this approach is to be found in Jan Huizinga's book Homo Ludens:
A Study of the Play Element in Culture. Though this work can be regarded
as preliminary at best, it is valuable for just that reason. So far as
we are aware, little work has been done on this literally ubiquitous as-

pect of human life.

Were folklorists to make an attempt to better define the nature of play -
we take this liberty with Bascom's "amusement" function, since the entire
concept is so vaguely defined at present that no semantic integrity is
at stake - their contribution to the social sciences in general would
be inestimable. The suggestion does not seem a rash one in light of the

nature of their materials - at least if one is inclined to follow the
lead that Huizinga provides. Hopefully this will become clearer after
a cursory summary of some of the salient features of his work. Regret-
tably, we cannot possibly do justice to its persuasiveness, scope and
imagination - nor its shortcomings - in this limited space.

Summing up the formal characteristics of play we might
call it a free activity standing quite consciously
outside "ordinary" life as being "not serious," but at
the same time absorbing the player intensely and utterly.
It is an activity connected with no material interest,
and no profit can be gained by it. It proceeds within
its own proper boundaries of time and space according to
fixed rules and in an orderly manner. It promotes the
formation of social groupings which tend to surround
themselves with secrecy and to stress their difference
from the common world by disguise or other means. (p. 13)

Other qualities of play, players, and the play-world which Huizinga
brings out vividly in his longer discussion but gives short-shrift in
the brief summary above are:

1. ...satisfies all kinds of communal ideals. (p. 9)

2. The profound affinity between play and order...

Play has a tendency to be beautiful. It may be
that this aesthetic factor is identical with the
impulse to create orderly form, which animates play in all its aspects. (p. 10)

3. Play casts a spell over us; it is 'enchanting,' 'captivating.' (p. 10)

4. The element of tension in play...a particularly important part. Tension means uncertainty, chanciness; a striving to decide the issue and so end it. (p. 10)

5. ...a certain ethical value in so far as it means a testing of the player's prowess: his courage, tenacity, resources and, last but not least, his spiritual powers - his "fairness"; because, despite his ardent desire to win, he must still stick to the rules of the game. (p. 11)

Huizinga goes on to explicate his view of the play aspects of law, war, knowing, poetry, mythopoiesis, philosophy, art and contemporary civilization.

As may be readily sensed, the entire treatment in Homo Ludens is as loose and free-wheeling as it is novel and intriguing. However, much more work is required in order to lend some semblance of rigor to the formulations, a complex structure of virtually unexplored hypotheses - in particular, to iron out Huizinga's sometimes incredible naivete concerning tribal, folk and archaic societies. There is much room for both the folklorist and anthropologist to try their tools - field-testing of these propositions. Are all the features Huizinga lists so clearly associated in fact as in his work?

SOCIOPSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES

Whereas functional studies tend to treat folklore as an independent variable - noticing its effects on other phenomena - under the rubric of sociopsychological studies we enquire into phenomena which seem to have strong effects on folklore, which appears in this case to be a dependent variable. Keeping in mind that this appearance may reflect more bias than fact, we may still find it profitable to proceed along these lines.

One of the first sociopsychological processes identified was syncretism, resulting in situations like the belief in condendado in the contemporary Andes, (embodied absolutely evil spirits of deceased human beings who committed some particularly heinous anti-social act /e.g. incest/ in life, and who stalk the trails at night to punish their relatives by devouring them - until put to final rest through prayers of some mortal, defeat in combat with some extraordinary mortal, or slaughter in the act of some atrocity by some mortal). Before the Spanish conquest such creatures did not exist, nor did any concept of absolute good vs. absolute evil. Nor do these concepts exist today - except in the "re-worked" form cited above, where redemption is effected by men rather than by God in spite of the pervading Catholic influence. Likewise the services of the patron saint of Punacancha, Our Lady of the Rosary, a bona-fide saint in orthodox Catholicism, are solemnized by an ordained priest who presides over masses, processional pilgrimages and official festivals in her honor; and yet her worship includes traditional drum, flute and conch-shell music, and her statue is believed to actually embody her. Moreover, she is believed to have the power to punish wrong-doing, as
neither any (known) pre-conquest supernaturals or any orthodox Catholic saint ever could.

