BELIEF, MEMORATE, AND LEGEND*

Juha Pentikäinen
University of Helsinki
Helsinki, Finland

1. The concept memorate has appeared in folkloristic literature since 1934 when C. W. von Sydow suggested the term in his paper "Kategorien der Prosa-Volksdichtung (Categories of Prose Popular Poetry)."1 During the 1930s a special Sydowian school developed that introduced such concepts to German and Scandinavian folkloristics and further developed the terminology through application in primary investigations. Among these early researchers were such well-known scholars as Gunnar Granberg, Albert Eskeröd, Elisabeth Hartmann, Will-Erich Peuckert and Martti Haavio.2 In the fifties the terminological discussion reappeared and an appropriate forum developed, particularly as represented by the numerous congresses for narrative investigation, where the main effort was expended on the systematization of legends.3 The narrower concern with definition of the paired concepts memorate-legend has occupied a number of scholars during the last ten years, among them: Lutz Röhrich, Barbara Allen Woods, Reidar Th. Christiansen, Iðrn Pío, Lauri Simonsuuri, Oldrich Sirovatka, Wayland D. Hand, Lauri Honko, Carl-Harman Tillhagen, Otto Blehr, Brynjulf Alver, and Bengt af Klintberg.4 Little in the way of consensus has been reached even among these scholars.

Modern terminology characteristically consists of, on the one hand, an abundance of synonymous or overlapping generic terms, and on the other, numerous rules of usage in connection with their definitions. It would be hard to find any two researchers who have used either the term legend or the term memorate in precisely the same way. The dictionary of Laurits Bødker, Folk Literature (Germanic) (1965), that covers well over a hundred terms marked by the concept legend does not lead to standardization of the terminology.5 Surprisingly, if one looks for reasons for the divergence of views, the most striking explanation is that scholars have interpreted von Sydow's terminology in various ways. In this paper I hope to clarify the various concept systems, especially those of the earlier theorists, by representing schematically the position of a concept in the system of each individual scholar. Much of the one-sidedness rests on the fact that the criteria from which the definitions were developed were not distinguished from one another. In other words, the scholars have not given sufficient consideration to the fundamentals of their distinctions. The following examination of the history of scholarship shows that in examining supranormal traditions scholars have refined and experimented further with the practical application of terminology that involves the distinctions suggested by von Sydow. There are three analyses of spirit beliefs that must be mentioned, namely Gunnar Granberg's "Skogeraet i yngre nordisk folkradition" (Wood Spirits in Later Nordic Folk Tradition) (1935), Martti Haavio's Suomalaiset kodinhaltiat (Finnish House Spirits) (1942) and Lauri Honko's Geistergläubbo in Ingermanland (Belief in Spirits in IngermanLand) (Part 1, 1962), all of which signify noteworthy progress vis-a-vis the earlier terminology. Our special attention here is devoted to the ambiguity of the boundaries drawn between memorate and legend: What are the characteristics of the legend? What are the characteristics of the memorate? Which criteria result in an appropriate distinction between the two? Which supplementary concepts can, with distinctions in certain exceptions, prove useful?6

2. In regard to von Sydow's suggested legend terminology it is informative to compare the articles "Om folksets stägner" (Concerning Folk Legends) (1931) and "Kategorien der Prosa-Volkadsichtung" (1934) with each other. From the schemes constructed from these texts it is clear that the first (Table I) is a preliminary of the second (Table II). While von Sydow first worked on the framework of his grouping in 1931, it was three years later that he arrived considerably closer to his ambitious goal of creating a Linnean system for folkloristics on the order of the natural sciences that would show the various genres of tradition, with their various essentials and laws. With his attempts at systematization von Sydow wanted, right from the beginning, to do away with the earlier classification of legend tradition, and also, the dichotomy between historical and mythical legends and that between migratory and local legends. His division (compare scheme I) should therefore cover the entire field of legend tradition. In addition, the aim of completeness is shown by the entries family legend (Swedish ättsaga) and hero legend (Hjältesaga), which are really necessary only for the analysis of Old Nordic Saga materials. It is doubtful that one can use the legend terminology on the saga material since the latter goes back to ancient written sources.

Von Sydow designated as legends of origin legends that are supposed to explain some type of origin phenomenon that causes astonishment and whose real origin no one knows, for example, explanations of natural formations, old graves, place names, customs. The concepts memorial legend and witness legend are of interest in discriminating between memorate and legend. The most important distinctions in the latter article deal with just these two concepts. Von Sydow defined memorial legend in 1931 primarily by content and function, though he also considered distribution, age, and structure. It is significant that the memorial legend has a basis in reality in a definite event or a definite person. Generally the memorial legend is tied to a definite time, place, or person, and therefore has little dissemination, a relatively short life, and short and single episodic structure. The direct relevance to the following classification attempt and to the "discovery" of the memorate is found in this passage: "The boundary between more or less new memorial legends and pure personal recollections of experienced happenings is naturally often extremely fluid." It is astounding, considering this characterization of terms, that two such indefinite and vague concepts as the remembrance of the tradition bearers and the base in reality of the accounts are recorded as a scientific basis of criteria; a memorial legend can then be an account of a 3000 year old grave or of a recent event, if one can only prove a basis in reality for it.

The definition of witness legend rests on the examination of content and function and to some extent on distribution and age. The witness legend is an account rich in nuances, full of fantasy and excitement, often old and widely disseminated, and generally dealing with the opinion the folk have about various things. Certainly the greatest part of belief legends belong precisely in the realm of this concept. In connection with the witness legend, von Sydow used, for the first time, the metaphor of the "crystallized folk belief," which has subsequently been repeated by many investigators in their legend definitions. Besides explaining, it is the function of the witness legend to illustrate, convince, and caution against. It is noteworthy that von Sydow defined his concepts on the basis of several varying criteria. If one wanted to use the terminology on primary material, drawing a line precisely between the memorial legend and the witness legend certainly would be difficult. Von Sydow himself indicated that a realistic witness
Scheme I:

von Sydow 1931

Legend

Memorial Legend

Legend Of Origin

Witness Legend

Family Legend

Hero Legend

Scheme II:

von Sydow 1934

Memorate

Legend

Chronicle Note

Single-Episode Legend

Multi-Episodic Legend

Memorial Legend

Legend Of Origin

Witness Legend

Family Legend

Hero Legend

Action

Motival

Belief

Person

Jocular

Fabulate

Fiction

Fabulate

Fabulate

Fabulate
legend can be confusingly like a memorial legend and that on the other hand the initial moment of remembrance can completely disappear from a memorial legend so that the boundary between the concepts is questionable.\

