Who Let the Dogs Out?

Tracking the Philosophical Life among the Wolves and Dogs of the Republic

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The wolf exerts a powerful influence on the human imagination. It takes your stare and turns it back on you.

—Barry Lopez, Of Wolves and Men

Philosophies diffuse odors.

—George Santayana, Dialogues in Limbo

The complex olfactory communication practices of wolf scent-marking remain in many ways a mystery to us. But for the wolves themselves, who make or inspect a scent mark once every two minutes, olfactory communication must play a rather important role in their relations with one another and the wider world they inhabit. Although scent-marking in wolves is thought to be in part an attempt to warn off intruders, some research suggests that it is used as a kind of “cognitive map” for members of the pack to find their way through the home territory by locating sources of water and standard hunting trails. Of course, for the breed of philosophers who seek meaningful pathways through the territory of our most ancient and familiar textual homes, the eyes, ears, and even the sense of taste have long been faithful guides, while the nose has remained always ancillary. Perhaps it is a species problem, for as Aristotle notes in the De Anima with respect to smell, “we do not have precision in this power of perceiving, but are inferior to many animals.” And yet, the wolves, and their more domesticated descendants, the dogs, may be onto something.
In his rich and engaging *Dialogues in Limbo*, George Santayana imagines himself entering into conversation with immortal dead philosophical figures, the first of whom, Democritus, insists that “a philosophy can be smelt.” In discussion with Alcibiades, Democritus claims: “Hence, though it be a delicate matter and not accomplished without training, it is possible for a practiced nose to distinguish the precise quality of a philosopher by his peculiar odor, just as a hound by the mere scent can tell a fox from a boar.” However comical, Santayana’s Democritus, like our wolves and dogs, may be on to something. Perhaps the nose knows something of philosophy, if only we would attend to it as we navigate the territory of our most familiar textual homes. There is arguably no home more familiar and no text more odiferous than Plato’s *Republic*. So perhaps something of Plato’s quality as a philosopher and of Socrates’s attempt in the dialogue to sniff out the longer road toward a philosophical life may be discerned by tracking the scent of wolves and dogs in the *Republic*.

Despite its rather peculiar absence of any thematization of smell or smelling as a mode of perceiving, Plato’s *Republic* reeks of various animals, but the smell of wolves and dogs permeates the text with striking pungency. The scent-markings of the canines in the *Republic* leave a trail that might itself be used as a kind of cognitive map leading us to one of the central teachings of the text itself: that the philosophical life is situated precariously between the tyrannical tendencies of the wolf and the blind obedience of the well-trained dog.

**The Scent of the Wolf**

The first hint of the presence of wolves in the *Republic* can be discerned even before one attacks Socrates in the form of the “wild beast” that is Thrasymachus. Autolykos, Odysseus’s cunning maternal grandfather, appears at a turning point of the discussion Socrates has with Polemarchus about the nature of justice. The appearance of Autolykos, the “lone wolf,” marks the moment when Polemarchus, having so eagerly taken up the question of justice inherited from his father, Cephalus, begins to wonder if he himself understands what he meant when he insisted that “justice is helping friends and harming enemies” (334a–b). Socrates brings him to this recognition by insisting that Autolykos would be the embodiment of justice on the account Polemarchus had been defending. Citing Homer, Socrates emphasizes that Autolykos is said “to excel all human-beings in stealing and swearing oaths” (334b). The appeal to Autolykos has a strong effect on Polemarchus, for he would rather relinquish his previous position than endorse a conception of justice that would elevate the “wolf itself” as a paragon. In Homer, Autolykos is said to have learned his skills of lying and thievery from Hermes, the trickster god, so well versed in using verbal equivocation to gain advantage. His name, Autolykos, the “lone wolf” or the “wolf itself,” like the name he gave Odysseus, is rife with significance. Homer tells us that Autolykos named Odysseus
after his own nature; since he himself was hated (ὀδυσσάμενος) by many men and women throughout the land, his grandson should have the name Odysseus.\footnote{11}

This hatred is one side of the rather equivocal attitude the Greek mythical tradition has toward the figure of the wolf. On the one hand, the wolf, as Richard Buxton suggests, “stands for one who by his behavior has set himself beyond humanity.”\footnote{12} This is particularly true of the “lone wolf,” a figure isolated from human and lupine community alike. Connected to this, of course, is the idea, embodied by Odysseus’s grandfather, of cunning criminality. In \textit{Pythian 2}, Pindar emphasizes this cunning in a passage that resonates deeply with the conception of justice for which Polemarchus advocates: “May I love my friend; but against my enemy I shall make a secret attack, like a wolf, treading now here now there on my crooked paths.”\footnote{13} This dimension of the lupine character is what drives Polemarchus to recognize the limits of his own position. On the other hand, however, because of its cooperative nature, its social life together with others in a pack, and its practices of collaborative hunting and of the equitable sharing of quarry, the wolf also stood in the Greek mythical tradition as a symbol of community and even as an analogue for human social life.\footnote{14} This strand of the tradition finds further expression in the treatment of domesticated dogs; and Socrates himself draws upon it during his discussion of the second wave in \textit{Republic} 5 when he suggests that the guardians, men and women alike, should share all pursuits in common, “like dogs” (466d).\footnote{15}