Folklorists could multiply examples of the "trickle down" phenomenon illustrated above many times, of course. And they themselves, as a professional group, amply document the occurrence of the counterpart process pointed out, for example, by George Foster: the "percolation" of lore up from the subordinate to the dominant strata. Together the processes constitute a cyclic exchange which seems, almost inevitably (except when accomplished by professionals of course), to produce altered forms, amalgams of certain borrowed and certain indigenous elements. In addition to the form of syncretism which occurs intra-societally and "vertically," there are forms which occur "horizontally" between analogous strata of distinct sociocultural systems and also what might be called "diagonal" forms involving exchange between different strata of different systems.

The word "syncretism," of course, names the process of modification which occurs in such exchanges, and its effects can be illustrated, that is described concretely — but this is not the same as analytically describing the process itself, that is, explaining it. Other processes at roughly the same level of analysis, i.e., naming, are familiar: "innovation," "extinction" and "evolution." For all of them, the question is How?

A welter of variables are involved, without doubt — sociological, psychological, cultural, spatial and even temporal if one lends credence to Foster's suggestion that time (as an independent variable) is crucial to consider. Easy answers and easy ways to get answers are not ready to hand, of course. Some first steps have already been taken, though, and others are in the offing. We do not assume, of course, that those cited here constitute even a representative, let alone definitive, sample of such work. Those we know of and find interesting fall roughly into two classes: observational and experimental. Arbitrarily, they will be considered in that order.

Good cues could be taken, we think, from Bascom's list of data-types which might easily be collected — and ought to be, if one expects to accumulate enough sufficiently detailed information to work on "how" questions. The types, to refresh the memory, are:

1) when and where the various form of folklore are told;
2) who tells them, whether or not they are privately owned, and who composes the audience;
3) dramatic devices employed by the narrator, such as gestures, facial expressions, pantomime, impersonation, or mimicry;
4) audience participation in the form of laughter, assent or other responses, running criticism or encouragement of the narrator, singing or dancing, or acting out parts in a tale;
5) categories of folklore recognized by the people themselves; and
6) attitudes of the people towards these categories. (p. 281)

If, regardless of the nature of the study being conducted, researchers were to systematically collect this kind of information, it might well prove invaluable. Such a procedure would provide a large and detailed...
corpus of comparable information which could be used as an analytic base for sociopsychological studies — even if only for purposes of suggesting hypotheses, facilitating at-home research design, providing background data for other fieldworkers.

Such data would be even more valuable — especially for purposes of considering change-phenomena — if it could be collected periodically for given areas. As a matter of fact, it would seem possible to collect data of this sort on an almost continuous basis through giving residents of the communities under study whatever modicum of training would be required for them to do this kind of work themselves — thus acting in the capacity of reporters.

Systems of rapid filing and retrieval would, of course, be mandatory if such a broadly-based data resource, or "pool," were to be used to the best advantage. These categories of data would be further sub-divided and other categories added as a matter of course.

A preliminary result of such a scheme might be gaining some insight into the intriguing questions so fundamental to sociopsychological studies as to be nearly prerequisite — How do diverse "basic" variables statistically correlate: genre; age, sex, status of both bearers and audiences; size of audience; season in which tale is told, etc. Then too, it would certainly be interesting to know, along lines indicated by Vansina, whether incidence-levels of certain genres were consistently associated with any particular forms of political organization, kinship, etc. Finally, it should be evident enough from the topics we have discussed previously — i.e. the relevance of emic analysis to the study of history — that information in Bascom's last two categories would be quite welcome and useful.

One might well ask, though, what sorts of categories beyond Bascom's would be more immediately useful for the study of sociopsychological processes. In this regard, it is impossible to do justice to H. G. Barnett's Innovation: The Basis of Cultural Change — it must be read. Suffice it to say here that this book, like Huizinga's is a first attempt, and a major one, at dealing with a highly complex subject. Rich in exemplification as well as in theory, like Homo Ludens, it is tentative but can nevertheless admirably serve as a source-book of hypotheses — whether they be in the form of categories for the data-pool suggested above, or actual research outlines.

