Merriman house, 1909, north facade. Persons unidentified. Courtesy of Mr. and Mrs. Richard Wells.

Merriman house, 1909, east gable. Persons unidentified. Courtesy of Mr. and Mrs. Richard Wells.
FOLK ARCHITECTURAL TERATOLOGY:
PROBLEMS IN THE STUDY OF AN INDIANA FARM

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In scholarly presentations of vernacular architecture, it has become de rigueur not only to fully document the building, but also to apply a label made up by geographers, folklorists, or architectural historians who have studied and compared the structures. Thus, such types as the I-house,1 the dog-trot cabin,2 the double-pen house,3 the saddlebag house,4 the shotgun house,5 or even the "basic Anglo-American" house6 have been isolated; studies of these types are all based on form, construction, and use. Form is the most important and primary means of defining architecture: "The typology and cross-cultural classification of material culture must be based on form only; . . . Form is of utmost importance because it is the most persistent, the least changing of an object's components."7

Form, therefore, is employed in cross-cultural classifications, and the purpose of classification is comparison. However, not all forms observed are easily fit to the defined types. Sometimes an item may be an idiosyncratic combination of types which defies classification. It may adhere to the basic rules of the culture yet seem to defy the textbook definitions. Obviously, not everything can be as clear-cut and easily labeled as scholars might wish, but these deviants (are they the minority or the majority?) create challenges and test hypotheses. One such architectural non-conformist is the Merriman Farm in Indiana.
The Merriman Farm is located about two and one-half miles southwest of Morgantown, Morgan County, Indiana, along a bend in the Mahalasville Road (Fig. 1).

The area consists of gently rolling hills, which are still used for farming in spite of encroaching subdivisions. The farm once included a log barn (now destroyed) on the north side of the road; a log house on the south side; and some modern buildings—a chicken coop, a woodshed, a smokehouse, and a privy, all to the south side of the road. Today, the house is abandoned and the yard is thick with weeds, poison ivy, young trees, honeysuckle, and rambling roses that grow.
healthily in the humid Indiana summer. The shrubbery around the porch is tall and overgrown, and there are two large maple trees that were planted around 1909 in the northwest corner of the yard. The house is set up on an embankment about twenty feet from the road, although at one time they were on the same level. The driveway to the house curves up the east side next to the chicken coop and ends at a now-collapsed wire fence (Fig. 2).

Stella Merriman, who died in 1958, said in her will,

She didn't want it /the house/ sold, and she didn't want anybody living in it. So that left it there just to go down and so many . . . multiflora roses grew up around, we have so
many cardinals and birds that nobody else has that I hate to go in there and bush hog that down, . . . and really clear it out because we'd lose all the birds. /She left in her will that the house was not to be rented and was not to be sold and no one was to live there.8

Her relatives, and nearest neighbors, the Richard Wells family, keep an eye on the house and honor the last wishes of their aunt, who felt that the house was important enough to be left undisturbed for the future.

The house stands in the middle of the yard. Basically, it is composed of two log units aligned end-to-end and joined by extra rooms and porches. The cabin at the east end of the house is a story-and-a-half rectangular unit with a full loft. It measures about eighteen-and-a-half feet by twenty-three-and-a-half feet, and is about twenty feet high at the gable.9 The second cabin is basically square, measuring about sixteen by eighteen-and-a-half feet, and is about thirteen feet high at the peak of the gable.10 The loft of this cabin is also full. Both lofts have small windows cut into their gable ends which are probably not original (Figs. 3, 4, 5).
These are the two cabins forming the basic structure of the house. They are surrounded by the porch and extra room in front, the kitchen and summer kitchen in the rear, and the pantry and dressing room in the enclosed area in the center. The entire outside dimensions of the house, including additions, are 44 x 34 feet. There are no fireplaces in either cabin; but there is a small, stove-sized chimney in the dressing room, and a stovepipe in the kitchen.

Henry Glassie has noted that "although construction is not of use in the establishment of types, the student of material folk culture must be concerned with both the form and material of construction, observable from the finished product, and the process of construction, which may be inferred from the object and can be understood through description." The methods of construction in the Merriman house and barn are not, in themselves, unique. The confusion lies in the relation of the construction to the total structure and the subsequent attempt to establish them within a typology.