These two dimensions of the wolf, its connection with the early phases of domesticated civilization and its recalcitrant segregation from communal life, can be discerned in the very ancient story of Lycaon in Arcadia. Lycaon’s father, Pelasgus, was said to be the first to settle the land, building shelter and clothing the people in sheepskins. These civilizing efforts were continued by Lycaon, who founded a city and established games in honor of Zeus. “But,” as Pausanias reports, “Lycaon brought a human baby to the altar of Lycaean Zeus, and sacrificed it, pouring out its blood upon the altar, and according to legend immediately after the sacrifice he was changed from a man to a wolf [λύκον].”\footnote{16} Civilization is not established without cost; and although the figure of the wolf here appears only at the moment of exile, a hint of its civilizing effect can be discerned already in the sheepskins Pelasgus used to clothe his people against the cold.\footnote{17}

If the wolf signifies the emergence and possible dissolution of community in the logic of Greek mythology, then it is perhaps no surprise that the scent of Autolykos marks the moment Polemarchus recognizes the limitations of his own understanding of justice and agrees ultimately to join Socrates “to do battle then as partners” (\textit{Republic} 335e).\footnote{18} We might, then, discern something sweet in the scent left by this first mark of the wolf in the \textit{Republic}; yet something more malodorous remains, for the final mark of the wolf in the \textit{Republic} is found in Book 8, when Socrates appeals to the story of Lycaon to articulate the manner in which
the just leader metabolizes into the tyrant (565d). The wolf then marks the moment of the emergence of the possibility of community in Book 1 and a decisive point in its dissolution in Book 8; between these markings of the wolf, however, the scent of its more domesticated cousin, the dog, emerges as dominant. Following the canine scent that permeates the text between the first and last appearances of the wolf will put us on the trail of the philosopher and the just life that is possible when a desire for the Good is cultivated in an excellent soul set upon the trail of dialectic.

A Whiff of the Dog, the Savagery of the Wolf

The first appearance of the dog in the Republic points in this direction. Its distinct scent marks the first appearance of aretē—excellence or virtue—in the dialogue, although the smell of horses is also in the air. Socrates first touches upon the question of excellence by appealing to the virtue of dogs (335b). At the end of his discussion with Polemarchus, having convinced him that “it is just to do good to a friend, if the friend is good, and harm to an enemy, if bad,” Socrates turns his attention to the impact unjust actions have on other living things. Here he solicits agreement from Polemarchus that when a horse is harmed, it is made worse, not better. Socrates then asks Polemarchus if harming a horse makes it worse “with respect to the virtue of dogs or to that of horses” (335b). In agreeing that what it means to be an excellent dog is different from what it means to be an excellent horse or human being, and that harming and doing good to each can ruin or cultivate the virtue of each, Polemarchus is led ultimately to the conclusion that “it is never just to harm anyone” (335e). This preliminary conclusion about the nature of justice is the basis upon which Socrates and Polemarchus agree “to do battle as partners” against those who claim otherwise; and sure enough, it is also the moment when they are attacked by Thrasymachus, a wolf among those gathered.

Although Socrates does not explicitly call Thrasymachus a wolf, he says that as they were talking Thrasymachus was “restrained by the men sitting near him” and then, “hunched up like a wild beast [θηρίον], he came at us as if to tear us to pieces” (336b). That Socrates has a wolf in mind, however, is made clear when, after Thrasymachus attacks him for speaking nonsense, he says: “I was thoroughly amazed hearing these things and, seeing him, I was terrified; and it seemed to me that if I had not seen him before he’d seen me, I would have become voiceless. But as it was, just when he first was made savage [ἐξαγριαίνεσθαι] by the argument, I looked at him first, so that I was able to answer” (336d–e). This seems to be the first articulation in literature of the ancient proverbial belief that being seen first by a wolf renders a person speechless.19 It is perhaps not unreasonable to think that the first appearance of the “lone wolf” in the argument with Polemarchus was what set Thrasymachus back on his haunches. Socrates would perhaps have noticed then that Thrasymachus was being “made savage” just as Polemarchus was being tamed. Indeed, the stance Thrasymachus takes—that justice is the ad-
vantage of the stronger—is itself simply a more extreme and savage stance than the position Polemarchus defended and then relinquished (338c). Thrasymanus’s harsh position dovetails with his harsh disposition, which becomes yet more savage the closer Socrates comes to establishing among those gathered a community oriented by a concern for the question of justice. This vacillation between the savage and the tame, the wild and the domesticated, is a trope running through the entire dialogue, though it is most poignant here in Socrates’s encounter with Thrasymanus. It is no surprise, then, to catch the scent of tyranny in the things Thrasymanus says, and to find the distinction between tyranny and democracy emerging as a central concern of a discussion that increasingly focuses on the question of just rule and the nature of the just human being. Thus the entire question of the nature of a just ruler and, by extension, of what it is to embody the excellence of justice emerges in an atmosphere thick with the savage scent of the wolf, even if it is also already marked by the virtue of the more domesticated dog.

