THE EFFECTS OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY EXPERIENCE ON THE POLITICAL VALUES OF CHINESE STUDENTS

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Submitted to the
Faculty of the University Graduate School of
Indiana University in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree
Master of Arts
in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures
Indiana University
December 2015
Accepted by the Graduate Faculty, Indiana University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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The Effects of the American University Experience on the Political Values of Chinese Students

A non-randomized anonymous online IRB-approved survey of 335 students, comprising 10% of the Chinese international population of the Indiana University system recorded the degree to which Chinese students reported confidence in and support for Chinese and US institutions of politics and governance. Responses suggest that Chinese students in the Indiana University system are a richly heterogeneous population, with gender, degree status, and socio-economic status serving as key variables in describing differences witnessed in political values.

Previous studies of Chinese students in the US have focused primarily on nationalism finding that Chinese students become more nationalistic the longer they are in the US. However, these studies do not usefully subdivide the term "Chinese student" into discrete elements to identify political values variation among different groups of students. They also do not attempt a rigorous explanation for the mechanisms by which political values change may occur. Given the potential weaknesses of earlier research, this study seeks to explore in greater depth variation across the Chinese student population targeting the role that gender, student degree status, and socio-economic status play in reported measures of confidence in and support for institutions of governance and politics.

Although this is not a longitudinal study, and is instead a cross-sectional study with data from only a single point in time about any specific individual, the data from this study suggest that political values of undergraduates may change with time spent in the US. Namely, support for US institutions among Chinese undergraduates is progressively lower for students who have been in the US for longer periods of time.
Additionally, this study suggests that Chinese students in the US do not hold a zero-sum conception of politics where support for China is inversely correlated with support for the US. Rather, support for and confidence in institutions of Chinese politics and governance are positively correlated with support for and confidence in institutions of the US— that is, a student who gives high ratings of support for or confidence in an institution of China is also likely to give high ratings of support for or confidence in an institution of the United States. Similarly, lower support for China also predicts lower support for the US.
Acknowledgements

My course of study for my M.A. degree in East Asian Studies has been marked by fortune beyond all prior imagination. I will be forever grateful to the faculty and staff of Indiana University who have assisted my development and helped me in the quest to find a niche in the world.

I would like to thank first and foremost Professor Scott Kennedy for the inspiration, which initiated this project and for the guidance, which has made its conduct possible. Professor Kennedy is a highly-renowned authority in contemporary China studies, and it has been my very great fortune to know him and learn from him. Professor Kennedy has devoted an inordinate amount of his time and energy to me, and done what only a very few (and only the very best) professors do, and that is take an engaged interest in their students and involve them in their work. Professor Kennedy, you have taken your interests and passions and made a career of them, and in so doing serve as an example to me that this rarely achieved goal is possible. Thank you for all you have done for me, offering your time and counsel, even when just returning from the other side of the world.

Professor Scott O'Bryan, thank you. It is to you I owe my experience of being at Indiana. It has been perhaps the most fruitful and educational period of my life. Thank you for your faith in me that I could assist you in teaching East Asian studies and for giving me the opportunity to serve as an AI. I have learned an incredible amount from you, but more importantly, the way that I think has been changed. Listening to you speak and the way you clearly construct arguments and deliver them with eloquence has been a powerful inducer to my own aspirations towards improvement. Beyond your role as a professor you have served as an invaluable mentor. Your command of and passion for the discipline of history are effusive and inspirational and your
insightful ways of picking apart language to express deeper and more accurate meanings—to annihilate platitudes and mealy-mouth talk of little substance—have impressed me to no end.

Professor Ethan Michelson, your syllabus in Law and Society contained a line that has echoed and resonated in my brain; that one must boil down the essential argument of a paper and express this succinctly in one sentence. Thank you for this powerful insight and for the opportunity to apply it in your class. Thank you also for your tolerance and patience with my verily delayed thesis progress, your sponsorship of my independent research study, your critiques and insights on my survey and analysis, your generous proffering of ideas and encouragement, and sharing of your resources and knowledge. Using Qualtrics was your idea, which enabled me to do my analysis and data collection. Thank you also for being the primary investigator for this study, and I hope that my methods were not out of line in conducting my research.

Special thanks is extended to my friends and associates, who, were it not for their help, this survey would never have been possible to design or undertake, nor would the inspiration of its conception have ever been conceived.

Xiao Meng who was my partner in my earliest efforts at surveying Chinese students on the Indiana University campus. Xiao Meng cooked dumplings with me and assisted me enormously in moral support on a cold November 2012 morning in front of Wells Library with a converted tricycle dumpling-cooking machine. She also helped greatly in selecting appropriate interview questions for this thesis.

Thanks is also greatly due to Yanfei whose conversation acted as a vital sounding board for many ideas and whose insightful criticism and encouragement allowed a more robust survey design than would otherwise have been possible.
Amanda whose translation into graceful and elegant Chinese of my crude Chinese rendering of a survey recruitment email was undoubtedly responsible largely for the great fortune I enjoyed in so many responses to a time-demanding survey with no-reward offered to respondents.

Thank you also to Han Yang, who commiserated with me on the unavoidable suffering in the writing of master’s theses, and whose stalwart, ox-like dedication to his writing serves as an inspiration to me.

To Sherry who graciously allowed me to test-run many of my interview questions on her patience, and who served as a focus group of one concerning the way that my questions might be received.

To Shuang who served as a vital sounding board for better understanding some of the survey responses from students and caused me to rethink the premises of many of my ideas and prejudices.

To Chris whose encyclopedic knowledge of many things related to issues of Chinese government and politics and willingness to listen to my prattle on various topics aided me immeasurably.

To my fellow M.A. classmates and extended cohort at Indiana University, those friends whom I have had the great pleasure to be thrown together with my first year, for your elder guidance and wisdom, to the joys of discussing topics of our narrow interests, to the moment when we realized that many words in Chinese, Korean, and Japanese sound almost exactly the same. Finally to the hope that we will all finish our theses with great expedition, and receive our degrees, this thesis is dedicated. Jude, Anthony, David, Amy, Kellie, Tiphani, Marina, and 小麥, good luck!
Special thanks is due to my earliest professors at the College of William & Mary, Professor Yanfang Tang, Professor T.J. Cheng, Yang Laoshi, and Professor Bin Yang for providing the firmament in China-related studies that has made all subsequent efforts possible.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract                                                iv

Acknowledgements                                         vi

List of Figures                                          xii

Chapter 1: Introduction                                  1

Chapter 2: Literature Review and Background              14

Chapter 3: Description of Research Focus, Research Design, and Hypotheses 30
  Variables Hypothesized to Correlate with Political Values 37
  Calculating Support for Institutions of Politics and Governance 39

Chapter 4: Description of Data                          43
  Demographic and Cultural Background of Survey Population 44

Chapter 5: Analysis of the Results                      50
  Introduction of Results                                 50
  I. Taxonomy of the Chinese Student                      52
  II. Comparison of IU Survey to World Values Survey Wave 6 56
  Survey Description                                     61
  Key Demographic Variables that Influence Political Values 73
  Gender Tests                                            73
  Socio-Economic Status (Wealth) as variable              78
  Wealth Tests                                            79
  III: The Effect of Time in the US on Political Values   84
  IV: Undergraduate Time in the US and Political Values   90
  Variable Hypothesis Correlation Results                99

Chapter 6: Conclusions and Implications                 121
  How the Chinese government views Chinese overseas students 125
  How America sees Chinese Students                      129

Chapter 7: Appendix                                     143
  Data Collection Section                                148
  Psychological and Sociological Mapping of Chinese Students in the US 156

Bibliography                                            164

Curriculum Vitae                                        x
**LIST OF FIGURES**

1-1 IUB Chinese Intl. Student Enrollment 2008-2012  
1-2 IU Doctoral Chinese Student Enrollment 2010-2014  
1-3 IU Undergraduate Chinese Student Enrollment 2010-2014  
2-1 Importance of living in a democratically-governed country (WVS)  
2-2 How democratically is your country being governed? (WVS)  
2-3 Confidence in the United Nations (WVS)  
3-1 Number of survey recruitment emails sent  
3-2 Support Index for the US and China by Degree Status  
3-3 How Strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement  
3-4 Confidence in Organizations  
4-1 School Affiliation of IU Survey Respondents  
4-2 Chinese Student Populations at Several Large Public Midwest Universities  
5-1 Variables Hypothesized to Correlate with Political Values  
5-2 IU Survey Respondent numbers by degree status, gender, and economic status  
5-3 Undergraduate Self-Reported Socio-economic Status  
5-4 Doctoral Student Self-Reported Socio-economic Status  
5-5 Undergraduate Student Funding Source  
5-6 Doctoral Student Funding Source  
5-7 What economic/social class do you belong to?  
5-8 Mean Age of Respondents  
5-9 Interest in Politics  
5-10 Level of Trust in Others  
5-11 How important are these things in your life  
5-12 Health and happiness  
5-13 Active Membership in Civil Society Organizations  
5-14 How democratically is China being governed?  
5-15 Confidence in Beijing Government  
5-16 Confidence in Chinese Armed Forces  
5-17 Confidence in Chinese Courts  
5-18 Confidence in National People's Congress  
5-19 Social Class  
5-20 Socio-Economic Comparison  
5-21 Level of Support for institutions by degree status  
5-22 Happiness Level  
5-23 University Satisfaction  
5-24 Party Membership  
5-25 Obama and Xi Job Performance Rating  
5-26 IU Survey Respondent Length of time in US Distribution  
5-27 IU Survey Respondent Age Distribution  
5-28 Most represented location of birth of respondents  
5-29 Support for Institutions by Gender
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Support Index for US and China by student degree status</th>
<th>84</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5-31</td>
<td>I Support my Country's Political institutions</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-32</td>
<td>Interest in Politics</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-33</td>
<td>Confidence in Chinese Armed Forces</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-34</td>
<td>Confidence in Chinese Media</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-35</td>
<td>Confidence in Beijing Government</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-36</td>
<td>Confidence in Government in Washington, DC</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-37</td>
<td>Level of Democratic Governance in the USA and China</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-38</td>
<td>Suitability of governmental and political systems to country's needs</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-39</td>
<td>Job Performance of Presidents Obama and Xi</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-40</td>
<td>Undergraduate year group comparison across selected variables</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-41</td>
<td>Political Values Questions and Responses by Undergrad Year Group</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-42</td>
<td>Undergraduate Support for China vs. Time</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-43</td>
<td>Support for US vs. Time</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-44</td>
<td>Support for China's political institutions</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-45</td>
<td>Confidence in China's Armed Forces</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-46</td>
<td>Confidence in Chinese Media</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-47</td>
<td>Confidence in Chinese Courts</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-48</td>
<td>Confidence in Beijing Government</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-49</td>
<td>Confidence in Chinese Hometown Government</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-50</td>
<td>Confidence in NPC</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-51</td>
<td>Level of Democratic Governance in China</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-52</td>
<td>Suitability of China's Government and political Systems to China's Needs</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-53</td>
<td>Xi Jinping's GPA</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-54</td>
<td>Political Views becoming more like those of Americans</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-55</td>
<td>Confidence in US Government</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-56</td>
<td>Level of US Democratic Governance</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-57</td>
<td>Suitability of US Government and Political Systems to US Needs</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-58</td>
<td>Obama's GPA</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-59</td>
<td>Cars Driven by Chinese Students at IUB</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-60</td>
<td>Support for and Confidence in Institutions by Student Status</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-61</td>
<td>Interest in Politics</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7-1 Survey Recruitment Email Sent by IU Office of International Students 143
7-2 Individualized Recruitment Email Sent by Researcher 143
7-3 Survey Welcome Page accessed by following embedded Web link 144
7-4 Full Text of Survey Recruitment Email 144
7-5 IUB Students from PRC 147
7-6 IUB Students from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan 147
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Purpose of this Study: Identification of the Problem and Puzzle

During the 2013-2014 academic year some 235,000 students from the People's Republic of China were in attendance at US universities. Since 2008, the dramatic expansion in numbers has resulted in some large state schools including Indiana University-Bloomington having populations that are 6-10% Chinese national. In 2000, 60,000 Chinese students left China to study in the US. By 2012 this figure was 194,000. Students from the People’s Republic of China are the largest foreign demographic on American campuses and account for one-third of all international students in the US. A shift has also been seen in student degree status with almost all Chinese students in the US in 2000 being graduate students while most of the growth since then has been in the form of undergraduate students. However, understanding of this new population is poor.

This project has several aims. The first is to describe the Chinese student population of the Indiana University system in demographic and political values terms. In this study, "political values" is taken to mean the reported levels of support for and confidence in institutions of politics and governance of the United States and China. Once established, as determined by the results of a survey, these demographic features and political values will be compared with the population of similarly aged and educated Chinese in China.

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The second aim is to disaggregate the monolithic term "Chinese student" into more sensible discreet elements that can be analyzed to offer a clearer picture of the variance of political values held by Chinese students.

The third aim is an attempt to gauge whether time spent in US is a relevant factor in explaining differences witnessed in political values particularly regarding support for and confidence in the governmental and political institutions of the US and China.

The fourth aim is to test the relationship between variables associated with the experience of being in the US and on an American campus with support for institutions of the US and China.

**Fig. 1-1 Indiana University-Bloomington Chinese Intl. Student Enrollment 2008-2012**

![Graph showing enrollment trends from 2008 to 2012.](image)

From 2008-2014, a more than three-fold increase in the numbers of Chinese students in the US occurred. Indiana University Bloomington serves as a case in point in this population growth with the Chinese international student population increasing five-fold, from some 600 students in 2008 to over 3,000 by 2014. Today, Chinese students comprise the largest foreign

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demographic on American campuses at 31% of the total international student population. A shift has also been seen in student status with almost all Chinese students in the US in 2000 being graduate students, and most of the growth since then in the form of undergraduate students.

**Fig. 1-2 Indiana University System Doctoral Chinese Student Enrollment 2010-2014**

Between 2010 and 2014 the number of Chinese international doctoral students in the Indiana University system increased by less than 100.

**Fig. 1-3 Indiana University System Undergraduate Chinese Student Enrollment 2010-2014**

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6 Hassan Siddiq, "More Chinese Students Want a US Education, but Fewer Stay for a Job."
During the same time period of 2010-2014, the number of Chinese international undergraduate students in the Indiana University system increased by over 2,400.

Although today Chinese students are in the United States in unprecedented numbers, the presence of Chinese students on American campuses is not new. The following section examines the longstanding relationship that has existed between Americans and Chinese in higher education. Regardless of the time period examined, a persistent concern for politics is at the forefront of discussion. The central questions asked are whether and how Chinese students are influenced by the experience of living in the United States and how this translates into support for the institutions that foster and are fostered by the system of government present in the US. The US Congress, the Presidency, and labor unions are examples of institutions that owe their existence to and in turn bolster the US system of governance. Throughout this text, the term "political values" is used. Defined here, this term means the self-reported level of support and confidence that a person has in and for institutions of politics and governance.

International relations between the United States and the then Qing government in China commenced over 200 years ago in the year 1784. Despite this lengthy engagement with the people of China there exists today a certain cultural amnesia among Americans regarding China. Each generation is required to make sense anew of the US relationship with China, almost forgetting entirely the events that tied the United States and China together in the preceding generations. At every instantiation of news of China or of the Chinese there is a sense that we are culturally embarking upon entirely new ground. In a certain sense this may be true given the

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dramatic political and economic changes that have occurred in China over the preceding century. Although the presence of Chinese students on American university campuses is not new, many factors explaining the present day population on US campuses are entirely different from those that explain the presence of previous Chinese student cohorts in the US. While the material and structural factors driving Chinese students to study abroad in the US are dynamic, an underlying psychological motivation to pursue education, of individual and familial betterment and advancement, are unchanged.

The discourse surrounding current attempts to understand the relationship between the US and China is described in economic, military, and even existential terms; the rise of a prosperous China threatens the very meaning of what it is to be an American, for by definition Americans are citizens of the strongest, most prosperous, and influential nation on earth. The increasing economic strength of China and growing world-stage profile of China therefore threatens the very identity of many in the US as China is seen as a possible usurper to all these titles. This type of zero-sum competitive thinking however is not a product of a unique relationship between China and the US. As recently as 25 years ago many of the same critiques now heard about China, particularly those related to the theme that China is "taking over", were leveled against Japan. Similar tides of thought no doubt occupied the minds of the Spartans as they contemplated the growing strength of Athens 2,500 years ago.

The assertion that China is in fact unique, that China's governing system, political history, population diversity, culture and other characteristics are too distinct from other countries to make cross-national comparisons meaningful, is one that has been leveled by

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scholars with an area studies bent towards China. Though the "China is unique" claim is an argument borne out of insufficient creativity and effort on the part of researchers, it is evident that the relationship between China and the United States today is quite unlike that of the relationship between any other two countries today. The relationship today is defined by simultaneous competition and cooperation between the sole global superpower and a potential challenger to this mantle. From a realist international relations perspective, China and the US both compete for a finite share of global influence and physical territory. Economically however, it would be difficult to imagine the US today without the presence of ubiquitous Chinese-manufactured goods and yearly bilateral trade exceeding half a trillion dollars. China and the US are also deeply connected culturally. The extent to which the culture of China has penetrated into the US is equaled and surpassed only by the extent that cultural aspects of the late 20th and early 21st century United States have penetrated into China: In the United States, food having its cultural origins in China can be found almost everywhere. Similarly, the spread of American-style fast food has entrenched itself so firmly in the culinary preferences of young Chinese that one would be hard-pressed to argue that McDonald's is not an indigenous aspect of Chinese cuisine. Young Chinese, likewise, as well loves basketball, as it is by young Americans.

The greatly increased proportion of Chinese students on US campuses has the potential to fundamentally alter American campus life. American students entering certain universities post

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10 John Mearsheimer, "Can China Rise Peacefully?" Lecture sponsored by Indiana University Center on American and Global Security, Bloomington, IN, September 13, 2013.
12 James L. Watson, Golden Arches East: McDonald's in East Asia (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997).
2008 have the possibility of an enormously different social and environmental presence than was possible for students only a few years before then. Much is heard in the news of this phenomenon, and more people are taking note of this change on the American campuses, in the form of documentary films and paid positions being created specifically to act as liaisons between US universities and Chinese students as well as visiting professors and cadres from institutions such as the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Another indication of the increasing imprint of Chinese students in the US on the collective consciousness of the world is that, a Google search for the term "Chinese students in the US" returns more and more search results month to month.

In 1854, Yung Wing became the first Chinese international student to graduate from a US university, Yale. This first student played an important role in bringing further Chinese students to the US in the hopes that doing so would assist Qing China's modernization. In 1872, 30 students forming the Chinese Educational Mission (CEM) arrived in Hartford, Connecticut, a city which gained the moniker "the cradle of the Chinese Republic." The students would later return to China, and though stigmatized for having "adopted American ways" were instrumental in the eventual establishment of the first Chinese nation-state, and served as important cultural interlocutors between the United States and the late Qing Dynasty, as well as Republican Era China.

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14 During the time of the author's research covering about a year's time, search engine data generated from requests regarding Chinese students returned increasingly more results.
16 Bieler, 10.
17 Bieler, 117, 213.
The linkages between American higher education and China's higher education run deep. The American four-year college was the basis for the foundation of the higher education system in China, beginning with St. John's University in Shanghai in 1879, which "introduced the American liberal arts model of education to the country." After the end of the Imperial Exam System in 1905, education in the mold of the United States became even more popular in China in the form of missionary colleges. Tsinghua and Peking Universities were also direct descendants of American influence and patronage. Students returning to China after studying in the United States formed the corps of Tsinghua University teachers and administrators, even after 1929, when American control over Tsinghua was turned over to the Republic of China's Ministry of Education. The returned student's found themselves caught between different factions that vied for their loyalty and support including the communists and the Kuomintang. As is still true today, "educational institutions were seen as strategic places to influence the next generation, morally intellectually, and politically."

While the presence of Chinese university students in the United States is nothing new, neither is the presence of Chinese high school students. In the 1910's Chinese students were attending high schools in Groton and Springfield Massachusetts. Why should it be such a surprise that there are so many attending high schools in the US today? After all, the Chinese-born are the second largest immigrant group in the United States, eclipsed only by those from

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20 Bieler, 55.
21 Bieler, 81.
22 Bieler, 100.
Mexico. The reason seems that the 1949 revolution entirely remade China and that American's today's conception of China is rooted in the time period of the rule of Mao, who isolated China, an aberration in the historical cooperation and communication between the United States and China.

In 1918, a veteran Chinese student had this to say about Chinese students in the US:

Students [are] undergoing a steady process of Americanization that [is] usually 'normal and desirable,' though some students [are] beginning to 'lose the Chinese virtues of sobriety and reserve,' and [are] becoming like the 'average American college sophomore, good-natured, but often careless and shallow.'

Yet despite this "Americanization," the commentator continued: the Chinese student "is constantly reminded of his present responsibility to represent China in this country and of his future responsibility to make China a stronger, richer and better nation." ²⁵

Throughout the history of Chinese students studying in the United States, there have been cyclical feelings within China of regarding Chinese students with overseas experience as patriots and traitors in turn. "The Chinese leaders' ambivalence toward Western influence caused the students' to cycle, sometimes quite quickly, between heroes and villains." ²⁶ Initially encouraged to go abroad in 1872, the Chinese Educational Mission, (the first officially-sponsored study abroad program) was recalled in 1881 and the returned students were regarded with great suspicion, and in some cases treated as criminals. ²⁷ Though the knowledge that students would learn in the United States would presumably serve to build and improve the social and physical infrastructure of China, students were nonetheless regarded as the "stinking ninth category' of

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²⁴ Bieler, 112.
²⁵ Bieler, 122.
²⁶ Bieler, 343.
²⁷ Ibid.
the black classes." In the wake of the communist victory in China, students who had studied abroad in western countries left China in great numbers, or often found themselves continuing their education in the Chinese countryside, reinforcing their class-consciousness through manual labor.

Following the Chinese communist victory in 1949, almost all Americans were expelled from China, Chinese universities lost many of their American-trained faculty members in purges, and students who had studied abroad were persecuted. Chinese students would not travel outside of China to study abroad in significant numbers again until the early 1980's.

China's famed "class of 1977", the first group of students admitted to universities since 1966, eagerly took up the educational pursuits that had been denied to them during Mao's Cultural Revolution. A great many of the class of 1977 pursued studies abroad, becoming the first significant Chinese student cohort to leave China in almost 30 years. These students were largely graduate students on scholarship from the Chinese government, which the government hoped would return to China. However, a very large proportion would not return and instead would become parts of the critical academic and technical infrastructure of the United States, landing positions as professors, scientists, and business people across the US. Between 1978 and 2006, over one million Chinese students studied abroad. 70% of these students remained abroad after completing their course of study, instead of returning to China.

However, in the brief intervening years between 2006 and 2015, the trend of Chinese students not returning to China has started to reverse itself. Due to the hugely increased numbers

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28 Ibid.
of Chinese students venturing abroad, and due to the changing profile of students from almost entirely graduate before 2000 to majority undergraduate today, China's CCTV news service is able to creatively claim a return rate of 75% of its overseas students since 1978. "Since the opening-up of the country in 1978, a total of 3.5 million Chinese have studied overseas, including more than 1 million studying abroad today. And 1.8 million of them have returned, accounting for nearly 75 percent of the total number."31

China's increasing economic clout and more desirable employment opportunities may also serve as inducements to return to China, while strict working visa policies typically make remaining abroad challenging for foreign graduates of domestic universities.

The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 marks a turning point in the history of Chinese students in the US, serving as an observable moment in time that witnessed a transition from relatively low (but already increasing) numbers of Chinese students in the US to greatly increased numbers. From 2008-2014, a more than three-fold growth in the number of Chinese students in the US occurred.32 Looking back a few years further provides an even starker figure, with a nine-fold increase in Chinese undergraduate students in the US between 2004 and 2014.33

Indiana University Bloomington serves as a case-in-point in this population growth with the school's Chinese international student population increasing five-fold, from some 600 students in 2008 to over 3,000 by 2014.34 This rapid population growth after 2008 can in large

32 Hassan Siddiq, "More Chinese Students Want a US Education, but Fewer Stay for a Job."
34 IStart "Bloomington International Student Enrollment Trends - China."
part be explained as resulting from China's continuing economic growth and the continuing progression of a trend of Chinese undergraduate study abroad that began years prior.

China's urban middle class began to take its current form with Deng Xiaoping's 1978 reform and opening and expanded exponentially after China's WTO ascension in 2001. One corollary effect of this economic growth is that higher education has become an attainable goal for a vastly greater proportion of China's population. Flush with government investment in higher education of $250 Billion annually, and the doubling in number of Chinese universities to 2,400 over the past decade, the number of college graduates annually "has increased to seven million, a four-fold jump over the same period [with] about nine percent of Chinese adults [having] some college education, more than twice the percentage in 2000."35

Despite increased university places for students in China, supply has not kept up with demand for university spots. Less than stellar results on the notoriously nerve-wracking gaokao, a student's only shot at getting admitted to a prestigious Chinese university, leave many high-school graduates without a coveted admission letter. For some, intense study at a college prep institution is in order, to try again the next year. For certain families of greater economic means, universities abroad can serve as an escape valve, a plan B to receive an education.36 However, American universities are also enormously attractive for many Chinese students, promising greater freedom to tailor-make their university course of study as well as provide much-valued overseas experience that could serve as an advantage in the competitive Chinese employment environment.37

36 X. Z., Interview by author, Minneapolis, MN, April 11, 2014.
Increased intensity of competition for university spots in China coincided with the global economic crisis of 2008, leading to a substantial uptick in numbers of Chinese students entering US universities in 2009. Decreased government-provided funding for US public universities coupled with increasing numbers of aspirational university students and a constant number of university places in Chinese universities resulted in a virtuous marriage; Chinese students were able to attend a university and US public universities were able to shore up their budgets with the benefit of increased numbers of foreign students paying out-of-state tuition rates.\(^{38}\)

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Discussion of the political values that Chinese students may or may not be acquiring during their time in the US is widespread. Defined here, the term "political values" means the degree to which Chinese international students report confidence in and support for Chinese and US institutions of government and politics. However, no study of considerable size has yet been undertaken to see what is actually occurring. Previous examinations of Chinese students in the US are limited to speculation drawn from limited interviews and studies of foreign students overseas generally from which conclusions about Chinese students in the US specifically are extrapolated.