The front porch is especially important in the Merriman house, for it is a place where the logs are exposed to show the corner-notching and framing together of the two log units. The cabins are both half-dovetailed at the corners; that is the method of notching houses that is most common in southern Indiana (Fig. 6). The chinking and mortar between the timbers is covered with clapboarding, probably both for protection and cosmetic effect. The front wall of the porch is painted white, as are the clapboards
on the rest of the house. As is frequently found in this area, the house has two front doors: one, a fancy, store-bought door with a window and carved designs; the other, a plank, board-and-batten, probably home-made, door. The sill of the porch is mounted on boulders in an attempt to maintain a degree of levelness with the house, and the porch plate is spliced neatly in the middle. Although apparently the main access to the porch was from the side, flat boulders serve as steps in front of each door.

At the west end of the porch is a small room with a single door and a window. This room has no entrance to the main part of the house, nor does it have any obvious method of heating. We were hard-pressed as to the function of this chamber until we were told it was the hired hand's room. The 7 1/2' by 7 2/3' room is large enough only for sleeping, and was located so that "he could get in there without disturbing anyone in the house." Although the walls of this room are lath and frame, the layers of plaster and wallpaper make them as thick as the walls of hewn logs.

The cabin forming the east end of the Merriman house is of hewn logs—probably poplar—half-dovetailed, and covered, except under the porch, with clapboarding. A slight step up into the cabin reveals that the room is non-structurally partitioned into two rooms. According to Mr. and Mrs. Wells, both sides of this cabin were used for sleeping. The window on the east wall has curtains which seem to be those in a photograph dated 1909. One might therefore assume that a major part of the interior design—especially the wallpaper and light fixtures—also date from roughly the same period. An indentation in the west wall indicates the
location of the fireplace in this cabin, which was removed and replaced by a stove and stove chimney at some unspecified date.

Figure 6

A small door in the west wall leads down two steps to Stella Merriman's narrow dressing room, lit on one end by a window. Mrs. Wells described the room's use to us: "Aunt used this... This was a dressing room. There used to be a bureau here--and she kept her little pot in there. That was her toilet facilities there... There was a privy outside, but of course she kept her pot inside during the night." The dressing room contains the tell-tale signs of two former fireplaces, one for each cabin, and each of a different size.

The west door of the dressing room goes to the other cabin forming the house. This is the room with the "fancy" front door and a "fancy" light fixture. Our guess that this was a room for company--or a parlor--was supported by Richard Wells, who said, "This was the living room... and, of course, they had a fold-down bed right here in the corner, and really, the folks slept there, too." Stepping out the back door, we found ourselves in the rear shed addition. This
room was the kitchen, and an old wood-burning stove still stands firmly in the corner attesting to the function of the room. The kitchen also contains a trap door to the root cellar dug out under the west cabin.

Off the kitchen is the pantry, a small, odd-shaped room with storage shelves lining the walls. At one time, the pantry contained a flour chest and pie safe, items deemed essential to a well-stocked kitchen. A ladder nailed to the wall leads through a hole in the ceiling to the lofts of both cabins.

The other half of the rear shed addition contains the screened-in summer kitchen, whose unfinished walls evoke the feeling that it is still more a porch than a room.

As we noted earlier, the lofts are reached by a ladder in the pantry. The loft of the larger cabin must be entered by climbing through a doorway cut from three logs of the cabin. The floor of this loft is higher than that of the west loft, and there are about 13 feet between the floor and the peak of the gable. There are almost five-and-a-half feet from the floor to the top of the plate.

The west loft is reached by climbing over two hewn logs, the top being the end girt. The gable peak is about 6 feet from the floor, making this area smaller in all respects than the east loft. We were unable to find any indication of staircases or other openings to either loft.

The most recent inhabitants of the house were George and Stella Merriman, pictured in front of the house in a 1909 photograph. The Merriman family came to southern Indiana from
Virginia in the 1830s and the descendants of the original "homesteaders" have a "sheepskin deed... supposed to be signed by Andrew Jackson... in about 1835." Whether the house now standing is the original Merriman house is uncertain, but at least by 1870 the family was probably living in it. The construction of the house would seem to place it at an even earlier date, perhaps in the 1830s.

If our description seems confusing, it is at least partly because there are a number of confusing points about the house. Were there two separate chimneys or did the cabins share one large one with different sized fireplaces? What happened to the original chimney? Were the cabins built separately and then one taken apart and moved to the present site to provide a larger home? Why was the house expanded—or created—as it was? As Richard Wells aptly put it, "I had been told that this probably was just a fireplace, you know, in here, but I don't know—that doesn't seem quite right to me—in that, why would it be all torn down and out and—it just looks to me like that'd be a lot of trouble to tear one out from the middle of the house that way and then put another chimney in as it is there."

