Developing Cybersecurity Programs for NSF Projects

Center for Trustworthy Scientific Cyberinfrastructure
Jim Marsteller, Susan Sons, Craig Jackson, Jared Allar
Outline

1. Introduction & Overview
2. Establishing a Cybersecurity Program
3. Policy Development
4. Putting It To Work
5. Keeping Your Program Healthy

Wireless Code: WestinConference
1. Introduction & Overview
Training Overview

- Presenters: Jim Marsteller, Susan Sons, Craig Jackson, Jared Allar.
- Q&A period at the end of each section, but Q’s are always welcome.

Presenters will be available this afternoon for 1 on 1 questions and discussions. Please stop by, your feedback is welcomed!

Will regularly refer to documents at: trustedci.org/guide
Goals of this Training:

1. Introduce PIs and managers of NSF LF\textsubscript{s} and CI Projects to a concise guide for developing and evolving a cybersecurity program that is tailored to the needs for our community.

2. Elicit discussion and feedback on the same.
How this happened
How is the guide different?

1. Authored with a **CI perspective**
2. Contributions and critique from LF/CI community (TrustedCI Forum, DKIST)
3. Lighter than FISMA/NIST SPs
4. Heavier than, *e.g.*, FCC’s small business policy creation tool or NISTIR 7621 *Small Business Information Security: The Fundamentals*
5. **Publicly** available and **free** to use (unlike, *e.g.*, ISO)
6. **Templates, templates, templates!!!**
7. Community-driven approach - **Community to contribute** to the evolution of the guide
So, what is a cybersecurity “program?”

“A cybersecurity program is a structured approach to develop, implement, and maintain an organizational environment conducive to appropriate information security and levels of information-related risk. Cybersecurity programs entail ongoing activities to address relevant policies and procedures; technology and mitigations; and training and awareness. Cybersecurity programs are scoped to the key assets, resources, and lifespan of organizations.” - CTSC
Why is a cybersecurity program important?

- Underlies **trustworthy science** - Maintaining the trust of scientists and the public in the CI, data and science.
- Prevents infrastructure from being used against others.
- Addresses **information security requirements** as defined in NSF cooperative agreements.
- Enables collaboration by supporting trust.
What are the components of a comprehensive program?

1. If you’ve got it, see your Cooperative Agreement.

2. See the NIST Framework or any number of cybersecurity maturity models. *The 22 Framework Core “Categories” are a great place to get a feel.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function Unique Identifier</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Category Unique Identifier</th>
<th>Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>Identify</td>
<td>ID.AM</td>
<td>Asset Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ID.BE</td>
<td>Business Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ID.GV</td>
<td>Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ID.RA</td>
<td>Risk Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ID.RM</td>
<td>Risk Management Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protect</td>
<td>PR.AC</td>
<td>Access Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PR.AT</td>
<td>Awareness and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PR.DS</td>
<td>Data Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PR.IP</td>
<td>Information Protection Processes and Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PR.MA</td>
<td>Maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PR.PT</td>
<td>Protective Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DE.AE</td>
<td>Anomalies and Events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DE.CM</td>
<td>Security Continuous Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DE.DP</td>
<td>Detection Processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Respond</td>
<td>RS.RP</td>
<td>Response Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RS.CO</td>
<td>Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RS.AN</td>
<td>Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RS.MI</td>
<td>Mitigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RS.IM</td>
<td>Improvements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recover</td>
<td>RC.RP</td>
<td>Recovery Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RC.IM</td>
<td>Improvements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RC.CO</td>
<td>Communications</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NSF Cooperative Agreements

Information Security Requirement

- Incorporated in NSF’s Supplemental Financial and Administrative Terms and Conditions
- Purpose is to help ensure that NSF large facilities and FFRDCs have policies, procedures and practices to protect research and education activities in support of the award
- Terms or requirements like this are increasingly common at the proposal stage. (See, recent IRNC solicitation.)
“Security for all information technology (IT) systems employed in the performance of this award, including equipment and information, is the awardee’s responsibility.

