ASPECTS 
OF 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
IN 
AFRICA 
Mark  W.  DeLancey 
Editor 
~eprinted  1980 
Copyright  1979  African  Studies Program 
Preface 
Authors 
The  Study  of  African  International  Re1 ations 
hk  DeLancey 
Dependence  or  Interdependence :  Afri ca  in the  Global 
Pol i tical  Economy 
Tho.thy M.  Shm and  M.  C&ahine  Naubmy 
Regional  Relations  in Southern  Africa  and  the  Global 
Pol i tical  Economy 
Ken  W.  Gfiwdy 
The  Quest for  East  African  Unity:  'One  Step  Forward,  Two 
Steps  Backward' 
4. Gun  Liebenow 
The  Origins  of  Boundary  Conflict  in Africa I. 
&.uvn  Boyd,  J4. 
The AFRICA Project  and  the  Comparative  Study  of African 
Foreign  Policy 
P&ch  1. McGauran  and  Thornm  U.  Johnnon 
Index 
PREFACE 
Several  respondents  to a  1975  survey  on  the  teaching  of African 
politics  courses  in U.S.  and  Canadian  colleges  and  universities  com- 
plained of various  defiencies  in the  reading  materials  available  for 
their  students.  One  of  these  complaints  concerned  the  lack  of a  set 
of essays  on  the  international  politics of Africa;  this  book  attempts 
to  answer  that  complaint. 
Each  of  these  essays  was  written specifically  for  this  book,  and 
thus  each  was  speci fical ly designed  for  instructional  purposes.  We 
sought  to provide a  variety  of  viewpoints  and  methodological  orienta- 
tions  as  well  as  essays  on  a  variety  of subjects.  Our  organizing 
principle was  the  needs  of  a  course  on  African  politics,  not  a  parti- 
cular  philosophical  or methodological  stance.  Two  of the  essays  contain 
discussions  of  the  methodology  by  which  the  research  was  conducted  and 
the  data  was  analyzed.  We  hope  that  this  will  serve  in a  small  way 
to  assist  students  in bridging  the  gap  between  courses  in methodology 
and  area  studies. 
The  preparation  of  this  volume  has  taken  somewhat  longer  than 
intended,  due  largely to the  editor's  two-year  research  and  teaching 
visit  to  Nigeria  and  Caueroon  in the  middle  of the  process.  Some  of 
the  essays  were  originally  planned  and  written  in 1975,  but all  have 
undergone  revision  in 1978. 
I  wish  to  thank  Dr.  Richard Ualker,  Director  of the  Institute of 
International  Studies  at the  University of  South  Carolina,  and  Virginia 
DeLancey,  the  former  for  the  provision  of financial  support  and  the 
latter for  the  provision  of moral  support. 
Mark  W.  DeLancey  * 
Columbia,  South  Carolina 
December,  1 978 
AUTHORS 
J.  Barron  Boyd,  Jr.  is Assistant  Professor  and  Chairperson  of 
the  Department  of  Political  Science  at Le  l~loyne College.  His  most 
recent  publ i cations  i ncl ude  a  chapter on  southern  African  regional 
foreign  policy  in  Cooperation  and  Conflict  in  Southern  Africa,  and 
an  article,  "International  Studies  and  the  Black  Afri ca  tlandbook 
Data", in  International  Studies  Notes.  His  major  researcli  interests 
are  in  southern African politics  and  African  international  relations. 
Mark  W.  DeLancey  is Associate  Professor  in  the  Department  of 
Government  and  International  Studies  at the  Uni versi ty  of  South 
Carolina  and  Associate  Director  of  the  International  Studies 
Association.  He  has  conducted  research  in  Cameroon  and  Nigeria 
and  is  currently  doing  an  analysis  of  Nigerian  foreign  policy. 
Recent  publ ications  include  articles  in  the  Journal  of  Modern  African 
Studies,  the  Journal  of  Developing  Areas,  and  Rural  Africana. 
Kenneth  W.  Grundy  is  Professor  of  Political  Science  at Case 
Western  Reserve  University.  His  books  i ncl ude  Guerri 1 la  Struggle 
in  Africa  (1971 )  and  Confrontation  and  Accommodation  in  Southern 
Africa  (1973).  He  is also  co-author  of  The  Ideologies  of  Violence 
(1974).  He  is currently  working  on  a  study  of  the  racial  component 
of  the  South  African  armed  forces. 
Thomas  H.  Johnson  (M.A.  University  of  Southern  Cal ifornia,  1976) 
is  a  doctorial  candidate  and  lecturer  in  the  School  of  International 
Relations  at the  Unversity  of  Southern  California.  His  areas  of 
specialization  include  African  international  relations,  peace  research, 
and  internation  theory  and  method01 oqy.  His  current  research  invol ves 
the  analysis  of  competing  models  of  the  international  and  domestic 
effects  of  political-economic  interdependence  among  developed  and 
developing  countries. 
3.  Gus  Liebenow  is  Professor  of  Political  Science  at  Indiana 
University  and  a  founder  and  past  President  of  the  African  Studies 
Association.  He  has  been  concerned  with  such  topics  as  political 
and  social  moderni zation,  and  the  structure of  dependency  relationships. 
His  publications  include  Colonial  Rule  and  Political  Development  in 
Tanzania  and  Liberia,  the  Evolution  of  Pri vileqe. 
Patrick  3.  McGowan  is an  Associate  Professor  of  International 
Relations  and  Political  Science  at The  University  of Southern 
California,  where  he  has  taught  since  1974.  His  current  research 
interests  are  in international  political  economy  and  African  regional 
subsystems.  He  is co-editor  of The  Saqe  International  Yearbook  of 
Foreign  Pol icy  Studies.  Among  his  most  recent  pub1 ications  are  articles 
in The  Journal  of  Modern  African  Studies  (March  1976)  and  International 
Organization  (Winter  1978)  on  international  dependence  in Africa. 
M.  Catharine  Newbury  is currently  Visiting Assistant  Professor 
of  Government  at Wesleyan  University.  Her  research  in Rwanda  (1970- 
71 )  and  among  the  Havu  and  Tembo  of eastern  Zaire  (1973-75)  focussed 
on  local level  political  change  and  internal  aspects  of dependency. 
She  has  published in Cahiers  d'Etudes  Africaines  and  Africa. 
Timothy  R.  Shaw  is currently  visiting Associate  Professor  in the 
Department  of  Political  Science  and  the  Norman  Paterson  School  of 
International  Affairs  at Carleton  University  of Ottawa  on  secondnent 
from  Dal housie  University  where  he  recently  served  as  Director  of 
the  Centre  for  African  Studies.  Dr.  Shaw  specializes  in the  foreign 
policy and  political  econom-y  of African  states.  He  is author  of 
Dependence  and  Underdevelopment:  The  Development  and  Foreign  Pol i tics 
of Zambia  (1976)  and,  with  Douglas  G.  Anglin,  Zambia's  Foreign  Policy: 
Studies  in Diplomacy  and  Dependence  (1978).  He  is co-edi tor,  with 
Kenneth  A.  Heard,  of Cooperation  and  Conflict  in Southern  Africa  (1976) 
and  The  Pol i ti cs  of  Africa :  Dependence  and  Devel opment  (1978). 
THE  STUDY  OF  AFRICAN  INTERNPTIONAL 
RELATI OPE 
Mark  W.  DeLancey,  University of  South  Carolina I 
t  Exciting and  explosive  events  have  taken  place  on  the  African  continent 
in recent years.  The  internationalization  of  the  struggle  for  the  freedom  of 
black  people  in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe,  the  approaching  success  of the  movement 
to break  South  West  Africa/Narnibia  from  the  colonial  rule of the  Republic  of 
South  Africa,  and  the  first  visit  to  black  Africa  of the  President  of  the 
United States  are  among  the  many  happenings  in the  latter  part of  the  1970s 
that  have  attracted  our  attention  as  citizens  and  scholars  to Africa's  par- 
ticipation  in international  politics.  The  purpose  of this  essay  is to  introduce 
some  of  the  major  topics  and  trends  in the  study  of the  international  relations 
of  sub-Saharan  Africa  and  to  provide  a  brief  survey  of the  most  recent  English- 
language  publ ications  on  the subject.  References  to  books,  articles  and  other 
materials  published  in earlier years  and  in other  languages  may  be  found  in 
the  various  bibliographies  listed under  each  of the  subject  headings  below. 
For  more  general  discussions  refer  to Mark  U.  DeLancey  "Current  Studies  in 
African  International  Relations,"  (1976)*  and  the  very  useful  work  by  W.A.E. 
Skurni k,  Sub-Saharan  Africa:  A  Guide  to  Information  Services  (1977).  This 
volume  contains  six chapters  on  major  topics  in African  international  politics. 
Each  chapter  begins  with  a  "substantive  introduction"  or essay  and  is completed 
with a  bibliography.  Author,  title and  subject  indexes  are  included.  The 
beginner  in African  courses  should  refer  to  the  excellent  and  very  useful 
volume,  Student  Africanist  Handbook  (1974)  by  Gerald  W.  Hartwig and  Nil 1 iam 
M.  0' Barr.  This  provides  an  introduction  to Africa  and  brief bibliographies 
for  each  discipline  and  each  African  state. 
There  are  several  sources  which  are  useful  for  keeping  up  with  current 
publ ica tions.  Africana  Journal , publ i shed  quarterly,  contains  bi bl iographic 
essays,  book  reviews  and  1 ists of new  books  on  Africa.  These  1 ists are  divid- 
ed  into  subjects,  such  as  economic  development  and  politics,  and  countries. 
A  Current  Bi bl iography  on  African  Affairs,  publ i shed  in E!ashington,  D. C., 
contains  research  articles  as  we11  as  bibliographic  essays.  Its lists of 
pub1 ications  include journal  articles  and  books.  Materials  publ ished  in Africa 
*Full  references  to each  i tern  are  contained  in the  bibliography  at the  end  of 
this  essay. 
have  not  received  sufficient  attention  in most  of the  bib1 iographic  sources. 
However,  The  African  Book  Pub1 ishing  Record,  publ ished quarterly  in Oxford, 
England,  now  provides  reliable  coverage  of all  items  published on  the  continent. 
In each  issue  there  are  thirty  to forty  book  reviews  and  a  lengthy  bibliographic 
list. 
There  are  several  general  studies  on  African international  politics  that 
provide a  broad background.  The  volumes  edited  by  Y.  Tandon,  Readings  in 
African  International  Relations  (1972  and  1974)  contain  numerous  previously 
publ ished articles.  Ali  A.  Mazrui  and  H.  H.  Patel,  eds.,  Africa  in World  Affairs: 
The  Next  Thirty  Years  (1973),  includes  fifteen  essays  published for  the  first 
time.  Mazrui,  a  prolific writer  on  all  aspects  of African  politics,  has  recently 
publ ished Africa's  International  Relations :  The  Diplomacy  of Dependency  and 
Change  (1977).  A massive  compilation  of articles  is contained  in the  annual 
production,  Col i n  Legum,  ed.  , Africa  Contemporary  Record.  The  contributions 
are  all  new  material  and  they  provide the  best  analysis  of current  events  availa- 
ble.  Reporting of current events  is done  most  fully by  the  two  monthly  editions 
of Africa  Research,  Ltd (Economic  and  Political).  D.  H.  Morrison,  et a1 . , Black 
'Africa:  A  Comparati ve  Handbook  (1972)  is a  we1 1 -organized  collection  of statistics. 
These  data  are  available  on  tape  for  use  in computers.  Adda  B.  Bozeman,  Conflict 
in Africa:  Concepts  and  Realities  (1976)  is an  attempt  to apply  a "national 
character"  analysis  to  the continent.  Bozeman  argues  that  there  is a  single 
African  political  culture  or character  and  that  the  African  conception  of 
conflict  is substantial ly different  from  that of Europeans.  She  concludes 
that  this  di fference  wi 11  cause  di fficul ties  between  African  and  European 
s ta tesrnen . 
Major  Problems  in African  International  Relations 
A  recent  study  of the  ways  in which  African international  politics  is 
taught  in Canadian  and  U.S.  colleges  and  universities  [Mark  W.  DeLancey,  Teach- 
ing the  International  Relations  of Africa  (1975)l  indicated that  there  was 
little general  agreement  among  instructors  about  the way  in which  such  courses 
should  be  organized.  Some  teachers  used  what  we  might  call  a  "problem-oriented 
approach;"  thei r courses  were  buil t upon  analysis  of selected  problems  in African 
international relations.  Such  topics  might  incl ude,  for examples,  Rhodesia/ 
Zimbabwe,  the  various  conflicts  in the  Horn  of Africa,  boundary  disputes  and 
refugees. 
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe:  The  conflict  in this  territory was  once  viewed  as  a 
domestic  conflict  between  black  and  white  people  in a  system where  whites 
controlled  most  political  and  economic  power.  Today,  the  view  is much  more 
complex  as  many  western  and  eastern  powers  have  begun  to  provide  moral  and 
material  support  and  as  the  black  population  has  become  divided,  with  some 
joining  the  white  population  in opposition  to other  members  of the  black  pop- 
ulation.  The  situation  is made  even  more  complex  with  the  involvement  of 
numerous  transnational , non-s tate  organi zati ons  such  as  church  groups. 
The  domestic  background  to  the  present  situation  has  been  analyzed  in 
several  recent works  incl uding  Larry  W.  Bowman,  Politics  in Rhodesia:  White 
?ower  in an  African  State  (1973);  B.  V.  Mtshal i, Rhodesia:  Background  to 
Conflict  (1967);  and  Patrick  O'Meara,  Rhodesia:  Racial  Conflict  or  Co-existence - 
(1975).  Mtshal i 's  contribution  is an  historical  analysis  and  Bowman's  book 
is a  study  of  the  major  white  political  organization,  the  Rhodesian  Front. 
0' Meara's  volume,  a  comprehensive  analysis,  is the  most  up-to-date. 
Since  the  white  Uni lateral  Declaration  of  Independence  (U.D.  I. )  in 1965, 
numerous  means  to  bring  full  independence  to a1 1  the  people  of  this territory 
have  been  proposed  and  tried.  The  legal  colonial  power,  Great  Britain,  has 
attempted  negotiations  and  economic  sanctions,  but  she  has  not  used  any  military 
pressure.  Robert  C.  Good,  UDI:  The  International  Politics  of the  Rhodesian 
Rebel 1 ion  (1973)  provides  analysis  of the  earl ier years  of negotiations.  The 
author  was  at one  time  U.S.  ambassador  to  Zambia.  S.  Wilmer,  "Ten  Years  of 
Vain  Negotiations,"  (1972)  argues  that  nothing  has  been  gained  for  the  African 
population  through  these  negotiations.  Also  see  Marion  E.  Doro,  "A  Bib1 iograph- 
ical  Essay  on  the  November  1971  Rhodesian  Settlement  Proposals ," (1973). 
Negotiations  wi thout  pressure  on  the  whi te  government  would  never  lead  to 
change;  Great  Britain  requested  that  the  United Nations  impose  economic  sanctions 
on  Rhodesia  in an  effort to  exert  such  pressure.  The  val ue  of such  sanctions 
has  been  the  subject  of  much  discussion,  but certainly  a  final  assessment  cannot 
be  made  until  the  resol ution of  the  conflict.  G.  V.  Stephenson,  "The  Impact 
of  International  Economic  Sanctions  on  the  Internal  Viabi 1 i ty of  Rhodesia," 
(1975)  argues  that  sanctions  have  not a1 tered  the  white  government's  pol icies. 
Yet  the  recently  expressed  desire  of that  government  that  sanctions  should end 
suqgests  that  some  serious  pressure  does  resul t.  M.  Doxey,  "International 
Sanctions:  A  Framework  for Analysis  with  Special  Reference  to  the  UN  and  Southern 
Africa,"  (1972);  Leonard  T.  Kapungu,  The  United Nations  and  Economic  Sanctions 
against  Rhodesia  (1973);  M.  Stephen,  "Natural  Justice  at the  United  Nations:  The 
Rhodesia  Case,"  (1973) ; Michael  Nil liams  and  Michael  Parsonage,  "Britain  and 
Rhodesia:  The  Economic  Background  to  Sanctions ,I1  (1 973) ; and  Ral ph  Zackl in, 
The  United  Nations  and  Rhodesia:  A  Study  in International  Law  (1974)  provide 
a  full  background  and  a  variety  of  viewpoints.  The  majority  of authors  argue 
that  sanctions  are  ineffective  and  inappropriate,  even  that  they  are  i 1 legal. 
However,  posi ti ve  views  are  presented  in Francis  Nehwati , "Economic  Sanctions 
against  Rhodesia"  (1 973)  and  Guy  Arnold,  "Rhodesia:  Increasing the  Effecti ve- 
ness  of Sanctions"  (1973). 
Another  type  of pressure on  the white  Rhodesians  is being exerted  by  some 
of the black  national ist groups.  Guerrilla  warfare  is thoroughly  analyzed  in 
Ken  W.  Grundy,  Guerrilla  Struggle  in Africa  (1971 )  and  Richard Gibson,  African 
Liberation  Movements  (1972).  An  example  of guerrilla  warfare  escalating  into 
conflict  between  independent  countries  is examined  in S.  V.  Mubako,  "The  Rho- 
desian  Border  Blockade  of  1973  and  the  African  Liberation  Struggle"  (1974). 
South  West  Africa/Namibia:  This  territory,  once  a  German  colony,  has  been 
treated by  the  Republic  of South  Africa  as  if it were  an  integral  part of South 
Africa.  In legal  terms,  howeyer,  it has  passed  from  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
League  of Nations,  when  it was  a  South  African  mandate  territory,  to  the  United 
Nations.  South  Africa  refused to  recognize  the  United Nation's  rights  in the 
area  and  extended  her  policy of apartheid  to the  territory.  This  has  aroused 
international  concern  and  a  variety  of tactics  have  been  used  in efforts  to 
dislodge  the  Republic  from  South  West  Africa  (or Namibia  as  it is called by 
the  U.N.  and  African  nationalists).  One  line of attack  has  been  through  the 
International  Court  of  Justice  in order  to have  the  South  African  presence 
declared  i 1 legal.  See  Natal ie K.  Hevener,  "The  1971  South-West  African  Opinion- 
A  New  International  Juridical  Philosophy,"  (1975) ; A.  U.  Obozuwa,  The  Namibian 
Question:  Legal  and  Political  Aspects  (1973);  I. Sagay,  The  Legal  Aspects  of 
the  Namibia  Dispute  (1975);  and  Solomon  Slonim,  South  West  Africa  and  the 
United Nations:  An  International  Mandate  in Dispute  (1973).  The  failure  of 
the  Court  to  reach  a  binding decision  led to an  increase  of activity within 
the  United Nations  in opposition  to South  Africa.  S.  C.  Saxena,  "Namibia 
and  the  United Nations,"  (1975)  discusses  this  activity and  its effects.  That 
the  role of the  great  powers  acting  independently  of the  Court  or  the  U.N. 
is of more  importance  than  the  actions  of those  two  organizations  in forcing 
the  Republic  to  change  its policies  is suggested  by  developments  since  1976. 
The  Republ ic of South  Africa/Azania :  Central  to  the  political  problems 
of  the  southern  third  of  Africa  is the  Republic  of South  Africa,  a  country 
in which  the  black  majority  remains  under  the  domination  of a weal thy  white 
minority.  In terms  of  mi 1 i tary  power,  economic  development  and  international 
concern,  the  Republic  is the  focal  point  of the  region.  The  white  government's 
pol icy of  apartheid,  separate  development  or whatever  euphemism  is currently 
being  used  for  its policy of  racial  domination  and  divide  and  rule,  is  the  key 
element  in the  conflict.  Two  new  books  provide  detailed  analysis  of the  history 
and  development  as  well  as  the  current  status  of the  domestic  political  situation; 
see  Gwendolyn  Carter  and  Patrick  O'Meara,  Southern  Africa  in Crisis  (1978)  and 
Ian  Robertson,  ed.,  Race  and  Politics  in South  Africa  (1977).  Also  refer  to 
Stockholm  International  Peace  Research  Institute,  Southern  Africa:  The  Escalation 
of a  Conflict  (1976).  A more  complete  historical  background  will  be  found  in 
Gideon  S.  Were,  A  History of South  Africa  (1974). 
The  foreign  pol icy of the  Republic  is discussed  in James  Barber,  South  Africa's 
Foreign  Policy,  1945-1970  (1973)  and  Sam  C.  Nolutshungu,  South  Africa  in Africa:  A 
Study  of  Ideology  and  Foreign  Policy  (1975).  The  latter  volume  is a study  of  the 
Republic's  attempts  to woo  the black-ruled  states  of Africa,  especially  her  immediate 
neighbors.  Also  on  this  subject  are  a  large  number  of essays,  for examples  refer 
/ to  D.  Hi rschmann,  "Southern  Africa:  Detente?"  (1 976) ; C.  Legum,  "Southern  Africa : 
The  Politics  of ~etgnte" (1976)  and  Vorster's  Gamble  for  Africa  (1976);  and  Agrippah 
T.  Mugomba,  "The  Rise  and  Fall  of  'Pax  Suid Afrika' :  Historical  Analysis  of South 
Africa's  Black  African  Fomi gn  Pol icy"  (1975).  South  African  views  are  expressed  in 
two  articles  by  J.  Barrat,  "~etgnte in Southern  Africa,"  (1975)  and  "Southern 
Africa:  A  South  African  View"  (1976)  and  one  by  D.  P.  de  Villiers,  "Southern  Africa 
and  the  Future"  (1975).  The  latter  i tern  was  published  in the  journal  South  Africa 
International  which  seems  both  in appearance  and  subject  matter  to  be  modeled  after 
the  U.S.  journal  Foreign  Affairs.  South  Africa  has  made  several  attempts  to  open 
ties  with  African states.  Listeners  to  the  international  broadcast  of  Radio  South 
Africa  receive the strong  impression  that  South  Africa  intends  to  become  a major 
power  throughout  the  continent.  Comnercial  investments,  financial  and  technical 
aid,  and  surplus  food  are  all  promised  to potentially friendly  states.  South  Africa 
wishes  to  be  in Africa  what  the  United  States  wishes  to  be  in Latin America.  This 
role of  continental  or sub-continental  leader  is put  in theoretical  terms  in much 
of  the  "dependency"  literature,  discussed  below,  and  in the  various  articles  using 
the  sub-system  concept.  Examples  of the  latter include Larry  W.  Bowman,  "The  Subordi- 
nate  State  System  of  Southern  Africa"  (1968);  Richard  Dale,  "President  Sir Seretse 
Khama,  Botswana 's  Forei gn  Pol icy,  and  the  Southern  African  Subordinate  State 
System"  (1976);  Tim  Shaw,  "Southern  Africa:  Co-operation  and  Conflict  in an 
International  Sub-system,"  (1974);  and  T.  M.  Shaw  and  Kenneth  A  Heard,  - Co- 
operation  and  Conflict  in Southern  Africa:  Papers  on  a  Regional  Subsystem 
(1976).  The  limits  to  South  Africa's  peaceful  intentions  in developing  her 
regional  role are  analyzed  in two  essays  describing  her invasions  of Angola: 
Robin  Hallet,  "The  South  African  Intervention  in Angola,  1975-76"  (1978)  and 
J.  Barratt,  The  Angolan  Conflict  (1976).  "Racism  and  Fascism  in the  Southern 
Atlantic"  (1978),  written  by  Sirgio  Sierra,  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party 
of  Uruguay,  discusses  the  growing  links  between  South  Africa  and  fascist  dicta- 
torships  in Latin America.  At  least as  sinister  are  the  implications  suggested 
by  Zdenek  Cervenka  and  Barbara  Rogers,  The  Nuclear  Axis :  Nuclear  Col laborati on 
between  West  Germany  and  South  Africa  (1977).  It is now  generally  acce:ted 
that  the  Republic  is capable  of producing  nuclear  weapons.  What  is not yet 
clear  is the  role of Germany,  the  U.S.A.  and  other  western  countries  in 
assisting  the  Republ ic in attaining that  capability. 
Three  outstanding  books  analyze  aspects  of the  international  campaign 
to overthrow  the  racist regime  of South  Africa.  Richard  E.  Lapchick,  The 
Politics  of Race  and  International  Sport:  The  Case  of South  Africa  (1975) 
describes  the  international  campaign  to  isolate  South  Africa  from  a1 1  aspects 
of international  athletics.  This  might  be  compared  with  Richard Thompson, 
Retreat  from Apartheid:  New  Zeal and's  Sporting  Contacts  with  South  Africa 
(1976).  Richard  E.  Bissell , Apartheid  and  International  Organizations  (1977) 
analyzes  the  campaign  against apartheid  in the  United  Nations  and  concludes 
that,  although  there  has  been  much  talk and  numerous  resolutions  have  been 
passed,  the  pressure  exerted  through  the  U.N.  has  had  little effect on  South 
Africa's  pol icies.  A  much  more  optimistic  view  is expressed  in George  W. 
Shepherd,  Jr. , Anti -Aparthei d:  Transnational  Conflict  and  Western  Pol icy  in 
the  Liberation  of South  Africa  (1977),  an  examination  of the  role of private 
international  organizations  (or  "transnationals")  in the  campaign. 
Further  references  may  be  found  in Mark  W.  DeLancey,  "The  International 
Relations  of Southern  Africa:  A  Review  of  Recent  Studies"  (1976)  and  chapter 
5 of Skurni k  (1977). 
The  Indian  Ocean  and  the  Horn  of Africa:  Much  of  the  discussion  about 
southern  African  issues  is involved  in the  larger  debate  over  U.S.  and  western 
strategic interests  in Africa,  especially  in respect  of the  important  Cape, 
Indian Ocean  and  Red  Sea  maritime routes.  With  the  decline  in influence of the 
01 d  European  col oni a1  powers  -  especi a1 ly Britain,  France, Be1 gi um  and  Portugal  - 
some  observers  have  argued  that  the  United  States  must  in some  way  "fill  the 
vacuum"  or  replace  in some  manner  the  departing  major  powers  in the  area. 
Coupled  with  this  is  the  suggestion  that  the Soviet  Union  is moving  quickly 
to  fill that  vacuum  and  that  they  may  preempt  (or  may  have  preempted)  the  western 
powers.  Tom  J.  Farer,  War  Clouds  on  the  Horn  of Africa:  A  Crisis  for  Detente 
(1975);  Michael  A.  Samuels,  ed.,  The  Horn  of  Africa  (1978);  and  Peter  Schwab, 
"Cold  War  on  the  Horn  of  Africa"  (1978)  provide  a  variety  of viewpoints  on  the 
implications  of  the  situation.  C.A.  Crocker,  "The  African  Dimension  of  Indian 
Ocean  Policy"  (1976)  argues  that  the  U.S.A.  had  been  complacent  about  events 
in this  region  until  the  Angolan  civil  war;  the  U.S.A.  now  seems  to  be  becoming 
more  competitive.  M.  Bezboruah,  US  Strategy  in the  Indian  Ocean  (1977)  suggests 
that  the  Americans  have  inflamed  competition  in the  area  because  of  their 
exaggerated  fears  of Soviet  expansionism.  Geoffrey  Jukes,  The  Indian  Ocean  in 
Soviet  Naval  Pol icy  (1972)  agrees.  Also  see  J.B.  Bell,  "Strategic  Implications 
of  the  Soviet  Presence  in Somalia"  (1975).  A  Tanzanian  diplomat  expresses  an 
African  view  in A.D.  Hassan,  "Big  Power  Rivalry  in Indian Ocean"  (1976). 
Boundary  Disputes  and  Refuqees:  When  you  look  at a  map  of today's  Africa 
you  are  seeing  a  collection  of states the  boundaries  of which  were  mainly  drawn 
by  Europeans,  to  serve  European  purposes,  on  the basis  of  European  power  politics. 
Very  1 i ttle concern  for  African  interests or needs  was  included  in the  process. 
As  discussed  in detail  in the  essay  by  Barron  Boyd  in this  book,  many  analysts 
have  suggested  that  the  artificial  nature  of these  boundaries,  their  lack  of 
congruence  with  African  political,  economic  and  cultural  realities,  would  lead 
to  numerous  cases  of  interstate  conflict  in Africa.  R.L.  Kapil,  "On  the  Conflict 
Potential  of  Inherited  Boundaries  in Africa"  (1966)  establ i shes  several  useful 
categories  of  boundaries.  Kapil  then  relates  each  type  of  boundary  to  its confl ict 
potential .  A.O.  Chukwura,  "Organization  of African  Unity  and  African  Territorial 
and  Boundary  Problems,  1963-1973"  (1975)  describes  the  role of  the  major  continen- 
tal  international  organization  in the  boundary  dispute  problem.  Two  vol umes  are 
devoted  to  thi s  problem:  Saadia  Touval , The  Boundary  Pol i tics  of  Independent 
Africa  (1972)  and  Carl  G.  Widstrand,  ed.,  African  Boundary  Problems  (1969).  The 
latter volume  is one  of  several  that  have  resulted from annual  conferences  at 
the  Scandanavian  Institute of African  Studies.  Another  volume  in the  same  series, 
Zdenek  Cervenka,  ed. , Land-Locked  Countries  of Africa  (1973),  is a1 so  relevant 
to  this  topic.  Because  of  the  unusual  manner  in which  colonial  boundaries  were 
determi ned  and  because  these  became  the  borders  of i ndependent  Afri ca , there  i s 
an  unusual1.y  high  number  of states  in Africa  that  have  no  access  to  the  sea. 
Much  of  African  history  has  been  characterized by  large-scale  movements 
of  people  over  the  continent.  Such  movements  continue  today,  in part as  a 
response  to  natural  disasters  such  as  the  Sahel ian drought  of  recent years 
and  in part  as  a  result  of man-made  disasters  such  as  wars,  economic  upheavals 
and  political strife.  A  brief  introduction  to this  topic  is N.  Rubin,  "Africa 
and  Refugees"  (1974).  P. E.  Chartrand,  "The  Organization  of African  Uni ty  and 
African  Refugees:  A  Progress  Report"  (1975)  describes  the  efforts  of  the  O.A.U. 
to  improve  the  living conditions  of  refugees  residing  in its member  states. 
The  role of the  U.N.  is discussed  in the  comprehensive  study  by  Louise  W.  Holborn, 
Refugees;  A  Problem  of  our  Time:  The  Work  of  the  United  Nations  High  Commissioner 
for  Refuqees  (1975).  An  earlier work,  Hugh  C.  Brooks  and  Yassin  El-Ayouty,  eds., 
Refugees  South  of  the  Sahara:  An  African  Dilemma  (1970)  contains  sever.1  essays 
on  various  aspects  of  the  topic. 
Rhodesia,  the  Horn,  refugees  and  the  other  problems  discussed  in this 
section  are  only  a  few  of  the many  situations  of  importance  to  the  recent  history 
of African  international relations.  T.A.  Marks,  "Spanish  Sahara:  Background 
to  Conflict,"  (1976)  discusses  another.  However,  those  considered  in this  section 
are  the  most  important,  both  in terms  of  their  significance  to African  politics 
and  in terms  of  their  significance  to  the  published 1 iterature on  African  politics. 
The  Foreign  Policies  of African  States 
A  major  topic  in any  course  on  African international  relations  is the 
foreign  policies  of African  states.  Research  and  publication  in this  topic 
can  be  divided  into  two  categories:  studies  pertaining  to one  state  (case 
studies)  and  studies  pertai ni ng  to  several  states  (comoarati ve  studies ) . 
Olajide Aluko,  ed.,  The  Foreign  Policies  of African  States  (1977)  attempts 
to  bridge  the  gap  between  case  and  comparative  study.  The  volume  contains  analyses 
of the  foreign  policies  of eleven  states  - Algeria,  Egypt,  Ethiopia,  Ghana, 
Guinea,  Ivory  Coast,  Kenya,  Nigeria,  Tanzania,  Zambia  and  Zaire - written  by 
ten  authors.  But,  the  editor  has  also written  a  comparative  essay  drawing  on 
the  eleven  cases  as  data. 
Case  Studies:  Nigeria,  with  its large population,  relatively broad  resource 
base  and  large army,  is one  of the  major  powers  on  the continent.  Although 
this  state  played a  passive  role in the  early years  of  its independence,  it has 
come  to  play  an  active  leadership  role  in continental  affairs,  especially  since 
the  conclusion  of  its civil war.  As  a  result of its position  in African  affairs 
and  as  a  result of  the  relatively large  number  of  Nigerian academics,  there  are 
a  large  number  of  pub1 ications  on  her  foreign  policy  behavior.  Two  books  by 
Nigerian authors  are  particularly  important:  A.B.  Akinyerni , Foreign  Pol icy  and 
Federalism:  The  Nigerian  Experience  (1974)  and  G.J.  Idang,  Nigeria:  Internal 
Politics  and  Foreign  Policy  (1973).  Both  devote  most  of  their  attention to  the 
more  passive  period of  Nigeria's  foreign  pol icy.  B.  Adebisi , "Nigeria's  Relations 
with  South  Africa,  1960-1975"  (1977) ; R.A.  Akindele,  "The  Conduct  of  Nigeria's 
Foreign  Relations"  (1973);  I.A.  Gambari,  "Nigeria  and  the  World:  A  Growing 
Internal  Stabi 1 i ty,  Wealth  and  External  Influence"  (1975) ; James  Maya1 1,  "Oi 1 
and  Nigerian  Foreign  Policy"  (1976);  and  0.  Ogunbadejo,  "Nigeria  and  the  Great 
Powers:  The  Impact  of  the  Civil  Liar  on  Nigerian  Foreign  Relations"  (1976)  are 
examples  of  the  many  journal  articles  available  that  analyze  the  more  active 
period. 
Zambia  i s another  state  that  has  received considerable  attention  from 
scholars.  Her  location as  a  land-locked  state,  partially surrounded  by white- 
dominated  regimes,  and  her  border  position between  the  eastern  and  southern 
African  groupings  of  states  are  the  causes  of  this  attention.  President  Kuanda 
has  made  definite  efforts  to pull  his  country  away  from  the  influence  and 
domination  of  the  Republic  of South  Africa.  For  this  move  he  is cheered  by  some 
writers  but  condemned  for  half measures  by  others.  Two  major  books  are available: 
Richard  Hal 1,  The  Hi gh  Price  of Pri ncipl es :  Kaunda  and  the  Whi te  South  (1973) 
and  Jan  Pettman,  Zambia:  Security  and  Conflict  (1974).  The  Pettman  vol urne 
contains  an  extensive  bib1 iography.  Timothy  Shaw,  one  of  the contributors  in 
this collection  of  essays,  has  conducted  research  on  Zambia's  foreign policy. 
In his  "The  Foreign  Pol icy System  of  Zambia"  (1976)  he  examines  the  processes 
whereby  Zambian  policy  decisions  are  made.  In "The  Foreign  Policy  of Zambia: 
Ideology  and  Interests"  (1976)  he  discusses  the  relationships  between  the  national 
ideology  of  humanism  and  the content  of Zambia's  foreign  policy.  His  comprehen- 
sive  essay,  "Dependence  and  Underdevelopment:  The  Development  and  Foreign 
Pol icies  of  Zambia"  (1976)  relates Zambian  pol icies  to  the  dependent  position 
that  country  occupies  in the  international  economic  system.  Shaw  has  also  con- 
tri buted  an  essay  on  Zambia  to  the  volume  edited by  A1 uko  (1977).  The  essays  by 
Shaw  might  be  compared  with  the  views  expressed  in Marion  Bone,  "The  Foreign 
Policy  of  Zambia"  (1973).  Also  see  B.  V.  Mtshali,  "The  Zambian  Foreign  Service, 
1964-1972"  (1975)  and  Seidman  and  Seidman  (1978). 
Zambia's  attempts  to  break  away  from  South  African  domination  might  be 
compared  to  Malawi's  policy  of  accomnodation  with  her  white  neighbor  as  discussed 
in Carolyn  McMaster,  Malawi :  Foriegn  Pol icy and  Development  (1975).  Zambia 
and  Malawi,  as  well  as  Botswana,  Lesotho  and  Swaziland,  are  compared  in P. 
Wallensteen,  "Dealing  with  the  Devil:  Five African  States  and  South  Africa" 
(1971). 
Other  recent  case  studies  of  African  foreign  policies  include  Willie 
Henderson,  "Independent  Botswana:  A  Re-Appraisal  of  Forei gn  Pol icy Options" 
(1974);  R.T.  Libby,  "External  Co-optation  of a  Less  Developed  Country's  Policy- 
Making:  The  Case  of  Ghana,  1969-1972"  (1976)  William Minter,  "Major  Themes  in 
Mozambican  Foreign  Relations,  1975-1977"  (1978) ; J. J.  Okumu,  "Some  Thoughts  on 
Kenya's  Foreign  Policy"  (1973);  R.C.  Pratt,  "Foreign  Policy  Issues  and  the 
Emergence  of  Social ism  in Tanzania,  1961-8"  (1975) ; T.  Shaw,  "African  States 
and  International  Stratification:  The  Adaptive  Forei gn  Pol icy of Tanzania" 
(1974);  R.P.  Stevens,  "The  1972  Addis  Ababa  Agreement  and  the  Sudan's  Afro- 
Arab  Policy"  (1976);  and  Yashpal  Tandon,  "An  Analysis  of the  Foreign  Policy  of 
African  States:  A  Case  Study  of Uganda"  (1974). 
Comparative  Studies:  These  studies  draw  upon  the  experiences  of more  than 
one  state  in deriving conclusions.  Most  of  the  comparative  studies  listed here 
use  statistics  or  "quantification"  in making  more  explicit  the  comparisons  and 
relationships  they discuss.  However,  as  is clearly  shown  in the  following  excel- 
lent  essays,  quantification  is not  necessary  for  good  comparati ve  studies: 
T.  M.  Shaw,  "Discontinuities  and  Inequalities  in African  International  Relations" 
and  P.  Wallensteen,  "Dealing  with  the Devil:  Five African  States  and  South  Africa" 
(1975).  Shaw  argues  that  Africa  has  become  a  continent  of unequal  actors  and 
that  the  myth  of  equal  states  is now  unteneable.  Wallensteen  compares  Botswana, 
Lesotho,  Swazi land,  Ma1 awi  and  Zambia  and  their  relationships  with  South  Africa. 
Also  see  the  excellent  essay  V.B.  Khapoya,  "Determinants  of African  Support  for 
African Liberation  Movements :  A  Comparati ve  Analysis"  (1976). 
Patrick  J.  McGowan  is one  of  the  leading  proponents  and  practioners  of  the 
comparative  study  of  foreign  policy.  His  essay  in this  book  presents  his  argument 
in favor  of  the  comparative  method  and  describes  the  quantitative  data  set,  an 
"events"  data  set,  that  he  has  developed  for  this  purpose.  Barron Boyd's  essay 
in this  volume  uses  that  data  set.  Further  research  based  on  this  data  is pre- 
sented  in P.  J.  McGowan  and  K.  P.  Gottwald.  "Small  State  Foreign  Policies:  A 
Comparati ve  Study  of  Participation,  Confl ict,  and  Pol i tical  and  Economic  Dependence 
in Black  Africa"  (1975).  R.  Vengroff,  "Neo-colonial ism  and  Pol icy Outputs  in 
Africa"  (1 975)  tests  the  hypothesi s  that  decision  making  in African  governments 
is ci rcumscri bed  by  foreign  economic  domination  (neocol oni a1 ism) .  He  finds 
that  mil i tary  and  foreign  policies  are  subject  to external  control  and  con- 
cl udes  that  economic  development  and  pol i tical  independence  are  unobtainable 
goals  for  African  states. 
Two  comparative,  quantitative  studies  are  concerned  with  the  hypothesis 
that  domestic  instability  is related  to  foreign  policy  behavior,  but  both 
find  little support  for  the  relationship:  S.A.  Gitelson,  "Why  Do  Small  States 
Break  Diplomatic  Relations  with  Outside  Powers?  Lessons  from  the  African 
Experience"  (1974)  and  R.  Vengroff,  "Instability  and  Foreign  Policy  Behavior: 
Black  Africa  in the  UN"  (1976).  However,  Raymond  W.  Copson,  "Foreign  Pol icy 
Conflict  among  African  States,  1964-1969"  (1973),  finds  that  such  a  relation- 
ship  exists.  His  study  uses  an  events  data  set,  al though  not  the  set  developed 
by  McGowan.  These  results  should  be  compared  with  those  of  J .N.  Coll ins,  "Foreign 
Conflict Behavior  and  Domestic  Disorder  in Africa"  (1973)  and  Copson's  later 
essay,  "African  International  Pol i tics :  Underdevelopment  and  Confl i ct i n  the 
Seventies"  (1978). 
Other  comparati ve  studies  incl ude  A.H.M.  Ki rk-Greene,  "Diplomacy  and 
Diplomats:  The  Formation  of  Foreign Service  Cadres  in Black  Africa"  (1974) 
and  B.  W.  Tomlin  and  M.A.  Buhlman,  "Relative  Status  and  Foreign  Policy: 
Status  Partitioning and  the Analysis  of Relations  in Black  Africa"  (1977). 
Middle  East  Relations :  The  Middle  East  confl ict has  had  ramifications 
throughout  the  African  continent  and  there  has  been  active  competi tion  between 
Israel  and  the  Arab  states  for  African  diplomatic  support.  Z.  Cervenka,  "The 
Emergence  and  Si gni f i cance  of the  Afri can-Arab  Sol i dari ty"  (1 974)  suggests 
that  1973  marks  a  major  turning  point  in this  competition.  The  Organization 
of African Unity  (O.A.U.)  came  out  in favor  of the  Arabs  and  many  African 
states  followed  suit.  The  history of  these  changing  relations  is outlined 
in J.C.  Miller,  "African-Israeli  Relations:  Impact  on  Continental  Unity" 
(1975).  Two  studies  have  relied on  analysis  of African  votes  at the  United 
Idations  to  measure  changes  in African  policies.  Samuel  Decalo,  "Africa  and  the 
UN  Anti-Zionism  Resolution:  Roots  and  Causes"  (1976)  and  R.  Kochan,  S.A. 
Gitelson  and  E.  Dubeck,  "Black  African  UN  Voting  Behavior  on  the  Middle  East 
Conflict"  (1975)  both  argue  that  no  simple,  unicausal  explanation  of  the  African 
pol icy  shift  is satisfactory.  V.  J.  Be1 fig1 io,  "Israeli  Foreign  Aid  Proprams 
to Africa"  (1976)  claims  that  there  is a  single  cause  for  this  change;  he 
argues  that  Arab  petrodollars  have  bought  the  Africans.  Also  see  Michael 
Curtis  and  Susan  A.  Gi telson,  Israel  in the  Third  World  (1976)  and  E.P.  Skin- 
ner,  "African  States  and  Israel :  Uneasy  Relations  in a  World  of  Crises" 
(1975).  The  author  of the  last piece  is a  scholar  who  has  served  as  U.S. 
ambassador  to  Upper  Vol ta. 