The barn across the road is no longer standing, having been destroyed by vandals in the fall of 1975. Fortunately, however, we were able to examine it while it was still being used as a barn. It certainly was not able to provide more information than the house, and, indeed, was almost more confusing.

Essentially, the barn was formed by three cribs—or at least it enclosed three main volumes (Figs. 7 & 8). The central log area, was surrounded by lean-to additions on three sides to store machinery and keep calves. Ignoring the frame additions, the
barn consisted of a hewn granary, a large open area, and an almost entirely separate large crib used for straw storage. The order of construction was moot—it looked as if at some undefined date, probably before 1850, the granary was hewn out. Its corners, like those of the house, were half-dovetailed, and the timbers were very neatly fit together. The lowest log, serving as the sill, extended continuously for 21½ feet to where the other major unit began. The next three timbers above the sill extended out 17 feet, leaving space for the gates which were hung on wooden hinges. The granary itself was half-dovetailed for the bottom eight timbers, and V-notched from there to the roof. The inside measurements of the granary were
about fifteen feet by five-and-a-half feet by eight-and-a-half feet high. The floor was raised about thirty inches off the ground level. Scribbled inside the granary in pencil was the inscription, "My Colt's Age, April the 5, 1857." Above the granary, a loft which extended out over the center opened onto the large crib. This area was the V-notched section, and, because of the change in notching and the use of smaller timbers, was probably a later addition.

The east end of the barn was used for straw storage, and measured about 18 x 16 feet. It had several large sections cut out of its sides for mangers, windows, and doors. The lower timbers of the crib were neatly V-notched, while those of the upper portion appeared to be more sloppily saddle-notched. The east end of the loft opened onto the west end of this crib. The center, half-open section, contained a small, enclosed room used for storage.

According to the Wells, the Merrimans raised chickens, hogs, corn, wheat, clover, oats, and, later, soybeans. They always farmed with horses. Richard Wells explained, "There used to be partitions in, I guess, both sides there." He concluded with, "It is a horse barn, by the way." The function, then, becomes clear—a granary and a horse barn combined under a single roof. But, like the house across the road, the typology is still muddled.

Trying to do the routine fieldwork and description of the Merriman house and barn involved us in lots of problems experienced by all folk architecture researchers: our inside and outside measurements did not add up; we could not get decent pictures because of the lush foliage and pervasive thickets.
around the buildings; the Wells family, who own the farm, were busy when we wanted to see them and we were busy when they were not; the house itself was being vandalized at an appalling rate, so there was noticeably less of it there to examine when we went back to it after a delay of four months; and of course we had difficulties with our car, tape recorder, camera, and memories that seem to be required of up-to-date fieldworkers.

Perhaps the greatest single problem, though, and the one which seemed to stand out right from the start, was the difficulty of reducing the description of these buildings to a manageable form. Howard Marshall and John Vlach first noticed the buildings while engaged in a road survey of traditional structures. They told us, with some excitement, that they had seen a log house and barn, and that the barn was V-notched at one end and half-dovetailed at the other. This observation seemed the more remarkable in that the Merriman farm lies more-or-less on top of an isogloss that separates both linguistic and architectural sub-regions.19

On a subsequent visit to the farm with Howard Marshall, we took measurements, which we later lost, and also some photographs. At the time of that visit we realized that neither the house nor the barn fit very well into our carefully-learned schemes of traditional types. Despite our feverish speculations and rummaging-around in the available literature, we just couldn't decide what to call the Merriman house and barn; they seemed to be, as Marshall aptly put it, "perfect examples of themselves."

Here was the problem most perfectly expressed by the Merriman farm: by all standards we had it was a freak. The barn didn't closely resemble any type we were
aware of, and the house looked like the sequential juxtaposition of a square and a rectangular cabin, or perhaps a formative saddlebag house, or some sort of monstrous and aberrant hybrid. We realized with a start that the Merriman farm is strangely representative of a large proportion of traditional architecture, which present themselves in unpredictable variations from what we had been taught was the norm. Folk architectural investigation suddenly took on a resemblance to teratology, the branch of biology concerned with the study of abnormal growths, freaks, and monsters.

An overt comparison between biological and architectural freaks raises some pertinent issues surrounding our own conceptions of folk architecture. In medical texts, teratology is of minimal importance, for two-headed boys, albino dwarfs, and elephant-men are rare; houses, however, constantly exhibit such apparent instabilities and deviations from their ideal types. The problem seems to lie most squarely in the uncritical acceptance of a biological model of classification by folklorists, historians, and anthropologists. We must pose the question: Are houses really best understood as analogues of living creatures? Have we made a fundamental error in developing classification, typologies, and taxonomies of houses that parallel the biological ideas of phyla, genera, and species? And if that basic understanding is a mis-understanding, what will take its place?