In his second article von Sydow accomplished the chief grouping of the legend categories into single and multi-episodic legends on the basis of structure (scheme II). The main division of the earlier system (scheme I) again forms the frame. Family legends and hero legends are multi-episodic, memorial legends, legends of origin, and witness legends are single episodic legend groups. If one considers that in the end only family sages (or chronicles) and hero legends, which are questionable in legend terminology and seldom appear as terms, are characterized as multi-episodic, then this basic distinction based on structure seems rather useless. It appears that von Sydow has here applied a distinction to legend that is more useful to the classification of märchen. In the same essay von Sydow groups märchen into two chief categories, the single-episodic (fables) and the multi-episodic (märchen). A new concept is the chronicle note which contains "all kinds of variable memories represented in the form of a statement." Such notes can deal with persons, families, places and regions, cultural situations and the like. The concept of the chronicle note is therefore defined on the basis of formal criteria; it deals with a statement in the form of a generalized assertion. Certainly it is a useful concept. Still, how the concept pertains to legend categories is unclear. In later writings von Sydow replaces the concept with memorial dite: "They differ from memorates only in that they simply point to a fact without narrating how it happened." The most noteworthy proposal in the 1934 article, however, concerns the concepts of memorate and fabulate. Without question the expressed view of certain scholars that memorate is a sub-category of legend is to be rejected. When von Sydow suggested this term he positively referred to the broad meaning of legend in scientific terminology and was of the opinion that memorates, "the narratives of people about their own purely personal experiences," should be separated from them. According to von Sydow memorates (Latin memoratum, "remembered") belong to "neither poetical character nor tradition." About the relation of memorate to legend he continues: "Of course, such a memorate can receive strong impressions of legends about similar events but there is no tradition present so long as it remains restricted to those who have experienced the contents." Therefore, according to von Sydow, the memorate is an interesting example of what the folk experience, what it is they deem worthy of notice and remembrance, and how the experience is comprehended. The very name and definition of the memorate show that von Sydow applied his delimitation primarily to the term memorial legend. He also said that a memorial legend can come out of the memorate if it appears to be interesting enough to be repeated. In connection with the transition into tradition, changes in content as well as style are produced.

The memorate must be defined first of all according to the criterion of the transmission, and also, at the same time, according to the content and style. Von Sydow's definition of memorate, however, contains some crucial deficiencies, so that the term must undergo a modern interpretation to be scientifically useful. In the first place the definition stresses that the memorate must be a narration in the "I" form; a memorate could only be narrated by the person who had himself experienced it. In this respect, then, the aspect of collective tradition, which decisively influences the tradition (also the experience), is missing. Third, von Sydow asserts that the cycle of the tradition goes from memorate to legend and even then only to memorial legend. Von Sydow emphasizes too strongly the personal element with the memorate: the criteria of the "genuine personal experience" would limit the applicability of the term.
to a minimum. It is most doubtful that any conceptual distinction will ever be made between historical reminiscence and the description of a supranormal experience, but in the present situation of investigation this distinction must be aspired to. For an account of secular content, which is not a legend, the term chronicate could be used. Memorate would then be exclusively the account of a supranormal experience. One such application of the term has been proposed by some later scholars.

In the later article by von Sydow the word legend really has two different duties. The term appears in the broader meaning—check scheme II—in the distinction memorate-legend, and is divided into several subcategories. In the narrower meaning, the concept can even compare with von Sydow’s most general legend category, the witness legend, which he chose to replace with the designation fabulate. I quote here a section from von Sydow’s text that has caused considerable confusion in folkloristic terminology:

However, what one usually means by the word legend are short, single-episodic narratives in which the background is certainly experiences and observations; yet they do not immediately come from these, but from a mental image that has originated from elements of this type in which they, so-to-say, crystallized. The events could not have actually happened in the form that they take in the telling; they were shaped much more by the creative art of the folk, which attempts to orderly arrange the material treated by the legend and endeavors to explain convincingly how it behaved. I have previously called this witness legend; but as it is in structure and application so closely in agreement with certain fables that it would be more correct to give it another name. I propose the term fabulate, that constitutes not only a good contrast to memorate but is also very suitable as an international expression for every language.

Thus it is suggested that fabulate had originally been thought of as a substitute for the witness legend. In the definition, however, von Sydow gave the concept fabulate rather elastic rules of application, and thereby made the concept of the legend unnecessary in scientific meaning. Several different applications are proposed for the fabulate in contrast to the memorate that would find only limited use according to von Sydow’s criteria. With the real fabulates, von Sydow distinguished two groups, the belief fabulate and the person fabulate. The former are those legends connected with folk beliefs—compare Granberg’s folk belief legends—the latter, on the other hand, are fundamentally jokes, yet they are connected with a certain person, for example Till Eulenspiegel. The boundary between this and märchen and scherzhafte geschichten unclear. Von Sydow also considered the märchen about the stupid devil a typical fabulate; in the English abstract of the article the term jocular fabulate (Scherzfabulat) was used just for these accounts. Except for witness legends the concept of the fabulate was also applied to other legend types. The origin legend (scheme II) was divided into two groups on the basis of form. In an epic narrative the term action fabulate is used in the case of an assertion of causal fiction. To the action fabulates also belong the etiological animal fables for which Dähnhardt used the designation Natursagen (nature legends). It is not to be denied that the characterization of the term fabulate by von Sydow contains various possibilities of interpretation. In the final analysis the lack of uniformity in the application of the concept fabulate can be traced back to its inventor.
3. In European genre analysis one can speak of a Scandinavian and a Central European tendency. This is especially true for the memorate-legend distinction. The analytical value of this conceptual pair has so far remained rather unclear among Central European scholars. I see at least two causes for this. First, the legend-and-experience ambiguity developed by Friedrich Ranke in the first decade of the twentieth century satisfied, to some extent, the same need as the terms legend and memorate among the Scandinavian scholars. Second, there is the terminology of the Einfachen Formen which the Dutch literary scholar André Jolles proposed in 1930 in which the crucial point of the discussion is removed to a philosophical level on the problem of the natural, clear, primary forms of the "Vorliteratur." Not only Ranke but also Jolles had supporters until the present.

Some folklorists (Elisabeth Hartmann, Will-Erich Peuckert, Lutz Röhrich, and others) represent an intermediate stage between the Scandinavian and Central European course since they, with the introduction of the terms of their Scandinavian colleagues, assimilated the customary terminology of their country. Compare, for example, the systems of von Sydow (scheme II) and Elisabeth Hartmann (scheme III) with one another. The main division in legend and memorate is similar in both. In the terminology of Hartmann, the fabulate becomes a more inclusive concept, covering the entire legend tradition, a synonym for legend. To be sure, Hartmann speaks also of true fabulates, and means by this the witness legend in the Sydowian meaning. In Ranke's scheme, instead of the experience legend one finds the experience fabulate, a legend building on experience whose related term, experience account, is a synonym for memorate: "The memorate, a more or less recent experience account, bearing a pronounced personal stamp."