Of great interest to US and Chinese policy-makers and academics is whether Chinese student experiences in the US are cultivating democratic values. Current prevailing discourse on this topic is largely limited to the question of whether Chinese students in the US are nationalistic, or are becoming nationalistic.

Lacking from this discussion is a more nuanced look at different categories of Chinese students to see whether there is variation in political values along lines of degree status, economic status, and gender, and other specific variables such as media access rates and ratings of environmental quality. Also lacking is broader discussion of political values beyond the topic of nationalism.

Previous research in studying the political values of Chinese students in the US can be divided into two methodological categories:

The first is quantitative political values survey work relating to Chinese populations in general and not specifically targeted towards Chinese students in the United States.

The second is comprised of qualitative studies of students abroad and contemporary news
pieces and short articles relating to Chinese students in the US. While timely, this second branch of inquiry is often not rigorous, and suffers from small sample sizes and overly diverse topical foci.

*The Civic Culture* provides the comparative political framework of the majority of the quantitatively based studies referenced in this literature review and is the methodological touchstone of this thesis survey project. This 1963 text by Almond and Verba examines the cultural requisites seen as necessary for functioning democracies in the western nations of the United States, Mexico, England, Germany, and Italy. *The Civic Culture* finds that educational levels, knowledge of government's effects on daily life, confidence in government, and engagement with non-governmental bodies within one's country are key indicators of whether a nation has a high or low degree of civic culture, these being the requirements for a functioning democracy.\(^{39}\)

A subsequent 1994 study, "Cultural Requisites for Democracy in China," by Andrew Nathan and Tianjin Shi utilizes the *Civic Culture* framework to place China in comparative perspective alongside the five western nations studied in the *Civic Culture*. Nathan and Shi find that Chinese have lower levels of the prerequisites necessary for a democratic culture than the comparison countries.\(^{40}\)

Additionally, Nathan and Shi specifically question the effect of educational levels on the perceived salience of government on Chinese respondents' lives, finding that increased educational levels equate with increased perception of government impact on daily life. As knowledge of government's impact on daily life is a fundamental prerequisite of civic culture,

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this demonstrates a linkage between higher education and the development of enhanced prerequisites for democratic civic culture. This question touches at the core of debate about Chinese students in the US, and whether or not they are developing a "democratic culture."

Nathan and Tianjin Shi's study found that in many respects, Chinese demonstrated lower metrics of having the necessary components of a democratic culture. Awareness of the impact of government on daily life, which "is thought to generate interest in politics and a desire to participate in the political process," was very low for Chinese. 72% of Nathan's respondents indicated that local and national government had no effect on their daily lives. Nathan also found that the more education a person had, the higher their subjective rating of government's saliency to their lives. However, when comparing Chinese respondents to those of similar educational attainment in other countries (US, UK, Germany, Mexico, and Italy) Nathan found a 20-30% lower level of awareness of government's effect on daily life for the Chinese. Nathan concluded by noting that the strangeness of this result given the very close extent to which Chinese government exercises control over its citizenry, and that therefore "the workings of even the grass-roots levels of administration remain obscure to the majority "creating a "safety cushion that may blunt demands for democracy.""

The presence of people knowledgeable about legal matters, who have the capacity to interpret and even influence legal and civil processes is key prerequisite for the codified law-based civil society present in western democracies. US media has often focused on a narrative of the so-called "Chinese rights lawyers" epitomized by Chen Guangcheng who are advocates for

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41 Nathan and Shi, 99.
42 Nathan and Shi, 104.
democratic change in China and are at the forefront of social and political change of a Chinese regime dangerously teetering on the edge of collapse.⁴³

However, Ethan Michelson in a 2009 survey which examines the political views and attitudes of Chinese lawyers finds that lawyers are not voices for political change in China. This is due to the fact that the ability of lawyers to perform their jobs is dependent upon at least tacit support of existing judicial institutions, which are inseparable from institutions of politics and governance. Lawyers then are very closely enmeshed and embedded within the current governmental and political structure of China and are not advocates for democracy, much less political change. Michelson finds that lawyers, though they claim to be "rights lawyers" understand this term very differently than do western media pundits who equate "rights" with US democratic value systems that Chinese lawyer's conceptions of "rights" do not embody.⁴⁴

Jie Chen and Bruce Dickson in Allies of the State find that the wealthy entrepreneurial class of China is not a voice for political change. Unlike the prosperous emerging middle class of medieval Europe, who along with increasing economic wealth and independence over production sought increased voice in political matters in contention with aristocratic and royal elements, the entrepreneurial class of China is aligned with, or a co-opted component of those holding the political levers of power.⁴⁵ Dickson and Chen conclude that if political change is to emerge in China, the entrepreneurial class will not be at its vanguard, but instead would serve as a state-supporting element, whose fortunes are closely tied to that of the existing political system.

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⁴⁵ Jie Chen and Bruce J. Dickson, Allies of the State: China's Private Entrepreneurs and Democratic Change (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010), 12.
Currently, it is unknown whether Chinese students in the US hold similar views regarding politics to those of the wealthy entrepreneurs in Dickson's study. A key unexplored question is what effect wealth has on political values of Chinese students in the US, and whether Dickson's conclusions about Chinese entrepreneurs and wealth also hold true for Chinese students in the US and those with family entrepreneurial backgrounds.

The most recent World Values Survey (WVS) Wave 6 (2010-2014) finds that Chinese feelings on their government in many ways mirror the feelings of United States' citizens on their government. The WVS finds that Chinese have high levels of secular values, valuing effective governance, valuing living in a democratic country, and believe that religion should play no substantial role in politics and governance. Moreover, the WVS finds that Chinese value living in a democratically-governed country at a level nearly identical to that of US respondents and believe China to about as democratically-governed as US respondents feel the US is democratically-governed. Chinese in the WVS display a high degree of confidence in institutions of domestic politics and governance but relatively low confidence in the United Nations. Additionally, the World Values Survey finds very low levels of active membership in civic culture organizations such as labor unions, artistic or educational associations, and political parties.\footnote{World Values Survey Wave 6 2010-2014 Official Aggregate, World Values Survey Association, 2014, accessed June 24, 2015, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp.}

\textbf{Fig. 2-1 Importance of living in democratically governed country with 1 being not at all important and 10 being extremely important? (WVS)}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Importance of living in a democratically governed country.</th>
<th>Chinese Respondents</th>
<th>US Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.43</td>
<td>8.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This question shows almost identical value placed on living in a democratic country among Chinese and US respondents. This suggests a shared aspiration for effective governance,
political voice, and quality of life that transcends nations as different as the US and China.

**Fig. 2-2 How democratically is your country being governed with 1 being not at all democratic and 10 being completely democratic? (WVS)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of democratic governance</th>
<th>Chinese Respondents</th>
<th>US Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.43</td>
<td>6.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A result that would be shocking to most in the US shows that Chinese and US respondents believe the level of democratic governance in their respective countries is almost equal.

**Fig. 2-3 Confidence in the United Nations (WVS)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Confidence in UN (&quot;a great deal&quot; + &quot;a lot&quot;)</th>
<th>Chinese Respondents</th>
<th>US Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31.6%</td>
<td>35.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Again, a striking similarity in responses by citizens of two very different countries when asked the same question appears here.

The second category of prior research in the field of political values of Chinese students in the US consists of small qualitative and largely anthropological studies and current events-based news articles that have attracted attention purporting to show values of Chinese students in the US. Among these are a 2013 study conducted at Indiana University of 20 undergraduate students,47 *Imported from China*, by Geri Alumit Zeldes, and *The Intimate University* by Nancy Abelmann. These studies find problems of East Asian student integration into mainstream American campus life and American society. These studies suggest that the world in which East Asian students live on American campuses is not only segregated racially but also culturally and intellectually to the extent that the ideas and norms that one might expect a student to acquire from the US university experience are not being acquired. These studies suggest that a feeling of alienation is bred from this lack of engagement with and by mainstream culture is not only having detrimental effects on the development of East Asian students but also has the potential to

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have detrimental effects on the international level.

In fact, some existing literature suggests that Chinese students become more nationalistic by their experience of studying in the US due to a defensive strategy against perceived attack on Chinese culture or institutions by the dominant host culture, or due to nostalgic longing for one's home country. Furthermore, scholars studying contemporary China have suggested that Chinese students in the US are not overly interested in politics and therefore are unlikely to act as agents of political change if and when they return to China. A 2014 study by Alan C. K. Cheung of 90 Chinese students at three East-Coast US universities found that the primary reasons for student decisions about remaining abroad or for returning to China were economic, rather than political in nature. Less than half of the students in Cheung's study indicated they were "likely" or "very likely" to return to China, and most hoped to spend at least a few years in the United States after their degree program gaining work experience. For those students who indicated a high likelihood of returning to China it was due to the prospect of securing employment in China.

David Bachman even puts forward the notion that Chinese students may be becoming radicalized and becoming even more anti-American by their experiences in the US. David Bachman states that Chinese students do not become integrated into local US culture or political culture and may even become "radicalized" by their time in the US and support

institutions with greater fervor than they did before coming to the US. According to David Bachman, “It was suggested to me by one of my Chinese students that in fact they [Chinese students in the US] were radicalized, or made more anti-American, by their experience; that they didn’t feel a part of American society, that they felt excluded and that much of what they saw they weren’t sure they liked.”

Bachman continues, saying: "When they did have American roommates, they tended not to work as hard, they tended to party more; the degrees of personal freedom that they had, or exhibited, were ones beyond the bounds for many Chinese students.”

Shuisheng Zhao, contends that Chinese students are highly nationalistic. In "The Olympics and Chinese Nationalism," Zhao argues that "Chinese youth, once the principal actors in the 1989 pro-democracy demonstrations, are now leading in the drive to rally around the authoritarian government." Zhao suggests that non-student intellectuals are supporters of the State as well. According to Zhao, the Chinese government expects students who study overseas to return to China with changed political ideologies, but this does not represent a threat to China's government, but rather is a planned evolution with effects on China of students studying abroad occurring on a 10 to 30 year timeline. Zhao further says that Chinese students in the US mostly consume Chinese media, and that many drive Mercedes and BMWs. Regarding media consumption Zhao says, “They [Chinese students in the US] mostly read Chinese language newspapers and have kind of patriotic feelings.”

51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
A 2010 study by Donglin Han and David Zweig, finds that Chinese student returnees from Japan and Canada over the preceding 15 years shows the development of an "internationalist" mindset. They compare these students views on "co-operative internationalism" and "assertive nationalism" with views from a nationwide survey in 2006 of China's middle class. The study shows that returnees are more "internationalist" and less nationalistic. Han and Zweig suggest that this means that should this returning cohort enter China's elite, they may support an increasing international role for China, and might constrain growing nationalist sentiment in China. 55

In a 2002 study, David Zweig finds that Chinese in Hong Kong, Taiwan and in Rural China all possess "a strong democratic consciousness," and engage in formal politics. Zweig refutes the idea that Chinese culture is inherently undemocratic and predicts that with "representative structures" democracy would spread in China. 56

A 2008 study by Zhao, Zhou, and Huang "Chinese students’ knowledge and thinking about America and China," study suggests that there is "a recurrent theme of a 'double-edge sword' among student perceptions of the U.S. Chinese students simultaneously held a favorable view of U.S. accomplishments, while maintaining a deep resentment of U.S. hegemony in world affairs." 57

A.I. Johnston and Daniela Stockman in their study, "Chinese Attitudes toward the United States and Americans," analyze anti-Americanism over time. Johnston and Stockman finds that certain features of American society and politics are admired, such as the education system,

personal freedom and efficient administration, but that there is "little market for the idea that the US political system is a model for China."\textsuperscript{58}

According to Johnston and Stockman, based upon the 2005 Program on International Policy Attitudes, there is negativity regarding America, but positivity regarding Americans as people.\textsuperscript{59}

Johnston and Stockman, quoting the 2000-2004 Beijing Area Study data reports that those Chinese who have traveled abroad "consistently perceive Chinese and Americans to be less different" than themselves.\textsuperscript{60} Johnston and Stockman, quote Mansfield and Snyder who speculate that democratization "promises to lead to more anti-Americanism and hyper nationalism in Chinese foreign policy." Nationalism is most virulent among the young and uneducated, but if the preferences in a democratic society are articulated by an educated and urban middle class with experience abroad, than prospect for anti-Americanism and hyper nationalism decreases.\textsuperscript{61}

What is lacking in all of these previous efforts is a significantly large quantitative sampling of Chinese students in the US, and one that specifically dissects the amorphous term "Chinese student" into more discrete categories, examining students according to degree status, economic status, and gender. Also, this study attempts to determine what factors may lead to support or non-support for institutions of politics and governance.

A key component of this study is the background question of whether China will democratize. But, this question is fraught, with very different understandings of the meaning of democracy for people in different countries. In \textit{Chinese Democracy}, Andrew Nathan suggests

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{59} Johnston and Stockman, 5.
\textsuperscript{60} Johnston and Stockman, 23.
\textsuperscript{61} Johnston and Stockman, 53.
\end{footnotesize}
that democracy in China is valued for what it can accomplish in terms of state aims, and not the protection of human rights, contrary to democracy's understood role in western countries.62

According to Nathan, democracy is valued by Chinese not for its ability to deliver and protect individual rights, but as a means to achieving order. The absence thereof, chaos (亂) has served as the chief antagonist of successive dynasties in Chinese history. Nathan suggests a stark difference in the meaning of democracy between the political cultures of the United States and of China. For Chinese, it is not the level of protection an individual has from the state that determines the level of democratic governance, but instead democracy is viewed as a means to "compound the natural harmony between the state and the individual."63 To speak of democracy in such nation-state centric terms however ignores the fact that democracy has come in many guises throughout history and has had many different meanings throughout different times and circumstances. The meaning of democracy even within a single country at a single instant in time is a matter of contentious negotiation and there has never been a firmly fixed benchmark of its meaning nor certainly has there been, or could there be, a "pure" example of democracy.

Han, D., D. Chen, and C. Fang in "Images of the United States: Explaining the Attitudes of Chinese Scholars and Students in the United States, find that Chinese students have a positive attitude towards the United States, including political institutions and economy, and environment, and remain positive towards China. "Chinese respondents maintain a strong attachment towards China and have a conservative attitude towards China's future growth." Nationalism and ethnocentrism are suggested as significant influencers on individuals' feelings about the US.64

Democratization theory suggests that economic development expands the sense of engagement that urban, well-to-do residents feel towards the nation state, making them feel the impact of government more acutely than poor rural poor residents do.\(^65\) Indeed, Nathan and Shi's study finds that urban residents ascribed more noticeable effects of government in their lives than did rural residents, but at levels still below the United States, UK, Germany, and Italy.\(^66\) Even when these differences might be explained by educational gaps between China and the other nations, similarly un-educated people in other countries still demonstrate higher perception of government effects on their life.\(^67\) Nathan and Shi find that despite this, Chinese are still satisfied with their government.\(^68\)

The World Values Survey concludes:

The desire for free choice and autonomy is a universal human aspiration, but it is not top priority when people grow up feeling that survival is uncertain. As long as physical survival remains uncertain, the desire for physical and economic security tends to take higher priority than democracy. When basic physiological and safety needs are fulfilled there is a growing emphasis on self-expression values. Findings from the WVS demonstrate that mass self-expression values are extremely important in the emergence and flourishing of democratic institutions in a society. With industrialization and the rise of postindustrial society, generational replacement makes self-expression values become more wide spread and countries with authoritarian regimes come under growing mass pressure for political liberalization. This process contributed to the dramatic Third Wave Democracy in the late 1980s and early 1990s and is one of the factors contributing to more recent processes of democratization.\(^69\)

Jie Chen and Chunlong Lu in "Democratization and the Middle Class in China: The Middle Class’s Attitudes toward Democracy," find a different understanding of democracy

\(^{65}\) Nathan and Shi, 102.
\(^{66}\) Nathan and Shi, 102.
\(^{67}\) Nathan and Shi, 103.
\(^{68}\) Nathan and Shi, 116.
among middle class Chinese than that present among middle class citizens of Europe and North America:

We have found that while most members of this new middle class are in favor of the individual rights that typically are hailed and protected in the democratic system, they shun political liberties—such as the freedom to demonstrate and to form organizations and are not interested in democratic institutions, such as the fully competitive election of leaders without restriction.\(^{70}\)

Problematic in attempting to analyze the political culture of a nation is that a nation itself is hardly a unitary entity, and differences in political values between individuals in a nation may be so great that any attempt to explain the political values of citizens of one nation may be only an inaccurate average at best, and fail to reflect the actual values possessed by individuals.

The relevance of John Stuart Mill's dictum on provincialism in thought have not diminished in the intervening century:

The world, to each individual, means the part of it with which he comes in contact: his party, his sect, his church, his class of society; the man may be called by comparison, almost liberal and large-minded to whom it means anything so comprehensive as his own country or his own age.\(^{71}\)

Former US Ambassador to China, Gary Locke, in his outgoing address referenced Chinese students in the US saying that Chinese travellers’ experience of freedoms and democracy during trips to the US could encourage them to “want some of those same things.”\(^{72}\) Whether it is freedom and democracy that students experience in the US is unclear, but critical-thinking skills seem to be being cultivated. If a student can judge his or her surroundings while in the US critically, this same critical lens could be applied to China as well.

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Existing research on Chinese students in the US suggests that career benefits of a US university degree and/or experience in the US that will make students more employable or increase their starting salaries in corporations post graduation are what Chinese students seek, not political tutelage.

Sociologist Thomas B. Gold states: "We tend to overplay the political agenda of kids who go abroad." Echoing this feeling statement by the student president of the Chinese Students and Scholars Club at the University of British Columbia who says: "Spending a few years in western countries post-university can boost job prospects for Chinese students when they return home. Gold continues:

“The United States, some 30 years ago, had this hope that when [Chinese students] come up to the United States they would be entranced by our system. That they would immediately go home and want to change things, which didn’t happen, and isn’t going to happen.”

Current academic conventional wisdom suggests that the hoped-for democratizing effect on Chinese students in the US is not occurring.

"Despite the benefits, encouraging Chinese students to study abroad creates all sorts of problems for China — though perhaps not the ones westerners imagine. For the most part, they aren’t bringing liberal values back to China.”

For students who return to China, the credentials that they earned at Western universities may even harm their career prospects, particularly career politics. Those who have been abroad for extended periods of time may not be trusted and resentment may be directed at them by colleagues who have not had the opportunity to study abroad. Stanley Rosen argues that

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73 Arno Rosenfeld, "Going Home: Chinese International Students and Democracy."
74 Ibid.
Chinese students who return to China just try to establish good lives for their families and are not interested in political agitation.\textsuperscript{76}

Paralleling the Chinese international student experience in the United States are students from Saudi Arabia in the United States. Like Chinese students in recent years, Saudi Arabian students have been arriving to US universities in greatly increasing numbers. But, does the totalitarian monarchy not fear its students being inculcated with American democratic values?\textsuperscript{77} Apparently not, and perhaps then neither should China.

According to Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations," increasing contact along cultural periphery zones will lead to conflict. Students abroad represent the spear thrust of this clash, and so, if we are to believe Huntington, conflict should occur between students abroad and the local population.\textsuperscript{78} Recent deaths of Chinese students at the University of Southern California may be a reflection of this conflict.\textsuperscript{79} Similarly, there is resentment among many Americans towards Chinese students in the US, for the perceived taking of university spaces from Americans, to the perceived lack of Chinese students desire to assimilate to local American culture. On the same hand, Chinese students may feel marginalized by Americans perceived lack of interest in understanding the experiences of Chinese students in the US.

Chinese government-led student associations are also a potential vector for political thoughtwork and maintaining ideological control over overseas Chinese students. According to

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{76} Arno Rosenfeld, "Going Home: Chinese International Students and Democracy."
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Chen Yonglin, a Chinese diplomat who defected to Australia in 2005, "students [are] an important part of embassy and consular work."\(^8^0\)

On the discussion of Party Identification, Converse and Dupeux found a predictive relationship between party identification through family generations. If a person's father identified with a political party, this person would be more likely to identify with a political party.\(^8^1\)

In sum, there is a great amount of discussion of what political views Chinese students hold and may be acquiring, but scant empirical evidence of what these views may be. Discussion of a potential democratization effect needs to be bolstered by data.


CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH FOCUS, RESEARCH DESIGN, AND HYPOTHESES

This thesis study attempts to bridge the gap between the numerous quantitative studies of the political values of Chinese and the brief and limited qualitative studies of Chinese students specifically in the US. By providing a quantitative study of the political values of Chinese students in the US, this thesis seeks to better understand the variance of political values of Chinese students in the US and the variables that may influence these values.

Four main hypotheses underlie this research project. The first is that Chinese students in the US are a diverse lot and are not a monolithic bloc that is universally wealthy, drives luxury cars, and is utterly uninterested in politics, as current popular discourse contends.

The second main hypothesis is that Chinese students in the US represent a window of sorts into China and an opportunity to study the university-aged population of China without ever leaving the United States. If this is the case, then Chinese students are a fantastic potential demographic from whom data on all sorts of politically sensitive questions might be gathered that a researcher operating in China would have far greater difficulty gathering. An operative assumption of this hypothesis is that Chinese students in the US are a comparable population to young Chinese studying for university degrees in China.

The third main hypothesis is that there is an "Americanization" effect taking place whereby students who spend longer periods of time in the US will display greater reported measures of support for and confidence in the governmental and political institutions of the US and lower support for and confidence in similar institutions of China.

The fourth main hypothesis is that there is a relationship between political values and certain factors which are either present in the daily-lived experiences of Chinese students in the
US that are unique to their US experience, or are innate components of their personal and family backgrounds which are thought to potentially influence political values.

This thesis will progress along a series of four primary examinations, with many sub-examinations, to test the saliency of these hypotheses.

The first examination seeks to provide a taxonomy of the term "Chinese Student" breaking this term down into its constituent elements with particular regard to gender, student degree status, and socio-economic status. Differences in political values witnessed along these lines will be explored. This examination also will serve as the largest scale study to date of demographic characteristics of Chinese students in the United States.

The second examination will compare results from the IU Survey to the World Values Survey Wave 6 attempting to see whether the IU Survey population (Chinese international students in the Indiana University System) is similar to Chinese in China of similar age and educational attainment. If it is, then the potential exists to study China by never leaving the United States. If the populations are dissimilar, then studying Chinese students in the Indiana University System, and possibly in the US generally will not shed meaningful light on the political values of Chinese in China and they must be regarded as distinct populations.

The third examination will specifically focus on the largely post 2008 phenomenon of the Chinese undergraduate student in the US and try to determine whether greater length of time in the US is correlated with greater or lesser support for and confidence in Chinese and US institutions of politics and governance. The researcher hypothesizes that greater length of time in the US will result in increased metrics of support for the US and lower metrics of support for China.
The fourth examination will look at correlation between a number of variables, listed below, and metrics of support for governmental and political institutions of the US and China. These variables are:

1. Level of Happiness
2. Media Usage
3. Environmental Quality
4. Friendships with Americans
5. Pre-existing attraction to American political system
6. Car ownership and driving rates
7. Possession of real estate in the US
8. Presence of family members in the US
9. Membership of Chinese political party

A non-randomized anonymous online IRB-approved survey was designed that recorded responses from 335 students representing 11% of the Indiana University system Chinese international student population.

The creation of this survey was influenced by and drew significantly upon previous social science studies, particularly *The Civic Culture*, by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba; "Cultural Requisites for Democracy in China," by Andrew Nathan and Tianjin Shi; the "2009 Survey on China's Legal Services Work Environment," by Ethan Michelson; *Allies of the State* by Bruce Dickson and Jie Chen; The World Values Surveys; and the Pew Global Attitudes surveys.

This study seeks to answer whether Chinese students in the United States hold similar political values to those of Chinese generally, and whether differing educational levels result in differing expression of political values as seen in Nathan and Shi's 1994 study. 82

This survey of 77 questions was designed based upon questions previously asked of Chinese nationals by a number of social science studies. Ethan Michelson's 2009 *Survey on China's Legal Services Work Environment, The Civic Culture, Pew Global Attitudes survey*

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work, the World Values Survey, work by Bruce Dickson and Jie Chen in *Allies of the State* and Andrew Nathan and Tianjin Shi's "Cultural Requisites for Democracy in China: Findings from a Survey," all influenced the formation of these questions.

Unlike Johnston and Stockman in *Chinese Attitudes to the United States*, who deem that "questions about attitudes toward the US political system are too sensitive to include in surveys," this study rests upon asking some potentially sensitive questions about both the US and Chinese political system. Where Johnston and Stockman utilize questions regarding Taiwan as a benchmark to examine attitudes of Chinese, this survey deliberately excluded any questions about Taiwan.\(^8\)

Though politics and understanding of the feelings of students towards governmental and political institutions of the US and China is the central aim of this study, the questions eventually selected for inclusion in this survey steered away from piercingly direct questions of politics in the hopes of receiving more student input and avoiding inflaming passions. The type of questions which were not asked are those such as "Will China ever become a democracy like the US," "Which political and governmental system is better, that of the US or China," "Do you support China's government," and "What is the status of Taiwan?"