Ali  A.  Mazrui,  "Black  Africa  and  the  Arabs"  (1975)  is an  outstanding 
essay  on  the  relationships  between  the  Arab  world  and  black  Africa.  He  states: 
Black  Africa  and  the  Arab  world  have  been  linked by  a 
fluctuating  pattern  of economic  and  cultural  connec- 
tions  for  at least  12  centuries.  In the secular  field 
the  Arabs  have  up  to  this  time  played  two  major  roles 
in black  Africa:  first as  accomplices  in African  en- 
slavement,  and  then  in the  twentieth  century  as  allies 
in African  1 iberation.  In the  past  several  years  they 
have  bui 1 t this  a1 1 iance  into a  comprehensive  pol i ti cal 
partnership,  aimed  at maintaining  a  solid front,  par- 
ticularly with regard  to the  Middle  East  and  Southern 
Africa.  The  critical  question  for  the  future  is 
whether  the Arabs  will  also  become  partners  in African 
development.  (p.  725). 
Two  books  provide extensive  coverage  of  the  history of  these  relationships: 
E.  C.  Chibwe,  Afro-Arab  Relations  in the  New  World Order  (1978)  and  Tareq 
Y.  Ismael,  The  U.A.R.  in Africa:  Egypt's  Policy  under  Nasser  (1971).  Brief- 
er analyses  of developments  in recent years  are  found  in A.  Akinsanya,  "The 
Afro-Arab  Alliance:  Dream or  Reality"  (1976);  A.  K.  Bakri , "The  Economic 
Factor  in African-Arab  Relations"  (1976/77) ; and  M.  A.  El-Khawas,  "African- 
Arab  Solidarity:  The  Emergence  of  a  New  A1 1 iance"  (1975). 
International  Organization  and  Integration:  There  are  at 1 east three 
aspects  of  international  organization which  are  of  great  importance  to  the 
study  of  African foreign  policy.  First,  for many  African  states,  especial- 
ly the  smaller  and  poorer  states,  a  very  large  proportion  of foreign  policy 
activity  is carried  out  at the United  Nations  and,  to a lesser  extent,  the 
O.A.U.  Second,  the  O.A.U.  plays  an  increasingly  important  role  in continen- 
tal  affairs  and  in the  development  of an  African  pol icy for  relations with 
the  outside world.  And,  third,  Africa  has  been  a  major  location of experi- 
mentation  with  regional  functional  and  pol i tical  uni ty  through  international 
organi za ti on. 
A  good  starting point  for  the  study  of  the  roles  of  international  orga- 
ni zation  in Africa  is Yassin  El-kyouty,  Africa  and  International  Organiza- 
tion  (1974).  Moses  E.  Akpan,  African  Goals  and  Diplomatic  Strategies  in the - 
United Nations  (1976)  presents  evidence  of the  way  in which  many  African 
states  use  the  U.N.  as  their  major  foreign  policy  instrument.  Also  see  Bissell 
(1977)  for  analysis  of  the  anti-apartheid  campaign  waged  by  African  states  at 
the  U.N.  Vengroff  (1976)  and  Kochan,  Gitelson  and  Dubek  (1975)  are  the  latest 
of  a  large  number  of  analyses  of  African  voting  in the  U.N. 
Interactions  and  the  division  of  labor  between  the  U.N.  and  the  O.A.U.  are 
considered  in Berhanykun  Andemicael , The  OAU  and  the  UN  (1975).  The  tenth  anni- 
versary  of  the  O.A.U.  in 1973  served  to  stimulate  the  publication  of  several 
studies  of  its effectiveness  and  its mode  of operation:  Z.  Cervenka,  The  Un- 
finished  Quest for  Unity:  Africa  and  the  OAU  (1977);  Yassin  El-Ayouty,  ed., 
The  Organization  of  African  Unity  after  Ten  Years  (1975);  and  M.  Wolfers,  Politics 
in the  OAU  (1976).  Col in Legum  presents  a  very  positive assessment  of  the  Orga- 
nization  in his  "The  Organization  of African  Unity:  Success  or  Failure?"  (1975). 
And,  specific  aspects  of  the  Organization's  activities  are  considered  in Z.  Cervenka, 
"Major  Policy  Shifts  in the  OAU"  (1974);  P.E.  Chartrand  (1975);  A.  0.  Chukwura, 
1975;  0.  C.  Eze,  "Prospects  for  International  Protection of Human  Rights  in Africa" 
(1974);  0.  S.  Kamanu,  "Secession  and  the  Light  to  Self-Determination:  An  OAU 
Dilemma"  (1974);  B.  David Meyers,  "Intraregional  Conflict Management  by  the  OAU" 
(1974);  D. Nworah,  "The  Integration  of the  Commission  for Technical  Co-operation 
in Africa  with  the  OAU:  The  Process  of  Merger  and  the  Problems  of  Institutional 
Rival ry and  Complementari ty"  (1976) ; and  James  H.  Pol hemus,  "The  Provisional 
Secretariat  of  the  OAU,  1963-1964"  (1974). 
For  further  references,  see  B.  David Meyers,  "The  Organization  of African 
Unity:  An  Annotated  Bi bl iography"  (1974) ; Ronald  K.  Nagel , "Documentary  Resources 
of  the  OAU"  (1970);  and  Skurnik  (1977),  Chapter  1. 
In addition  to  the organizations  at the  continental  or near-continental  level, 
there  have  been  numerous  attempts  to build at a  smaller  or  regional  level,  both 
in political  and  economic  affairs.  Some  impression  of the  number,  the  functional 
variety  and  the  political  implications  of  these  regional  experiments  can  be  gained 
with  a  glance  at the  four  volume  work  by  Louis  B.  Sohn,  African  Regional  Orga- 
nization:  History,  Literature and  Basic  Documents  (1971 ).  L.  K.  Mytelka,  "A 
Genealogy  of  Francophone  West  and  Equatorial  African  Regional  Organizations"  (1974) 
provides  such  an  insight  for  the  French-speakinq  states  of  the continent.  This 
essay  provides  brief  descriptions  of several  organizations,  a  substantial  bib1 io- 
graphy  and  an  analysis  of  the  problems  that  such  organizations  face  with  the  national 
se1 f-interest  of member  states  and  competi tion  between  the  members.  For  further 
analysis  of one  of the  organizations  Mytelka  considers,  see  W.  A.  Ndongko,  "Trade 
and  Development  Aspects  of the  Central  African  Customs  and  Economic  Union"  (1975). 
The  various  institutions  formed  by  three  East  African  states  -  Kenya, 
Tanzania  and  Uganda  -  have  been  subjected  to more  thorough  analysis  than  any 
of  the  other  regional  groupings  of  Africa.  As  described  by  J.  Gus  Liebenow 
in his  essay  in  this  book,  these  states  have  had  a  long  period  of  involvement 
in  and  an  usually  diverse  variety  of  regional  institutions.  For  some  years 
East  Africa  was  viewed  as  progressing  toward  political  as  we1 1  as  functional 
integration.  Recent  events  have  greatly  disappointed  observers.  In  addi tion 
to  Liebenow's  article,  see  Susan  A.  Gitelson,  "Can  the  United  Nations  Be  an 
Effective  Catalyst  for  Regional  Integration?  The  Case  of  the  East  African 
Comnuni ty"  (1 973) ; F.  I.  Ni  xson,  Economic  Integration  and  Industrial  Location: 
An  East  African  Case  Study  (1973); and  I.  Sharkansky  and  0.  L.  Doresang,  "Inter- 
national  Assistance:  Its  Variety,  Coordination,  and  Impact  among  Pub1 i.:  Corpora- 
tions  in  Kenya  and  the  East  African  Cormunity"  (1974). 
In  the  last  few  years,  attention  and  hopes  have  focused  on  West  Africa 
where  the  Economic  Communi ty  of  West  African  States  (ECOWAS)  has  formed  largely 
under  the  leadership  of  Nigeria.  tiowever,  ECOWAS  is  so  young  that  no  research 
on  it has  been  published.  Description  and  commentary  may  be  found  in  numerous 
notes  in  West  Africa  and  other current  events  journals  covering  African  events. 
Some  background  information  is  located  in  G.  C.  Abangwu,  "Systems  Approach  to 
Regional  Integration  in  West  Africa"  (1975) and  Adebayo  Adedeji , "Prospects  of 
Regional  Economic  Co-operation  in  West  Africa"  (1970). 
Many  analysts  studying  regional  integration  use  transactions  between  the 
states  being  considered  as  a  measure  of  integration  or  disintegration.  In  the 
African  case  such  measures  are  often  difficult  to  use  because  of  the  lack  of 
re1 iable  statistics on  legitimate  transactions  and  the  very  large  number  of 
i l legi tirnate  transactions.  For  one  aspect  of  the  former  problem  refer  to 
N.  Sudarkasa,  "Commercial  Migration  in  West  Africa,  with  Special  Reference  to 
the  Yoruba  in  Ghana"  (1974-1975).  Suggestive  of  the  importance  of  the  latter 
problem  is  3.  D.  Collins,  "The  Clandestine  Movement  of  Groundnuts  across  the 
Ni  ger-Ni geria  Boundary"  (1976). 
Underlying  the  activities  of  the  O.A.U.  and  of  the  various  regional  organi- 
zations  is a  widely  discussed  philosophy  of  African  unity,  a  belief  that  in  some 
way  at some  time  the  numerous  states  of  Africa  must  give  up  some  or  all  of  their 
sovereign  prerogatives  so  that  they  work  together  from  a  position  of  strength. 
This  plea  for  united  action is  put forth  in  Kwame  Nkrurnah,  Africa  Must  Unite  (1963). 
Colin  Leguv,  Pan-Africanism  (1965)  is  the  best  history  of  the  develooment  of  this 
philosophy.  A1 so  see  Adekunl e  Ajal a,  Pan-Africanism:  Evol ution, Progress  and 
Prospects  (1973)  and  P.O.  Esedebe,  "What  is Pan-Africanism?"  (1977).  Nkrumah's 
book  is a  politician's call  to  his  people  to  take  action,  but  R.  H.  Green  and 
Ann  Seidman,  scholars  influenced  by  Nkrurnah,  present  the  intellectual  case  to 
support  that  call  in their  important  book,  Unity  or Poverty?  The  Economics  of 
Pan-Africanism  (1 968). 
Further  references  to  this  subject  are  found  in A1 ice Hoover,  "Pan-Africanism: 
A  Selective  Bibliography"  (1971 )  and  "Pan-Africanism,  Unity,  and  Foreign  Pol icy ," 
chapter  1  of Skurni k  (1977). 
The  European  Economic  Corrmuni ty:  A  major  focus  of interaction  for  an  African 
state  is its  relations  with  the  former  colonial  power.  A special  aspect  of  this 
has  been  the  question  of  the appropriate  relationship  for  an  African  state  with 
the  European  Economic  Communi ty  (E.E.C.  ) .  In the  view  of some  politicians  and 
scholars,  association  between  an  African  state  and  the  E.E.C.  is valuable  to  the 
African  Country  because  it will  increase  trade,  aid and  overall  economic  develop- 
ment.  For  others,  however,  such  association  is seen  as  injurious  to  the  African 
state  because  it continues  African  dependence  upon  the  European  powers  and,  there- 
fore,  maintains  the  present  international  division of  labor  -  which  keeps  Africa 
at the  bottom of the  i nternational  economic  hierarchy.  Among  recent  scholarly 
essays  on  this  question  are  Adeoye  Akinsanya,  "The  European  Common  Market  and 
Africa"  (1976) ; E.  C.  Djamson,  The  Dynamics  of Euro-African  Co-operation  (1976) ; 
J.  Gal tung , "The  ~omc  and  Neo-Capi tal i srn"  (1976) ; R.  H.  Green,  "The 
~ome~~onvention:  Dependence  or  Departure toward  Collective  Self-Re1 iance?" 
(1 976) ; I.  V.  Gruhn,  "The  ~omg  :  Inching towards  Interdependence" 
(1976);  H.  Hveern  and  0.  K.  Hol the,  "EEC  and  the  Third  World"  (1972);  and  W.  A. 
Ndongko,  "From  Economic  Domination  to  Association:  Africa  in the  EEC"  (1976). 
Dependency  Theory  and  Neocolonial ism:  Some  instructors  teaching  African 
i nterna t-ional  re1 ati ons  have  abandoned  the  "probl em-oriented  approach"  and  have 
organized  their  course  around  some  theoretical  approach.  One  of the  most  popular 
of these  has  been  the  application  of systems  analysis  to  the  international  relations 
of  regions  of  the world  as  discussed  in I. William Zartman,  "Africa  as  a  Subordinate 
System  in International  Relations"  (1967)  and  in his  "Africa"  (1976).  Some  scholars 
have  begun  to  use  dependency  theory,  borrowed  to a  large  extent  from  the study  of 
Latin American  politics.  The  Grundy  and  Shaw  essays  in this  volume  rely  heavily 
on  this  conception.  A  key  essay  in the  introduction  of dependency  theory  to  the 
study  of African international  relations  is  "Dependence  in an  Interdependent  World: 
The  Limited  Possibilities of  Transformation  within  the  Capitalist World  Economy"  4 
(1974)  by  Immanuel  Wallerstein. 
The  dependency  theme  has  been  developed  by  a  number  of authors,  but Tim 
Shaw  has  perhaps  been  the  most  prolific of these.  His  articles  stress  the  irn- 
portant  interplay  between  African  international  (and  domestic)  politics and 
the  international  economic  order.  He  argbes  that  all  of  the  African  states 
are  linked  in a  dependent  relationship  to  the  large  capitalist  powers  of  the 
west.  Some  African  states  play  an  intermediate  role in this  relationship,  being 
exploited by  the  western  powers  but  exploiting,  in turn,  the  smaller  and  weaker 
states  surrounding  them.  This  theme  is developed  in his  "Kenya  and  South  Africa: 
' Subimperial ist States' "  (1977).  Also  see  Ken  Grundy,  "Intermediary  Power  and 
Global  Dependency:  The  Case  of  South  Africa"  (1976).  Other  authors  have  sug- 
gested  Nigeria,  Ivory  Coast  and  even  Zaire  as  players  of  this  intermediate  role. 
Shaw  (1975b)  and  Shaw,  "The  Pol i tical  Economy  of African  International 
Relations"  (1 975)  present  a  general  overview  of African  dependency.  The  latter 
essay  is the shorter  discussion. 
In T.  M.  Shaw  and  M.  J.  Grieve,  "The  Political  Economy  of Resources:  Africa's 
Future  in the  Global  Economy"  (1978)  the  authors  "analyze  Africa's  place  in the 
global  economy  -  paying particular  attention  to the  impact  of the  environment  on 
its development  prospects  - and  [they]  examine  different  projections  of its future 
problems  and  opportunities."  An  interesting companion  to  this essay  is Ronald 
Prain,  "Metals  and  Africa:  Economic  Power  in an  International  Setting"  (1978) 
in which  Africa's  mineral  wealth  is analyzed,  Africa's  importance  as  a  supplier 
of minerals  to  the  world  is assessed,  and  Africa's  potential  for  pol i tical -economic 
influence  is considered.  Also  see  Leslie  L.  Rood,  "Foreign  Investment  in African 
Development"  (1978). 
Chester  A.  Crocker,  "Military  Dependence:  The  Colonial  Legacy  in Africa"  (1974) 
P.  J.  McGowan  and  K.  P.  Gottwal d  (1975);  S.  M.  Smith,  "Economic  Dependence  and  Eco- 
nomic  Empiricism  in Black  Africa"  (1977);  and  R.  Vengroff  (1975)  are  recent explora- 
tions  of the  dependency  concept. 
Dependency  theory  suggests  that African  underdevelopment  is a  result of the 
structure  of the world  economy.  This  is related to  the  African  and  third world 
demand  that  there  be  a  new  international  economic  order.  Zdenek  Cervenka,  "Africa 
and  the  New  International  Economic  Order"  (1976)  and  J.  P.  Renninger,  "After  the 
Seventh  Special  General  Assembly  Session:  Africa  and  the  New  Emerging  World  Order" 
(1976)  discuss  this  demand.  I. W.  Zartman,  "Europe  and  Africa:  Decolonization  i 
or Dependency"  (1976)  in a  highly  controversial  article  argues  that  decoloni- 
zation  is a  slow  process,  but  a  process  that  is making  important  progress. 
African  countries  are  not  trapped  in a  permanent  state  of  dependency;  they  are 
working  their  way  out. 
The  Africa  Pol i cies  of  European,  Ameri can 
and  Asian  States 
For  most  of the  period  since  African states  gained  their  independence, 
countries  such  as  the  United States  and  the Soviet  Union  have  not  been  partic- 
ularly active  in the  development  of Africa  foreign  policies.  Britain,  France 
and  Belgium  -- the  ex-colonial  powers  -- were  thought  to  be  the  states  with  the 
greatest  interest  in the  continent  and  were,  therefore,  the  states  with well- 
developed  Africa policies.  The  cold war  encountered  Africa  only  in a peripheral 
way.  But  have  times  now  changed?  Viet  Nam  is over  and  the  Americans  are  seek- 
ing new  outlets  for their  energies.  The  Portuguese  have  given  up  their wars  in 
Angola  and  Mozambique  and  U.D.I.  in Rhodesia  is floundering;  all  of southern 
Africa  is in a  state of  change.  There  has  been  a  sudden  realization  in the  U.S.A. 
that  African  minerals  are  important  to  her economy.  And,  it appears  that  the 
Soviets  and  their  allies  have  become  more  interested  in African  affairs.  Now 
we  find many  states  developing  policies  for Africa. 
The  United States:  Recent  comprehensive  works  on  U.S.  Africa  pol icy  in- 
clude  four  books:  Frederick  S.  Arkhurst,  ed.,  U.S.  Policy  toward  Africa  (1975); 
Edward  W.  Chester,  Clash  of Titans:  Africa  and  U.S.  Foreign  Policy  (1973); 
Russel 1 Warren  Howe,  Along  the  Afric  Shore:  An  Historic  Review  of Two  Centuries 
of US  -  African  Relations  (1975);  and  P.  Will iarn  Yarborough,  Trial  in Africa: 
The  Failure  of  U.S.  Policy  (1976).  Strong  attacks  are  made  on  U.S.  policy either 
because  it is too  weak  and  is allowing  the  Soviets  to  dominate  the continent  or 
because  it is  too  supportive  of American  commercial  interests  and  thus  is involved 
in American  domination  of the continent.  See  Stewart  Smith,  U.S.  Neocolonialism  in 
Africa  (1975)  and  M.  Gurtov,  "Kennedy  and  Africa"  (1974)  for expressions  of the 
latter view.  American  policy  is bitterly  attacked by  the  Nigerian writer  Chinweizu 
in his  The  West  and  the  Rest  of Us  (1975). 
Relations  between  the  U.S.  and  specific  African states  are  considered  by  a 
number  of scholars.  The  bulk  of  such  attention  has  centered  on  American  policy 
toward  the  Republic  of South  Africa.  American  investments  in that state  are  considered 
to  be  supportive  of apartheid  in Dean  McHenry,  United States  Firms  in South  Africa  I 
(1975);  Ruth  First,  Jonathan  Steele  and  Christabel  Gurney,  The  South  Africa  Con- 
nection:  Western  Investment  in Apartheid  (1973);  and  Ann  Seidnan  and  Neva  Seid- 
man,  South  Africa  and  U.S.  Mu1 tinational  Corporations  (1976). 
Kissinger's  suggested  "tilt" in favor  of  the white  populations  of southern 
Africa  is analyzed  in M.  A.  El-Khawas  and  8.  Cohen,  eds.,  The  Kissinger  Study  of 
Southern  Africa:  National  Security  Study  Memorandum  39  (1976).  This  contains 
a  copy  of  that  famous  memo  as  well  as  analysis  of  the  Nixon/Ford  southern  Africa 
policies.  Anthony  Lake,  The  'Tar-Baby'  Option:  American  Policy  towards  Southern 
Rhodesia  (1976)  is an  equally  important analysis.  Two  other  studies  of bilateral 
relations  are  highly  critical  of  U.S.  policy.  Michael  Bowen  et a1 , Passinq by: 
The  United States  and  Genocide  in Burundi,  1972  (1973)  argues  that  a  d+fferent 
U.S.  stand  on  domestic  events  in Burundi  might  have  reduced  violence there. 
Stephen  R.  Weissman,  American  Foreign  Policy  in the  Congo,  1960-1964  (1974)  links 
the  class  origins  of American  pol icy makers  to  the  type  of policy that  emerges. 
The  U.S.  involvement  in the  Angolan  Civil  War  has  been  subjected  to  much  study, 
partly because  that  involvement  was  ill-advised  and  a  failure  but partly because 
it marked  the  beginning  of a  new  era  in U.S.  policy,  an  era  of more  active  par- 
ticipation  in Africa.  Colin  Legum  and  Tony  Hodges,  After  Angola:  The  War  over 
Southern  Africa  (1976);  Hodges,  "The  Struggle  for  Angola:  How  the  World  Powers 
Entered  a  War  in Africa"  (1976);  and  Legum,  "The  Soviet  Union,  China  and  the  West 
in Southern  Africa"  (1976)  analyze  the  compl icated interplay  of American,  Soviet, 
Chinese  and  South  African  interests  in the  Angolan  War.  The  U.S.  involvement 
is further  analyzed  in Ernest  Harsch  and  Tony  Thomas,  Angola:  The  Hidden  History 
of Washington's  War  (1976) ; M.  A.  El-Khawas,  "American  Invol vement  in Portuguese 
Africa:  The  Legacy  of the  Nixon  Years"  (1975);  and  J.  A.  Marcum,  "Lessons  of 
Angola"  (1976).  A  controversial  best-seller,  John  Stockwell,  In Search  of Enemies : 
A  CIA  Story  (1978),  is a  discussion  by  one  of the  participants  of the  C.  I .A.  role 
in the  American  involvement  in Angola.  The  Assistant  Secretary  of State  for African 
Affairs  at  that  time  was  Nathaniel  Davis.  He  presents  his  insights  in "The  Angola 
Decision:  A  Personal  Memi r"  (1978). 
M.  A.  El-Khawas  and  F.  A.  Kornegay,  eds.,  American-Southern  African  Relations : 
Bi bl iographic  Essays  (1975)  provides  further  references  on  this  important  aspect 
of  foreign  pol icy. 
American  foreign  policy  is often  described as  being  highly  influenced  by 
ethnic  groups,  as  for example  with  respect  to  Israel.  The  biggest  ethnic  group  in 
the  country  is its black  population,  yet  until  recently  this  group  has  played  only 
a minor  role  as  an  influence  on  policy-making.  Three  works  describe  and  attempt 
to  explain  recent  changes  in that role:  M.  D.  Morris,  "Black  Americans  and  the 
Foreign  Pol icy  Process:  The  Case  of Africa"  (1972);  Abdul  Aziz  Said,  ed.,  Ethnici ty 
and  U.S.  Foreign  Policy  (1977);  and  R.  Wilkins,  "What  Africa  Means  to  Blacks"  (1974). - 
The  USSR:  Have  the  Soviets  decided  to  make  major  investments  of  their  time 
and  energy  in Africa?  Do  they  wish  to  dominate  the  area  and  move  it into their 
sphere  of  interest?  Do  they wish  to  convert  Africa  to  Communism?  Or  do  they 
see  Africa  as  an  opportunity  to  cause  great  disarray  in the  western  bloc  at a 
low  cost  to  themselves?  Or are  they  simply  a benevolent  people  who  are  willing 
to  offer  their  assistance  without  strings  or  ulterior motives  to  those  in need? 
Such  questions,  written  perhaps  in a  more  sophisticated manner,  underlie  much  of 
the  analysis  and  description  of Soviet  policy  for Africa. 
Edward  Wilson,  Russia  and  Black  Africa  before  World  War  11  (1973)  presents 
clear  evidence  that  Russian  and  Soviet  interest  in the  continent  has  existed  for 
many  years.  The  most  complete  analysis  for  the  present  era  is Christopher  Stevens, 
The  Soviet  Union  and  Black  Africa  (1976).  Stevens  discusses  political,  economic 
and  military  relations  between  1953  and  1972.  He  gives  special  attention  to 
bilateral  relations  with  Guinea,  Mali,  Kenya,  Ghana  and  Nigeria.  For  the  Soviet 
view,  refer  to  I.  D.  Ovsgany,  A Study  of Soviet  Foreign  Policy  (1975),  especially 
Chapter  111,  "The  Soviet  Union  and  the  Developing  States."  A distinctly  different 
view,  that  of  a  Soviet  plot to  dominate  Africa,  is presented  in Jan  A.  du  Plessis, 
"The  Soviet  Union's  Foreign  Policy  towards  Africa"  (1974);  A.  Z.  Rubinstein,  "The 
Soviet Union's  Imperial  Game  in Africa"  (1977) ; and  Walter  F.  Hahn  and  Alvin  J. 
Cottrell,  Soviet  Shadow  over  Africa  (1976).  The  first two  items  appear  in South 
African  publications;  South  Africa  stresses  the  comnunist  threat  to Africa  in an 
effort  to  maintai n  western  support  for  South  African  domestic  and  international 
policies.  This  argument  is vividly  stated  in G.  Poser,  "Soviet  Sea  Power,  Southern 
Africa  and  World  Equil ibrium"  (1976). 
As  in the  case  of  the  U.S.A.,  the  Angolan  Civil  War  marks  an  apparent  change 
in Soviet  policy.  C.  Stevens,  "The  Soviet  Union  and  Angola"  (1976)  considers 
Soviet  participation  in the  Angolan  War  as  a benchmark  in the  history  of Soviet 
African  policy.  For  further  analysis  see  Legurn  (1976),  Hodges  (1976);  and  Legum 
and  Hodges  (1976).  William  E.  Griffith,  "Soviet  Policy  in Africa  and  Latin America: 
The  Cuban  Connection"  (1975)  argues  that  Soviet  success  in Angola  may  suggest 
further  Soviet  successes  in southern  Africa,  but  it does  not  suggest  overall  success 
in third world  ventures  for  them. 
Nigerian-Soviet  relations  have  received  attention,  especial ly by  Nigerian 
authors:  0.  Aluko,  "Nigeria  and  the  Superpowers"  (1976);  0.  J.  6.  Ojo,  "Nigeria- 
Soviet  Relations"  (1976);  0.  Igho  Natufe,  "Nigeria  and  Soviet  Attitudes  to  African 
Military  Regimes,  1965-1970"  (1976) ; and  Ogunbadejo  (1976).  In his  most  recent 
essay,  " Ideology  and  Pragmatism:  The  Soviet  Role  in Nigeria,  1960-1977,"  (1 978) 
Ogunbadejo  describes  pos t-Stal i nist Soviet pol icy as  "pragmatic"  as  opposed  to 
its previous  doctrinaire  ri gi di ty.  It was  this  pragmatic  character  that  opened 
the  way  for  Soviet  involvement  in the  Nigerian  civil  war. 
Other analyses  of  Soviet  relations with  particular African  states  include 
H.  Malcolm  Kerr,  "Soviet  Influence  in Egypt,  1967-73"  (1976);  B.  Nimer,  "The 
Congo  in Soviet  Policy"  (1973);  and  C.  Stevens,  "In  Search  of  the  Economic  Kingdom: 
The  Development  of  Economic  Relations  between  Ghana  and  the  U.S.S.R."  ('974). 
A1 though  most  of  the  1 i terature  is concerned  with  Soviet  political  re? ztions, 
there are  additional  studies  of economic  relations.  Warren  Weinstein,  ed., 
Chinese  and  Soviet  Aid  to Africa  (1975)  and  U.S.,  Central  Intelligence Agency, 
Communist  Aid  to  Less  Developed  Countries  of  the  Free  World  (1976)  present  useful 
data  and  comparative  analyses.  The  broader  view  of  Soviet  economic  policies  can 
be  found  in several  of the  essays  in Roger  E.  Kanet  and  Donna  Bahry,  eds.,  Soviet 
Economic  and  Pol i tical  Relations  with  the  Developing  World  (1975). 
Most  of the  references  ment;oned  above  conclude  that  the Soviet  Union  is be-  d 
having  like any  other  great world  power  in its African  policy.  For  the  most 
recent  analyses  see  the  articles  by  D.  E.  Albright  and  Colin  Legum  in the  January 
1978  issue  of Problems  of Communism.  The  Albright  essay,  "Soviet  Pol icy,"  describes 
the  "priorities, general  approach,  objectives  and  operating  style that  have  shaped 
Soviet pol icy  in the  recent period.  "  Legum,  "The  African  Environment"  analyzes 
changes  in African  attitudes  toward  the  U.S.S.R.  in recent years. 
The  People's  Republic  of  China:  As  suggested  by  Robert  Legvold,  "Soviet  and 
Chinese  Influence  in Africa"  (1976)  there  is at least  as  much  competition  between 
the  Soviets  and  the  Chinese  as  between  the  Soviets  and  the  Americans.  Indeed, 
in recent years  there  has  been  a  marked  correlation  between  American  and  Chinese 
goals  and  tactics  in offsetting  the  growth  of Soviet  influence in Africa.  George 
T.  Yu,  "China's  Impact"  (1978)  "examines  the nature  of  Sino-Soviet  rivalry on  the 
continent  and  its imp1 ications  for  Soviet-African  relations. "  Also  relevant  is 
George  Ginsburgs,  "The  Soviet  View  of Chinese  Influence  in Africa  and  Latin America"  I 
(1976). 
There  are  several  comprehensive  studies  of China's  pol icy.  Among  these  are 
Alan  Hutchison,  China's  African  Rev01 ution  (1975),  which  claims  that  China's 
goal  is not  power  or  the  export  of  rev01 ution;  it is simply  a  desire  for  friend- 
ship.  Alaba  Ogunsanwo,  China's  Pol icy  in Africa,  1956-1971  (1974)  argues  that 
China's  Africa  policy  is a  product  of  her  competition  with  the  U.S.A.  and  the 
U.S.S.R.  She  wishes  to  further  international  strategic interests  in Africa. 
The  variety  of  apparent  contradictions  in Chinese  policy  are  made  more  coherent 
in Bruce  D.  Larkin,  China  and  Africa,  1949-1970  (1971 ).  Two  briefer  general 
views  are  presented  in M.  A.  El-Khawas,  "The  Development  of China's  Foreign 
Pol icy  toward  Africa,  1955-1 972"  (1973)  and  Po-t'ang  Yeh,  "Peipi ng's  Pol icy 
towards  Africa  as  Viewed  from the  Independence  of  Guinea-Bissau  and  Mozambique" 
(1974). 
Although  China  has  formal  and  informal  relatiqnships  with  many  African  states, 
her  attention  has  focused  on  Tanzania.  George  T.  Yu,  China's  African Policy:  A 
Study  of  Tanzania  (1975)  is the  most  complete  study  of this  unusually  firm bilateral 
relationship.  The  major  symbol  of  this  friendship,  the  important  Tanzara  Railroad 
between  the  Tanzanian  coast  and  Zarnbia,is  considered  in Richard  Hall,  The  Great 
Uhuru  Rai lway:  Chi na ' s  Showpiece  in Africa  (1 976).  A  thorough  description  of 
Chinese  foreign  aid projects  is available  in Wolfgang  Bartke,  China's  Economic  Aid 
(1975).  This  catalog  of Chinese  aid includes  forty-six  country  surveys. 
Other  Powers:  There  is surprisingly  1 i ttle  recent  pub1 ication  in Engl i sh 
about  the  Africa  policies  of either  the  former  colonial  powers  -  Britain,  France, 
Belgium,  Portugal  and  Spain  -  or  of  other  non-major  powers. 
British economic  aid programs  in southern  Africa  are  discussed  in David 
Jones,  Aid  and  Development  in Southern  Africa:  British Aid  to  Botswana,  Lesotho 
and  Swaziland  (1977)  and  Kathryn  Morton,  hid and  Dependence:  British Aid  to 
Malawi  (1975).  A  useful  companion  to  these  is the  study  by  Leon  Gordenker,  Inter- 
national  Aid  and  National  Decisions :  Development  Programs  in Malawi,  Tanzania, 
and  Zambia  (1976).  The  author  examines  the  manner  in which  aid-gi ving  organi zations 
exert  influence on  recipient  states. 
W.  A.  Ajibola,  "The  British  Par1 iament  and  Forei gn-Pol icy Making:  A  Case  Study 
of Britain's  Policy  toward  the Nigerian  Civil  War"  (1974)  is more  a study  of the 
British  foreign  policy  process  than  it is a  study  of  British Africa  policy.  K. 
Maxey,  "Labour  and  the  Rhodesian  Si tuation"  (1976)  analyzes  Harold Wilson's  decision 
to  take  only  weak  action  when  Rhodesian  whites  declared  independence. 
Other  ex-colonial  powers  are  discussed  in E.  de  Sousa  Ferreira,  "Portugal  and 
her  Former  African  Colonies :  Prospects  For  a Neo-colonial  Relationship"  (1975) ; 
W.  R.  Pendergast,  "French  Cultural  Relations"  (1974) ; and  W.  Weinstein,  "The  I 
Limits  of Mi 1 i tary  Dependency:  The  Case  of Be1 gian  Mil i tary  Aid  to  Burundi,  1961- 
1973"  (1 975). 
R.  0. Matthews,  "Canada's  Relations  with  Africa"  (1975)  reviews  the  history 
of  Canadian  pol icy  since  1945.  Matthews  and  D.  G.  Anglin  have  publ ished  several  1 
articles  in the past  ten  years  analyzing  Canadian  Africa  policies.  Brazil,  a 
state  with  trade  ties to  Africa  as  we1 1 as  ties  as  a  Portuguese-speaking  state 
and  a  major  recipient  of  slaves  in an  earlier  period,  is thought  by  some  observers 
to  view  Africa  as  a  potential  area  for  the  expansion  of Brazilian  influence. 
Aspects  of  this  are  discussed  in W.  A.  Selcher,  "Brazilian  Relations  with  Portu- 
guese  Africa  in the  Context  of  the  Elusive  ' Luso-Brazi 1 ian  Comnuni ty"'  (1976). 
Selcher  points out  the  difficulty  that  is caused  by  Brazil's  friendship  with 
South  Africa.  There  is also  a  growing  relationship  between  Nigeria  and  tirz?il, 
but  this  has  as  yet  not  been  analyzed  in any  scholarly  work. 
Other  non-colonial  powers  are  considered  in R.  A.  Higgot,  "Rhetoric  and 
Reality:  Austral ia's  African  Relations  under  Labour"  (1976) ; Richard  Thompson 
(1976);  and  Dieter  Bielenstein,  ed.,  Perspectives  in Afro-German  Relations  (1975). 
This  essay  has  reviewed only  a  small  proportion  of  the  publ ished  i tems  3 
available  for  the study  of  African  politics.  We  have  limited ourselves  to  recent 
publications  in the English  language.  Yet,  even  with  these  limitations,  certain 
generalizations  can  be  made.  To  a  large  extent,  the  literature  is descriptive 
and  prescriptive.  It tells  us  what  things  do  look  like or what  they  should  look 
1 i ke.  But,  very  few  publ ications  are  analytical.  Too,  very  few  studies  are  com- 
parative;  the  majority  of publications  are  based  upon  single  case  studies. 
There  is also  a  wide  variety  of subjects  that  have  not  received  very  much 
consideration.  For  examples,  we  know  very  little about  the  way  in which  foreign 
policies  are  formulated  in African  states.  And,  we  have  little knowledge  about  the 
foreign  pol icy attitudes  of  either  the African  elites  or  the  masses.  Too,  there 
has  been  only  very  1 imi ted  research  on  the  1 inkages  between  domestic  and  international 
politics  in Africa.  And,  there  is only  a  limited amount  of  publication on.  the 
South  Africa policies  of African  states.  Some  data  on  the  rhetoric  of  such  policies 
is easily  obtainable,  but with  the  exception  of  a  few  studies  of the  "front-1 ine" 
states,  1 i ttle has  been  done  on  the  reality of  such  policies. 
These  are  only  a  few  of  the  weaknesses  and  lacunae  in the  scholarly  production 
on  African  international relations.  But  one  can  clearly  see  that  there  remains 
much  research,  debate  and  writing  to be  done. 
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DEPENDENCE  OR  I NTERDEPENDENCE : 
AFRICA  IN THE  GLOBAL  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
Timothy  M.  Shaw,  Dal housie  University 
M.  Catharine  Newbury,  Wesleyan  Uni versi ty 
The  international  relations  and  foreign  pol icies  of African  states are 
becoming  more  complex  and  controversial.  Their  complexity  relates  to  increases 
in the  number  of  actors  and  issues  in contemporary  world  politicsl  and  the 
di versi ty  of  interests  that  emerge  as  societies  develop.  The  controversy  arises 
from  different definitions  of  international  pol i tics and  foreign  re1 ations 
and  from  contrasting  perspectives  on  the nature  of national  independence. 
Through  attempting  to  describe  and  explain  such  complexities  and  controversies, 
this  chapter  will  examine  Africa's  place  in world  politics and  in the  global 
pol i ti cal  economy. 
The  complexity  of  Africa's  participation  in international  affairs  is 
twofold.  Firstly,  African  states  have  to  deal  with  a  much  longer  agenda  of 
issues  and  a wider  set  of  actors  than  have  existed  before.  Indeed,  Africa 
and  other  Third  World  states  have  contributed  to  both of these  phenomena: 
worl d  pol i tics  is now  concerned  with  questions  of development  and  inequal i ty 
as  we1 1 as  with  war  and  peace;  world  politics now  includes  a  vast  range  of 
actors--national  and  international,  transnational  and  regional .2  These 
phenomena  are,  of course,  interrelated:  new  states  have  drawn  attention  to 
their own  problems  and  perspectives  and  have  proceeded  to create  new  insti- 
tutions  and  forum  in which  to  present  them.  They  have  insisted that  their 
dominant  concerns  are  economic  and  political  rather  than  strategic  or  ideo- 
logical ; for  them,  exchange  rather  than  war  is "high  ~ol  Africa  con- 
sti tutes a  majority  of the  new  states  and  a  third of  the  votes  in the  United 
Nations  (UN)  system;  it has  advanced  demands  from  the  poor  for  a  new  and 
more  equitable  world  order.  The  international  system,  then,  has  become  more 
diverse  both  in terms  of actors  and  issues  because  of Africa's  participation. 
The  second  aspect  of  the  new  complexity  is internal,  within African 
countries,  and  relates  to  the  making  of foreign  policy.  The  response  of 
African  states  to world  politics  involves  a  range  of  interests  and  insti- 
tutions,  both  national  and  continental.  As  Africa  develops,  so  its social 
structure  becomes  more  complex;  the  unity  of the  nationalist  period  is 
yielding  to  more  specia7ized  and  stratified societies  in which  ethnici ty 
and  race,  region  and  religion,  education  and  profession  produce  a  variety 
of  institutions  and  interests.  The  making  of  foreign  policy  is rarely  open 
in any  state,  but  despite  its exclusiveness,  it is usually  subject  to  some 
pressures.  In Africa,  foreign  policy  is no  longer  the  preserve  of  presidents; 
rather,  a  range  of ministries,  parastatal s  and  interest  groups  affect external 
relations.  Outside  pressures  are  a1 so  ingredients  in foreign  pol icy-making; 
such  external  relations  and  demands  are  particularly  salient  for  new,  weak 
and  poor  countries .4 
Foreign  pol icy  is a  response  to  world  pol i tics ; but  no  state  can  ex- 
cl ude  external  interests  in its own  deci sion-rnaki ng.  Moreover,  any  expression 
of  the  "national "  interest  involves  bargaining  among  several  domestic  actors. 
So  both  the  internal  and  international  aspects  of contemporary  world  pol i tics 
are  complex.  However,  the  complexities  should  not  divert attention  from  a 
few  basic  relationships,  especial ly the  balance  between  internal  and  external 
forces.  The  1 i nkages  between  these  are  important  in understanding Africa ' s 
international  posi ti on.  The  analysis  of  independence,  interdependence  and 
dependence--of  the  proportion  of  domestic  and  foreign  factors--rai ses  questions 
of  perceptions  and  controversy.  These  are  unavoidable  in any  effort to  explain 
behavior,  particularly  when  issues  of  national  security  and  development  are 
involved.  Nevertheless,  in an  attempt  to  go  beyond  description  alone,  we 
turn  first  to  the nature  of formal  independence  in Africa.  This  is a  fundamental 
point  in the  analysis  of African foreign  policies;  a  degree  of autonomy  and 
power  are  essential  in responding  to  international  relations,  especially  if 
a  state  seeks  to  change  its external  environment. 
Pol i ti cal  Economy  of  Independence 
Two  very  di f ferent  perspecti ves  have  been  i denti fi ed  and  used  through 
which  to examine  and  explain  Africa's  position  in world  politics:  the  dependency 
and  the  decoloni zation  approaches.  The  latter  view  emphasizes  change  rather 
than  conti nui ty,  choices  rather  than  constraints,  symbol s  instead  of  structures, 
and  ideal s  not economics;  i t is based  on  the  prerni se  that  formal  independence 
leads  to  real  power  to  act  in the  international  system.  By  contrast,  the 
more  cri tical  dependence  approach  suggests  that  pol i ti cal  and  legal  independence 
does  not  by  itself produce  a  new  political  economy;  it indicates  instead  that 
internal  underdevelopment  and  external  dependence  have  been  perpetuated  despite 
any  appearances  to  the  contrary .  The  decoloni zation  perspecti ve  imp1 ies 
that  the  foreign  policies  of  African  states  are  true  reflections  of  their 
new  national  interests  and  that  they  are  sufficiently  independent  to  make 
thei r own  decisions.  But  the  dependence  approach  suggests  that  gi ven  Afri ca 's 
subordinate  place  in the  international  hierarchy,  its forei gn  pol i cies  are 
largely  determined  by  external  forces  and  tend  to  advance  such  interests. 
Decolonization  implies,  then,  an  evolution  towards  a  new  pattern of  relations 
between  Afri ca  and  the  powers ; dependency,  however,  suggests  that  gi ven 
established  inequalities  any  reduction  in inequality  is unl ikely.  These  two 
distinct modes  of  analysis  have  profound  implications  for  the  way  we  see 
African  foreign  pol icy choices  and  for  the  assumptions  with  which  African 
statesmen  face  the  world. 
The  contradictions  suggested  by  these  two  approaches  may  be  resol ved 
in part  by  making  distinctions  between  pol icy and  practice  and  by  recognizing 
several  different  issue  areas  and  levels  of  interaction.  Firstly,  Africa's 
ideologies  of national ism  and  PanAfricanism,  non-a1 i gnment  and  sel f-re1 iance 
are  responses  to  its inheritance  of  dependence  and  underdevelopment.  If we 
examine  only  rhetoric  and  declarations,  then  Africa  would  indeed seem  to enjoy 
the  fruits of  independence.  If, however,  we  also  analyze  its external  economic 
and  strategic  relations,  a rather  different  and  much  less  autonomous  image 
emerges.  This  relates  to  the  second  point,  that  of  issue  areas.  African 
states  display  a1 1  the  trappings  of  independence  in the diplomatic  issue 
area--they  establ ish overseas  missions,  participate  in the  UN,  and  bring 
pressure  to  bear  through  the  Third  World  coalition.  Yet  in the  economic, 
strategic  and  social  spheres  they  are  dependent  and  even  penetrated;  they 
are  characteristical ly vulnerable  to external  economic  fluctuations,  strategic 
demands  and  social  changes.  So  Africa's  apparent  pol i ti cal  decoloni zation 
may  be  contrasted  with  its dependence  in other  issue  areas,  particularly  those 
that  i nvol ve  the  great  powers. 