The terminology of Hartmann is in its entirety a peculiar cross between von Sydow and Ranke, a conceptual system that without its historical scholarly background would be very hard to comprehend. The concepts belief fabulate and action fabulate mean, in Hartmann's system, approximately the same as in that of von Sydow. A new term is the Märchen fabulate (synonym fantasy fabu-

Scheme III:

Hartmann 1936

Legend
Fabulate

Memorate
Experience account

Belief Fabulate
Märchen Fabulate
Fantasy Fabulate

Experience
Fabulate

Practical
inference

Cautioning
Legend

late) which contains items "that are no longer based on direct belief representations but rather are much nearer in content to märchen from which they are frequently distinguished merely by their simpler, single episodic form." 28 Thus defined, Hartmann's concept of the märchen fabulate was very close to the meaning of the term fabulate proposed by Granberg and Honko. Also noteworthy is Hartmann's attempt to subdivide the concept of the belief fabulate into three categories on the basis of function: experience fabulate, a legend building on experience; "practical inference," an instructive belief-legend and warning legend; and a cautioning legend. 29 Experience account, the term used by the German scholars, can be considered a possible synonym to the memorate. 30

Among the German scholars, Lutz Röhrich has most recently concerned himself with the terminology of prose tradition. He represents, first of all, the Central European tendency, but also applies the concepts of the Scandinavian folklorists, especially those of von Sydow. For his formulation of the memorate-legend question, the section titled "The Experience Legends and Their Form" in his article "Die deutsche Volksage. Ein methodischer Abriss" (The German Folk Legend: a Methodological Summary) (1950) is of interest.

Here the memorate carries the Sydowian meaning: "the simple experience account in the i-narration, the preliminary stage of the legend." 31 Röhrich defines the legend like Friedrich Ranke:

> The legend has a strong personal tie. It reports either self experiences, or, where this is impossible, then the narrator frequently becomes more closely identified with the experiencer: 'My grandfather has experienced this himself,' or 'This I have heard frequently at my father's house.' There are various family traditions, (Überlieferungen): Even the unbelieving grandson is interested in what his grandfather believes he has experienced; and even when people no longer believe the legend, they express their views about their former credibility. 32

When his work Sage (Legend) appeared in paperback in 1966, Röhrich changed this definition so much that legend is replaced by memorate: "The memorate has a strong personal tie. It reports ..." 33 This correction is nearly in accord with what the Scandinavian scholars understand the concept to mean. Otherwise, the chapter "Memorate" in Röhrich's book is only a revised and supplemental issue of the texts in the publication "Die Erlebnisse und ihre Form" (The Experience Legends and Their Form); the author has at one place—not inconsequentially—replaced the concept legend or legend account with memorate. 34 To the treatment of supranormal experiences Röhrich applied the term legend experience, which gives an erroneous picture of the relation between legend and experience. 35 The experience account, whose use is completely based on an account of a supranormal experience, appears as a synonym for memorate. 36 The analytical value of the concepts is not at all heightened by Röhrich's suggestion that for one and the same term several applications based on various criteria be used. Thus the fabulate is defined here not only by its function as "an entertaining narrative" but also, with reference to von Sydow as "developed and standardized by the narrator's" form of the account. 37 The last paragraphs in the chapter "Memorate" give the reader the impression that the terms memorate (as well as the unsuccessful synonym experience memorate), experience legend, fabulate, and narrated legend represent only a supplementary concept in a series of terms which the author used to clarify the various steps of the process from legend experience up to that
malleable primary form which the concept of the legend represents in the terminology of simple forms:

From the germ cell of the experience memorate to the 'simple form' (Jolles) it is often only a step; small formations and tension elements are present even in the simplest narratives. They exist not only in the unusual encounters that confront the person of the legend, but also in the correctly or falsely depicted conduct of the people. Often the tension is based on an almost: the treasure had almost been lifted, the rescue was almost successful, had the man not failed.

Surprisingly, many of the scholars who regularly refer to von Sydow have completely overlooked the writings of later Scandinavian folklorists on questions of genre analysis. None of the Central European or American folklorists, for example, refer to the article by Gunnar Granberg; "Memorat und Sage. Einige methodische Gesichtspunkte" (Memorate and Legend: A Methodological Viewpoint) which appeared in 1935, and yet for the investigation of supranormal tradition this essay is at least as important as von Sydow's paper treated above.

Scheme IV: a

Granberg 1935

Memorate

Legend

Fabulate

Folk Belief Legend

Entertainment Legend

For one thing, Granberg's definitions make the distinction memorate-legend analytically useful. Granberg accepted the term that von Sydow used for memorates and fabulates, expanded the application of the first, but in return limited the latter to a special meaning. The legend, which in von Sydow's system of analysis threatened to become an unnecessary concept, was newly defined by Granberg:

By legend I mean short, single episodic narratives whose background is of course formed to some extent by experiences and observations but that do not directly come from them but, as von Sydow said, out of "such elements arise mental images in which they become so-to-say crystallized." Legends are marked by the inventive art of the folk but it is especially important that they have received a firmness of form and that here the individual has very little latitude. If the personal elements are more prominent, an unsettled tradition is revealed. This is especially the case in the periphery of the area of distribution where the tradition is often in a state of dissolution—or sometimes of growth.
The legend is therefore defined according to the content, style, and structure. A new characterization of memorate is that the concept is extended not only to accounts by the experiencer but also to thirdhand experiences known to the narrator. According to Granberg, fabulates are individual narratives that have no tradition in their background and that are completely "shaped by the inventive art of the folk." On the basis of function, Granberg distinguishes two main groups of legends, the folk belief legends and the entertainment legends. The first are, in regard to their contents, closely connected to the region where a specific belief conception dominates. The latter "on the other hand are those which the listeners love primarily because they are amusing and often very drastic, and therefore one likes to repeat them." In comparison to von Sydow's, this system of five concepts by Granberg--scheme IV--is less voluminous. The adequacy of the terms for genre analysis of the supranormal tradition is questionable.

Granberg's article is also interesting for its discussion of the value of legends and memorates as sources for the folk belief researcher. He arrives at the following conclusion:

A folk belief researcher must therefore preferably study memorates, and naturally it is best if this takes place in the field among the folk. Also legends and the traditionally connected legend motifs can naturally be valuable for a folk belief investigation. But here one must emphasize the importance of accurate preliminary investigations. It can then be shown that a part of these legend motifs--even if they are of native origin--from beginning to end are pure fantasy motifs and that they have been passed on because of their epic value, that is, on the basis of their value as interesting narrative matter. Other motifs can certainly initially be based on belief conceptions even though they have later been transmitted.