Within a time mutually agreed upon by the awardee and the cognizant NSF Program Officer, the awardee shall provide a written Summary of the policies, procedures, and practices employed by the awardee’s organization as part of the organization’s IT security program, in place or planned, to protect research and education activities in support of the award.”
CA-FATC LF Article 56 and CA-FATC FFRDC Article 59:

“The Summary shall describe the information security program appropriate for the project including, but not limited to: roles and responsibilities, risk assessment, technical safeguards, administrative safeguards, physical safeguards, policies and procedures, awareness and training, and notification procedures in the event of a cyber-security breach. The Summary shall include the institution’s evaluation criteria that will measure the successful implementation of the IT Security Program. In addition, the Summary shall address appropriate security measures required of all subawardees, subcontractors, researchers and others who will have access to the systems employed in support of this award.”
CA-FATC LF Article 56 and CA-FATC FFRDC Article 59:

“The Summary will be the basis of a dialogue which NSF will have with the awardee, directly or through community meetings. Discussions will address a number of topics, such as, but not limited to, evolving security concerns and concomitant cyber-security policy and procedures within the government and at awardees' institutions, available education and training activities in cyber-security, and coordination activities among NSF awardees.”
Day in - Day out...

People
Processes
(and Paper)
Protections
Partners
Q&A
2. Establishing a Cybersecurity Program
CTSC Cybersecurity Program Processes & Core Tools

Establish Program

Identify Assets & Document Environment

Tools

Best Practices

Risk Assessment

Program Frameworks

Select Baseline Controls

Evaluate & Refine Program

Evaluate Control Effectiveness

Implement and Tailor Controls
Importance of Project Leadership

PIs have the ultimate responsibility for ensuring the project has an effective information security program

- Promote the importance of a cybersecurity program
- Assigning security responsibilities
- Determine acceptable levels of risk
- Support cybersecurity program
Project Relationships

Play a key role in a cybersecurity program

Cyberinfrastructure (CI): Research environments that support advanced data acquisition, data storage, data management, data integration, data mining, data visualization and other computing and information processing services distributed over the Internet beyond the scope of a single institution.
Project Relationships
You are not alone

CI Projects are becoming increasingly distributed. Multi-institutional, international, interdisciplinary but highly interconnected. Virtual project teams are commonplace.

While this can create challenges, it also creates opportunity.
Challenges of CI projects

- **Disparate policies and requirements** among collaborators - establishing MOUs
- **Cultural differences** (open research environments vs. restrictive govt labs); information sharing, communications, different compliance reqs
- **Larger attack surfaces**: users, servers, network connections, inconsistency with administration and management
- **More actors**: hacktivists, governments, bad users
Opportunities in CI Projects

“I’ve got your back”

- **Collective knowledge** of a distributed team can be a **resource of support**. “Has anyone seen this unusual network traffic?”
- Improve detection ability and response times by **sharing event information**. “Mass scanning from IP address 201.234.178.62, suggest blocking”
- Ad-hoc support in times of need.
Risk!
Risk-based approaches

- NIST 800 Series / FISMA*
- HIPAA Security Rule*
- DIARMF* .... even DOD is going there; DIACAP is out!
- NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity
- ISO
- COBIT

* blended into compliance regimes
Why risk management? **Flexibility.**

- pure compliance or rule-based approaches are generally inappropriate for infosec
  - *fast-changing, relatively new, relatively low risk (for now)*
- well-suited for organizations with limited resources and time
- good for situations where the type of risk is difficult to insure against or the “insured” is hard to identify
- allows for mitigation, transfer, avoidance, and acceptance of risk
Why do we find the need to sell you on risk management?

Guesses?
Craig’s answer: It’s risky.

Ownership
Effort
Time
Thought
Where to begin?