Thrasymanus himself seems particularly resistant to domestication throughout the dialogue, though this initial encounter is a powerful demonstration of Socrates’s ability to tame the wolf. Although his resistance has already been suggested by the vicious response Thrasymanus has to the emerging community between Socrates and Polemarchus, it is reinforced again when, just as Socrates has those gathered convinced that the good ruler cares about the advantage of the ruled, Thrasymanus lashes out again in a particularly demeaning manner, asking Socrates if he has a wet nurse and insisting that his nose needs a wiping because he does not recognize the dynamics of the relationship between sheep and shepherd (334a). Here Thrasymanus draws on a long tradition, one heard already in Homer’s standard epithet for Agamemnon as “shepherd of the people,” which identifies political leadership with shepherding. The analogy is introduced, however, in order to argue that tyranny, “the most perfect injustice,” makes one the happiest (344a). Immediately upon articulating this position, Thrasymanus sought to leave, but, as Socrates reports, “he was forced to remain by those present” (344d). With Thrasymanus so restrained, Socrates identifies the central concern of the entire dialogue, which is not really justice per se but rather “the course of a whole life, on the basis of which each of us would live a most profitable [λυσιτελεστάτην] life” (344e). By putting it in terms of profitability here, Socrates intends to shift the very meaning of what is valuable. If Thrasymanus understands justice and the good life it enables in terms of the self-interest of the stronger, Socrates will lead those gathered at the home of Cephalus to recognize as most profitable and stronger the life of justice and virtue. Thus, already in the first book, Socrates confronts Glaucon with the central choice of the dialogue: Thrasymanus “‘claims that the life of the unjust person is stronger than that of the just person. Which do you choose, Glaucon,’ I said, ‘and which of the two things said seems to you to be truer?’” To this Glaucon replied: “I, indeed, say that the life of the just person is the more profitable [λυσιτελέστερον]” (347e).
The question is directed to Glaucon, who emerges in the middle of the discussion with Thrasymachus to become the central figure of the dialogue. Glaucon is the one with whom the main teachings of the dialogue find articulation and the one toward whom Socrates directs his most poignant questions. The community Socrates establishes with Glaucon in the *Republic* is the only city founded in deed rather than merely in speech. Here, in fact, is the moment when Socrates appeals to the image of jurors in a court of law, and it is Glaucon who agrees that it will be best if they proceed as judges and speakers both (348b). On the basis of this procedure, Socrates seeks to found a community animated by a concern for justice among those gathered. But before that community can be established, Thrasymachus has to be tamed by being shown the dysfunctional nature of injustice and tyrannical rule. This Socrates does in part by appealing to the training of animals, and specifically horses, to illustrate first, that each being has a particular work [ἔργον] proper to it in which it can excel and second, that the proper work of human being is to live well. Such a life, however, requires an orientation toward justice (352d–354a).

The smell of horses here draws our attention back to the argument with Polemarchus and the possible community that emerged there. Indeed, these passages are braided tightly into that discussion with Polemarchus in three discernible strands. First, there is a structural parallel between the shifting positions of Polemarchus and Thrasymachus: the former moves from his original position that justice is harming enemies and benefiting friends to the view that “it is never just to harm anyone,” while the latter moves from the claim that justice is “the advantage of the stronger” toward the begrudging recognition that justice is a certain way of life. Second, an appeal to animal training generally and to the training of horses in particular punctuates Socrates’s introduction of the question of virtue with Polemarchus and his introduction of the proper work of a being in his discussion with Thrasymachus (352d). Finally, if the virulence of the wolf is provoked the moment Socrates appeals to Autolykos and begins to establish a philosophical friendship with Polemarchus, by the end of Socrates’s discussion with Thrasymachus the wolf himself has ultimately “grown gentle [πρᾶος ἐγένου]” and has “ceased being hard [χαλεπαίνων ἐπαύσω]” (354a).