Granberg used his terminology in his dissertation "Skogsraet i yngre nordisk folktradition" which appeared in 1935. The most valid aspect of the work involves the presentation of tradition morphological opinions. Even more complex than the work of Granberg is Martti Haavio's book Suomalaiset kodinhaltiat (1942)--an almost 600 page analysis of Finnish household spirits which--if it had been translated in an international language--would have enlivened the discussion of method. Haavio's research aspect is primarily tradition-psychological and tradition-geographical. The most important question in analysis is in regard to the religio-scientific source value of the material:

It is noteworthy that the memorate forms the main source. The belief legends which are proven to be international exist supported by the memorate material and are thereby stimulated by it although sometimes an opposite action can also be ascertained. The significance of belief legends is secondary to the investigation of folk belief: the legends live mainly because of their interesting contents and their epic value. On the other hand memorates show clearly what the narrator has experienced and how he has conceived his experience, that is, what he believes. Thus memorates are closely connected with belief conceptions.
In Lauri Honko’s Geistergläube in Ingmanland the aspect of genre analysis occupies a central position. The fundamental ambiguity is described in the introductory chapter under the title, "Traditionsmorphologische Probleme" (Tradition Morphological Problems). The supplement to this was composed in the paper "Memorates and the Study of Folk Beliefs" (1961) which appeared two years later. Of the earlier scholars, Honko primarily agreed with Granberg, Haavio, and Eskeröd. Research of the experience situation as well as frequency analysis is new. The author examined the religio-scientific evidence and source value of the supranormal tradition. The tradition analysis is to clarify to what degree and in what manner the individual traditions reflect the true folk beliefs, that is, what special nature and degree of authenticity they possess at any given time. In his investigation, Honko operated with thirteen genres: folk belief, memorate, fabulate, belief legend, local belief legend, entertainment legend, migratory legend, märchen, fiction, metaphor, incantation, prayer, and rite description.

The tripartite division folk belief-memorate-legend is instructive for source criticism of supranormal tradition. Folk belief is defined on the basis of form criterion. It conveys its supranormal declaration in the form of a statement, for example “in the forest there is a ghost” or “the baying of the dogs prophesies death.” A useful procedure for the clarification of the source value of folk beliefs is corpus analysis. Here the investigator concludes on the basis of two criteria, frequency and distribution, if a folk belief in a specific region belongs to the generally known collective tradition or not. The educational fictions and the poetical pictures or metaphors are to be separated by source criticism from the folk beliefs.

Honko sees memorates, the accounts of the supranormal experiences of an individual, either the narrator himself or one of his acquaintances, as the most reliable source for folk belief researchers. Here we have empirical tradition; according to Honko it is possible with the help of individual memorates to reconstruct the supranormal experiences—I refer here to the scheme about an Ingrian spirit experience. Compared with memorates, legends generally form secondary sources for religio-scientific analysis. Their testimonial power can be clarified through comparison and corpus analysis.

Honko defines fabulate in much the same way that Granberg does: "If the spirits in certain legends are given seemingly strange roles, and if the recital of the legend is characterized by a great deal of fantasy, one may call them "ghost" fabulates." Belief legend and entertainment legend which also appear in Granberg’s terminology contrast in terms of function, whereas local legend and migratory legend, on the other hand, contrast in terms of distribution. Bengt ai Klintberg, who has systematized Swedish legends, has built his system precisely on the foundation of a statement of Lauri Honko’s:

In respect to source criticism, it is important to prune from the materials those fabulates, entertainment legends, and international migratory legends that do not have a basis in a region’s actual folk belief. However, one should remember, that the same legend in one area can function as a fabulate, and in another as a belief legend.

5. Within cultural anthropology the ambiguity of genre in supranormal
tradition has scarcely been noticed.\textsuperscript{57} The American anthropologist William Bascom has concentrated on the religious reality of prose genres. In "The Forms of Folklore: Prose Narratives," Bascom proposes to substitute the comprehensive term prose narrative for a system of three terms: myth-folk-tale-legend.\textsuperscript{58} A fourth term, memorate, should be added, which has an important quality for the study of religion that cannot be compared with any of the above-mentioned terms. Ake Hultkrantz is, as far as I know, the only scholar of primitive religions who has used the term memorate. In the introduction to his work The North American Indian Orpheus Tradition Hultkrantz divided his material into three categories on the basis of form, content, and function, which he designates myth, legend, and fairy tale. He refers to von Sydow in characterizing the term legend:

The legend, again, is an epic narrative, very often a memorate transformed by tradition, whose main personages appear at least partly in the supernatural sphere, though without their necessarily belonging there. The action of the narrative takes place in the past, but is in general not so remote; the human figures who always appear in the legend are regarded as historical personages, and the action occurs at least in part in places with which the listeners are familiar. The function of the legend is to strengthen the solidarity in the group and the group values by maintaining the continuity between the current religious belief and conduct and the religious world of the ancestors of the group. It may have a pedagogical character, but it is at the same time considered as an actual occurrence in the past, a meeting between human beings and spirits which has really taken place, and it is therefore an object of genuine belief.\textsuperscript{59}

The major part of the above characteristics fit memorate significantly better than legend, should we define the term as Granberg and Honko do. The reader could here misinterpret memorate as a subtype of legend. In his analysis, Hultkrantz speaks exclusively of the legend. If the memorate were also given an analytical task, it would be possible to examine the material from the standpoint of the source criticism of the study of religion.

The Norwegian scholar Otto Blehr represents the socio-anthropological direction in Scandinavian folkloristics. His article "Noen synspunkter pa analysen av folketrofortellinger" (New Viewpoints About the Analysis of Folk Belief Stories) (1965)\textsuperscript{60} deals with the analysis of traditional belief concepts. He works with Norwegian materials that come partly from his own collection. As a basis for analysis Blehr suggests the following list of terms: folketroopplevelse ("folk belief experience": supranormal experience), folketroelement ("folk belief element": independently occurring belief motif), folketroforskilling ("folk belief concept": the sum of ideas about any particular being), folketroutsagn ("folk belief saying": belief concept), folketrofortelling ("folk belief story": memorate), and folketroutsagn (an entertaining story containing supranormal elements that has received a traditional form and whose truth value is irrelevant).\textsuperscript{61} Folketro, "folk belief," is used as a prefix to every term: it is the key word in Blehr's distinction and includes "such conceptions of magic, omens, and supernatural beings that are not part of any religious system."\textsuperscript{62}
I cannot agree with this definition. Independence from a religious system is no criterion; even in the matter of folk belief we are dealing with a religious system. If Blehr includes "the Church" under "religious systems," one wonders how he will classify the accounts, for example, of believing Christians about their religious experiences or the devil tradition supported by the medieval church. In addition, Lauri Honko has observed that the homo religiousus portrays a special type of tradition bearer—the most enthusiastic churchgoer in the village can be just the one to have the most supernatural experiences.