Instead, questions of political values were approached obliquely with questions such as "How democratically is China being governed," "How democratically is the US being governed," and "How strongly do you agree with the following statement: I support my country's political institutions" appearing in the survey. The survey questions placed emphasis on both the governmental and political systems of the United States and those of China. The analytical

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software program *Qualtrics* was chosen as the primary tool for designing the survey and storing and analyzing data.

Participants were recruited through a bi-lingual (Chinese and English) email sent to school email addresses of students gathered from the Indiana University "Find People" website. Potential participants were selected based upon surname, and largely limited to the 100 most common Chinese surnames. As a result of this method, some Chinese students with less common surnames were excluded from this study. Non-PRC nationals, as well as respondents from Hong Kong are not represented in this study.

In sum, 3,130 emails were sent in an attempt to reach a possible total of 3,520 Chinese students in the Indiana University system.

Of responses received, a large number were unable to be utilized for analysis purpose. These included students from Taiwan, Hong Kong and the United States. A very large number of respondents completed only several questions, and thus were not useful as data points.

**Fig. 3-1 Number of survey recruitment emails sent to students throughout IU system**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IU School</th>
<th>No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bloomington</td>
<td>2,632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IUPUI</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Bend</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indianapolis</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Albany</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kokomo</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The predominant analytic method of this work involved comparing the answers to political values questions of similar groups to see if there were differences between the mean responses of these groups. This comparison does not effectively track the variance of data. As a

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result, on a hypothetical question that asks 10 students to pick their favorite number between the numbers 1 and 5, if the mean favorite number turns out to be 3, the analysis done in this study will not obviously show the full extent of number preferences. In other words, we would not know whether it was the case that five students selected 1 and five students selected 5, or whether all 10 students selected 3 as their favorite number.

The attempt to find a correlation between time in the US and political values in this study is inherently flawed due to this being only a single instance survey of different students and not a longitudinal study that compares the same discrete students over time. Thus, any discussion of time as a variable in political values is done so with this caveat in mind. However, careful consideration was taken in running the time-treatment tests particularly in limiting time-treatment analysis to undergraduate students who have been in the US for up to 59 months. Students from five distinct year groups were analyzed and were shown to be similar in the aggregate across variables such as gender, academic major, and socio-economic status.

The fact is that this is not a randomized sample is a grave problem that this survey faces in purporting to showcase the political values of different subgroups of Chinese students in the US. It is a very biased data pool that comes from students who opened their emails and chose to spend the time to respond. This study is not a random sample of the population of Chinese students in the US, nor even of Chinese students in Indiana.

This study is not a balanced design in that not all treatment combinations (survey questions) have the same number of observations (responses). Certain responses were answered with much greater frequency than others, particularly questions towards the beginning of the survey. These questions at the beginning asked such things as 'happiness level' and province of
birth, while questions asking about parents' political affiliation were answered with much reduced frequency.

Response bias is a concern of this study, and it is not known whether responses to this study came from students who are very politically engaged, or possibly even bypassed politically engaged students due to their fears of repercussions should their views be made known.

The timing of when the survey was conducted is highly relevant. Had the same questions been asked in the midst of Fall 2014 protests in Hong Kong, answers may have tended towards the more patriotic and support of government of China if the Facebook feeds of the researcher's Chinese friends might be any indication.

Finally, all of the data from which the analysis in this project is based is provided entirely by respondents and the researcher has no capability to verify the accuracy of any student responses.86

The regional component to this study should not be overlooked. This study as well as the sociologically and anthropologically-grounded studies by Nancy Abelmann in *The Intimate University* and Geri Alumit Zeldes in *Imported from China*, which this study references, all take place within the context of large, Midwestern state schools.87 The extent to which the profile of Chinese students at schools such as these differs from other schools may be enormous. Results of this study cannot then be said to be generalizable to students across the United States. There is evidence to suggest that the profile of students at these schools is markedly different from that of others, given anecdotal evidence of lower test score requirements at these schools than at others. Further nation-wide, statistically rigorous and randomized survey work is thus needed to draw

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86 The words "respondent" and "participant" are used interchangeably to refer to students who responded and participated in this survey.
definitive conclusions about the demographic characteristics and political beliefs of Chinese students generally in the US. However, the value of this study lays not so much in demography, but in an effort to demonstrate a change-over-time effect by presence in the US. Indeed this is not exactly possible due to the very likely differences in demographic profile of different cohorts of students. The students who have been in the United States for four or more years may have arrived in the United States for markedly different reasons than those of more recent years, and thus a longitudinal study of students is necessary to demonstrate any actual change. This study therefore can best be used as a benchmark for future research, and an introductory exploration into a population and topic that bears further study.

Names are drawn from largely Han ethnicity Chinese and likely exclude minorities including Mongolians or Uighurs due to name searches that used monosyllabic common Chinese surnames. Also, this method would likely exclude those from Hong Kong or Taiwan or with Wade-Giles spelled names. As is, the survey achieved an ethnicity sampling size of 7%, and 93% Han, figures closely in line with China's official population statistics.

**Variables Hypothesized to Correlate with Political Values**

**Variable 1:** Happiness - Students who are happy and/or satisfied with their school will show higher support for the governmental and political institutions of the United States than those who are dissatisfied or unhappy.

**Variable 2:** Use of Media - The more frequently students consume English-language media, the higher their measures of support for and confidence in the governmental and political institutions of the US will be, and the lower they will be for China.
Variable 3: Quality of Life in the US - Those ranking the environment in which they are living in the US as excellent should have more positive views of US governmental and political institutions than those ranking the environment in which they are living in the US as less than excellent.

Variable 4: Friendships - More American friends should equate with higher support for US government and political institutions.

Variable 5: US Political System as Motivating Factor - Students for whom the political system of the United States was a motivating factor in their decision to study in the United States should have higher levels of support for the political and governmental institutions of the US than those students for whom the political system of the Untied States was not a motivating factor.

Variable 6: Cars - Students who drive and own cars in the US will have higher levels of support for the political and governmental institutions of the US than those who do not drive cars. (Cars reflect national culture. The car is product of the suburban lifestyle, habitus.

Variable 7: Property Ownership - Real estate property ownership in the United States by respondents or their families should predict higher levels of support for US institutions of politics and governance than those who do not own real estate property in the US.

Variable 8: Family in US - Students with family members in the US should have higher support for institutions of politics and governance of the US than those without family in the US, and lower levels of support and confidence for institutions of China.

Variable 9: Party Membership - Membership of a Chinese political party should predict higher
support for institutions of China and lower support for institutions of the US as compared with respondents who are not members of a Chinese political party.

**Calculating Support for and Confidence in Institutions of Politics and Governance**

Though this survey is comprised of 77 questions only a few of the questions are directly related to measuring support for and confidence in political and governmental institutions of the United States and the People's Republic of China. Below is the analytical framework for determining support for and confidence in institutions.

Survey questions 37, 42-1, 42-2, 42-3, 42-4, 42-5, 42-8, 46, 50, and 61 relate to China.

Survey questions 41, 42-6, 47, 51, and 62 relate to the United States.

We are interested to see whether support and confidence for the US and China differ between different analytical categories such as student degree status, gender, and socio-economic status.

To do this the survey respondents are separated into the categories mentioned above: degree status, gender, and self-reported socio-economic status.

Next, each of the separate analytical categories is examined to see what level of support each analytical category has for institutions of China and the US. A number, which we will call the SUPPORT INDEX, (which is expressed as a ratio of the measures of actual support and confidence of national institutions divided by the total possible measure of support) is placed next to each of these analytical categories. The higher the number, the greater the confidence and support for China or the US. The lower the number, the lower the confidence and support for China or the US. Numbers for China appear below in the first column and numbers for the US appear in the second column.
Fig. 3-2 Support Index for the US and China by Degree Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree Status</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Undergraduate</td>
<td>0.628</td>
<td>0.681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master's</td>
<td>0.568</td>
<td>0.663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>0.616</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

****It is important to note that the Support Index of China and the US are not directly comparable to one another. Because the IU Survey did not ask completely parallel questions regarding the US and China, there can be no direct comparison between the numbers for China in and those for the US. Rather, the numbers for China must only be compared to other numbers for China. The numbers for the US must be compared only to other numbers for the US. Any comparison must be done across the analytical categories and not within a category. For example, we may compare the support index for China for undergraduate male students who are wealthy to the support index for China for PhD female students who are not wealthy. However, we may not compare the support index for China for undergraduate male students who are wealthy to the support index for the US for male undergraduate students who are wealthy.

Each question in the IU survey that concerns support or confidence in institutions of politics and governance is a multiple choice question. A question generally asks about one's level of support or confidence on a range from the choices of "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree" regarding the statement presented. Each possible multiple-choice answer is associated with a numeric value. A higher numeric value indicates a higher level of agreement with the statement presented. A lower numeric value indicates a lower level of agreement with the statement presented. There are several different scales employed. Some questions exist on a scale of 1-4, others on a scale of 1-5, and some on a scale of 1-10. An example of a question on a scale of 1-5 is presented below.
From this example we see that the mean numeric is 3.28. This indicates a mean value for this analytical category (the analytical category is "Chinese Student" which is comprised of all respondents) that falls between the multiple choice answer options of "Neither Agree nor Disagree" and "Agree." Therefore, 3.28 is the relevant number that we will take from this question in helping us determine the Support Index for this analytical category. Because this question is question number 37, which was earlier defined as a question relating to China, this value of 3.28 will go towards determining the Support Index for China in the analytical category of "Chinese Student."

Let us continue this exercise to another question related to China from which we desire information in creating the Support Index for China for the analytical category "Chinese Student".

Fig. 3-4 Confidence in Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>A great deal (非常高信任)</th>
<th>Quite a lot (比較高信任)</th>
<th>Not very much (不太信任)</th>
<th>None at all (根本不信任)</th>
<th>Total Responses</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The Armed Forces of China (中国人民军队)</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Here, we see a question that has a range of 1-4, with four possible multiple-choice answers. The numeric value of "4" is associated with the answer choice "A great deal" while the numeric value of "1" is associated with the answer choice "None at all". We see that the mean value is 2.95, a response which falls very close to the answer choice "Quite a lot".

From here, determining the Support Index for this analytical category is simple. Let us imagine for the sake of our example here that the Support Index for China for the analytic category of "Chinese Student" is determined only from these two questions. To determine the support index we will add the mean values from the two questions, above (3.28 and 2.95). The result is 6.23. Since the first value of 3.28 came from a question whose possible maximum value was 5, and the second value of 2.95 came from a possible maximum value of 4, we see that the total maximum value for these questions is 5 plus 4, which equals 9. Thus, out of a possible maximum value of 9, we have the value of 6.23.

We wish to present the Support Index as a ratio of the possible maximum support value. Therefore, if we divide 6.23 by 9 (6.23/9) we arrive at the ratio of .692, which if we wished to display as a percent would be 69.2% Therefore, .692 or 69.2% is our Support Index for the hypothetical example category of "Chinese Student" which we have created. Please note that this percentage does not indicate that 69.2% of the respondents in this hypothetical analytical category support China. Rather, it is a ratio of support in terms of the maximum possible support under the parameters of these questions.
CHAPTER 4: DESCRIPTION OF DATA

Data in this study comes from 335 citizens of the People's Republic of China who are students across the Indiana University system. 86% of responses come from students enrolled at Indiana University-Bloomington. Of the 335 respondents analyzed in this study, 196 completed the survey in full.

Fig. 4-1 School Affiliation of IU Survey Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bloomington</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other IU Campus (majority IUPUI)</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-IU(^{88})</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The gender distribution is 54% female, 46% male. These figures almost exactly match the Chinese international student gender distribution at Indiana University-Bloomington, which is 55% female and 45% male.\(^{89}\)

Of the 335 respondents in this survey, 177 are undergraduates, 85 are Master's students, and 67 are doctoral students. Two respondents are in the Indiana University Intensive English Program and three respondents only describe themselves as "other" which includes post-doctoral students.

A usable response rate of 11% out of 3,130 recruitment emails sent without taking into account undeliverable emails was recorded from the IU Survey. The decent response rate suggests that the subject of this study was not unattractive to Chinese students and that further related projects may find fertile ground.

\(^{88}\) 6 of the 335 respondents indicated a school outside of the Indiana University system as their campus. However, given the fact that the recruitment email only went out to persons with IU email addresses, the researcher believes this should not raise a problem in their inclusion in this study. In fact, several of the respondents who indicated a school affiliation of "other" had computer IP addresses originating in Bloomington, IN.

Demographic and Cultural Background of Survey Population

The idea to survey Chinese populations in the United States emerged from the researcher’s arrival in Bloomington, Indiana in Fall 2012 and shock at seeing so many Chinese students on campus and around town. In the fall of 2012, the researcher undertook a survey of Chinese students on the Indiana University Bloomington campus regarding Chinese students attitudes towards the province of Xinjiang, its people, and the relations of both to China. The results were obtained through an entirely un-randomized survey conducted on the Indiana University campus and served as the initial impetus and indication that studying the political values of Chinese students in the US may shed interesting light on politics in China, often regarding sensitive dimensions.

According to the Chronicle of Higher Education 287,260 Chinese post-secondary students have active student visas, and in 2012-2013 school year, 235,597 Chinese students were studying at institutions of higher learning in the US.\(^90\) Waiting in the wings are increasing numbers of Chinese students attending US K-12 programs. In 2005, 639 student visas for Chinese high-school students were issued. In 2014 this number was 31,889.\(^91\)

If we were to create a map of the Chinese University Student Population in the United States, we would not see a uniform distribution of students across the country's universities, nor would we see the same profiles of students at different universities. The Midwestern United States has a surprisingly large number of Chinese international students, with universities in

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Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan and Ohio having them in great abundance. The results of an interview conducted by the researcher suggest that Chinese students in the US are very attuned to the relative rankings of different institutions in the US and have a well-developed psychosocial framework used to place oneself in relation to other Chinese students in the US.\textsuperscript{92} Specifically, it was claimed that Chinese students know the characteristics of Chinese students in different geographic locations. For example, Chinese students at large public state Universities in the Midwest would not be as elite as their peers at East Coast schools. Indeed, the admissions requirements at many Midwest state schools are lower than others. Many schools, including Indiana University do not require TOEFL scores, and instead admit students, requiring them to take an IEP (Intensive English Program) course prior to enrolling in regular courses. As a result, the English capacity of many Chinese undergraduate students is below that which is adequate to truly excel in coursework that is more abstract in nature than mathematics or business courses or requires significant writing.\textsuperscript{93} In fact, many students may have been admitted to Universities in the United States under false pretenses. According to a report, up to half of all Chinese undergraduate applications to universities have gone through agencies that write essays for students and help them apply.\textsuperscript{94} According to Zinch China, a consulting group that advises American colleges, "An estimated 90% of recommendation letters are fake, 70% of essays are written by someone else other than the applicant and 50% of high school transcripts are manipulated."\textsuperscript{95} In fact, the researcher uncovered evidence that seems to confirm widespread and organized cheating on standardized exams. In 2011 the researcher heard about the way that

\textsuperscript{92} X. Z., Interview by author, Minneapolis, MN, April 11, 2014.
\textsuperscript{93} Based upon the researcher's experiences as Associate instructor between 2012-2014.
\textsuperscript{95} \textit{Ibid.}
GMAT, (Graduate Management Admissions Tests) are studied for, where participating test-takers post to message boards the exact wordings of questions that they encounter, which are then viewed and memorized by proximate test takers. Apparently test questions for each test in a given month-long period are drawn from a pool of several hundred that change each month. On a given test, a student will encounter 37 of these questions. But, if all can be memorized, a near perfect score is all but assured. In an interview conducted in summer 2013 with a Chinese student about this phenomenon, the researcher confirmed this phenomenon. A similar website, Jijing, popular among students in Taiwan. However, in conversations with both a Chinese graduate student and Taiwanese recent graduate, they do not view checking these websites as cheating, and rather as a study aid.

According to a 2011 study conducted at Lehigh University that surveyed the perceptions of professors regarding their first-year Chinese graduate students in business and the sciences, the professors believe that students are often "linguistically and culturally unprepared for study in higher educational institutions in the US." This having been said, not all American born students have been able to meet this requirement either.

Large state schools in the Midwestern United States have a very large number of Chinese students, including the school with the most Chinese students, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. Purdue University and Michigan State University Lansing are not far behind.

Eight out of the 'Big Ten' universities are included on the Institute of International Education's

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97 J., (Graduate Student) "MBA GMAT Exam in China," in discussion with author, Washington, D.C., January 2011.
101 Edmund James, "从中国到 UIUC-百年留学史 (From China to Urbana-Champaign: A History of 100 Years)," Youku.com, accessed June 5, 2015 [weblink missing].
2011-2012 list of the top 20 American schools with the highest international populations. Eight Big Ten universities made the IIE’s 2011-12 list of the top 20 American schools with the highest international populations. "Of all Big Ten schools, nine of which provided a detailed breakdown of their international populations, Chinese students made up an average of almost 46 percent of their international students in 2012, or about 6 percent of the entire student body."¹⁰¹

**Fig. 4-2 Chinese Student Populations at Several Large Public Midwest Universities**¹⁰²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>1,212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin Madison</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana University Bloomington</td>
<td>3,079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purdue University</td>
<td>3,934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan State University</td>
<td>4,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Univ. of IL Urbana Champaign</td>
<td>4,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With an increase of nearly 100,000 Chinese students between 2009-2012 on US university rosters, Chinese students comprised some 25% of all foreign students in the US. By the 2013-14 school year, this figure was 29%.¹⁰³ This enormous increase has also been seen at IU. In fact, Indiana had the largest percent increase in Chinese students between 2011 and 2012...

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Edmund James, "从中国到UIUC-百年留学史 (From China to Urbana-Champaign: A History of 100 Years)," *Youku.com*, accessed June 5, 2015 [weblink missing].

of any other state. But what is striking is the particularly high numbers of Chinese students at Midwest schools, 46% of the international student population at Midwest schools, vs. 29% nationally. What accounts for so many Chinese students particularly at these schools?

Chinese students are also attending high school in the United States in greatly increasing numbers. Many attend expensive private schools whose tuition rivals that of Ivy League universities. According to Voice of America, there are 30,000 Chinese high school students in the United States. "Last year American schools welcomed 50 times more Chinese students than they did just eight years ago." According to the results of the IU survey, 11% of respondents attended middle or high school in the United States. This is an outstandingly large number that shows that potential effects of the American experience are not limited to experiences had at universities.

Chinese students have been reported to be choosing to attend college in the United States due to the competitive pressure of the gaokao and lack of university spaces in China. The number of Chinese undergraduates in the US increased nine-fold from 2005 to 2012. In 2013, Chinese students contributed $24 billion to the US economy.

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The reporting on Chinese students in the United States is widespread, and the phenomenon is well-recognized, but there is still nothing to indicate what the students are learning about America.

A so-called "micro study" discussing Chinese students at the University of Illinois-Urbana Champaign details some problems with the Chinese students on campus including application cheating, that is having the application prepared by a third party, and lack of adequate English language abilities. Numbers of Chinese students in freshman classes at UIUC increased from 20 to 600, and now Chinese students comprise 10% of freshman class.108

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CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS OF RESULTS

Introduction of Results

I. Taxonomy - The Chinese student population of the Indiana University system is very diverse with significant differences witnessed in political values by gender, student degree status, and socio-economic status. Broadly speaking, males are more supportive of Chinese institutions than females, females are more supportive of US institutions than males, graduate students are less supportive of Chinese institutions than undergraduates, and higher socio-economic status correlates with greater support for Chinese institutions. This suggests the importance of refraining from blanket generalizations concerning the demographic characteristics and political values of Chinese international students in the United States.

II. IU Survey Population Description - Responses by respondents to the IU Survey vary from the World Values Survey in many respects. This provides evidence suggesting that the Chinese students in the Indiana University system are a dissimilar population to that of similarly aged and educated Chinese in China.

III. Effect of Time - Survey analysis suggests that the longer Chinese undergraduate students spend in the US the lower their confidence in and support for US institutions of politics and governance will be. Analysis of 151 undergraduate students who have been in the US for periods of time from 0-59 months shows that Chinese undergraduate students who have been in the US for longer periods of time have lower support for and confidence in US institutions than Chinese students who have been in the US for shorter lengths of time.

There is less of a linear relationship between time and support for and confidence in Chinese institutions. However, support for and confidence in Chinese institutions is higher
among students in their first year than it is for students who have been in the US for more than 1 year.

Though this is not a longitudinal study, and is only a snapshot recording political values of students at different time stages of their university experience, this data may point to a time-effect treatment whereby undergraduate students become significantly more critical of the institutions of politics and governance of the US and slightly more critical of those of China the longer they are in the US.

**IV. Variables Hypothesized to Correlate with Political Values** - The table below shows different variables that were predicted to correlate with greater or lesser support for and confidence in governmental and political institutions of China and the US.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive Response</th>
<th>Support for China</th>
<th>Support for US</th>
<th>Hypothesis supported?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is Happy</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>Partially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uses US media a lot</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher rating of US Environmental Quality</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More friendships with Americans</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>Partially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has pre-existing attraction to US pol System</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has a Car</td>
<td>No Correlation</td>
<td>No Correlation</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family owns US Real Estate</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>Partially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has Family in US</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>Partially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of Chinese political party</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most interestingly support for the US predicts support for China. That is, support for China is correlated with support for the US.

In starting this survey the researcher imagined bifurcated political identification, with respondent support for one country's institutions inversely correlated with support for those of the other. In fact, this study shows that political support is not bifurcated along national lines, but
that support for the institutions of one country predicts support for the institutions of another. We may surmise from this that students may not see the governmental and political systems of the US and China as necessarily oppositional to one another. Support for one's country of national origin, that is being inclined towards nationalism, is perhaps inevitable and may not necessarily signify an oppositional stance towards the systems of another country.

I. Taxonomy of the Chinese Student: Noticing the Ferrari, paying no mind to the Ford

A central goal of this research project has been to disaggregate the Chinese student, to provide a sort of Linnaean classification system for Chinese students in the US. Dividing the monolithic term "Chinese student" into sensible categories that can be better analyzed is essential to understanding who Chinese students in the US are and what political values they hold. In the same way that an ornithologist will learn little of the dietary habits of the American Bald Eagle by studying those of the American Goldfinch, despite these both being graceful birds of the eastern woodlands that derive their sustenance from the same ecological zone, the political scientist can learn but little of the political values of a self-funded recently arrived Chinese business undergraduate student by interviewing a Chinese chemistry doctoral student of extended residence in the United States.

A common trope of the Chinese student in the US is that of the wealthy luxury car-driving, ivy-league attending, communist party-backed socialite epitomized by Bo Guagua, son of deposed Chongqing strongman Bo Xilai. However, this project seeks to demonstrate that this conception is but a fiction of our collective imagination which is drawn towards that which

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catches our eye, reinforcing existing notions and ignoring evidence that does not fit into our schemas of the way things are.

The stereotype of luxury car driving Chinese student is not supported by this study. Most cars owned by Chinese students are modest brands and three quarters of cars are purchased used. Many Chinese students work menial jobs in on-campus basement cafeterias, scrimp to save money, and are supported by parents who sell their apartments in China to pay for their children's education. There are profound differences in socio-economic status between different levels of students. Undergraduates tend to be the wealthiest, followed by masters students, followed by impoverished PhDs. While Chinese students report being better off economically than their American peers in aggregate, the aggregate tells only part of the story. There are lots of wealthy Chinese and there are lots of merely, or barely middle class Chinese students at US universities.

**Fig. 5-2 IU Survey Respondent numbers by degree status, gender, and economic status**
*For the purposes of this survey wealth is determined by student responses to IU Survey Question 22, which asks students about their socio-economic status. Those reporting that they are "upper class" or "upper middle class" are assigned to the *wealthy* category. Those reporting that they are "middle class," "lower middle class," or "lower class" are assigned to the *not wealthy* category. It should be noted that self-reported economic class is suspect as people often declare themselves to be middle class irrespective of their actual financial circumstances. However, the researcher while acknowledging this problem, believes that the data nonetheless accurately reflects actual student wealth, at least for those reporting that they are wealthy. Spot checks on respondents who reported themselves as wealthy reveal that these respondents as a group also indicated that they were of higher socio-economic status than their peers and ate meals out of the house more frequently than respondents who indicated they were not wealthy.

The IU Survey results demonstrate that undergraduates, this largely post 2008 phenomenon, are very distinct from the category of Chinese doctoral student that have long been a feature of American campus life. These differences are witnessed in economic status as undergraduates report being much wealthier than PhD students and are almost entirely self-funded.

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It is clear then that in analyzing the Chinese student population we must look at specific sub-populations of Chinese students and not view them as an aggregate whole. There are differences along the lines of gender, economic status, and student status.
II. Comparison of IU Survey (2014) to World Values Survey Wave 6, (2010-2014.)\textsuperscript{111}

Comparison of parallel survey questions from the WVS and IU Survey suggests that the IU survey population is distinct from the survey population of Chinese in China of similar age and educational attainment. Demographically, the IU Survey population appears to be of a higher socio-economic strata than the WVS population and politically, IU Survey respondents report lower confidence in institutions of Chinese government and politics.

This implies that studying the political values of Chinese students in the US will not tell us about the political values of comparably aged and educated Chinese in China. The most significant demographic difference witnessed between these populations is socio-economic status with the IU Survey population reporting higher status than the WVS population.

\textbf{Fig. 5-7 What economic/social class do you belong to? (percent)}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>WVS - Univ. prep</th>
<th>WVS - Univ. Degree</th>
<th>IU Survey</th>
<th>Same or Not</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upper</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper-Middle</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower-Middle</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Class</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Class</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Though this question was asked somewhat differently on the WVS and IU surveys, there were five different socio-economic categories to choose from in each survey. The results indicate (in a subjective respondent self-assessment) that IU survey respondents are of higher socio-economic level than counterparts in China. Notably, the percent indicating they are of the lowest socio-economic strata is 2% whereas WVS respondents percentage indicating the same was 6.6% for university degree holders and 13.4 percent for those with university preparation, which includes those currently enrolled in a university program. Because there was no category in the WVS for China for “some university education” the analysis of this section compares two

educational categories from the WVS to the IU Survey.