_If I buy into a risk based approach, then what?_

As we’ll discuss repeatedly, there is *not just one answer to that question*, but identifying and documenting your information assets, as well as understanding their value and/or sensitivity is a wildly helpful step that can be overlooked or underemphasized.
“Information Assets”

- **Valuable**
  - Research Data

- **Sensitive**
  - “Personal Information”

- **Information Systems**
  - Telescope
  - SCADA System
Tips for Identifying Information Assets

1. Create and maintain solid documentation of what is actually there.
   a. Information Asset Inventory
   b. A solid basis for selecting controls, conducting RAs; an investment in continuity of the program.

2. Start with your information inventory (vs information systems) and capturing data flows.

3. Think in terms of types of information and information systems; get more detailed as needed.

4. Take the opportunity to get a handle on the security objectives for those assets.
1.2 Type of Information

⇒ Enter a description of this information type here. It should be specific enough that someone who was handed a disk full of data can easily determine whether the data they have belongs to this classification or not. In the table below, you’ll list information that’s part of this set.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asset Name</th>
<th>Short Description</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Asset Detail</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Insert a short name to unambiguously identify asset</td>
<td>Describe the asset. Unless there’s a referenced asset detail, this should include where it is and how it’s accessed.</td>
<td>Who is responsible for this asset?</td>
<td>Where is there more information about this asset?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Confidentiality:
Integrity:
Availability:

Yes, we’ve got a template for that.
Information Asset Details:

- What’s included in this set?
- Why do we have it? Where is it coming from, and what do we use it for?
- How is this set stored?
  - Format
  - Location
  - Backups
- Where should this data travel?
  - Who and what systems should be able to access?
  - How will it get there?
  - How is that movement protected? (e.g., authentication, encryption)
- What, if anything, sets this data apart from other things in the type?
The ‘CIA’ Triad of Security Objectives

**Confidentiality**  Preserving authorized restrictions on access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information. A loss of confidentiality is the unauthorized disclosure of information.

**Integrity**  Guarding against improper information modification or destruction, and includes ensuring information authenticity. A loss of integrity includes the unauthorized modification or destruction of information, and the unauthorized control of an information system.

**Availability**  Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of assets. A loss of availability is the disruption of access to or use of an asset.

See, 44 U.S.C. 3542(b) and FIPS 199
By focusing on preventing “losses of information security,” CIA objectives sit between the fundamental reasons why we protect info assets and the controls we put in place.
The process for info systems is similar:

### 2.2 Type of Information System

⇒ *Enter a description of this system type here. It should be specific enough that someone who was handed a disk full of data can easily determine whether the data they have belongs to this classification or not. In the table below, you’ll list information that’s part of this set.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asset Name</th>
<th>Short Description</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Asset Detail</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Insert a short name, may be descriptive or may be the system hostname.</td>
<td>Describe the asset. Type of equipment, its function, etc. For hardware, include model and serial number when available.</td>
<td>Who is responsible for this asset?</td>
<td>Where is this asset documented in more detail?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Confidentiality:

Integrity:

Availability:
Details on information systems:

- Hardware specs & serials (if applicable)
- Software packages & major version numbers
- What data does this system touch?
- How does that data get in and out, and where does it go to / come from?
- What can this system control? How is that done?
- What does normal operation of this system look like? What runs on this system?
- How do we know when it’s not behaving?
- What administrative systems control and document this system?
Q&A
Next Up:

Selecting Baseline Controls
All these can feed into selecting controls, but we need to talk about selecting baseline controls.
Selecting Baseline Controls: You have options!