Blehr's folketrofortelling is synonymous with folk belief concept (Glaubensvorstellung); folk belief story is closest to memorate, while a term for folk belief legend is lacking. His assertion cannot be agreed with that it is totally irrelevant whether or not a narrative account more developed than the memorate is religiously more valid. On the other hand, Blehr is correct in that the memorate demonstrates the most interesting source for the folk belief scholar. He also divides the accounts into units, which he calls folk belief elements and contextual elements. To one unit belong all folk belief motifs that also appear independently; to the other those references in the account to person, place, or time. The analysis of content and structure is a useful method for examining supranormal tradition. However, it is astounding that Blehr says that the contextual elements in the account are only to convince the listener or the audience and that they therefore change more freely than the belief elements. Blehr's ideas turn appreciably from those of Lauri Honko, for example: "... the contextual elements of the folketrofortelling (memorate) are not primarily (to be grasped) according to their special content, one must examine much more how far they make the content of the elements of the belief in the account believable." Blehr examines the question only from the point of view of the story, telling situation, while Honko looks at the supranormal experience first.

In the treatment of form, variation, age, and distribution of the folk belief accounts, Blehr outlines two important problems—ones that unfortunately resist solution through his own materials. First he states the hypothesis of "Right of Possession" of the narrator to his stories: someone can have an authoritarian right in his community to a certain story, that is based upon his own personal experience or his rendition; only the narrator heard this account, for example, from dead relatives or from another village. Second, Blehr maintains that there is possibly room for a middle person between the person who had the experience and the one who hears the memorate (1. narrator experienced it himself, 2. narrator close acquaintance of the one who experienced it). Future research can only come to more preciseness and perhaps to new distinctions by means of depth studies of individual tradition bearers and their communities. The purely aesthetic, individual, or social psychological study of the narrative situation, however, does not present a solution: "Relating supernatural tradition to social roles, values, and norms is necessary before we can say anything about the function of folk beliefs." Conclusions presuppose a frequency analysis, an enumeration of the types of tradition bearers, an explanation of the social roles of the tradition bearers, and of the influence of social controls by the community.

Brynjulf Alver's article, "Category and Function," draws attention to the functional analysis of the categories of folk tradition. Alver concentrates on the borderline questions between narrative and belief, and is of the opinion...
that function cannot serve as an unequivocal concept. He differentiates nine alternatives, which he calls "basic elements of function":

1. amusement, entertainment, "a good story,"
2. joke,
3. validation of collective beliefs, often as an example,
4. use as a control of human activities in a supranormal situation,
5. illustration of norms and imperatives, expression of social approval of human behavior,
6. statement of causality and origin,
7. pedagogy,
8. taboo,
9. omen.

The alternatives refer in this case to the experience as well as to the storytelling situation: in my opinion, these two levels must be kept separated. Concerning the single functions, one can speak of the qualities of belief. Thus it is instructive if a definite correlation between a genre and the quality of belief can be demonstrated. The various types of tradition will probably arrange those elements belonging to the supranormal tradition differently.

Alver groups memorates into three sectors: 1. experience legend, 2. collective memorate, 3. individual memorate. "The experience legend is a memorate in form, but the content has been taken from legends. The collective memorate is built on different elements of legends and collective beliefs. The individual memorate, however, is not traditional at all, but is simply individual stories of supernatural experience."

Alver's term experience legend (compare die Erlebnissage of German scholars) comes very close to the term stereotype which is explained below. On the other hand the notion individual memorate, according to Alver, would primarily contain idiosyncrasies—accounts about experiences which have nothing to do with the collective tradition. The number of such memorates in tradition is rather small. I cannot sanction Alver's placement of the term experience legend as a subcategory of the memorate. So doing, the distinction memorate-legend loses its analytical meaning in the total grouping and is still valid only in the subcategory of memorates. Legend and memorate must still remain, for reasons of economy of expression, as main headings: other terms can be used for subcategories.

Thus we have concerned ourselves above primarily with the research of Scandinavian and Central European folklorists. One looks in vain for the term memorate in the works of folklorists writing in the English language. Not once in the international reference works in the field does this word appear. Exceptions are the works of the Americans Barbara Allen Woods and Wayland D. Hand. Woods is well-acquainted with the works of von Sydow and the German scholars. Memorate, fabulate, and belief fabulate are for her fitting terms for the analysis of folk prose. The actual limitation and additions are based on observations on the function of the tradition about the devil in dog form:

The findings of the present survey indicate, however, that the material of legends is very fluid and may shift in form from one category to another. The fabulate or
ordinary legend may appear at times as a memorate; and the
experience version often seems to have the function of
asserting the truth of a story. What Sydow calls the be-
lief-fabulat, [sic] I prefer to call a corroborative legend;
this term again describes not a distinct formal category,
but the function of the narrative. For legends told as
experiences, as indicated, may be corroborative in function;
and, on the other hand, ordinary legends may have a didactic
or corroborative purpose.

The article by Wayland D. Hand, "Status of European and American Legend Study"
(1965) is a synthesis of discussion of the systematization of legend tradition.
Single definitions of terms and differences in the various typologies of the
researchers are not taken into account in this article. On the other hand he
debates whether memorate should be considered in the systematization of the
legend since they "do not qualify as a possession of the folk at large"!
It is surprising that in Hand's otherwise representative bibliography not a
single work by Granberg, Haavio, or Honko is mentioned.

If the distinction memorate-legend, at least for the time being, appears to
be the private possession of the Scandinavian folklorists, the same problem
can also be detected in Anglo-American anthropology. As an example, I refer
to the work of Bronislaw Malinowski on the "natural" terminology of traditional
forms among the Kirivinians. Bascom's research also points in this direction.
Especially the sociologically--and anthropologically--oriented study of re-
ligion could draw more use from Scandinavian genre analysis, should the Scan-
dinavian researchers themselves come to a more unified terminology regarding
concepts and norms for use.

6. In the final analysis, it is naturally the analytical usefulness that will
decide the worth of the terminological distinctions. On this basis some
opinions, those for example about legend and memorate expressed in Scandinavia,
must be rejected. First of all, von Sydow's system contains so many short-
comings that as it stands it cannot serve as a starting point for analytical
examination. The many lacks and mistakes can be explained partly in that they
were, so to say, never tested in practice. Second, it must be emphasized that
a separation between legend and memorate is only topical if the supranormal
tradition is examined. Third, the distinction memorate-legend completely
forfeits its analytical value if the memorate becomes a subcategory of legend.

It is generally easy to differentiate an individual memorate from an inter-
national migratory legend. The scholar can, for example, in the following
three Finnish texts quickly decide that A is a belief concept, B a memorate,
and C a legend:

A. The ghost often looks like the person who started the first
fire in this house or in this hut.

B. At that time I was living in Keuru at the farmstead Kure-
niemi near Kolho. I had an infant. When he cried early one
morning, I got up to quiet him. Then I saw, that on the
hearth across from the bed, an old man was sitting. He was
so old that his hair and his beard appeared to blend into
one another. I thought, who could have closed the door so
poorly the night before as to let this man get in. I said
nothing, nor did the man. After a while he got up noiselessly
and went past the bed to the door, through which he disappeared.
When I told Herman the salesman about it that day, he said: 'Did the old man show himself? I know him already; that is the spirit of this house. I have seen him many, many times. He often sat in the sauna, when I heated the sauna.'