Barnett's strong penchant for model building is well-suited to the expression of his co-emphases on both the ideational and behavioral aspects of culture — and all seem entirely appropriate to the complex nature of his subject matter. He covers the cultural, motivational, cognitive as well as the sociological aspects of innovation — which he defines very broadly, as any new stimulus — in so systematic a way that his book constitutes a virtual mandate for further work.

Barnett's theory was meant to handle change in human symbolic systems of all sorts, save for the linguistic, from which he nevertheless clearly derived inspiration. As such it could be applied to folklore materials, if sensibly interpreted at the methodological and procedural levels, in order to study the sociopsychological processes of change which we have mentioned. Little has been done along these lines and much needs to be done, so the way is clear.
What significance would such results have? If a better understanding of the sociopsychological process involved in folklore could be gained, it might be possible to comment in explanatory detail on this kind of hypothesis:

Nations...must possess cultural forms or mechanisms which groups involved in the same over-all web of relationships can use in their formal and informal dealings with each other. Such forms develop historically, hand in hand with the other processes which lead to the formation of nations, and social groups which are caught up in these processes must become "acculturated" to their usage. Only where such forms exist can communication and coordinated behavior be established among the constituent groups of a society. They provide the cultural idiom of and ideal representations through which different groups of the same society can pursue and manipulate their different fates within a coordinated framework...The Guadalupe symbol thus links together family, politics and religion; colonial past and independent present; Indian and Mexican...It is, ultimately, a way of talking about Mexico: a collective representation" of Mexican society. (Wolf, 1958, pp. 38-9)

Along deductive-experimental lines some highly suggestive work has been done. It remains to be seen to what degree the situations, so cleverly contrived, reflect sociopsychological realities. Perhaps the least problematic among those with which we are familiar, is the work done by Messenger in the Aran Isles. He wrote a ballad in a traditional vein which concerned a shipwreck that occurred during his stay and submitted it to the editorial mercies of the gentry in order to observe, as a participant, the genesis of a piece of folklore. Periodically he has returned in order to ascertain what modifications have been made in his absence and understand the mechanisms through which this has occurred.

By now, Bartlett's experiments (for related work, see Allport) with serial and repeated reproduction are famous — as are the criticisms of them, so aptly summarized by Dundes in his introduction to a piece by Bartlett. It does seem, though, that the experimental distortions introduced by Bartlett could be greatly ameliorated with very little effort: by working in an actual folk community with established patterns of communication, by working in the native language of the subjects, by relying on oral rather than written transmission, by allowing the participants themselves to determine the pace of reproduction. Following Bascom's suggestion, one might use pieces of less well-known lore or, following Messenger's, make up some. A familiarity with traditional and well-known materials would certainly provide a basis for the latter procedure—though one might be able to control for one's distortion even better, if one had a certain mathematical talent, through use of content analysis (Armstrong). They might be applied to traditional materials and then the configurations approximated in the original material one introduces, or even modified in determinate ways.

Finally, a good deal of work has been done by social psychologists working with what they refer to as communication nets (Miller, pp. 249-260):
Letters denote senders and/or receivers; arrows denote channels which are open and the directions in which they are open. Some channels are used more frequently than others - even though all could be used - and this is termed the "traffic density" of a channel. Researchers also consider the "directedness" of communication - the fact that A may intend for his message to reach B in particular, though C receives it as well. The term "pattern of group information" recognizes the fact that who-knows-what changes through time as communication progresses, while "pattern of opinion" acknowledges attitude-change on the part of communicators. "Primary information" denotes the information which is the subject of communication, while "secondary information" is information circulated by a group about their state of information and opinion at any given time (it is a response to primary information). When communication is "instrumental," the sender depends heavily on secondary information, though when communication is "consummatory" he is not concerned with it. Such is the model, in brief - though, by the way, it has aroused enough interest to have developed mathematical expressions of these concepts.