- **Concise Best Practices Guides**
  - SANS Critical Security Controls
  - CTSC’s Securing Commodity IT

- **Extensive Best Practices Guides**
  - 800-53 rev 4

- **Risk Assessment Results**
  - Lots more on RA’s later

- **Program Evaluation Frameworks / Maturity Models**

- **What to choose?**
Project timeline and lifespan are important
Best Practices Guides

● Concise Best Practices Guides
  ○ SANS Critical Security Controls
  ○ CTSC’s Securing Commodity IT

● Extensive Best Practices Guides
  ○ NIST SP 800-53 rev 4
Program Evaluation Frameworks & Maturity Models

- Overarching best practices view of a program

- E.g.,
  - NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity
  - Booz Allen Cyber Operations Maturity Framework
  - Higher Education Information Security Council (HEISC) Information Security Program Assessment Tool
  - Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (ES-C2M2)
Q&A
The Role of Risk Assessments

- NOT the same as *risk management*
- A flexible tool: gauging the relative magnitude of risks
- Can be focused on one asset or your whole project
- An *input* to decisions around resource allocation
- An opportunity to gauge control effectiveness
- *E.g.*, NIST SP 800-30
(Estimated) Impact $\times$ (Estimated) Likelihood = (Inherent) Risk (Level)
Risk Assessment is fundamentally....

About matching available effort and resources to feasible threats in order to achieve acceptable levels of risk.

Crown jewels + Likely threat event + No Controls = We’ve got a problem

Commodity IT + Controls are cheap/easy + No Controls = We’ve got an easy win
Risk Assessment Recommendations

1. Consider holding off on a formal or extensive risk assessment, and first consider the scope, structure, and roadmap for your program.

2. Consider lightweight or heavyweight, targeted or comprehensive assessments based on where you are in your project lifespan and available resources.

3. Take an asset-based approach (particularly if your project and/or cyber program are new):

   Understanding the value and sensitivity (and location and access controls) of your information and information systems is an early step to any risk assessment.
Kickstarting a program

A couple case examples...
Case 1… a new project, kickstarting a program

- **Identify your information assets** (information + information systems), and know which are mission critical and sensitive.
- **Identify & implement best practices.** *Society has done the risk assessment for you!*
  - If no best practices exist / too complex to identify or implement / want to make sure you’ve got the critical stuff covered…. *get help.*
- **Pick a maturity model or use the NIST Framework to envision your program.** How sophisticated can you afford to be?
Case 2… a not-so-new project, kickstarting a program

1. **Identify Critical Risks**
   a. “Cybercheckup” - Identifying holes in the ship.
   d. *Low-hanging fruit*. May be outside critical zone, but cheap, easy wins.

2. **Select Targeted Controls**
   a. Again, best practices!

3. **Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover**… remember its not all about prevention.
That said…. Let’s talk a bit more about our approach to formal risk assessments, tips, and tools.
Benefits of a Formal Risk Assessment

- Assist a project with **identifying gaps** in a security program
- Output of a RA can be used to develop a **cybersecurity plan** (mitigation plan and ownership)
- More advanced designs can be used to evaluate control effectiveness
Determine the level of risk as a combination of likelihood and impact. (Task 2-6; Table I-1; Table I-2; Table I-3; Table I-5.)

**TABLE I-5: TEMPLATE – ADVERSARIAL RISK**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Threat Event</td>
<td>Threat Sources</td>
<td>Capability</td>
<td>Intent</td>
<td>Targeting</td>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>Likelihood of Attack Initiation</td>
<td>Vulnerabilities and Predisposing Conditions</td>
<td>Severity and Pervasiveness</td>
<td>Likelihood Initial Attack Succeeds</td>
<td>Overall Likelihood</td>
<td>Level of Impact</td>
<td>Risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Threat Source</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADVERSARIAL</td>
<td>Individuals, groups, organizations, or states that seek to exploit the organization's dependence on cyber resources (i.e., information in electronic form, information and communications technologies, and the communications and information-handling capabilities provided by those technologies).</td>
<td>Capability, Intent, Targeting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCIDENTAL</td>
<td>Erroneous actions taken by individuals in the course of executing their everyday responsibilities.</td>
<td>Range of effects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRUCTURAL</td>
<td>Failures of equipment, environmental controls, or software due to aging, resource depletion, or other circumstances which exceed expected operating parameters.</td>
<td>Range of effects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENVIRONMENTAL</td>
<td>Natural disasters and failures of critical infrastructures on which the organization depends, but which are outside the control of the organization. Note: Natural and man-made disasters can also be characterized in terms of their severity and/or duration. However, because the threat source and the threat event are strongly identified, severity and duration can be included in the description of the threat event (e.g., Category 5 hurricane causes extensive damage to the facilities housing mission-critical systems, making those systems unavailable for three weeks).</td>
<td>Range of effects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Basic InfoSec Risk Management Terms