African  states  interact  at several  levels--wi th  their  neighbors,  in the 
continental  system,  and  in the wider  world  system.  Within  Africa  there  appears 
to  be  a  greater  degree  of equality  and  autonomy  among  actors  than  in the  global 
sys tem.  In the  latter,  inequal i ties  and  asymmetri es  are  substantial,  with 
African  states  being  concentrated  at the  lower  end  of  the  hierarchy.  This 
i nterna ti onal  dependence  stands  in contrast  to  continental  interdependence. 
In addition  to  i ts  es tab1 i shed  geographic  and  raci a1  identity , Africa 
has  its own  regional  organization  and  law,  but  it continues  to  be  dependent 
on  economic  and  military exchange  with  the  world  pol i tical  economy.  So  al- 
though  Africa  has  recaptured  its political  independence,  its autonomy  is stil l 
1 irni ted  by  continued  dependence  on  extern31  trade  and  investment,  ski 11 s  and 
technology,  arms  and  assistance.  There  is thus  a  basic  discontinuity  between 
con ti nen tal  diploma ti c  interdependence  and  global  economi c  dependence.  As 
the  1 eading  African  student  of  continental  affai rs  has  observed,  African 
diplomatic  thought  distinguishes  between  two  forms  of  supranationalism: 
firstly,  continental  supranational i ty  in pol i tics  and,  secondly,  global 
supranationality  in economics.6 
A1 though  the  primary  actor  in the  African  international  system  is still 
the  state,  the  number  of non-s tate  actors  has  increased  rapidly  since  independence 
These  now  cover  a  range  of  issues  and  functions  and  collectively  create the 
potential  for  greater  African  autonomy,  particularly  if dupl icati ve  extra- 
African  1 inks  are  reduced.  The  most  infl uential African  organizations are 
economic  or  political  in function,  one  indication of the  imperatives  of 
development  and  control.  They  are  concentrated  at the continental  level, 
but  the  mos t-devel oped  organizations  exist  at the  subcontinental , regional 
level.  There  are  some  thirty  continental  organi zations  in the  OAU/Economic 
Comrni ssion  for Africa  (ECA)  system,  i ncl udi ng  the  African  Development  Bank 
and  Fund,  the  Association  of African  Central  Banks,  the  Association  of African 
Ai rways,  and  the  Inter-African  Coffee  Organization,  and  another  seventy  concerned 
with  social  issues,  such  as  the  All-African  Conference  of  Churches,  the  Supreme 
Council  for  Sport  in Africa,  the  Association  of African  Universities,  and 
the  All-Africa  Trade  Union  Federation.  A  complex  set  of relations  exists 
among  this  range  of  actors:  that  is,  between  the  UN,  its specialized  agencies, 
the  OAU,  regional  organizations  in Africa,  and  African  States.  They  exchange 
support  proposals  and  are attempting  to  define  their  respective  roles  in order 
to  increase  thei r mutual  compati bi 1 i ty . 
In addi tion  to  interstate  organi zations  there are  also  important  trans- 
national  institutions  on  the continent.  In pre-colonial  Africa,  traders, 
missionaries,  and  explorers  affected international  relations ; in colonial 
Africa,  metropol i tan  admini strations  and  companies  were  dominant;  and  in con- 
temporary  Africa,  a  rich  variety  of  transnational  actors,  from  mu1 tinational 
corporations  to  professional  associations , are  acti ve  in  the continental 
system.  So  the  mixed-actor  system  is  not  new  to  Africa;  its  diversity  and 
complexity,  however,  have  evolved  over  time.'  Thus  the  structure  of  the 
African  international  system  has  developed  from  a  1 imi ted  number  of  essential ly 
bilateral  relations  into  a  complex  web  of  bilateral  and  multilateral  ties. 
Relations  between  traditional  African  nations  were  direct,  1 imi ted,  and  bi lateral . 
In  the  interregnum  of  the  colonial  period  they  became  more  formal,  extensive, 
and  multilateral.  In  contemporary  Africa  they  are  frequent,  extensive,  in- 
formal,  and  mu1 tilateral,  invol ving  both  state  and  other  actors.  The  impact 
of  the  latter  on  African  development  is  ambiguous;  some  advance  and  some 
erode  African  unity  and  autonomy. 
African  norms  have  developed  para1 1 el  to  these  insti tutional  changes. 
Traditional  rulers  were  concerned  with  their  sovereignty  in  the  face  of  external 
threats.  Colonial ism  confronted  African  val ues  and  stimulated  the  development 
of  nationalism  and  PanAfricanism.  Independent  Africa  has  created  PanAfrican 
institutions  and  norms  which  combine  traditional  values  with  contemporary 
imperati ves.  African  regional  1 aw  is especial ly  concerned  with  the  protection 
of  national  sovereignty,  mediation  of  disputes,  treatment  of  refugees,  and 
liberation  of  the  continenL8  The  international  personality  of  African  states 
was  tenuous  unti 1  the  achievement  of  independence,  but  nonetheless  existed 
in  precolonial  times;  it is now  unquestioned  in  world  politics,  although 
in  the  future  it may  have  an  increasing  number  of  faces. 
International  relations  in  Africa  have  always  been  largely  intergovern- 
mental ; they  have  invol vec  national  el i tes , 1 ocated  in  major  urban  areas. 
They  cont.ivue to  be  mainly  'official '  and  to  involve  few  people  other  than 
political  ard  administrative  cadres,  although  institutions  such  as  the  Black 
Cultural  Festivals,  All-Africa  Games,  and  All-Africa  Trade  Fairs  may  widen 
the  interaction  of  some  individual  Africans  with  each  other.  The  cause  of 
African  unity  is  now  being  championed  by  a  mu1 tiplici ty  of  regional  and 
continental  organizations.  Their  goals,  however,  are  essentially  conser- 
vative  in  that  they  serve  to  support,  not erode,  national  sovereignty. 
For  example,  the  OAU  tends  to  advance  the  interests  of  regimes.  It has 
recogni zed  neither  secessions  nor  changes  in  colonial  borders;  it regulates 
inter-state  relations,  but  does  not  necessarily  advance  the  interests  of  the 
African  people. 
The  OAU  system  does,  however,  express  Africa's  racial  identity  in  world 
pol i tics and  encourages  the  i ntra-African  resol ution  of  di sputes.  PanAfri cani srn 
is expressed  in the notions  of  "we  are  all  Africans"  and  "try Africa  first/"' 
Africa  is still  ambivalent  about  the  acceptability  of  global  norms  and  insti- 
tutions;  whilst  it uses  its voting strength  at the United  Nations  to make 
demands  on  the  international  system,  at the  same  time  it has  attempted  to 
increase  its continental  juri sdi ction  over  African  affairs.  It seeks  support 
and  assistance  from  the United  Nations  system;  but  it also  encourages  the 
peaceful  settlement  of  local  disputes  through  continental  institutions  rather 
than  in the  Security  Counci 1. 
The  OAU  has  helped  to normalize  relations  after  border,  internal,  or 
ideological  disputes,  but  has  insufficient  authority  to  remove  the  causes 
of  tensions.  Consensus  is reflected in the  encouragement  of  "good  nei~j- 
borliness"  among  a  variety  of African  states,  but  the  OAU  has  been  permis- 
sive  about  coups  and  domestic  violence  in Africa. 10 
The  in ormality  of the African  state  system  stands  in contrast  to both 
imperial  relations  and  contemporary  world  politics.  Diplomatic  initiatives 
or  disputes  are  often  the  responsibility of influential  leaders  in Africa; 
their  pol icies  or agreements  are  later  recognized and  legitimized by  the  OAU, 
which  has  only  a  small  secretariat  and  budget.  The  OAU  system  can  bring about 
rapprochement,  but  is incapable  of mounting  sustained  peacekeeping operations. 
Its approach  to  consensus  and  conci 1 iation  revi ves  pre-colonial  attitudes  of 
compromi se  and  coexistence.  To  date,  however,  regional  and  continental 
initiatives  for  cooperation  in the  economic  and  strategic  issue  areas  have 
been  less  successful  than  those  concerning  less sal ient diplomatic  or cultural 
questions. 
The  independence  of African  states  has  been,  then,  1 imi ted  by  relationships 
of  both  dependence  and  i nterdependence.  Despite  the characteris tic adoption 
of pol icies  of African  social ism and  self-reliance,  these  nations  are  still 
dependent  on  foreign  trade  and  capital , external  support  and  materiel .  They 
are  a1 so  increasingly  interdependent  i n the  African  system,  as  reflected  by 
participation  in regional  and  continental  organizations  and,  through  col lecti ve 
diplomacy,  in world  politics.  African  states  respond  to these  two  types  of 
constraint  in distinctive  ways ; economic  dependence  is generally  resented  as 
a  form  of neocol oni a1 i sm  whereas  diplomatic  interdependence  is encouraged  as 
an  expression  of PanAfricanism.  Most  regimes  accept  interdependence  but 
reject  dependence,  at least at the  level  of ideology.  However,  the continuation 
of  the  dependence  of  African  states--i n  practice  and  pol icy--affects  progress 
towards  interdependence  on  the  conti nen t. 
Dependence  has  begun  to  be  modi fied  by  some  countries  through  di vers i fyi ng 
production  and  partners  and  by  adopting  the  "parastatal  strategy"  of partial 
state  ownership. 11  On  a  continental  scale,  African  dependence  on  external  trade 
and  capital  is being challenged  by  the  development  of  intra-African  exchange 
and  by  the  collective  bargaining  strategies  adopted  by  African  states  in 
mu1 ti lateral  institutions  such  as  the  European  Economic  Communi ty  (EEC)  and 
the  United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development  (UNCTAD) .  The  character- 
istic  "verti cal"  pattern  of  trade  and  communications  between  African states 
and  Europe  is being  supplemented  and  modified  by  the  development  of  a  "horizontal" 
continental  exchange  and  infrastructure.  For  example,  the  ECA,  in association 
with  regional  organi zations,  is advancing  intra-African  trade  and  communications 
through  a  variety  of  projects,  such  as  the  trans-Africa  and  trans-Sahara  high- 
ways,  the  Tanzania-Zambi a  rai lway , and  the  Pan-African  Telecomnuni cations 
Network. 
The  creation  of  a continental  diplomatic  and  economic  infrastructure  is 
a  prerequi site  for  greater African  independence.  However,  the  infrastructure 
is still  incomplete;  moreover,  its potential  has  been  grasped  by  only a  few 
leaders.  The  continuation  and  modification of Africa's  dependence  is symbol i zed 
by  the  evolution  from  "indirect  rule"  to  "informal  penetration."  Colonial 
admininistrators,  traders  and  missionaries  may  have  been  concerned  not  to 
disrupt  establ i shed  pol i ties  unduly.  But  external  intrusion  nonetheless 
changed  the  basis  of  the  power  of  indigenous  rulers.  Similarly,  Africa's 
continuing  dependence  on  foreign  exchange  and  capital  perpetuates  subordination 
and  1 imi ts  choice.  Foreign entrepreneurs,  diplomats,  and  experts  may  attempt 
to  limit  their  impact  on  "national"  decision-making  and  planning but  in fact 
they  have  a  profound  effect on  African  societies.  The  choice  of collaboration 
or  confrontation  is a continuing  one  in Africa,  with  important  results  for 
the  development  of  the  continent.  African  regimes  have  always  been  astute 
i n adapti ng  to  external  opposi ti on  and  opportuni ties .  Indeed,  contemporary 
African  1 eaders  sometimes  justify  thei r strategies  of  confrontation  and  col- 
laboration by  reference  to  pre-colonial  behavior.12  They  selectively  adopt 
or  discard myths  to  legitimize  their  pol icies  and  control.  But  myths  of equal i ty 
both within  and  between  states  have  been  hard  to  sustain  under  the  interrelated 
pressures  of  external  dependence  and  i n ternal  underdevel oprnen t . 
Internal  and  International  Inequalities 
Ideals  of  sovereignty  and  unity  in  Africa  are  based  on  the  assumption 
that  its  states  are  equal.  Yet  the  resources  and  rates  of  growth  among  African 
countries  continue  to  di verge.  Moreover,  formal  independence  tended  to 
exacerbate  1 atent  internal  i nequal i ties  as  a  few  indigenous  groups  took  control 
of  the  state  apparatus.  To  date,  Africa  has  been  preoccupied  by  establishing 
national  control  and  extending  i ndependence  throughout  the  continent.  In  the 
future,  however,  the  ma1 distri bution  of  power  and  affl uence  both  between  and 
within  states  is  likely  to  become  a  dominant  issue.  This  tendency  will  be 
reinforced  by  trends  in  the  global  political  economy  towards  scarcities  of, 
and  high  prices  for,  raw  materials  and  towards  a redistribution  of  wealth 
internationally.13 
Indeed,  Africa  may  be  returning  to  relations  of  realpolitik  remin-iscent 
of  precolonial  international  politics.  The  bases  of  power  continue  to  include 
qua1 ities  of  leadership  and  ideology  as  well  as  possession  of  mili tary  and 
mineral  resources.  But  in  a  world  system  characterized  by  shortages  and  in- 
flation  only  a  few  African  states  are  likely to  achieve  significant  economic 
growth.  The  bases  of  such  growth  are  either  control  over  strategic  products 
or  acting  as  the  center  of  regional  integration;  or  both,  given  the  relation- 
ship  between  national  power  and  regional  hegemony.  Personal  political  leader- 
ship  such  as  Presidents  Nkrumah  and  Nyerere  or  ex-Emperor  Haile  Selassie 
-  achieved  will  continue  to  realize  influence,  but  the  impact  of  their states 
will  tend  to  decline  compared  with  the  power  of  countries  like  ~i~eria,~~ 
Zaire,  Algeria,  Zambia  and  Angola.  This  group  of  states  is  likely  to  achieve 
continental  dominance  because  each  of  them  possesses  both  minerals  and  the 
potential  to  be  a  regional  center.  Other  states,  like  Gabon,  Niger,  Guinea, 
Libya  and  Botswana  may  have  significant  mineral  resources,  but  their  potential 
as  leaders  of  a  region  is minimal.  States  such  as  Kenya,  Ivory  Coast  and 
Senegal  have  few  minerals,  but  do  possess  sufficient administrative  and  in- 
dustrial  potential  to  act  as  catalysts  for  regional  cooperation.  The  other 
states  of  Africa  are  primarily  producers  of  agricultural  commodi ties,  dependent 
on  a  few  crops  and  a  small  number  of  markets.  If  the  mineral  exporters  and 
regional  leaders  achieve  continental  superiority,  then  the majority  of  African 
states will  be  subordinate.  Only  South  Africa  (and  to  a  lesser extent  Zimbabwe 
[Rhodesia])  now  possesses  significant  mineral , industrial  and  administrati ve 
capacities. 
So  African  states  can  be  usefully  distinguished  along  several  criteria, 
other  than  whether  they  are  one-  or multi-party  states,  civilian or  military 
regimes,  Christian  or  Moslem,  Arab  or  Black.  Relevant  categories  would  seem 
to  be  national  attributes,  external  dependence  and  (as  we  suggest  below) 
degree  of  internal  stratification  or  underdevelopment.  National  attributes 
include  size  of  territory,  population,  and  mi 1 i tary,  and  whether  they  produce 
oi 1,  minerals,  or agricul tural  products.  In terms  of external  dependence,  the 
states  of  Africa  can  be  compared  by  their  commodity  and  trading  partner  con- 
centrations;  that  is,  according  to  how  many  primary  products  they  export  and 
to  how  many  states.  Such  categorization  would  indicate  that  Africa  includes 
states  which  are  both middle  or regional  powers  and  which  belong  to either 
the  Third or Fourth  Worlds.  Africa,  the  largest  regional  grouping  in terms 
of  size  and  numbers  of members,  also  contains  the  most  land-locked  and  least- 
develo~ed states.  Further,  these  tend  to  be  the  most  dependent  on  a  few  ex- 
ports  to  a  few  states  and  to be  those  most  affected  by  the  energy  crisis;  they 
will  also  be  most  vulnerable  to  drought  and  to  the  new  politics  of  food.  By 
contrast,  Africa  incl udes  several  exporters  of  oi 1  (Libya,  A1 geria,  Nigeria, 
Angola  and  Gabon)  and  of  other  "strategic"  comnodities  such  as  copper  (Zambia 
and  Zaire),  uranium  (Niger,  Gabon  and  South  Africa)  and  phosphates  (Morocco 
and  Tunisia).  Over  time,  the  development  prospect  and  achievements  of these 
different  groupings  have  diverged,  leading  to new  continental  inequalities. 
The  larger  and  more  affluent  states  have  been  subject  to most  external 
diplomatic  and  corporate  pressures  to  be  "open"  to  investment  and  to a  "sub- 
imperial"  role.  The  paradox  of  this  small  group  of emergent  "middle"  powers 
in Africa  is that  they  themselves  remain  dependent  on  external  markets  or sup- 
port.  A1 though  the propensity  of extra-continental  powers  for  direct or overt 
intervention  has  decreased,  structures  of dependence  continue.  The  col 1 ab- 
oration  between  major  African  states  and  the  great  powers  is no  longer  a 
simple  relationship  of  domi nation;  the  middle  powers  of Africa benefit  from 
their  local  hegemonies  along with  the  great  powers.  States  like  Zambia  and 
Zaire,  for  instance,  are  now  able  to  play  influential  roles  in southern 
Africa.  This  is exemplified  by  the  involvement  of  Zambia  in nenotiations 
towards  independence  in Mozambique  and  Zimbabwe  and  the  role of  Zaire  in 
events  in Angola  as  we1 1  as  vice  versa.15  But  the  maintenance  of  these 
regional  roles  is dependent  on  relationships  with  the  consumers  of copper 
and  with  the  cor~orations which  invest  in the  mines,  industries,  and  infra- 
structures  of  the  ~tates  question.  Similarly,  the capacity  of  Libya  and 
Nigeria  to  extend  aid to  the  Sahelian  states  is a  function  of  the high  price 
of  oil  and  the  ability of  these  two  states  to spend  their  new  income  on 
international  assistance  as  we1 1 as  on  industrial  projects. 
The  regional  powers  of  Africa not  only  possess  important mineral  or 
entrepreneurial  resources,  they  have  a1 so  become  diplomati c  centers  for 
both  the  African  and  the global  systems;  most  headquarters  or  regional  of- 
fices  of  African  and  global  organizations  are located  in their  capitals. 
Further,  they  tend  to have  larger  domestic  products,  armies,  and  populations 
than  most  African  states.  They  receive  aid from  a wide  variety  of sources, 
especially  from  the  United  States,  and  are  host  to  the  largest  number  of 
corporate  subsidiaries.  Conversely,  their  balance  of trade  is most  dependent 
on  regional  exchange  because  they  are  the  dominant  economies  in their  regions. 
Thi s  set  of  characteris tics  reveals  the  i ntermedi ate  position of dominant 
African  states  in the  global  hierarchy;16  but  on  the continent  their  influence 
is becoming  pervasive.  Their  relative affluence  and  prospects  stand  in stark 
contrast  to  the  poverty  and  depression  of most  of Africa. 
Africa  has  always  been  peripheral  in the  global  economy,17  its propor- 
tion  of world trade  remaining stable at about  4  percent.  Its exports  have 
increased  by  about  10  percent  in the  fifteen years  since  independence,  but 
their  direction  remains  predominantly  towards  Europe.  Half  the  continent's 
export  earnings  come  from  two  commodities--oil  and  copper;  these  along with 
coffee,  cotton  and  cocoa  account  for mre than  60  percent  of Africa's  income 
from  exports.  The  ori gin of these  two  major  exports  is concentra ted--A1 aeria, 
Libya,  Nigeria,  Zaire  and  Zambia  receive  over  half  the  continent's  foreign 
earnings  and  are  thus  able also  to  be  Africa's  leading  importers  of  foreign 
capital  and  consumer  goods.  Moreover,  most  African states  produce  only  one 
or  two  comnodi ties  for export  (e.g.,  iron  from Mauritania,  sugar  from Mauritius, 
oi 1  from Libya  and  copper  from  Zambia)  so  their  balances  of trade  and  payments 
are  extremely  vulnerable. l8 
Africa's  oil  exporters  participate  in the  cartel  activities  of OPEC 
and  OAPEC,  with  Libya  having  started  the  trend  to state  control  over,  and 
high  prices  for,  oi 1  products.  However,  Africa  cannot  by  itself,  even  if it 
were  more  united,  maintain a  high  price  for most  of  its primary  products;  it 
contributes  only  small  proportions  to  the world  trade  in major  raw  materials. 
In any  case,  the  prospects  for  producer  power  in most  primary  comnodities  are 
slight:  only  in  tin  and  bauxite,  manganese,  phosphate  and  copper,  tea,  cocoa 
and  coffee  could  effective  "trade  unions"  of  the  Third  World  operate,  and 
then  political  will  is  essential.19  Africa  produces  1/5  of  the  world's 
copper  and  1/4  of  its coffee,  so  it would  stand  to  gain  from  producer  power 
in  these  commodi ties.20  However,  its experience  in  absorbing  the  high  price 
for  oil,  fertilizers  and  manufactures  is  sombre:  whilst  a  few,  a1 ready  re- 
lati vely  advantaged,  African  states would  benefit  from  cartel  operations  in 
such  commodities,  most  would  stand  to  lose  from  world  inflation,  recession 
and  res tructuri ng.21  Other  important  industrial  raw  material s  over  which 
Africa  exerts  some  potential  leverage  include  most  of  the  globe's  cobalt, 
diamonds  and  go1 d,  1/3 of  the  world's  chromium  and  manganese  ore,  1/5 of  its 
phosphate  and  uranium  and  1/10  of  its  iron  ore.  Its  exports  of  primary  pro- 
ducts  for  consumer  goods  are  less  potent:  1/2  the  world's  palm  oil  and  sisal, 
1/4  of  its groundnuts,  and  just  1/10  of  its sugar,  tea,  cotton  and  maize.22 
Not  only  does  Africa  produce  minimal  proportions  of  many  conodi ties,  the 
production  of  most  is concentrated  in  a  few  states.  Moreover,  many  of  the 
minerals  are  located  in  Southern  Africa  and  are  at present  controlled  by 
whi te  regimes  and/or  mu1 ti national  corporations .  Natural  resources  as  we1 1 
as  national  attributes  continue,  then,  to  produce  a  continental  hierarchy 
in  Africa. 
Africa's  international  inequal i ty  is  unl i kely  to  change  for  two  reasons. 
Firstly,  in  an  era  of  shortages  and  depletion  there  are  insufficient  resources 
to  enable  all  states  and  peoples  to  achieve  affluence;  the  ecological  imperative 
means  that  many  African  countries  wi  11  never  develop  unless  substantial  uni- 
versal  redistribution  occurs :  "within  a  capitalist worl d-economy,  a1 1  states 
cannot  'develop'  simultaneously  by  definition,  since  the  system  functions 
by  vi rtue  of  having  unequal  core  and  peripheral  regions. "23  And,  secondly, 
interstate  inequal i ties  are  perpetuated  by  1 inkages  among  ruling  classes  which 
share  common  interests  in  maintaining  their  own  power  and  affluence;  the  leaders 
of  Africa 's  "mi ddle  powers"  recei ve  support  from  external  associates  who 
become  more  important  to  them  than  their  own  internal  constituency. 
The  increase  in  i nequal i ties  within African  states  is  related  to  their 
unequal  status  in  the  global  hierarchy  and  to  the  collaborative  role  of  their 
elites.  Indeed,  the  dependence  of  states  is perpetuated  by  the  interdepen- 
dence  of  elites.  The  cooperative  relationship  between  local  elites  and  the 
mu1 ti nati onal  corporati on  has  been  characteri zed  as  a  form  of  transnational 
politics  in  which  conspicuous  consumption  and  foreign  management  techniques 
are  transferred  to  and  adopted  in  the  Third  World.  From  this  perspective, 
it appears  that  the  common  interests  of  the  rich  states  and  the  rich  in  the 
poor  states  have  produced  a  dominant  transnational  associati~n;~~ has 
conceived,  implemented  and  control led  the  characteristic  paras tatal  strategy 
in  Africa  to  advance  both  corporate  and  indi genous  interests.  This  "radi ca1 " 
transnational  approach  focuses  on  the  mutual  gains  of  an  empathetic  and  sym- 
biotic  relationship  between  external  and  local  interests  in  the  periphery. 
States  in  Africa  may  be  dependent,  but  given  shared  interests,  foreign  and 
domestic  el i tes  have  entered  into a  relationship  amongst  themsel ves  approach- 
ing  that  of  interdependence. 
The  "symbiosis"  of  the  African  state and  mu1 tinationals  leads  to  ~utual 
benefi ts--investments,  patronage,  corruption  and  sty1 e for  the  new  el i tes 
and  markets,  security  and  influence  for  the  multinationals.  The  latter are 
adaptable,  but  the  future  of  such  "neocolonialism"  depends  on  the  accepta- 
bi 1 i ty  of  the  bargain  arranged  between  domestic  and  foreign  rul ing  el i tes. 
Revolution  is  unlikely  in  the  near  future,  either  in  African  internal  or 
i nternational  pol i tics .  However,  new  paras tatal  agreements  may  modi fy  the 
attractiveness  of  the  arrangement  for  either partner.  Over  time  the  "balance 
of  power"  in  the  relationship  may  shift away  from  the  colonial  inheritance 
and  towards  a  greater  degree  of  African  influence  and  direction,  especially 
if national  resources  or markets  are  of  especial  value  to  any  particular 
corporation. 25 
The  ability of  national  elites  to  extract  more  benefits  from  the  trans- 
national  relationship  may  be  crucial  for  their  ability  to  repress,  divert 
or  co-opt  internal  opposi tion.  Competi tion  between  national  and  corporate 
decision-makers  takes  place  in  the  context  of  political  demands  within  African 
states: 
In  peripheral  areas  of  the  world  economy,  however,  the 
primary  contradiction  is not  between  two  groups  within 
a  state each  trying  to  gain  control  of  that  state  struc- 
ture,  or  to  bend  it.  The  primary  contradiction  is  be- 
tween  the  interests  organized  and  located  in  the  core 
countries  and  their  local  allies  on  the  one  hand,  and 
the  majori ty  of  the  population  on  the  other.26 
It is  the  tension  between  classes  and  other  social  groups  within  African  states 
that  leads  to  unstable  foreign  pol icies ; transnational  el i te  1 i nkages  per- 
petuate  African  states '  ambi valence  as  revealed  in the  expression  of  thei r 
"national  interests." 
Foreign  Pol icy:  National  or  Class  Interests? 
The  foreign  and  development  pol icies  of African states  can  be  best  ex- 
plained  by  examining  the  linkages  between  "internal"  and  "external"  actor~;~' 
it is  through  relations  at this  interface  that  the  foreign policy,  inter- 
national  status  and  political  economy  of  each  state  are  largely  determined. 
Independence  involved  a  change  of  the  dramatis  personae  of each  country; 
it did not  of itself  lead  to  the  re-establishment  of  national  control  over 
the  economy.  However,  by  ves ti ng  formal  responsi bi 1 i ty  for  foreign  pol i cy 
in indigenous  hands  independence  did create  the  potential  for  a  successful 
assertion  of  economic  and  cultural  nationalism.  But  any  attempt  by  a  poor 
state  to  confront  an  unequal  world  system  alone  is  largely  doomed  unless 
it possesses  significant  resources  or strategic  position.  Col lecti vely, 
African  and  Third  World  demands  for  redistribution and  greater  economic  in- 
dependence  have  greater  potential ; yet  the  maintenance  of  such  unity  is pro- 
blematic  as  First World  actions  tend  to magnify  diversities  and  inequalities 
within  such  coalitions.  Moreover,  in the  first decade  of  independence  most 
new  ruling classes,  especially  in the  more  dependent  countries,  were  able  to 
rule  only  through  collaboration with  external  interests ; to  disengage  meant 
i sol ation,  intimi dation  and  obscuri ty--a  situation  that  most  fi rst-genera- 
tion  nationalist  leaders  sought  to avoid.  Foreign  associations  also  offered 
the  prospects-- i f  not  the  real i ty--of  aid and  capital , techno1 ogy  and  ski 1 1s , 
markets  and  money.  Uhuru  meant  new  demands  on  leaders  for  visible  growth 
and  continual  patronage;  the  external  estate  helped  to  satisfy  these  initial 
demands. 
The  elusiveness  of  real  economic  and  social  independence  has  led to 
coup  d'etats,  mi 1 i tary  regimes  and  one-party  states,  a1 l  designed  to maximize 
control  over  the  state  and  to achieve  pol i tical  order.  Increased coercion  and 
control  have  become  imperative  because  of  the  process  of underdevelopment 
and  the  inabi 1 i ty of  the  new  state  in Africa  to  contain  that  process.  To 
overcome  the  dilemmas  of dependence,  the  new  class  could  intensify  its estab- 
1 ished external  relations  or change  both  its development  and  foreign  pol icies 
to  transform  its inherited pol i tical  economy.  But  the  incumbents  in most 
African  states  have  opted  for  collaboration;  only  the  few  have  chosen  to  alter 
their  external  linkages.  Indeed,  in  most  states  there  has  been  a  retreat 
from,  rather  than  confrontation  with,  the  problems  of  development.  The 
primary  reason  for  this  is  that  the  new  class 
.  . .  is  not  a class  which  is  development-oriented  .  .  .  It forms 
either  an  expensive  facade  for  a  nation  remaining  basically  stagnant 
and  deprived,  or  a  de  facto  intermediary  for,  a1 ly  of,  and  expense 
upon,  continued  foreign  economic  penetration  and  domi nation.  These 
characteristics  go  a  long  way  .  .  .  towards  explaining  the  fragility 
of  African  political  systems  . . . .  An  elite which  preaches  austerity, 
efficiency,  and  development,  but  which  practices  1 uxury  (for itself 
and  i ts  government)  combined  with  inefficiency,  and  which  produces  very 
1 imi ted  soci a1  or economic  advances  for  the  vast  ma  jori ty  of  the 
population--is  inherently  unlikely  to  maintain  broad  domestic  backing.28 
Most  "political  change"  in  Africa  to  date  has  been  within  the  rul i ~g 
elite and  has  not  often  led  to  a  significant  redefinition  of  the  state's 
role  in  the  global  pol i ti cal  economy.  In  order  to  understand  this  phenomenon, 
it is  necessary  to  go  beyond  the  orthodox  distinctions--such  as  those  made 
between  ci vi 1 i an  and  mi  1 i tary  regimes,  one-  and  mu1 ti-party  states--and  exam- 
ine  the  nature  of  a  state's  external  and  internal  1 inkages.  This  dependency 
approach  assumes  that  the  relationship  between  the  ruling  elite,  the  labor 
aristocracy  and  the  peasantry  is  conditioned  by  the  former's  place  in  world 
politics;  or,  in  other words,  the  extent  to  which  the  new  class  is a  "com- 
prador  bourgeoisie"  is  of  great significance  for  the  character  of  the  "internal" 
pol i tical  economy.  As  Leys  asserts,  "in  post-colonial  societies  in  Africa 
there  can  be  little doubt  that  the  dominant  class  is still  the  foreign 
bourgeoisie. "29  It is  important,  then,  to  investigate  the  salience  of  relations 
between  external  actors  and  the  new  class  and  the  importance  of  an  external 
"consti tuenzy"  for  the  domestic  pol i tical  economy.  Hence  the  central i1:y  of 
international  relations  in  the  study  of  Africa. 
A  crucial  distinguishing  motif  for  the  two  dominitnt  types  of  political 
economy  today  on  the  continent  would  seem  to  be  whether  they  are  "state  cap- 
italist" or  "state  socialist"  regimes.  Both  types  reflect  the  trend  towards 
a  concentration  of  power  and  affluence  around  state structures.  However, 
there  is  clearly  a  difference  between  those  states that  presently  encourage 
private  capital  (e. g.,  Egypt,  Ivory  Coast,  Kenya,  Nigeria,  Senegal )  and  those 
that  now  insist on  community  ownership  (e.g.,  Angola,  Algeria,  Libya,  Mozambique, 
Somalia,  Tanzania).  In  both  sets  of  cases  the  state  exerts  an  increasing 
monopoly  over  decision-making,  but  in the  former  control,  income  and  status 
are  redistributed  to  individuals  whilst  in the  latter  they  flow  to  new  insti- 
tutions established  by  the  state.  This  distinction  between  state  capitalist 
and  state social ist governments  tends  to  reinforce  the  distinction  between 
middle  and  other  powers  in Africa.  For  Africa's  "great"  powers  are  largely 
those  that  are  mos t permissive  towards  western  external  actors.  Indeed, 
there  tends  to be  a  high  coincidence  of  interest  between  state  capital ist 
governments  and  external  states , entrepreneurs  and  corporations. 30 
A1 though  independence  has  had  a  minimal  and  delayed impact  on  the pol i- 
tical  economy  of African  states,  it has  made  the  "national  interest,"  as  de- 
fined  by  the  ruling class,  a  legitimate  concern  in the bargaining  process 
between  regimes  and  foreign  actors.  In general,  it is true  that  "the  inde- 
pendent  governments  of Africa  are  far more  efficacious  'indirect rulers' 
than  the  obas  and  mwami s  of  the colonial  era,"31  but  a  few  states  have  begun 
to  change  both  thei r external  associations  and  thei r internal  structures. 
There  are,  however,  important obstacles  to such  efforts,  which  help  to ex- 
plain  the  primacy  of  state  capitalist  rather  than  state  socialist  regimes. 
As  dos  San tos  notes : 
. .  .  . if dependence  defines  the  internal  situation  and  is structur- 
ally  linked to  it, a  country  cannot  break  out  of  it simply  by  isolat- 
ing herself  from  external  influences  . . . The  only  solution  therefore 
would  be  to  change  its internal  structure  -- a  course  which  neces  arily 
1 eads  to  confrontation  with  the  existing  international  structure. 82 
Some  African  states  have  attempted  this  transformation  of establ ished  external 
ties  and  internal  structures,  often with  a lack  of success  (e.g.,  Egypt,  Ghana, 
Ma1 i and  Sudan  under  di fferent  governments).  Only  a  few  regimes  have  had 
sufficient  longevity,  innovati veness  and  support  to  undertake  a  sustained, 
longer-term  reassessment  of their  inherited dependence  and  underdevelopment; 
but  these  experiments  have  produced  various  contradictions  inherent  in state 
socialism  rather  than  any  progress  beyond  in the  direction  of a  more  demo- 
cratic,  decentral ized,  "African"  social ism  (e.g.,  Algeria,  Congo(B),  Guinea, 
Somalia,  Tanzania  and  now  Guinea-Bissau,  Mozambique  and  possibly  Angola  and 
Ethiopia).  'Progress  beyond  state capital ism  and  social ism  is,  of course, 
problernati c  because  the  redistribution  of benefi ts  and  opportuni ties  threatens 
establ ished  interests  and  institutions. 33 
In imperial  systems,  colonies  and  their  administrators  were  clearly  subordinate 
to  the  metropole.  In  "neocolonial" Africa,  new  states  and  leaders 
have  limited  choice  and  autonomy,  and  yet  "we  have  no  fully  adequate  theory 
of  the  'neocolonial  state, '  its  relation  to  international  capital ism  and  domestic 
classes  and  its  consequent  role  in  the  production  process. "34  If  we  are  to 
begin  to  explain  the  underdevelopment  of  Africa,  its  characteristic  state 
capitalist  systems,  and  its  continued  re1 iance  on  foreign  aid,  capital  tech- 
nology  and  markets,  then  we  clearly  need  to  develop  a  comprehensive  theory 
of  the  state  in  Africa.  Essential  to  any  such  definition  is an  understanding 
of  the  nature  of  parastatal  structures  and  the  activities  of  multinational 
corporations.  The  political  economy  of  parastatals  and  mu1 tinational  corpora- 
tions  is central  because  in  most  African  countries  these  are  the  institutions 
through  which  the  state  and  external  interests  come  to  terms. 35 
The  mu1 ti national  corporation  is a  remarkably  flexible  insti tutiot  and 
in  the  Third  World  it has  secured  access,  profit  and  cooperation  by  permit- 
ting,  even  encouraging,  national  participation  and  1 imi ted  regional  inte- 
gration. 36  The  corporation  has  maintained  the  flow  of  raw  materials,  per- 
petuated  its monopol ist position,  and  secured  1 ocal  advocates  by  entering 
into  cooperative  branch-plant  arrangements  with  national  regimes  or  share- 
holder~;~~  incorporation  and  direction  has  enabled  it to  maintain  its 
"global  reach. "  However,  parastatal s, as  local  embodiments  of  mu1 tinational 
corporations,  differ  greatly  in  their  nature  and  importance.  In  particular, 
some  parastatals  constitute  an  indirect way  to  develop  state capital i sm  through 
individual  share-hol ding,  whereas  in  state  social ist regimes  the  government 
usually  holds  the  local  shares  on  behalf  of  the  people.  There  is  a  major 
distinction  between  the  impact  and  potential  of  parastatals  in  Nigeria  and 
Kenya,  for  instance,  compared  with  those  in  Zambia  and  Zaire  and  those  in 
Tanzania  and  Somalia.  But  in  both  types,  independence  creates  the  possi- 
bili ty  of  a  more  intransigent  foreign  policy,  or  at  least  for  some  disrup- 
tion  of  stability.  State  control  itself  may  at times  be  haphazard  and  un- 
predictable--both  internal  and  international  instabi 1 i ty  may  upset  the  logic 
of  dependence.  As  Cohen  has  argued,  ". .  . the  imperial  1 inkage  is not  so 
neatly  facilitated  nor  so  smoothly  functioning  as  is  sometimes  assumed.  There 
are  real  difficulties  in  guaranteeing  the  stabi 1 i ty  of  the  peripheral  capitalist 
system  . .  . "38  At  times,  then,  African  foreign  policies  can  disrupt  established 
transnational  class  relations  and  more  truly  express  a  "national "  interest. 
The  characteristic  "parastatal  strategy"  of Africa  may  be  an  expression 
of national ism  (as  in state-capi tal ist systems)  or  a  step  towards  national i- 
zation  (as  in state-social ist systems)--the  "local i zation  of capital ism"  or 
a  "social ist approach. "39  The  former  strategy  of  state  capital ism  does  not 
constitute  a  fundamental  challenge  to  the  inheritance  of  integration  into  the 
world  economy,  especial ly into  corporate  structures  and  unequal  exchange  wi th 
advanced  capital i st economies.  Partial  national i zation  through  state  social i sm, 
on  the  other  hand,  does  create  the  possibility of  greater  self-reliance  and  the 
potential  for  further  moves  towards  a  non-capi tal ist political  economy,  even 
if the  transition  to  socialism  itself is problematic.  In the  former,  partner- 
ship  with  the  multinational  corporation  is seen  as  the  final  stage  of economic 
change--"  the  commanding  hei ghts"  having  been  conquered;  i n the  1 atter,  the 
parastatal  strategy  is conceived  as  just  one  step  towards  other  socialist 
measures  such  as  more  direct  political  or worker  control,  different operating 
criteria,  and  eventual  full  national  ownership  in some  form of cooperative 
structure .40  Moves  towards  and  beyond  state  social ism  in Africa  are  unl i kely 
because  the  interests  of the  new  class are  more  vulnerable  in a  state  socialist 
than  in a  state  capitalist  society.  Further,  given  the  pervasiveness  of depen- 
dence  and  export-oriented  economies,  progress  towards  social i sm  necessi tates 
more  than  confronting  the  mu1 tinational  corporation.  A  foreign  policy  of both 
national i sm  and  social i srn  requires a  simul taneous  attack  on  several  forms  of 
dependence.  It is inseparable  from  effective  national  planning  and  a  strategy 
which  does  more  than  reinforce elite privilege:  "Establishing  a  system  of 
state  ownership  within  a  capitalist world  economy  does  not mean  establishing 
a  soci a1 i st economy. "41  Indeed,  most  moves  toward  national  economi c  control 
in Africa  are motivated  more  by  internal  demands--el  i te affl uence  and  control 
over  the  process  of class  formation--than  by  a desire  to upset  external  link- 
ages.  However,  domes tic opposi ti on  to  the  incumbent  el i te may  incorporate 
cri ticism of its  foreign  relations  as  well  as  of  its mismanagement  and  indul- 
gence. 
The  interaction  of global  and  internal  constraints  and  opportunities 
has  led to  increased  inequalities within  Africa,  amongst  classes  as  well  as 
between  states .  Pol i ti cal  independence  has  tended  to  increase  economi c  depen- 
dence  because  the  new  ruling elite has  needed  control  over  patronage  and  sym- 
bols.  The  new  el i te  has  adopted  foreign  incomes  and  tastes42  whi le most  of 
the  population  has  been  1 argely forgotten  and  impoverished.  The  paras tatal 
strategy  has,  thus  far,  tended  not  only  to  reinforce  the  state-corporate 
relationship,  but  also  to  undermine  any  prospect  of  an  indigenous  entrepre- 
neurial  class  developing  in  Africa.  In  most  states,  indigenous  capitalism 
cannot  compete  wi th  the  es tab1 i shed  1 inkages  of  dependence,  the  "monopoly 
in  international  commodi ty  markets  and  monopoly  in  industri a1  technology. 1143 
Local  services  develop  largely  in  response  to  corporate  penetration,  not  as 
an  alternative  to  dependent  industrialization.  The  elimination  of  a  national 
middle  class  serves  the  interest  of  both  partners  in  the  parastatal  system. 
Internal  "class"  interests  may  explain  much  external  behavior  of  African  states .44 
Dependence  reduces  the  foreign  pol i cy  "choi ces"  of  most  Af  ri can  states . 
The  pol i tical  economy  of  parastatal  structures  reveals  a  continued  impact 
of  multinational  corporations  on  the  content  and  direction  of  national  develop- 
ment.  These  structures  give  foreign  companies  the  opportunity  to  captvce  a 
market  or  source of  supply,  to  export  machinery  or provide  management  and 
consul tancy  services .45  The  "partnership"  forged  during  the  coloni a1  period 
has  been  modified  but  not  changed  in  its  fundamentals:  "The  elites  do  not 
grow  into  an  independent  bourgeoisie  because  they  cannot  do  so.  They  remain 
the  junior  partners  of  an  external  system  upon  which,  at a1 1 decisive  points, 
they  must  continue  to  depend. "47  In  both  colonial  and  post-colonial  times, 
el i tes  which  col laborated  with  external  interests  became  "parasitic" ; "indi- 
rect  rule"  led  to  reliance  not  on  traditional  ties  or  on  an  indigenous  con- 
sti tuency,  but  rather  on  external  associations. 