It seems likely that most of us began to accept a biological type of classification while we were in primary school. We
were given countless examples of problems in science and math which depended on our understanding of the idea of discrete classes of things. Those classes were always arrived at through an essentially Aristotelian method: if one examines specimens, finds and discards variable characteristics, and then describes the immutable remaining characteristics, one should then have arrived at the "natural" classes for that type of specimen. A logical corollary was that well-formed classes are mutually exclusive, and are exhaustive of all the possibilities in the system. And, interestingly enough, the main examples were all taken from the natural or biological world. We were taught that apples are a different class of thing than oranges; we were put on guard against non-logical categorizations by being told not to multiply cows by horses or apples by oranges. What we came away with was an erroneous idea of entity; we thought that all things could be dealt with as if they were animals or fruit. That this notion is still with us is obvious (just look at any of the lists of genres we've all made up); it is a method of thought borrowed from the natural world in order to solve two problems that lie in the cultural domain: the problem of nomenclature and the problem of isolating meaningful groups.

The nomenclature requirement is fundamental. We need a way to communicate with each other about the things we study; if we wanted to, we could imitate biologists still further by having international congresses at which panels of experts would formally decree that henceforth only two-story buildings with central hallways and such-and-such arrangements of internal volumes and other characteristic features can be called I-houses. Virtually any arbitrary system of names for observable houses would satisfy the need for a consistent nomenclature, but we further feel that nomenclature should
be tied to a classification system that is itself in correspondence with the reality of our subject matter. This, of course, has been the goal in biology for a long time. Since the eighteenth century, when the Swedish botanist Linnaeus founded modern taxonomy, classifiers of the biological world have tried to come to grips with developmental relationships. But prior to the mid-nineteenth century various forms of life were generally viewed as wholly separate classes, all entirely discrete and all created at the same moment. The only relationships thought to exist between classes were their relative ordering in the Great Chain of Being, and what was called "natural affinity": the obvious physical resemblances between various forms. Charles Darwin provided in his theory of evolution a theoretical basis for classification that was more powerful than the natural affinity of resemblance classes. It not only explained the existence of these resemblance classes, but also it provided a system of ordering for the entire biological universe. The loss of discreteness for the classes, however, became a concomitant problem. When evolution was assumed as a biological paradigm, we gained the elegance and power of the "phylogenetic tree" idea, but only at the expense of precision in the boundaries of classes.

Extensions of Darwinian concepts into the social and historical sciences are too common and too well known to require discussion here. But most such extensions are unconscious and uncritical, when they should only be made with great caution and a full awareness of the shortcomings in the analogy.

First, theories of the biological or natural world may not apply to the cultural world. Problems arising from such misapplications are now easy to see in the early anthropological notions of general unilinear cultural evolution and the doctrine of survivals.
oversimplifications that crop up from superimposing evolutionary theory on classification systems for artifacts may be more subtle, but they are just as real.

Second, theories of biological evolution require that the concept of speciation and the identification and naming of species be meaningful and systematic. This is a hard requirement to fulfill in the cultural domain; for example, "speciesness" in the organismic world implies that a group of individuals breed among themselves, but do not normally breed across species lines. This criterion fails, however, for any entity that does not engage in sexual reproduction, for example, micro-organisms—or houses. Moreover, the species concept cannot easily deal with individual variation caused by isolation, changes in environment, or specialization. When does a variation in one species become a new and separate species? When does a new variant become a different version? When does an oikotype become a type?

Finally, the acceptance of and attempt to solve problems with the biological evolutionary model carries with it a commitment to a classificatory goal that may simply not be adequate to both the descriptive and the explanatory interests of folklorists.

Of course, other biological theories of types are available; we might try to work out successful cultural analogies to Lamarck's theory of the genetic inheritance of acquired characteristics. But we think the point has been made by now that simple analogies won't help us, and have only led us to a topsy-turvy view in which individual houses like the Merriman house appear as freaks, or, more charitably, as isolated units with an unpredictable degree of variability.
The solution to this dilemma clearly requires our commitment to a strong alternative philosophical and theoretical position. We cannot leave theory-making to somebody else while we indulge our love for measuring up and describing archaic ruins; it simply isn't possible to do empirical investigation without at least an implicit theoretical position. The only question is: will we try to consciously build workable ideas, or will we continue to uncritically accept a body of notions according to which most of what we encounter will be typological monstrosities?