With these words—πρᾶος and χαλεπός, gentle and hard—the pungent scent of the wolf disperses, giving way to the discernable smell of the dog. The words themselves point to what is perhaps the most famous reference to dogs in the *Republic*, the moment when Socrates compares the guardians of his more luxurious city in speech to “noble puppies.” There he goes so far as to suggest to Glaucon that such dogs are “truly philosophic” (375e, 376b). Let us follow the scent.

**Philosopher Dogs and Kings**

Like a dog with a stick, Socrates plays with words. Having turned Glaucon’s attention to the unhealthy, “feverish” city, Socrates insists that there will be a need
for guardians who will be fierce to enemies and yet gentle to citizens. He puts it this way: “Don’t you think . . . that for guarding [εἰς φυλακὴν] there is any difference between the nature of a noble puppy [γενναίου σκύλακος] and that of a well-bred young man?” (375a). The words put Glaucon—and us—on alert: this analogy is playful; but as with all Socratic playfulness, something important is at play.

What Socrates says here with respect to the analogy between dogs and boys points at once back to his discussion with Polemarchus and Thrasymachus and forward to his account of the philosopher king. Linguistically, Socrates situates the nature of the dog and thus of its analogue, the guardian, between gentleness and savagery. In this way, he gestures back to the appearance of Thrasymachus, now tamed. The language is striking. Socrates asks Glaucon about the spirited nature of dogs, wondering “how will they not be savage [ἄγριοι] with one another and the other citizens?” And he continues: “But, indeed, it is necessary for them to be gentle [πράους] toward their own but hard [χαλεπούς] on their enemies” (375b–c). The words recall the position Polemarchus originally defended, namely, that “justice is helping friends and harming enemies,” and they echo those that mark the taming of the wolf at the end of Book 1 (334a–b, 354a). Thrasymachus, who first appeared having been “made savage”—ἐξαγριαίνεσθαι—by the discussion with Polemarchus, is ultimately “made gentle” by the words Socrates speaks. The entire encounter with Thrasymachus is thus woven deeply into the texture of this passage about guardians and dogs.

If, however, the bark of the wolf can still be heard among the guardian dogs, we catch here too the first scent of the philosopher. Socrates evokes the “image [εἰκών]” of the noble dog in order to suggest that there are, in nature, animals who are at once gentle and great-spirited, but he goes on to insist that a guardian will, like a noble dog, “need, in addition to spiritedness [θυμοειδεῖ], also to be a philosopher [φιλόσοφος] according to nature” (375c–e). This marks the first appearance of the word φιλόσοφος in the dialogue. The analogy is further fleshed out by the suggestion that both the philosopher and the dog “distinguish friendly from hostile looks by nothing other than by having learned the one and by being ignorant of the other” (376b). Here again the passage is Janus-faced, pointing back to Polemarchus’s original articulation of justice and forward to the laughable suggestion in Book 5 that unless philosophers rule like kings, the city they have founded in speech will never “come forth by nature” (473e). The scent of the noble dog, embodying at once the opposing characteristics of moderate gentleness and spirited ferocity, marks the site at which the connection between spiritedness and philosophy is first introduced into the dialogue. This scent-marking points already to the discussion of the philosopher king in Book 5, and, even beyond it, to the “longer road” that leads to the heart of Socrates’s teaching about the power of dialectic and the philosophical life animated by a desire for wisdom.

The appeal to noble puppies here in Book 2 points more immediately, however, to the question of the proper education of the guardians; although in their
natures they are “philosophic, spirited, swift and strong,” they must nevertheless be “reared and educated” in order to become gentle to their own and fierce to their enemies (376c). In Book 3, we encounter a series of markers leading to the heart of Socrates’s proposed education for the guardians; but the further we follow, the more the education of humans is reduced to the training of dogs, with the virtue of moderation emerging as primary. Music, in this context, becomes central to the proposed training, for music is capable of cultivating moderation in the soul. The scent of the “wild beast [θηρίον]” that is Thrasymachus reasserts itself in this context; for Socrates insists that a person who is “not trained [τρεφόμενον] and whose abilities to perceive are not purified” is the sort of person who “becomes a misologist and unmusical. For he no longer uses persuasion through words, but brings things about through force and savageness [ἀγριότητι], like a wild beast [θηρίον], and he lives in ignorance and awkwardly without rhythm and grace” (411d–e). A terrifying picture of this awkward life without rhythm was presented in the encounter with Thrasymachus, when he appeared to threaten the community that was emerging between Socrates and Polemarchus. In that context, Thrasymachus himself introduced the traditional image of the shepherd and sheep to characterize the proper relationship between a ruler and the ruled. Here, however, that image reappears, but Socrates has now shifted the focus to the proper training of dogs to protect the flock: “For indeed, the most terrible and shameful thing of all is for a shepherd to train [τρέφειν] dogs as assistants with the result that by intemperance or hunger or some other bad habit, the dogs themselves attempt to do harm to the sheep and instead of dogs become like wolves.” The language of “training” is here amplified and the concern that the guardians not become “like wolves” made explicit.