As  President  Nyerere  insists,  there  is only  one  rational  choice  for 
Af ri ca--soci a1 ism:  "Thi rd  Worl d  capital ism  would  have  no  choice except  to 
cooperate  wi  th  external  capital ism,  as  a  very  junior  partner. "48  However, 
for  some  states  being  a junior  partner  in  the  global  capitalist  economy  holds 
attractions.  As  several  critiques  of  the  development  of  the  Ivory  Coast 
and  Ghana  show,49  a  semi-capital ist strategy  can  be  highly  profitable  in 
certain  circumstances,  both  for  the  state  and  for  groups  within  the  state. 
Nevertheless,  the  cost  of  class-formation  is  high  over  time,  heightened 
dependence  increases  vulnerability,  and  for Africa  as  a  whole  only  a  few 
successful  capitalist  rt  imes  are  possi ble--some  state participation  or 
control  is  inevitable. 
The  other,  controversial  class  which  affects  both  the  calculation  of 
the  benefits  and  costs  of  collaboration  and  the  orientation  of  a  state's 
foreign  pol icy  is the  "labor  aristocracy. "50  The  emergence  of a workers' 
elite  in state,  parastatal  and  private  organizations  has  served  to widen  the 
distribution  of gains  from  independence  and  state capitalism  and  to  co-opt 
a  further  social  group,  thus  reducing  the  immediate  prospects  for  change 
in internal  politics  or external  relations.  Despite  some  recent skepticism 
about  the  usefulness  of the  concept,51  the  approach  is helpful  in explaining 
the  lack  of  militant worker  activity  in Africa.  Indeed,  the  coexistence  be- 
tween  the  rul ing class  and  the  labor  aristocracy  helps  to  explain  why  the 
former's  definition  of  the  national  interest  has  rarely  been  chal lenged. 
The  ruling  class  practices  co-optation  internally while  it performs  col lab- 
oration  external ly. 
Together  then,  the  transnational i zation  and  1 abor  aristocracy  theses 
go  some  way  to explain  the  absence  both  of  revolution  in Africa  and  of  inter- 
national  violence  between  Africa  and  the  rich countries  despite  intensified 
inequal i ties  and  the  paradoxes  of  state capital ism.  Interstate  dependence 
has  benefitted a  few  in Africa;  and  together  these  few  control  the  state 
machinery.  Unti 1 other social  forces  demand  participation  in power  and 
privilege,  the  external  relations  of the  incumbent  elites  can  be  perpetuated. 
Even  Leys  admits  that,  despite the  trend  to  monopoly  and  conflict  in the 
political  economy  of  capitalist African  states  such  as  Kenya,  ". .  . it would 
be  dogmatic  and  mechanical  to assert  that  neocolonial ism and  underdevelopment 
must  inevitably  lead  to  revolutionary  change  in Kenya  as  a  result of inevitable 
social  and  economic  crisis. "52  Nevertheless,  African  leaders  are  concerned 
to  increase  their  control  and  embourgeoisment.  They  have  begun  to  redefine 
thei r collective  ideology of  nonal ignment  away  from  pol i tical  non-partisanship 
and  towards  economic  confrontation.  As  the  international  system  has  moved 
/ from  bipolarity  to multipolarity,  from  Cold  War  to detente,  so  Africa  in its 
second  decade  of  independence  has  trans formed  nonal i gnment  away  from  a  concern 
with  pol itico-securi ty  matters  and  into a  highly  partisan  demand  for economic 
redistribution. 
Nonal i qnment  and  Dependence 
Africa  constitutes  the  majori ty of new  states  in the  nonal ignment  move- 
ment,  and  has  played a  major  part  in the  activities  of the  movement.  As 
bipolarity  gave  way  to  detente  and  development  to  underdevelopment,  so  the 
Thi rd Worl d  demanded  economi c  change  rather  than  pol i ti cal  vi s i bi 1 i ty.  The 
new  definition  of nonalignment--which  emphasizes  economic  opportunity  rather 
than  pol i ti co-strategic  impartial i ty--and  the  new  mood  of confrontation  were 
responses  to  the continuation  of dependence.  The  novel  ideology  of  "col lecti ve 
self-reliance"  incorporates  the  national  interests  of a  diverse  range  of 
states;  it is both  compatible  with  and  supportive  of the  idea  of nonalignment. 
However,  each  state's  different  positions  and  prospects  make  Third  World  unity 
problematic.  As  some  countries  benefit  from  close  ties  with major  actors, 
different  forms  of  dependence  threaten the  solidarity  of the  Third  World,  the 
very  sol idari ty that  is essential  to  escape  from  dependence. 
Africa  has  tried to  relieve  its inheritance  of dependence  by  the  a lop- 
tion  of  several  international  strategies:  i )  national  non-a1 ignment;  ii ) 
regional  integration ; i i i )  continental  diplomatic  interdependence;  and  i v) 
col lecti ve  advocacy  in international  organi zations  and  global  conferences. 
The  first  and  the  last are  usually  compatible  and  constitute  a  significant 
and  potent  combination  in an  era  of  resource  scarcities  and  high  prices. 
Yet,  the  incidence  of dependence  and  the  prospects  to reduce  it are both 
uneven.  In this  section  we  first examine  some  more  of  the  characteristics 
of  dependence  and  then  look  at Africa's  relations  with  the  great  powers. 
These  are  both the  major  sources  of dependence  and  the  primary  concern  of 
nonal i gnment,  whether  this  strategy  is defined  in pol i tico-strategic  and/or 
economi c  terms. 
African  states are  confronted with  multifaceted and  interrelated 
problems  of dependence  and  ~nderdevelo~ment5~  are  intensified for 
many  countries  by  their  small  size  and  land-locked  status.  Dependence  can 
occur  in different  domains54  and  so  pose  a  variety  of political  and  admini- 
strati ve  di lemmas.  Wi 11 i am  Demas  has  suggested  that economic  dependence 
is manifested  in five ways  in the  Third  World: 
a)  dependence  through  foreign  ownership  and  control  of  key 
sectors  of  the  economy, 
b)  dependence  through  forei gn  aid, 
c)  dependence  through  trade, 
d)  dependence  through  re1 iance  on  foreign  human  resources 
and  forei gn  technical  expertise,  and 
e)  dependence  through  imported  consumption  and  production 
patterns. 55 
To  these  we  might  add  monetary  pol icies,  the  mu1 tiple  infl uences  of  the 
ubiquitous  mu1 tinational  corporation,  and  the  phenomenon  of transnational 
el i te  1 inkages.  Outside  the  economic  sphere,  other  forms  of pol i tical , 
military,  social  and  cultural  dependence  can  be  cited. 
Clearly  these  may  be  ranked  in a  different order  for  each  state. 
But  the  importance  of  each  form  lies not  so  much  in tangible  results  (over 
which  there  is some  dispute),56  but rather  in their  implications  for  foreign 
and  development  policy and  planning.  The  empirical  impact  of  various  types 
of dependence  may  be  less  salient  than  perceptions  of their strength:  de- 
cision-makers  may  believe  dependence  to  be  inevitable even  if there  are  some 
strategies  and  choices  which  they  could  adopt  to  reduce  it.  Such  psycho- 
logical  dependence  results  from  being affected  by  foreign  values,  education 
and  tastes  which  cannot  be  realized in small,  dependent  political  economies. 
Fatal ism,  insecurity and  instability mean  that  longer-term options  are  neither 
recognized  nor  considered;  inertia  and  poor  information  further  reduce  the 
prospects  for  the  innovation  and  intransigence which  would  be  needed  for  a 
successful  escape  from,  or  redefinition of,  dependence:  "there  is a  need 
for  a  basic  minimum  of  national  feeling  and  self-confidence  before  room  for 
manoeuvre  can  be  studied  and  exploited. "57  The  great  powers,  mu1 ti national 
corporations  and  international  organizations  have  been  able  to penetrate 
African states  through  such  elites. 
The  major  source  of dependence  in Africa  is still  Europe.  Unl i ke  Asia 
and  Latin America,  Africa  has  been  of  relative  political  insignificance  to  the  super- 
powers  and  China.  Its peripheral  status  in the  triangular  Sino-Soviet-American 
rivalries  stands  in contrast  to  its importance  for  Europe,  both  for  the  ex-colonial 
powers  as  states  and  now  for  the  European  Economic  Community  (EEC)  as  a  collectivity. 
Whilst  African  transactions  with  the  socialist  states  and  Japan  have  grown  at a  faster 
rate  than  those  with  Europe,  they  remain  minute  for most  states  compared  with 
substantial  exchanges  with  the  EEC,  which  now  includes  all  the  ex-colonial  powers 
whose  admi ni strati ve,  educational  and  economic  systems  Africa  inherited.  Despite 
significant  changes  in some  African  states,  many  remain  dependent  on  the  values 
and  structure;  which  they  assumed  at  independence.  These  bilateral  links  have  now 
been  strengthened  by  mu1 ti 1 ateral  associations  wi th other  EEC  members,  i ncl uding  the 
economic  center,  West  Germany.  This  crucial , compl ex  and  evol ving  relationship  has 
/ recently  been  forrnal+ed  in the  Lome  Convention  between  the  EEC  and  the  asso- 
ciate  states  of  Afri:  .  the  Caribbean  and  the  Pacific  (ACP).~~ 
Despite  modi fications  and  reservations,  the  EurAfrican  re1 ationship 
remains  the  most  sal ient  single  factor  in explaining  the  foreign  pol icy 
orientations  and  development  strategies  of African states.  Linkages  between 
Europe  and  Africa  are  continual  and  pervasive,  through  the  EEC  as  well  as 
through  the  Comnonweal th  and  Francophonie,  and  through  bilateral,  biconti- 
nental  and  bi 1 ingual  insti tutions.  A1 though  the  concept  of reciprocity  has 
been  abandoned  and  free-entry  has  been  assured  for most  African  products, 
Africa  remains  dependent  on  Europe.  This  is reflected  in receipts  from 
STABEX  and  EEC  aid,  in the  fact  that  most  foreign  investment  still  comes 
from  Britain  and  France,  and  that  most  of Africa's  trade  and  technologi(:al 
exchange  is with  Europe.  Moreover,  Europe  has  its own  favorites  in Africa. 
In particular  it has  maintained close  links whenever  possible with  those 
territories which  in colonial  times  it had  identified as  administrative  centers: 
"The  four  ACP  countries  with  the  largest  and  fastest-growing  trade  with  the 
EEC  are  Nigeria,  Zaire,  Ivory  Coast  and  ~en~a.  This  group  of states  has 
also  been  courted  by  other external  interests;  a  few  African  countries  may 
be  able  to  play  off the  competition  but  most  are  condemned  to  relative in- 
significance.  Given  the  gross  disparities  between  the  EEC  and  Africa,  the 
impact  of  the  former  on  the  latter  is often  uneven  and  unconscious.  Further, 
the  replacement  of a  set  of bilateral  links  by  mu1 tilateral  ones  does  not  by 
itself constrain  Europe's  dominance.  Thus  it is hard  to accept  William  Zart- 
man's  optimistic  conclusion  that 
/ From  an  evolutionary  point of view  .  .  . the  Lome  Convention 
is a we1 come  development.  Neither a  neo-col onial  consol i dation 
nor  an  institutionalization  of dependency,  it is a natural  step 
in the  process  of decolonization,  that  at the  same  time  strengthens 
the  capsbi 1 i ties  of developing  African  economies  and  pol i ties 
while  di 1 uting thei r bi lateral  ties  wi th  the  metropole.  8 
The  provision  for  advantages  to African  states  in the  Lome 
Agreement  does  not  remove  inequalities  between  the  signatories 
but  it helps  reduce  disparities  among  them.6O 
The  other  major  western  actor  in Africa  is the  United States,  although 
Japan,  ~anada,~'  and  Norway  have  growing  economic  1 inks with  some  states. 
The  role of  the United  States  in Africa  has  been  minor  compared  to  its activities 
in other  parts  of  the  Third World,  particularly  those  in Latin  America, 
South  East  Asia  and  the  Middle  East.  Moreover,  its indirect and  passive  role 
until  the  1960s,  along  with  a  marginal  but  fairly mutual  economic  exchange 
with  a  few  states,  means  that  Africa  became  an  overt  Cold  War  target  late. 
Except  for  historical  military or economic  interests  in states  such  as  Morocco, 
Zaire,  Ethiopia,  Tunisia  and  Liberia.  American  concerns  tended  to be  con- 
centrated  in Egypt  and  in Southern  Africa;  elsewhere  the  U.S.  worked  through 
European  colonial  intermediaries.62  In Egypt  and  Southern  Africa,  strategic, 
economic  and  ideological  interests  led to American  involvement  in attempting 
to mediate  complex  regional  disputes.  The  association  between  the  U.S.  and 
Israel  and  South  Africa  prejudiced  its prospects  in the  rest of ~frica.63 
Its actions  in the  Congo  further  reinforced  images  of it as  a  conservative, 
counter-rev01 uti onary  actor.  No  American  admini stration  has  yet  escaped  from 
this  image,  a1 though  Henry  Kissinger's  shuttle  diplomacy  in Northern  and 
Southern  Africa  and  President  Carter's  1 inks  with  America's  black  community 
and  leadership  may  have  moderated  it somewhat. 
However,  whi 1st the  U.S.  has  belatedly  recognized  the  inevitability 
of change  in the  Middle East  and  Southern  Africa,  its economic  penetration 
has  both  increased  and  become  more  controversi a1 .  In the  relati vely  optimistic 
first  development  decade,  western,  especially  American,  ideas  of externally 
induced  growth  were  widely  accepted;  but  the  failure  of this  initial  develop- 
mental  ideology  has  led to  a  more  skeptical  and  pessimistic  mood  in the  pre- 
sent  second  development  decade.64  Given  the  demands  for a  New  International 
Economic  Order,  American  investment  in Africa  is now  both  more  opposed  and 
more  vulnerable.  So,  at the  very  time  that  Africa's  criticism of America's 
political  and  strategic policies  on  the continent  has  become  somewhat  muted, 
economic  confl ict has  prevented  any  general  improvement  in relations. 
Nevertheless,  gi ven  America's  global  dominance,  several  African  states 
have  been  more  permi ssi ve  towards  i ts  economic,  ideological  and  strategi c 
penetration,  particularly  those  with  a  capital ist orientation.  U.S.-Africa 
trade  is concentrated  in a  few  products  and  with  a  few  partners:  the  U.S. 
buys  oil,  copper,  coffee  and  tea--those  comnodities  identified above  as  most 
amenable  to  cartelization--from  Nigeria,  Libya,  Ivory  Coast,  Zaire  and  Kenya. 
It a1 so  concentrates  its aid  in these  raw  material -producing  states  rather 
than  in the  poorest,  which  export  and  import  little.  U.S.  private  investment 
has  also  been  concentrated  in this  select  group  of states,  in both  oil 
and  mineral  production  and  in the  manufacturing  industry: 
The  countries  that  receive  the  largest  proportion  of  their  imports 
from  the  United  States  are  also  the  ones  that  receive  the  largest 
per  capita  amounts  of  grants,  1 oans,  and  private direct  investment. 
These  patterns  are the context  within  which  future  e  onomic  rela- 
tions  between  the United  States  and  Africa  are  set. 65 
This  concentration  of  U.S.  interest  and  influence contributes  to  the  growth 
of  inequalities  in Africa  and,  as  we  note  in the  next  section,  to  the  rise 
of sub-imperial ism. 
The  ability of  Europe  and  the United  States  to  secure  dependencies  in 
Africa  is increasingly  matched  by  that  of the Soviet  Union.  A1 though  the 
U.S.S.  R.  lacks  the  wide  range  of  instruments  of statecraft--particularly  its 
own  transnational  organi zati ons  such  as  pri vate  corporations,  interest  iroups 
and  re1 i gious  insti tutions--i t has  establ ished  common  cause  with  several 
African  countries,  particularly with  those  a1 ienated  by  the  west  (e.g.,  Guinea, 
Libya,  Uganda)  and/or  those  seeking  to establ ish social ist pol i tical  economies 
(e.g.,  Algeria,  Mozambique,  Somalia),  a  question  to which  we  return  in the 
final  section. 
The  varieties  of dependence  relations  between  the  great  powers  and 
Africa  are  wider  than  formal  international  1 inks.  Major  intrusive actors 
have  encouraged  transnational  as  we1 1  intergovernmental  relations.  The  west 
interacts  with  state  managers  and  established  interest  groups;  the  socialist 
states  have  relations  with  parties,  workers  and  1 iberation movements.  Whi le 
the  capi tal i st countries  develop  transnational  el i te ties,  the Soviet  bloc 
and  China  he1 p  to  support  a transnational  counter-el i te .  Af ri can  managers 
go  to corporate  meetings  in Europe  and  North America;  African  pol i ticians 
attend  meetings  of  the  Soviet  Communist  Party  and  tri-continental  institutions. 
But  despite  the  range  of  possible  1 inkages,  external  influence  in Africa  tends 
to  be  unstable  because  of the  characteristic  instability  of the  continent's 
own  pol i ti cal  economies. 
The  frequency  of  change  and  the  difficulties of influence have  led  the 
Soviet  Union  to  adopt  a more  pragmatic  approach  to Africa;  it has  abandoned 
its  insistence  on  ties  with  national  communist  parties  and  on  the  adoption  of 
"scientific"  rather  than  "Afrfcan"  social ism.  The  Soviet  attitude  to Africa 
has  evolved,  then,  from  an  ideological  and  universalistic one  to  a  more  prag- 
matic  and  particularistic  stance.  Its policies  and  relations  have  become 
more  calculating and  self-interested.  Its capabi 1 i ties  are  1 irni ted  so  over- 
all  its influence  is weak.  In particular  its activities  are  challenged  by 
diverse  national  and  external  interests,  particularly  the  continuing  western 
presence  and  the  receptiveness  to  Chinese  influence.  As  Africa  is a  more 
4 complex  and  unequal  region  than  it was  before  the  era  of detente,  any  attempt 
at exerting  continent-wide  influence  by  any  external  power  is 1 ikely to  be 
problematic. 
The  rise and  fall  of Soviet-Egyptian  relations  is illustrative  of  the 
dilemmas  facing  any  great  power  in Africa.  Alvin  Rubinstein  concludes  that 
Soviet  infl uence  over  Egyptian  foreign  pol icy , even  during  the 
period of  maximum  Egyptian  vul nerabi 1 i ty,  was  1 imi ted  . . . . Soviet pol icy 
seems  to  have  made  adjustments  to  Egyptian  domestic  pol i tics  more  often 
than  Egyptian  pol i cy-makers  yielded  to  Soviet  preferences  . . . . The 
Soviet-Egyptian  influence  relationship  is asymmetrical  both  as  to  its 
aims  and  accompl ishments  . . . . The  dependent  member  of a  relationship 
has  the  ability to  undertake  independent  initiatives,  to  the  detriment 
of the  donor's  interests.66 
But  Russia  would  not  let itself be  influenced  by  Egypt  to  the  extent  that  it 
would  risk  war  with  the  United  States;  its reservations  about  extending  a 
carte  blanche  to  Egypt  to  fight a  third war  with  Israel  not only  upset  the 
regional  strategic  balance,  but  led to  the  demise  of  the Soviet  presence 
and  to  President  Sadat's  courtship  of the  Americans;  astute  leaders  can  still 
play  the  01 d  pol i tics  of nonal ignment'.  Egypt  resisted  Russian  infl uence  wi th 
greater determination  after  the  October  1973  war:  "The  USSR  has  invested 
billions  of  dollars  in Egypt,  but so  far,  it has  been  able  to exert  little if . 
any  real  influence  over  Sadat's  foreign  or  domestic  policies  . . . . Soviet 
Egyptian  relations  have  deteriorated  sharply  despite  the  massive  Soviet  aid 
during the  war. "67 
?i ke  other  great  powers,  China  has  both  widened  its activities  in Africa 
and  concentrated  them  in particular  states  and  parties,  but  its resources 
and  interests  are  more  limited and  it is a  late-comer  to  the  race  for 
influence.  Following  set-backs  brought  about  by  the  Cul tural  Revolution, 
China  has  establ i shed  diplomatic  relations with  most  African  countries, 
thus  excluding  Taiwan  and  also  creating  the basis  for  influence  both within 
the  continent  and  against  its  own  enemies.  Like  the  Soviet  Union,  it has 
gradually  shi fted  its  priorities  away  from  support  for  1 iberation  movements 
and  radical  parties  and  towards  regimes  in  power,  especially when  these  are 
anti -Soviet.  China  has  the  advantage  of  being  a  non-whi te,  non-European 
Third  World  nation,  and  tends  to  share  more  perceptions  and  policies  with 
Africa  than  other  intrusi ve  actors.  Through  judicious,  modest  and  generous 
economic  and  mi  1 i tary  aid,  through  appropriate  models  and  technology,  and 
through  an  exchange  of  political  support  it has  come  to  secure  friends,  markets 
and  materials  in  Africa. 
China  lacks  the  capabilities  to  act  as  a  super-power  in  Africa  so  its 
goals  in  Africa  are  limited.  Nevertheless,  association  with  China  can  rein- 
force  Africa's  nonal i gnment,  particularly  its diversification  of  partners 
and  disengagement  from  the  world  capital ist economy.  African  leaders  are 
much  less  likely to  fear  Chinese  hegemony  than  dominance  from  other  sources, 
given  its  lack  of  resources  and  motivation;  it is also part  of  the  Third 
World  itself.  Moreover,  it is no  longer  clear  that  China  seeks  continual 
rev01 ution  and  social  change  in  Africa:  "the  short-term,  pragmatic, 
evol utionary,  and  non-disruptive  components  of  Chinese  foreign  pol icy  have 
governed  her  African  pol icy. "68  African  leaders  have  ernphasi zed  those  several 
interests  which  are  compatible  with  China's  rather  than  alienate  a  leading 
member  of  the  Third  World  coalition;  they  often  share  an  identity  of 
interest  rather  than  being  the  objects  of  influence. 
It is  indicative  of  China's  modest  ambitions  and  circumspect  role  in 
Africa  that  there  is  only  one  state with  which  it can  be  said  to  enjoy  a 
"partial  i nforrnal  a1 1 ianceH--Tanzania.  This  particular  relationship  among 
"unequal  equalsH69 may  reflect  a  coincidence  of  world  view  and  development 
goals  rather  than  an  expression  of  Chinese  influence.  To  be  sure,  Tanzania 
sought  support  for  its national  development  ar~d security  and  for  the  libera- 
tion  struggle  in  southern  Africa  in  exchange  for  improving  China's  respecta- 
bility  and  access  in  world  politics.  Its  "rewards,"  especially aid  for 
Tazara  (a major  rail road  project) ,70  have  been  considerable,  generous  and 
timely;  and  yet  there  is  little to  suggest  that  China's  "presence"  in 
Tanzania  is permanent  or widespread.  Its  penetration  of  the  Tanzanian  society, 
polity  and  bureaucracy  is minimal ; the  relationship  is exclusively  official, 
bi lateral  and  intergovernmental. 
George  Yu  has  suggested  that  the  close  association  with  China  advances 
Tanzania's  own  policies  and  development,  its nonalignment  and  nationalism, 
without  leading  to  a  new  dependence.  It is a  reflection of  comnon  elite 
perceptions  and  shared  goals  within  the  grouping  of non-a1 igned  states ; 
Tanzania  also  maintains  important  links  with  a  variety  of  African  and  Euro- 
pean  nations,  i ncl udi ng  Zambia,  Kenya,  Bri tai n,  West  Germany,  Japan,  Sweden, 
etc. 72  Alan  Hutchison  also  remarks  of  this  important  dyadic  relationship 
that,  "A  position of  privilege,  even  of  prestige,  should  not  therefore  be 
confused with  one  of  influence. "73  Moreover,  a1 though  China  and  Tanzania 
share  many  perceptions,  their  interests  in China's  major  aid project--Tazara 
--are  not  completely  similar:  China  emphasizes  its contribution  to  regional 
integration  and  liberation as  well  as  to  its own  status  and  economic  possi- 
bili ties.  Tanzania  and  Zambia  attach  more  importance  to  the  potential  it 
creates  for  economic  development,  both  agricul tural  and  industrial,  a1 ong 
the  new  1 ine-of-rai  1. 74  This  asymmetry  of power  and  interest  generates 
mi sperceptions:  "The  misunderstanding  about  the  friendship  between  Tanzania 
and  China  arises  .  .  . because  the  benefits  to China  are  intanqi ble whereas 
those  to  Tanzania  are  tangible.. . . I! 75 
The  one  issue  area  in which  the  impact  of  great  power  rivalry  is very 
clear  is that  of the  mili tary.  We  turn  to  this  question  of strategic relations 
and  the  continental  arms  race  before  deal ing with  the  broader  subject  of 
sub-imperialism.  Inequalities  continue  to  grow  between  African  military 
forces,  with  a  few  major  strategiccenters emerging  on  the continent.  The 
main  sources  of arms  purchases,  particularly  in sub-Saharan  Africa,  remain 
France,  Britain and  the United  States  rather  than  the  socialist  states. 
Africa's  mi 1 i tary  might  is concentrated  in the  north--particularly  in Egypt, 
A1 geri a,  Morocco  and  Li bya--and  in a  few  black  states--Ni aeria,  Ethiooia, 
Zaire,  Sudan,  Somalia  and  uganda. 76  South  Africa  and  Rhodesia  maintain sig- 
nificant  forces,  of  course,  whilst  those  of Angola  and  Mozambique  will  have 
greater  potential  with  their  reorganization  following  their wars  of  1 i beration. 
Over  time,  Africa's  militaries  have  become  more  sophisticated,  larger  and 
better  equipped,  a1 though  many  continue  to be  diverted  from  an  external  role 
by  internal  security,  political  and  economic  activities. 
African  states  maintain  a  diverse  range  of military  associations  and 
agreements  which  in general  reflect their  overall  foreign  pol icy orienta- 
tion.  The  major  links  of  the  United States  are  with  Morocco,  Egypt,  Ethiopia, 
Zaire  and  Liberia;  the  Soviet  Union  has  training,  supply  and  other  understand- 
ings  with  A1 geria,  Libya,  Uganda,  Mozambique,  Angola  and  Guinea;  France  has 
a  variety  of military  ties  with  the  francophone  states  of West  Africa,  from 
Yorocco  to  Congo(B)  whilst  Britain  has  a  few  remaining  links  with  Kenya, 
Ghana  and  Malawi.  China  has  understandings  with  a  select  group  of countries 
such  as  Cameroon,  Equatorial  Guinea  and  Tanzania,  particularly with  the  latter; 
and  Cuba  has  begun  to supply  training and  support  for  Guinea  and  ~n~ola.~' 
SOW  of  those  relations  are  long-standing  (e.g.,  until  1976  u.S.  military  aid to 
Ethiopia,  U.S.S.R.  to  Somali,  France  to  Ivory  Coast,  Britain  to  Kenya  and 
China  to Tanzania)  but many  are  more  recent,  modest  and  unpredictable;  most 
African  states  continue  to  emphasize  non-a1 i anment  in the  strategic  issue 
area  and  are cautious  about  dependence  on  military ties  with  just  one  ?reat 
power.  Several  have  preferred  security  relations  with  a  group  of  foreign 
"middle  powers"  such  as  Italy,  Yugoslavia  and  Canada.  The  next section  is 
concerned  wi th  the  rise of Africa' s  own  middle  powers  and  wi th thei r 
ability  to  dominate  regions  on  the  continent. 
Reaional i sm  and  Sub- Im~eri i sm 
The  present  era  of mu1 tipolari ty,  detente  and  resource  depletion  enhances 
the  prospects  for  a  few  states  within  the  Third  World  to  increase  their  own 
growth  and  influence.  The  small  group  of middle  powers  in Africa  may  be  able 
to  seize  these  favorable  ci rcumstances  to  advance  thei r international  status 
and  achieve  dominance  at the  regional  level.  For  the  global  hierarchy  is not 
static;  a1 though  inequalities  are  likely to  persist,  movement  up  and  down  the 
ladder  is possible.  The  upward  movement  of a  few  African  states  has  siqni- 
ficance  for  other  countries  which  are  relatively subordinate  and  for  the  1 inger- 
ing dreams  of  continental  unity. 
Within  the  global  system,  a  "sub-imperial"  state  is at the  "center"  of 
the  peri~hery";78 it is a  "client"  which  is able  to exert  dominance  in one 
region.  A  sub-imperial  state  in Africa  exerts  a  reqional  hegemony  within  the 
continent akin  to  the  global  dominance  of an  imperial  power;  it plays  an 
important  i ntermediate  role  in a  sphere  of  infl uence  whi le remai ni ng  subor- 
di nate  i tsel f  to  major  external  actors .79  Sub-imperi a1  or  "go-between"80 
states  no  longer  have  simple cooperative  relations  with metropol i tan  centers : 
01 d  dependence  ties  are  evolving  into new  and  more  complex  forms  of a~~rnrnetr~.8~ 
I  Nevertheless,  it is clear  that  a  group  of  leading African  states  have  achieved 
both  economic  growth  and  military  prowess  because  of  their  association with I 
major  world  powers  and  interests. 
The  leading states  of Africa  are  largely  those  most  permissive  towards 
international  capital ism;  they  are characterized  by  a  significant  amount  of 
external  investment,  col laborati ve  parastatal  institutions,  de~endence on 
I  regional  exchange,  and  a  trend  towards  domestic  inequal i ties.  They  receive support  from  foreign  investment  and  assistance  agencies  and  are  encouraged  to 
play  an  intermediary  role between  the  center  and  the  peri~hery.82  However, 
thei r semi-peripheral  status  leads  to  ambivalence  and  opposi tion,  especially 
from  states  in their  region  who  are  dependent  both  on  semi -peripheral  as  well 
as  core  states. 
Regional  integration  may  be  either  a voluntary  or  a coercive  process; 
cooperative  arrangements  in Africa  to  date  have  been  largely  based  on  consensus, 
but  regional  exchange  is now  becoming  an  imperative  for  the  manufacturing centers 
of  Africa  such  as  Egypt,  Kenya  and  the  Ivory  Coast.  Increasingly,  therefore, 
regional  cooperation  may  come  to reflect  the  interests  of national  and  foreign 
elites  in a  few  African  states  and  capitals;  it may  perpetuate  the  uneven 
development  of Africa rather  than  advance  continental  development. 
Regional  integration  in Africa  was  first practiced by  colonial  govern- 
ments  to  increase  administrative  efficiency and  economic  opportunities.  In 
contemporary  Africa  it has  been  widely  advocated  as  both  a  path  to  Deace  and 
as  a  strategy  for  development.  The  continued incidence  of  regional  conflict 
and  the perpetuation  of  regional  decay  lead  to  skenticism,  however,  about 
its  inevitable efficacy.  Moreover,  a1 though  regional  organizations  in East, 
West  and  Southern  Africa  have  adapted  to  the  impact  of decolonization  they 
are  now  threatened  by  a  revival  of  nationalism based  on  the  uneven  distribu- 
tion  of gains  from  economic  cooperation.  The  major  beneficiaries  from  the 
East  African  Community,  the  Entente,  and  the  Southern  African  Customs  Union 
have  been  the  1 eadi ng  manufacturing  and  service  centers  of the  regions--Kenya, 
1vo:y  Coast  and  South  Africa,  respectively,  or  rather  the  industrial  complexes 
of  Nairobi,  Abidjan  and  the  Witwatersrand.  The  maldistribution of  industrial 
plants,  infrastructure and  services  characterizing  most  reqional  orqani zations83 
hel~s  explain the  fluidity  of such  organizations  in Africa;  African  states 
attempt  to establish  new  organizations  to  avoid  dominance  from within Africa 
as  well  as  from the  global  system. 
Regional  inteqration  does  not  always  provide  an  escape  from  Africa's 
inheritance  of  subordination.  Instead,  regional  integration  in its  present 
forn  may  promote  both  the  underdevelopment  and  disunity  of  the  continent. 
For  regional  integration  in Africa  is unlikely  to  produce  self-reliance  or 
integrated  economies  when  some  of  its major  advocates  are  foreign  actors  or 
col laborationist  el i tes.  Rather  than  advzncing  disengagement  from  the  global 
economy,  such  regional  integration  tends  to  encourage  the  es tab1 ishment  of 
regional  spheres  of  influence serving  the  interests  of a  few  African  and 
external  states  and  elites.  The  master-plan  of the  Economic  Commission  for 
Africa  (ECA)  to  create  five  sub-regions  on  the  continent  may  further  legi- 
timize  such  sub-imperialism.  It would  seem  that  the  "second  scramble"  for 
Africa  is not  amon9  colonial  powers  but  among  African  states,  each  of which 
is significantly  affected  by  external  interests. 
Political  independence  in Africa  has  tended  to  increase,  rather  than 
limit,  economic  dependence;  economic  growth  has  also  declined  and  become  more 
uneven.84  Most  African  states  have  very  open  economies  and  have  been  rather 
uncritical  in their  acceptance  of corporate  plans  and  activities  to  date. 
One  result of  development  plans  based  on  the  parastatal  strategy  and  associa- 
tion with  external  interests  has  been  the  heightening  of internal  and  inter- 
state inequalities  in Africa:  a  few  African  states  and  elites  can  exploit 
the  overall  relationship  of dependence  to  their  own  benefit.  For  example, 
the  Economic  Conunity  of West  African  States  (ECOWAS)  is but  the  latest  in 
a  series  of attempts  to secure  both  integration and  dominance,  in this  case 
by  a  triumvirate  of Nigeria,  Senegal  and  the  Ivory  Coast. 
The  concept  of sub-imperialism  is not  only relevant  for  the  analysis 
of western  powers  in Africa;  it may  also  be  applied  to  the  close  relation- 
ships  already  developed with  a  few  African  regimes  by  the  Soviet  Union. 
It may,  in time,  be  appropriate  to  examine  the  dependencies  of China  and 
Japan  in this  way  as  well,  but  their  interests  are  not yet  sufficiently 
developed.  Whi 1st  the  former  seeks  international  respectabi 1 i ty  and 
acceptabi 1 i ty the  1 atter  i s  primari ly concerned  wi th exchanging  raw  materi a1 s 
for  manufactures ; neither  have  wide-ranging  interests  in Africa  to  date. 
But  the  caution  and  modesty  of  China's  Africa  policy may  be  transitory  aiven 
the  i ntensi ty of  the  Si no-Soviet  spl i t; Soviet-Chinese  competition  may  come 
to  rep1 ace  the  Sovi et-Ameri can  s truggl e  in being  the  dominant  contemporary 
external  ~atal~st.85  its quest  for  "influence,  "86  "the  character  of 
Soviet  objectives  is broader  than  that  of  the  Chinese  both  in scope  (Soviet 
objecti ves  have  traditional ly been  more  differentiated)  and  in domain  (they 
have  also  been  pursued  among  a  more  diverse  set  of states). "87  Neverthe- 
less  until  Angola  and  Ethiopia  and  the  dramatic  display  of Soviet  ability 
to  intervene  in a  distant  civil  war,  the  western  states  remained  dominant 
in Africa--"the  Soviet  and  Chinese  ability  to  influence  Black  African  re- 
gimes  has  remai ned  margi nal . "88 
However,  the  Soviet  Union  and,  to a lesser  extent,  China  have  identi- 
fied  a  few  states  or parties  which  appeared  to offer  improved  prospects  for 
influence  or identity of views  over  a  range  of  issues  such  as  development 
strategies  and  great  power  politics .89  Because  of the  greater  time  since 
its revolution and  its more  advanced  economy,  Russia  has  had  a  significant 
lead over  China  in the  development  of its  pol icy towards  and  penetration 
inside Africa;  it has  been  able  to build on  an  established  Tsarist  interest 
in northern  Africa,  whereas  China's  pre-colonial  contacts  with  the  East 
African  coast occurred  much  earlier  and  were  more  fitful .go  Russia  has 
abandoned  its dogmatic  Stalinist  insistence  on  Third World  states  follow- 
ing "scientific"  socialism and  the Soviet  model.  Under  the  impact  of resis- 
tance  and  fai 1 ure  in the  imnediate  independence  period  its pol icy became  more 
pragmatic  and  realist,  favoring  non-a1 ignment  and  a  non-capi tal ist path,  especial- 
ly disengagement  from  the  international  capital i st economy.91  The  Soviet 
Union  is concerned,  then,  not only  with Africa's  external  relations  but  also 
with  its internal  class structures  and  development  strategies.  This  com- 
bination  of  interests  serves  to justify  its "penetration,"  or its  "trans- 
national "  association  with  "progressive"  forces.  Having  abandoned  its earl ier 
insistence on  the  establishment  of communist  parties  in every  country,  the 
Soviet  Union  has  tried  to  identify and  support  "popular"  or  "radical"  re- 
gimes,  parties  or  factions.  Having  rejected the  possibility of a "Third 
Way"  in the  Third World,  it now  supports  "African"  socialism when  it is ad- 
vocated  by  a  "national  democratic"  state.  92  Its belated  recognition  of  the 
tenuousness  and  distinctiveness  of  class  formation  in Africa  led the  Soviet 
Union  to encourage  a  variety  of  strategies  aimed  at national  economic  con- 
trol , one-party  states,  industrial ization  and  working-class  power.  Its 1 ist 
of  "revolutionary"  states  in Africa  has  changed  under  the  impact  of coups, 
but  has  included Ben  Bella's  Algeria,  Nkrumah's  Ghana,  Keita's  Mali  and 
Nasser's  Egypt.  At  present,  according  to  Soviet  scholars  and  bureaucrats, 
the  select  group  of African states  embarked  on  a  non-capitalist  path  consists 
of  ~uinea, Soma1 ia,  Congo  (Brazzavil le),  Mozambique  and  ~n~ol The  Soviet 
Union  exhi bi ts  considerable  ambivalence  about  Tanzania  (in part because  of 
that  country's  close association  with  China)  and  hesitation over  A1 geria; 
it has  also  encouraged  rather  cynical  ties  with  two  African  gadflies--Amin 
of  Uganda  and  Gadafi  of Libya.  In general,  the  Soviet  Union  has  supported 
moves  towards  domestic  social i sm  and  external  diversification,  especially 
when  these  pol icies  have  been  expressed  in a  "Marxist-Leninist"  language. 
The  Soviet  Union's  pragmatism  and  "national  interest"  are  often mi xed 
with a  concern  for  ideological  affinity and  compatibility.  As  a  great  power 
it has  significant  geo-pol i tical  interests ; where  these  coincide with  pol i ti- 
cal  empathy--as  in contemporary  Angola,  Mozambique  and  Guinea--i t tends  to 
concentrate  resources.  To  be  sure,  it remains  flexible and  proper  in its 
dealings  with  "moderate"  African  regimes,  providing aid and  investment  for  a 
majority  of  countries;  indeed,  "seeing  the  search  for allies  as  almost  chimeri- 
cal  in the  rapidly changing  African  pol i tical  arena,  the  Soviet  Union  became 
primarily concerned  with  pure  strategic  interest."94  It has  also  come  to 
realize  that  as  classes  are  as  yet embryonic  in Africa  and  are  not always  the 
dominant  social  force,  so  the  advance  of capital ism and  inequal i ties may 
generate  class  conflict  and  more  orthodox  class struggles.  Much  of its 
strategic  interest  in Africa  has  been  derivative,  based--1 i ke  Bri tain's  in 
the  nineteenth century--on  the  centrality  of  Egypt  in its "imperial"  ambi- 
tions.  Further,  it is also  an  expression  of its superpower  role and  the 
continuation  of cold war  realpolitik.  As  the  USSR's  capacity  to  intervene 
grows,  so  African  perceptions  of  it as  another  great  power  -  perhaps  even  in 
coll usion with  the  other,  American,  colossus  -  increase,  coinciding with 
Chi nese  views  of  Soviet imperial i sm.95 
The  consensus  among  Africanists  and  Sovietologists  for  the  decade 
1965-1975  was  that  "the  Soviets  are  keeping  a  low  profile in Africa. "96 
Similarly  Hall  and  Peyman  recently  asserted  "that  by  1975  China  was  more 
influential  in Africa  than  the  United  States  or the  Soviet  Union,  not  to 
mention  former  col onial  powers..  . 'l97  Clearly  these  eval uations  must  now  be 
considerably  revised in the  1 ight of Russia's  potential  for  further  inter- 
vention  in southern  Africa  through  sub-imperial  states  1 i ke  Cuba,  Angola, 
Mozambique  and  Ethiopia.  Sub-irnperi a1  states  may  not only  create  regional 
integration,  dominance  and  order;  they  may  also  act  "by  proxy"  in regional 
confl i cts. 
Just  as  a  few  African  regimes  come  to  play  a  go-between  role on  behalf 
of external  economic  i nterests  in advancing  regional  i ntegra tion,  so  can  they 
serve  as  intermediaries  in regional  wars  and  arms  races.  Political  and 
military  clients  maintain  their  own  interests  as  well  as  those  of  their 
protectors;  there  may  be  tensions  and  disagreements  between  them  as  we1 l  as 
col laboration.  Nevertheless,  through  mil i tary  and  pol i tical  support  a  poor 
state  can  become  dependent  on  its supplier  of arms,  personnel  and  advocacy, 
as  suggested  in the  previous  section.  The  different external  strategic  as- 
sociations  of African states  have  intensified  regional  tensions  and  turned 
border  conflicts  and  so-called  "local"  wars  into  targets  of great  power  at- 
tention.  Thus  the  disagreements  between  Morocco  and  Algeria,  Ethiopia  and 
Soma1 ia,  Libya  and  Egypt,  Tanzania  and  Uganda,  for example,  tend  to escalate-- 
in terms  of  visibility,  intensity,  destruction  and  salience--because  of  the 
considerable stakes  which  both  African  and  external  states  have  in the out- 
comes.  Some  of the  political  and  security  aspects  of dependence  are  i 11 us- 
trated  by  the  continuing  comolex  confrontations  in the  Horn  of Africa. 