Socio-economic status aside, WVS and IU survey respondents have many characteristics in common.

**Fig. 5-8 Mean Age of Respondents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>WVS - Univ. prep</th>
<th>WVS - Univ. Degree</th>
<th>IU Survey</th>
<th>Same or Not</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean Age</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The mean age of respondents in the WVS and IU Survey is almost identical.

**Fig. 5-9 How interested would you say you are in Politics?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>WVS - Univ. prep</th>
<th>WVS - Univ. Degree</th>
<th>IU Survey</th>
<th>Same or Not</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interest in Politics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive (Very + Somewhat)</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative (Not very + Not at all)</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reported interest in politics is very similar.

**Fig. 5-10 Level of Trust in Others** (Percentage reporting that most people can be trusted or that they need to be very careful)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>WVS - Univ. prep</th>
<th>WVS - Univ. Degree</th>
<th>IU Survey</th>
<th>Same or Not</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Most people can be trusted/need to be very careful</td>
<td>58.1/38.3</td>
<td>66.7/27.6</td>
<td>67/33</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The reported level of trust in others is very similar at about two-thirds trusting, and one-third not trusting of others. As an aside, US respondent responses to the same question from the World Values Survey are nearly inverted with only one-third indicating that most people can be trusted. Whether or not with time respondents in the US become more similar in their responses to US citizens is a question for future research.

**Fig. 5-11 How important are these things in your life?** (Percent recording very important)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>WVS - Univ. prep</th>
<th>WVS - Univ. Degree</th>
<th>IU Survey</th>
<th>Same or Not</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>88.3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leisure time</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Though in the previous chart, reported interest in politics is similar, the IU Survey population displays a lower percentage indicating that politics is “very important” to them. The percentage reporting that Religion is “very important” is somewhat higher in the IU Survey.

**Fig. 5-12 Health and Happiness** (Percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>WVS - Univ. prep</th>
<th>WVS - Univ. Degree</th>
<th>IU Survey</th>
<th>Same or Not</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Happiness (very happy)</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health (Very good)</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reported levels of health and happiness are similar.

**Fig. 5-13 Active Membership in Organizations of Civil Society** (Percent reporting “active membership”)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>WVS Univ. prep</th>
<th>WVS Univ. Degree</th>
<th>IU Survey</th>
<th>Same or Not</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Church or Religious organization</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport or Recreational Organization</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art, Music or Educational Organization</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Union</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Party</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Organization</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Association</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian or Charitable Organization</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Help or Mutual Aid Group</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other organization</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of Choice and control over life</td>
<td>6.71</td>
<td>7.43</td>
<td>6.66</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Active membership in organizations of civil society is more similar than dissimilar, differing substantially based more likely upon structural differences between campus life and organization in the US and China and the greater opportunity to be involved in civic society organizations on a US campus.

IU Survey respondents have much greater likelihood of active membership in an art, music or educational organization. This may indicate less of a difference in the character of students in the US and more to the greater opportunities that US campus life presents to become involved with extracurricular activities.
No respondent in the IU survey reported being an active member of a political party. This is not surprising given that no one in this survey is eligible to vote in a US election and is thus formally excluded from political activity.

IU Survey respondents were much more likely to be active members of a professional organization. Again, this is likely a function of the differing characteristics of the US campus environment and is probably not indicative of fundamental differences between Chinese students in the US and those in China. IU Survey respondents were slightly more likely to be involved in a humanitarian or charitable organization in the US, again likely a function of greater opportunity for civic cultural engagement in the US. IU Survey respondents were also slightly more likely to be involved in a self help or mutual aid group likely for the same reasons above.

**Fig. 5-14 How democratically is China being governed?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How Democratically is China being governed?</th>
<th>WVS - Univ. prep</th>
<th>WVS - Univ. Degree</th>
<th>IU Survey</th>
<th>Same or Not</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.58</td>
<td>6.27</td>
<td>4.82</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IU Survey respondents believe the level of democratic governance in China is much lower. This is very significant and reinforces the conjecture that the IU Survey respondent population and the World Values Survey respondent population are distinct.

**Fig. 5-15 Confidence in Beijing Government**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Confidence in Beijing Govt.</th>
<th>WVS - Univ. prep</th>
<th>WVS - Univ. Degree</th>
<th>IU Survey</th>
<th>Same or Not</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive (a great deal + quite a lot)</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative (not very much + none at all)</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IU Survey respondents have much lower confidence in the government in Beijing.
Fig. 5-16 Confidence in Chinese Armed Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Confident in Chinese Armed Forces</th>
<th>WVS - Univ. prep</th>
<th>WVS - Univ. Degree</th>
<th>IU Survey</th>
<th>Same or Not</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive (a great deal + quite a lot)</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative (not very much + none at all)</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Positive confidence is similar but a much greater percentage of the IU Survey respondents report having “not very much” or no confidence at all in the Chinese Armed Forces.

Fig. 5-17 Confidence in Chinese Courts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Confidence in Courts</th>
<th>WVS - Univ. prep</th>
<th>WVS - Univ. Degree</th>
<th>IU Survey</th>
<th>Same or Not</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive (a great deal + quite a lot)</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative (not very much + none at all)</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Confidence in Chinese courts is enormously lower in the IU Survey. 56% of IU respondents report negative confidence versus 19% of the WVS. 15% of IU Survey respondents report no confidence at all in the Chinese Courts.

Fig. 5-18 Confidence in National People’s Congress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Confidence in NPC (Parliament)</th>
<th>WVS - Univ. prep</th>
<th>WVS - Univ. Degree</th>
<th>IU Survey</th>
<th>Same or Not</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive (a great deal + quite a lot)</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative (not very much + none at all)</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is more than 30 percentage point lower confidence in the NPC among IU Survey respondents. percentage. One-fifth have no confidence at all in the NPC.
Survey Description

The raw results of the 77-question survey that yielded 335 respondents are discussed below. Respondents have a mean age of 23.8 years and are predominately students at Indiana University Bloomington (86%) with the remainder from other Indiana University system schools. Respondents are 53% undergraduate, 45% graduate (doctoral and masters) and 5% other including Intensive English Program. Graduate students were more likely than undergraduates to complete the survey in its entirety.

Gender matters. Male students are more likely to hold polarized views while females tend towards more neutral stances. Male students are more likely to respond as strongly disagreeing or strongly agreeing with a given statement while females are more likely to answer "neither agree nor disagree." Males report higher overall support for most institutions of Chinese governance and politics and lower levels of support for those of the US as compared with females.

Socio-economic status matters. Those self-reporting as being members of upper class or upper middle class socio-economic strata are more likely to show higher measures of support and confidence in the governmental and political institutions of China than students from lower middle class or lower class socio-economic background.

Chinese students are far from universally wealthy. The chart below demonstrates that 15% of respondents in this survey indicate that they fall below the category "middle class" while 22% identify themselves as members of a wealthy or above middle class status. Only 1% identify as upper class.
A subsequent question which asks Chinese students to compare their economic status to students at their school indicates that one-third believe themselves to be better off economically than their peers, while the majority (54%) perceive no economic difference between themselves and others. Indeed, 14% of Chinese students indicate that they are worse off economically than students at their school.

Student degree status matters. Not only does the likelihood of taking and completing this survey increase with higher degree status but respondent submitted comments increase in length and sophistication as well. The results show that in the aggregate undergraduate students have the highest level of support for and confidence in institutions of governance and politics. Masters students have the lowest level of confidence and support for Chinese institutions while doctoral students have the lowest level of support for US institutions.
Fig. 5-21 Level of Support for Chinese and US institutions by Degree Status
(underline indicates the highest support in each category and italic the lowest support.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>China Q's</th>
<th>Max Value</th>
<th>Undergraduate</th>
<th>Master's</th>
<th>PhD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of respondents</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>3.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42-1</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42-2</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42-3</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42-4</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42-6</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>30.16</td>
<td>27.24</td>
<td>29.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China Support Index</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.628</td>
<td>0.568</td>
<td>0.616</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US Q's</th>
<th>Max Value</th>
<th>Undergraduate</th>
<th>Master's</th>
<th>PhD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>19.08</td>
<td>18.57</td>
<td>17.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Support Index</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.681</td>
<td>0.663</td>
<td>0.640</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 5-22 Happiness Level

4. Taking all things together, how happy would you say you are? (对现在的一切情况都考虑进去，你对自己生活得愉快吗？)... 87% report being rather happy or very happy.

Table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Very happy (很高兴)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Rather happy (快乐)</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Not very happy (不太快乐)</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Not at all happy (一点都不快乐)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig 5-23 University Satisfaction

16. How satisfied are you with your University?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Very dissatisfied</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Dissatisfied</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Very satisfied</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

67% of Chinese students are either satisfied or very satisfied with their University.

On questions of political values, the response rate is lower than questions asking about non-political issues. This may indicate one of two things: either a sensitivity to these issues and an unwillingness to openly share information, or unfamiliarity with thinking about these sorts of
questions.

Chinese political party membership (including membership in the Chinese Communist Party) is high among student's parents. 48% of respondents' fathers and 38% of respondents' mothers are Chinese political party members.

**Fig. 5-24 Party Membership**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party (共产党)</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Democrats (民主党)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Communist Youth League (共青团)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Other (其他)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fig. 5-25 Obama and Xi Job Performance Rating on 4.0 Scale**

Xi Jinping receives a higher job performance rating than Obama.

The level of democratic governance in the US is evaluated as being higher than that in China. On a 10 point scale with 1 being not at all democratic and 10 being completely democratic, China scores a 4.82 to the US's 7.26.

Family, friends, and school/work are the most important. Leisure time comes next, followed by politics, and finally religion. Politics then is not so important. It is as Robert Dahl
said “Politics is a sideshow in the great circus of life,” that most people are more interested in work, family, health, friendship and recreation than they are in politics.112

87% of students report being very happy or rather happy. This is incredible. 13% were not very happy, and only 2 of 335 students reported being not at all happy. This is very encouraging and shows a happy Chinese student on campus.

Student health, although mental or physical was not specified shows that 79% report very good or good health while 21% report fair health, and 1%, poor health.

Slightly more than one-third of students are business and management students while 19% are Math and/or Computer science students. This shows that over half of Chinese students in the survey have majors in the practical and applied fields of study. Majors in the humanities are relatively less common for Chinese students. Although not examined in any depth in this study, student major may well be another category that future researchers should use to provide a deeper understanding of Chinese students in the US.

Just over half, 53% of respondents in this survey are undergraduates. 25% are master's students, and 20% are doctoral students. This survey then has attracted a significant portion of more "traditional" Chinese students in the US, in the sense that Chinese students studying in the US prior to 2008 were more likely to be graduate students than they are today. Compared with student status breakdown at Indiana University-Bloomington, these numbers are not an accurate reflection of the student body, where over three-quarters of students are undergraduates. This survey than was much more likely to attract graduate students as a proportion of total students. Among the students surveyed at IUPUI, the majority were Doctoral students. Therefore, separate survey breakdowns must be undertaken showing just undergraduate students. The pool of

undergraduate students is 177, a fair number to do analysis with. From the statewide survey which included IUPUI and other IU universities, only 29% of respondents were undergraduates, 33% were master's students, 33% doctoral students. Undergraduates were less likely to complete the survey in its entirety than graduate students. Although though 177 individual survey forms were started by undergraduates, only slightly more than half (92) were completed.

Fig. 5-26 IU Survey Respondent Length of Time in US Distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Length of Time in US</th>
<th>Percentage Distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 1 year</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2 Years</td>
<td>23%</td>
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<td>2-3 years</td>
<td>21%</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-4 years</td>
<td>18%</td>
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<tr>
<td>4-5 years</td>
<td>10%</td>
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<tr>
<td>5+ years</td>
<td>15%</td>
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Fig. 5-27 IU Survey Respondent Age Distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IU Survey Respondent Age Distribution</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
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<td>60</td>
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Number of Respondents 332
Mean age 23.8
Population Standard Deviation 21.5
Population Variance 462.0
Minimum age 18
Maximum age 44

68% of respondents fall within the six years of birth 1989 - 1994. The average age of survey respondents is 23.8 years old.
Students in this survey come from all across China. The most represented provinces are Beijing, Jiangsu, and Guangdong, followed by Shandong, Shanghai, and Zhejiang.

Ethnically speaking, Han at 93% predominate with 7% "other". This is almost an exact match of China's official minority population, and an exact match to the IU Xinjiang Survey conducted in 2012. The most prominent ethnicity recorded is Man (满).

19 respondents elected to provide their ethnic group, with 13/19 claiming Man (满), two She (畲), two Hui (回), one Zhuang (壮) and one Yi (彝).

A total of 11% of respondents attended Middle and/or High School in the United States prior to becoming university students. 38 out of 334, a not insignificant number. In further studies this could be an important population to isolate to view independently regarding political values.

78% of respondents report being self-funded, that is they fund their education through personal or family means. 32%, receive some assistance from their university, and 1% have a Chinese government scholarship. 2% are funded by a US government scholarship or fellowship.

88% of Chinese undergraduates in this survey received college funding exclusively from

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113 Daniel Idziak, "Chinese National Student’s Perceptions and Beliefs Regarding the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, PRC: A Study," written for Indiana University course, Politics of Modern Xinjiang, December 2012.
self or familial support. This figure compares with a PBS report stating that two-thirds of Chinese students in the US primarily "pay their own way."

64% of students identified themselves as members of the middle class, 21% as members of the upper middle class, 1% as upper class, 13% as members of lower-middle class, and 2% as lower class. Chinese as an aggregate appear well off but there are significant differences within the category of Chinese student.

23.5%, or almost 1 in 4 Chinese students have family members in the United States. Cousins and aunts or uncles make up the majority of family members with 53% of those respondents with family having cousins and 59% having aunts or uncles. Among those with family the mother is present 10% of the time, the father 8%, and siblings 8%. The researcher neglected to ask about spouses or children, an oversight, which was highlighted by a comment received in the free response section of the survey.

Political party affiliation is a question that many chose not to respond to or stopped the survey at this point. In earlier survey versions this question was placed closer towards the beginning of the survey and a marked drop off in responses was observed after this question. That is, this question was the last one that many students answered. This question was then buried deeper in the survey in later rounds. The fact however that so many students declined to answer this question versus the preceding question of intent to remain in the United States indicates that this may have been a sensitive topic for some students. Indeed one of the free responses suggested that the researcher would not get accurate answers because the questions were "sensitive."

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114 Survey Question 21: How is your education being paid for?
11% of respondents indicated that they are Chinese political party members. Looking at China as a nation, CCP membership stands at 85.7 million, out of a total population of 1.357 billion.\textsuperscript{116} This gives a Chinese communist party membership that encompasses 6.4% of China's population. Giving this a more age relevant result, removing the 20% of the Chinese population that is under age 18, this gives a possible party membership population of approximately 1.1 billion. Absent this population, theoretically adjusted CCP membership would climb to 7.8 percent of the age eligible population. In China 11% of all university students become communist party members.\textsuperscript{117} It has been suggested that this is less due to ideological commitment than the ability for CCP membership to enhance career opportunities. CCP members starting salaries were 15% higher than non-affiliated peers.\textsuperscript{118} CCP membership for Chinese plays a role akin to that of a social fraternity in the United States.\textsuperscript{119}

The numbers from this survey show a matching 11% political party membership compared with that of China. Political parties represented are the CCP at 85%, and Communist Youth League at 15%.

48% of respondent’s fathers are members of a party, with 44% being a member of the CCP. This is quite interesting, and in conjunction with the previous questions suggests that well over half of students have at least one parent who is a political party member.

Out of a total of 544 possible parents, (assuming each student has two parents) 235 are members of a Chinese political party. Therefore, 43% of all parents are members of a Chinese political party.


\textsuperscript{117} Data from 2011.


political party. Specifically regarding the communist party, 201 parents are members of the Chinese communist party, or 37% of all parents. This makes it even more likely that well over half of students have parents who are CCP members.

49% of respondents are very interested or somewhat interested in politics. That is interesting, a far cry from a politically disengaged Chinese population that we hear about, and contrasted with American university students, it may be possible that Chinese students may be even more interested in politics. In any case, it is not true that Chinese students do not care about politics, or what is possibly more likely, the students that responded to this survey were interested in politics so there was pre-selection filtering going on. Those students who were uninterested may have simply not responded.

51% strongly agree or agree that as a result of classes they have taken at their university, their understanding of the American political system has increased while 30% neither agree nor disagree, having no strong opinion. Only 18% disagree or strongly disagree that their understanding of the US political system has improved. Chinese students then are not entirely isolated, only reading Chinese newspapers as Shuisheng Zhao has suggested. They are in fact learning something about the political system of the US.

When asked what GPA the presidents of the US and China should receive, Xi Jinping receives a cumulative GPA of 3.17 while Obama receives a 2.46. Xi Jinping receives an A or B from 86% of respondents (38% A, 48% B) while 10% assign a C and only 3% assign a failing grade.

Regarding whether the US political system was a motivation to study in the US, 70% of students disagreed or strongly disagreed, with only 9% agreeing or strongly agreeing. This suggests that students do not regard America's political system as a reason for their motivation to
study in the US. However, if the reason they came was the quality of the education, surely there must be some relation between America's political system and the educational system. So, perhaps the connection is not obvious to students.

A resounding 83% of students believe that accessing information that they are interested in is easier in the US than it is in China. Information collection is a fundamental human requirement for survival, and for intellectual growth and future success, the very purpose of the university, and life generally. This is particularly interesting when considering that 66% of students access media primarily in Chinese. This suggests that students are accessing news websites and other media sources from places beyond the mainland censors. Perhaps they are accessing information from Hong Kong, Taiwan, other overseas publications, or even Chinese dissident groups. So, while Chinese students may still be predominately consuming media in Chinese, it seems likely from these two questions that the media they are accessing is not of People’s Republic of China origin and that they therefore are being exposed to information that they could not readily access in China. Through this media exposure, political values are likely to be effected.

Students also seem remarkably well informed, more so than might be expected of the average American college student. 60% report accessing news websites daily while 23% access news websites several times a week. Only 1% claims to never access news websites via the Internet. This sample is likely over-representative of students who have an interest in politics, as it was self-selecting, so it is probable that these results cannot be generalized to apply to Chinese students in the US generally.

As to consumption of American television programs, the responses are spread very widely across all responses ranging from daily at 14%, to never at 8%. The most frequent
response of "several times per week" comes in at 30%. This suggests that the television is not nearly as important an information source as websites.

When asked about membership in voluntary organizations, an attempt to gauge the level of civic cultural involvement of Chinese students and community engagement was made. The researcher hypothesized that civic engagement would have great effects on student's political values, with highly engaged students reporting political values quite distinct from students with low or no civic engagement.

Civic engagement, measured by the categories presented in *The Civic Culture*, is particularly low for Chinese Students. Of the approximately 200 students who answered this question, 1/3 of students reported being engaged in extracurricular community activities. However, this question could be misleading as perhaps the sum total of all membership reveals that each student is engaged in some activity, so in order to reconcile this, a formula was devised providing all possible non-memberships, and all possible memberships, and percentages of the total given to approximate total engagement as a percentage.

There are 11 categories with a total of 2084 responses to these 11 questions. The formula devised shows that 4% of IU Survey respondents are active members in organizations of civil society. 11% of respondents are inactive members. Therefore, civic cultural membership stands at 15% with 85% of respondents reporting no membership in organizations of civil society. Even among this sample of likely relatively politically engaged students, 85% are not members of any of the traditional facets of civil society. It would be interesting to see whether membership in these organizations changes with age, and specifically to the point of the survey, to see whether those that are members have different political values than non-members. Essentially, does civil society engagement have an effect on political values.
Chinese dissident movement is weak, and CCP "has long been adept at disrupting any truly independent organizations of civil society." According to this survey, students who have been in the US for longer periods of time are increasingly likely to be engaged with elements of civil society. An unanswered question is whether the experience of US civil society is affecting ideology.

10% of the respondents reported belonging to a religious denomination among whom 59% identified as Christian and 36% as Buddhist. In sum, 1 respondent identified as Muslim.

**Key Demographic Variables that Influence Political Values**

Gender, socio economic status and student degree status are key variables of political value differentiation.

**Gender** - How does gender influence political values? Three tests were run. The first compares all males and all females. The second test was an examination of isolating student status as a variable, so the second test compares male and female doctoral students. The third test attempts to remove time as a variable, and so males and females that have been in the US for more than 4 years are compared.

**Gender Test 1: Comparing Male and Female Respondents**

*Parameters:* 335 student respondents were analyzed side-by-side according to gender.

More females are featured in this study than males, with 182 female respondents, (54%) and 152 male respondents (46%). However, this is also the approximate male-female breakdown of IUB and does not indicate an increased likelihood of females to respond to this survey. 87% of females and 85% of males study at IUB, with the remainder studying at other Indiana University campuses.

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Results: Males are more polarized in their views and throughout the survey are more likely to respond to questions as strongly agree or strongly disagree than females. Females are more likely to take neutral stances. Males report being significantly more interested in politics than females and are more critical of political institutions than females, but not by too extreme a degree on average. The sample is heavily skewed towards females in early years, and males in later years. That is, there are more females than males in this survey that have been in the US for one or two years, and many more males that have been in the US for four or more years. Therefore, analysis of gender is vital to determine the validity of the primary study parameter of comparing earlier and later arriving students.

Gender does not reveal a difference in rating the democracy levels of China or of the US. However, it is more important for women to live in a democratic country. The plurality of men and women believe maintaining order in the nation is the most important duty of a state but men are more likely than women to say this. Women are more trusting of others and men are much more likely to have had negative interactions with government officials in the US and in China.
Women are more likely to be members of civil society organizations, but much less likely to have a car than men. Females are better off economically than males.

Similar numbers of females and males support or strongly support China's political institutions.

Of all the organizations surveyed, confidence in the Armed Forces of China was the greatest for both women and men. Confidence was lowest for Chinese media for both men and women, followed by Chinese courts. Other indices are very similar between genders, except for the United Nations. Women have much more confidence in the UN than men.

There is no difference between men and women regarding the level of Chinese democracy. A mean of 4.81 on a 10-point scale was recorded for women and 4.83 for men. No significant difference on the question of US democracy was recorded either, at 7.27 for women and 7.25 for men. However, it is more important for women to live in a democratic country at 7.29 mean vs. 6.74. Men see less connection between democracy and chaos. Men marginally believe China's government systems are better suited to China's needs while there is no difference along gender between beliefs about the US government systems suitability. The environmental quality rating of the US is similar between the sexes for both China and the US.

The male and female average grade given to Xi Jinping is almost same, but males have more values tending towards the extreme ends of the scale. Women are less critical of Obama than men.

For both men and women, stereotype of luxury car driving Chinese student is not supported. Most cars are modest with three quarters of cars purchased being used vehicles. There has been lots of anecdotal talk about party membership of parents who send their kids to the US
to study, such as sport-car driving party boy Bo Guagua at Harvard.\textsuperscript{121} However, students are not as wealthy as frequently portrayed. We must move away from this blanket stereotype of the rich Asian kid. This study shows that this is not accurate.

**Gender Test 2: Comparing Male vs. Female Doctoral Students**

*Parameters:* Doctoral students responded in great number to this survey. A total of 67 participated. In this test, 40 male doctoral students (group 1) are compared to 27 female doctoral students (group 2).

*Results:* The differences in political values between genders at the doctoral level are smaller than those at the undergraduate level. However, there is still dramatic difference between males and females. Males are more critical of institutions of politics and governance than females. Males have lower confidence in national and international organizations, and give lower GPA ratings to both Obama and Xi than their female doctoral student counterparts. Females show higher civic cultural engagement.

There is no substantial difference in self-identified support for "my country's political institutions." Females report being less interested in politics than males. Males have less confidence in organizations. Males report lower confidence in the Chinese armed forces, Chinese media, Chinese central government, hometown government, government in Washington DC, and the UN. The sole place where women have more confidence in an institution is the Chinese courts. Maintaining order in the nation is more important for males. Women feel they have less freedom of choice than males.

Males feel China is governed less democratically than females. Males give China a democracy rating of 4 on a 10-point scale compared with a female average of 5.11. Females feel the US is less democratically governed than males. The importance of living in a democratically governed country is higher for females, 6.74 (female) to 6.32 (male). Females see a weaker connection between democracy and chaos than males. Females see China's government system as more suitable to China's needs than do males, while females see the US government system as less suitable than males. Males give Xi Jinping a lower GPA, 3.07 versus Females, 3.17 GPA. Males give Obama a significantly lower GPA, 2.04 vs. females 2.72

**Gender Test 3: Comparing males and females who have been in the US for more than four years.**

*Parameters:* 37 females and 46 males of mixed student statuses, but close to half breakdown between graduate and undergraduate in each group.

*Results:* Gender is important in looking at political values. Males are more supportive of political institutions of China. Due to more males in later years surveys, without separating by gender, results would show more of a China-supporting result than is accurate. Males give Obama a dramatically lower GPA ranking, and higher ranking than females for Xi Jinping. Maintaining order in the nation is of key importance and males believe that both China and the US are being governed more democratically than females.
Socio-Economic Status (Wealth) as variable:

As the researcher began to examine gender, it seemed more and more apparent that wealth, not gender or time spent in the United States might be the most important determining factor of support for political institutions. It seemed that with an increase of wealth, so also was there an increased support for Chinese political systems. The desire to test whether this might be the case, a confirmation of the thesis of Bruce Dickson's *Allies of the State*, that the wealthy of China support the state, and not according to modernization would oppose it, resulted in the following comparisons. Due to the skewing of more males in later years, and more females in earlier years, it was critical to separate this comparison by gender.