Socrates develops this image yet further at the end of Book 4 as he introduces the spirited dimension of the soul between the logistical aspect and the part without logos. There the tripartite soul is thought not in terms of the metaphor of shepherd and sheep but in terms of the relationship between the shepherd and his well-trained dogs. Socrates appeals to this image to illustrate how a just person will endure injustice. Such a person, when treated unjustly, will doggedly continue to attempt to do noble deeds, “having been called by the words in him like [a dog] called by a herdsman” (440d). GlaucIon grasps the image immediately and makes it explicit: “we posited the guardians in our city like dogs obedient to the rulers, who are like the shepherds of the city” (440d). The imagery here of the guardians trained like dogs anticipates the bestiary that is Book 5 of the Republic. The scent of the dog thus leads us directly into Book 5, where it mingles with all three of the waves Socrates identifies as crashing down upon him.

Playing in the Waves

If, as we have discerned, wolves have long stood as an analogue for the more cooperative dimensions of human life, even as they also often signify isolation and
the breakdown of community, the scent of dogs that marks the first two waves Socrates encounters in Book 5 punctuates the more cooperative aspects of their character. Socrates introduces the first wave—that the male and female guardians should share all pursuits in common—by appealing explicitly to the behavior of dogs (451c–e). Female and male dogs guard the same things, they hunt together, indeed do “everything in common [κοινῇ πάνταϊ]” (451e). As a result, according to Socrates, they must be given “the same rearing and education [τὴν τροφὴν τε καὶ παιδείαν]” (451e). Here, where education is reduced to a kind of training, the analogy between guardians and dogs begins to stink. The stench emanates not from the fragrant idea that women and men ought to be treated equally but from the fetid suggestion that education is conditioning. The second wave Socrates seeks to navigate renders the analogy yet more rank; for with it comes not simply the notion that women and children should be shared in common, but also that the guardians must be pure-bred like animals (457c–461e). Socrates here proposes to Glaucon, who, perhaps because he is both erotic and musical, is well versed in the breeding of noble animals, that the guardians will need to be bred in a manner much like he breeds his own hunting dogs (459a–466d).36

The scent of the dog has thus led us to the third, “biggest and most difficult [χαλεπώτατον]” wave—that philosophers should rule as kings (472a, 473e). Indeed, already with the earlier suggestion that dogs were the most philosophical of animals, the trail had been established. That trail, however, is an upward road that does not end with the introduction of the philosopher king; rather, the appeal to the philosopher king is articulated within a generally comic context in which human beings are understood in bestial terms. And yet, here, with the suggestion that the ruler must be erotic, we have already been moved beyond the image of the philosophical dog; for earlier, Socrates had emphasized the importance of a love of learning, and of the need to learn—albeit perhaps by training—the difference between what is one’s own and what is hostile. Here, however, this love of learning is pushed further toward a love of the whole; for Socrates insists that love is not of a part but of the whole and that “a philosopher desires [ἐπιθυμεῖν] wisdom, not a part of it, but all of it” (475b). Thus, however comical the introduction of the philosopher king may be, it marks an important moment along a longer path toward a deeper understanding of what it is to live a philosophical life. Indeed, if we reinscribe this discussion here back into Socrates’s original suggestion that we might discern something of the nature of justice in the soul by writing it large into the city, and if we recall that the entire discussion of dogs and wolves concerns the proper role of the thumotic dimension of the soul in relation to the logistic and a-logical aspects, we might pick up the scent of the philosophical life itself. That life, to be sure, requires more than a certain training concerning the friendly and the hostile; it involves more than breeding a community of noble animals by well-intentioned, calculative shepherds; it also requires some familiarity with what is proper and a desire to integrate a sense
of the good into the whole in which we together live. We thus catch something of the scent of the life to which Socrates calls Glaucon in the things said about philosophical dogs and kings.