Tensions  in the  Horn  have  included the  attempts  by  Eri trea  to gain 
independence  from  Ethiopia,  demands  for  Somalia  irredentism against  Ethiopia 
and  ~enya,98 civi 1 war  in the  Sudan  (which  involved  neighboring  black  and 
Arab  states  as  well  as  Israel),  the  struggle  for  independence  from  France 
in Djibouti,  the  tensions  between  the three  partners  in the  East  African 
Comnunity,  and  disagreements  between  Egypt,  Sudan  and  Libya.  This  set of 
tradi tional , border,  1 i beration,  racial  and  ideological  confl icts  has  been 
exacerbated  and  i ntensi fied by  partisan external  support .99  The  Americans 
have  withdrawn  their  undenvri ting of Ethiopia and  have  establ ished  new  1 inks 
with  Kenya  and  Egypt;  the  Soviets  have  shifted  their  commitment  from  Somalia 
to  Ethiopia  and  have  increased support  to Uganda  under  Amin  and  Libya  under 
Gadafi,  but  have  been  rebuffed by  Sadat's  Egypt  and  by  Sudan  after  an  attempt- 
ed  coup;  the  British continue  to  provide  military  assistance  for  Kenya  and 
are  again  cooperating with  the  Sudan  and  Egypt;  the  Chinese  have  become  the 
sole  suppliers  of  materiel  and  training  for  Tanzania;  and  a  complex  set 
of Arab  and  external  interests  have  supported  the  1 iberation movements  in 
Eritrea  and  the  Affars  and  ~ssas.~~~ J.  Farer  concludes  in his  study 
of  the  strategic  and  political  issues  of  this  region:  "The  Horn  is not  an 
especially  hospitable  setting  for  human  habitation.  But  as  a  venue  for  con- 
frontation  by  proxy,  it now  shows  real  promise".lO1 
Al though  regional  integration  does  often invol ve  cooperation  and 
mutual  benefit,  when  associated  with  regional  imperial ism,  it may  also  consti- 
tute  a  form  of structural  violence  for  peripheral  African states.  The  weaker 
states  of Africa  may  become  reluctant  to  "try  Africa  first"  if continental 
mediation  means  accepting  solutions  imposed  by  a  small  group  of more  power- 
ful  African  countries.  They  may  either  appeal  for more  disinterested dispute 
resolution  from  outside  the  continent  or  attempt  to establish  new  coalitions 
wi th  foreign  powers  to  chal 1 enge  the  dominance  of a  few  African  nations  in 
continental  affairs.  In other  words,  African  unity and  autonomy  may  now  be 
vulnerable  not so  much  because  of direct  international  imperial isms  but 
because  of the  impact  of inequality  on  the  continent.  Moreover,  any  trend 
towards  a new  diversity of  interests  among  the  states  of Africa  may  leid to 
a  revival  of ideological  disputes  and  new  varieties  of foreign  policies. 
Notions  of African  socialism  and  unity,  self-reliance  and  non-a1 ignment  may 
be  threatened  by  disparate  national  interests  in Africa.  New  coal i tions  both 
within  the  OAU  and  the  UN  may  come  to  reflect the  growing  diversity  of interests 
among  both African  states  and  the wider  non-a1 igned  grouping.  In the  final 
section  we  turn  to an  evaluation  of continuities  and  discontinuities  on  the 
continent,  particularly to  an  analysis  of the  prospects  for  greater  inter- 
dependence  and  coexistence  both  in Africa  and  between  it and  the  world. 
The  Pros~ects for Se1 f -Re1 i ance  and  I nterde~endence 
Given  the  limited prospects  of development  for many  African  countries 
in the  present  world  order,  a strategy  of self-reliance  might  be  an  appropri- 
ate  response.  Such  a strategy  involves  attempts  to avoid  the  problems  of both 
class  formation  and  external  dominance,  to go  beyond  nonalignment  and  depen- 
dence  on  a  great  power  or  sub-imperial  state,  by  trying  to  implement  unilateral- 
ly some  of  the  rhetoric  of  the  New  International  Economic  Order.  The  attrac- 
tions  of sub-imperial ism cannot  be  realized by  most  African  states.  For  them 
especially,  self-rel iance  may  be  the  only  a1 ternative  to  continued,  even 
perpetual, dependence.  Sel f-re1 iance  consists  of pol i cies  and  behaviors 
designed  to maximize  national  autonomy  and  to avoid having external  actors 
decide  the  development  goals  and  strategies  for Africa.  There  are  a  few 
examples  on  the  continent of states  which  have  oriented  themselves  towards 
such  a strategy  of self-reliance.  These  states  have  started to change  both 
their  development  and  foreign  policies  and  to  forge  new  linkage structures, 
to  put  national  interests  above  external ly-determi ned  goal s  and  rol es .  They 
have  declined  to  have  the character  of  their  political  economies  designed 
for  them  by  external  interests  and  they  have  largely  rejected  the  legacy 
of  "deformed  devel opment. "102 
Self-reliance  is related  to  a foreign  policy  of  confrontation which 
seeks  to  change  both  external  conditions  and  internal  inequality  by  dealing 
with  the  two  sides  of  the  linkage;  as  such,  it constitutes  a reaction  to 
dependence  and  an  attempt  to  escape  from  it.  The  strategies  of state  capital- 
ism  and  state  social i sm  examined  above  are  evol utionary  forms  of decoloni za- 
tion;  a more  critical  view  of dependence  leads  to advocacy  of disengacjement 
and  i sol ation  rather  than  diversification  or sub-imperial ism.  Soviet  scholars 
and  dip1 omats  have  encouraged  this  more  comprehensive  response  of  sel f-re1 iance 
and  have  advocated  it as  a  non-capitalist  path.  Despite  its attractions  for 
Russian  pol icy-makers,  it does  deserve  serious  consideration  as  a  strategy 
which  abandons  orthodox  prescriptions  and  puts  national  interests  above 
international  integration. 
The  possi bi 1 i ties  of  non-capi tali st development  are  clearly  aided  by 
the  propects  of  increased  exchange  wi th  the  more  i ndus tri a1 i zed  soci a1 is t 
states,  but  such  interaction  is not necessarily characterized  by  interdepen- 
dence  just  because  it takes  place  between  "similar"  systems.103  To  be  sure, 
social ist economies  make  different  demands  on  the  global  economy  and  do  not 
create  the  same  imperatives  for  foreign  exchange  as  do  capitalist  states  and 
corporations.  Nevertheless,  we  remain  cautious  about  equating  integration 
into  the  emerging  social ist "world  system"lo4  with  non-capi tal ist develo~rnent. 
Soviet  scholars  in particular  claim that  Russia's  internationalist  policies 
"afford  the  young  states  which  have  chosen  socialism  as  their  goal  the  op- 
portunity  to  develop  in that  directionH.105  Yet  their  definition  of a 
social i st-orientation  is wide  and  uncritical --foreign  investment  and  aid 
are  encouraged  as  is  "modern"  technology,  whi le external  exchange  wi thin  the 
world  capital ist economy  is considered  to be  inevi table.106 
Africa  needs  to  feel  free  to  examine  a1 ternative  formulations  of na- 
tional  and  col lective sel f-re1 iance. 1°7  Given  the  imperative  of the  environ- 
ment  it might  a1 so  useful ly examine  intermediate  and  appropriate  technology 108 
rather  than  the  capi tal-intensive  modes  of production  advocated  both  by  the 
mu1 tinational  corporation  and  by  the  Soviet  Union.  Africa  itself  has  to 
begin  to  choose  between  state capital ism,  state  social ism and  non-capi tal ist 
development  whi 1st  recognizing  that  the  choices  are  neither  clear  nor  readily 
attainable.  The  present  ruling classes  on  the  continent will  likely  resist 
any  demands  for  a  radical  restructuring  of Africa's  political  economies.  The 
establ ished  modes  of cooperation  between  national  and  international  el i tes 
are  quite  well  entrenched,  and  this  is likely to make  any  transition  from 
dependence  to  interdependence  both  di ffi cul t and  protracted. 
In the  absence  of significant  international  and  internal  redistribution 
increased  conflict  and  coercion  are  likely  in the  mid-  to  long-  ten future.lo9 
Because  the  ruling class  in Africa  is essentially  dependent,  it tends  to  rely 
on  external  support  rather  than  on  its domestic  constituency.  Because  it is 
often  unresponsive  to  internal  inequalities  and  demands,  it comes  to  rely 
on  coercion  as  well  as  patronage  for control.  Yet  Africa's  leaders  still  seek 
short- term gains  through  external  association,  despite  the  long history  of 
di lemnas  inherent  in such  collaboration.  It is understandable  that instant 
panaceas  appear  so  attractive.  But  it is important  to recognize  the  rami- 
fications  of such  an  orientation.  In the  absence  of national  development 
strategies  adapted  to  1 ocal  needs,  i ntegration  into  the  global  economy  tends 
to  promote  foreign  policies of compromise  and  domestic  regimes  of repression. 
Africa  (i ncl udi ng  ~anzani 10)  1 os t i ts  i nnocence  in i ts  f i rs t decade 
of recaptured  independence.  In its present  second  decade,  with  the  failure 
of optimi stic  sol utions  and  predi ctions , cri ti cal  analyses  and  better-defi ned 
development  strategies  are  beginning  to produce  more  informed  and  appropriate 
proposals,  such  as  self-rel iance.  However,  the  new  elites  of Africa  remain 
unprepared  for  any  radical  change  that  upsets  their  comfortable  re1 ationshi p 
with  the  external  estate.  To  be  sure,  they  are  concerned  to maximize  benefits 
for  themsel ves  from  foreign  associations  but  they  are  not yet willing  to 
restructure  both  their  pol i tical  economies  and  external  1 inkages.  Opposition 
to  this  new  class  has  been  limited or contained  to  date.  In the  future  authori- 
tarianism and  regime  violence,  rather  than  rev01 ution and  social ism,  are  1 i kely 
to  characterize  African  pol i tics .l l1 Africa  has  experienced  false  starts  and 
the  absence  of ei ther  growth  or  redistribution.  These  conditions  as  we1 1 as 
the  underdeveloped  class  structures  of African  states  are  encouraging  a  trend 
now  toward  "departici pation"l  l or  centralization along with  coercion.  Pro- 
spects  for  change,  participation and  redistribution to benefit  the  many  seem 
increasingly  slim.  External  actors  are  1 ikely  to supply  the  means  for such 
control  necessary.  These  trends  throw  doubt  on  the  util i ty of concepts  such 
as  "modernization"  or  "de~elo~ment"~ which  imply  that  change  is ultimately 
good  for  the  many  as  well  as  the  few.  In any  case,  the  benefits  to  be  gained 
from  dependence  vary  between  states . 
The  advantages  to  be  secured  from  participation  in the transnational 
elite  differ  between  Third  and  Fourth  World  regimes  in Africa.  The  Third 
World  by  definition  has  some  resources  to  offer  in exchange  for  a  continued 
collaborative  relationship;  the  Fourth  World  has  1 i ttle or  nothing  to offer. 
The  Third World  can  as  a  group  insist on  a  new  pattern of  interdependence 
in which  a1 1  partners  gain  and  participate  as  near  equals;  the  Fourth  World 
can  only  appeal  to  ideals  of humanity  and  equality  in any  demand  it makes 
for  the  relief  of  dependence.  The  Third World  has  orchestrated,  and  can  bene- 
fit from,  claims  for  a  New  International  Economic  Order;  the  Fourth  World 
can  only  participate  as  a  poor  partner  in the  Group  of 77  recognizing  that 
any  new  deal  between  First and  Third Worlds  is likely  to  be  disadvantageous 
to  it.  Despite  the  rhetoric  in international  forums  and  organizations  and 
among  aid agencies  about  special  attention  for  the  problems  of the  poorest, 
least-developed  states,  in practice  the  middl ing-rich  now  receive  more. 
Unless  very  generous  and  much  increased  aid and  comodi ty agreements  are 
implemented,  the  Fourth  World  will  continue  to  be  impoverished114 while  re- 
sources  are  redistributed  between  First and  Third Worl ds. 
Africa  stands  to  benefit  less  than  most  regions  of the  Third  World 
from  any  new  world  order.115  A few  of  its burgeoning  middle  powers  wi 11 
gain  as  their  sub-imperial  role  is reinforced.  The  identity of  this  minor- 
ity of countries  may  change  over  time  as  their  leadership  changes  or  their 
fortunes  are  affected  by  relations with  the world  economy.  But  the  future 
Pax  Africana  will  consist  of  a  new  continental  hierarchy  of  increasingly 
unequal  actors  rather  than  a mythical  PanAfricanism of equal  states.  The 
continent  is returning  to  a  mu1 tipolar  structure  in which  a  few  regional 
powers  dominate,  as  in the pre-colonial  system.116 
The  mu1 tipolar  global  system  has  ambivalent  implications  for  Africa. 
On  the  one  hand  the  mu1 tip1 ication  of  power  centers  has  enhanced  the  prospects 
for  diversifying  external  relaticns;  but  it has  also  made  the  original  con- 
ception  of  nonalignment  vestigial.  On  the  other  hand,  mu1 ti polarity  has 
increased the  number  of  potential  sources  of  external  penetration;  it has 
a!  so  tended  to  exacerbate  international  competition,  particularly  the  cleavage 
between  the  two  leading socialist  states,  the  Soviet  Union  and  China.  The 
current  world  order,  then,  poses  problems  as  well  as  opportunities  for  African 
decision-makers.  With  skill,  they  can  turn  the  contemporary  system,  its 
norms  and  institutions,  to  good  advantage;  but a  naive  approach  to  external 
intentions  and  issues  wi 11  serve  to  intensi fy  both  dependence  and  underdevelop- 
ment. 
A few  African  leaders  and  organizations  have  been  able  to enhance  their 
visi bi 1 i ty,  power  and  development  by  recognizing current  threats  and  oppor- 
tuni ties;  but  the  majority  of actors  and  states  have  been  unable  to  respond 
to  the  revival  of real pol i ti k.  The  di vergent  reactions  of P,frican  countries 
and  institutions to  contemporary  world  politics  further  en1 arges  inequal i ties 
on  the continent.  Until  Africa  establ ishes  a  truly  consensual  foreign  pol icy 
in response  to  its corrmon  inheritance  of dependence  and  underdeveloprner t it 
is unlikely  to achieve  either  development  or  independence;  even  the benefits 
of decoloni zation  and  interdependence may  be  elusive .I17  Meanwhile,  the 
tendency  towards  inequal i ties  in Africa  perpetuates  compl exi ties  and  insures 
that  African  foreign  policies  remain  controversial  in both  practice  and  analysis. 
77 
END  NOTES 
1  For  a  succinct  introduction  to  these  see  Seyom  Brown,  New  Forces  in World 
Pol i tics  (Washington:  Brookings  Institution,  1974). 
2  On  contemporary  "Trends  and  Patterns  in World  Society"  see  Richard A.  Falk, 
A  Study  of Future  Worlds  (New  York:  Free  Press,  1975),  pp.  56-141. 
3  On  the  associated  rise of economic  issues  and  regional  and  transnational 
actors  see  David  H.  Blake  and  Robert  S.  Wal ters,  The  Politics  of  Global 
Economic  Relations  (Englewood  Cliffs:  Prentice-Hall , 1976);  Richard W. 
Mansback,  Yale  H.  Ferguson  and  Donald  E.  Lampert,  The  Web  of World  Poli- 
tics:  Non-state  Actors  in the  Global  System  (Englewood  Cliffs:  Pren- 
tice-Hall , 1976);  and  Joan  E.  S~ero. The  Politics  of International  Economic - 
Relations  (New  ~ork: St.   arti ins,  1977). 
4  On  new  states  in the  international  system  see  Marshal 1  R.  Singer,  Weak 
States  in a  World  of Powers:  The  Dynamics  of  International  Relationships 
(~ew  Free  Press,  1972),  August  Schou  and  Arne  Olav  Brundi tland, 
eds.,  Small  States  in International  Relations  (New  York:  Wiley,  1971, 
Nobel  Symposium  17),  Steven  L.  Spiegel,  Dominance  and  Diversity:  the  Inter- 
national  Hierarchy  (Boston:  Little Brown,  1972),  and  Ronald  P. Barston, 
ed.,  The  Other  Powers:  Studies  in the  Foreign  Policies  of Small  States 
(London:  George  A1 len and  Unwin,  1973). 
5  See  I. William Zartman,  "Europe  and  Africa:  Decolonization  or Dependency?" 
Foreign  Affairs  54  (January  1976) :  325-343  and  Sami r Amin,  "Underdevelop- 
ment  and  Dependence  in Black  Africa :  Origins  and  Contemporary  Forms," 
Journal  of Modern  African  Studies  10  (December  1972) :  503-524. 
6  See  A1 i A.  Mazrui,  "African  Diplomatic  Thought  and  Supranationali ty"  in 
Ali  A.  Mazrui  and  Hasu  H.  patel,  eds.,  ~friia  world Affairs:  The  Next 
Thirty  Years  (New  York:  Third Press,  1973),  p.  121 ; see  also  his  essay  on 
"The  political  Economy  of World  Order:  Modernization  and  Reform  in Africa" 
in Jagdish  N.  Bhagwati,  ed.,  Economics  and  World Order:  From  the  1970s 
to  the  1990s  (New  York:  Macmil lan,  1972) ,p.  287-319. 
7  On  the  emergence  of a  mixed-actor  system  in Africa  see  Timothy  M.  Shaw, 
"Discontinuities  and  Inequal i ties  in African  International  Pol i tics," 
International  Journal  30  (Summer  1975):  369-390  and  "The  Actors  in 
African  International  Pol i tics"  in Timothy  M.  Shaw  and  Kenneth  A  Heard, 
eds. , Pol i tics  of Africa:  Development  and  Dependence  (London :  Longman, 
1979).  For  a  rather  unsatisfact0r.y  overview  from  a  state-centric  and  great 
power  perspective  see  W.A.E.  ~kurGk, Sub-Saharan  Africa:  A  Guide  to  infor- 
mation  Sources,  International  Relations  Information  Guide  Services,  Vol . 
3  (Detroit:  Gale,  1977). 
8  See  T.  0.  Elias,  Africa  and  the  Development  of International  Law  (Leiden: 
Si jhoff,  1972)  and  Felix  Chuks  Odoye,  International  Law  and  the  New  African 
States  (London:  Sweet  and  Maxwell,  1972). 
9  See  Vincent  Bakpetu  Thompson,  Africa  and  Unity:  The  Evolution  of PanAfricanism 
(London:  Longman,  1969),  Adekunle  Ajala,  PanAfricanism:  Evolution, 
Progress  and  Prospects  (London:  Deutsch,  19l3) and  Berhanykun  Anderni cael , 
The  Organization  of African  Unity  and  the  United  Nations:  Relations  be- 
tween  the  OAU  and  the  UN  (New  York:  Africana,  1976). 
10  On  the  Origins  and  practice of African international  law  concerned  with 
violence  and  interstate  dis~utes see  Adda  B.  Bozeman,  Conflict  in Africa: 
Concepts  and  Real i ties  (princeto 
the  tenuousness  of African  Uni ty - 
African  Unity  and  the  OAU  (Lon 
n: 
see 
don : 
Pri nc 
Zden 
Fri 
eton  Uni 
ek  Cerve 
edmann, 
vers 
nka, 
1977 
i ty press,  1976).  For 
The  Unfinished Quest '1 
11  The  "parastatal  strategy"  in Africa  consists  of  a  set of arrangements 
between  the  state  and  mu1 tinational  corporations.  It characteristically 
involves  a  51% state  shareholding combined  with  a  49% corporate  stake, 
with  the  corporation  largely  determining  management  and  production  goals 
and  controlling  patents,  distribution  and  external  links.  The  mutual 
understanding  based  on  partial  national ization and  foreign  partici~3tion 
generates  symbiotic  re1 ations  between  host  state  and  corporation  in which 
security  and  access  are  exchanged  for  technology  and  capital. 
12  For  analyses  of  pre-colonial  di plomacy  and  international  relations  see 
A.  Adu  Boahen,  "Fanti  Diplomacy  in the  Eighteenth  Century"  and  K.  Ingham, 
"Foreign  Relations  of  the  Kingdoms  of Western  Uganda"  in K.  Inqharn,  ed., 
The  ~oreign  of ~frican  (~ondon:  Butterworth,  1974),  pr,. 
25-49  and  161-187;  J.  F.  Ade  Ajayi,  "Recent  Studies  in West  African  Di- 
plomatic  History,"Niqerian  ~ournal of  International  Affairs  I (July  1975) : 
39-46,  and  R.  Smith,  "Peace  and  Palaver:  International  Relations  in Pre- 
colonial  West  Africa,"  Journal  of African History  14  (1 973) :  599-621 . 
On  contemporary  patterns  of African  diplomacy  informed by  this  i nheri- 
tance  see  R.  A.  Akindele,  "Reflections  on  the  Preoccupation  and  Conduct 
of  African  Di plornacy,"  Journal  of  Modern  African  Studies  14  (December  1976) : 
557-576. 
13  On  these  contemporary  concerns  see  Timothy  M.  Shaw,  "The  Third World  and 
the  New  International  Order:  Imp1 ications  for Theory  and  Policy,"  Inter- 
Uni versi ty Seminar  on  International  Relations  (Ottawa)  December  1976. 
14  On  Nigeria's  emergence  as  Africa's  leading  state  see  Jean  Herskovits, 
"Nigeria:  Africa's  New  Power,"  Foreign  Affairs  53  (January  1975) :  314- 
333;  Ibrahirn Agboola  Gambari,  "Nigeria  and  the  World:  A  Growing  Internal 
stability,  ~eaith  External  ~nfluence," Journal  of  International  Affairs 
29  (Fall  1975):  155-169:  James  Mayall,  "Oil  and  Nigerian  Foreign  Policy," 
African  Affairs  75  (July  1976) :  31 7-330;  and  Olajide  A1 uko,  "Nigeria's 
Role  in Inter-African  Relations  with  Special  Reference  to  the  OAU,"  African 
Affairs  72  (April  1973):  145-162.  - 
15  See  Timothy  M.  Shaw,  "The  International  Politics of Southern  Africa: 
Change  or  Continuity?"  Issue  7  (Spring  1977);  with Agrippah  T.  Mugomba, 
"Zambia:  Detente  or Di sengagement?"  in John  Sei 1 er,  ed.  , Southern  Africa 
Si nce  the  Portuguese  Coup  (forthcomi ng ) ; and  "The  Pol i tical  Economy  of 
Regional  Detente:  Zambia  and  Southern  Africa,"  Journal  of  African  Studies 
4  (Winter  1977/8). 
On  the  analogies  between  the  contemporary  hierarchy  of  states  and  that  of 
corporations  as  expressed  by  the  "Law  of  Increasinq  Firm  Size"  and  charac- 
teri zed  by  the  concentration  of  production  and  decisi on-rnaki ng  in  global 
and  regional  centers  see  Stephen  Hymer,  "The  Multinational  Corporation 
and  the  Law  of  Uneven  Development,"  i n  Bhagwati , ed.,  Economi cs  and  Yorl d 
Order,  pp.  114-132: 
. . .A  regime  of  North  Atlantic  Mu1 tinational  Corporations  would 
tend  to  produce  a  hierarchical  division  of  labor  between  geogra- 
phical  regions  corresponding  to  the  vertical  division  of  labor 
within  the  firm.  It would  tend  to  centralize  high-level  deci- 
sion-making  occupations  in  a  few  large  cities  in  the  advanced 
countries,  surrounded  by  a  number  of  regional  sub-capi tal s,  and 
confine  the  rest  of  the  world  to  lower  levels  of  activity  and 
income,  i .e.,  to  the  status  of  towns  and  villages  in  the  new  Im- 
perial  system.  (p.  114). 
On  Africa ' s  persistent  economic  probl ems  see  Dharam  P.  Ghai , "Perspecti ves 
on  Future  Economic  Prospects  and  Problems  in  Africa"  in  Bhagwati , ed., 
Economics  and  World  Order,  p.  257-286.  "Africa,  the  Third  World  and  the 
Strateqy  for  International  Develo~ment  in  Mazrui  and  Patel,  eds.,  Africa 
in  worib  Affairs,  pp.  235-256,  and  his -toll ection  on  ~conomic ~ndependence 
in  Africa  (Nairobi :  East  African  Li terature  Bureau,  1973). 
See  Eleanora  and  Robert  L.  West,  "Conflictinq  Economic  Interests  of  Africa 
and  the  United  States" in  Frederick  S.  ~rkhurst, ed.,  U.S.  Policy  toward 
Africa  (New  York:  Praeger,  1975), pp.  158-165. 
See  the  stimulating  but  cautionary  essay  on  "The  Potential  for  Monopolistic 
Commodity  Pricing  by  Developing  Countries"  by  Marian  Radetski  in  Gerald  K. 
Helleiner,  ed.,  A  World  Divided:  The  Less  Developed  Countries  in  the  Inter- 
national  Economy  (Cambridge:  university Press,  1976),  pp.  53-76. 
But  it produces  only  6% of  the  bauxite.  See  the  useful  table  on  "Africa's 
Share  of  World  Mineral  Production"  in  Arkhurst,  ed.,  U.S.  Policy  toward 
Africa,  p.  249. 
See  Regi nal d  H.  Green,  "Petroleum  Prices  and  African  Development:  Retrench- 
ment  or  Reassessment?"  International  Journal  30  (Summer  1975) :  391 -405; 
Ernest  J.  Wilson,  111,  "The  Energy  Crisis  and  African  Underdevelopment," 
and  G.  E.  Emembelu  and  S.  S.  Pannu,  "Africa:  Oil  and  Development,"  Africa 
Today  22  (October-December  1975) :  11 -37  and  39-47. 
An  invaluable  source  of  such  basic  data  is,  "Primary  Commodities  of  Africa," 
Africa  South  of  the  Sahara  1976-77  (London:  Europa,  19761,  pp.  1119-1135. 
Immanuel  Wallerstein,  "The  Present  State  of  the  Debate  on  World  Inequality," 
in  his  World  Inequality:  Origins  and  Perspectives  on  the  World  System  (Mon- 
treal :  Black  Rose,  1975),  p.  23. 
See  Richard  Sklar,  "Post-Imperial ism:  A  Class  Analysis  of  Mu1 tinational 
Corporate  Expansion, "  Comparati ve  Pol i ti cs  9  (October  1976) :  75-92;  0s.- 
valdo  Sunkel,  "Transnational  Capital ism  axd  National  Disintegration  in 
Latin  Ameri ca,"  Social  and  Economic  Studies  22  (March  1973) :  132-1 76; and 
Martin  Godfrey  and  Steven  Langdon,  "Partners  in Underdevelopment?  The 
Transnational ization Thesis  in a  Kenyan  Context,"  Journal  of  Cornonweal th 
Politics  14  (March  1976):  42-63. 
25  In his  essay  on  "Europe  and  Africa"  Zartman  argues  that  "the  dependency 
approach  at best  describes  a  static  moment,  while  the decolonization 
theory  accounts  for  changing  relations  by  showing  the  origins  and  ingred- 
ients  of  the  present  state  of affairs"  (p.  340).  We  would  suggest  that 
decol oni zation  has  brought  few  benefi ts  because  of  continuing  dependence; 
dependence  is perpetuated  because  of common  el i te  interests  expressed 
through  the  transnational  association.  On  the  limited pros~ects for 
manoeuvre  and  economic  decoloni zation  see  Robert  L.  Curry,  Jr.  and 
Dona1 d  Rbthchi ld,  "On  Economi c  Bargaining  between  Afri can  Governments 
and  Mu1 ti -national  Companies,"  Journal  of Modern  Afri can  Studies  12 
(June  1974) :  173-191. 
26  Imnanuel  Wal lerstein,  "Class  and  Class  Conflict  in Contemporary  Africa," 
Canadian  Journal  of African  Studies  7  (1973):  380. 
27  See  Timothy  M.  Shaw,  "The  Political  Economy  of African  International 
Relations,"  Issue  5  (Winter  1975) :  29-38  and  "African  States  and  Inter- 
national  Stratification:  The  Adaptive  Foreign  Policy  of Tanzania"  in 
Ingham,  ed.,  The  Foreign  Relations  of African  States,  pp.  231-236. 
28  Reginald  H.  Green,  "Political  Independence  and  the  National  Econorqy:  An 
Essay  on  the  Political  Economy  of Decolonization,"  in Christopher  Allen 
and  R.  W.  Johnston,  eds.,  ~frican  Papers  in the  History, 
Pol i tics  and  Economics  of Africa  Presented  to Thomas  Hodgkin  (Cambridge: 
Uni versi ty  Press,  1970),  pp.  275-276. 
29  Colin  Levs,  "The  'Over-developed'  Post  Colonial  State:  A  Re-eval uation." 
Review  o-f  African  Political   cono om^  5  (January-April  1976) :  44.  For  a- 
case  study of  the  roles  and  relations  of  "external"  actors  in the  making 
of development  and  foreign  policy  in one  African  state  see  Timothy  M.  - 
Shaw,  "The  Foreign  Pol icy system of Zambia ," African  Studies  Review  19 
(Apri 1  1976) :  31 -66. 
For  further  conceptualization  and  cases  see  Carl  Widstrand,  ed.,  Mu1 tina- 
tional  Fi rms  in Africa  (Uppsala:  Scandinavian  Institute of African  Studies, 
1975)  and  Henry  1. Bretton,  Direct  Foreign  Investment  in Africa:  Its 
Pol i tical  Purpose  and  Function  in Patron-Cl ient Relations  (New  York:  General 
Learning  Press,  1976). 
31  Inanuel  Wallerstein,  "Africa  in a  Capitalist  World,"  Issue  3  (Fall  1973): 
9. 
32  T.  dos  Santos,  "The  Crisis  of Development  Theory  and  the  Problem of Depen- 
dence  in Latin America,"  in Henry  Berstein,  ed.,  Underdevelopment  and 
Devel opmen t :  The  Thi rd Worl d  Today  (Harrnondsworth :  Pengui n,  1973),  p.  79. 
33  For  critiques  of socialist  practice  in Africa,  especially  Tanzania,  from 
a  radical 'perspecti ve  which. advocates  change  beyond  state social ism  see 
inter alia.  "S~ecial Issue  on  the  Political  Economv  of  Parastatals," 
Eastern  ~frican  Review  5  (1972) ; John  Loxley  &d  John  S.  Saul,  "Mul- 
ti national s , Workers  and  Paras tatal s  i n Tanzania, "  Review  of Afri can 
Pol i tical  Economy  2  (January-Apri 1  1975) :  54-88;  Brian  Van  Arkadie, 
"Development  of  the  State  Sector  and  Economic  Independence. "  i n  Ghai , ed., 
Economic  Independence  in Africa,  pp.  33-122;  ~ustinian  et a1 . , - 
eds.,  Towards  Social ist Planninq  (Dar  es  Salaam:  Tanzania  Publ ishing House, 
1972) ; I.  G.  Shi vji , "Capi tal ism Unl imi ted;  Publ i c  Corporations  in Partner- 
ship  with  Mu1 tinational  Corporations,"  Africa  Review  3  (1973) :  359-382; 
and  I.  G.  Shivji,  Class  Struggles  in Tanzania  (London:  Heinernann,  1976). 
34  John  S.  Saul,  "The  Political  Aspects  of  Economic  Independence,"  in Ghai, 
ed.,  Economic  Independence  in Africa,  p.  135.  But  also  see  Sklar,  "Post- 
Imperial i srn. " 
35  On  the  case  of Zambia  see  Timothy  M.  Shaw,  Dependence  and  Underdevelop- 
ment:  The  Development  and  Foreign  Policies  of  Zambia,  Papers  in Inter- 
national  Studies,  Africa  Series,  no.  28  (Athens :  Ohio  university,  1976) 
and  "Zambia:  Dependence  and  Underdevelopment,"  Canadian  ~ournal-  Afri- 
can  Studies  10  (1976):  3-22;  Richard  1. Sklar,  Corporate  Power  in an 
African  State:  The  Pol i tical  Impact  of Mu1 tinational  Mining  Companies 
in Zambia  (Berkeley:  University  of Cal ifornia  Press,  1975);  and  Anthony 
Martin,  Minding  their  own  Business :  Zambia's  Struqgl e  against  Western 
, Control  (Harmondsworth:  Penguin,  1975). 
36  See  Norman  Gi rvan,  "Economic  Nati onal i sts  v.  Mu1 ti national  Corporations : 
Rev01 utionarj  or  Evol utionary  Change"  in Wi dstrand,  ed. , Mu1 tinational 
Firms  in Africa,  pp.  25-56.  For  a  rather  uncritical  review of African 
responses  see  Lesl ie L.  Rood,  " Forei qn  Investment  i n  African  Manufactur- 
ing,"  Journal  of Modern  African  studies  13  (March  1975):  19-34  and  "Na- 
tional ization  and  Indigenization  in Africa,"  Journal  of Modern  African 
Studies  14  (September  1976):  427-447.  For  a  critique  of corporate  advocacy 
of  regionalism  see  B.  W.  T.  Mutharika,  "Multinational  Corporations  in Region- 
al  Integration:  The  African  Experience,"  African  Review  5  (1975) :  365-390. 
37  On  the  varieties  of  corporate-paras tatal  arrangements  see  Ann  Sei dman, 
"Multinational  Corporations  and  Economic  Independence  in Africa,"  Afri- 
can  Social  Research  19  (June  1975):  739-750,  "Old  Motives,  New  Methods: 
Foreign  Enterprise  in Africa  Today,"  in Allen  and  Johnson,  eds.,  African 
Pers  ecti ves,  pp.  251-272  and  Planning  for  Development  in Sub-Saharan 
Africa  New  York:  Praeger,  1974).  Also  see  Widstrand,  ed.,  Mu1 tinational -7- 
Firms  in Africa.  On  the  archtypical  "African"  corporation  see  S.  Cronje, 
M.  Ling and  G.  Cronje,  LONRHO:  Portrait  of a  Mu1 tinational  (Harmondsworth: 
Pel i can,  1976). 
38  Robin  Cohen,  "Editorial:  The  State  in Africa,"  Review  of African  Politi- 
cal  Economy  5  (January-April  1976):  2. 
39  See  Ghai,  "Introduction"  in the  collection on  Economic  Independence  in 
Africa:  p.  xiii. 
40  See  Clive  Y.  Thomas,  "Industrialization  and  the Transformation  of Africa: 
An  A1 ternati ve  to  MNC  Expansion,"  in Wi dstrand,  ed.,  Mu1 tinational  Firms 
in Africa,  pp.  325-360. 
41  Immanuel  Wall erstei n,  "Dependence  in an  Interdependent  Nor1 d:  The  Limited 
Possibilities  of  Transformation  within  the  Capitalist  World  Economy," 
African  Studies  Review  17  (April  1974):  22. 
42  See  Steven  Langdon,  "Multinational  Corporations,  Taste  Transfer  and  Under- 
development:  A  Case  Study  from  Kenya,"  Review  of African  Political  Econo- 9 
2  (January-April  1975):  12-35. 
43  Col in Leys,  Underdevelopment  in Kenya:  The  Pol i ti cal  Economy  of Neocolon- 
ial ism  (Berkeley:  University  of California  Press,  1974),  p.  11. 
44  See  Timothy  M.  Shaw,  "The  Foreign  Policy  of  Zambia:  Ideology and  Interests," 
Journal  of Modern  African  Studies  14  (March  1976):  79-105  and  "Zambia's 
Foreign  Policy,"  in Olajide  Aluko,  ed.,  The  Foreign  Policies  of African 
States  (London :  Hodder  and  Stoughton,  1977),  pp.  220-234. 
45  See  Brian  van  Arkadie,  "Development  of  the State  Sector  and  Economic  In- 
dependence,"  in Ghai,  ed.,  Economic  Independence  in Africa,  pp.  88-122. 
46  For  a  comprehensi ve  case  study  see  Jus ti nian  Rweyamamu,  Underdevelcoment 
and  Industrial ization  in Tanzania  (Nairobi :  Oxford  University  Press,  1973). 
47  Basi 1  Davi dson,  Can  Africa  Survive?  Arguments  against  Growth  without 
Development  (Boston:  Little Brown,  1974),p.  85.  On  the  possibilities 
of a  more  national  and  less  comprador  bourgeoisie  see  Paul Kennedy,  "Afri- 
can  Businessmen  and  Foreign  Capi tal :  Col laboration  or  Confl ict?"  Afri- 
can  Affairs  76  (April  1977),  177-194. 
48  Julius  K.  Nyerere,  "The  Rational  Choice:  in his  Freedom  and  Development: 
Uhuru  Na  Maendeleo  (Dar  es  Salaam:  Oxford  University  Press,  1973),  p.  384. 
See  Philip  Foster  and  Aristide  R.  Zolberg,  eds.,  Ghana  and  the  Ivory Coast: 
Perspectives  on  Modernization  (Chicago:  University  of Chica  o  Press,  1971) 
Jon  Woronoff,  West  African  Wager:  Houphouet  versus  Nkrurnah  9 Metuchen:  Sca 
crow,  1972) ; and  Sami r Amin,  Neocolonial ism  in West  Africa  (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin,  1973). 
Giovannie  Arrighi  and  John  S.  Saul,  " International  Corporations,  Labor 
Aristocracies  and  Economic  Development  in Tropical  Africa,''  in their 
Essays  on  the  Political  Economy  of Africa  (~ew  Monthly  Review, 
1973),  p.  141. 
See  Richard  Sandbrook  and  Robin  Cohen,  "Workers  and  Progressive  Change 
in Underdeveloped  Countries,"  in their,  The  Develo~ment of an  African 
Working  class :' Studies  in Class   orm mat ion  and  ~ction  Univer- 
sity  of Toronto  Press,  1971)  pp.  1-9  and  Issa  Shiv.ii,  "Peasants  and  Class -  .. 
A1 liances ," Review  of African  Pol i ti cal  Economy  3  j~a~-october  : 
10-18. 
Leys,  Underdevelopment  in Kenya,  p.  274. 
For  useful  introductions  to  dependence  and  underdevel opment  from  a  vari- 
ety  of perspectives  consul t Henry  Bernstein,  ed.,  Underdevelopment  and 
Development:  The  Third World  Today  (Harmondsworth:  Penguin,  1973); 
re- 
James  D.  Cockcroft,  Andre  Gunder  Frank  and  Dale  L.  Johnson,  Dependence 
and  Underdevelopment:  Latin  America's  Pol i tical  Economy  (New  York: 
Anchor,  1972) :  Robert  I.  Rhodes,  ed.,  Imperial ism  and  Underdevelopment: 
A  Reader  (New  York:  Monthly  Review,  1970); and  Charles  K.  Wilber,  ed., 
The  Pol i tical  Economy  of  Development  and  Underdevelopment  (New  York: 
Random  House,  1973). 
54  On  the  pervasive  economic  dependence  on  external  capital , trade  and  skills 
see  Barbara  Stallings,  "Economic  Dependency  in  Africa  and  Latin  America," 
Sage  Professional  Papers  in  Comparative  Politics  3  (1972). 
55  William  G. Demas,  "Economic  Independence:  Conceptual  and  Policy  Issues 
in  the  Commonwealth  Caribbean,"  in  Percy  Selwyn,  ed.,  Development  Policy 
in  Small  Countries  (London:  Croom  Helm  for  IDS,  1975),  p.  194. 
56  On  the  debate  over  indicators  of  dependence  and  possible  empirical  tests 
through  which  to  eval uate  its  impact  and  interrelations  see  Patrick  J.  McGowan, 
"Economic  Dependence  and  Economic  Performance  in  Black  Africa,"  Journal 
of  Modern  African  Studies  14  (March  1976) :  25-40;  P.  J.  ~c~owan 
Dale  L.  Smith,  "Economic  Dependency  in  Black  Africa:  A  Causal  Analysis  of 
Competing  Theories,"  paper  presented  at a  meeting  of  the  ~nternatiohal 
Studies Association,  St.  Louis,  March  1977;  Richard  Vengroff,  "Neo-colo- 
nial ism  and  Pol icy  Outputs  in  Africa,"  Comparative  pol itical  Studies  8 
(July  1975):  234-250;  and  R.  Vengroff,  "Dependency,  Development  and  In- 
equality  in  Black  Africa,"  paper  presented  at a  meeting  of  the  African 
Studies  Association,  Boston,  November  1976.  These  essays  reveal  as  much 
about  the  disparate  sociology  of  knowledge  as  about  the  correlates  of 
dependence.  Most  advocates  of  dependence  woul d  be  skeptical  about  the 
utility or  appropriateness  of  such  empirical  tests.  See,  for  instance, 
the  critique  by  Shei la  M.  Smith,  "Economic  Dependence  and  Economic  Ernpi ricism 
in  Black  Africa,"  Journal  of  Modern  African  Studies  15  (March  1977):  116-118. 
57  Percy  Selwyn,  "Introduction:  Room  for  Manoeuvre?"  in  the  collection  on 
Development  Policy  in  Small  Countries,  p.  18. 
/ 58  On  the  Lome  Convention  see  Nicholas  Hutton,  "Africa's  Changing  Relation- 
ship  with  the  EEC,"  World  Today  30  (October  1974) :  pp.  426-435  and  Isebill 
V.  Gruhn,  "The   om:  Convention :  Inching  towards  Interdependence,"  Inter- 
national  Organization  30  (Spring  1976) :  241-262.  Cf.  Johan  5al tun-he 
Lorn6  Convention  and  Neo-capi tal ism"  and  R.  H.  Green,  "The  Lome  Convention ," 
African  Review  6  (1976):  35-54  and  B.  Dolan,  "The  ~ome' Convention  and  Europe's 
Relationship  with  the  Third  \#lor1  A  Critical  Analysis ," paper  presented  at 
a  meeting  of  the  International  Studies Association,  St.  Louis,  March  1977. 
59  Timothy  Curtin,  "Africa  and  the  EEC:  ,The  ~ornl Convention,"  Africa  South 
of  the  Sahara  1976-77,  p.  52.  On  Lome  and  inequality  in  Africa  see  Esko 
Antola,  "The  European  Communi ty  and  Africa:  A  Neo-Colonial  Model  of  De- 
velopment, "  Peace  and  Sciences  (Vienna :  International  Insti tute  for 
Peace,  1976) and  Jyrki  Kakonen,  "Effects  of  the  EEC  Association  on  Foreign 
Trade  and  Diplomatic  Relations  of  the  African  States,"  University  of  Turku 
Studies  in  Political  Science  5  (1976). 
60  Zartman,  "Europe  and  Africa,"  pp.  342  and  343. 
On  Canada's  interests  in Africa  see  Robert  0. Matthews,  "Canada  and  Anqlo- 
phone  Africa"  and  Louis  Sabourin,  "Canada  and  Francophone  Africa,"  in 
Peyton  V.  Lyon  and  Tareq  Y.  Ismael,  eds.,  Canada  and' the  Third  World  (To- 
ronto:  Macmillan,  1976),  pp.  60-161,  and  Timothy  M.  Shaw,"Zarnbia  and 
Canada:  Diplomacy  in Southern  Africa,"  in Denis  Stairs  and  Don  Munton, 
eds.,  Canada  in Worl d  Perspectives  (forthcoming) . 
See  the  persuasive  and  critical  essay  by  Imnanuel  Wal lerstein,  "Africa, 
the  United States  and  the  World  Economy:  The  Historical  Bases  of American 
Policy,"  in Arkhurst,  ed.,  U.S.  Policy  toward  Africa,  pp.  11-37. 
See  Timothy  M.  Shaw,  "Oil,  Israel  and  the  OAU:  An  Introduction  to  the 
Pol i tical  Economy  of  Energy  in Southern  Africa,"  Africa  Today  23  (Jan- 
uary-March  1976):  15-26,  and  Elliott P.  Skinner,  "African  States  and 
Israel :  Uneasy  Relations  in a  World  of  Crises,"  Journal  of African 
Studies  21  (Spring  1975):  1-23. 
On  the  evol ution  of this  development ideology  see  Robert  A.  Packenhar'', 
Liberal  America  and  the  Third  world:  pol i tical  Development  Ideas  in- 
Foreign  Aid  and  Social  Science  (Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press, 
1973).  For a  pessimistic  analysis  of the  current  prospects  for  both 
development  and  U.S.  infl uence see  Nelson  Kasfir,  "~nterde~endence 
American  Commitment  to Promote  Development  in the  Third World:  Africa 
-  the  Hardest  Case,"  in David A.  ~aldwin, ed.,  America  in an  Interdepen- 
dent  World:  Problems  of United States  Foreign  Policy  (Hanover,  NH:  Uni- 
versity  Press  of New  England,  1976),  pp.  223-243. 