Results: Higher self-reported socio-economic status predicts greater support for institutions of politics and governance of both China and the US for both undergraduate males and females. However, the GPAs of both Xi Jinping and Obama are lower among wealthy females vs. those less well off, but wealthy males give both Xi and Obama higher GPAs than their less-wealthy counterparts. It is more important for the wealthy to live in a democratic country than the not as wealthy. This seems to confirm the findings of Bruce Dickson.

Parameters: Two tests were run: The first test compares middle-class undergraduate females who have been in the US less than two years (group 1) with upper-middle class and upper-class undergraduate females who have been in the US for less than two years (group 2=wealthy). There are 21 respondents in group 1, and 8 respondents in group 2.

The second test compares middle class undergraduate males who have been in the US for 4 years or more (group 1) with upper-middle class undergraduate males who have been in the US for 4 years or more (group 2=wealthy). There are 14 respondents in group 1, and 7 respondents in group 2.
Wealth Test 1: (Poor vs. wealthy) Compares those responding that they are of lower-middle class or lower class (group 1) to those that are of Upper-middle class or upper class (group 2).

Parameters: There are 44 respondents in group 1, and 66 in group 2. The researcher believes self-reported economic class to be a relatively accurate indicator of wealth. Answers seem consistent in comparing economic status with others at their school. More males are in the poor group while more females are in the wealthy group.

Results: Wealthy more likely to be undergraduate students. 65% of the wealthy are undergraduates while only 20% of the poor are undergraduates. The poor consist of 45% doctoral students and 34% masters students. Wealth predicts more critical responses about democracy and less faith in institutions. With this comparison, the researcher seems to identify the causal mechanism that determines political values. Wealth. Wealth, more than time spent in the US, is correlated with support for Chinese political institutions, and decreased support for US political institutions. This supports Bruce Dickson's thesis in Allies of the State that the wealthy support China. But, how can we account for the large percentage of the self-reported wealthy that disagree that they support China's political institutions? The wealthy are more likely to say maintaining order in the nation is most important at 43% compared with 36%. But, some contradictory data exists. The wealthy are also very likely to say protecting freedom of speech is important at 20%. Perhaps not surprisingly, those that identified as poor believed fighting rising prices was important at 30%. This indicates different policy objectives for different socio-economic strata of China's population. It may also indicate a sizable portion of disaffected wealthy that have come to the US, those who do not like China's political system. The results seem to show that such a population is present in the US. The wealthy believe they have much more freedom of choice. And probably they do!
For the poor, politics is much less important. Work and school are more important, family less important, religion less important. Leisure time is less important. The poor are much less happy and their state of health is worse. Only 2% of poor attended high school or middle school in the US versus 18% of wealthy. Poor students are more likely to intend to remain in US, which makes sense as most are doctoral students. The wealthy are much more likely to return to China at 38%, outnumbering those who plan to remain in US or "don't know." The wealthy are much less likely to be employed, at 19% vs. 60% of poor. This makes sense on multiple levels, considering that the wealthy tend to be undergraduates, while the poor tend to be doctoral or masters students. Also, if one is wealthy, one might not need a job. 85% of the wealthy receive some funding from self or family versus 50% of the poor.

The wealthy are more likely to have bought real estate and report being more likely in the future to buy a house. Close family (mother, father, brothers, sisters) of the wealthy are more likely to live in the US. Party membership is greater among the poor at 19% versus 8% for the rich. The rich are marginally more likely to have party member parents.

The poor are more likely to say that they support "my country's political institutions" an interesting aberration in data that otherwise points to greater support for China among the wealthy. Among rich, more strongly disagree at 13%. Total disagree and strongly disagree at 21% for rich, vs. 24% for poor. These values are both higher than the average, indicating a polarization of views based upon wealth. Those rating themselves "middle class" far less likely to disagree.

The rich have more confidence in China's armed forces, more confidence in Chinese courts, more confidence in the central government, more confidence in hometown government, and more confidence in the NPC than the poor. They have almost equal confidence in the UN,
and Chinese media and more confidence in the NPC than the poor. The wealthy have marginally less confidence in the government in Washington than the poor.

The wealthy believe that China is being governed less democratically than the poor. However, this may be confounded by the fact that there are more women in wealthy category. The poor believe the US to be governed more democratically than the rich.

The Importance of living in a democratic country is greater for the wealthy.

The connection between democracy and chaos similar, but more extreme views for wealthy. Significant portion who say weak or no connection, 32% of wealthy, vs. 21% of poor. Coupled with fact that women are more likely to report chaos link with democracy, this suggests that there are a large percentage of wealthy males disaffected with the Chinese government.

The wealthy are more likely to say China's political system is well-suited to China's needs. But, there are also a substantial number who disagree. Again, this disaffected group of the wealthy seems to appear. A question arises whether Bruce Dickson discovered a similar sub-strata of the wealthy. Might this group be a springboard for political change? The wealthy are marginally less likely to say the US government and political systems are well-suited to US needs.

The wealthy are quite a bit less likely to have drivers license. However, this is probably due to the significant number of undergraduates in the wealthy sample. Here is another confounding variable. Does student status matter? Do undergraduates think substantially different than graduates? We must turn to this comparison next.

The poor give Xi Jinping a much higher GPA than the wealthy. Although, this may be due to more women in wealthy sample, who give Xi Jinping lower grade than do the men. Men are overly represented in the poor sample. So, this result needs to be taken with a huge grain of
salt. The poor also say Obama is doing a better job than the wealthy.

**Wealth Test 2: Comparing undergraduate females, less than 2 years in US, middle class (group 1 [poor] vs. upper middle and upper class (group 2[wealthy]).**

*Parameters:* 21 respondents in group 1 and eight respondents in group 2.

*Results:* The wealthy show greater metrics of support for US and Chinese institutions than the poor, with the exception of the GPA ranking for Obama and Xi Jinping, which are lower. The wealthy are less likely to indicate an intention to remain in the US after graduation. The wealthy are less satisfied with their university. Wealthy are more likely to eat meals outside their home. They are more likely to have fathers who are party members, and less likely to have mothers who are party members. Support for China's political institutions is greater for the wealthy as is their interest in politics. Wealth increases confidence in the Chinese armed forces, Chinese courts, Chinese Central government, hometown government, government in Washington DC, and in the UN. Wealth decreases confidence in the media. The wealthy rank the US as less democratic than the poor and China as more democratic, and the importance of living in a democratic country is greater for the wealthy. The wealthy are more likely to agree that China's system is suitable for its needs, and they are also more likely to agree that the US system is suitable for its needs. The wealthy believe that both Obama and Xi Jinping are doing a poorer job than their less well-to-do counterparts.

**Wealth Test 3 - Compare middle class undergraduate males who have been in the US for 4 years or more (group 1) with upper-middle class undergraduate males who have been in the US for 4 years or more. (group 2 =wealthy)**

*Parameters:* 14 in group 1, 7 in group 2.
Results: Wealth increases support and confidence for all institutions of politics and governance for both the US and China. The wealthy group's self-reported response to the statement "I support my country's political institutions" is hugely higher. 3.83 among wealthy vs. 3.0 among the middle class. The wealthy are less interested in politics

The wealthy have higher confidence in the armed forces, media, courts, central government, government hometown, government in Washington, the UN, and NPC.

The wealthy are much more likely to say maintaining order is the highest priority. If maintaining order means maintaining their societal position, this certainly makes sense. Freedom of choice is much higher for the wealthy. The Democratic governance level of China is much higher for wealthy. 6.5 vs. 4.25 on a 10 point scale.

It is also much higher for the US at Democratic level of US also higher 8 vs. 7.25. The importance of living in democratic country is slightly higher for the wealthy. and there is a lower connection between democracy and chaos.

The wealthy are hugely more believing that China's government is well suited to China's needs at 4.33 vs. 3.14.

The wealthy are also more likely to say the US government system is well suited to US needs. Xi Jinping gets a hugely higher GPA - 3.83 from wealthy, 2.71 from mid class Obama also gets a higher GPA from the wealthy, 2.83 vs. 1.63 from middle class.

Is there difference in the political values between students of different academic levels? Commonsense suggests that there should be, given the differing ages, intellectual development levels, likely academic commitment, and motivation between different student academic levels. So far in discussion common permeating wisdom, this is not taken too much into account.
Results: The results show that in the aggregate undergraduate students have the highest level of support for and confidence in institutions of governance and politics. Masters students have the lowest level of confidence and support for Chinese institutions while doctoral students have the lowest level of support for US institutions.

III: The Effect of Time in the US on Political Values

The Deceptive Appearances of Uncontrolled Aggregate Data

Looking solely at the results of this study in aggregate, without controlling for student degree status, gender, and economic status, one would not be incorrect in assessing that support for Chinese institutions increases with time in the US while support for those of the US decline. The following figures come from the 335 respondents in the IU Survey.

The following figures show support and confidence in institutions by length of time spent in the US, without controlling for factors such as student degree status, gender, and economic status. Larger numbers indicate greater support and/or confidence.
The graph above shows a positive relationship between support for China's political institutions and length of time in the US. The $R^2$ value of .34 indicates that a weak correlation is present between time in the US and likelihood that a respondent reports greater support for Chinese political institutions the longer they are in the US.

In the above graph, the r-squared value of .74 shows a moderately strong relationship between length of time in the US and interest in politics. Students that have been in the US for longer periods of time are more interested in politics than more recent arrivals to the US.
The graph above shows a slight linear increase with time in the US vs. confidence in the Chinese Armed Forces with a $R^2$ value of .18.

As with the Chinese armed forces, a slight increase in confidence in Chinese media is correlated with increasing time in the US.

No correlation exists between time in the US and confidence in the Beijing government. This shows that in the aggregate, students who have been in the US for more than 5 years have
no less confidence in the government in Beijing than those students that have just arrived in the US.

**Fig. 5-36 Confidence in Government in Washington, DC**

Contrasting with the question about confidence in the Beijing government, the same question about the government in Washington, DC elicits a very robust correlation with $r$-squared value of .88 between length of time in the US and confidence in Washington DC. Though levels of confidence in the governments in both Beijing and Washington are similar, there is a clear trend line of lessened confidence in the Washington government for each successive year.

**Fig. 5-37 Level of Democratic Governance in the USA and China**

This graph shows that students that have been in the US for greater lengths of time believe the United States to be progressively less democratically-governed. At the same time, an
r-squared value for China's regression line of .01446 shows that there is almost no relationship whatsoever between length of time in the US and perception of Chinese democratic governance. This suggests that longer length of time in the US may be related to decreased perception that the US is governed democratically, while no such change exists for China.

**Fig. 5-38 Suitability of governmental and political systems to country's needs**

While respondents believe that both the US and Chinese government systems are quite well-suited to their respective needs, a slight correlation is found between length of time in the US and belief that US governmental and political systems are well suited to US needs. On the other hand there is no correlation for China. Thus, this data like the graph before this one, support the idea that with greater time in the US, Chinese students believe US governmental and political systems to be less well-suited to US needs, while there is no concurrent decline in suitability for Chinese institutions.
Perhaps the most damning "evidence" that Chinese students are becoming more nationalistic is seen in the above graph. First, Xi Jinping scores a consistent entire grade point better than Obama across all time in US groups. More importantly it shows support for Obama lessen the longer a student has been in the US and support for Xi Jinping increase! With a robust r-squared value of .8 it seems as though the longer students are in the US the less they like Obama.

Thus, in only viewing these few graphs, presented without reference to variables such as student gender, degree status, and economic status one would be forgiven in concluding that Chinese students are becoming more nationalistic. It is this researcher's suspicion that previous studies of Chinese students in the US, due to sampling errors of not properly selecting balanced pools of students with reference to gender, economic status, and degree status, have resulted in non-robust conclusions about increasing student nationalism.

Therefore, these figures must be taken with a large grain of salt, as the data arrive from an unbalanced sample. This study finds that the longer a student is in the United States, the more likely this student is to be a relatively economically depressed, male doctoral student. The IU survey will demonstrate that student political values vary greatly by gender, economic status, and
student degree status. Hence, controlling for these variables is of great importance in attempting to show any correlation between time and political values.

IV: Undergraduate Time in the US and Political Values

The question of whether the length of time a Chinese student spends in the United States is correlated with differing levels of support for and confidence in the political and governmental institutions of China and the US is a central question that this thesis seeks to answer. Of course it is impossible to say with certainty what effect time in the US may have on political values without a longitudinal study. However, the sample present here of undergraduate Chinese students does provide the necessary data to demonstrate whether a correlation between length of time in the US and support for institutions exists. Looking solely at the 151 undergraduate Chinese students who participated in the IU Survey who have been in the United States for up to 59 months (just short of 5 years), student characteristics of each year group (0-11 months, 12-23 months, 24-35 months, 36-47 months, 48-59 months) are very similar across gender, age, student major, socio-economic status, family political background and other variables seen as having a potential influence on political values.

**Fig. 5-40 Undergraduate year group comparison across selected variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years in US</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>% Male</th>
<th>% Female</th>
<th>Major: Non-Hum</th>
<th>Mean age</th>
<th>% Self funded</th>
<th>% &quot;middle class&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;1 year</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2 years</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>20.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-3 years</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>21.1</td>
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<td>69</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-4 years</td>
<td>40</td>
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<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>21.8</td>
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<td>4-5 years</td>
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<td>44</td>
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<td>22.2</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>57</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

With such close variable similarities between the different year groups, the researcher can confidentially assert that if there are differences seen in the responses of these different year groups to questions relating to political values, varying lengths of time in the US is the most likely explanation for differences.
Fig. 5-41 Political Values Questions and Responses by Undergraduate Year Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Values Questions and Responses by Undergraduate Year Group</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>China Q’s</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of respondents</td>
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<td><strong>Sum</strong></td>
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<td><strong>China Support Number</strong></td>
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<td><strong>US Q’s</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sum</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>US Support Number</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 5-42 Undergraduate Support for China vs. Time

The graph above shows the mean support for and confidence in Chinese institutions for different year groups. Support is very high for students who have been in the US for less than one year. The Confidence Number crashes in year two and by the final year group, 4-5 years in the US, the support index is lower than that of students in the US for less than one year. While this data suggests that time in the US is correlated with a decline in support for and confidence in Chinese institutions, there is not a robust trend-line showing a year on year decline. A further future phenomenon worth exploring is the precipitous drop witnessed between the first and
second year groups, a finding that is seen in other data comparisons in the IU Survey and reinforced by several personal interviews conducted by the researcher.

**Fig. 5-43 Support for US vs. Time**

![Graph showing support for US vs. time with R² = 0.62488](image)

As with questions related to China, support for and confidence in the US is very high for students in their first year in the US. Unlike questions related to China, there is a fairly robust trend-line with an R-squared value of .62 showing a year on year decline in confidence and support for US institutions of government and politics.

Analysis of the undergraduate population suggests that length of time in the US is correlated with declining levels of support and confidence for institutions of both the US and China. However, decline in support for the US is more pronounced than for China.

Below a series of regression lines for each question related to political values will be charted vs. undergraduate time in the US.

**Fig. 5-44 Support for China's political institutions**

![Graph showing support for China's political institutions with R² = 0.11133](image)
No obvious correlation between time in the US and response values to the question "I support my country's [China's] political institutions" exist.

**Fig. 5-45 Confidence in China's Armed Forces**

With the exception of the undergraduates that have been in the US for between three and four years, confidence in China's armed forces displays a negative linear trend.

**Fig. 5-46 Confidence in Chinese Media**

Confidence in Chinese media remains relatively consistent across all year groups.

**Fig. 5-47 Confidence in Chinese Courts**
No clear trend is discernible in confidence in Chinese courts except that confidence is highest among students who have been in the US for less than one year.

**Fig. 5-48 Confidence in Beijing Government**

Confidence in the government in Beijing is highest among students who have been in the US for less than one year. There appears to be a slight negative correlation between time in the US and confidence in the Beijing government.

**Fig. 5-49 Confidence in Chinese Hometown Government**

An odd sort of U-shaped graph appears here that also appeared in other analyses. Whether this suggests the possibility that there is a sharp fall off in support for Chinese institutions among students in their second year in the US is an intriguing possibility and provides fertile terrain for future research. Notably, confidence in one's hometown government is considerably lower than confidence in the central government in Beijing.
Confidence in China's National People's Congress is highest among students in their first year in the US and drops significantly for students in their second year in the US.

A drop off in the rating of the democracy level of China is witnessed in comparing students who have been in the US for one year versus two. After this, the rating of China's democratic governance level increases with each year.
The graph above presents a confusing figure with no obvious pattern. Response values for students in their first year are almost identical to those of students who have been in the US for between four and five years. From this, might we surmise that political values regarding China do not change? However, looking at the pattern of this graph in context with others that ask questions of Chinese politics, we again see a peak of support in the 3-4 year category. Examining the shapes of the graphs formed here, we see a U-like shape. Let us imagine a cursive u, or a u with a long tail on the right hand edge. The graph above sort of looks like this. This is a phenomenon witnessed not only in this undergraduate comparison with time but also in another time-based comparison made of all student degree statuses. This suggests an intriguing idea that political values regarding China are not formed in a linear fashion whereby each succeeding year in the US marks a distinct change in trajectory. To accurately test whether such a phenomenon exists and is not just a reflection of a demographic oddity in the 3-4 year cohort, a larger longitudinal study should be undertaken.
Xi Jinping's GPA falls most noticeably in the second year group, and upticks in the 3-4 year group only to decline again and end up somewhat poorer than the ratings from Chinese students in their first year in the US.

There is no clear linear relationship in this question, only it should be noted that agreement that political views are becoming more similar to most Americans is not high.
This line illustrates quite convincingly that confidence in the US government in Washington does not improve over time.

**Fig. 5-56 Level of US Democratic Governance**

![Graph showing level of US Democratic Governance over years](image)

A robust \( R^2 \) value of .8 showing decreasing GPA of Obama among succeeding year groups in the US. Obama declines from a C+ student to a middling C grade.
Variable Hypothesis Correlation Results

In this section factors such as parental party membership, media access, car ownership, environmental quality, number of American friends, and preexisting interest in politics are considered as they relate to political values.

Determining how to measure "political values" is an imprecise exercise. However, certain questions in this survey were selected as relevant to measuring the confidence in and support for political and governmental institutions of the US and China. They are as follows:

Key questions related to the United States
Q41 - My political views have become much more similar to the political views of most Americans.
Q42f - Confidence in government in Washington, DC
Q47 - How democratically is the US being governed?
Q51 - Suitability of United States government and political system to US needs.
Q62 - Job performance GPA rating of President Obama.

Key questions related to China
Q37 - I support my country's (China's) political institutions.
Q42-1 - Confidence in Chinese Armed Forces.
Q42-2 - Confidence in Chinese Media.
Q43-3 - Confidence in Chinese Courts.
Q44-4 - Confidence in Beijing Central Government.
Q42-5 - Confidence in hometown government (in China).
Q42-8 - Confidence in Chinese National People's congress.
Q46 - How democratically is China being governed?
Q50 - Suitability of Chinese government and political system to China's needs.

Q61 - Job performance rating of President Xi Jinping.

**Variable 1:** Students who are happy and/or satisfied with their school will show higher support for the governmental and political institutions of the United States than those who are dissatisfied or unhappy. They will also show decreased support for institutions of China.

*Parameters Test 1*: To test this hypothesis, students who ranked themselves as satisfied or very satisfied with their university (group 1) were compared with those who ranked themselves as dissatisfied or very dissatisfied (group 2). The two groups have similar breakdown of student status, but very unbalanced numbers of students in each group. 198 students in are in group 1, versus 28 students in group 2.

*Parameters Test 2*: 289 students reported being rather happy or very happy (group 1) compared with 46 who reported being not very happy or not at all happy (group 2). While the group sizes are unbalanced, gender is roughly balanced. The unhappy pool is skewed towards graduate students. Length of time in the US is roughly evenly distributed across the groups. Of note, markedly more ethnic minorities were present in the unhappy group, 13% versus 6% minority in happy group.

**Results:** Happiness and school satisfaction are key variables in predicting support for the institutions of the US—but happiness and school satisfaction also predict support for the institutions of China. The happier or more satisfied someone is, the higher rankings they will give to the governmental and political institutions of both the US and China. This was the first indication to suggest that support and confidence for and in institutions of China does not preclude support and confidence in US institutions. Therefore, the hypothesis that the satisfied would give higher ratings to US institutions is partially supported.
Dissatisfied students report a higher level of democracy in China, and a lower level for the US than those who are satisfied. The dissatisfied are also more likely to say that China's government and political systems are well-suited to China's needs and are less likely to say that US government and political systems are well-suited to the US's needs. The dissatisfied also show stronger support for Chinese courts, the central government, hometown government, National People's Congress (NPC), and lower support for the government in Washington than do the satisfied.

However, in contrasting fashion the dissatisfied give lower rankings to Xi Jinping than the satisfied, and higher ratings to Obama than the satisfied. They also show higher support for the United Nations, and lower support for the Armed forces and Chinese media.

Overall, happiness and university satisfaction suggests that students will be generally more supportive of the governmental and political institutions of the US. However, due to the pool size disparity, this is not a very robust conclusion.

Protecting freedom of speech is the most important task of government for the unhappy at 36% versus 18%. This suggests that the unhappy feel they lack a voice in politics. The unhappy are much more likely to say China's governmental and political systems are not well suited to China's needs. 3.08 vs. 3.60 on a scale of 1-5 with, 1 meaning that a respondent strongly disagrees and 5 meaning that a respondent strongly agrees.

The unhappy also say the US government system is less well suited to US needs, 3.42 vs. 3.77, but the difference in support between the unhappy and the happy in these two questions show a larger gap in support for systems of China than for the US, a gap of .35 vs. .52, which supports the hypothesis that happiness will lead to more support for US, but not that those that are unhappy will have more support for China.
Reported low satisfaction or confidence in one country's institutions is linked to low confidence in the other country's institutions. Students who have been in the US for longer periods of time have decreased support for institutions of both the US and China. This points to the idea that the experience of politics is unitary, not a phenomenon separated by nation and there is less nationalistic sentiment than predicted, where one would expect high support for one nation leading to lower support for another.

**Variable 2: Use of media.** *The more frequently students use English language media, the greater their support for and confidence in US institutions of politics and governance, and the lower they will be for those of China.*

*Results:* Use of media in English predicts higher economic and social class, higher university satisfaction, more likelihood of remaining in the US, as well as higher happiness. Consuming media in English predicts lower measures of democracy for both the US and China and lower levels of support for both Obama and Xi Jinping. English media consumption, contrary to hypothesis, does not result in higher support for Obama and US institutions, but lower support. But consumption of media in English leads to lower support for Chinese institutions. Those that consume media predominately in Chinese report higher support of China's political institutions, 3.34 vs. 3.10 on a 5 point scale with 5 indicating the most support and 1 indicating the least support.

**Variable 3: Quality of life in the US.** Those ranking the US environment as excellent should have more positive views of US political institutions.

*Results:* In general, high ranking for US environmental quality predicts higher support for US institutions. For those saying the Chinese environment is poor, confidence for Chinese
institutions is universally much lower, particularly for confidence in one's hometown government. Students in Bloomington gave higher environmental quality ranks than those at other IU campuses.

Respondents believe that the area that they attend school in the US has higher environmental quality than their hometowns in China. 92% of respondents rated the US environment as very good or good. Only 1% ranked it poor or very poor.

28% of respondents ranked the environmental quality of their hometown in China as good or very good, while 35% ranked it as poor or very poor. Environmental quality directly affects the way one lives. In a poor environment, an organism suffers, and life is worse. If it is the case that due to less suffering and feeling better in a clean environment that students get from being in the US, this should be a very important factor in altering of political values if the environment is itself a function of the politics of a place.

Reported confidence in the government in Washington is similar between the groups while confidence in the UN is lower. So, while saying the Chinese environment is poor does predict lower support for Chinese government and political institutions, it does not predict higher support for Washington or the UN.

Saying the Chinese environment is poor indicates lower support for Chinese institutions and may mark one as a thought dissident. The environment is a highly political issue. A student's feelings on environmental quality are correlated with support for political institutions. If one makes negative statements about China's environment, Chinese can become very defensive saying things such as "It's fog, not pollution." One survey respondent said that the researcher should not be comparing the US and China environmentally because China is a developing country, and that the US bullies China on this issue.
Environmental quality ratings for the US are much higher than for China with those giving higher environmental ratings reporting being more satisfied with their material life.

Those saying that the Chinese environmental quality is good are far more likely to indicate plans to return to China (41% vs. 23%) and have much lower intent to remain in US (20% vs. 49%). Those saying the environmental quality in one's hometown is bad are much more likely to want to stay in US.

High environmental rating, dramatically more trust in other people 73% vs. 59% Trust in people correlated with environmental quality. So, it seems students did not simply see environmental quality as the natural environment, but general conditions surrounding them.

Therefore, student belief about environmental quality is a key indicator of one's support of and confidence in Chinese institutions.

**Variable 4:** Friendships - More American friends should equate with higher support for US government and political institutions.

*Parameters:* Too unbalanced a sample. The disparity between male and female students is too great, which skews the results. Males are more likely to give positive rankings to Chinese institutions. So, need to break up by gender, and student status comparing male undergraduate students who agreed they had many friends to male undergraduate students who asserted that they did not. 24 respondents are in the first group and 21 are in the second group.

*Methods:* Test whether there are differences in political values between those who say they have many American friends or few American friends. Note, that this is not a quantitative measurement of number of friends, but rather perceptions held by students as to how many friends they have. The hypothesis is that those saying they agree or strongly agree that they have many American friends will show higher levels of support for American government and
political institutions than those saying they have few American friends.