Toward a Philosophical Life

The canine scent-markings we have thus far been following seem here to point to the central teachings of the dialogue and, indeed, even to territory that lies beyond the Republic itself along the longer road Socrates suggests that he and Glaucon would need to follow in order to discern the nature of justice. Socrates first mentions this longer road when he and Glaucon turn from their attempt to seek justice in the city to an attempt to locate it in the “single person” (434d–e). Socrates points to the inadequacy of the road on which their current argument has progressed at precisely the moment they begin to consider the tripartite soul and the proper role spiritedness plays in orienting a person toward the Good. This too is the general context marked by the scent of wolves and dogs; for the image of noble dogs trained by caring shepherds seems to be the analogue of a well-bred soul whose spirited dimension has been properly trained to heed the commands of its logistical side. The longer road is, however, mentioned a second time in the dialogue, in Book 6, where the concern has become a proper philosophical education. There Socrates rehearses with Adeimantus the path they have traversed, dividing the soul into three forms and seeking justice, moderation, courage, and wisdom; but he insists that a finer look at these things would require “another and longer road” (504a–b). The formulation suggests not simply that the course they have thus far traversed needs to be pursued yet further, but that there may be another road altogether that would afford “the finest possible” look at these things. There is, of course, controversy concerning the nature of this other, longer road, and, specifically, whether the road on which Socrates is compelled by Glaucon to embark is the beginning of that longer road or a longer way down the path of an inadequate trail. Glaucon forces Socrates further down a path he is hesitant to take, a path that requires him to articulate the nature of the Good Itself and education in gymnastics, mathematics, and ultimately dialectic. Along this road Socrates is reticent to take, the scent of dogs is in the air, pointing in the direction of the longer road to which Socrates gestures. For in the final step of his account of the education that would be necessary for the guardians to become philosophers, Socrates comes to the highest study: dialectic. He describes how one engaged in dialectic attempts “by argument without the use of any of the senses—to attain each thing itself that is and doesn’t give up before he grasps by intellection itself that which is good itself” (532a–b). When Glaucon presses Socrates to proceed to the dialectic itself, which he describes as a “haven from the road,” Socrates refuses, insisting instead: “You will no longer be able to follow, my dear Glaucon . . . although there would not be any lack of eagerness
on my part. But you would no longer be seeing an image of what we are saying, but rather, the truth itself, at least as it looks to me. Whether it is really so or not can no longer be properly insisted upon. But that there is some such thing to see must be insisted on” (533a). Socrates denies Glaucon's desire for a haven from the road only to redirect his thumotic energy toward the posited ideal of the Good. His insistence that there is such an ideal is rooted in his recognition that the Good Itself is “beyond being” and thus beyond even the power of the intellect to discern. By positing the Good Itself as an erotic ideal, however, Socrates encourages Glaucon to orient his life toward the Good, and challenges him to weave this love of the Good into community with others (509b).\(^\text{40}\) That Glaucon might choose such a life was already suggested at the end of Socrates’s encounter with Thrasymachus, when he expressed a willingness to embrace the life of a just person as more profitable.

In giving Glaucon a taste of dialectic, Socrates treats him like a well-bred dog. Indeed, Socrates appeals twice at the end of Book 7 to the analogy between dogs and the children they have been educating in speech. First, in order to discern who might demonstrate a readiness for war, he suggests that children be led to war as spectators and permitted, when it is safe, to experience and “taste blood, like puppies” (537a). Second, however, Socrates warns that although a similar dynamic is at play with regard to speeches, they must take great care not to allow young people to be exposed too soon, for “when young boys get their first taste of them, they misuse them as though it were play, always using them to contradict; and imitating those men by whom they are refuted, they themselves refute others, like puppies enjoying pulling and tearing with argument at those who happen to be near” (539b). Glaucon emerged from the encounter with the tamed wolf, Thrasymachus, as the readiest of the young men there present to receive a taste of dialectic; and when Socrates has finally made Glaucon eager for the path of dialectic itself, he transfers his desire for a haven from the road toward another, longer road: a life of questioning oriented by a concern for the good and a desire for justice.

If the scent of dogs in the \textit{Republic} has led to the beginning of this longer road, the final appearance of the wolf in the dialogue reinforces the danger endemic to those who develop a taste for injustice and allow it to guide their lives. As he charts the transition from democratic leadership to tyrannical rule, Socrates appeals to the story of Lycaon. There he suggests that just as Lycaon was turned into a wolf the moment he tasted human innards mixed with other sacrificial victims, so too does the leader become a tyrant as soon as he sheds the blood of his tribe and acts unjustly against the citizens. After such injustices, Socrates suggests, such a man will either be killed by the people “or be a tyrant and turn from a human being into a wolf” (565d–566a). This last mark of the wolf in the dialogue evokes the memory of the first appearance of the “wolf itself,” Au-
tolykos, that odious figure who turned Polemarchus away from his own misguided sense for the nature of justice and toward a friendship with Socrates that was inherited ultimately by Glaucon. The scent of dogs marks important moments of Glaucon’s developing friendship with Socrates, the philosopher, and points to a philosophical life oriented by a desire for the good and animated by the attempt to put justice into words. The scent-markings of the canines in the *Republic* seem thus to have led us to the longer road that charts a new territory beyond the text, toward a philosophical life in which a desire for the Good is permitted to inform our relationships with one another.