West  and  West,  "Conflicting  Economic  Interests  of Africa  and  the  United 
States,"  in Arkhurst,  ed.,  U.S.  Policy  toward  Africa,  p.  179.  This  con- 
tribution  and  the  collection's  appendix  contain  useful  data  on  economic 
exchange  between  Africa  and  the  world  economy. 
A1 vin  Z.  Rubinstein,  "The  Soviet-Egyptian  Infl uence  Relationship  since 
the  June  1967  War,"  in Michael  MccGwire,  Ken  Booth,  John  McDonnell,  eds., 
Soviet  Naval  Pol icy:  Objectives  and  Constraints  (New  York:  Praeger,  1975), 
pp.  175-177. 
Robert  0.  Freedman,  "The  Soviet  Union  and  Sadat's  Egypt"  in ibid.,  p.  230; 
see  also  his  Soviet  Policy  toward  the  Middle East  Since  1970  (New  York: 
Praeger,  1975):  "given  the  overall  Soviet  goal  of expelling western  in- 
fluence  from  the  Middle  East,  the  Soviet leadership  seems  willing to  con- 
tinue  to  provide  large  amounts  of mil i tary  and  economic  aid as  we1 1  as 
diplomatic  support  to  Arab  regimes  that often  oppose  the  USSR,  in the 
hope  of spurring  anti -western  trends  in the  region. . .the  Soviet  leaders 
seem  will ing to  pay  the  costs  invol ved  in pursuing  such  a  pol icy because 
they  have  made  the  basic  decision  that  the  Middle  East  is a  region  of 
major  importance  to  the  Soviet  Union."  (p.  179) 
Bruce  D.  Larkin,  China  and  Africa  1949-1970:  The  Foreign  Policy of the 
People ' s  Republ i c  of China  (Berkeley :  Uni versi ty of  Cal i forni a  Press, 
1971),  p.  210.  See  also  Alaba  Ogunsanwo,  China's  Policy  in Africa,  1958- 
1971  (Cambridge:  University  Press,  1974)  and  Wolfgang  Bartke,  China's 
Econorni c  Aid  (New  York:  Holmes  and  Meier,  1975. ) 
George  T.  Yu,  China's  African  Policy:  A  Study  of Tanzania  (New  York: 
Praeger,  1975),  pp.  xv  and  52. 
Ibid.,  pp.  73-85  and  125-148;  see  also Martin  Bailey,  Freedom  Railway: 
China  and  the  Tanzania-Zambia  Link  (London:  Rex  Coll ings,  1976)  and 
Richard  Hall  and  Hugh  Peyrnan,  The  Great  Uhuru  Railway:  China's  Showpiece 
in Africa  (London:  Go1 lancz,  1976). 
Yu,  China's  African  Policy,  p.  86. 
Ibid,  pp.  87-91. 
Alan  Hutchison,  China's  African  Revolution  (London :  Hutchinson,  1975), 
p.  272. 
These  different  emphases  are  reflected in Hugh  and  Peyrnan,  The  Great 
Uhuru  Railway  who  place  more  importance  on  its strategic  and  political 
impact  on  African  and  international  pol i tics  and  Bailey,  Freedom  Railway 
who  stresses  its economic  and  integrative  potential. 
Hutchison,  China's  African  Revolution,  p.  278. 
See  The  Mil i tary  Balance  1976-1977  (London:  International  Institute for 
Strategic  Studies,  1976),  pp.  31-48  and  94-95.  See  also  SIPRI,  Arms  Trade 
wi th  the  Thi rd Worl d  (Harmondsworth :  Pel i can,  1975),  pp.  200-258. 
The  Mi 1 i tary  Balance  1976-1 977,  pp.  31  and  41 . 
See  Arrighi  and  Saul,  "National ism  and  Rev01 ution  in Sub-Saharan  Africa," 
in their  Essays  on  the  Pol i tical  Economy  of Africa,  pp.  49  and  76. 
See  Timothy  M.  Shaw,  "Regional  Cooperation  and  Conflict  in Africa,"  Inter- 
national  Journal  30  (Autumn  1975) :  671-688. 
See  Johan  Galtung,  "A  Structural  Theory  of  Imperialism,"  Journal  of Peace 
Research  2  (1971):  104-105;  see  also  his  "Conflict  on  a  Global  Scale: 
Social  lmpe;ial  ism and  sub-imperial ism -  Continuities  in the  Structural 
Theory  of  Imperial ism,"  World  Development  4  (March  1976) :  153-165. 
See  Timothy  M.  Shaw,  "International  Stratification  in Africa:  Sub-im- 
perial ism  in Eastern  and  Southern  Africa,"  Orbis  21  (Summer  1977). 
Cf.  Zartman,  "Europe  and  Africa,"  p.  341.  See  also  his essay,  "Africa," 
in James  N.  Rosenau,  Kenneth  W.  Thompson,  Gavin  Boyd,  eds.,  World  Politics: 
An  Introduction  (New  York:  Free  Press,  1976),  pp.  569-594. 
See  Lynn  K.  Mytelka,  "The  Distribution  of Gains  in Third World  Integrative 
Systems,"  World  Politics  25  (January  1973):  236-250  and  "A  Genealogy  of 
Francophone  West  and  Equatorial  African  Regional  Organizations ," Journal 
of  Modern  African  Studies  12  (July  1974):  297-320.  Also  see  James  H. 
Mi ttleman,  "The  Development  of Post-colonial  African  Regional ism  and  the 
Formation  of  the  OAU,"  Kroniek  van  Afrika  2  (1971):  83-105. 
See  Ghai , "Perspectives  on  Future  Economic  Problems  and  Prospects  in 
Africa"  and  "Africa,  the  Thi rd Worl d  and  the  Strategy  for  International 
Development". 
On  the  impact  and  implications  of this  split  in Southern  Africa  see  Colin 
Legum,  "The  Soviet  Union,  China  and  the  West  in Southern  Africa,"  Foreign 
Affairs  54  (July  1976):  745-762. 
For  an  attempt  to  employ  this  central  but  elusive  concept  see  Alvin  Z. 
Rubinstein,  ed.,  Soviet  and  Chinese  Influence  in the  Third  World  (New 
York:  Praeger,  1975).  See  also  Warren  Weinstein,  ed.,  Chinese  and  Soviet 
Aid  to Africa  (New  York:  Praeger,  1975). 
Robert  Legvold,  "Soviet  and  Chinese  Influence  in Black  Africa"  in Rubin- 
stein,  ed.,  Soviet  and  Chinese  Influence  in the  Third  World,  p.  159. 
Ibid.,  p.  167. 
See  Helen  Desfosses  Cohn,  Soviet  Policy  toward  Black  Africa:  The  Focus 
on  National  Integration  (New  York:  Praeger,  1972).  Cf.  the  more  ortho- 
dox  but  less  persuasive  analysis  of the  superpowers  as  actors  concerned 
primarily with  inter-,  rather  than  intra-,  state relations  in W.A.E. 
Skurni k,  "Africa  and  the  Superpowers ,'I  Current  Hi story  71  (November  1976) : 
145-148. 
See  Edward  T.  Wilson,  Russia  and  Black  Africa  before  World  War  I1  (New 
York:  Holmes  and  ~eier, 1974)  and  Teobaldo  Filesi,  China  and  ~friia 
the  Middle  Ages  (London:  Cass,  1972). 
On  the  dilemmas  which  Africa  poses  in terms  both  of  tactics  and  ideology, 
and  on  the  trend  towards  pluralism,  diversity and  conservatism  in the 
social ist world's  relations with  the  continent  see  Zbigniew  Brzezinski , 
ed.,  Africa  and  the  Communist  World  (Stanford:  Stanford  University  Press 
for  Hoover  Institution,  1963). 
The  Soviet  Union  distinguishes  countries  in the  Third World  along  three 
basic  indicators:"l)  the  class  or classes  that  are  in power;  2)  the  type 
of foreign  pol icy  that  is pursued;  and  3)  the  nature  of the  domestic  po- 
licies  that  are  implemented."  Roger  E.  Kanet,  "Soviet  Attitudes  toward - 
Developing  Nations  since  Stalin,"  in his  collection  on  The  Soviet  Union 
and  the  Developing  Nations  (Baltimore:  Johns  Hopkins,  1974),  p.  44. 
On  socialism  in Libya,  Algeria,  Mali,  Ghana  and  Tanzania  see  the  contri- 
butions  of  Valerie  Plave  Bennett,  Jean  Leca,  Helen  Desfosses  and  J.  Dirck 
Stryker,  Jon  Kraus  and  Frances  Hill  in Helen  Desfosses  and  Jacques  Levesque, 
eds.,  Socialism  in the  Third World  (New  York:  Praeger,  1975),  pp.  99-251. 
For  critical  analyses  of  the  political  economies  of Ghana  and  Tanzania 
see  the  essays  by  Emi ly Card  and  Lionel  Cl i ffe  in Ri chard  Harris,  ed. , 
The  Pol i tical  Economy  of Africa  (Cambridge,  Mass. :  Schenkman,  1975)  pp. 
49-91  and  137-185. 
Arthur  Jay  Klinghoffer,  "The  Soviet  Union  and  Africa,"  in Kanet,  ed., 
The  Soviet  Union  and  the  Developinq  Nations,  p.  63. 
95  Ibid.,  pp.  51-77.  In general,  however,  this  essay  is an  unfortunate, 
polemical  attack  reminiscent  of  the  cold war  period.  Klinghoffer  as- 
serts,  for  instance,  that  "a  class  analysis  of African  society  is not 
particulary  insightful ," p.  76  and  that  "Africa  may  become  anti-west- 
ernized  and  socialized,  but  it is unlikely  to  become  sovietized  or  com- 
munized,"  p.  77. 
96  Ibid.,  p.  51.  Cf.  the  "Cold  War"  perspectives  of W.A.C.  Adie,  Oil.  Poli- 
tics  and  Seapower:  The  Indian  ocean  vortex  (New  York:  crane;  ~ussak for 
National  Strategy  Information  Center,  1975). 
97  Hall  and  Peyman,  The  Great  Uhuru  Railway,  p.  13. 
See  Catherine  Hoskyns, 
o~ia-Somalia-Kenya Dis 
Press  for  IDA,  1969); 
Africa  (Cambridge:  Ha 
245;  and  Colin  Lequm  a 
Rex  Col 1 i ngs , 1977). 
rvard  Uni vers 
in African  Diplomacy:  2,  The  Ethi- 
(Dar  es  Salaam:  Oxford  University 
The  Boundary  Pol i ti cs  of  ~ndependent 
ity Press,  1972),  especially  pp.  212- 
nd  Bill  Lee,  Conflict  in the  Horn  of ~frica 
99  See  J.  Bowyer  Be1 1 , The  Horn  of Africa  (New  York:  Crane,  Russak  for 
National  Strategy  Information  Center,  1973) ; John  H.  Spencer,  Ethiopia, 
the  Horn  of  Africa,  and  U.S.  Policy  (Cambridge:  Institute for  Foreign 
Policy Analysis,  1977);  and  Legurn  and  Lee,  Conflict  in the  Horn  of Africa. 
100  External  interests  become  more  complex  and  indirect  if one  takes  into 
account  Soviet  interests  in Libya,  Yemen  and  Iraq and American  support 
of  Saudi  Arabia,  the  Gulf  states  and  Iran,  a11  of which  are  involved  in 
wider  Red  Sea  and  Indian Ocean  issues.  See  Timothy  M.  Shaw,  "Inequalities 
and  Interdependence  in Africa  and  Latin America:  Sub-Imperial ism and 
Semi- Industri a1 i zation  in the  Semi -Periphery,"  paper  presented  at a  meeti ng 
of  the  African  Studies  Association,  Houston,  1977. 
101  Tom  J.  Farer,  War  Clouds  on  the  Horn  of Africa:  A  Crisis  for  Detente 
(Washington  D.C.:  Carnegie  Endowment,  1976),  p.  153. 
102  Richard  Harris,  "The  Political  Economy  of Africa"  in his,  The  Political 
Economy  of  Africa,  p.  13.  On  the  complex  relations  among  "rnaldeveloped"/ 
"overdeveloped"  states  and  poor  countries,  see  K.  J.  Hol sti , "Underdevelop- 
ment  and  the  'Gap'  Theory  of  International  Confl ict ," American  Pol i tical 
Science  Review  69  (September  1975) :  827-839. 
103  Soviet  scholars  recognize  the  uneven  relations  among  the states  of Africa 
and  between  Europe  and  Africa  but  they  assert  that  Soviet-African  ties 
can  only  advance  African  development.  See  Peter  Foge  Jensen,  Soviet 
Research  on  Africa  with  Special  Reference  to  International  Relations, 
Research  Report,  no.  19  (Uppsala:  Scandinavian  Institute  of African 
Studies,  1973). 
104  On  the  problems  of  involuntary  and  unequal  regional  integration  among 
socialist  as  well  as  capitalist  states  see  Richard A.  Fa1 k,  "Zone  I1 as 
a  World  Order  Construct,"  in James  N.  Rosenau,  Vincent  Davis,  Maurice  A. 
East,  eds.,  The  Analysis  of  International  Politics  (New  York:  Free  Press, 
1972),  pp.  187-206.  Cf.  V.  G.  Solodovnikov  and  V.  Boooslovskv  Non-caoi- 
ta1 ist Development:  An  Historical  Out1 ine  (Moscow:  6rogress;  -* 
Developing  Countries  on  the  Non-Capi tal ist Road  (Sofia:  Bulgarian  Academy 
of  Sciences,  1974)  and  Mai  Palmberq  "Literature  on  Non-Capi tal ist Develop- 
ment,"  Scandinavian  Seminar  on  ~on-ta~i i st  Development  in Africa,  Hel- 
sinki,  August  1976. 
Gleb  Starushenko,  Africa  Makes  a  Choice:  The  Development  of Socialist- 
Oriented  States  (Moscow:  Novosti,  1975),  p.  8.  See  also  Joe  Slovo,  "A 
Cri tical  Appraisal  of  the  Non-Capi tal i st Path  and  the  National  Democratic 
State  in Africa,"  Marxism ~oda~,'June  pp.  1-14. 
For  a  broader  discussion  of alternative  development  strategies  and  their 
advocates  see  Timothy  M.  Shaw  and  Malcolm J.  Grieve,  "Dependence  or  Develop- 
ment?  A  Review  Article  on  International  and  Internal  Inequalities  in 
Africa,"  Development  and  Change  8  (July  1977) :  377-408. 
On  this  strategy  see  What  Now?  Another  Development  (Uppsala:  Dag  Ham- 
marskjold  Report,  1975),  pp.  70-87. 
On  the ecological  imperative  in Africa  see  Timothy  M.  Shaw  and  Malcolm 
J.  Grieve,  "Africa  and  the  Envi ronmen t :  The  Pol i ti cal  Economy  of Resources, " 
paper  presented  at a  meeting of  the  Canadian  Association  of African  Studies, 
Sherbrooke,  May  1976. 
On  the  problems  which  instabil i ty  cause  for  the  coherence  and  continuity 
of  African  foreign  pol i cies  see  Richard Vengroff,  "Ins tabi 1 i ty  and  Foreign 
Policy  Behavior:  Black  Africa  in the  UN,"  American  Journal  of Political 
Science  20  (August  1976):  425-438. 
See  R.  Cranford  Pratt,  "Foreign-Pol icy  Issues  and  the  Emergence  of Social ism 
Contrast  the  di fferent  trends  and  explanations  advanced  in Andrew  M. 
Kamarck,  "Sub-Saharan  Africa  in the  1980's:  An  Economic  Profile" with 
Phillipe Lemaitre,  "Who  Will  rule Africa  by  the  Year  2000?"  in Helen 
Kitchen,  ed.,  Africa:  From  Wstery  to Maze  (Lexington:  Heath,  1976), 
pp.  167-194  and  249-276.  For  an  intriguing,  but essentially  orthodox, 
comparati ve  analysis  of  pol i tical  strategies  of oppression  and  stabi 1 i ty 
in Africa  see  also  James  J.  Lawler,  "Confl ict-Avoidance  in Africa," 
Peace  Research  Reviews  8  (June  1976). 
See  Nelson  Kasfir,  The  Shrinking  Political  Arena:  Participation 
and  Ethnicity  in African  Politics, with  a  Case  Study  of Uganda  (~erkeley: 
University  of  Cal ifornia  Press,  1976),  pp.  14-27  and  Samuel  T.  Huntinqton 
and  Joan  M.  Nelson,  No  Easy  Choice:  Political  Participation  in   eve lo^- 
ing Countries  (Cambridge:  Harvard  University  Press,  1976). 
Cf.  recent  writings  in the  tradition of the  established  paradigm,  for 
example,  Arthur  Jay  Kl inghoffer,  "Modernization  and  Pol i ti cal  Development 
in Africa,"  Journal  of Modern  African  Studies  I1 (March  1973) :  1-19  and 
Leslie  Rubin  and  Brian  Weinstein,  Introduction  to African  Politics:  A 
Conti nen tal  Approach  (New  York:  Praeger,  1974). 
114  On  the  pathos  of  the  Fourth  World  see  Gerald  K.  Helleiner,  "The  Least 
Developed  in the  New  International  Economic  Order:  Devil  Take  the  Hind- 
most?"  Cooperation  Canada  25  (1976) :  3-1 3  and  Shaw,  "The  Third World 
and  the  New  International  Order." 
115  For  a  survey  of  some predictions see  Timothy  M.  Shaw  and  Malcolm J.  Grieve, 
"The  Pol i tical  Economy  of  Resources:  Africa's  Future  in the  Global  En- 
vironment, "  African  Review  (Forthcoming).  For  a  review  of Africa's  impact 
on  North-South  bargaining  see  John  P.  Renniger,  "After  the  Seventh  Special 
General  Assembly  Session:  Africa  and  the  New  Emerging  World  Order," 
African  Studies  Review  19  (September  1976) :  35-48. 
116  On  the  concentration  of  power  and  infl uence  on  the  continent  see  David  H. 
Johns,  "Diplomatic  Activity,  Power  and  Integration  in Africa"  in Patrick 
J.  McGowan,  ed.,  Sage  International  Yearbook  of Foreign  Policy  Studies  3 
(1976):  85-105.  See  also  his  "The  Normalization  of  Intra-African  Diplo- 
matic  Acti vi ty ," Journal  of  Modern  African  Studies  10  (December  1972) : 
597-610  and  Timothy  M.  Shaw,  "The  Development  of  International  Systems 
in Africa,"  a  paper  presented  at the  third  International  Congress  of 
Africanists,  Addis  Ababa,  December  1973. 
11 7  Cf.  A1 i A Mazrui , "The  New  Interdependence:  From  Hierarchy  to Symnetry" 
i n  Guy  F.  Erb  and  Valerina  ~allab,' eds.,  Beyond  ~e~endenc~    eve loping 
World  Speaks  Out  (Washington:  Overseas  Development  Council , 1975),  pp. 
38- 54. 
REG IOi4AL  RELATIONS  IN SOUTHERN  AFRICA 
AND  THE  GLOBAL  POLITICAL  ECONOYY 
Kenneth  W.  Grundy,  Case  Western  Reserve  University 
It is  irnpossi bl e  to  understand  international  relations  in a  dependent 
region  of  the  world  (or  for  that  matter  domestic  politics  in their  broadest 
out1 ine)  outside  of  the  context  of  the  total  global  constel lation of wealth 
and  power.  The  imnediate  purpose  of this  chapter  is to  discuss  the  nature 
of  international  relations  in Southern  Africa  and  the place  of the region 
in the  international  political  system.  Differing perceptions  of which  state 
is dominant  in the  region,  if one  includes  nonregional  powers,  of what  forces 
determine  dominance,  and  of what  effects  these  factors  have  on  the global 
distribution of  power  have  made  debatable  what,  on  the  surface,  had  once 
looked  to  be  rather  clear  cut.  Conditions  of dominance  and  submission, 
super  and  subordination,  imposition,  penetration,  accommodation  and  resi s- 
tance  characterize  regional  and  global  affai rs  regarding Southern  Africa. 
It is our  task  here  to sort out  these  relationships  in systematic  terms. 
The  first part of the  essay  consists  of  some  wide-ranging  impressions 
of  the  structural  character  of the  dependent  pol i tical-economic  relations 
between  the  developed  and  the  less  developed  world.  Near  the  end  of  that  part 
we  shall  focus  particularly  on  the  impact  of intermediary  forces  in the  struc- 
tures  and  techniques  of  dependence.  In the  second  section,  we  home  in on 
Southern  Africa,  and  especially  on  the  pivotal  place  of South  African  settler 
colonialism  in the  region.l  This  is followed by  a  descriptive  section  provid- 
i ng  a  picture of contemporary  regional  relations.  An  analysis  of the  most 
current  events  provides the  substance  of the  last part of the  essay  as  we  seek 
to  establ ish whether  the  region  is becoming  unglued.  We  move,  in short,  from 
the  general  to  the  specific,  to  provide the  reader  with  an  analytical  and 
i nterpreti ve  framework  by  which  "new"  events  and  developments  can  be  understood. 
The  Structural  Character  of World  Politics  -  Economic  Relations 
The  world's  states  are  monstrously  unequal  in wealth,  strength,  size  and 
any  number  of other  criteria  relating to  general  living conditions  and  the 
relative ability  to make  autonomous  decisions  and  to  carry  our  pol icies relating 
to  these  conditions.  Just  as  importantly,  within  these  states  there  is an 
unequal  distribution  of  the  assets  of power  and  living conditions.  In rough 
terms,  the  world  is composed  of  "have"  and  "have  not"  states  that  are,  in turn, 
made  up  of  "have"  and  "have  not"  groups  of people.  Too  many  theories  of  inter- 
national  relations  and  of imperial ism  in particular  ignore  the  i ntra-state 
features  of  inter-state  relationships.  They  tend  to  deal  with  states  as  holistic 
entities.  Since  data  usually  is compiled  on  a  statewide basis,  the  state  often 
by  default  becomes  the  effective  unit of analysis. 
Seen  from  one  perspective,  the  international  system  consists  of core 
(powerful )  and  periphery  (weak  or marginal)  states.  The  core  states  occupy 
dominant  positions  in the  global  economic  systems,  possess  dominant  or near 
dominant  mi 1 i tary  structures  global  in scope,  and  boast  comnanding  techno- 
logical  and  cultural  structures.  The  periphery  states  are  those  that must, 
for  various  reasons,  adjust  and  adapt  to  decisions  and  structures  controlled 
by  the  core.  Each  state  is 1 ikewise  made  up  of a  center  (the  power  wielders) 
and  a  fringe  (the objects  of  power).  Depending  on  the  issue  to  be  decided 
the  center consists  of  the  political  and  economic  elites  that  can  at any  given 
time expect  or  see  to  it that  their wishes  will  be  honored.  The  fringe  includes 
the  workers,  small  farmers,  the  unemployed,  the  uneducated  and  general ly those 
disadvantaged.  It is because  of the  inequities  in the  distribution of the 
assets  of  power  and  wealth,  and  because  of a widespread  resistance  to  any  given 
pattern of distribution  that  dominance  relationships  are asserted  and  reinforced 
by  structural  arrangements. 
To  be  sure,  this  introductory  statement  overlooks  various  intermediary 
actors,  both  within  and  between  states.  In addition,  because  of  its crudity, 
it underplays  divisions  and  competi tion  among  groups  within  the  "have"  and 
"have-not"  elements  of a state.  But  we  shall  return  to  these  concerns  shortly. 
There  is also  the  danger  that  this  type  of analysis  may  take  on  the  flavor  of 
a  conspiratorial  theory.  Nothing  like this  is intended.  Rather,  it is fully 
understandable  that  people  should want  to  increase  their  material  we1 1-being 
and  their  sense  of personal  worth  and  security,  and  to  do  so  in concert  with 
others  with  similar  values  and  interests.  They  would,  for obvious  reasons, 
be  more  likely  to  appreciate  their  own  interests  and  more  willing to  take  risks 
to  protect  and  improve  them,  at  the  expense  of others,  especially when  1 imi ted 
resources  are  being  contested.  Such  a  perspective  hardly  qua1 ifies as  a 
conspiratorial  theory  of  political  behavior,  although  it does  not  imnunize 
political  actors  or  their  policies  from  criticism based  on  moral  arguments. 
There  is also  the  danger,  particularly  in discussing  the  centers  and  fringes 
of states,  to  infer  that  behavior  is generally  planned,  just  because  struc- 
tures  exist  that  indicate  regular  patterns  of  interaction.  Again,  this  would 
be  reading  too  much  into descriptive  impressions  that  may  appear  to  indicate 
stability and  continuity.  To  freeze  a  descriptive model  in this  fashion  would 
be  to  deprive  it of much  of  its analytical  utility. 
Although  many  of  the  terms  and  metaphors  used  in the  following  discussion 
derive  from  economics,  it should  be  made  clear  at the outset  that  dependence 
as  used  here  is not  strictly  an  economic  phenomenon.  On  the  contrary,  it is 
an  aggregate  phenomenon  consisting  of economic,  political,  strateoic  and  cul- 
tural  determinants  and  aspects.  Words  like asset,  benefit,  loss,  cost,  ex- 
change,  market,  1 iabil i ty and  interest,  for  example,  should  be  considered  in 
their  broadest,  figurative  context. 
Though  it may  be  useful  at times  to  conceive  of  a  form  of domestic  de- 
pendence  (e.g.,  the  "homelands"  policy  of South  Africa),  since  our  chief  con- 
cern  in this  chapter  is international  relations,  we  will  regard  dependence  as 
a  dominance  relationship between  states,  and  one  that,  in its contemporary 
form,  depends  upon  super  and  subordination  within  state  boundaries .2  When 
domestic  dominance  patterns  weaken,  external  governments  and  organi zations  some- 
times  find  it necessary  to  construct  new  structures  to  serve  as  their  agents 
or points  of penetration,  and  to  facilitate  the  process  of unequal  exchange. 
Thus,  dependence  is founded  on  the  symbiotic,  a1 though  by  no  means  equal , 
relationships  that  have  been  established  between  the center  of the  core  state 
and  the  center  of  the  periphery  state.  Both  centers  profit from  this  relation- 
ship;  however,  the center  of  the  core  profits more.  The  fringe elements  of 
both  states  are  disadvantaged  by  the  relationship,  but the  fringe of  the 
periphery  state suffers  more.  Contemporary  imperial i sts,  a1 though  they  may 
not  have  created  them,  exploit  these  internal  inequal i ties  and  fortui tiously 
encourage  them  by  establ i shing  harmonies  of interest  between  center  elements 
in different  states,  and  conflicts of interest  between  the  fringe  segments 
in various  states,  between  the center  elements  and  the  fringe  elements  in each 
state,  and,  ultimately,  between  the  core  and  the periphery  states  themselves. 
It is this  final  antagonism,  the  disharmony  of interests  between  the  core  and 
the  periphery  states,  that  is the  usual  subject  of analysis  in most  studies  of 
dependence  and  international  relations.  But  this is,  in many  ways,  only  the 
formal  manifestation  of  the  subject.  It is a  symptom  of the  phenomenon  of 
dependence,  not  i ts  cause. 
The  major  potential  source  of  instability  in the  system  is the  fringe 
in the  periphery,  for  it consists  of  those  most  disadvantaged.  If ever  the 
two  fringes  should  realize  the  similarity  of their  interests  and  if fringe 
a1 1 iances  should  be  formed,  the  two  centers  would  have  to  resort  to  more  direct 
forms  of violence  to  secure  the  imperial  system.  Core  states  have  often  found 
it necessary  to  rush  to  the  rescue  of periphery  governments.  This  is as  much 
an  indication of  the  incomplete  or  inefficient  operation  of a  complex,  jerry- 
built contemporary  dependence  system  as  it is an  indication of  imperialism  in 
full  flower.  Dominant  states  and  their  allies  (the  center  of the  periphery 
states)  are  willing  and  able  to  revert  to the  direct  use  of  violence  to  sustain 
the  status  quo  and  their  privileges  within  it.  This  implies  that  systemic 
structures  work  imperfectly. 
Stratified  relationships  are  not  solely  a  product  of particular economic 
or  ideological  systems.  Although  some  economic  or  ideological  modes  may  be 
more  adaptable  to  dominance  and  dependence,  no  single world  economic  system 
has  a  monopoly  on  imperialistic  behavior  and  none  can  exclude  its own  behavior 
from  being  designated  as  imperial  when  it involves  super  and  subordination 
reinforced  by  structural  ties.  What  matters  is the  character  and  quality  of 
the  re1 ationships  between  states  and  between  groups  therein,  and  the  effects 
these  re1 ationships  have  on  various  peoples. 
In essence,  dependence  re1 ationships  are  exchange  relationships.  Whether 
the  exchange  between  the  core  and  the  periphery  is economic,  political , rnili tary 
or  cu! tural , the  relationship  is asymetrical .  The  character  of the  relation- 
ship  is one  that  usually  redounds  to  the  benefit  of  the  core  at the  expense 
of  the  periphery,  particularly to  the  fringe  groups  of the  periphery.  This 
is not  to  say  that  all  such  relationships  between  core  and  periphery  always 
work  to  the  advantage  of one  side  over  the  other.  But  it is normally  an  unequal 
exchange  chiefly  because  the  val ue  of goods  exchanged  is inequitable  between 
the  actors,  that  is,  the  values  exchanged  have  little relationship  to  the 
human  efforts  involved  in creating  the  goods,  or  because  the  effects  or spinoffs 
within  the  respective  actors  are  asymnetrical.  It is also  unequal  because  the 
market  in which  the  exchange  occurs  is controlled  by  the  core,  and  hence  is 
stacked  in the  core's  favor.  k'ith  regard  to  the  asymnetry  of  spinoffs,  the 
social  imp1 ications  of  the  relationship  are,  on  balance,  disadvantageous  to 
the periphery  state  and  particularly  to  its inhabitants.  Even  should  prices 
for  goods  exchanged  be  increased  to  the  advantage  of the  periphery  state,  the 
effects  of  the  relationship within  the periphery  state  would  still  be  negative 
if its social  spinoffs  yielded  depleted  resources,  continued  dependence  on 
finished  products  manufactured  in core  states,  di storted economic  and  social 
infrastructures,  and  a  society  that  displays  marginal  ski1 1 s,  a  psychological 
sense  of  i nferiori ty  and  dependence,  and  the  mai ntenance  of a  pri vi leged  center 
in league  with  the  center  of a core  state.  In such  a  situation,  the periphery 
is poorly  equipped  to  resist  the  pressures  and  blandishments  of the  core. 3 
The  consequences  of  these  exchanges  eventual ly have  pol i tical  overtones  which 
give  the  core  immense  leverage  in dictating  future  relations. 
Dependence  is a  matter of degree.  Some  states  and  groups  are  more  or 
less  dependent  than  others,  and  more  or  less  involved  in the  system,  depend- 
ing on  the  inequalities  of exchange,  and  the  structural  stabilities  that  under- 
lie their  behavior.  There  is even  the  possibility and  the  likelihood that  as 
condi tions  constantly  change,  some  state 's  behavior  may  simul taneously  ref1 ect 
characteristics of both the  core  and  the  periphery.  Portugal,  for example,  had 
been  dominant  in the context  of its  own  colonial  system  at the  same  time  that 
i t was  part  of the periphery  of a  North American-West  European  economic  sys 
The  governments  of some  periphery states  may  perceive  that  their  role  in the 
larger  system  is to  serve  as  an  intermediary  between  the  core  and  other,  still 
more  marginal  states.  This  role may  be  particularly  lucrative  if, for one 
reason  or another,  (e.g.,  the existence  of more  than  one  empire,  the  division 
of  labor  and  levels  of status  in the productive  process,  or the  complications 
of ideological,  ethnic,  racial  or  geopol i tical  factors),  there  is increased 
room  for  maneuver  in the  interstices  between  systems  and  between  components 
of  the  systems.  It is to such  a1 ternatives  that we  now  turn. 
Despite  the  possi bi 1 i ties  or  tendencies  for powerful  forces  to concert 
in defense  of the  global  order,  the  facts  that  there  are  different  and  compet- 
ing core  powers,  that within  the  centers  of core  states  there  are  conflicts 
of  interests,  and  that each  element's  principal  concern  is to  maximize  its 
particular  advantages,  not  just  in relation  to  the periphery but,  if need  be, 
in relation to  the  other  core actors,  do  provide elements  of the  centers  in 
the periphery  states  (and  the  fringes  in the  core  and  periphery)  with opportunities 
for  maneuver. 5 
One  might  pursue  this  still  further  by  noting  that  some  geopolitical  factors 
(location,  topology  and  the  uneven  distribution of  the  worl d's  scarce  resources) 
might  also  be  parlayed  into  the  rise of  intermediary forces.  Given  ideological 
bl indspots  and  racial  and  ethnic  hang-ups,  additional  flexibi 1 i ties  and  rigid- 
ities are  introduced  into an  already  complex  system.  The  effect  is to  provide 
interstices  in which  ostensibly  less  powerful  states  can  find  space  to  provide 
intermediary services  to more  powerful  actors  in the  system.  The  price exacted 
for  these  services  is enhanced  stature  and  influence  and  even  a  competi tive 
role within  the  system.  At  the  same  time  an  intermediary  state  may  issist 
the  imperialists  on  other  issues.  It may  even  go  so  far  as  to  construct  an 
embryonic  mini-empi re  in its own  right,  usual ly,  however,  with  the  encouragement 
or  at  least  acquiescence  of core  gr0u~s.6  This  mini-empire,  far  from  being  an 
object  of derision  and  scorn,  may  eventually  challenge  a  larger  core  state, 
at  first  in regional  terms  (perhaps  beginning with  only  a  single  issue)  and 
then,  conceivably  in even  broader  terms.  This  would  be  the  case  particularly 
if it could  exploit  its own  hinterland more  efficiently  than  it was  being ex- 
ploi ted  by  the  dominant  core.  Just  as  a  strict dichotomy  between  center  and 
fringe  is too  crude  for  social  analysis  at  the  intra-state  level,  so  the 
distinction  between  core  and  periphery  must  be  hedged  with  reservations,  ex- 
ceptions,  qua1 ifications  and  contingencies  in trying  to  understand  the  workings 
of  the  international  system.  In a world  of  some  150  states,  it stands  to 
reason  that  there  is room  for  at least a  few  such  intermediary  actors. 
Southern  Africa  and  Settler  Colonial ism 
South  Africa  displays  many  of the  characteristics  of an  intermediary 
state.  The  South  African  economy,  partially  industrialized and  partially 
a  producer  of  primary  products  and  raw  materials,  might  be  said  to  be  one 
or  two  steps  ahead  of most  periphery states  in the  productive  ladder,  yet 
still  a  couple  of steps  behind core  states.  South  Africa  imports  unskilled 
1 abor  from  its  1 ess  developed  nei ghbors , yet  i t sti 11  depends  heavily  on 
products  and  technology  emanating  from  the  core.  It exports  finished  pro- 
ducts  and  to a  much  lesser extent  investment  capital  to  its neighbors,  yet 
must  still  secure  capital  and  reinvested  profits  and  sell  its raw  materials 
to more  advanced  economies.  It is,  in short,  located  in the  middle  of  the 
production  process,  and  hence,  in  between  the  core  and  periphery  in  the  global 
system.  This  has  led  to  a  rather  ambiguous  combination  of  foreign  and  domes- 
tic  policies,  some  of  which  reflect  a  harmony  of  interest  between  South  Africa 
and  the  imperialist  core,  and  some  of  which  reflect  conflicts  of  interest 
and  competition  with  the  core.  But  that  it is  part  of  the  dependence  system, 
a  crucial  link  in  the  productive  and  control  chain,  is  undeniable. 
South  Africa  and  to  a  far  lesser  extent,  Rhodesia  occupy  intermediary 
places  in  the  Euro-American  global  system  for  another  reason,  too,  one  that 
under1 i es  how  and  why  they  managed  to  achieve  thei r  role  of  economi c mi  ddl e- 
ranking.  This  reason  related  directly  to  the  peculiarities  of  their  own 
centers,  for  a  crucial  intermediary  force  in  the  dependence  system  has  been 
colonial-settlers,  especially  when  they  are  able  to  establish  minority  regimes. 
The  term  colonial-settler,  as  used  here,  must  include  not  only  settlers,  but 
a1 1  the  administrative  machinery  associated  with  the  expatriate  mercantile- 
extractive  complex  --  the  local  staffs  of  metropol i tan-based  companies,  the 
colonial  civil  service  at the  lower  (less mobile)  grades,  and  the  agents  and 
backers  of  these  interests  in  the  metropolitan  core.  This  group  has  emerged 
as  a "third  element",  an  "independent  factor"  insinuating  itself  between 
the  core  governments  and  the  i ndi genous  peopl es  of  periphery  states .7  By 
asserting  their  independence,  colonial-settler  governments  may  both  strengthen 
and  chal lenge  the  establ ished  imperial i st order. 
How  and  why  do  such  colonial-settler  elites  come  to  be  relatively  inde- 
pendent?  To  answer  this  we  have  to  look  into  the  history  of  colonial  expansion. 
Without  raising  the  important  question  of  what  propel led  or  initiated  the 
nineteenth  century  imperialist  thrust,  it is necessary  to  admit  that  one 
seminal  factor was  the  colonial-settlers  themselves.  They  came  in  most  in- 
stances  from  the  mother  country  and  often  were  the  direct administrative  agents 
of  the  metropol itan  government  and  of  companies  based  in  and  financed  by  capital 
frov  the  metropole.  Nevertheless,  there  was  never  a  precise  coincidence  of 
interests  between  this  colonial  element  and  the  government  in  the  metropol is. 
Because  of  the  structural  evolution  of  modern  imperial ism,  a  point  was  reached 
at which  the  core's  center  decided  that  direct  administration  of  colonial  ter- 
ri tories  did  not  add  to  the  advantages  derived  from  a  territory  in  relation 
to  the  costs  involved. 
Imperialist  governments  realized  that  it was  not  necessary,  indeed  in 
certain  contexts  actually  detrimental,  to  be  saddled  with  the  responsibilities, 
costs  and  stigma  of  being  a colonial  power.  This  was  not  a unilateral  decision. 
Domestic  and  international  pressures,  pl us  the  increased  costs  of colonial 
government  resul ting  from  national ist independence  pressures  in the  colonies 
contributed  to  such  policy  decisions.  But  it was  determined  that  old advantaqes 
might  actually  be  more  effectively maintained  and  managed  by  an  indigenous  "self- 
governing"  elite tied  to  the  ex-metropole  by  other,  non-official  1 inks. 
In contrast,  at some  different  point  in the  evolution  of  the  colony,  some 
colonial-settlers  began  to  realize  that:  (1)  they  could  benefit  to  a  greater 
extent  if they  were  to  sever  or at least  re-arrange  their  links  with  the  me- 
tropole;  and/or  (2)  ul timate  self-government  for  the  fringe  majority  (and  even 
for  an  indigenous  elite tied to  the  ex-metropole)  might jeopardize  the  colonial- 
settlers'  preferred  position  in the  colony.  Hence,  it becam  clear that  their 
own  interests  conflicted with  those  of  their  mother  country,  or at  least with 
the  governing  elements  there.  This  left them  with basically  three  a1 ternatives. 
In order  of  probable  preference  to  the  colonial-settlers  these  were:  (1 )  inde- 
pendence  with  government  in the  hands  of the  colonial-settlers,  usually a 
minority  government  except  in cases  of the  earlier  classical  colonies;  (2)  con- 
tinued  colonial  rule with  the  colonial-settlers  in legal  surrogate  but  still 
privileged positions ; or  (3)  independence  under  an  indigenous  government.  It 
was  possible,  a1 though  risky,  to attempt  a fourth  a1 ternative,  somewhere  be- 
tween  alternatives  two  and  three,  that  is,  to  create  an  airtight alliance with 
key  elements  of the  indigenous  elite and  support  their bid to  independence. 
This  is not  unlike  the  way  that  the  colonial-settlers  in Katanga  (Shaba)  cham- 
pioned  Moi se  Tshornbe.  But  this  provided  1 ittler security  since,  ultimately, 
both  the  imperial  powers  and  the  indigenous  majority  would  seek  to annul  this 
marriage  of convenience.  It is wrong,  therefore,  bl indly  to  regard  colonial- 
settlers  as  nothing  but  spokesman  for  the  imperial  core  state. 
Thus,  the  presence  and  pressures  of  the  colonial-settlers  may  help  ex- 
plain why  some  imperial  powers  have  been  unwilling or  have  had  a  difficult 
time  divesting  themselves  of certain  territories.  ' The  colonial-settlers 
themselves  and  their  allies  and  agents  in the  metropole  proved  to be  a  tenacious 
and  formi dab1 e  pol i tical  force  in metropol i tan pol i ti cs.  Thei ;*  1 i ves  were 
meaningless  outside  of  their own  portion  of empire.  They  benefited directly 
from  their  colony.  Therefore,  they  promoted  their  colony.  Ironically,  this 
is why  they  were  sometimes  found  opposing  the  core's  center  when  decisions  of 
emi>i re were  in the  balance.  They  chal len~ed  mother  country  whenever  it 
appeared  that  the  latter was  making  policy  based  upon  considerations  of  the 
wider,  total  empi re.  No  matter  how  paradoxical  this  may  appear,  it is con- 
ceivable  and  1 i kely  that  the  contemporary  imperial  relationship  (i .e.,  the 
unequal  exchange  relationship)  no  longer  needs  colonial-settlers.  Hence, 
empire  might  actually  be  advanced  by  policies that  on  the  surface  seem  to 
represent  a  retreat  from  formal  or juridical  empire.  This  has  been  an  era 
when  the  formal  institutional  trappings  of empire  are  a  liability.  Because 
colonial-settlers'  horizons  are  1 imi ted or because  thei r fie1 d of maneuver 
is provincial,  not  global,  colonial-settlers  resist their  "sell-out"  by  pur- 
suing what  they  try  to  promote  as  "anti-imperial"  policies that  are  in their 
imnediate  interest,  but  in conflict with  the  long-run  interests  as  conceived 
by  the core's  center.8  They  become,  in short,  anti-imperialists  in the  global 
context  in order  to  facilitate,  prolong  and  strengthen  their  own  domestic 
"imperial"  system.  The  colonial-settlers,  then,  come  to be  a middle  force, 
exploi ti ng  and  denigrating  the  indigenous  territorial  or  regional  population, 
slowing  down  the  process  of  independence  for  an  indigenous  government,  and 
also,  occasional ly,  resisting  the  pol icies of the  great  corporations  and  their 
governmental  spokesmen  back  in the  metropole.  Settler  comnuni ties,  unl i ke 
the  big capitalist  enterprises,  have  by  and  large  been  unable  to come  to  terms 
with  even  the  indigenous  elite.  Only  by  seceding  from  the  empire  could the 
colonial  settlers  be  free  to  repress  and  exploit more  completely  the  majority 
fringe  in their territories,  the  element  that  to  them  represents  the greatest 
threat.  It appeared,  with  South  Africa's  outward  policy,  dialogue  about 
dialogue,  and  detente,  that  South  Africa's  leaders  were  ready  to accommodate 
themselves  to  bourgeois  black  regimes  on  their  boundaries.  But  there  are  built- 
in limits  as  to  how  flexible  they  can  be. 