*Results* - There is no definite correlation between having many American friends and support for US institutions. In general, having American friends increases support for US institutions, but also increases support for Chinese institutions. An exception to this trend is those that have many American friends have more confidence in the Government in Washington than that in Beijing. Those that report fewer friends have more confidence in the government in Beijing. Also, those that have many American friends report a lower level of US democracy while having more friends results in higher level of China democracy ranking.

**Variable 5:** Students for whom the political system of the United States was a motivating factor in their decision to study in the United States should have higher levels of support for the political and governmental institutions of the US than those students for whom the political system of the United States was not a motivating factor. These students should also have lower levels of support for the political and governmental institutions of China than their peers for whom the political system of the US was not a motivating factor.

*Parameters:* Comparing those students who agree or strongly agree (agree group) that their decision to come to the US was motivated by the US political system to those who disagree or strongly disagree (disagree group).

20 agree group 141 disagree group - A highly unbalanced sample, indicating that for most students the US political system is not a motivating factor for Chinese students to study in the US.

*Results:* Hypothesis largely confirmed. The relatively small percentage of students 20 out of 335 who agreed that their decision to come to the US was based on the political system of the US show an interesting profile: they are less economically well-off, there are many masters
students in their ranks, they have lower car ownership rates (and the cars they do have are more humble and were more likely to be purchased used) and they are very opposed to the institutions of China, while giving very positive support to those of the US, and rate environmental quality of their hometown in China as poor.

This group ranks China's democracy level enormously lower, has far lower confidence in Chinese organizations, access media more in English, is more likely to have religious affiliation, has enormously more negative experience with Chinese government officials, and is more likely to have engagement with civic culture organizations.

This group, distinct from others, gives US organizations higher rankings than China's, with the government in Washington receiving much more support than the government in Beijing. Despite this, this group still ranks Xi Jinping's GPA as higher than Obama's. This group also has far higher intent to remain in the United States. The comments received from this group also demonstrate approval of the institutions of the US. From this, the hypothesis is largely confirmed. Students who indicated that their decision to come to the US was motivated by the political system of the US show higher support for US institutions, and lower support for those of China. This is the one group where we see inversely correlated support for the political and governmental institutions of China and the US. In other groups, support for government systems across both nations rise and fall somewhat concurrently. Therefore, pre-existing attraction to the US is a strong indicator for support of and confidence in US institutions.

The IU survey supports the assertion that Chinese students are not terribly interested in political tutelage, and do not seek the experience of the US university in order to someday alter the political system of China. A mere 6% of students in the Indiana University survey reported that the political system of the US was a motivating factor in their decision to study in the US.
Variable 6: Car ownership in the US should predict higher support for political institutions of the US than those who do not have cars in the US.

Parameters: Compared undergraduates with cars to those without cars.

Results: No connection. Driving cars does not significantly increase support for Obama or other institutions of the US, but since this is confounded with wealth and other factors, this variable could not be effectively isolated. The car, like the skyscraper has been humanized, in the sense that the car, though originating in mass consumer form in the United States, has since been transmitted outside of its bounds of origin, and now, like the skyscraper, cannot be said to be a "an American style product" but rather is part of the common heritage of human modernity. Chinese and Americans can equally well build skyscrapers or drive cars with no reference to country of ideological origin or feel any sense that they are participating in an activity that is in anyway constrained by national borders.

Though car ownership seems to have little bearing on political values, this study does seem to dispel the myth of the rich Chinese student. For both men and women the stereotype of the luxury car driving Chinese student is unfounded. Most cars are modest brands and three-quarters of students buy used cars.

76% of respondents had either drivers’ license or learner's permit. Only 23% did not have either. In conversations with Chinese students, the researcher detected an intense earnestness on the part of Chinese students towards car acquisition. They seemed to view possession of a car and the means to drive it as some marker of their status. Indeed in China the car is an important marker of status, such that without one, the single urban male may be confounded in his attempts

to woo a bride. However, students the researcher spoke with would not admit that their desire to become a motorist had anything to do with status or seeking relationships. Rather, the car was identified as a means to overcome the obstacle of poor public transit infrastructure and the inconveniences foisted upon them by having to do haul groceries and other consumer goods over long distances by public bus. On a human-level infrastructural comparison note between college towns in the US and large cities in China, a car is indeed of much more use, although not necessity, in the United States.

45% of respondents in this survey had a car and 75% were purchased used. Unlike the majority of Americans who rely upon car dealer financing or bank-loans to finance their purchases, 87% of Chinese students paid in cash up front for their cars. On a plane ride once, the researcher heard the women next to him relate a story about a young Chinese girl who had over $100,000 in cash in her carry-on bag and who was flying to the US to start college. Another anecdote is that a subject that the researcher interviewed claimed she arrived in the US with enough hard cash to buy a car, which ended up being in excess of $8,000. Stories like these are widespread. In this researcher's own experience, East Asian airline passengers about to board an international flight between Chicago and Japan were selectively targeted by US customs officials who warned over the intercom that anyone traveling with over $10,000 in cash who did not declare it would be liable to have the money seized. While it is possible that the large amounts of cash being carried by certain individuals on planes may represent an attempt to surreptitiously move money out of China for investment purposes elsewhere, it may also represent a distrust of banks or Chinese students lacking internationally usable credit cards.

A statement the researcher has heard not more than once, something to the effect that Chinese students all drive really expensive cars, seems to be not supported by this data. Of 88
respondents, the clear majority are average car brands that do not bespeak luxury.

**Fig. 5-59 Cars Driven by Chinese Students at IUB**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Car</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Chevrolet</td>
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<tr>
<td>Porsche</td>
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</table>

Many Chinese drivers become drivers for the first time in the United States, with half of survey respondents having never driven a car in China. 87% of respondents believe it is easier or much easier to become a car driver in the US than China. Only 1% believes it is easier in China. If 75% have licenses or learning permits, this indicates that some formative experiences of motoring are occurring under US traffic regime, with all associated legal certification processes, and enforcement mechanisms. The researcher, having personally trained several Chinese student drivers can attest to the eagerness which drivers partook of motoring, though this eagerness is perhaps not less than that of anyone getting behind the wheel for the first time, American 16 year olds included. The sense of power and freedom that the automobile engenders then and the fact that is easier to become a driver in the US may then incline Chinese to favor the American traffic and motoring regime over those regimes extant in China. The added affordability of the American car, and the positive interactions with American officials, relative to interactions with Chinese officials may be of interest.
Variable 7: Property ownership and intent to purchase property in the US should indicate higher levels of support for US institutions and lower support for Chinese ones.

Parameters: Comparing those with property or intent to purchase property with no property and no intent to purchase property. I hypothesize that those that have property or intend to purchase property should have higher levels of support for US institutions.

Results: The results are mixed. Property owners give higher rankings to certain institutions of the US, but lower rankings to others. They also give higher support for certain Chinese institutions but lower rankings to others. Property owners report higher agreement with the statement "I support my country's political institutions" but when asked specifically how much confidence they have in organizations, property owners have lower confidence in China's armed forces, Chinese courts, and their hometown government. Generally speaking however, property ownership enhances support for institutions of government for both the US and China.

Property owners have more confidence in the governments in Washington and Beijing, the UN, and for the National People's Congress. Property owners believe both the United States and China to be governed more democratically than non-property owners. A profile of respondents whose families have real estate in the US shows this group to be better-off economically. Support for political institutions among property owners supports Bruce Dickson's thesis that the wealthy of China are aligned with the Chinese state, but also suggests that the wealthy are aligned with states generally. Since the existing economic and political order has served them well, perhaps there is little to be upset about. Property ownership increases support for US institutions (except for Obama's GPA) but also increases support for Chinese institutions.
Variable 8: Students with family members in the US should have higher support for institutions of politics and governance of the US, and lower for China than students without family members in the US. It is assumed that family members in the US are a reliable predictor of satisfaction with being in the US, satisfaction with the political system, and with intent to reside long term in the US. Because the family has made some presumptive commitment to being in the US, it is likely that this is because they enjoy living in the US more than in China.

Parameters: 79 students report family being in the US, vs. 256 who do not. There are equal gender breakdowns in this sample. 58% of those with family are undergraduates, vs. 51% of those without family. Those with family have been in the US only slightly longer than those with family. (family 3.42 vs. no family 3.29)

Results: Those with family members in the US have mostly higher levels of support for institutions of politics and governance for both the US and China. The exceptions in ranking Xi Jinping who gets a considerably lower ranking by those with family in the US, and in question of suitability of Chinese governmental system for China. For those with family in the US, they believe that Chinese institutions of government and politics are less well suited than those without family in the US, yet still have considerably greater confidence in these institutions than those students without family in the US. Interestingly, those without family in the US reported non-significantly higher levels of overall satisfaction with their time in the US. (3.33 vs. 3.30) Q.76 While those with family in the US were not greatly happier than those students without family in the US. (3.08 vs. 3.06) Q. 4 Students with family in the US reported being slightly better off socio-economically, and were less likely to be members of Chinese political parties themselves, and are less likely to have parents who are members of Chinese political parties. It seems then that those students who have family members in the US are less likely to be
connected politically with the Chinese government. However, this does not indicate blanket disapproval of the Chinese government––far from it. Those with families in the US were more likely to give the institutions of Chinese government higher ranking than those without families in the US.

Those with family in the US believe that China's governmental and political system are less well suited to China's needs than those without family in the US. (3.41 vs. 3.58) Q. 50 While those with family believe ever so slightly are more likely to say that the US governmental and political systems are well-suited to the US's needs. (3.75 vs. 3.72)

Those with family in the US give lower marks to Xi Jinping. Xi's GPA as estimated by those with family in the US is 2.98 vs. 3.23 by those who do not have family in the US. Barrack Obama scores exactly the same for both groups 2.46, still much lower than Xi.

Those with family in the US are more likely to say their decision to come to the US was motivated by politics (2.38 vs. 2.01)

**Variable 9: Chinese Political Party membership should predict higher support for China and lower support for the US.**

**Parameters:** This comparison was done comparing only Masters degree students. 15 were members of Chinese political parties and 69 were not members. This decision was made to control for student status as otherwise this may have resembled a test comparing graduate students with undergraduates, as the majority of party members are graduate students, while the majority of those who are not, are undergraduates. In both samples, females are the majority comprising 67% of party members and 60% for non-party members.

**Results:** Party membership predicts stronger support for Chinese governmental and political institutions, but also stronger support for US institutions as compared to non-party
members. Support for political institutions transcends national lines. Higher support for one national institution predicts higher support for the corresponding national political institution.

From a policy perspective, American should not be particularly suspicious of Chinese students in the US, nor particularly suspicious of Chinese political party members. Those that support the governmental and political institutions of China also support those of the US. Membership in a Chinese political party then plays an important role in cultivating support for political organizations generally. Party members are much more likely to have parents who are party members.

Party membership predicts higher support for institutions generally, for the US, International organizations and Chinese organizations. Interestingly party members see US as more suitable to US needs than China's systems to China's needs.

Fig. 5-60 Support for and Confidence in Institutions of Politics and Governance Measured by Student Status

<table>
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<th>Questions</th>
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<td>19.43</td>
<td>18.29</td>
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The preceding figure depicts the response to key questions about political and governmental systems of China, the United States, and political organizations generally. The
data is divided by student status and shows that students of different degree status have very
different levels of support and confidence in organizations of politics and governance. The larger
the value of the support index, the greater the support for an institution.

The results show that in the aggregate undergraduate students have the highest level of
support for and confidence in institutions of governance and politics. Masters students have the
lowest level of confidence and support for Chinese institutions while doctoral students have the
lowest level of support for US institutions. These findings partially confirm findings by Nathan
and Shi in their 1990 study that indicates higher educational levels are connected to lower levels
of support for governmental institutions.

Also shown by this data is that students who give high ratings of support or confidence of
an institution of China are also likely to give high ratings of support or confidence for institutions
of the United States. Support for the institutions of one country does not preclude support for
those of another.

In the IU survey most respondents listed maintaining order as being the most important
duty of the state. This supports the conclusion made by Andrew Nathan in *Chinese Democracy*,
that the meaning of democracy in China is different than that in the western world. In China,
democracy is viewed in terms of the state and what the state can accomplish, while in the
western world, democracy is viewed in terms of protection of the individual from state
oppression. According to the IU survey results, this may be true, as most respondents listed
maintaining order in the nation as being the most important duty of the state.

According to the results of the IU survey that ask about membership in civil society
organizations, participation is extremely low for Chinese students for all lengths of time in the
US.
How many of these students have scholarships from the PRC to study in the US? According to the IU survey results, not many, only 1.3% (4/300) out of all respondents.\textsuperscript{123}

Previous conclusions by Bachman and Gold suggest a culturally-isolated Chinese student, who, instead of acquiring American political and social values, is being driven further from them. The IU survey similarly finds that contrary to the initial thesis hypothesis, Chinese students are not becoming more supportive of American institutions the longer they are in the US. Likewise, happiness with the American university experience, which was hypothesized to predict higher support for US institutions and lower support for Chinese, instead found that happiness led to higher support for both institutions of China and the US. This suggests that happiness and satisfaction to the extent that it exists reflects positively on the US institutions, and even more positively on institutions of China. That is, even those students that are enamored of their US University are also enamored by the governmental and political realities of China.

The results of this survey indicate that Shuisheng Zhao overgeneralizes in saying that Chinese students in the US "mostly read Chinese newspapers and have patriotic feelings."\textsuperscript{124} According to this survey, while 66% of Chinese students access media primarily in Chinese, 34% access it primarily in English. Even if this still means most access media mostly in Chinese, this does not mean that these same students are not accessing media in English at all. Additionally, more than 50% of Chinese students indicate that they watch American television programs at least weekly.\textsuperscript{125} Thus, they can not but be exposed to English language media. Zhao then makes far too broad a generalization to characterize Chinese students as patriotic and limited in their media consumption. Though Bachmann suggests that Chinese students may be becoming anti-American, the results of this survey indicate that some are also becoming less

\textsuperscript{123} IU Survey Question 21
\textsuperscript{124} Arno Rosenfeld, "Going Home: Chinese International Students and Democracy."
\textsuperscript{125} Question: How often do you watch American television programs including entertainment and news shows?
supportive of China the longer they are in the US, and that Chinese students should not be so readily cast into one mold.

Regarding Chinese students' post graduation plans, the IU survey finds that 41% of those surveyed plan to remain in the United States compared with 22% planning to return to China.\textsuperscript{126} This figure compares favorably with a survey by Alan C.K. Cheung's reported on in 2014 that claims confirmation of a "long-held" concern that Chinese students will not return to China finding that less than half of students plan to return to China and that the primary reason for desiring to return is economic rather than political or social in nature.\textsuperscript{127}

The researcher's numerous conversations with Chinese students further support this assertion, with most interviewees expressing the desire to work in the United States to gain experience, before possibly returning to China.

Like Dickson and Chen who find that the entrepreneurial class of China largely supports the state, this survey supports Dickson and Chen's assertions in that greater reported wealth is correlated with greater support of China's political system, but interestingly, also the US's. Thus, discussions of increasing nationalism among Chinese must be tempered by rigorous side-by-side comparisons of at least two countries to determine whether measures of "nationalism" are not in fact measures of support for the concept of state institutions, irrespective of nationality of the state institutions. More succinctly, does the way nationalism is studied reflect the way that

\textsuperscript{126} Appendix - (Question 15: After you complete your current degree program do you plan to remain in the United States or Return to China?)


people think about a particular state, or does it reflect the way that people think about institutions that often have common forms across states?

To those who claim a lack of interest in politics by Chinese students in the US, the IU Survey provides strong evidence to the contrary. Responding to the question, "How interested would you say you are in politics?" half of respondents replied positively, that is they are either "Very" or "Somewhat" interested in politics. It is certainly possible of course that this survey attracted a sample that is more interested in politics than the typical Chinese student. However, because the IU Survey captured some 10% of the entire Indiana University Chinese international student population, the researcher believes that we must dismiss the idea of the politically disengaged Chinese student on American campuses. That 10 percent of Chinese students even undertook an in depth and time consuming politically-focused survey should be evidence that Chinese students care somewhat about politics. Additionally, the many free response entries that the researcher received from survey-takers indicated a keen interest on the part of many on questions of politics.

**Fig. 5-61 Interest in Politics**

**38. How interested would you say you are in politics?**

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<th>#</th>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>%</th>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Very interested</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Somewhat interested</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Not very interested</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Not at all interested</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>100%</td>
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As to the ability of Chinese students to afford and pay for their education, this survey suggests that Chinese students rely on personal and familial funding to a much greater extent than international students in the US generally. According to the IIE, 64% of international students in the U.S. relied on personal and family support to pay for college during the 2011-
2012 school year. The IU survey shows similar figures of support, with 36% of students reporting some sort of scholarship either originating in the US or China, and with 78% receiving at least some support from personal or family funds.

The common stereotype of the wealthy Chinese student is not well-supported by this data. In fact, most students identify as middle-class, and consumption habits do not point towards inordinate wealth. Interviews and conversations with Chinese students confirm a close attention to income, concern about not having enough money, and seeking of part-time or supplementary jobs. Indeed, many "wealthy" Chinese students work low-paying part time jobs, including in food service and preparation, and labor for event planning, moving tables and boxes around. The current focus on nationalism of Chinese students is limiting and the full diversity of opinion is not well-explored or taken into account. Though in the aggregate students are very supportive of and have high confidence in Chinese institutions of politics and governance, this is far from universal and many Chinese students hold profoundly oppositional stances to the institutions of Chinese politics and governance.

This finding is supported by the IU survey, and finds that Chinese give largely high marks to the government and political systems of China, and almost universally rate the job performance of Xi Jinping in governing China as superior to Barrack Obama's administration of the US.

Bruce Dickson's and Jie Chen's *Allies of the State* provided many direct questions that were asked in this survey, and the central conclusion that the wealthy in China are not vectors for

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129 Raw Data Survey Question - "How is your education in the US being paid for? [Please select all that apply]
political change in China, but rather one's whose fortunes are closely tied to the maintenance of the current party-state.\textsuperscript{130} The IU survey supports this assertion, with wealth being the greatest predictive factor, above gender or student status in predicting support for institutions of Chinese politics and governance. Interestingly however, respondents who are wealthier also give higher indications of support for institutions of the United States. This suggests that there is a unitary conception of politics and that support for the institutions of one country do not preclude support for those of another, even in the case of comparing the US with China, two nations whose populations share a widespread belief that they are destined for greatness as world leaders. These results bode well for the potential for cooperation in global management between in the United States and China in what Henry Kissinger has claimed will be a crucial challenge to overcome in order to avoid conflict between the US and China.\textsuperscript{131}

Support for the claim of a different understanding of democracy between the US and China as espoused by Jie Chen and Chunlong Lu in "Democratization and the Middle Class in China: The Middle Class’s Attitudes toward Democracy," is demonstrated in the IU survey by seeing very high levels of perceived democratic governance in China that certain groups of students reported. This suggests that China, by no means a democratic country by American standards, has aspects of governance that Chinese student respondents believe to be democratic.

The survey conducted in Indiana presents a mixed picture, but one which to some extent supports earlier claims of Chinese student nationalism. Indeed it seems that Chinese students are nationalistic: support for and confidence in institutions of Chinese politics and governance is higher than for institutions the United States among all subdivisions of students. However, this is

\textsuperscript{130} Jie Chen and Bruce J. Dickson, \textit{Allies of the State: China's Private Entrepreneurs and Democratic Change} (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010), 41.
not an entirely robust assertion because it paints in too wide a brushstroke, and does not sufficiently dissect the Chinese student population into more exacting pools. For example, Chinese male undergraduate middle class students show declining support for institutions of politics and governance of both the US and China with time in the US. What's more, ratings of US democracy are much higher than for China among all groups, and the importance of living in a democratic country seems to increase with time spent in the US. What seems to be happening is an increasingly critical lens which is applied to politics, and even if ratings of support for institutions of US politics and governance are shown to decline with time, this still may represent an achievement of Americanization, that is cultivating critical opinions of the place in which one lives.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The initial intent of this survey was to gather data from state schools all across the Midwestern United States, but this proved an insurmountable challenge given lack of funding for this study. A future survey would do well to cover schools not only across the Midwest, but across the entire United States.

The deficiency of limited regional focus notwithstanding, it is reasonable to assume that information gleaned from Chinese international students in Indiana may also illustrate characteristics of Chinese students outside of Indiana. This study clearly points to the possibility that Chinese students across the Indiana University system are not a monolithic group and much more effort is needed in differentiating particular sub-populations of Chinese students throughout the US. The researcher suggests future studies examine students by gender, student status (undergraduate, masters, doctoral, and other), and socio-economic status.

If in fact length of time in the US is related to an increase in critical thinking, greater reflection on issues of governing systems and political organizations, then perhaps the education being received by so many Chinese students in American universities will have an impact on the future governing and political systems of China. Perhaps this is a 30 year phased evolution of China, part of the master plan of the Chinese government to cultivate the critical thinking skills that will be necessary for China's success in the years to come.

To the point of Chinese students becoming Americanized, this survey has no definite conclusions. If Americanization means that students become more supportive of US institutions, they have not. However, if Americanization means having become more critical of political institutions then perhaps they have become Americanized to some extent.
This study suggests that Chinese students are not becoming more nationalistic from their time spent in the US; greater support for Chinese institutions is not correlated with greater length of time in the US. However, lower support for US institutions is correlated with greater length of time in the US. This distinction may in part explain the findings of earlier studies that have suggested that Chinese students in the US are becoming more nationalistic. There is no increasing support for China, only lessening support for the US.

The data in this survey suggests that it is a mistake to conceive of support for state-level political institutions in diametric terms where support for institutions of one nation implies a corresponding lack of support for institutions of another country. We must stop viewing the US and China as political opposites where support for the system of one implies a lack of support for the other. With Chinese international students becoming an increasingly component of the US university, we must rethink assumptions we make about the political values of a people who come from a political system which on the surface appears so alien to that of the US. Beneath the surface we see a Chinese population which values effective governance, believes that living in a democratically-governed country is very important, views China as being significantly democratically governed, gives high job performance ratings to the Chinese president, and which believes that China's current governmental and political system are well suited to China's needs. Most importantly, Chinese students are not a monolithic bloc, with political values aligned en masse as has so often and unfortunately been portrayed in popular discourse and particularly implied by the paucity of research being done in this field. Chinese students, depending on gender, socio-economic status, and student degree status display markedly different profiles in their views towards institutions of politics and governance.
Learning about the political views of a female physics doctoral student from Fujian from a male undergraduate business major from Beijing makes as much sense as studying American views on gun control by speaking with a European. In each case we might assume a general level of knowledge of the opposite party exists, yet a detailed and precise picture will not be the result. The vast majority of the current discourse on the topic of Chinese students in the US and their political beliefs has been of this sort; learning about apples by looking at oranges; making broad extrapolations from very limited data. But, joyfully from the researcher’s perspective, we are at a point in time where much better research can be done to learn more about the political values of young Chinese people who choose to venture abroad for their education. The vast majority of Chinese students now educating themselves in the US will return to China to live and work and in so doing have no choice but to leave an indelible print upon an as yet unimagined future.

Increasingly, those who wish to better grasp facets of China, to understand intentions or project possible future scenarios on the national and international levels must turn their attention to the fundamental processes and systems which form thoughts and views of the masses and the elites of China. The Chinese undergraduate on the US campus is a great experiment in ideological formation; undoubtedly Chinese students are learning things from their American experiences, gathering compounded stimuli compelled upon them by unique local and social circumstances, which in turn inform views on social and governing systems. This thesis has attempted to examine some of the variables that may influence, or at very least be shown to correlate with greater or lesser expressions of support for governing systems. Variables such as media usage rates, rates of car driving, the presence of family members in the US, environmental quality, were all considered, and a shocking finding was made; high expressions of support for Chinese institutions are correlated with high support for US institutions. A possible implication
of this is that politically there is no zero-sum competition for ideological support in the minds of Chinese students on US campuses. US policy-makers seeking to inculcate American democratic values, as Ambassador Gary Locke claimed US universities are doing, would do better to present the virtues of the US, such as they are, not in terms of diametric opposition to China, but in terms of shared aspirations common to most people, such as better governance and more transparent and honest political processes. Like it or not, China and the US are linked together in many ways yet each maintains a national vision that places itself at the top of a global political hierarchy. Whether this results in military conflict or in beneficial cooperative competition that raises the standards of human dignity, development and morality may well be incumbent on those living today and on the relationships that are forged and bolstered.

The training ground of a future business and political class of China has taken form on the US campus. The pessimist would view this as but another manifestation of an inevitable civilizational slouch of the cultural west towards decline and of the gradual assumption of power of the monolithic Chinese hoard bent on bringing its Beijing authoritarian model of governance to bear upon the free world. However, there are great numbers of Americans on Chinese campuses, albeit relatively few who are receiving four-year degrees from colleges. Yet the Chinese college system is a descendant of the west, of court Jesuits, and of the US, it's missionary colleges, of a Jeffersonian academic ideal forged of colonial American experience and influenced by an illustrious line of forbears tracing its roots to Plato and not Confucius. Perhaps then the shared academic pedigree of both the US and China may have a salubrious effect on international relations and may be of critical importance on the future relations between the US and China. It is perhaps the case that through the crucible of the US University
experience, views of one another may be formed that emphasize similarities and cooperation and not differences and conflict.

**How the Chinese government views Chinese overseas students**

The question posed in this section is whether Chinese students abroad are an asset or a liability to the Chinese government, and it is one which the IU survey attempts to answer in part. Firstly, do Chinese students feel towards government change, and in what ways, and is this potentially dangerous to China's political system? Even if it is not dangerous, is there a brain drain taking place?