**Asset:** Assets are valuable and/or sensitive organizational information and information systems.

**Vulnerability:** Any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations and/or stakeholders through an information system via a loss of information security.
Basic InfoSec Risk Management Terms

**Threat**: Any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations and/or stakeholders through an information system via a loss of information security.

**Control**: The management, operational, and technical safeguards or countermeasures prescribed for an information system to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and/or availability of information assets.
### Characterizing Threats

Use an asset based approach

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asset</th>
<th>Attack Surface</th>
<th>Threat Description</th>
<th>What could go wrong?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Email (Data)</td>
<td>Email Server</td>
<td>A third party exploits a vulnerability or misconfiguration in server to access emails stored on the server or observe them being received or transmitted by the server.</td>
<td>3rd party data we're responsible for protecting is breached; we may have to inform everyone; may have to support mitigating damages, investigation, manage reputation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Email (Server &amp; Service)</td>
<td>Postfix (mail transfer agent)</td>
<td>An attacker could use our mail server to send spam.</td>
<td>Consumes our bandwidth, delays legitimate emails, we (our project or whole parent organization) get blocklisted and can't send email at all until resolved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument Control System</td>
<td>Web-Based Control Interface</td>
<td>An attacker could exploit the web application we use to remotely turn our instruments' sensors on and off, causing sensors to be turned off or become unavailable when needed.</td>
<td>Loss of valuable sensor telemetry, possibly during a once-in-a-lifetime event.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Characterizing Threats

### How does the threat attack the asset?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asset</th>
<th>Attack Surface</th>
<th>Threat Description</th>
<th>What could go wrong?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Email (Data)</td>
<td>Email Server</td>
<td>A third party exploits a vulnerability or misconfiguration in server to access emails stored on the server or observe them being received or transmitted by the server.</td>
<td>3rd party data we're responsible for protecting is breached; we may have to inform everyone; may have to support mitigating damages, investigation, manage reputation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Email (Server &amp; Service)</td>
<td>Postfix (mail transfer agent)</td>
<td>An attacker could use our mail server to send spam.</td>
<td>Consumes our bandwidth, delays legitimate emails, we (our project or whole parent organization) get blocklisted and can't send email at all until resolved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument Control System</td>
<td>Web-Based Control Interface</td>
<td>An attacker could exploit the web application we use to remotely turn our instruments' sensors on and off, causing sensors to be turned off or become unavailable when needed.</td>
<td>Loss of valuable sensor telemetry, possibly during a once-in-a-lifetime event.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---
Estimating Impact

Impact measures the degree of potential harm to organizational interests.

Things to consider when estimating impact:

- Asset value
- Asset sensitivity
- Nature of impact (financial, reputation, human harm)
- Cost of response
Estimating Impact

CTSC Risk Assessment Scale:

If the incident were to occur, what would be the potential impact (of a single occurrence)?