C. The spirits (fire spirits) were talking among themselves. The spirit of one house said: 'At our house they don't ever cross themselves when the oven door is closed.' Another spoke: 'Burn the house down!' The first said: 'That would really be the right thing to do, only the sieve from your house lies up on top of the bunk bed.' The other thought: 'Protect that, don't burn the sieve!' Well, the house began to burn. The posts of the bunk bed, however, remained undamaged, and the sieve on the end of the post.

B is a memorate, the individual report from a mother who was quieting her child, of her experience with a spirit. The surest signs of the memorate in this case are the perceptual psychological authenticity of the report, as well as, in regards to the narrative, the profusion of "unnecessary" details. C is the migratory legend of the fire spirits talking among themselves, which is known all over Eastern Europe, from the Urals to Romania in the south and in the north as far as western Finland. In Finland it is impossible to prove a belief background for this legend, which builds itself around the dialogue of the supernatural beings. On the other hand, A can be termed a folk belief on the basis of form criterion; the supernatural expression appears here in the form of a generalizing assertion. Corpus analysis demonstrates that the folk belief belongs to the collective tradition in Finland.

In the analysis of supranormal tradition, a situation often repeats itself so that without a comparison or a quantitative check it cannot be concluded whether the statement under discussion is a memorate or a legend. There are, for example, memorates that were collected exactly in the stage where they were in the process of becoming legends. When the interesting description of an encounter with a supernatural being is retold in a region other than where the experience had taken place, the report changes; experiential details unnecessary for the plot fall away and are replaced by new motifs that may belong to legends, which, regarding content, resemble this account. Demarcation can then become difficult. The distinction is further irritated by the fact that under the term memorate, elements of various levels have to be housed, from first hand memorates told by the experiencer himself to a well-known typical statement. Gunnar Granberg was the first to point out the various subcategories of the memorate. According to Granberg, the degree of significance of the personal is crucial in drawing the line between memorate and legend as well as in demonstrating the subcategories of the memorate. Granberg doesn't clearly separate the criteria that defines his terms. I have reconstructed below the following diagram that illustrates the separate subcategories of the memorate.

Scheme V: Subcategories of the memorate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTENTS</th>
<th>Traditional</th>
<th>Varying</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>--traditional</td>
<td>--traditional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>--stereotype</td>
<td>--varying</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Individual | --Individual | --individual |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORM STYLE</th>
<th>Varying</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stereotype</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>--traditional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>--stereotype</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A

D

E
In one criterion, the aspects of content (traditional as opposed to individual) are united; in the other, the stylistic and formal (stable form as opposed to freely variable). Granberg differentiates the following categories of the memorate: a. individual content and form, b. individual form, but accounts that contain legend motifs, c. presentations based on traditional legend and belief elements, structurally stereotypical, but bordering on the personal experience. Granberg illustrates the last named group with the help of the following example: "Anders Karlsson was once going through a woods near Ryd. He had often gone this way, but this time it seemed entirely strange to him, and gradually he found that he had gone the wrong way. So he took his coat off and then put it on inside out. Then he found the path immediately; at the same time, however, he heard mocking laughter and he realized that the wood spirit had led him astray." Granberg would not necessarily call this story a memorate. In my diagram there is yet a fourth group, which Granberg did not establish: d. individual in content, but formally and structurally stereotyped. This category, to which, for example, the dominant of the individual tradition can be counted, should quantitatively be less inclusive than the others. By dominant of individual tradition we understand the preference for a certain expository model, so that conforming explanations and the acceptance of idiosyncratic tradition are the results. Gunnar Granberg assumes that examples of his middle subcategories, b, are the most numerous. Martti Haavio also came to this conclusion: "Such memorates in which the individual element has precedence are markedly less-frequent than those whose motifs are attached to the general folk tradition." The classification and the source criticism examination of the problematic materials between legend and memorate could be made easier if, for example, the terminology were fixed, which the researcher could then use when unsure about the genre of the traditional item he is working with. In this intermediate area between legend and memorate we have an imposing number of narratives in which appear, despite apparent individuality, a clear schematic typification of stylistic and structural characteristics belonging to the legend. So, in the middle of a story, which in respect to its individuality fits the specifications for the memorate, a development in the plot (or a fixed metrically-bound formula) might occur that is typical for legends. In order to clarify the source value of supranormal traditions, these stories must be kept separated from memorates as well as from legends. I suggest the term stereotype for such a vestigial story whose content is schematized and impersonal and in which unique characteristics are either completely or partly obscured. This stereotype allows for the recognition of motif affinities—the conscious choice of a traditional element according to a model—or associations with legend and other traditional forms. That a memorate is stereotypical doesn't yet say anything about its place in the collective tradition.

From the historical view of the above research, numerous examples could be cited of how terminological distinctions became blurred or entirely lost their meaning because the researchers did not recognize the criteria that lay at the base of their definitions. The history of the term fabulate is a perfect example of how, through expansion of a seldom-used term, the earlier distinctions (for example, memorate-legend) lose their analytical meaning. This same kind of unnecessary overlapping exists with the terms migratory legend and entertainment legend. The difference between both terms would be clear if one would emphasize that the first is based ultimately upon the examination of its distribution (its opposite is the local legend), the latter, on the
other hand, upon that of function (with its opposite, the belief legend). Lauri Honko lists nine criteria in his essay on the tasks of folklore analysis, which can profitably serve as the basis for an analysis of terms: content, form, style, structure, function, diffusion, frequency, age and origin. A tenth criterion concerning the transmission process could be added, which, for example, comes into question in regard to occupational, group or individual tradition. This criterion also holds good for the memarate, when it is defined as an account about a supernormal tradition experienced by the narrator or a person known to him. In defining the limits between memarate and legend, special attention has to be directed to the examination of content, function, and structure. Simultaneously time, diffusion, frequency, style, age, and origin could serve as control criteria as well as distinctions in special cases.

The most certain characteristic of the memarate is its perceptual-psychological probability; inferences can be drawn about how authentically the account being examined describes a supernormal experience. Thus we are dealing with functional analysis, which is done on the basis of the content of the tradition as well as on the information about the tradition bearer. The most important characteristics of the legend can be determined from the content.

Characteristic of the legend is a stable, stereotypical content, dominated by a certain plot scheme. The comparison demonstrates that this pattern recurs in the variants of a given legend as well as frequently in the legend types belonging to the same legend cycle. For example a large part of the dead-child legends are built closely upon a certain formalized saying that occurs where the murdered child discloses the deed to its mother or makes known its hiding place: "The jar is narrow, but the bones are long," or "Bring father a stocking, bring mother a shoe, the singer will put them on his little foot." A stable reply such as this, or a dialogue of supernormal beings is a certain characteristic of the legend. Also typical of the legend are clearness-of-plot and impersonality. Place, time, and person are often anonymous; sometimes they are mentioned, but differently than in the memarate, which concentrates upon the description of the experience.