The  core's  center  and  especially  the  core's  fringe  do  not easily  abandon 
their  colonial  settlers.  Racial  attachments,  family  and  psychological  ties 
of  "kith  and  kin"  do  not evaporate  on  signal.  For  these  reasons  the  abandon- 
ment  is seldom  total,  and  may  in fact only  take  place on  one  level,  the  govern- 
mental. 
South  Africa's  complexities,  with  racial  affinities  confused  by  Afri kaner 
against  English-speaker  in turn further baffled  by  class  sympathies  and  identi ties, 
prompted  the  Afrikaner  government  to  regard  Great  Britain not as  the  mother 
country  but  as  the  imperial  enemy.  But  there  were  also  powerful  British- 
rooted economic  interests  in turn-of-the-century  South  Africa  that 
saw  an  opportunity  to  enlarge  profits  if they  could  involve  the  British  govern- 
ment  and  military  in their  own  cause.  Britain  "won"  the  ensuing  Boer  War  but 
"lost"  the  peace.  Whi le the  British and  Engl ish-speaking  South  Africans  took 
firm hold  of the  economy  the  political  system  was  turned  back  to  the  ~frikaners.~ 
Boer  against  Great  Britain is an  unusual  case  because  of the national istic  split 
that  accounted  for  important  economic  contradictions  among  the  colonial -settlers 
in South  Africa.  Far  more  frequently  col onial-settlers  derive  from  the  metropole 
itself,  and  usually  are  only a  generation  or  two  or  three  removed  from  the 
"home  country".  In Rhodesia,  A1 geria,  Kenya,  Angola,  Mozambique  and  Katanga 
this  has  been  the  case.  Race  and  ethnicity  are  convenient  code  groupings  that 
may,  of  course,  be  raised  to  the  level  of causal  factors,  as  in South  Africa. 
But  they  are  reinforced and  made  important  because  of  the  economic  and  political 
ramifications  they  entail. 
As  the  colonial-settler  comnuni ty  took  root  it began  to  establish  insti- 
tutions  and  interests  that,  depending  on  their  size  and  character,  became 
increasingly  independent  of the  metropole.  Even  nominally metropolitan  insti- 
tutions  displayed  fissiparous  tendencies.  It did not  take  colonial  officials 
in the  territory  long  to  realize that  only  one  thing  stood  between  them  and 
uninhibited  power,  the  metropol i tan  government.  So  they  began  with  appeals 
for  more  decisional  latitude,  followed  them  with  arguments  for  the  efficiency 
and  " democracy"  of  greater  decen tral i zation  and  terri torial  autonomy,  and 
ended  up  with  demands  for and  finally  declarations  of  independence.  The  speed 
with  which  this  process  moved  depended  on  a  number  of factors,  not  the  least 
of which  were  the  degree  to which  the  administrative  machinery  depended  on  metro- 
pol itan  revenues  and  military might  to  assure  their  station,  the extent  of settler 
pressure  behind  them,  and  the  determination  of  the  metropol i tan  government 
to  resist  such  trends.  Settler  colonies  were  more  inclined to move  along  this 
road  than  purely  administrative  colonies.  If colonial  settlers  felt that  they 
might  add  to  their  economic  privileges  as  we1 1 as  their  power  by  moving  away 
from  the  mother  country,  they  did not  hesitate,  arguing  as  did the  Rhodesians, 
that  it was  the  mother  country  that  disowned  them,  not  the  other way  around? 
Li!:ewise,  settler  employees  and  officials  of metropol i tan-based  entwprises 
also  manifested  independent  tendencies,  especially  if they  reasoned  that  their 
local  operations  were  self-sufficient  and  could  compete  in the  total  world 
economy  and  that  they  might  thereby  inflate their  psychological  and  material 
rewards  by  assuming  total  control  rather  than  exercising  subordinate  admini- 
strative  roles.  Moreover,  other  fully  or  principal ly  local  enterprises  were 
competitors  of  metropolitan  interests,  and  hence  suffered  from  ultimate  author- 
ity  being  in  the  hands  of  the  core's  center.  They  were  not  especially  sym- 
pathetic  to  the  interests  of  the  imperial  whole.  Indeed,  since  they  were 
anxious  to  maximi ze  their  immediate  advantages  by  exploiting  the  indigenous 
labor  pool  more  ruthlessly,  they  constituted  the  most  aggressive  segment  of 
the  colonial-settler  opponents  of  continued  imperial  rule. 
In  some  African  colonies,  for  various  reasons,  the  imperial  power  allied, 
a1 bei t  not  always  enthusiastically,  with  the  indigenous  bourgeois  national ists 
whom  they  regarded  as  the  best  bet  to  prolong  the  imperial  pattern  of  unequal 
relationships  without  the  albatross  of  juridical  empire.  No  force  in  t+e 
issue  supported  the  indigenous  masses.  In  some  cases,  the  hasty  retreat  from 
legalistic  colonialism  can  be  explained  by  a  desire  on  the  part  of  imperial 
decision  makers  to  move  before  the  colonial  settlers  could  consolidate  their 
positions  and  snatch  independence  for  themselves.  It was  not  an  altruistic 
desire  to  a1 low  majorities  to  be  self-governing.  Rather,  legal istic  decoloni- 
zation  was  simply  an  evidence  of  long-term  flexibility.  There  was  the  danger 
that  racial  minority  regimes  in  former  colonies  were  unstable  and  increasingly 
independent  of  the  former  metropole.  The  core's  center  had  a1 ready  chosen 
the  indigenous  bourgeois  bureaucrats  to  rep1 ace  the  often  irascible,  some- 
times  demanding,  potentially  independent  colonial-settler  officials.  The 
process  frequently  led  to  the  colonial-settler  regime  being  ostracized  as 
a  pariah  by  neighbors  and  often  the  wider  global  community.  By  thus  being 
isolated  the  regime  gains  added  incentive  to  solidify  its  independence  by 
pursuing  autarchic  pol icies  designed  to  make  it economically  and  mi  1 i tarily 
sel f-sufficient. 
There  is,  of  course,  no  reason  why  at some  point  indigenous  bureaucrats 
cannot  reason  as  do  the  colonial-settlers.  In  the  future  they  too  may  begin 
to  think  that  they  possess  the  skills  and  resources  to  "go  it alone",  and 
by  so  doing  avoid  the  necessity  of  sharing  power  and  profit  with  metropolitan 
i nteres ts .  In  addi ti on,  thei r  own  domes tic pol i tical  i nsecuri ty  may  compel 
them  at least  to  appear  to  break  with  the  core  states.  This  would  require 
that  they  somehow  transcend  a  dependent  colonial  mentality  that  had  been 
carefully  cultivated  by  imperial  experience.  This  is not  impossible,  however, 
to  some  extent  it has  a1 ready  occurred  in  some  territories,  as  in  Tanzania. 
In most  cases  the  relationship  between  the  centers  of  core  and  periphery  is 
dynamic  with  each  side  testing  the  1 irni ts  of control  and  autonomy.  However, 
the  periphery's  centers  usually  look  upon  rev01 utionary  autonomy  as  premature 
or  "unreal istic". 
Indicators  as  to  why  the  imperial  powers  oppose  the  independence  of  colon- 
ial  settler  governments  might  be  found  in the  policies  that  these  governments 
followed  once  they  secured  juridical  independence.  The  case  of South  Africa 
and,  a1 though  the  time  factor  makes  this  difficult,  the  case  of Rhodesia,  are 
instructive.  South  Africa,  for  example,  has  moved  in the past  thirty years 
from  a  state  almost  entirely  dependent  on  economic  and  other  ties  with  the 
former  metropole  to  one  that,  a1 though  still  dependent  on  core  economic  forces, 
has  learned  to exploit  these  relationships  more  fully.  In so  doing  South 
Africa,  not  the  ex-metropole,  has  begcn  to  define  the  terms  of contact.  It, 
more  than  the  ex-metropole,  has  begun  to  exercise  regional  economic  hegemony, 
and  it is being  re-integrated  into  the  global  capitalist  system  on  far more 
favorabl e  terms. 
Wi thout  reviewing  the  economic  evol ution  and  most  notably the  industrial i- 
zation  of  South  Africa,  we  can  appreciate  that  the  government  in Pretoria 
today  defines  the  terms  of  foreign  investment  and  trade  in that  country. 
In the  past  South  Africa  had  been  principally  a supplier  of gold and  raw 
materials  for  European  and  North American  finance  and  industry.  But  its gov- 
ernment  has  taken  conscious  steps  to  reshape  this  relationship  of dependency. 
By  creating  governmental  corporations,  especially  in "vulnerable"  and  strate- 
gi cal ly important  economic  and  mi 1 i tary  sectors,  by  investing  in infrastructure, 
by  direct  government  investment  in forei gn-based  private  firms,  by  requiring 
sales  of  stock  locally,  by  forcing  or encouraging  foreign  capital  to accept 
i ncreasing  degrees  of  local  participating and  control,  by  forcing  industrial i- 
zation  through  regulations  demanding  increased  local  content  of products  as- 
sembled  in South  Africa,  and  by  redefining the  terms  of  trade  with  other  core 
countries  through  adjustments  in tariff  and  1 icensing  policies,  South  Africa 
has  asserted  its  independence  of Great  ~ritain.11 The  result has  been  not 
only  a  consol idation  of the  instruments  of domestic  colonialisla,  but  the 
creation  of a  South  African  imperial ism of  its own.12  The  South  African  govern- 
ment  has  not  only  dominated  key  sectors  of the  economy,  but  it has  "domesticated" 
many  that,  in the  context  of other  countries,  had  been  heretofore  fairly 
rapacious  and  sel f-con tai ned  forei gn  enterprises. 
One  gets  the  impression  that  there  has  not  been  much  resistance  from 
executives  and  directors  in the  core,  largely  because  this  enables  them  to 
plead  innocence  regarding apartheid  social  pol icies  that  they  have  not  really 
tried  to  change  or modify,  and  from which  they  profit.13  An  attitude  of  self- 
imposed  isolation  growing  out  of South  Africa's  inability  to  deal  with external 
and  internal  cri ticism and  ostracism,  combined  with  regional  strategic  vul- 
nerabil i ty,  contributed  to  this  pol icy direction.  External  and  internal  threat 
were  real  enough  to  harden  their  resolve  to  maximize  their  defensibil i ty, 
independence  and  autarky. 
All  of  this  is not  to  argue  that  the  Republic  of South  Africa  is a  totally 
independent  entity  in world  politics,  divorced  from the  wider  capitalist econo- 
mic  system.  It is sufficient,  however,  to  give  rise to  discussion  as  t3 whether, 
at least  in terms  of  Southern  Africa,  the  South  African  tail  is wagging  the 
U.K.  dog,  or  at  least  is doing  pretty much  as  it pleases  without  much  more 
than  verbal  resistance  from  U.  K.  or  U.S.  governments  and  investors.14  Since 
peripheral  relationships  are  a  matter  of  degree,  it must  be  admitted  that 
South  Africa  is significantly  more  independent  of  Great  Britain  today  that 
twenty-fi  ve  years  ago,  and  considerably  more  than  most  ostensibly  "independent" 
former  colonies.  Moreover,  a1 though  today  there  is more  contact  between  various 
European  capital ist interests  and  their  South  African  counterparts,  it must  be 
added  that  what  is vital  in exploring imperial  relationships  is not  solely  the 
extent  or  volume  of  these  1 inks,  but  their qua1 itative nature,  in terms  of 
super  and  subordination.  To  be  sure,  extensive  linkages  can  contribute  to  the 
perception  and  the  reality of dependence.  But  in itself  it is not explanatory. 
The  more  important  questions  relate  to the character  of those  relationships 
and  the  extent  of  their  inequality.  Who  benefits  and  who  loses  and  to what 
extent?  Certainly  there  is a  great  deal  more  trade  between  the  United  States  and 
Europe  than  there  is between  the  Uni ted  States  and  Latin America.  But  i n one 
case  the  effect  of  that  trade  yields  dominance  and  dependence;  in the  other 
case,  the  relationship  is more  debatable.  The  same  might  be  noted with  regard 
to  investments,  technical  exchanges,  cul tural  and  comnunications  contacts  and 
political  ties.  Or  take  the  case  of South  Africa.  Less  than  eight  per cent 
of  its trade  is with  Africa,  but  the  asymmetry  1 ies  essentially  in its favor. 
In contrast  about  seventy  per  cent  of  its trade  is directed  to  Europe  and 
America.  In the  latter arrangement,  however,  the  relationships  are  considerably 
more  equitable.  Structurally  the  spin-offs  sti 11  benefit  the  industrial  states 
and  the center  of  the  intermediary  state.  Hence  volume  and  quality  (in monetary 
and  structural  terms)  must  be  considered  in any  analytical  equation.  It is 
not  enough  to  argue  that  since  return  on  investment  is  higher  in South  Africa 
than  practical ly anywhere  else  in the  Comnonweal th,  then  Bri ti sh  and  American 
capital  is exploiting  South  Africa.  Rather  the  better  argument  is that  out- 
side  investors  are  exploiting  the  indigenous  population  (the  fringe)  and  the 
natural  resources  of South  Africa,  but  so  is the  colonial  settler  minority, 
even  to  a  greater  degree.  Exploitation,  it must  be  remembered,  is not  a  zero- 
sum  game.  One  side's  gains  do  not  necessarily  cancel  out  the  other  party's 
losses.  Rather  certain  organizational  and  structural  changes  may  inflate 
the  sum  total  of gains,  rendering  exploitation  no  less  real,  but  nevertheless 
a1 tering  the  rnagni tude  and  character  of  the  relationships.  The  apartheid 
policies  of  the  South  African  regime  have  rendered  a  situation where  there 
is more  than  enough  for  the  centers  in both the  core  and  the  intermediary. 
Some  of  the  excess  may  be  distributed  to  the  fringe  in the  core  --  almost 
none  goes  to  the  indigenous  fringe  in Southern  Africa.  Hence  it is not so 
much  that  the  colonial  settlers  are against  finance  imperial ism  in principle. 
Rather,  there  seems  to be  a  kind of  love-hate  relationship  founded  on  a  con- 
fl icting yet  complementary  economic  ~artnership  a  positive  community  of 
security  interests.  The  core  suppl ies  the  capital , the  technology,  the  trade, 
the  long-term  protection and  strategic  support  and  the  ideological  legi timi- 
zation  in the  world  at large,  and  the  center  of  the  intermediary  state  provides 
the  pol i tical  structure  for  control 1 ing and  exploiting  indigenous  labor,  access 
to  the  raw  materials  and  the  ruthlessness  and  muscle  to  maintain  local  order. 
They  need one  another,  but  they  still  do  not  trust  one  another,  since  each 
can  concei ve  of arrangements  that  might  be  preferable,  and  even  more  profitable 
to  itself. 
The  decisional  center  of  gravity  has  been  shifted  by  determined  and  conscious 
governmental  pol icy by  the  center  of the  intermediary  state.  Insofar  as  profits 
continue  to  flow  to  the  core's  center,  new  investments  (which  in most  cases 
are  re-i nvestrnents  of local ly generated  profits)  and  increased  trade  will 
accrue  to  South  Africa.  But the  structural  instruments  for  greater  independence 
from  the  core  a,re being established  despite  and  because  of the  extension  of 
these  contacts. 
South  Africa's  relations with  the  core  are  in an  important  transitional 
state.  Its governing  elite senses  this.  Earlier,  South  Africa's  leaders  sug- 
gested  that  they  might  serve  as  "bridges"  between  black  Africa  and  ~uro~e.15 
But  later  views  became  more  assertive  and  independent  of  Europe.  As  the  African 
states  were  about  to  be  granted  formal  independence,  Foreign  Minister  Louw 
gratuitously  warned  African  statesmen  of the  danqers  of  dealinq  with  Eurooe. 
He  spoke  of  "sel f-appointed  advi sors"  from  "outsi de"  who  sought  only  profit  for 
themselves  and  the  countries  that  sent  them.  Moreover,  he  cited  the  dangers 
of  "foreign  financiers"  seeking  valuable  concessions  and  guaranteed  profits. 
Finally,  he  told  them  that with  foreign  aid  "a  political  quid  pro quo  will  be 
demanded  (or  at least  expected)."  Not  bad  advice,  and  coming  from  one  whose 
people,  earlier  in its history  suffered  some  of  these  same  imperial  machinations. 
He  clearly  meant  the  European  powers,  but latter-day  warnings  have  substituted 
the  spectre  of communist  rather  than  European  capitalist  imperialism. 
Louw's  words  might  well  have  served  as  early  caution  regarding  South 
Africa's  "outward  looking"  policy.  Later  Pretoria  became  fully  aware  of the 
opportunities  that  its growing  economi c  power  affords  i t in black  Africa. 
!dhi te  South  Africans  draw  the  parallels  between  their  role in the  rest of 
Africa  and  the  United States'  domination  of the  Americas.  Insofar as  this 
could  be  real ized  the  result would  be  an  intense  struggle  between  EuroAmerican 
interests  and  those  of South  Africa  for  hegemony  in Southern  Africa.  It has 
already  begun  in some  places,  such  as  Malawi,  Rhodesia  and  the  former  High 
Commission  Territories,  to  the  extent  that  the  indigenous  governments  permit 
and  encourage  i t.  But  though  South  Africa  is anxious  to assert  its i ndepen- 
dence  of  Europe  and  America  in economic  terms,  it is sti 11  keen  on  fa1 1 ing 
back  on  these  powers  as  strategic  elements  in the  global  contest,  and  even 
in the  regional  contest,  especially  since  the  tenuous  balance  of  forces  has 
been  a1 tered. 
Even  though  the  control  mechanisms  may  be  slipping  from  the  hands  of  the 
ruling elements  in the  metropole,  the  new  relationships  are  so  lucrative  as 
to  neutralize  some  core  protest and  resistance  and  to  produce  acquiescence 
i f  not enthusiastic  coll aboration  from  various  el i tes,  notwithstanding  sporadic 
pub1 ic outcries  of  righteous  indignation.  But  the  structural  changes  are 
central . 
Much  current  discussion  of  imperialism  flows  from  the  common  sense  pro- 
position  that whoever  pays  the  piper  calls  the  tune.  Things  are  not  that 
simple  in practice.  We  have  arrived at  a  situation  in Southern  Africa  (and 
elsewhere,  too)  where  there  i s  a  wi deni ng  "non-correspondence  between  the  na- 
tional i ty  of  capital  and  the  national i ty  of  effecti ve  state  power. "16  For 
example,  the  core  may  be  prevented,  because  of  domestic  political  problems  or 
external  pressures  and  risks,  from  applying  full  mi  1 i tary  and  financial  power 
everywhere.  Even  should  this  be  attempted,  success  is  not  guaranteed.  Hence, 
in regional  affairs  the  core  may,  by  necessity,  defer  to  governments  that  on 
one  hand  may  appear  to  be  junior  partners  but  on  sow  questions  effectively 
become  equal  or  even  senior  partners.  South  Africa  had  been  carving  out  such 
a  relationship  before  the  Portuguese  fall  and  the  growing  effectiveness  of  black 
revolutionary  forces  in  the  region  forced  the  core  to  search  for  newer  arrange- 
ments. 
We  have  presented  an  overview  of  relations  in  Southern  Africa.  It remains 
to  describe  current  aspects  of  regional  relationships  in  order  to  analyze  and 
interpret  events  as  they  unfol d. 
Contemporary  Regional  Re1 ati ons 
The  economic  might  of  the  Republic  of  South  Africa  (RSA)  continues  to 
cast a  shadow  over  the  entire  region  and  the  spectre  of  South  Africa's  armed 
forces  hovers  nearby.  In  many  ways  white  South  Africa  is  both  the  glue  holding 
the  region  together  as  an  embyonic  economic  unit  and  the  irritant  that  might 
precipitate  its  di smemberment.  South  Africa  produces  si xty-six  per  cent  of 
the  region's  gross  domestic  product.  Virtual ly  a1 1  economic  indicators  (in 
colonial  times)  and  the  basic  economic  infrastructure  reinforced  this situation. 
Transport  routes,  vol untary  and  recruited  migratory  labor  flows,  the  economic 
and  geopol i tical  ramifications  of  being  land-locked,  electrical  grids  and 
transfers  of  technology  and  investment  served  to  strengthen  the  dominance 
relationships  favoring  the  settler and  colonial  regimes,  especially  of  South 
Africa  and  Portugal. 17 
It has  not  been  easy  for  leaders  in  independent  African  states  to  sever 
these  1 i nkages.  Indeed,  there  is  serious  question  regarding  thei r  commi tment 
to  re-structure  these  dependent  economic  re1 ationshi ps , and  thei r  capacity 
to  do  so  even  if  they  desired.  The  burdens  of  subordination  do  not  fall  evenly 
on  all  peoples  and  governments.  To  appreciate  the  complex  reality  of  uneven 
level s  of  dependency,  it is  necessary  to  review  the  extensity and  intensity 
of  regional  1 inkages  of  the  specific  territories  concerned. 
South  West  Africa/Namibia.  This  territory  occupies  a  unique  position  in - - - - - -  --  - - - - - -- - 
the  region.18  During World  War  I, South  West  Africa,  which  had  been  a  German 
colony,  was  occupied  by  South  African  troops.  This  was  legitimized by  the 
Allied and  Associated  Powers  which,  under  terms  of the  Covenant  of  the  League 
of  Nations,  designated  South  West  Africa  a  Class  C  Mandate  to  be  administered 
by  South  Africa.  With  the  demise  of the  League  and  its replacement  by  the 
United  Nations,  South  Africa,  rather  than  allow  the  UN  to  oversee  its admini- 
stration  of the  area  as  a  Trust  Territory,  approached  the  General  Assembly 
for  permission  to  incorporate  the  territory into  the  Union.  The  General 
Assembly  denied  this  request  in December  1946.  Following  this  rebuff,  South 
Africa  continued  to  administer  South  West  Africa  as  a  part of South  Africa, 
claiming  to  do  so  under  terms  of  the  Mandate.  A1 though  the  General  Assembly 
passed  a  resol ution  in 1966  terminating  South  Africa's  mandate,  and  subsequent 
advisory  opinions  of  the  International  Court  of Justice  and  resolutions  of 
the  General  Assembly  and  Security  Counci 1  maintain  that  the  continued  presence 
of  South  Africa  in Namibia  (as  it is now  officially  designated  outside of 
South  Africa)  is illegal,  South  Africa  still  rules  the  vast  territory. 
South  West  Africa  is integrally  a  part of the  South  African  econonly, 
using  the  same  currency,  the  same  tariff structure,  regulated  from  Pretoria, 
and  with  trade  and  productivity data  being  incorporated officially  into com- 
mon  statistics.  But  despite  the  apparent  effective  occupation  and  integration, 
there  is growing evidence  of popular  discontent  and  of a  reluctant  South 
African  wi 11 i ngness  to  readjust  i ts  relationship wi th  the  underpopulated, 
mineral-rich  land  in order  to  secure  the  success  of  its detente  policy and 
its  long-range  stabilization  as  a white  regime  in a  black continent.  Nonethe- 
less,  by  a  series  of  fortuitous  (for South  Africa)  circumstances,  the  conquest 
and  absorbtion  of South  West  Africa  represented  the  first success  of the  ex- 
pansive  policy  of  the  independent  government  in the  Union  of South  Africa. 
It was  a  harbinger  of the  outward  pol icy and  of South  Africa's  budding  challenge 
to  Great  Britain for  control  of the region. 
Wi th the  increased  i nterna ti onal  pressures  regardi ng Namibia,  South  Africa 
cannot  continue  to  occupy  the  territory  much  as  before.  Rather  South  Africa 
is moving  to moderni ze  the  dependency  relationship.  Realizing that  accomno- 
dations  must  be  made  if South  Africa  is to escape  being  drawn  into an  inter- 
national  war  over  Namibia,  and  if the  white  inhabitants  of Namibia  are  to  be 
protected  and  South  African  business  interests  are  to  continue  to operate 
profitably  in the  territory,  South  Africa  has  sought  to  arrive  at an  internal 
settlement  with  various  conservative  ethnic  interests  in Narni bia.  South  Africa 
has  permitted  the  U.N.  Secretary-General  and  his  deputies  to  visit  Namibia 
where  they  have  met  with  petitioners  of diverse  viewpoint  and  nationality. 
Real i zing  as  we1 1 , as  did other colonial  powers  before  i t, that  i t was  not 
imperative  to  administer  a  dependency  di rectly,  South  Africa  wants  to  emplant 
a cooperative,  indeed  pliable  indigenous  government,  one  that would exclude 
the  revolutionary  liberation movement  (SWAPO)  from  participation.  If SWAPO 
cannot  be  totally excluded,  South  Africa  hopes  to  neutralize  or  isolate  them 
in the  domestic  Namibian  political  process.  At  present,  South  Africa  intends 
to  grant  independence  to a  racially  mixed  government  by  the  end  of  1978. 
Such  a  step,  it is hoped,  would  deflect  international  criticisms  and  blunt  the 
appeal  of  revolutionaries.  To  South  Africa  it is a  dynamic  and  gradual  ad- 
justment  (they  would  see  it as  an  initiative)  to  an  already explosive  and  un- 
rnanageabl e  issue. 
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe.  On  November  11 , 1965,  the white  minority  Rhodesian 
Front  Government  declared  its independence  of Great  Britain.  After  33  years 
of  being administered  by  the  British  South  Africa  Company  (BSAC,  Ceci 1  Rhode's 
concessionary  corporation),  Rhodesia  had  been  annexed  as  a  British colony  in 
1923.  The  predominantly  white  Rhodesian  electorate  on  October  22,  1922,  had 
voted  8,774  to  5,989  to  reject  amalgamation  with  the  Union  of South  Africa 
in favor  of  responsible  government  under  the  British crown.  The  choice  was  a 
setback  for  South  Africa,  Britain and  the  BSAC,  all of  whom  urged  Rhodesians 
to  join  South  Africa.  But  as  Rhodesia  grew  and  greater  and  greater  resources 
were  discovered,  competition  between  Britain and  South  Africa  for  control 
mounted. 
Colonial  status for  Rhodesia  gave  British capital ists and  settlers  certain 
advantages  over  their  South  African  counterparts.  So  when  UDI  was  declared, 
the  stage  was  again  set  for more  open  competition  between  the  two  powers  vying 
for  regional  dominance. 
South  Africa  had  the  advantage  of location.  Its proximity  plus  road  and 
rai 1  1 inks  with  Rhodesia  were  crucial.  Likewise,  its ports  (a1 though  a1 ready 
crowded)  gave  it an  opportunity  to  help  Rhodesia  evade  the  sacction~ imposed 
by  the  UN.  Rhodesian  do1 lars  could be  exchanged  for  South  African  Rands. 
South  African  "pol ice"  units  (upwards  of 4,000  men)  bolstered  the  Rhodesian 
anti-guerril la forces.19  And  South  Africa's  sympathetic  whites  and  their 
government  facilitated  the  1 ife of a  pariah  state  in an  otherwise  hostile world. 
Portugal , through  its colony  of Mozambique,  a1 so  provided  simi 1 ar  "services" .20 
Far  away  Great  Britain,  in contrast,  by  the  ill-chosen  device  of economic 
sanctions  (the  government  had  earlier  ruled out  the  use  of force) ,21  had  virtually 
severed  the  most  effective  links  it had with  Rhodesia,  i .e.,  cultural,  trade  and 
monetary  contacts  and  tariff  arrangements.  In effect  Rhodesia  became  for  South 
African  businessmen  a  capti ve  market.  The  overall  impact  of the  rearrangement 
of dependencies  is that  the  white  ninori ty  regime,  though  conscious  of  its drift 
southward,  became  heavi ly dependent  for  the  maintenance  of  its domination  on 
South  Africa.  Mi 1 i tary,  economic,  strategi c  and  cultural  contacts  with  South 
Africa  expanded  as  those  with  Great  Britain contracted or were  severed.  The 
result was  that  by  around  1972  Rhodesia  could  be  referred  to  figuratively  as 
South  Africa's  "Sixth  province" .22  Even  the  Zambian  Foreign  Minister,  in explain- 
ing his  country's  dealing  with  South  Africa  to  gain the  peaceful  liberation of  a 
Zimbabwe  and  Namibia,  argued  that  "The  -- facto  position  is that  South  Africa  is 
the  colonial  authority  we  have  to  deal  wi th."23  Certainly,  there  is an  important 
distinction  between  colonial  status  and  that  of a  province,  but  the  message  with 
regard  to  the  ultimate  locus  of power  is clear.  Nonetheless,  for  diverse  reasons 
South  Afri ca' s  leaders  have  chosen  to  reconsider  this  tendency. 
Angola.  Even  though  in the  later years  of Portuguese  rule more  whites  (almost 
500,000)  resided  in Angola  than  in any  part of  the  region except  South  Africa,  this 
territory  was  never  especial ly close  to South  Africa.  Infrastructural  1 inks 
were  never  developed,  and  trade  and  investment  relationships  were  marginal.  The  I 
Cunene  Ri ver  scheme  (hydroelectric  and  irrigation) , now  under  construction,  was 
the  first major  tangible  linkage  southward.  In fact,  the  British had  more  profound 
economic  ties  with  Angola  through  their  Portuguese  connections  and  their  investments 
in the  Benguela  railway  and  in various mineral  and  plantation  developments.  For 
the  bureaucrats,  business  interests  and  the white  citizens  of Angola,  the  structural 
1 i nkages  of dependency  headed  northward  through  Lisbon.  The  Benguel a  rai lway , i n 
turn,  inflated Angola's  strategic  importance  for  the  copper  mines  of Zaire  and 
Zambia.  Rather,  Portugal  (in Angola)  and  South  Africa  stood  united as  ideological 
and  psychological  bastions  of  resistance  to majori ty  rule and  black  national ism. 
They  also collaborated  in mi 1 itary-intell igence-strategic  activities  and  reinforced 
one  another  i n  Western  and  international  forums. 
But  the  April  1974  overthrow  of the  Portuguese  government  by  dissident  young 
officers,  and  the  ultimate  rise to  power  of  leftist elements  in the  armed  forces 
changed  this.  After  thirteen years  of  rev01 utionary war  in three  African  ter- 
ri tories  the  Portuguese  sought  to  terminate  the  wars  by  withdrawing  from  Africa. 
The  coup  leaders  at first  did not  advocate  a  total  abandonment  of  their  terri- 
tories  in Africa.  General  Antonio  Spinola,  who  led the  military  junta  unti 1 
his  forced  resignation  on  30  September  1974,  favored  a  policy of continued 
federation  or association  with  Angola  and  Mozambique  in order  to  protect  the 
large  Portuguese  minorities  in these  territories  and  to  maintain  the  profi ta- 
ble economic  links  on  which  the  fragile  Portuguese  economy  depended.  This, 
coupled with  the  prospects  of  a  right-wing  military  coup,  external  manipu- 
1 ations  and  attempted  assassinations,  led the younger  mi 1 i tant  officers  in 
the  Armed  Forces  Movement  to  force  Spinola  from  office  and  into exile,  and  to 
divest  Portugal  (as  they  had  originally  planned)  of  its African  holdings. 
The  pace  of  decol oni zati on  in Mozambique  quickened,  for  Mozambique  was  blessed 
by  the  presence  of only  one  effective  African  nationalist movement,  the  widely 
popular  Frelimo.  Angola  still  remained  a  question  as  no  single  liberation 
movement  (the  MPLA,  the  FNLA  or  UNITA)  had  asserted  ascendancy.  Col laboration 
among  them  in a  transitional  government,  encouraged  by  Portugal,  the  OAU 
and  by  various  African  governments,  continual ly fa1 tered.  Eventually  a  full 
scale  civil  war  erupted  and  in mid-1975  a  coalition of  FNLA  (based  in northern 
Angola  and  assisted by  Zaire,  the United  States  and  China)  and  UNITA  (eastern 
and  southern  based  and  assisted by  the  United  States  and  South  Africa)  fought 
against  the  MPLA  (supported  by  the Soviet  Union  and  Cuba),  entrenched  in the 
capital  and  in control  of many  key  cities,  coastal  regions  and  ports. 
Zaire  has  long  dreamt  of re-establ ishing the  historic Congo  kingdom  by 
annexing  northern  Angola.  A1 though  such  an  irredenta may  frighten  some  An- 
golans,  it frightens  them  even  more  since  it leaves  unsettled  the  fate  of 
Cabinda,  the  oil-rich  enclave  on  the  north  side  of the  Congo  River,  heretofore 
administered  as  part of Angola  and  coveted  by  Zaire  and  others.  There  in late 
1974  a  subsidiary  of Gulf  Oil  was  lifting 300,000  barrels  a  day  and  far more 
in prospect.  One  can  quickly  see  a possible  explanation  for  the  cooperation 
of  Zaire  and  the  United  States  with  the  FNLA.  The  MPLA's  occupation  of Cabinda 
threatens  Gulf  interests  and  thwarts  Zaire's  ana  the  FNLA's  desire  to  secure 
those  oi 1  revenues  for  themsel ves. 
Because  of domestic  unrest  and  indecision  the  Portuguese  government  had 
been  unable  to  act  in Angola.  They  favored  the  MPLA,  which  also  seemed  most 
effectively  in control  in the  field.  But  Portugal  wanted  to  achieve  a  smooth 
transition  to  self-government  before  independence  was  granted  on  November  11, 
1975.  It was  difficult  for  them  simply  to  cut  Angola  adrift  before a  resolution 
of  the  civil war  was  assured,  especially  in that  Portugal  might  be  effectively 
abandoning  a  large  number  of  Portuguese  still  in Angola.  But  as  the  civil  war 
became  more  unmanageable,  Angolan  whites  fled  the  territory.  By  the  scheduled 
independence  of Angola  in November  1975,  a  mass  exodus  left only  30,000  whites 
out  of  some  500,000  there  before  the  coup.24  And  the  Portuguese  armed  forces, 
.rhich  once  numbered  as  many  as  70,000,  withdrew totally  by  independence.  Angola 
became,  for  the  white  Portuguese,  an  abandoned  land.  Portugal 's role  in the 
Angolan  war  became  basically  insignificant once  the  Armed  Forces  Movement  let 
i t be  known  that  Portugal  intended  to wi thdraw. 
Despite  the  MPLA's  control  of  the  capital  and  its heavy  military assis- 
tance  from  the Soviet  Union  and  Cuba,  the  FNLA  with  Zairian  and  mercenary 
assistance  did not  fold  in its northern  home  base .25  And  UNITA,  in uneasy 
alliance  with  FNLA  in the  south,  and  supported  by  mercenary  forces  and  South 
African  regulars  (officially  set  at up  to  2,000  men)  attached  to  UNITA  units, 
slashed  through  southern  and  coastal  Angola  taking  key  cities  and  ports.  MPLA 
with  massive  Cuban  military aid  repulsed  this  thrust  and  eventual ly asserted 
an  uneasy  governmental  control  over  ~n~ola,26  UNITA  still  harrasses  the 
government  forces  through  1 arge  stretches  of terri tory.  South  Africa,  the 
United  States,  Zaire  and  China  still  dabble  in Angola,  as  do  the  latter and 
Cuba  in Zairian  affairs. 
Mozambique.  In contrast  to  the  Angolan  situation,  South  Africa's  ties 
with  Mozambique  have  been  extensive,  intensive  and  long-standing.  It has  been 
estimated  that  in 1971,  for  example,  approximately  forty-two  per  cent  of 
Mozambique ' s  GNP  was  deri ved  from  South  African  1 inks .27  Particularly  vi tal 
are  South  Africa's  use  of  the  port of Maputo  (Lourenco  Marques)  for  the  ship- 
ments  of the  Wi twatersrand  (Johannesburg  and  vicinity ).  Mozambique  a1 so  se- 
cures  the  hard  capital  earned  by  her railways  and  ports;  the  per  capita  fees, 
wages,  and  taxes  paid and  col lected by  South  Africans  for mine  labor:  exports 
to  South  Africa:  and  in the  past  the  tourist  trade  generated  by  South  Africans 
and  Rhodesians.  The  supply  of  laborers  to  the  Witwatersrand  Native  Labour 
Association  is,  by  governmental  agreement  of  1901  and  updated  in 1928,  tied 
into the  use  of the  port  of Maputo.  In return  for  the  exclusive  right to 
contract  for  up  to  100,000  workers  per year  in Mozambique,  South  Africa  agreed 
to  ship  at  least  47.5  per cent  of  the  Transvaal 's  exports  and  imports  through 
the  port.  bre modern  1 i nkages , parti cul arly  the  Caborra  Bassa  hydroelectri c 
project,  have  intensified  South  African  interests  in continued  good  relations 
with  whomever  control s  Mozambique  and  vice  versa. 28 
Where  doubt  and  pessimism  marked  the  march  to  independence  in Angola, 
euphoria  and  optini sm  characteri zed  the  process  in Mozambique,  even  among 
some  whites  remaining  in the  country.  The  announcement  of a  new  constitution 
set  the  tone.  The  fundamental  objective  of the  new  state  would  be  to  el imi- 
nate  the  structures  of  oppression  and  colonial  exploitation,  to extend  and 
reinforce  democratic  popular  power  and,  in terms  of  foreign  affairs,  to carry 
on  "the  struggle against colonialism  and  imperialism."  In addition foreign 
capital  would  be  a1 lowed  to  operate  only  within  the  framework  of the  econom- 
ic policy  of  the  state.  Such  a  course  is to  be  followed  even  though  other 
socialist countries  are  to  be  the  "natural  allies"  of ~ozambi~ue.29 
President  Samora  Machel,  in the weeks  before  and  after  independence, 
fleshed  out  these  dicta  regarding  Mozambique's  regional  pol icy,  a1 though  he 
did  so  with  a  desi re  to  keep  as  many  options  open  as  he  could.  He  said,  for 
example,  that  Mozambique  was  fi rmly  commi tted  to  backing  Zimbabwe  national - 
ists  in their bid for  majority rule.  On  South  Africa  he  has  taken  a  less 
milS tant  line,  despite  expressions  of so7 idarity with  the  masses  in South 
Africa  and  ~amibia.  Rhodesia  and  Ian  Smith  are  excoriated  regularly  in the 
press,  but  John  Vorster  is treated more  civilly.  At  first,  relations  continued 
without  major  hitch.  Until  early  1978,  South  Africa  acted  as  Mozambique's  agent 
by  selling on  the  open  market  the gold heretofore  usually transferred  to 
Portugal  at the  official  rate  to  cover  the  deferred  payments  to Mozambican 
workers  on  the  South  African  mines.  The  hard  currency  at windfall  profits 
thereby  gained  was  sent  to Mozambique,  one  early  resul t of the  coup.  The 
South  African  consulate  general  in Maputo,  closed before  independence,  has 
been  replaced  by  a  visa  office,  a1 though  the  Mozambicans  have  not  established 
a  similar  office  in South  Africa. 
On  the  supply  of mine  laborers,  Frelimo  Vice  President  Marcelino  dos 
Santos  has  said,  "In  principle we  are  against  recruiting workers  for  imperial ism. 
However,  we  must  also  be  real istic.  We  cannot  dssune  our  full  responsibilities 
in relation  to  South  Africa  in a  month  or  even  a  ~ear.1'31 But  it is just  this 
blend of principle and  realism that  has  marked  Frelirno's  rule and  which  keeps 
the  South  Africans  guessing  and  hopeful.  Policies,  by  and  large,  have  involved 
only  moderate  change.  But  it is the  implication  that  changes  will  occur  and 
the  real  meaning  of  the  cryptic  "our  full  responsibilities  in relation to 
South  Africa"  that  loom  in South  Africa's  future. 
Rhodesians  were  even  more  the  target  of  Frel imo  bombast.  Nonetheless, 
despite  Britain's  offer  to  subsidize  Mozambique's  losses  from  closing  the 
border  with  Rhodesia,32  the  government  did not  close  Rhodesia's  access  routes 
by  rail  or road  to  the  Indian  Ocean  ports  of Beira  and  Maputo  until  March  1976. 
Since  then  there  have  been  major  border  incursions  and  a  virtual  state  of war 
prevails. 
Zambia.  Before  independence  in 1964,  Zambia 's  long-standing  re1 ations 
with  the  white  settler  regimes  were  intense,  extensive  and  ambiguous.  De- 
pendence  upon  transport  routes  southward  to  export  copper  was  unti 1  recently 
almost  complete.  For  example,  as  late  as  1972  over  fifty per  cent  of ?ambials 
exports  went  by  rail  through  Rhodesia  and  almost  fifty per  cent  of  its  imports 
came  via  Rhodesia.  A  good  many  Zambian  businesses  had  been  subsidiaries  of 
Rhodesian  and  South  African  firms,  or  of British firms  managed  from  regional 
offices  in Johannesburg  or Sal i sbury .  Zambia's  own  white  population  (nearly 
74,000  at independence,  around  30,000  today),  so  crucial  for  important  techni- 
cal  and  managerial  skills,  originated  in large  part  in the  south,  or at least 
it had  imbibed  a  heady  slug of the social  philosophy  of  segregation  and  racial 
supremacy  from  colonial  settler  societies.  Historically,  Zambia  has  traded 
heavily with  Rhodesia  and  South  Africa.  In 1964,  for example,  some  sixty  per 
cent  of  Zambia's  imports  came  from  the  white  south,  where  it sold about  twelve 
per cent  of  its exports.  By  1975  this  had  been  considerably  reduced  and 
South  Africa  had  fallen  to sixth  place  as  Zambia's  source  of  imports,  mostly 
in the  critical  grain,  mining and  equipment  sectors.  The  years  since  Zambian 
independence  and  Rhodesia ' s  UDI  (1 965)  have  seen  Zambia  consciously attempt 
to  reorient  its economy  and  cultural  life away  from white  settler  Africa. 