5 - Catastrophic
4 - Major
3 - Moderate
2 - Minor
1 - Insignificant
# Estimating Impact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3rd party data we’re responsible for protecting is breached; we may have to inform</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>everyone; may have to support mitigating damages, investigation, manage reputation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumes our bandwidth, delays legitimate emails, we (our project or whole parent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organization) get blocklisted and can’t send email at all until resolved.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of valuable sensor telemetry, possibly during a once-in-a-lifetime event.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 5 - Catastrophic
- 4 - Major
- 3 - Moderate
- 2 - Minor
- 1 - Insignificant
Estimating Likelihood

**What it is:** Probability that a *vulnerability* will be exercised by a threat

Things to consider when estimating likelihood:

- **Anticipated frequency** (10 year or 100 flood?)
- **Motivation, knowledge and capabilities of threat sources**
- **Specifics of vulnerability** (easy/difficult to execute)
- **Confidence in performing the estimation**
## Estimating Likelihood

- **5** - Constant, or extremely frequent
- **4** - Very frequent
- **3** - Somewhat frequent
- **2** - Infrequent
- **1** - Rarely, if ever

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3rd party data we're responsible for protecting is breached; we may have to inform</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>everyone; may have to support mitigating damages, investigation, manage reputation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumes our bandwidth, delays legitimate emails, we (our project or whole parent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organization) get blacklisted and can't send email at all until resolved.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of valuable sensor telemetry, possibly during a once-in-a-lifetime event.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Estimating Control Effectiveness and Residual Risk

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What could go wrong</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Likelihood</th>
<th>Control Effectiveness</th>
<th>Inherent Risk Level Scale: 1-25</th>
<th>Residual Risk Level Scale: 0-25</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3rd party data we're responsible for protecting is breached; we may have to inform everyone; may have to support mitigating damages, investigation, manage reputation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumes our bandwidth, delays legitimate emails, we (our project or whole parent organization) get blocklisted and can't send email at all until resolved.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of valuable sensor telemetry, possibly during a once-in-a-lifetime event.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Using the results of the assessment

- If residual risk level is not acceptable, select additional controls to attain acceptable risk level
- Determine **action plan and activity owner**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control Effectiveness</th>
<th>Inherent Risk Level Scale: 1 - 25</th>
<th>Residual Risk Level Scale: 0-25</th>
<th>Further Mitigation Warranted?</th>
<th>Action/Mitigation Plan</th>
<th>Mitigation Activity Owner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Maintain current practice. Server only allows encrypted connections, all configuration changes are checked by Senior Systems Administrator before going into production; security updates to server software are applied promptly.</td>
<td>Senior Systems Administrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Server software is currently kept up to date; administrative access to the server is limited to the local network and requires two-factor authentication. However, users currently don’t have to authenticate to the server for sending mail if they have received mail recently. This should be changed so that users’ email clients must authenticate each connection.</td>
<td>Senior Systems Administrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Maybe</td>
<td>Consider 2FA. The control server is behind a firewall, but security could be increased by using two-factor authentication instead of passwords alone, and/or making it accessible only from the VPN.</td>
<td>ISO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tips for carrying out comprehensive RAs

1. Operationalize your definitions.
   
   *Is “extremely likely” a frequency of every day, week, or month?*

2. Consistently apply concepts from risk to risk. Don’t switch definitions based on the risk!

3. Consistently characterize threats; include a set of common elements in each description. (Or, use a catalogue; see Appendices E and F of 800-30)

4. Solicit estimations from multiple sources / validation.
Q&A
3. Policy Development
Policy Development

Program formalization is a key step in virtually all maturity models for distinguishing relatively immature programs from relatively mature. Policy development and implementation is necessary for formalization.

Results in:

- Reproducible and communicable processes.
- Artifacts that can be critiqued and evolved.
Templates!!!

We will refer to templates found at the following page: http://trustedci.org/guide

Cautionary Note: You will *have to* make these your own.
Policy Development

1. A brief overview of the range of policies
2. Highlight a selection of policies
3. Talk about some tips
Possible policies

**Acceptable Use Policy** - Set of rules that a user must agree to follow in order to be provided with access to a network and/or resources. Used to set expectations, reduce potential liability, and act as a reference for enforcement of policy.

http://trustedci.org/guide/docs/AUP

**Access Control Policy** - Defines the assets being protected and the access control rules for them.

http://trustedci.org/guide/docs/ACP
Possible policies (2)

*Adjunct, Subawardee, Subcontractor Policy* - An agreement containing a set of rules and expectations to be used between two parties seeking access to the other’s network, data or resources.