Now and then a study of content and structure also produces results about functions of the legend. It is characteristic of the warning legend that, first, the violation of a norm is reported, then the supernormal punishment, and finally, the fate of the guilty person. The exciting entertainment legend reminds one, on the other hand, of a criminal account, where one begins with the drastic description of an incident and afterwards tells how an able person dealt with the supernormal experience. In the analysis of the dead-child legends, I established an interesting conformity between results from the contents and those from information about the tradition bearer. Four-fifths of the women told the warning legend version of the same child murder legend, whereas three-fourths of the male narrators knew the criminal legend version.

The term fabulate has appeared in many various ways since von Sydow: 1) as the main concept of prose tradition; 2) as a synonym for legend; 3) in the distinction memarate-fabulate, in which legend is the cover concept; 4) for an invented story without the background of tradition. Many people certainly were inclined to do away with the term entirely on account of its polysemic usage. I, however, would consider it necessary to preserve fabulate in a narrowly outlined meaning—at least as long as there is not a better word for it—namely, as designation for a narrative that clearly contains invented, mem-
empirical, unbelievable elements. A fabulate can then be a legend, which doesn't possess the background of tradition in the supranormal tradition of an area (for example in Finland the legend cited above about the fire spirits conversing among themselves) or also a memorial that contains perceptually and psychologically questionable material. Thus sketched, fabulate would be a term with content, whose task ultimately consisted in emphasizing the nonempirical character of the tradition in question. Under this designation a place could also be found for the clearly nonempirical roles of supranormal beings that have passed from märchen into legends.

What interests the scholar of religion most in this distinction memoirte-legend is undoubtedly its source-critical value. It is also often a question of a process that is useful in the source criticism of the scholar of religion. The proof of the difference between memoirte and legend (and belief legend and entertainment legend) is especially important at the present time, if the supranormal tradition is examined. If the historical tradition were to be analyzed, a similar problem of source criticism would arise: What is the value of tradition as historical source? One of the most important observations made by folklorists concerning historical traditions is that the source value of the various genres as historical sources is not the same. Until now researchers have not made any distinctions in regard to historical tradition that would resemble those between memoirte and legend. Obviously it would be useful, in regard to the source criticism of the historian, to keep a general statement that contains historical information separated from the individual remembrance and the stereotypical legend with traditional plot and structural elements. For these three categories one could perhaps use the terms memorial, Fabulate, and historical legend, analogous to the terms folk belief, memorial, and belief legend.

Notes


5. For example the articles aetiological legend, fabulat, fabulate, legend, memorat, mytisk sågen, sågen, sage, sagn with further references.

6. For the purpose of communication between author and reader we must explain many terms with examples of variants. In this article there is room for only a few statements of this sort. I refer to my dissertation "The Nordic Dead-Child Tradition. Nordic Dead-Child Beings. A Study in Comparative Religion," where I have used in practice the terminology advanced here and which also contains a large number of illustrative materials.

7. von Sydow, Selected Papers on Folklore, 60-61.


9. Ibid., 98.

10. Ibid., 105-108.

11. Ibid., 111.
12. Von Sydow, Selected Papers on Folklore, 65. Note particularly here the special interpretation of the term "fable" which depends on structure. For the other use of the concept see Bøkker, Folk Literature (Germanic), 93-94.

13. Von Sydow, Selected Papers on Folklore, 108. The term "dite" denotes "all such traditions as are not narrative," compare Ibid., 106-126. See also the article by Åke Hultkrantz, "'Miscellaneous Beliefs.' Some Points of View concerning the Informal Religious Sayings," Temenos 3 (1966): 67-82.

14. For example Christiansen, "Fabulat og memorat," 86-100; Piø, "Fabulat og memorat," 100-106.

15. Von Sydow, Selected Papers on Folklore, 73.

16. The collective tradition is a frequency analytical concept which one understands to be traditional elements which are approved and generally known in a certain society; the opposite is the individual tradition. The collective tradition is not the sum of the individual traditions, but, as Albert Eskerød said, qualitatively something more and quantitatively something less (Eskerød, Are's åring, 77). Not all individual tradition becomes collective tradition, since the group exercising social control carries out the selection. The diagram of Lauri Honko shows the influence of the collective tradition on the supernormal tradition (Honko, "Memorates and the Study of Folk Beliefs," 16-17). Compare Juha Pentikäinen, The Nordic Dead-Child Tradition. Nordic Dead-Child Beings. A Study in Comparative Religion (Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemian Akateeminen Tutkimus, 1968), 110-111.


18. Von Sydow, Selected Papers on Folklore, 74.


20. Von Sydow, Selected Papers on Folklore, 76, 86.

21. Ibid., 76-77.

22. The widespread application of the concept was proposed by Tillhagen in "Was ist eine Sage?" while Granberg (Skogsraet i yngre nordisk folk-tradition, 121) and Honko (Geisterslaube in Ingermanland, 135) wanted to limit the meaning most of all. See also Hartmann, Die Trollvorstellungen in den Sagen und Märchen der skandinavischen Völker, 1 If; Höhrich, Sage, I, /9; Christiansen, "Fabulat og memorat": Piø, "Fabulat og memorat.

23. Lauri Honko, "Genre Analysis in Folkloristics and Comparative Religion," Temenos 3 (1968): 48-66 (55 f.).
Friedrich Ranke, "Sage," in John Keier, ed. Deutsche Volkskunde. insbesondere zum Gebrauch der Volksschullehrer (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Co., 1926), 193-218; Volkssagenforschung. Vorträge und Aufsätze (Breslau: Maruschke & Behrend, 1935). Friedrich Ranke defined the Legend as "narration of a peculiar experience that is believed and is considered true" (Ranke, Volkssagenforschung, 11 f.). He was especially interested in the problem of legend formation. He discerned three points of origin: 1. the etiological legend origin, 2. origin out of the event and 3. origin out of the experience; Ranke, Volkssagenforschung, 74-77. The experience legend means the last named group whose point of origin is therefore the supernatural experience of some people.

André Jolles, Einfache Formen, Legende, Sage, Mythe, Rätsel, Spruch, Kasus, Memorabilia, Märchen, Witz (Halle: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1930). His eight "Einfache Formen" are: Legend, Sage, Myth, Riddle, Proverb, Incident, Memorabilia, Märchen, Humor. Compare Honko, "Genre Analysis in Folkloristics and Comparative Religion," 55-56.