The question of whether the Chinese government has to fear the potentially modified political beliefs of students that have been abroad is a key question. Before going abroad, Chinese students must be approved both by the US embassy and also by Chinese authorities. Therefore those that come to the US have been pre-vetted, and a limited demographic of those that can demonstrate "strong financial, social, and family ties to [their] home country" are permitted a visa.\textsuperscript{132} The United States government is not interested in having visitors who are likely to violate the terms of their visas. Likewise the Chinese government exercises a degree of control over the comings and goings of its citizens and it does not seem that the Chinese government is keen to allow unfettered freedom of movement to its citizens. So, we may assume that any Chinese student venturing out of China is of a certain, and relatively high economic situation. This study did not ask the income level of students parents, deeming this too sensitive and personal a question, though perhaps this was in error.

Well-supported claims exist that the Chinese government actively monitors its overseas population. Anne Marie Brady, for one, studies the presence of Chinese spies reportedly active on Australian university campuses.\textsuperscript{133}

The Chinese national security "blue book" defines four major national security threats: Western democratic values, Western cultural hegemony, information inflows through cyberspace and the foreign media, and underground religious activities. As such, Chinese students might be key infiltrators of bringing seditious Western democratic values to China.\textsuperscript{134}

The "Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council—exists to ensure that distance from the motherland doesn't dull their patriotism. Its goal is to safeguard loyalty to the Communist Party." It pays special attention in monitoring the rich.\textsuperscript{135}

Xia Yeliang claims that China is setting up an extensive spy network in US and Australian universities comprised of students and visiting scholars.\textsuperscript{136}

After Tiananmen, the Chinese government launched highly-successful overseas China promotion propaganda campaign to keep Chinese abroad loyal to China. With 100 Million Chinese traveling outside of China in 2013—projected to rise to 200 million by 2020, the Chinese government monitoring agency will have its hands full.\textsuperscript{137}

There exist financial incentives for Chinese students to return to China after receiving education in America and apparently many students are funded by the CCP.

Concerned by the brain drain of promising students not returning to China with their advanced degrees, the Chinese government has instituted policies to try to attract graduates of US universities back to China. These include the "1,000 Talents" which through monetary and work incentives seeks to lure Chinese students back to China presumptively to increase the development of China.\(^\text{138}\) According to David Zweig, "stay rates" for Chinese Ph.D. students do not appear to be declining. 92% of science and technology Ph.D. students who received their degrees in 2002 were still in the United States in 2007.\(^\text{139}\)

China's efforts to attract students back to China after graduation may be bolstered by the changing demographic profile of Chinese students in the US, namely the shift from predominately graduate to predominately undergraduate students at US universities today. Those completing undergraduate degrees may not have jobs as readily available to them in the countries that they completed their degrees, as might those receiving graduate degrees. It may also be the case that many students have come to the US simply to be educated and not to look for a career based in the US. Younger students are also less likely to establish families. This coupled with the difficulty of obtaining visas, and the changing nature of the Chinese student profile may conspire to reverse the brain drain.


Additional CCP-sponsored programs for incentivizing Chinese international students to return to China include the “Fund for Returnees to Launch S & T Research”, the “Program for Training Talents Toward the 21st Century”, the “Chunhui” or Spring Bud program, the “Changjiang Scholar Incentive Program”, and the “Program of Academic Short-return for Scholars and Research Overseas Program.” The range of government programs for study abroad scholars suggests that a large number of Chinese international students are directly funded by the CCP and thus, their educational goals are likely in line the central government’s developmental and foreign policy goals.” This is an interesting hypothesis, but one that is not supported by data from the IU Survey. It is possible of course that those receiving CCP funding specifically chose not to participate in this study.

"Recent discourse on Chinese nationalism has revealed an emerging assertiveness growing concurrently with China’s rapid economic ascension. Peter Hays Gries (2005) has noted this assertive nationalism is especially strong among China’s younger generations, referred to as the fourth and fifth generation.”

According to Gries, younger generations of Chinese who have grown up in relative economic comfort without experiencing the hardships of their parents and grandparents generations, nonetheless feel a psychological need to form their patriotic identity through a narrative of suffering. For Gries, this narrative takes form in an increasingly aggressive stance towards foreign competitors, namely Japan and the United States. Gries cites the popularity of "nationalistic diatribes" such as the book *China Can Say No* and the reactions to the

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downing of the US spy plane in 2001 and the Belgrade Embassy Bombings of 1998 as evidence of "assertive nationalism" among China's population born since the 1980's.\(^\text{142}\)

Since Gries 2005 work, much has changed in the US-China relationship and evidence of a less combative relationship, at least from a cultural standpoint if not from an international relations standpoint, is in evidence. The mere presence of so many Chinese students on US campuses is one indication of a cultural softening as is the increasing numbers of American students studying in China and studying Chinese at US universities. Hollywood's internationalization of its film market means that many films now being produced in the US are joint ventures between US and Chinese industry, and even if there are no Chinese partners in the mix, film studios in the US will go to great lengths to avoid offending the sensibilities of Chinese censors to ensure a film's ability to be screened in China.\(^\text{143}\) This self-censorship, while abhorrent in its implications for freedom of expression, nonetheless represents a type of concession that can occur when two sides increase their cultural engagement.

**How America sees Chinese Students: Political implications for US-China Relations**

In the hopeful eyes of many policymakers in the US, Chinese students in the US are potential agents for the future creation of an American-style democratic China. In the words of former US ambassador to China, Gary Locke, Chinese student's experiences of freedom and democracy in the US might make them "want some of those same things" back home.\(^\text{144}\)

"Nothing has captured the American political imagination more powerfully and more

\(^{142}\) *Ibid.*


persistently than the quest of the Chinese people for democracy."145 A 2014 article by Charles Kenny in Bloomberg Business promotes the idea that having foreign students in the US is a good, inexpensive way to promote democracy. Kenny cites a study by Michel Beine that finds "foreign-educated students have an outsize impact when they go home." The type of impact that students have though is based upon what sort of education they received. A 2013 study by Marion Mercier that looked at the backgrounds of 900 leaders of developing countries since 1960, found that "leaders who had spent time abroad as military attachés or for military training were more likely to endorse policies restricting democracy after they came to power. Those who had studied overseas earlier in their lives were more likely to embrace democracy."146 Those who go overseas have a powerful influence on the political views of friends and family members they are in contact with in their home countries.147

Kenny writes:

Antonio Spilimbergo, an economist at the International Monetary Fund, found that countries with large numbers of citizens who’ve studied in democratic nations, including the U.S. and the U.K., are more likely to have democratic governments than countries where few citizens have studied overseas.

Thus, it may not be an entirely groundless idea to believe that democratization in China may be given a boost by Chinese students studying in the US.

But, not everyone is so keen to believe that allowing Chinese students into the US in great numbers is such a good idea. A Chinese dissident in residence at the Cato Institute in Washington, DC warns that Chinese students in the US serve as a sort of fifth-column for the

147 Ibid.
Chinese government and military who may steal secrets and otherwise jeopardize US national security interests while accepting no American-style democratic tutelage.\(^{148}\) Other concerns with academic freedom emerge. With the growing popularity of Confucius Institutes, cooperating US universities are required to cede academic sovereignty to the Chinese party state, with certain topics such as Taiwan not being permitted to be discussed in class. A further avenue of concern that may cast a pall on the hope of the democratized Chinese student is the prospect of Chinese students who are academically and socially unprepared for US university life, and who develop anti-US feelings as a result of their social marginalization on campus.\(^{149}\) Also, every Chinese student in a state school represents a university spot that could have gone to an American student. On paper, Chinese students often have very high qualifications, higher than their American peers, but find English-intensive courses challenging, and concerns over plagiarism are rife.

Concern also exists that Chinese spies in US universities are rampant. According to interviews by the researcher, spies, or at least informants are present on the Indiana University campus and several such persons can be readily identified. Australian universities have been warned about problems with spies on campus that report to the Chinese government.\(^{150}\)

According to a 2006 argument by Joel Spring, China is an "educational security state" a nation whose educational objectives are geared towards maintaining or improving its geopolitical national strength vis-a-vis "perceived rival states." Therefore, "notions of global camaraderie and cultural cohesion through international educational cooperation" will play second fiddle to the


sending state's policy objectives. This is not an idle speculation given the problems of corporate and campus espionage. Following this logic, Chinese students in the US would not be likely adopt American values in their time in the US, or become more friendly to American institutions. Rather they would become even stronger components of the Chinese state. The IU Survey supports the first part of Spring's thesis, that students will not become more friendly to American institutions, but the results suggest that certain groups may also become less friendly to Chinese institutions.

In the article "The Clash of Civilizations" Huntington writes:

The people of different civilizations have different views on the relations between God and man, the individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy. These differences are the product of centuries. They will not soon disappear. They are far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political regimes.

The question then is whether in some way Chinese students, members of, according to Huntington, a different civilization, will see their views altered by time spent in the United States. "The interactions among peoples of different civilizations enhance the civilization-consciousness of people that, in turn, invigorates differences and animosities stretching or thought to stretch back deep into history." Is welcoming Chinese students to the US a good idea from a geopolitically competitive perspective? But, how is the US's focus on educational attainment of its citizens to support national security objectives in any way different from China's? The revenue generation of an influx of international students is beneficial not only to the bottom line financial considerations

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of individual universities, but is also valuable to the US on aggregate US economic interest as well as accomplishing US foreign policy agendas.\textsuperscript{153}

With 47\% of students in the US studying science and engineering, there are concerns for US national security. "An examination of the policy objectives of China’s own 'educational security state' is needed to ensure that U.S. national security is not at risk."\textsuperscript{154}

"The increase in S&E (science and engineering) enrollment was larger than in recent years, but for the 2006–09 period, S&E students accounted for a steady 44\% of total foreign enrollment.”\textsuperscript{155}

Fareed Zakaria elucidates the benefits of the US's dominant position in higher education:

Higher education is America’s best industry….with 5 percent of the world’s population, the United States absolutely dominates higher education, having either 42 or 68 percent of the world’s top fifty universities (depending which study you look at). In no other field is America’s advantage so overwhelming...With such a strategic advantage in the education field of the global economy, maintaining high levels of international student enrollment remains a desired outcome of U.S. education policy, with particular emphasis on revenue earnings for a staggering economy and goodwill diplomacy effects for a government with a mistrusted foreign policy.\textsuperscript{156}

Circa 2013, the American mainstream media was discussing the instability of the Chinese governmental system. The Bo Xilai scandal had broken and pundits were decrying the structural problems of China's economy and the tenuous hold that government had on society. The researcher's experience at Indiana University exposed him to a different conclusion, that the regime was quite stable and not in any danger of imminent collapse. Ethan Michelson argues that China's lawyers are not voices for political change in China, and are embedded within the

\textsuperscript{155} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{156} \textit{Ibid.}
system, owing their livelihoods to the current political structure. Anne Marie Brady goes so far as to say that Chinese citizens today have been so inculcated with government propaganda that they view the current system as the best one for them. Bruce Dickson in *Allies of the State* places China's entrepreneurial elite solidly in the government's camp, finding this group an unlikely voice for political reform. Among Chinese the US favorability rating stands at 47%. This is a possible indication that the political values systems that underlie the US are not universally attractive. On the other hand, it may be the case that heavy-handed US promotion of what it views as democracy is the reason for US's unpopularity.

The researcher's initial reaction to seeing so many Chinese abroad is certainly that the government would have to be very careful with allowing so many to leave. Wouldn't they pick up political values that would be antithetical to the party-state? And then, return to China and potentially foment trouble or have dissident groups abroad? If what Anne Marie Brady says is true, and Chinese have been effectively brainwashed by propaganda, wouldn't some of this wear off in receiving the "propaganda" of the west in the form of media and news broadcasts that extol the virtues of the capitalistic economic system and pluralistic governance?

Given the conclusion to this study that suggests that in fact the longer Chinese students are abroad, the more some groups identify with China, it seems plausible that China's government is not afraid in the least of students picking up identification with the United States, or altering the civic cultural values of Chinese students. Perhaps Chinese government officials have access to previous studies which show that Chinese abroad will indeed identify more

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closely with China as in how expatriate communities often grow more fond of the motherland while they are overseas.\textsuperscript{160} From the researcher's own experience and examples, time spent in China did not make the researcher more favorably disposed towards China; in fact it made the researcher more favorably disposed towards aspects of the United States which were not in evidence in China, particularly better environmental quality, and better access to information sources.

As to efforts of social engineering to direct the political cultivation of Chinese students towards support for aspects of US governance and political systems while they are in the US, the researcher encountered no such overt efforts by university officials or special interest groups. However, the activities of religious groups on campuses do have pronounced social agendas which may indirectly tend towards de-identification with the Chinese party state should Chinese students be attracted to such organizations.

Perhaps also, potential troublemakers or those that would do harm to the party state are funneled off overseas, using the United States as an outlet valve for would be renegades such as Chen Guangcheng, much like Britain used Australia for convicts and other social undesirables. Perhaps it is perfectly aright to allow troublemakers to leave, and there is no need to keep information bottled up anymore, at least for the upper echelons of society who enjoy wealth and comparatively fetterless global mobility. China then is not an armed camp like the Soviet Union that must be kept walled-off for fear of information leaking out or propaganda seeping in. The upper class of society already has access to any information they may want or need, and they are given the choice about what political values to hold, and they have made the choice that those of

\textsuperscript{160} Expressions of nostalgic sentiment for a place where one is not are in abundant evidence, a manifestation of the "grass is greener on the other side" phenomenon.
China are superior to the United States. If these assumptions are true, then the Chinese government does not have to worry about corrupting influences from the US.

Indeed even many in the US see China as a powerful model and around the world there have been suggestions that a so-called "Beijing Consensus" exists that delineates an alternative path for development that many in the developing world find attractive, much more so than the "Washington Consensus."\(^{161}\)

Where is the future of political values research for Chinese students in the United States and elsewhere overseas? Or for that matter, for overseas students generally? Has the arrival of "Big Data," heralded the obsolescence of surveys for determining political values? Do the immense troves of data that can be gleaned from Facebook and the browsing and purchasing habits of millions be used to more effectively answer questions of political values than can survey work?\(^{162}\) It is possible that the day of the survey has also ended, that the future of data collection on political values will be entirely single-blind, that those being surveyed will not even know that they are being surveyed? It seems likely that with the ability of government to collect this sort of data, such studies are already underway and in use by governmental agencies in the United States and abroad to conduct research on the political orientations and activities of Chinese students in the US, not to mention the many foreign students from predominately Muslim countries. However, the inability of the scholar to access classified information, or to legally snoop among the data collected on individuals is restricted. Without access to classified


government collected files, or oneself being the owner of Facebook and free to utilize the data, the data would have to be purchased.

In conducting this project, it would have been more prudent to design a more limited, but randomized survey, or a more qualitative-based survey. As it was the complexity of gathering data was great and the resulting somewhat graduate student heavy data makes many comparisons between year and ages difficult. It is likely that the same 335 students (196 that completed the survey in its entirety) could have been recruited much more effectively by some other means.

Lower support for China also predicts lower support for the US. The experience in the US is cultivating critical thinking about both China and the US, is not blindly inculcating support for US government and political institutions. So, while some students who venture abroad may lose support for the institutions of China, they also lose support for the institutions of the US.

Finally, we must look at Chinese students by sub-population as determined by gender, student status, and economic status to gain an accurate understanding of political values. A one-size fits all approach does not work.

Suggested by this data, but not analyzed, is a specific trajectory of political values change. The question of how, year by year, support for political values changes, would be interesting to examine. In this case the mean values do not tell the whole story. While the mean values show no distinct trend, time in US is predictive of developing stronger beliefs and less likelihood of answering "neither agree nor disagree." This thus suggests a solidifying of political values with more advanced time in the US.

In further studies, care must primarily be taken to subdivide the Chinese student population into more discrete populations. Chinese undergraduate students, the initial impetus for the focus of this study are unfortunately, but not surprisingly, less likely than graduate
students to have responded to this survey. A study with a large sample size—at least several thousand—widespread geographic range coverage, and randomized sampling in a longitudinal study is necessary to truly understand the effect of time and experience in the US on the political values of Chinese students.

A longitudinal nationwide, randomized, statistically rigorous study of all Chinese university students in the United States would be the best possible follow-up for this study. Also interesting would be a companion study of American students who study in China and what they learn.

Replication of this study is readily possible, and in a sense, has already been done in a companion study. Christopher Blackburn of Indiana University conducted a similar study in 2013. In an as yet unpublished study, Blackburn emailed surveys through the Indiana University Office of International Students, to approximately 2,800 Chinese students at Indiana University. According to an interview conducted in December 2013, Mr. Blackburn reportedly received some 180 responses. It would be highly instructive to compare the results of these completely separate and independently designed studies to determine whether or not data and conclusions drawn are similar.

Studying other groups of international students in the United States, particularly Saudi Arabian students, whose numbers have increased dramatically along with those of Chinese students would lend a valuable comparative dimension to this work. A very intriguing study indeed would be to survey American students who study abroad in China and evaluate whether and how attitudes towards the US and Chinese governing systems are affected.163

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In the face of China's increasing international standing, a phenomenon illustrated clearly by the RMB being selected by the International Monetary Fund as a reserve currency in late 2015, the endurance of the United States' cultural hegemony across much of the world may be seen to be in jeopardy. The question of whether America's social capital is eroding at the very time that China's is increasing is often asked. From a strength of community standpoint, Almond points to US civic cultural decline as evidenced by differences witnessed in Civic Culture surveys conducted in 1964 and in the 1980's. In a 1990 speech, Gabriel Almond wondered aloud whether the utility of employing the *Civic Culture* framework to gauge political values had "had its day" due to the changing nature of western societies and the emergence of an "alienated subject" mentality among the citizens of western nations with declining connections to their communities. Robert Putnam cites weakening civic engagement in the US due to breakdown of families (through divorce, birth control, abortion) and the decline in the importance of families, which are the primary means of political socialization and norms transmission.

Despite the many dire prognostications of the decline of the United States, the US university system remains an enduring attraction for foreign students. However, what exactly foreign students are taking away from their experiences remains an unanswered question. This research project has pointed to the possibility that undergraduate Chinese students may become less enamored with the US political and governmental system the longer they spend in the US. But why is this?

Putnam mentions entertainment and its isolating effects. Entertainment is an increasingly solitary occupation, increasingly taking the forms of passive TV viewing and semi-passive video game playing, and may play a particularly pronounced role in the lives of foreign students at US universities who must overcome greater social and cultural barriers to socialization than
domestic students.\footnote{Putnam, Robert D., and Robert Leonardi. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993.} Chinese students at US universities in fact may not actually be doing all that much socializing, whether with Americans or with other Chinese students. If this is the case, then Gordon Matthews dictum that that people throughout the "affluent, mass-mediated world today may be as molded by the material and cultural supermarkets as by the state," may not be hold quite as much weight for culturally marginalized international students who are not "shopping" in the cultural marketplace of the nation in which they are attending school and instead are primarily consuming the cultural and state-sponsored products of their homeland.\footnote{Gordon Mathews, Global Culture/Individual Identity Searching for Home in the Cultural Supermarket (London: Routledge, 2000), 9.}

If Almond is correct, and Americans have a greater sense of alienation from their government and communities than they did in the past, it seems then a very natural outcome that Chinese students in the US today might imbibe some of this apathetic sentiment. Far from stimulating the desire to have in China a political system resembling that of the US, the experiences of Chinese students in the US may instead stimulate a desire to shun questions of politics and focus solely on economic goals. Perhaps this is exactly why the Chinese government does not mind its students going to the US, because the government is aware just how limited political engagement in the US actually is and has no fears that students will return to China as political activists.\footnote{Young Americans have a particularly poor voting record: Perhaps this results from the alienated subject mentality, voter apathy, and lack of political engagement that characterizes American young people today. Reference the recent November 2014 elections in the US where only 41% of eligible voters voted, and 80% of young people did not.}

Or, it may be the case that this study's findings have an entirely different implication, that decreasing support for and confidence in the institutions of US politics and governance indicate the development of increased critical thinking about governing systems on the part of Chinese students. An interesting discovery in this study was the correlation between metrics of support
for China and the US, whereby a student who gave high ratings of support to the US was also likely to give high ratings of support to China, and vice versa for low ratings. Thus, thinking about politics and governing systems of varying countries is linked and cannot be separated so cleanly along national lines.

In any event, studying the political values of Chinese students is a rich and wide open field with too few actors. Several questions of how to most effectively study this population come to mind. Are the foundations that guide national-level political values research due for an update? Will future measurements of political values resemble a paid subscription to data-mining services such as Google or Facebook to garner relevant data? Will large-scale survey projects disappear?

And to what extent then does this observer play a role in influencing what is observed? How by the act of gathering data, studying, and propagating findings are researchers affecting the course of the development in international relations and political values formation? The appeal of this line of inquiry is manifest, but to future researchers who may embark on studies in similar veins, let these lines from *The Glass Bead Game* be commended to you:

> He experienced history not as an intellectual discipline, but as reality, as life...he had used the position in which fate had placed him not just to warm himself at the cozy fires of a contemplative existence; he had allowed the winds of the world to blow through his scholar's den and admitted the perils and forebodings of the age into his heart.  

> It is this presence, a feeling of being part and parcel of history, that political values research promises. And what more interesting topic to study than the people of China who are already shaping and guiding the tides of our life and will so in all probability throughout our lives?

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We exist now in an exponentially increased rush towards a future that differs substantially from the present. Today, the technological, if not social, advancement in a month of what humanity achieved in a past millennia occurs. Our world is becoming increasingly anarchical, an anarchy of minds where anything imaginable by any individual actor or group is possible and where absolutely anything has a chance of coming to pass within our lifetimes. This is due in large part to new technologies, especially those concerned with increasing interconnectedness and interdependencies across distances and the ability to more cheaply and quickly than ever before produce physical artifacts which in turn either oppose or bolster systems of thought. Thus, what individual people are thinking is more important than ever and if we can evaluate the views of individuals on systems, what forms these views and how they change, the implications for the future of the world are enormous.
CHAPTER 7: APPENDIX

Fig. 7-1 Survey Recruitment Email Sent by IU Office of International Students

Dear Student,

As a Chinese international student studying in the United States you are invited to participate in a survey about your experiences in the USA. Chinese students form a very important and increasingly visible part of American university life but knowledge about them is limited. By participating in this survey, you will be contributing to a better understanding of Chinese students and their experiences in the United States.

This survey seeks to find out how living and studying in the United States may affect Chinese students’ views about certain issues, including political values. This survey will take about 15 minutes of your time and will ask you demographic questions, questions about your personal experiences, and questions about your views and feelings.

Your participation is entirely voluntary. Thank you!

Fig. 7-2 Individualized Recruitment Email Sent by Researcher

(Survey of IU Chinese Students’ Experiences in the U.S.)

您好！

我们想邀请您参加一个关于您在美国的经验的问卷调查。中国学生是美国大学一个非常重要的组成部分，但我们对中国学生的理解还很有限。此调查将为您提供有关您的经验和感受的信息。我们非常感谢您能抽出宝贵的时间帮助我们了解中国学生在美国的现状，这对我们的意义重大。

您的参与是自愿的。谢谢！

调查链接 Survey Link

关于研究员：Daniel Ildriak 易卓然，是印第安纳大学的研究生，学习东亚研究。

As a Chinese international student studying in the United States you are invited to participate in a survey about your experiences in the USA. Chinese students form a very important and increasingly visible part of American university life but knowledge about them is limited. By participating in this survey, you will be contributing to a better understanding of Chinese students and their experiences in the United States.

This survey seeks to find out how living and studying in the United States may affect Chinese students’ views about certain issues, including political values. This survey will take about 15 minutes of your time and will ask you demographic questions, questions about your personal experiences, and questions about your views and feelings.

Your participation is entirely voluntary. Thank you!
Upon following the web link, survey participants were brought to a very attractive and official-appearing website providing some legitimacy of appearance to what might have seemed like a phishing attempt to some.

**Fig. 7-4 Full Text of Survey Recruitment Email**

(Chinese surname)同学:

您好！

我们想邀请作为中国国际学生的您参与一个关于您在美国的经验的问卷调查。（如果您不属于中国国际学生，很抱歉麻烦您）中国学生是美国大学一个非常重要的组成部分，但我们对中国学生的理解还很有限。此项调查将会问您一些有关背景和政治价值观的问题，大
As a Chinese international student studying in the United States you are invited to participate in a survey about your experiences in the USA. (If you are not a Chinese international student, please accept our apologies for this email reaching you in error.) Chinese students form a very important and increasingly visible part of American university life but knowledge about them is limited. By participating in this survey, you will be contributing to a better understanding of Chinese students and their experiences in the United States.

This survey seeks to find out how living and studying in the United States may affect Chinese students' views about certain issues, including political values. This survey will take about 15 minutes of your time and will ask you demographic questions, questions about your personal experiences, and questions about your views and feelings.

Your participation is entirely voluntary. Thank you!

Survey Link

About the researcher: Daniel Idziak is a graduate student in East Asian Studies at Indiana
University.

Benefits

This study will help the researcher better understand the demographic characteristics and views of Chinese students studying at universities in the United States and will hopefully contribute meaningfully to better understanding the experiences of Chinese students in the United States and scholarship in East Asian Studies.

Confidentiality

The survey questions do not require any information that would reveal your identity and any information that you provide will not be able to be linked to you personally. Data will only be reported in aggregate form. Your email address will not be used in the results of this survey and your participation will not be shared with anyone beyond the research team.

Organizations that may inspect and/or copy your research records for quality assurance and data analysis include groups such as the study investigator and his/her research associates, the Indiana University Institutional Review Board or its designees], and (as allowed by law) state or federal agencies, specifically the Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP) who may need to access your research records.

Contact

If you have questions at any time about this study, you may contact Daniel J. Idziak, Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405, or at didziak@indiana.edu.
For questions about your rights as a research participant or to discuss problems, complaints or concerns about a research study, or to obtain information, or offer input, contact the IU Human Subjects Office at (812) 856-4242 or by email at irb@iu.edu

Voluntary Nature of Study

Taking part in this study is voluntary. You may choose not to take part or may leave the study at any time. Leaving the study will not result in any penalty or loss of benefits to which you are entitled. Your decision whether or not to participate in this study will not affect your current or future relations with Indiana University.