Notes


3. A hint of this is discernable in *Truth and Method*, Gadamer’s seminal articulation of hermeneutics. There we see the “fusion of horizons” and “insight” as “part of the vocation of man.” See Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 2nd ed. (New York: Continuum Press, 1994), 306–307 and 356. We hear further that the openness of understanding is a kind of “hearing,” and we sense that “taste undoubtedly implies a mode of knowing.” See ibid., 361 and 36, respectively.


7. Ibid., 4.

8. If Xenophon’s *Symposium* is to be believed, Socrates himself anticipated the suggestion that smell might be a sense of philosophical discernment. That dialogue takes place at the house of Callias, where Socrates and others gathered to celebrate the victory of Autolycus at the pancratium. Autolycus, a young man with whom Callias was in love, was accompanied by his father, Lycon. Their names evoke the Greek, λύκος, *wolf*. Surrounded in this way by *wolves*, they turn their attention to beautiful odors, and Lycon asks Socrates: “What should our dis-
tinguishing scent be?” To which Socrates replies: “of the beautiful and good [καλοκἀγαθίας], by god.” See Xenophon, Opera Omnia, vol. 2, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921), Symposium, 2.4.


11. Odyssey, 19. 407–409. For a discussion of the etymological origins of Odysseus's name and of whether or not the word ὀδυσσάμενος should be translated in an active or passive sense, Odysseus being "the man who suffers or inflicts pain, the Hated or Hater," see Norman Austin, “Name Magic in the 'Odyssey,'” California Studies in Classical Antiquity 5 (1972): 2–3.


14. Buxton, “Wolves and Werewolves in Ancient Greek Thought,” 62–67. Buxton eloquently articulates these two dimensions of the figure of the wolf in the Greek mythical tradition. He reminds us too that “the origins of Rome were perceived as lying with a renegade band of young men, led by the foster-children of the she-wolf—outsiders in co-operation” (ibid., 76n14).

15. The second wave is introduced at 457b–c.

16. Pausanias, Description of Greece (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press), 8.2. Elements of this retelling of the myth have been informed by the account offered in Buxton, “Wolves and Werewolves in Ancient Greek Thought,” 72–73.

17. Pausanias, Description of Greece, 8.1.5.

18. There Socrates says χαρούμεθα—“we will do battle.” The word itself is used to refer to battles between humans and beasts alike. For an example of its use in relation to beasts, see Homer, Ilias, ed. Thomas W. Allen (Oxonii: e typographeo Clarendoniano, 1931), 16.824.


20. This issue is introduced at Republic 338d.

21. Thrasymachus is portrayed not only as a wolf but also as a lion to be shaved (341c) and as a snake to be charmed (358b). Each reference is calibrated to the question of the subduing and taming of something wild and dangerous. Saxonhouse suggests that when these animals reappear in the dialogue, it is to recall "the earlier role of Thrasymachus as the potential (though far from complete) tyrant whose soul is now laid bare to reveal the internal condition of what was previously seen only as a savage and bestial exterior. Cf. 566a; 588c and 590b.” See Arlene W. Saxonhouse, “Comedy in Callipolis: Animal Imagery in the Republic,” American Political Science Review 72, no. 3 (1978): 892n10.


23. For a more detailed discussion of the role of Glaucon, see Long, “Socrates and the Politics of Music: Preludes of the Republic.” John Sallis and Eva Brann both recognize that Socrates's relationship with Glaucon is central and in fact is the only actual community founded in the Republic. See John Sallis, Being and Logos: Reading the Platonic Dialogues (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 454; Eva T. H. Brann, with Peter Kalkavage and Eric Salem, The

24. The Greek for speakers is ῥήτορες, suggesting perhaps that there is a certain way of speaking rhetorically that remains also capable of judging the value of what is said. This seems to anticipate the philosophical rhetoric developed in the Gorgias. See Christopher P. Long, “Attempting the Political Art,” Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 27 (2012): 153–174.

25. There is, of course, much debate about the contours of Socrates’s argument against Thrasydamus and the nature of Thrasydamus’s fluctuating position. The point here, however, is not to unpack the details of those arguments but to identify the direction toward which the dogs and wolves of the Republic point.

26. Polemarchus’s original conception of justice is articulated at 332d, the agreed-upon understanding at 335e; Thrasydamus articulates his original conception of justice at 338c, and Socrates emphasizes that the argument about justice is ultimately “about the way it is necessary for someone to live” at 352d.