Friedrich Ranke's tradition analysis and the functionalism of Richard Weiss are represented at their most typical in the work of Heinrich Burkhardt, Zur Psychologie der Erlebnissage (Zürich: Juris-Verlag, 1951). In many respects Lutz Röhricht also built up on the terminology of Friedrich Ranke; Röhricht, Die deutsche Volkssage, 665 f; Sage, 4-6. The most important representative of the Jollesian lineage is Kurt Ranke (Kurt Ranke, "Einfache Formen," in Ranke, Internationaler Kongress der Volkserzählungsforscher in Kiel und Kopenhagen, 1-11; Kurt Ranke, Sagen und Legenden V. Literaturgeschichtlich," in Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart 6 (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1961), 1313-1314; Kurt Ranke, "Volkserzählung," in Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart 6 (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1962), 1150-1151.

Hartmann, 1, 14.

Ibid., 2-15-21.

Ibid., 17.


Röhricht, Die deutsche Volkssage.

Ibid., 666.

Ibid., 665.

Röhricht, Sage, 4.

Compare the texts of Röhricht, Die deutsche Volkssage, 665-667 and Röhricht, Sage, 4-9.

Röhricht defined the term in the following manner: "To the legend experience usually belongs an external cause and an internal disposition: impressions from outside like formations of fog, storm and wind must meet with an inner cause, that is with all possible shades of the numinous feelings, fear as an inner disposition . . ." (Röhricht, Die deutsche Volkssage, 665; Sage, 4-5). Compare in this connection the

37. Hartmann, 7, 74.

38. Röhrich, Sage, 4, 7-9.


40. For example, Röhrich, Die deutsche Volkssage; Sage, 7-9.

41. Granberg, "Memorat und Sage."

42. Ibid., 120-121.

43. Ibid., 121.

44. Ibid., 121-122.

45. Ibid., 123.

46. The tradition geographical and psychological opinions in the book proceed too much from ecological viewpoints. The aspect of tradition analysis in the introduction—the belief motifs were necessarily separated from the legend motifs, the memorates from the legends—can consequently be considered throughout the entire work. Granberg, Skogsræt i yngre nordisk folktradition.

47. Haavio, Suomalaiset kodinhalitiat, 8-10.

48. Honko, Geisterglaube in Ingermanland, 131-140.

49. Honko, "Memorates and the Study of Folk Beliefs." See also Honko's address to the 4th International Congress for Folk-Narrative Research in Athens 1964 "On the Functional Analysis of Folk-Beliefs and Narratives about Empirical Supernatural Beings."


52. Honko, "Memorates and the Study of Folk Beliefs," 16-17.

53. Honko, Geisterglaube in Ingermanland, 135.

54. Ibid., 134 f.

55. Honko, "Memorates and the Study of Folk Beliefs," 13.
56. af Klintberg, 9-10.

57. Honko, "Genre Analysis in Folkloristics and Comparative Religion," 53 f.


60. Blehr, "Noen synspunkter pa analysen an folketrofortellinger." In his article "The Analysis of Folk Belief Stories and its Implications for Research on Folk Belief and Folk Prose" Blehr translates his terminology into English: folketro folk belief, folketroelement folk belief element, folketrofortelling folk belief story, folketrosagn folk belief legend.


62. Ibid., 32; Blehr, "The Analysis of Folk Belief Stories and its Implications for Research on Folk Belief and Folk Prose," 259.

63. Honko, Geisterglaube in Ingermanland, 122-125.

64. In researching the Nordic dead child tradition I completed a similar analysis. I examined each item -- with the help of tables arranged according to a certain codal system -- according to the following points: a. narrator (personal history, family and occupational), b. the experiencer, c. type of experience (the main grouping follows the three-fold division into modalities: hearing, vision, sensitivity), f. role playing of the supernormal being, g. behavior of the experiencer, h. belief concept of the origin of the being, i. naming of the being, j. interpretational remarks, remarks of source critical nature. More precisely Pentikainen, The Nordic Dead-Child Tradition, 113. About source critical questions in the interview situation see Kenneth S. Goldstein, A Guide for Field Workers in Folklore (Hatboro, Pennsylvania: Folklore Associates, 1964), 22-23, 104 f; Alan Dundes, "Metafolklore and Oral Literary Criticism," The Monist 50:4 (1966): 505-516; Juha Pentikainen, "Testfrågor och kontextfrågor i intervjsituationen," Fältarbetet. Synpunkter pa etnfolkloristisk fältforskning (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura and Svenska Litteraturpal collapseskap I Finland, 1968), 26-42.


66. Honko, Geisterglaube in Ingermanland, 88 f; Memorates and the Study of Folk Beliefs," 16-17.


68. For example Henssen, Carl-Herman Tillhagen, "Traditionsbäraren," in Bäckner, Nordisk seminar i folkeldigning, 36-46. An analytical type of research of the tradition bearer is represented in the area of Märchen tradition by
Linda Degh ("Die schöpferische Tätigkeit des Erzählers," in Ranke, Internationaler Kongress der Volkszählungsforscher in Kiel und Kopenhagen, 63-73; "Processes of Legend Formation," in Negas, 77-87) and in the area of belief concepts by Lauri Honko (Geisterglaube in Ingemanland, 120-125).

69. Honko, "Memorates and the Study of Folk Beliefs," 19.

70. Alver, "Category and Function;"

71. Ibid., 66.


73. Alver, "Category and Function," 68.


75. For example Funk & Wagnalls, Standard Dictionary of Folklore, Mythology and Legend (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1949, 1950) doesn't use this terminology.

76. Woods, 11.

77. Hand, 1443.


79. Carl-Herman Tillhagen expands the use of fabulate in that the term includes the entire epic prose tradition with the exception of Märchen, memorates, and such legends that are only of local interest. The following assertion of Tillhagen ("Was ist eine Sage?", 12), shows that he also lets his distinction fabulate-memorate go beyond the supranormal tradition: "Only those legends should be excluded from the catalogue -- so it appears to me -- which are strictly of local interest, and which contain no internationally-distributed motifs. Such are primarily legends about places, place names, military exploits, historic as well as cultural-historic conditions, persons, etc. As a rule it is less a question of fabulates than of memorates, and these fall outside of the perimeters of a catalogue, according to the qualifications which the definition given above sets for the legend." The practical goals of systematizing traditional forms have, in the suggestion of Tillhagen ("Der internationale Sagenkatalog," in Peeters, 37-40; "Was ist eine Sage?"), decided the terminological opinions. The same applies to Lauri Simonsuuri's Typen- und Motivverzeichnis der finnischen mythischen Sagen. It doesn't treat, as one might conclude from the title, a simple index of belief legends, but the memorates and belief concepts of this subject area are also included.

80. At the folklore conference in Alborg in January, 1961, Reidar Th. Christiansen and Iårn Pål spoke on the topic "Fabulate and memorate." From the statements of Christiansen as well as Pål it was clear that both see memorate and fabulate as two subcategories of Legend.

81. Honko, Geisterglaube in Ingemanland, 103-108; "Memorates and the Study of Folk Beliefs." 11.


85. Ibid., 122.