We would suggest that one important criterion of an acceptable classificatory philosophy be a concern with whole systems. A house and the mind that created it form a paired set that can be called a natural-cognitive system. As a natural system it is realized--performed, so to speak--within the realm of the physical, material world, from the action of brain and muscle cells on bricks and rafters. As a cognitive system the house and mind are linked by the elements of competence: perceptions, intentions, cognitions, consciousness. One need not attempt to neatly reduce the natural system to the cognitive one, nor the cognitive to the natural. In fact, both those reductions only lead to sterile philosophical extremes, solipsism on the one hand and a dogmatic materialism on the other. Nor is it necessary to become a rigid dualist, to adopt a bifurcated view of the system under study. An appropriate philosophy will be "biperspectival," that is, it takes into consideration the isomorphisms between all natural and cognitive systems. We may choose to seek an agreeable biperspectival view by looking at houses and minds in terms more semiotic than genetic, more linguistic than historical, by taking current theories of language and applying them to a specific
population of houses and minds as Henry Glassie has done.  

It may be that we could best explain the reciprocal relations between houses and the minds that create and use them in terms of four features abstracted by general systems theory: (1) wholeness, as opposed to mere aggregation; (2) adaptive self-stabilization; (3) long term adaptive reorganization; and (4) hierarchical structuring, by which a given system functions as part of a higher system and by which the parts of a system on any given level are themselves whole systems.

Perhaps we can handle problematic examples like the Merriman farm by following up a careful job of description with questions that arise from examining it as a unique enactment of such general systems principles: what are the subsystems—units of form, units of construction, units of traditional function—that were manipulated by the builders into the whole house, the whole farm? How did the house's rooms function, and how did the functional design of the house sustain, or thwart, the adaptation of those who lives in it to their own lives, to their visions of their lives? How do house and mind transform each other? These are difficult sorts of questions even to raise, and in the case of the Merriman farm they may now be impossible to answer; we may be sure, however, that such questions are never resolved (and rarely even generated) by an approach that begins and ends with blanket categorizations. Calling the Merriman house a Formative Saddlebag provides us with a confusing nomenclatural solution and the erroneous feeling that we have somehow explained the house by typing it.

Still, we hope several points have come through: first, describing, naming, classifying,
and theorizing about house types are not separable tasks. They must always be taken together, wittingly or unwittingly. Second, we have all been conned by our forth-grade teachers and by our inclinations to analogy; we've been conned into an unreasoned dependence on the biological world as a source for our operating philosophy, and if we stick with such a poorly thought out science-of-the-concrete, most of the objects of our studies—houses, fiddle tunes, and legends alike—must be regarded as structural or functional freaks. Third, there are possibilities—controversial and difficult, but still possibilities—that something like a general systems approach to house-mind systems can lead to a more appropriate understanding of types, forms, and variants. When we begin to think of houses and minds together as self-transforming, whole, homeostatic systems, the Merriman farm can become more than a local loveable monster.
NOTES


3 See Glassie, Pattern in the Material Folk Culture, pp. 103-106 for illustrations.


7 Glassie, Pattern in the Material Folk Culture, p. 8.

8 Mary Wells, Morgantown, Indiana, interview 8/2/75.


10 Ibid.

11 Glassie, Pattern in the Material Folk Culture, p. 11.

13 Richard Wells, Morgantown, Indiana, interview, 8/2/75.
14 Mary Wells, Morgantown, Indiana, interview, 8/2/75.
15 Richard Wells, Morgantown, Indiana, interview, 8/2/75.
16 Mary Wells, Morgantown, Indiana, interview, 8/2/75.
17 Richard Wells, Morgantown, Indiana, interview, 8/2/75.
18 Richard Wells, Morgantown, Indiana, interview, 8/2/75.
23 Speciation and naming can be accomplished according to many different meaningful systems, however; cf. Claude Levi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (Chicago, 1970), chapters 2, 5, 6, and 7, for anthropological perspectives on biological classification.
24 David B. Held, Theoretical Anthropology (New York, 1970), p. 82. Held explicitly accepts the Lamarckian theory as more adequate to the cultural sphere than the Darwinian theory, which "allows no place for human effort."
26 Glassie, Folk Housing in Middle Virginia, passim.
29 We are here deliberately raising the critical issue of whose vision is to be adopted as fundamental to establishing the meanings of traditions; cf. Dan Ben-Amos, "Analytical Categories and Ethnic Genres," Genre 3 (1969) 301.