Results? Well, one finds statements like the following:

...four basic reasons for social communication, 1) to increase uniformity of information, 2) to increase uniformity of opinion, 3) to change status in the group, and 4) to express emotions. All four types of messages may travel over a net, and a single message may fall into more than one class. (Miller, p. 253)

If a difference of opinion arises in a highly cohesive group, there are more attempts made to influence the members and the influence is more often accepted without resistance...most of the communications tend to be directed toward those members whose opinions are at the extremes. (Miller, p. 254)

Reading of this, one cannot help but ask several questions: 1) are such generalizations valid cross-culturally? 2) are they valid in non-experimental situations - where problems are not artificial? 3) what implications might such general tendencies have for change in folklore? 4) would the model be useful, perhaps in attempting to describe situations in which folklore is transmitted? We have no idea how fruitful or barren such an approach might prove for folklore - but the social psychologists would certainly profit from having their generalizations tested outside
their rather narrow communications frames, say, for instance, in Anang courts (Messenger, 1959).

As concerns experimental approaches in general, the major question remains the validity of their results outside the realm of artifice. Aside from these substantive concerns, though, we find them stimulating simply as models in terms of which observation may be structured and directed - they are "suggestive" - and as means to gaining provisional understandings of phenomena difficult to observe first-hand.

FOLKLORE AS COMMUNICATIONS

In viewing folklore as a medium of analysis, it is productive, we think, to keep in mind that it constitutes a system of communications par excellence. Folklore studies can therefore contribute to the understanding of virtually any process or product conceived relevant to human communications, in our opinion. We have already adumbrated several possibilities. Four others will be mentioned here only in passing and briefly illustrated, since they are not yet well-developed enough - at least so far as we are aware - to warrant any detailed exposition. Since this is the case, any contributions made by folklorists would constitute "pioneering" efforts.

The first goes under the rubric paralanguage (Sebeok), and consists in the study of the significance of sounds produced in communication situations which nevertheless lie beyond language as studied by linguists. Coming to mind, offhand, is a group of jokes - mentioned by Jansen (Dundes, p. 48) - shared by marijuana smokers, in which all punch-lines are preceded by sharp, hissing inhalation.

Second is kinesics (Sebeok), concerned with the communicative significance of body postures, gestures, facial expressions. Reference to personal experience will convince even the non-folklorist that there could hardly be a better medium than folklore in which to investigate this sort of question.

Third, proxemics (Hall) - the study of the significance of spatial orientation and the manipulation of space in communications. If we may refer back to Huizinga to document our conviction that folklore, once again, has much to offer:

All play moves and has its being within a playground marked off beforehand either materially or ideally, deliberately or as a matter of course. Just as there is no formal difference between play and ritual, so the "consecrated spot" cannot be formally distinguished from the play-ground. The arena, the card-table, the magic circle, the temple, the stage...(p. 10)

Finally, there is mass communications. Much work has been done concerning printed media, film and the electronic media - though a great deal has been of a rather pragmatic nature - while relatively little has been done with face-to-face communications. Often such communications involve folklore, of course. Minstrels, for example, come to mind immediately.

Whether or not a liason develops between these new but expanding areas...
of interest and folklore largely depends, we imagine, on the energy, interest and determination of folklorists themselves...considering the structure of interdisciplinary communications.

CONCLUSION

Models presented in the first part of this paper were those of traditionally strong interest in anthropology. Those presented in this final portion also have their place in history; but the specific topics treated are, by and large, rather more novel and unexplored. Some of the latter are now being actively considered in the literature in a tentative and preliminary way, while others to date have nothing but a good future.

In any case, the reader who does not immediately perceive the relevance of the ideas presented is ill-advised to regard their treatment here as the last word on the subject, since the task of liaison between diverse fields seems always plagued by unforseen subtleties. For this reason, a bibliography of (hopefully) sufficient scope to allow further investigation has been included as an essential ingredient of our treatment. Perhaps the best we can hope for is to have aroused the reader's interest in some of the same issues which interest us and to have provided a preliminary orientation to what we know of the literature. If this article serves as a kind of catalyst it has done its job.
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Today the possession of a PhD is prima facie evidence that terrible things have been done to your mind.