*Asset Management Policy* - Requirements for managing capital equipment including: inventory, licensing information, maintenance, and protection of hardware and software assets.

http://trustedci.org/guide/docs/AMP
Possible policies (3)

*Information Classification Policy* - Used to ensure consistency in classification and protection of data.  
http://trustedci.org/guide/docs/info_class

*Disaster Recovery Policy* - Contains policies and procedures for dealing with various types of disasters that can affect the organization.  
http://trustedci.org/guide/docs/recovery

*Incident Response Procedures* - A pre-defined organized approach to addressing and managing a security incident.  
http://trustedci.org/guide/docs/IR
Possible policies (4)

*Mobile Computing Policy* - Establish standards for the use of mobile computing and storage devices.

*Network Security Policy* - Outlines the rules for network access, determines how policies are enforced and lays out some of the basic architecture of the company security/network security environment.
Possible policies (5)

*Password Policy* - A set of rules designed to establish security requirements for passwords and password management.
http://trustedci.org/guide/docs/password

*Physical [and Environmental] Security Policy* - Details measures taken to protect systems, buildings, and related supporting infrastructure against threats associated with their physical environment.
http://trustedci.org/guide/docs/physical
Possible policies (6)

*Privacy Policy* - A statement that discloses the ways a party gathers, uses, discloses and manages a customer or client's data.

*Remote Access Policy* - Outlines and defines acceptable methods of remotely connecting to the internal network.
Possible policies (7)

*Training and Awareness Policy* - Outlines an organization's strategy for educating employees and communicating policies and procedures for working with information technology (IT).
http://trustedci.org/guide/docs/TAP

*Personnel Exit Checklist* - Form to be completed at the end of employment that addresses revoking access to resources, physical space and the return of organizational assets.
http://trustedci.org/guide/docs/exitlist
Policies we’ll highlight

- Master Information Security Policy and Procedures (MISPP)
- Acceptable Use Policy (AUP)
- Incident Response Policy
- Access Control Policy
- *A note about Privacy Policies*
Master Information Security Policy & Procedures (MISPP)

**Purpose:** Core, general policies + guide for navigating the full corpus of policies and procedures.

**Audience:** You and all your stakeholders.

- Roles & Responsibilities (... ISO, Leadership)
- Developing, Implementing, and Maintaining Our Cybersecurity Program (... core processes)
- Resources & Key Contacts (... we’re here to help)
- Other Policy and Procedure Documents (... a gateway of sorts)
- Enforcement provisions
- Terms & Acronyms
- ... plus anything else so central to the program that it warrants stating here
Acceptable Use Policy (AUP)

**Purpose:** Establish a code-of-conduct for all users on the usage of a resource/information system.

**Audience:** You and all your stakeholders.

- Define rights and responsibilities of all users
- Establishes authority
- Consequences of infractions to policy (suspension, legal, criminal)
- Reduce Liability: disclaimers, no warranties
- Other Policy and Procedure Documents (Privacy, Password, management, Academic Citation)
- Contact Information (General support, Emergency/Security)
Incident Response Policy

**Purpose:** Decide and document what to do in the event of a security incident BEFORE it happens, so that the response can be both rapid and well thought out.

**Audience:** IT and helpdesk staff, incident response team

- Define priorities for IR (e.g. relative importance of gathering forensic data vs. minimizing downtime)
- Define who is responsible for which decisions
- Lay out response procedures for grey pigeon and black swan events
- Specify when and how response procedures will be tested
- Afternoon IR training available!
Access Control Policy

**Purpose**: Define how access to various information assets (both systems and data) will be mediated, as well as who will be allowed access to what.

**Audience**: All users, stakeholders, and IT staff.

- You must first know what your assets are.
- Least privilege principle
- Authentication vs. authorization
- Impacts every control
A note about privacy policies...