Fig. 7-5 IUB Students from PRC

<table>
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<th>IUB Students From PRC (excluding HK, Macau) Fall 2012</th>
<th>No.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undergraduate</td>
<td>2,341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masters</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctoral</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensive English Program</td>
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Fig 7-6 IUB Students from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan

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</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fall 2012</td>
<td>85</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IUB Students from Taiwan</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fall 2013</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fall 2012</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IUB Students from Macau</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fall 2013</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fall 2012</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Data Collection Section

This section provides an overview of the process of conducting a survey between May and September 2014.

The survey was sent out multiple times, and as a result it is likely that some students received the survey more than once, and even that the same student completed the survey more than once. However, barring malicious intent or extreme boredom on the part of a respondent, this is not likely to have happened.

Data collected was drawn from multiple slightly different versions of this survey. At three points during the survey process, the survey was altered, affecting the order of the questions asked, the navigational ability within the survey for those participating, (a progress bar was added as was the ability to advance to the next page or return to a previous page, an option not available on the earliest version), and the addition of several questions not asked in earlier versions.

On the question that asks about family members in the United States, the researcher should have included "children" as one of the options. Although the numbers probably would have been extremely low, having children in the US might be a very strong indication for support of US political institutions, intent to remain the in the United States for a long time, engagement with US governmental institutions or intent to purchase property. One respondent in the comments section expressed some disappointment at the lack of options for children or spouse.

The question "How long have you been in the United States" should in future be changed to "What is the total amount of time you have spent in the United States." The question that was asked was somewhat ambiguous as to whether the time in the US was the total time, or the time since last entry.
IRB approval was sought and received with Indiana University professor Ethan Michelson serving as principal investigator. The Indiana University IRB protocol number for this study is: 1404830369.

The researcher took efforts to try to ensure that only students from the PRC received the recruitment email, but this hope was not always borne out. The survey reached a number of non-Chinese national students, but in such cases the researcher was either informed of the error by the recruitment email addressee, or the non-Chinese national student response was removed from the data pool by the researcher and not included in the data analysis.

The researcher's early efforts to conduct this survey through the office of international students (which would have entirely obviated the problem of improperly arriving emails) resulted in failure due to the office mailing system being unable to recognize or send Chinese characters in emails, a rather ironic situation given the number of Chinese international students at Indiana University. This first attempt resulted in a mere 12 responses from over 1,100 emails sent out. It was determined that an email in Chinese specifically addressing the student by name would be more likely to yield a response.

Following this failure, the researcher built a database of some 4,000 student names drawn from the IU find people website utilizing the Romanization of the 100 most common Chinese surnames.168 Emails addressed to students by last name were sent out, a process which resulted in a much higher response rate than the earlier survey.

Though the survey specifically targeted PRC national students, it was unavoidable that students from the other regions, particularly Taiwan and Hong Kong as well as American nationals would be inadvertently sent emails. Having only Romanized first and last names to

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work with in creating the survey pool database and entirely lacking national identifiers, it was inevitable that a number of errors would be committed.

An additional abandoned thought was to make the survey a survey of all students having last names drawn from the several hundred most prevalent Chinese and Chinese diaspora surnames, but this would have altered somewhat appreciably the scope and aim of the survey, and have precipitated likely far more errors on the researcher's part.

As it stands the researcher as far as possible excluded from the survey sample any student with an Anglicized first or middle name or name otherwise not commonly associated with contemporary "Chinese" first or middle naming conventions. However, this selection on the researcher's part may well have left out many students who have been in the United States for a longer period of time and who consequently adopted an English name, and so the survey might undercount students who have been in the United States for longer periods of time. However, names such as those showing an apparently adopted English name, but one that is highly unconventional, were included in the study, with the researcher supposing that such a student was more likely to be a Chinese international student rather than an American student of Chinese ancestry. This belief is based on experiences with Chinese nationals who have adopted very unconventional forms for their English names, such as Apple, Canine, or Happy Stone.\footnote{Adopted English names of Chinese nationals encountered by the researcher.}

The email collection method also had the effect of reaching a significant number of Taiwanese students, and the author was made aware of this by not a few personal emails from Taiwanese students, taking justified umbrage for their inclusion in this study.\footnote{Responses such as this one from a Taiwanese student were typical: "Hey Daniel, I don't know how you got my email address, and I don't care what you study. But I just want to clarify that I am NOT a Chinese. I am a TAIWANESE. If you are really interested in East Asia please don't mess it up. I felt insulted when you call me a Chinese."}

Among respondents whose responses were removed prior to data analysis were many...
who responded to only the first question, "I agree to take this survey."

As students from the PRC (excluding Hong Kong and Macau) are the focus of this study, the responses of 11 respondents who did not fit these criteria were removed from the survey data set to be analyzed. Of the 11 removed, four came from Hong Kong, four from Taiwan, one from the USA, and one from an indeterminate place. The author received a number of emails from Taiwanese students who vociferously asserted that they were not Chinese, and recommended to the researcher a revaluation of the recruitment methods.

The questions "Are you currently employed," "How is your education being financed," and "Have you ever had interactions with government officials in China," were not asked of 72 of the respondents due to the presence of several different survey versions.

This survey was conducted via email, specifically by recruitment emails sent to students' Indiana University email addresses. The timing of the survey, predominately sent out over the late spring semester of 2014 and during the summer precluded many students who quite simply did not check their school-related email accounts for whatever reason. Additionally, due to gmail being to some extent blocked in China, those students accessing their school email through the gmail client server imail, would have been unable to receive the recruitment email. Furthermore, not all Chinese students in the Indiana University system had an equal opportunity to participate in the study, nor was the opportunity even presented to all. Recruitment for this survey took place via mailing students based upon their family surname, with recruitment emails sent to students having the 100 or so most common Chinese surnames. Those with less common surnames had no opportunity to participate.

Regrettably, this means of recruitment, though far from ideal, was made necessary for several reasons. The first was the inability of a recruitment email sent by the Office of
International Students to reach a significant number of students or to return a significant response yield. Of a total of 1,143 email requests sent, 12 responses were recorded. The author believes this low response rate was due to the lack of attention-grabbing due to the inability of the email system of the Office of International Students to use Chinese characters.

Also, in receiving an email such as Fig. 7-1 in the Appendix from the office of international students, the author believes that the average student hasn't the least interest in reading something like this which they would likely be frequently bombarded with. Contrast this with Appendix figure 7-4, which represents the later individualized emails sent out, with Chinese characters and which directly addressing a student by surname. These emails had dramatically more success in response rates. Of 3,130 emails sent, a usable response rate of over 10% was achieved.

2,632 surname-addressed emails were sent to students at IUB in an attempt to reach the 3,079 Chinese students at IUB. However, a number of the 2,632 emails sent erroneously reached students from Taiwan and the United States. There were also a very significant number of undeliverable emails. The researcher estimates however that this survey was sent to approximately 75% of the Chinese students at IUB.

In designing the online survey many factors were taken into account. One was whether to have a progress bar and whether or not to include forward and back buttons.

Hays finds that surveys that require a next button to move on to the next question take about 50% longer to complete. However, this survey, which employs multiple-choice answers, is

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171 The office of international students supports research by faculty and students for IRB-approved research projects. However, due to the time of year, summer, a far more limited pool of students was eligible to receive my email, due to enrollment status at the time.

not compatible with automatic advancement to the next question. Therefore, this time saving strategy was not feasible.

As this survey in its early iteration had no "back button" it is certainly possible that some respondents entered a response that was incorrect that they may have gone back to change had the back button been available.

In the initial survey run, an emailing of approximately 380 students, sent June 6, 65 responses were received. Of these a substantial number did not complete the survey. 12 of the 40 ceased taking the survey after the question regarding real estate ownership, while three ceased taking the survey after the question regarding car ownership.

The data analyzed in this survey comes from several separate surveys, each of which contained slight differences. Chief among these differences were the ways the surveys were sent out and the order of questions, not the substance of the questions. The earliest round of surveys was sent out in May 2014 by the Indiana University Office of International Students. This survey was sent to 1,143 students and received a total of 12 completed responses. Finding this method inadequate to gather data, other options were undertaken.

The question "are you currently employed" questions was not present on early versions of the survey and therefore total student employment figures probably understate student employment.

Early versions of survey had wording "Do you or your family intend to purchase a house apartment or other real estate in the United States?" Later versions read "In the future, do you, or does your family, intend to purchase a house, apartment, or other real estate in the United States."
Early survey versions had the question "Which of the following most accurately describes the number of friends you have at your university?" In later versions, this was removed, as viewed as redundant given that there was already a question asking something very similar, namely "How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement: I have many American friends."

The early and later versions of the survey differed primarily in question placement. After viewing early version response rates, response rates were abysmally low particularly at the end of the first survey page, which immediately asked the question "Are you a member of any Chinese political Party?" Completed survey rates dropped off significantly with this question. The researcher posits that this line of questioning alarmed students (perhaps as being too personal or revelatory) and dissuaded them from continuing. The researcher's intent had been to ask the most relevant questions towards the researcher's interest at the beginning, in the hopes that if a student chose to discontinue the survey at some point along, they would at least have answered the most important questions. However, this backfired, and it was found necessary to first hook the students a bit. The primary change then made in the second and final survey version was shifting questions of direct relevance and interest to a student's life directly to the beginning of the questionnaire.

In the modified final version of the survey the question, the first question after "which country are you a citizen of" asked the question: "For each of the following, please indicate how important it is in your life" and included the category options drawn from Almond and Sidney Verba's *The Civic Culture* of family, friends, politics, and religion.

The very next question asked "Taking all things together, how happy would you say you are?" This version of the survey had far deeper question response rates with respondents more
likely to continue on to the next page. It is thought that because this version of the survey seemed a little more friendly and interested with and concerned in the student's welfare, students were more likely to be interested in the survey itself and more likely to go deeper into the survey.

Early versions of the survey did not have a back and forward button nor a completion bar at the bottom. If students had tried to click back or forward on their browser window, the survey would likely have crashed. Based upon comments received from the survey, at least one student encountered an error, which caused the cessation of the survey.

The initial survey had this wording "Considering the media sources that you use, such as internet and television, do you consume this media primarily in English or in Chinese?"

The final survey had this wording "Considering the media sources that you use, such as internet and television, do you use this media primarily in English or in Chinese?"

In the final survey, the word "use" was decided to be superior to "consume" as consume is needlessly verbose and possibly confusing to non-native speakers of English.

One impressive result of this survey is the researcher's realization of a higher capacity in English among Chinese students than previous experiences interacting with Chinese students had led the researcher to believe was the case. However, it is always possible that this survey attracted a somewhat more highly English-proficient and academic-oriented sample. In future studies, a simple random sample needs to be conducted to get a truly accurate picture of Chinese students' views.

The original survey question read: "If applicable, have your interactions with governmental officials in the United States been mostly positive or mostly negative?" In the final version the "if applicable" was removed reading: "Have your interactions with governmental officials in the United States been mostly positive or mostly negative?"
The initial survey read: "If applicable, have your interactions with governmental officials in China been mostly positive or mostly negative?" Due to the researcher's oversight, there was not a question asking if students had had any interaction with Chinese government officials.

The final survey turned this question into two questions, first asking: "Have you ever had any direct interactions with government officials in China such as police officers, immigration officials, department of motor vehicles officials, etc.? (Please select all that apply)"). Then the same question was asked regarding governmental officials in the US. Not including this question in the initial draft was an oversight on the researcher's part.

Psychological and Sociological Mapping of Chinese Students in the US

The new Chinese student demographics' exposure to America is not limited to the academic realm and has created new social challenges, both for Chinese students and American students. Unlike the mostly older graduate student norm that existed since 1978 on American campuses, Chinese students today on campuses are younger, often less mature, and often much less used to interactions and living in a new country, mostly alone. Concerning the travails and difficulties almost all American college students in the United States experience upon their first experiences in college, with academic rigor and distance from home and support network, it is remarkable that there is not much more difficulty for Chinese students who are so far from home and in a very alien environment, and much more areas for cultural clash between Americans and Chinese.

A prevailing trend in literature on Asian students in the US reveals a profound sense of isolation, marginalization and cultural contrast between students of East Asian and US origins. Two scholars in the Midwest in particular stand out for their focus on contemporary student life of Asian students in the United States, Geri Alumit Zeldes of Michigan State University and
Nancy Abelmann of University of Illinois Urbana Champaign.

While Chinese students often feel isolated or marginalized, the demographically disrupting appearance of culturally distinct Asian students also has effects on Americans, effects that sometimes spill onto message boards at the bottom of websites containing articles relating to the phenomenon of the Chinese student population. Comments include directed calls on Asian students broadly to assimilate to American culture, to speak English, or even racist or derogatory rants. There is often and conflict over waste disposal. Calls for students to not litter, or complaints about littering or otherwise improper disposal of trash are frequent. Even when lack of communication is not presumably an issue, different theories on the proper disposal of waste may create conflict.

Concerning this point, the researcher himself came into conflict over conflicting theories of waste disposal with a Chinese apartment building-mate during the 2012-2013 school year. Sharing a common trash disposal area, the researcher was perturbed to find great quantitates of trash and recyclables littered about the vicinity of trash disposal bins in Bloomington, instead of being placed inside of the bins. Calling the attention of the presumed perpetrator to her infraction, the name and address of whom appeared abundantly on improperly disposed of packaging materials, resulted in confusion and alarm on the part of the presumed perpetrator. The conflict may have stemmed from differing modes of waste disposal familiar to Chinese urban areas versus those of the United States. Whereas in urban areas in China, a central garbage pit exists close to apartments where to waste is thrown, in the US, though there may be fenced 

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off disposal areas, it is still socially required convention to place rubbish within the bin. In reflection that this is not an isolated phenomenon, signs in the elevators at the large proportion Chinese student-residing dormitory *Campus View* and *Tulip Tree* dormitories admonish students to not be "lazy trashers" and contain a diagram indicating the lifting of a trash can lid, and a diagram next to it showing a crossed out pile of trash on the ground next to the trash can, in an indication that this is improper waste disposal. This is not to say that western students in other countries in no way contravene social norms. Lest this devolve into a discussion far removed from the topic at hand, let us continue.

The true extent and magnitude of the new Chinese student population in US university towns, though it is right under people's noses, is still only gradually being realized, and an understanding of the characteristics of these students is just barely emerging. One of the most poignant looks at the lives of Chinese university students in the US and reaction to them is a 2013 short documentary film entitled *Imported from China* by Geri Alumit Zeldes. In her film, Zeldes follows the reaction to the Chinese student presence by American students on the Michigan State University campus, and demonstrates that there is significant tension between Americans and Chinese students and profound feelings of alienation and disconnection among Chinese students from their university and American classmates. In a similar case study by Nancy Abelmann at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign (UIUC), Abelmann finds that Korean and Korean-American students feel similar disconnection between themselves and mainstream American university culture. Regarding the researcher's survey, these examples tie into questions asked of happiness and university satisfaction. The researcher found that students

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174 As observed by author on Indiana University campus
that reported being happier and more satisfied with their university also reported higher degrees of support for the political and governmental institutions of the United States.

In the researcher's interviews with Chinese students on the Indiana University campus, this sense of separation from mainstream American university culture was also in evidence. One subject, a female master's student, reported rarely having the opportunity to speak English and improve upon her English, because she was constantly surrounded by a Chinese speaking environment, among her classmates, her job responsibilities, and the apartment complex in which she lived.\textsuperscript{176} Another student, a PhD student at UIUC reported a distinct racist undertone to her experience, and a feeling of marginalization.\textsuperscript{177}

Zeldes in a short documentary film, \textit{Imported From China}, records significant tensions between Chinese international students and American students.\textsuperscript{178} Zeldes finds that American students on the Michigan State University campus react to the presence of Chinese students with a mixture of puzzlement, nationalistic feeling, and annoyance. Meanwhile, Chinese students feel excluded from the experiences of most American students and seem to exist in entirely different worlds and having drastically different experiences of the American college experience.

In the researcher's own conversation with a Chinese graduate student, the student, though being an extremely capable English-speaker, expressed frustration with the lack of opportunity to speak English in the United States, owing to her work requirements of teaching Chinese, her Chinese speaking colleagues, and largely Chinese speaking friends.\textsuperscript{179}

\textsuperscript{176} Y. C., "Life of a Chinese Graduate Student in the US," interview by author, Bloomington, IN, February 15, 2013.
\textsuperscript{177} X. Z., Interview by author, Minneapolis, MN, April 11, 2014.
\textsuperscript{178} Geri Alumit Zeldes, \textit{Imported from China}. Film. Directed by Troy Hale & Geri Alumit Zeldes, 2013. Screened at Indiana University, Maurer School of Law, February 27, 2014.
\textsuperscript{179} Chen, Y. "Life of a Chinese Graduate Student in the US." Interview by author. February 15, 2013.
Nancy Abellmann of UIUC discusses the sense of isolation and segregation that Korean and Korean-American students feel vis-a-vis their Anglo-American peers, and a profound sense that college has not met their expectations. Though Abellmann speaks of a population entirely distinct from the Chinese, many of the racial experiences are similar to those experienced by the Chinese. Indeed the history of foreign Asian students in the US is one of first being Japanese students, then Koreans, and today Chinese. There are waves.\textsuperscript{180} In Abellmann's book, The Intimate University, which focuses around qualitative interviews of some 50 students, the musings and thoughts of some 10 are included in this book and comprise the bulk of her work, Abellmann discovers that among the many problems that students raise with their American school is the problem of Ethnic segregation, finding this most troubling.\textsuperscript{181} In her many interviews a persistent thread shows that students are very dissatisfied with their colleges, that the schools are not living up to students "liberal dreams" of what the University [UIUC] should have been.\textsuperscript{182}

Like Zeldes, Abellmann's close examination of the Korean American students at UIUC finds a similar sense of alienation, but also one of shattered expectations and hopes about their experience in the US educational system. Like Zeldes, she finds a minority population that is disaffected. In this survey, the researcher asks many of the questions that are in dialogue with these sociological, anthropological approaches including happiness levels, satisfaction with university, and American friends. Overall, the results of this survey show that Chinese students are satisfied with their university, despite not having that many American friends.

Another point of psychological friction exists in the dramatically different physical landscape and infrastructure, which Chinese students often find at in their US university towns. Accustomed to living in dense urban environments with extensive transport infrastructure such as bus lines and metro systems, many Chinese students find themselves in small, often rural American towns, to which they have difficulty adapting. This feeling, observed on several online discussion forums was further supported by the researcher’s interview with a freshman Chinese student from coastal China.

Compounding the psychological tension among Chinese students in the US may be a sense of failure in not having attained a coveted spot at an elite Chinese university and being "forced" to attend university overseas. Among Chinese undergraduate students, an overwhelming preference is to attend a top Chinese university, and for those who are unable to do so, attending school in America is second choice escape valve. This sentiment is summed up by a quote found at the bottom of a discussion forum regarding Chinese students in the US: "Those who go to the U.S. for undergraduate study are a bunch of losers eliminated by the gaokao (高考) in China."\(^{183}\)

Concerning this point, the researcher interviewed a PhD student from UIUC and learned about some of the psychological baggage associated with being a Chinese student at a US university and the world that students have created that is totally closed to the experiences of outsiders.\(^{184}\)

A sense of sadness permeated the student's expression, and she openly approached the researcher and began a dialogue with him after the conclusion of a presentation. She spoke about

\(^{183}\) The gaokao (高考) is the college entrance exam for high school students in mainland China and may be likened to the SAT (Scholastic Assessment Test) in the United States, only even more existentially terrifying. Unlike the SAT, which may be taken repeatedly in a given year, the gaokao is offered only once per year.


\(^{184}\) X. Z., Interview by author, Minneapolis, MN, April 11, 2014.
her experience as a Chinese student in the United States. One thing can be said of advantage to this project, and that is, Chinese students seem to be very willing to speak with the researcher about their experiences, as though they are interested, perhaps even grateful that someone wants to hear their story, that someone is interested in their story, one that is often fraught with challenges, emotional, financial, and directional. After the discussion, one of my fellow panelists, began speaking with me.

The student told the researcher that she thinks the research topic is too broad, and that each year the Chinese students that come to the US are very different from those of the preceding years for a number of factors. When she came to the United States circa 2007, there was an online web forum known as CUUS (See you in the US) on which all students who would soon be travelling to study in the United States were members of. These students exchanged information and debate on message boards, argued and even became "close friends." The interviewee told the researcher that in 2007, she "knew" every single Chinese student that was coming to the US that year. That morning, she had seen her online friend for the first time, after a gap in communication of eight years. He had dropped from the message boards for a few years after having been unsuccessful in receiving admission to a program, for which it was expected by all (on the forum) that he would. This resulted in a tremendous loss of face, and no one dared try to get in touch with him to ask him what was going on. The comment that this same student had made to the researcher earlier in the day was that among Chinese students, they intuitively know the social standing of other Chinese students, and they know that if a student goes to a certain school, what their financial situation is.

Also spoken of was the importance of social status in matters of who Chinese students choose to associate with. The student pointed out that however that while her friend's comments
at one time (2007) may have been true, now CUUS is not used so much anymore, or if so, only by applicants to top, Ivy League schools. Other message boards have been taken over by US application preparation services that help Chinese students go to school in the US. Plus there are just so many more Chinese students coming to US now. In her day, she felt like she knew every Chinese student in US, close knit network, close friends among people she had only ever met online.

The student reported that the situation for Chinese students now in the US is so vastly different, than when she was applying, Chinese students received financial aid and paid in-state tuition. Now, Chinese students are almost universally paying out-of-state rates. When the researcher asked her about her decision to study in the US for her undergraduate degree, a sense of great sadness loomed on her face, and she spoke of the pressures of the gaokao, and how an applicant only really has a shot at one university in the application process. Out of three choices which an applicant is allowed to select, only the top one counts. For the student, feelings of status were very important and the loss of face of taking the houlu (backdoor) that US universities represent for students who are unsuccessful with the gaokao, is humiliating though she did not say directly that this was her personal experience, it seemed clear that it was. She also spoke of being on a UIUC parents' forum where parents write about selling their apartments in China to pay for their students to attend school in the United States. They want to send their children to schools in the US not because they are wealthy, but because everyone is doing it. Presumably also there is no choice with a single child; education, one way or another is paramount and is worth everything.


Hesse, Herman. Magister Ludi (The Glass Bead Game), Bantam, 1969.


Idziak, Daniel J. "Chinese National Student’s Perceptions and Beliefs Regarding the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, PRC." Written for Indiana University course, Politics of Modern Xinjiang, December 2012.


Johnston, A. I., and D. Stockmann, “Chinese Attitudes toward the United States.”


Zeldes, Geri Alumit. Imported from China. Film. Directed by Troy Hale & Geri Alumit Zeldes, 2013. Screened at Indiana University, Maurer School of Law, February 27, 2014.


SUMMARY

Professional proficiency in Mandarin Chinese. Overseas work and study experience in China, Poland, Brunei, and Taiwan. Skilled in social science survey design and analysis, research on contemporary Chinese civil society, writing, editing, summarizing, project management, and university teaching.

EDUCATION

Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana - M.A. East Asian Studies 2012 - 2015
National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan - Chinese Translation 2014
College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia - B.A. International Relations & Chinese 2004 - 2008
Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland - Polish Language 2007
Peking University, Beijing, China - Business 2006
Tsinghua University, Beijing, China - Chinese Language & History 2006

EXPERIENCE

Associate Instructor, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 2012 - 2014

- Designed and taught undergraduate courses in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures.
- Evaluated the written work and in-class performance of 250+ students.
- Provided substantive feedback and academic counsel; assigned grades.
- Developed curriculum and course structure in coordination with departmental colleagues.

Foreign Service Officer Intern, U.S. Department of State, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Summer 2013

- Posted in U.S. Embassy, assisted in organizing ASEAN 2013 international summit.
- Drafted memos and diplomatic cables on behalf of ambassador for the office of the Secretary of State.
- Monitored news, conducted economic-and demographic research projects, analyzed international events.
- Drafted and edited substantial portions of the 2013 Brunei Country Commercial Guide.
- Participated in public diplomacy outreach initiatives, met with diplomatic counterparts from various countries.

Research Assistant, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington, VA 2011- 2012

- International Center for Terrorism Studies - Researched and analyzed security concerns related to terrorism.
- Edited IR journals Partnership for Peace Review (NATO) and Terrorism: An Electronic Journal.
- Led team of summer interns, directing workflow and overseeing diverse projects.
- Organized academic and professional symposiums on national security concerns and international threats.

Specialist, Apple Inc., Arlington, VA 2011- 2012

- Analyzed, troubleshoot, and solved a wide spectrum of IT hardware and software problems.
- Maintained and expanded corporate partnerships, trained customers in personal technology workshops.
- Consistently exceeded sales targets and realized high job performance metrics.

ASSOCIATION & COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP

American Mandarin Society - Member, Washington, DC. 2011- Present
Preparing Future Faculty Conference - Planning Committee, Bloomington, IN 2012 - 2013
World Languages Advisory Committee - Participant, Arlington County Public Schools, Arlington, VA 2011 - 2012
Student Government, Director of Campus Community Bicycle Program, Williamsburg, VA 2007 - 2008
HONORS & AWARDS

Appointment as Associate Instructor at Indiana University. Aug 2012 - Aug 2014
Scholarship for Advanced Chinese Translation at National Taiwan University, Taipei ROC
May 2014
Indiana University 2013 International Student Summer Enhancement Grant
April 2013
Louise McNutt Fellowship for Asian Studies, Indiana University, Academic Year 2012-2013.
April 2012
Freeman Award for Study in Asia, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg Virginia.
March 2006