27. Commentators generally recognize the importance of these passages in which the philosopher appears first in close proximity to the dog. Some, like Reeve, find it strange, but see it as signifying an important moment along a path to a deeper understanding of the philosopher. See C. D. C. Reeve, Philosopher-Kings: The Argument of Plato’s Republic (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), 179. Julia Annas argues that “the analogy is meant seriously,” in Julia Annas, An Introduction to Plato’s Republic (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 80. Many, however, argue that the connection is not to be taken seriously. As Bloom suggests: “This identification of dog-like affection of acquaintances with philosophy is, of course, not serious. It only serves to prepare the way for the true emergence of philosophy in Book 5 and to heighten the difference between philosopher and warrior.” See Plato, The Republic of Plato, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: BasicBooks, 1991), 350. Peterson takes some issue with Bloom’s position: “My reaction, rather than to take this as a nonserious preparation for a better account of philosophers later, is to take the unacceptable comparison here as a suggestion that the later description of philosophers is also unacceptable.” See Sandra Peterson, Socrates and Philosophy in the Dialogues of Plato (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 122–25. Rosen, for his part, insists that “this analogy cannot possibly be taken literally.” Stanley Rosen, Plato’s Republic: A Study (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2005), 83. Most commentators, however, recognize that the passage draws the earlier discussion Socrates has with Polemarchus into relation to the discussion of the philosopher king later in the dialogue.

28. This suggestion about philosopher kings is the biggest wave Socrates must face, a wave that he calls “uproarious” and that he worries will “likely drown [him] in laughter” (473c).

29. In discussion with Glaucon, Socrates suggests in Book 5 that the method they have been pursuing in the hunt for justice in the soul was inadequate and that a “longer road” would be required (435d). For the significance of the appearance of spiritedness and philosophy in these passages related to the guardians and dogs, see Jacob Howland, The Republic: The Odyssey of Philosophy (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1993), 95.

30. Socrates sets the word θρέψονται next to παιδευθήσονται to deepen the connection between the rearing of animals and the education of guardians. In Homer, iterations of τρέφω are used in relation to dogs in particular (Iliad 22.69; Odyssey 14.22).

31. For a detailed discussion of the trope of music that runs through the Republic, see Long, “Socrates and the Politics of Music: Preludes of the Republic.”

32. Republic 416a. Saxonhouse suggests that Socrates shifts the traditional focus of the shepherd/sheep model of political leadership when he focuses his attention on the shepherd’s ability to cultivate restraint in his dogs to prevent them from harming the sheep. Saxonhouse, “Comedy in Callipolis: Animal Imagery in the Republic,” 892.
33. In order to avoid the connotations of common English translations of λογισμός as “calculation” or “reason,” both of which carry the weight of too much philosophical baggage, the term is translated as “logistical” so that the close connection with the Greek λόγος can be heard.

34. Saxonhouse recognizes the importance of the animal imagery of Book 5: “Though animal imagery of this sort persists throughout, it appears most frequently in Book 5. Book 5 also contains the most frequent laughter. On almost every page Socrates’s suggestions are seen as laughable. Whereas previously the animal imagery may have been merely curious or mildly disturbing, in Book 5 we find that it is meant to be funny.” See Saxonhouse, “Comedy in Callipolis: Animal Imagery in the Republic,” 895. Rankin, on the other hand, posits a strict difference between “Plato, the poet,” who was “capable of being led further by the spell of his own images than was always convenient for Plato the philosopher.” See H. D. Rankin, Plato and the Individual (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1964), 54–55. Of course, Plato the poet is also Plato the philosopher, which is the entire point of writing dialogues as a mode of poetic philosophical expression. To describe the animal images as something tangential to the philosophical teaching articulated in the dialogue is to underestimate Plato and close off an avenue of interpretation rich in philosophical significance.

35. Wood calls our attention to the mythological context in which the three waves crash into the dialogue. Drawing on Eva Brann’s notion that one of the central literary tropes of dialogue is “a re-enactment of the Labors of Heracles,” Wood argues that the three waves symbolize Heracles’s attempt to swim the river Styx to rescue Theseus and Peirethous. See Brann, with Kalkavage and Salem, The Music of the Republic: Essays on Socrates’ Conversations and Plato’s Writings, 4, and Robert E. Wood, “Image, Structure and Content: On a Passage in Plato’s Republic,” in Review of Metaphysics 40, no. 3 (1987): 506. Wood emphasizes the connection between the waves and dogs on a mythological level when he writes: “But before Heracles was even able to swim the river, he had first to tame the three-headed dog Cerberus who guarded the gate to and from the underworld” (507).

36. Socrates develops most of the important teachings in the dialogue with Glaucon precisely because of his erotic and musical nature (see 398e–403c). For a discussion of this, see Long, “Socrates and the Politics of Music: Preludes of the Republic,” 79n27.

37. See also Republic 368d–e, where Socrates suggests that they seek justice writ large in the city before turning to justice in the soul of a single person.

38. Glaucon interrupts the discussion with Adeimantus and compels Socrates to speak about the Good at 506d–e.


40. Hyland underscores just how apt this analogy between the Good and the sun is; just as the Sun is beyond the power of vision to look directly upon, so is the Good Itself beyond the power of intellection. See Hyland, “Aporia, the Longer Road, and the Good,” 157.