We didn’t template one, on purpose.

- You may or may not be required to have one.
- You may or may not want to have one.
- Input is key…. think general counsel.
- Int’l collaboration can complicate things in a hurry.
Policy Development: Tips, Gotchas

- **Do:**
  a. Involve stakeholders (yes, even the relevant lawyers)
  b. Prioritize
  c. Use templates, examples
  d. Ask for help
  e. Share the resulting policies and train your personnel

- **Please don’t:**
  a. Allow policies to be developed and filed away without a formal approval process
  b. Work in a vacuum
  c. Assume you need one of each
  d. Be afraid to take this seriously
  e. Underestimate the power of v2
Section 4: Putting It To Work
Education & Implementation
Who cares?

...and what do I do with everybody else?
DANGERS OF SHADOW IT
Inside Users / Personnel:

- “Cyber Hygiene”
  - See this slide deck at http://trustedci.org/guide
- Specific policies that impact their job
- When to get help or ask a question

Outside Users:

- AUP (Acceptable Use Policy)
Training methods matter.
Providing information is only half the job.

Training:

- In person
- Be personable
- Make it relevant
- Sales, not just exposition.
The everyday experience will teach your team more than any training you give them.

What is it teaching them?
Putting it all in place

New Projects:
- Put security practices in place as parts of your project/CI come online.
- You can and should evolve your program over time: don’t get stalled trying to do everything at once.
- Focus on hygiene (e.g., best practices) first, and big dangers as they become apparent (grey pigeons and black swans).

Established Projects:
- Documenting your assets may be a big job. Do it anyway.
- Find gaps, then prioritize and fill.
- Implement changes in stages rather than all at once.
- The more you grow, the more you’ll want to consider automation.
Section 5: Keeping Your Program Healthy
So you’ve...

...figured out what assets you are protecting.
...taken a look at your risks.
...written policies and procedures.
...trained personnel.

In short, you’ve made a plan and followed it.

Now What?
Keeping Your Program Healthy Means:

- Keeping security-related overhead low so you won’t have to choose between information security and your core mission.
- Testing procedures to make sure they work
  - Incident response is your most important area to test, because when you need it, something has already gone wrong.
- Reviewing policies to ensure that they still fit your project or organization well.
- Risk Assessment, Program Evaluation
Congrats, your job is security.

(and science, and teaching, and mentoring interns, and getting grants, and...)
What should we test and how often should we test it?
Incident Response Plan Testing

You don’t want to be making it up as you go.

- Annual tabletop/functional exercises
- Verify communications (Phone #s, email, SMS, pgp communications)
  - Don’t use a communication channel that might be compromised
  - Staff changes
- Validate plan effectiveness
- Refine incident response plan based on lessons learned
Q&A
How much policy review is enough?
Section 6: Conclusion
CTSC Cybersecurity Program Processes & Core Tools
Next steps for our team.

1. **Incorporating your feedback and ideas**
2. Looking for opportunities to work through the guide with NSF projects
3. Data Breach Handling Template
4. Information of budgeting for cybersecurity personnel and programs
5. Consider implications of int’l collaboration
6. Engage community and incorporate feedback
Q&A
Review

1. Introduction & Overview
2. Establishing a Cybersecurity Program
3. Policy Development
4. Putting It To Work
5. Keeping Your Program Healthy
Resources

- Center for Trustworthy Scientific Cyberinfrastructure
  - [http://trustedci.org/contact/](http://trustedci.org/contact/)

- NIST Cybersecurity Framework

- NIST Special Publications
  - [http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html](http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html)
Acknowledgements & Thanks

→ National Science Foundation
→ Bret Goodrich & DKIST / NSO
→ Contributors & Commenters
→ You!

This document/presentation is a product of the Center for Trustworthy Scientific Cyberinfrastructure (CTSC). CTSC is supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant Number OCI-1234408. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.
Thanks!