Symbol ic of  the  reoriented  economy  has  been  the celebrated  Tanzara 
(the Tan-Zam  Railway)  which  links  the  copper  be1 t to  Dar  es  Salaam  1860 
ki lorneters  away.  Despite  manifol d  problems  (changing  gauges,  inadequate  port 
faci l i ties  in Dar,  the  1 ightness  of construction  that  necessitates  ha1 f-loaded 
cars),  it provides  Zambia  with  a  vital  a1 ternative  l ifel ine and  thereby  increases 
its bargaining  power  with  Rhodesia  and  South  Africa. 33 
In another  sense  Rhodesia  is responsible  for  Zambia's  abil ity to  redirect 
its trade  and  transport.  In January  1973,  Prime  Minister  Smith  closed  the 
border  with  Zambia,  hoping  to  force  President  Kaunda  to  stifle  Zambabwean 
1 i beration  movement  activities  in Zambia. 34  Instead,  the  Zambians  completely 
rejected  Smith's  demands  and  closed  their  side  of  the  border.  They  then 
util ized a1 ternative  routes  for  a1 1  shipments.  Rhodesian  Railways  thus  lost 
around  $1,200,000  monthly  in revenues  from  Zambia.  This,  coupled with  hostile 
pol i tical  measures  (UN  votes,  sanctuary  for  pol i tical  exiles  and  national ist 
leaders,  1 eadership  in efforts to  isolate  minority ruled  southern  African 
regimes),  have  imparted  a  sense  of  independence  heretofore  absent  from  Zambian 
foreign  pol icy. 35 
Sti 11,  the  Zambian  economy  (and  hence  the  Zambian  government  of  Kenneth 
Kaunda)  is  in deep  trouble.  It is partially  the  old problem  of  unequal  exchange, 
and  of  markets  for  primary  comnodities  being  in the  hands  chiefly  of  the  consumer 
corporations  and  countries.  The  demand  for  copper  (which  used  to account  for 
ninety-eight  per  cent  of Zambia's  foreign  exchange  earnings)  is down.  This  has 
led  to  an  extended  slump  in prices  and  a  forty  per  cent reduction  in sales.  Trans- 
portation  difficulties  sti 11  exist  (largely  because  of the  warfare  in Angola 
and  border  closures)  and  have  led to  the  two  giant  mining corporations  declaring 
a  forty  per cent  force  majeur  because  they  have  been  unable  to  fill orders. 
Such  developments,  coupled  with  inflated import  prices  (especial ly of oi 1 ),  and 
inefficiencies  and  misdirections  in domestic  development  priorities  have  left 
Zambia  wi th massi ve  balance  of payment  deficits.  Such  internal  di fficul ties 
may  have  partially  led President  Kaunda  to  seek  to  resolve the  nagging  Rhodesian 
issue. 
Ma1 awi .  Since  Ma1 awi an  independence  in 1964,  President  H.  Kamuzu  Banda 
has  not  nearly  so  consciously  moved  to  terminate  1 inks  with  the white  south. 
Despite  appearances  that  lead  critics  to  draw  attention  to  newsworthy  contacts, 
many  of which  (in diplomatic  and  strategic  terms  as  well  as  in investments 
and  financial  aid)  are  undeniable  and  expanding,36  Malawi  trade  with  the  white 
south  has  shrunken  since  1964  when  twenty-two  per  cent  of exports  and  forty- 
six  per  cent  of  imports  were  in that  direction.  By  1972  these  figures  had 
been  reduced  to  7.7  per  cent  and  34.4  per  cent respectively.  But  South  Africa's 
share  rose  from  six per  cent  of exports  and  imports  in 1964  to  5.5  per  cent  of 
exports  and  29.5  per  cent  of  imports  in 1976.  The  supply  of Malawian  labor  for 
South  African  mines  has  been  cut  back  from  a  peak  of  around  130,000  miners 
per year.  A  1974  Malawian  order  to  suspend  recrui tment  had  led to  a  drop  to 
only  207  by  1977.  That  year  recruitment  was  resumed  and  by  early  1978  the  num- 
ber  of Malawians  on  the  gold mines  had  risen  to  20,000.  It is not  likely  to 
go  much  higher.  This  South  African  pressure  fulcrum  has  been  eroded.  One  must 
not  discount  the  deep  involvement  of Malawi  with  the  white  south.  President 
Banda's  panache  at a  time  when  the  rest of  black  Africa  sought  to  bury white 
rule  in the  region  had  an  impact  beyond  mere  trade  and  commercial  contact. 
This  data  must  be  seen  in its total  context,  that  of a  state  that  had  not 
depended  upon,  but  has  chosen  to  link  its economic  future with  South  Africa. 
It is in  the  field of aid and  investment  that  South  Africa  makes  a  greater 
impact.  The  secondment  of South  African  governmental  officials  and  private 
individuals  to  Malawi  government  offices,  the  financial  assistance  to  build 
the  new  capital  at Lilongwe  and  the  Nacala  rail  1 ink  through  Mozambique a 
increased  bidding  by  South  African  firms  on  contracts  in Malawi,  and  other 
projects  supported by  loans  from  the  quasi -pub1 i c  Industrial  Development 
Corporation  of South  Africa  etch  the  design  of contact  and  mutual  support 
deeper.  In a way  both the  British and  South  Africans  see  it as  a  form of 
competition  for  influence  in the  country. 
Ironically,  President  Banda,  who  most  vocally  and  consciously  led the 
pro-"dialogue"  with  South  Africa  forces  during  the  late  1960s  and  early 
1970 s,  has  kept  a  low  profile  during  the  "detente"  phase  of regional  affairs 
from  1974  to  1976.  He  has  been  consolidating  his position  domestically  and 
seeking  to  normalize  relations  with his  new  neighbors  (Frelirno)  and  his  old 
ones.  President  Banda  dealt  openly  and  cordially with  the  Portuguese  forces 
and  had  made  major  territorial  claims  on  Tanzania  and  Zambia,  among  other 
less  than  friendly  gestures.  His  earlier  pragmatic  opening  southward  has 
evol ved  into  an  equally  pragmatic  re-association  with  black  Africa. 
Botswana,  Lesotho  and  Swaziland.  The  former  High  Commission  Territories 
are  reluctantly  but  integrally  a  part of South  Africa's  economic  hinterland. 
A1 l  are  1 and-locked,  completely  surrounded  (except  for  a  geometrical  contact 
point  between  Botswana  and  Zambia  in the  middle  of  the  Zambezi  River  and 
Swaziland's  sixty miles  of border with  Mozambique)  by  whi te-governed  territories. 
But  being land-locked  is not  the  sole  cause  of  their  economic  vulnerability and 
their  intimacy with  South  Africa.  Early  in their  respective  histories  as 
separate  protectorates,  it was  widely  assumed  in South  Africa,  in Great  Britain 
and  in the  territories  themselves  that  eventually  they  would  be  absorbed  by 
South  Africa.  Thei r  total  econcmi c  i~fras tructure  and  their  financial , monetary 
and  comnercial  affairs were  an  appendage  of  South  Africa.  They  participated 
in  a  common  currency  system,  a  commn  tariff  structure,  common  banking  and 
commercial  services  and  saw  their  communications  and  transport  systems  i nte- 
grated  into  those  of  South  Africa.  Botswana's  economic  1 ifel ine,  the  rai lway, 
is  still  owned  and  operated  by  Rhodesian  Railways,  and  its  capital  had  been 
located  at Mafeking  in  South  African  territory.  All  three  territories  export 
labor  to  South  Africa  (mostly  for work  on  the  mines).  Lesotho  is  most  pro- 
foundly  affected;  some  40-45  per  cent  of  all  adult  Basuto  males  are  employed 
in  South  Africa.  For  Swaziland  and  Botswana  the  figure  is approximately 
fifteen  per  cent.  This  occurs  with  the  full  knowledge  and  cooperation  of  the 
respective  governments.  Wages,  remittances  and  deferred  pay  are  sent  home  by 
the  employers '  organi zations  and  the  workers.  This,  combi ned  with  recrui ti ng 
fees,  taxes  and  revenue  from  customs  and  excise,  all  paid  directly  by  the 
South  African  authorities  to  the  "exporting"  governments,  render  these  govern- 
men ts  dependent  upon  revenues  generated  in  South  Africa. 
While  all  three  are,  on  paper,  dependent  on  South  Africa  for  their  eco- 
nomic  well-being,  they  do  evidence  varying  degrees  of  vulnerabil i ty  and  varying 
perspectives  on  their  independence.  Lesotho  is  perhaps  the  most  dependent  and 
Swazi land  the  least.  Leaders  of  each  are  aware  of  the  circumstances  and  a1 1 
pay  1 ip-service  to  the  twin  imperatives  of  living  at peace  with  their  neighbors 
and  yet  broadening  thei r  a1 ternatives  (both  economic  and  pol i tical ) .  President 
Khama  of  Botswana  has  been  most  consistent since  independence  in  his  desire 
to  maintain  political  independence  in  the  face  of  economic  isolation  and  con- 
straint.  Swaziland,  less  critical  of  South  Africa  and  less  revolutionary  in 
its  determi nation  to  break  South  Africa's  economic  stranglehol d,  has  been 
relatively  cordial  in  its  dealings  with  and  about  South  Africa.  But  Swaziland 
has  an  added  dimension  of  vulnerability,  and  this  refers  to  Mozambique.  The 
monarchy  of  King  Sobhuza  has  1 i ttle  in  common  with  the  radical  Frel imo  govern- 
ment  that  presently  controls  Swaziland's  vital  access  to  the  sea.  Simply 
because  both  are  bl ack-governed  shoul d  not  hide  deep  di fferences  in  purpose, 
social  bases  of  support  and  governmental  style.  Lesotho,  under  Chief  Jonathan 
Leabua,  vascil lates  between  periods  of  intense  collaboration  with  South  Africa 
(1966-1972)  and  vocal  hostility  (1972  to  date).  In  the  cases  of  all  three 
governments,  however,  the  short-term  options  are  few  if  the  regime  is  to  main- 
tain  itself  and  the  economy  not  revert  to  abject  subsistence.  There  are  various 
1 imi ted  or  incremental  a1 ternati ves  (especial ly those  pursued  by  Botswana) 
that  prepare  the  peoples  and  their  governments  for  a  more  independent  econom- 
ic 1 ine  and  that  lay  the  groundwork  for  future  development,  but  in all 
instances  choices  are  limited and  risks  are great. 
Tanzania.  Depending  on  one's perspective,  Tanzania  and  Zaire  may  or  may 
not  be  included  in Southern  Africa.  I  happen  to think  they  belong.  In the  case 
of Tanzania,  a1 though  historical  and  economic  ties  southward  are  margi nal , 
they  seem  to  be  growing.  Tanzanian  support  for  1 iberation movements,  parti- 
cularly  Frelimo  in Mozambique,  led to  continuous  interaction with  a  hostile 
Portugal,  with  sympathetic  inhabitants  of Mozambique  and  now  with  a  friendly 
government  there. 37  The  furtherance  of Tanzanian  efforts  has  a1 so  contri - 
buted  to  greater coordination  of her  sanctuary  role with  Zambia.  The  3il 
pipel ine  between  Dar  es  Salaam  and  the  Zambian  Copperbel t, new  a1 1 -weather 
roads,  and  the  Tan-Zam  railway  now  1 ink  the  two  countries  economically,  as 
well  as  politically  and  strategically.  So  Tanzania,  a1 though  geographically 
not  a  part  of Southern  Africa  and  historically  tied to  East  Africa,  is coming 
to  play  a  role  in regional  affairs.  Diplomatic  interaction regarding  ini tia- 
tives  to  achieve  a  negotiated settlement  in Rhodesia  expand  this  role. 
Zaire.  Zaire  has  long  had  economic  ties  southward.  The  Copperbel ts  of 
Shaba  (Katanga)  and  Zambia  were  intimately  tied in infrastructural  terms. 
Katanga's  copper,  moreover,  was  shipped  out  via  the  Benguela  Railway  and 
Lobi to,  and  her  imports entered  through  that  route.  The  capital  city,  Kinshasa, 
was  in Bakongo  country,  and  the continual  flow  of these  peoples  across  the  border 
(in both  directions)  linked Angola  and  Zaire.  Today,  with  Zaire  coveting 
the  petroleum  of Cabinda  and  Zaire's  intimate  involvement  in the  internal 
warfare  in Angola  (through  its support  of the  FNLA)  and  vice  versa,  its impact 
on  Southern  African  affai rs  continues  to  be  undeniable. 
Contemporary  Events :  Is the  Region  Becoming  Ungl ued? 
There  are  two  conflicting  impulses  vying  for  ascendency  in regional  affairs 
--  the  impulse  to atomism and  the  impulse  to  regional  integration.  Each  is 
currently  identi fied with  important  pol i tical  forces.  The  atomists  are  largely 
those  black  pol i tical  forces  that  seek  independence  in Namibia,  and  majority 
rule  in the  cases  of Zimbabwe  and  South  Africa.  Included as  well  are  leaders 
in a1 ready  independent  black  states  that  wish  to  extricate  thei r economies  and 
policies  from  the pervasive  tug  of  South  African  economic  power.  They  have 
been  atomists  simply  because  to  foster  regional  integration,  given  today's 
distribution  of  power  and  wealth,  means  to  acquiesce  in if not  to  contribute 
to  South  African  dominance.  In many  ways  these  people  are  seeking  to  undo  a 
pattern  of  interaction  that  has  prevailed and  been  reinforced  for  decades  and 
to  resist  the  continued  economic  dynamism  of  the  industrialized white  South. 
We  should  not  assume,  however,  that  this  attitude  toward  regional  integration 
wi 11  always  prevai 1 among  the  nationalist  governments.  The  regional  balance 
of  forces  is shifting,  especially  with  Portugal 's  departure.  Selective  inte- 
grati ve  measures  are  proposed  and  implemented  that  invol ve  independent  black 
governments.  The  Zambian  about-face  on  issues  like Caborra  Bassa  and  the 
Nacala  rail  link  after  the establishment  of a  Frelimo  government  illustrates 
a  flexibility  on  the  issue.  On  the  other  hand,  given  the  eventual  establish- 
ment  of  a  majority  government  in South  Africa,  it would  be  likely  that  neigh- 
boring black  states  may  still wish  to avoid the  centralizing and  hegemonial 
tendencies  associated with  uneven  development  and  economic  asymmetry. 
A1 igned  against  these  forces  are the  predominant  economic  interests  in 
South  Africa  who  view  the  outward  movement  as  an  opportunity  to establish what 
they,  and  others  before  them,  have  regarded  as  a  logical  role  for  South  Africa 
in the  region,  the  industrial  heartland of an  increasingly  cooperative  and 
ultimately  integrated economic  entity  characterized  by  continued  rninori ty  rule 
in South  Africa  itself .38  Proposals  to  institutional i ze  these  aspi rations,  as 
a  Southern  African  Common  Market  or  Free  Trade  Area,  are legion.  Ironically, 
Afrikanerdom  has  itself  been  ambiguous  about  its role  -- to  lead  the  region 
and  thereby  solidify  the  ascendance  of -- Vol k,  or to withdraw  behind  the 
1 aager  and  thereby  guarantee  the  integrity  of the  culture.  Engl ish-speaki ng 
South  Africans  have  for  long  held  the  commercially-motivated  viewpoint  personi- 
fied  in Cecil  Rhodes,  the  empire  builder,  whose  drive  northward  into his  "hinter- 
land"  has  since  marked  the  philosophy  of those  who  came  after  him.  It is in 
this  ambiguous  and  dichotomous  context  that  the  pull  and  tug  of regional  af- 
fairs  occurs.  And  as  if such  a  kaleidoscope  of  pressures  were  not enough, 
extra-regional  intrusi ve  actors,  anxious  to  see  Southern  Africa  confarm  to 
their  own  global  image,  provide  added  dimensions  to  the  analysis. 
The  collapse  of the  Salazar-Caetano  regime  in Portugal  in April  1974, 
and  i ts  rep1 acement  by  a  mi 1 i tary  government  of uncertai n ideological texture 
has  done  more  to  unsettle  Southern  African  affairs  than  any  single  event  since 
Rhodesian  U.D.  I.  Indeed,  in terms  of the  real i ty and  profundity  of  the  change 
it portends,  UDI was  merely  a  rear  guard  action,  delaying  trends  set  in motion 
with  the  British retreat  from  colonial  empire.  The  military  takeover,  in 
contrast,  led to  the  independence  of  two  regional  states  dominated  by  revol u- 
tionary  movements  intent on  redrawing  the  constellation  of power  in the  region. 
So  the  mi li tary-strategic  configuration  of  Southern  Africa  has  shifted.  Rhodesia 
and  South  Africa  have  lost an  important  ally.  The  "Front"  has  arrived at the 
Limpopo.  Rhodesia's  borders  have  been  even  more  penetrable.  And  contrary 
to  traditional  patterns  of  interactions,  this  is just  not another  European 
event  with  a  spillover  into Africa.  What  is also  important  is that  the  Portu- 
guese  government  fell  because  its African  wars  became  such  a  burden  on  its 
people,  its economy  and  its military forces.  Africa  in this  fashion  kls  had 
an  impact  on  Europe  quite  different  than  most  would  have  contemplated.  Tho 
rise of  black  governments  tempered  in revol uti onary  armed  struggle  provides 
a  new  ingredient  in regional  affai rs.  Heretofore,  African  governments  in the 
region  ascended  to power  in relative  tranquility.  They  were,  to  a  large extent, 
the  chosen  agents  of liberal  colonial  authorities  anxious  to  designate  succes- 
sor  governments  that would  be  willing to  cooperate  in the  transition without 
too  radically  dismantl ing the  colonial /neo-colonial  structures.  Both  the 
Frelimo  and  MPLA  governments  are  making  revolutionary  policies.  Whether  or  not  the 
exigencies  of  short-term  economic  stabi 1 i ty will  tone  down  the  revol utionary 
ardor  and  yield pragmatic  policies  is still  open  to question.  Frelimo  must 
pace  itself carefully  as  it strives  for  self-reliance  and  economic  indepen- 
dence.  But  it would  also  appear  that  the  government  is determined  to achieve 
greater  sel f-re1 iance  soon.  South  African  analysts  who  contend  that  real i srn 
will  prevail  and  who  thereby  assume  continued business  as  usual  simply  do 
not  understand  that  it is just  as  realistic  (a1 though  over  a  far  longer  time 
perspective)  for  Mozambique  to sever  links  until  it can  deal  from  a  position 
of  internal  political  and  economic  strength.  There  is at least  as  much  evi- 
dence  that  the  South  African  government  and  people  have  been  sobered  by  the 
events  of  the  past  two  years,  and  that  South  Africa  has  become  more  realistic 
and  pragmatic  when  faced  with  the  fait accompl i of  Frel imo  power  in Maputo. 
In 1 ine with  the  sort  of analysis  developed  earlier,  it could  be  argued 
that  Prime  Minister  Vorster  sensed  the  fundamental  instabil i ty of the  Smith 
government  in Rhodesia.  Gi ven  South  Africa 's  contemplated  role as  the  dominant 
regional  power,  a  determination  had  apparently  been  made  that  it would  be  futile 
and  costly  to  try  to  prop  up  an  inherently  weak  regime  even  though  the  racial 
and  cultural  affinities  are  evident.  Hence,  the  reasoning  in Pretoria  probably 
runs  1 ike  this.  Let's  try  to  serve  as  midwife  for  the  birth of an  African  or 
racially  mixed  regime  that would,  at least,  cooperate  in the  continued  economic 
patterns  and  growth  of  the  region.  Ideally  this  new  government  would  be  led 
by  bourgeois  national i sts  who,  a1 though  outwardly  critical  of South  Africa 
and  apartheid,  would  be  wi 11 ing  to maintain  economic  1 inks  and  diplomatic  ties 
with Pretoria,  and  who  would  not  provide  support  for  military  actions  against 
South  Africa.  Finding  candidates  for  such  a  government,  however,  is almost 
as  challenging  as  selling  it to all  important  parties,  i .e.,  white  Rhodesians, 
black  nationalists  and  peoples,  and  Zambia  and  other  key  black  governments 
in the  region  and  the  OAU.  Whether  the  Muzorewa-Sithole-Chirau  combination 
is such  a  force  is  currently  being  argued.  It may  be  that  Vorster  is banking 
on  the  basic  proposition  that  the  assumption  of state  and  governmental  responsi- 
bility  by  even  less  than  ideal  candidates  will  have  a moderating  effect on 
their  performance  in power.  In other words,  once  in power,  the  black  govern- 
ment  will  easily  slip  into old habits  of pragmatism  and  reluctant  cooperation 
and  thereby  become  a  status  quo  force,  ideology  and  rhetoric  notwithstanding. 
Such  a  government,  it may  be  further  felt,  would  be  more  difficult  to  displace 
than  a  white  regime  with  a  narrow  internal  base  of power  which  draws  the 
opprobrium  of  the  world.  In class  terms,  the  new  bourgeois  regime,  despite 
its nationalistic  tendencies,  can  become  accustomed  to the  perquisites  of 
office and  the  blandishments  of continued  relations,  and  serve  to  deflect  the 
ha1 f-hearted  cri ticism  of  1 i beral istic bourgeois  governments  el sewhere. 
Contributing  to this  reasoning  is the  fall-back  realization that  the  Smith 
government  would  have  eventually  collapsed,  and  if it had  done  so  in the  crucible 
of  revolutionary  violence,  a  government  comnitted  to the  total  destruction 
of white  power  in the  subcontinent  would  likely emerge.  Such  a  government  may 
yet prevail.  But  adaptable  South  African  whites  say,  let's at least  try  to 
usher  into  power  the  right  kind of government  at a  much  more  measured and 
manageable  pac;  than  others  may  wish,  and  by  so  doing  demonstrate  our  flexi- 
bil i ty  and  goodwi 11  in order  to gain  credit with  neighboring black  governments 
(who  themsel ves  are  not noted  for  thei r radical ism),  the  general  international 
cornunity  and  the  new  government  we  help  to  come  to power.  Such  an  "enlightened" 
incl ination  to  ride  the  waves  of change,  a1 bei t not  the  roughest  surf  on  the 
beach,  nonetheless  shows  an  unusual  courage  for  a  South  African  ~overnrnent 
in foreign  affairs.  For  the  stakes,  as  South  Africa  sees  it, are the  very  con- 
tinuation  of white  rule  in South  Africa.  If they  lose  this  game,  there  may 
be  no  rematch  other  than  direct  military  conflict.  Despite  South  Africa's 
professed  comni tment  to  non-intervention  in the  affairs  of neighboring  states, 
South  Africa  began  the  difficult  task  of  trying  to  open  contacts  with  Zambia 
on  the  Rhodesian  issue  and  thereafter  to  try  to persuade  Ian  Smith  to make 
concessions  to  Zimbabwe  nationalists  in order  to bring the  two  parties  to  the 
negotiati ng  table. 39 
But  white  Rhodesia  is exposed  and  untenable.  The  prospects  of continued 
civil war  in Zimbabwe  are  real  as  essentially  two  black  nationalist groups 
again  (as  they  did  in the  early  1960s)  seek  to  assert  their  predominance. 
The  problem,  however,  is that  essential  power  in Zimbabwe  is the  issue,  and  it 
hardly  looks  negotiable  to  either  national ist force.  Si tuations,  however, 
can  change,  depending  on  how  long the  internal  settlement  can  remain glued. 
A1 though  South  Africa  would  appear  to be  showing  some  initiative and 
flexibility  in its  foreign  pol icy,  it must  be  remembered  that  South  Africa's 
mi 1 i tary expenditures  continue  to  grow,  amounting  to  nineteen  per cent  of 
State  expenditures  and  5.1  per  cent  of  the  gross  national  product  in 1977-78.40 
The  growth  in absolute  and  relative  terms  is unmatched  in the  region  and  has 
led  to  virtual  self-sufficiency  in small  arms  and  material.  Evidence  abounds 
that  the  South  African  government  has  not  hesitated  to  use  its military forces 
if they  perceive  that  the  protection  of their  interests  demand  it.  Repeated 
incursions  into Angola,  the  most  spectacular  in the  Fall  of 1975  and  again  in 
May  1978,  have  taken  place. 
So  the  carrot  is accompanied  by  the  reality of the  stick.  And  South 
Africa's  domestic  policies with  regard  to deal ing with  those  who  reject  and 
seek  to  alter  the  policy  of separate  development  by  any  but  the  most  ineffectual 
parliamentary  means  are  no  less  repressive  than  in the  days  when  South  Africa  did 
not  seem  to  care  to adjust  to  the  realities  of  independence  for  colonial  Africa. 
The  feeling  in Pretoria  is that  if South  Africa  can  continue  to  grow  economical- 
ly,  and  can  relate  to  neighboring  governments  in such  a fashion  that  they  also 
become  comnitted  to  economic  growth  at the  expense  of economic  development  and 
independence,  and  if South  Africa  can  maintain  a high  level  of  domestic  control, 
then  South  Africa  can  even  weather  the  establishment  of black  governments  on 
its borders. 
Portugal,  or  at  least  key  segments  of  Portuguese  and  the  military  forces, 
could  not withstand  the  pressure  and  opted  out  of southern  Africa.  White 
Rhodesia  may  just  be  learning  to  adapt,  yet  it comes  at a  time  when  adaptation 
may  not  be  enough;  revolution  is demanded.  South  Africa's  rulers  contemplate 
stabilizing  a  tolerable  regional  order  in a  few  years.  A  rnodus  operandi , 
they  contend,  can  be  contoured.  But  forces  beyond  their  control,  notably 
African national ism and  rev01 utionary  social ism,  are  abroad  in the  region 
and  for  South  Africans  and  others  to  seek  to  control  them  indirectly  through 
hand  picked  or  lesser of evil  black  candidates  is a  policy  born  of desperation. 
Steadily  South  Africa's  a1 ternatives  are  being  constricted.  White  South 
Africa's  chosen  path  may  be  the only  serious  dynamic  defense  of the status 
quo  open  to  them.  It may  deflect,  delay,  indeed  even  reverse  temporarily  the 
trends  that  seem  so  obvious  today.  But  in the  long  run,  as  Coloured  novel ist 
Richard  Rive  put  it:  "The  end  [of  White  dominance  in South  Africa]  is in- 
evi table,  but  not  predictable. " 
END  NOTES 
The  reader  is urged  to  consult  my  book,  Confrontation  and  Acconodation 
in Southern  Africa:  The  Limits  of  Independence  (Berkeley  &  Los  Angeles: 
The  University  of  California  Press,  1973),  for  basic  background  data  on 
international  affairs  in the  region  of  Southern  Africa. 
This  section  of  the  chapter  is heavily  dependent  upon  Johan  Galtung,  "A 
Structural  Theory  of  Imperial ism,"  Journal  of Peace  Research  8  (1971 ) : 
81-117. 
Sami r Amin  argues,  for  instance,  that  "outward-oriented  development" 
(integration  into  the  worl d  economy  by  concentration  on  production  for 
export)  "is  not  development  but  development  of  underdevelopment."  Thus 
Gabon  with  a  $600  per capita  per  year  GDP  "is  not less  but  more  under- 
developed"  than  Rwanda  with  $70,  because  the  "structural  chracteristics 
of underdevelopment"  as  described  above  are  more  marked  in Gabon:  '  De- 
velopment  and  Structural  Change:  The  African  Experience,  1950-1970," 
Journal  of  International  Affai rs,  24  (1 970) :  21 7. 
See  two  works  by  Wi 11 iam  Minter,  Portuguese  Africa  and  the  West  (New 
York  and  London:  Monthly  Review  Press,  1972)  and,  Imperial  Network 
and  External  Dependency:  The  Case  of Angola,  International  Studies 
Series,  Vol.  1  (Beverly  Hills,  California:  Sage,1972). 
Bob  Rowthorn,  "Imperialism  in the  Seventies  -- Unitv  or  Rivalry?"  New 
Left  Review, -no.  69  (September-October,  1971 ),  pp.  31-54;  two  extensive 
editorials,  "The  End  of  U.S.  Hegemony,"  Monthly  Review  23  (October,  1971): 
1-16;  "Im~erialism in the  Seventies:  Problems  and  Pers~ectives," Monthly 
~eview  (March,  1972):  1-8;  and  Rick  Wolff,  "~e~emonic  the 
- 
Contemporary  World:  Coopera ti on  and  Competition,"  paper  prepared  for  the 
colloquium  on  "The  Problem  of  Inequality  in the  Contemporary  World-System," 
McGill  University,  Montreal,  Canada,  May  15-18,  1974. 
Ray  Mauro  Marini , "Brazil ian  Subimperial ism,"  Monthly  Review  23  (February, 
1972):  14-24. 
Arghi ri Emmanuel , "Whi te-Settler  Colonial ism  and  the  Myth  of  Investment 
Imperialism,"  New  Left  Review,  no.  73  (May-June  1972),  pp.  36,  40  &  38. 
A  general  critique  of  Emmanuel's  work,  especially  of his  basic  thesis  that 
imperial ism  is not solely  a  function  of capital ism  but  of  unequal  exchange 
that  presumably  a1 1  industrial ized countries  can  indulge  in,  is Geoffrey 
Pi 11 i ng,  " Imperi a1 ism,  Trade,  and  ' Unequal  Exchange ' :  The  work  of Aghi ri 
[sic]  Emnanuel,"  Economy  and  Society  2  (May,  1973):  164-185. 
See,  Kenneth  W.  Grundy,  "Anti-neo-colonial  ism  in South  Africa's  Foreign 
Pol icy  Rhetoric,"  in Timothy  M.  Shaw  and  Kenneth  A.  Heard,  eds.,  Coopera- 
tion  and  Conflict  in Southern  Africa:  Papers  on  a  Regional  Subsystem 
(Washington,  D.C.  :  University  Press  of  America,  1976),  pp.  351-364. 
For  hi stori cal  background  and  interpretation  of the  Angl o-Boer  Wars,  see : 
Eric  A.  Walker,  A  History  of  South  Africa  (London:  Longmans,  Green,  1957); 
Cornelis  W.  de  Kiewiet,  The  Imperial  Factor  in South  Africa  (Cambridge: 
The  University  Press,  1937);  and  J.  A.  Hobson,  The  War  in South  Africa: 
Its Causes  and  Effects  (~ew  ~acmil  -1900). 
Johan  Galtung,  "On  the  Effects  of  International  Economic  Sanctions: 
Wi th  Exampl es  from  the  Case  of  Rhodesia,"  Worl d  Pol i tics  19  (Apri 1 
1967) :  378-41 6. 
For  example,  the  state-capitalist  sector  of the  economy  has  grown  immense- 
ly since  1948.  It now  covers  all  major  segments  of the  infrastructure. 
Among  other  results,  the  state  now  accounts  for  some  seventy-five  per 
cent  of  steel  output.  It is involved  in the  manufacture  of ammunition, 
weapons  and  war  materiel,  synthetic  fuels  and  fertilizers,  and  other 
diverse  products.  For  a  history  of  this  process,  see:  Earl  Phillips, 
"State  Requlation  and  Economic  Initiative:  The  South  African  Case  to 
1960,"  ~nternational Journal  of African  Historical  Studies  7  (1974) : 
227-54. 
See  Ruth  First,  Jonathan  Steele  and  Christabel  Gurney,  The  South  African 
Connection:  Western  Investment  in Apartheid  (London:  Temple  Smith,  1972), 
pp.  147-92. 
Ibid.,  esp.  pp.  9-80;  and  the  press  and  Parliamentary  flap  triggered by 
the  publication  in The  Guardian  of  a  series  of articles  by  Adam  Raphael, 
beginning March  12,  1973,  about  the  low  wages  paid  by  British  firms  to 
blacks  employed  in thei r South  African  subsidiaries.  Charles  Harvey, 
"The  Effect of  External  Pressure  on  British Firms  Investing  in South 
Africa,"  in Shaw  ii  Heard,  eds.,  Cooperation  and  Conflict,  pp.  394-407. 
For  example,  Barbara  Rogers  argues  that  the  balance  of advantage  in the 
economic  1 inks  between  Britain and  South  Africa  lies  "very  much  in South 
Africa's  favour,"  South  Africa's  Stake  in Britain  (London:  Africa  Bureau, 
1971 ). 
Foreign  Minister  Eric  Louw  in 1959  in "The  Union  and  the  Emergent  States 
of  Africa,"  in South  African  Bureau  of Racial  Affairs,  South  Africa  in 
the  African  Continent  (Stellenbosch:  SABRA,  1959),  p.  21.  The  idea  of 
South  Africa  as  a  bridge  can  also  be  found  in Fact  Paper  no.  5  (February, 
1956),  p.  12,  and  in Fact  Paper  no.  33  (April,  1957),  p.  9  (both published 
by  the  South  African  Department  of  Information).  See  also  Foreign Minister 
Hilgard  Muller's  later  references  to  the  same  theme  in,  for  example, 
Republic  of South  Africa,  House  of Assembly,  Hansard,  vol.  13  (1965),  cols. 
456-457. 
Editorial,  "Imperialism  in the  Seventies,"  - Monthly  Review  23  (March,  1972) : 
1-8. 
For  background  on  economi c  re1 ati ons , see  Grundy , Confrontation  and  Ac- 
commodation,  Chap.  2.  A  radically  updated  version  will  appear  as:  Grundy, .  . 
"Economic  patterns  in the  New  southern  African  Balance,"  in Gwendolen  M.  - 
Carter  and  Patrick  O'Meara,  eds.,  Southern  Africa;  The  Continuing  Crisis 
(Bloomington:  Indiana  University  Press,  forthcoming). 
An  indispensible  collection  of materials  is:  John  Dugard,  ed.,  The  South 
West  Africa/Nami bia  Dispute  (Berkeley,  Los  Angeles  &  London:  University 
of  California  Press,  1973).  See  also  J.H.P.  Serfontein,  Namibia?  (Rand- 
berg:  Fokus  Suid  Pub1 ishers,  1976). 
Good  descriptions  of  the  guerrilla  operations  can  be  found  in:  Basil 
Davidson,  ~oe  and  ~nthon~ Wil kinson,  Southern  Africa:  The  New 
Pol i tics  of  Rev01 ution  (~armondsworth:  Penguin,  1976) ; Kees  Maxey,  The 
Fiaht  for  Zimbabwe:  The  Armed  Conflict  in Southern  Rhodesia  Since  UDI 
(London :  Rex  Col 1 i ngs,  1975) ; and  Mi chael  Raeburn,  Bl ack  Fi re!  Accounts 
of the  Guerrilla  War  in Rhodesia  (London:  Julian  Friedmann.  1978). 
On  the  circumvention  of sanctions,  see  Robert  C.  Good,  U.D.I.:  The  Inter- 
national  Pol i ti cs  of  the  Rhodesian  Rebel1 ion  (Princeton.  N. J. :  Princeton 
University  Press,  1973) ; Leonard  T.  Kapungu,   he  ~ni  and 
ic Sanctions  (~exington, Mass. :  D.C.  Heath  &  Co.,  1973);  and  Harry 
Strack,  Sancti ons :  The  Case  of  Rhodesi a  (Syracuse :  Syracuse  Uni ve 
Press,  1978). 
Douglas  G.  Anglin,  "Britain  and  the  Use  of Force  in Rhodesia,"  in Michael 
G.  Fry,  ed.,  Freedom  and  Change:  Essays  in Honour  of Lester  B.  Pearson 
(Toronto:  McClelland  &  Stewart,  1975),  pp.  43-75. 
For  greater  detail,  see  John  Sprack,  Rhodesia:  South  Africa's  Sixth 
Province  (London:  International  Defence  and  Aid  Fund,  1974). 
"Why  Zambia  Wants  to Talk,"  an  interview with  Vernon  Mraanga,  Financial 
Mai 1  (Johannesburg),  18 April  1975;  my  italics. 
The  Star  (Johannesburg),  weekly  air edition,  1  November  1975,  p.  15. 
For  a  revealing expose  of United States  covert  operations,  see  John 
Stockwell , In search  of  Enemies:  A  C.  I .A.  Story  (New  York:  W.W.  Norton, 
1978).  See  also:  Rene  Lemarchand,  "The  CIA  and  U.S.  Policy  in Zaire  and 
Angola,"  in Rene  Lemarchand,  ed.,  American  Policy  in Southern  Africa: 
The  Stakes  and  the  Stance  (Washington,  D.C.  :  University  Press  of America, 
1978),  pp.  341-432. 
An  official  South  African  military account  bears  the  revealing title, 
"How  We  Swept  Cubans  and  MPLA  Aside  with  Contemptuous  Ease,"  Paratus 
(Pretoria),  28  (March,  1977).  South  Africa  contends  that  tbei r forces 
were  not  repulsed,  but withdrew  only  after  initial  encouragement  and 
expected  support  from  the United  States  had  not materialized.  In some 
measure  this  would  confirm the  Stockwell  account  of U.S.  involvement. 
Financial  Mai 1  (Johannesburg),  21  June  1974. 
Kei th Mi ddlemas , Caborra  Bassa :  Engi neeri ng  and  Pol i tics  i n  Southern 
Africa  (London:  Wei denfeld  &  Nicolson,  1975). 
The  Constitution  is reproduced  in Facts  and  Reports  (Amsterdam)  5 
(4  October  1975):  i tern  2230.  See  particularly  Arts.  4,  14 and  22. 
The  Star  (Johannesburg),  weekly  ai r edi ti on,  28  June  1975,  p.  1 . 
Ibid.,  5  July  1975,  p.  17. 
Financial  Times  (London),  12  May  1975;  and  Guardian  (London),  14  May  1975. 
Guy  Arnold,  "Changing  the  Communications  Map,"  Africa  Report  20  (July/ 
August,  1975) :  37-41 .  The  inadequacies  of the  harbor  at Dar  es  Salaam 
are  discussed  in:  B.  S.  Hoyle,  "African  Politics  and  Port  Expansion 
at  Dar  es  Salaam,"  The  Geographical  Review  68  (January,  1978):  31-50. 
The  Rhodesi a-Zambi a  Border Closure:  January-February  1973  (London :  Inter- 
national  Defence  and  Aid  Fund,  May  1973). 
Douglas  G.  Angl in,  "Zambian  Disengagement  from  Southern  Africa  and  Inte- 
gration  with  East  Africa,  1964-1972:  A  Transaction  Analysis ," in Shaw 
&  Heard,  eds.,  Cooperation  and  Conflict,  pp.  228-289. 
Carolyn  McMaster,  Malawi :  Foreign  Pol icy and  Development  (New  York:  St. 
Martin's  Press,  1974). 
See,  ~enneth W.  Grundy,  "Host  Countries  and  the  Southern  African Liberation 
Struggle,"  Africa  Quarterly 10  (Apri 1-June,  1970) :  15-24. 
For  example,  "Southern  Africa  Trade  Bloc?",  The  Star,  weekly  air edition, 
11  October  1975,  p.  15. 
Dougles  G.  Angl in,  "Zambia  and  Southern  African  'Detente ' ," International 
Journal  30  (Summer,  1975) :  494ff. 
Republic  of South  Africa.  Department  of Defence,  White  Paper  on  Defence, 
1977  (Sirnonstown:  The  SA  Navy,  1977),  p.  14. 
126 
THE  QUEST  FOR  EAST  AFRICAN  UNITY: 
'ONE  STEP  FORWARD,  TKO  STEPS  BACKNARD' 
J.  Gus  Liebenow,  Indiana  University 
In  April,  1977  the  Tanzanian  Minister  for  Home  Affairs  announced  that 
the  450  mile  border  separating Tanzania  from  Kenya  would  be  "permanently 
sealed".  This  action  was  the  culmination  of  a  long  series  of  disputes 
between  the  two  states  over  transport,  trade,  taxes,  tourism  and  a  range 
of  pol i tical  issues.  Concurrently  with  this  action  relations  between  Uganda 
and  its  two  East  African  neighbors  had  reached  a  new  low  in  the  continuing 
crisis  which  has  raged  since  Idi  Amin  seized  power  in  1971.  The  significance 
of  these  events  has  had  ramifications  far  beyond  the  three  states  dire~tly 
invol ved.  For  indeed,  they  constituted  devastating,  if  not  fatal,  blows 
to  the  continent's  rnos t  dramatic  case  of  regional  integration. 
Throughout  history  attempts  to  create  pol i tical  comnuni ty  at an  increasingly 
larger scale  have  been  recurrent  phenomena.  Wi  thin  the  present  generation 
people  on  each  of  the  major  continents  have  witnessed  efforts  to  expand  the 
limits  of  political  community.  In  many  instances  these  goals  have  been  pursued 
by  those  whose  primary  motivation  has  been  the  domination  of  one's  neighbors  -- 
as  in  the  cases  of  Germany  and  Japan  during  the  second  quarter  of  this  century. 
Attempts  to  enlarge  the  scope  of  political  communi ty,  however,  are  a1 so  being 
pursued  today  in  Western  Europe,  Central  America,  Southeast  Asia  and  parts  of 
Africa  by  those  with  goals  that  are less  subject  to  challenge.  These  goals 
woul d  i ncl ude  mutual  defense,  the  maxirni zing  of  econorni c opportunities  within 
a  region  for  the  benefit  of  all  parties,  or  the  creation  of  a  political  system 
which  sublimates  or  balances  potentially  hostile  differences  of  a  linguistic, 
re1 i gious,  racial  or  cul tural  nature. 
In  many  respects  Africa  is  an  excellent  1 aboratory  for  the  study  of  peaceful 
efforts  to  expand  the  notion  of  political  comrnuni ty  beyond  the  limits  of  the 
existing  nation-states.  By  an  informal  count,  over  two  dozen  plans  for  some  form 
of  integration  involving  two  or  more  African  states  have  been  advanced  in  the  past 
two  decades.  Indeed,  under  the  banner  of  Pan-Africanism,  the  commitment  to 
cooperation  or  consol idation  above  the  state  level  has  become  an  article  of 
pol i tical  faith  among  the  overwhelming  majori ty  of  Africa's  leadership  in  the 
post-colonial  era.  In  its  least  politically  operational  version,  Pan-Africanism 
merely  assumes  the  psychological,  racial,  cultural  or spiritual  identity of  all 
the  people  of  the  continent  as  well  as  their  dispersed  off-spring  in the 
New  World.  It is an  identity  based  upon  their  snared  experience  as  victims  of 
the  slave-trade  and  European  colonial  rule.  Increasingly,  however,  acceptance 
of  Pan-Africanism  as  an  ideology  imp1 ici  assumes  the  need  for  administrative 
or  political  structures  through  which  citizens  of  the  African  states  can  achieve 
tangible benefits  from  economic,  cultural  and  pol i tical  cooperation. 
The  variety  of  structures  created  or  proposed  in Africa  can  be  instructive 
for  other  areas  of  globe.  In terms  of numbers  of  geographic  units  involved  the 
African  evidence  covers  a  broad  spectrum.  At  one  extreme  is the  bilateral 
posture as  exemplified  in the  Mano  River  Customs  Union  between  Liberia  and 
Sierra  Leone  or  in the  collaborative  efforts  of Tanzania  and  Zambia  to  construct 
and  operate  a  railway  line from  the  copperbelt  to  Dar  es  Salaam.  Multilateral 
cooperation  on  a  regional  basis  is evidenced  in the  East  African  Comnon  Services 
Organization,  the  economic  cooperation  among  fifteen  states  of West  Africa,  and 
in UDEAC  -- the  cooperative  effort of  several  former  French  dependencies  in 
Central  Africa.  At  the  far  end  of  the  spectrum  is the  continental  approach, 
which  was  so  ardently  espoused  by  the  late  Kwame  Nkrumah  of Ghana  and  which  has 
seen  1 imi ted  fruition  in the  creation  of  the  Organization  of African  Unity. 
The  qua1 i ty of approaches  attempted  in Africa  within  the  bilateral,  regional 
and  continental  frameworks  also  gives  the  African  experience  uni versa1  significance. 
The  pol i tical  model,  emulating  the  experience  of  the  thirteen  American  states 
in 1887-89,  has  had  mixed  reception.  Indeed,  Nkrumah,  who  advocated  not  only 
continental  unity  but  the  imperative  of the  political  approach  as  well,  frequently 
referred  to  the  American  example  in his proposal  for  a  United States  of Africa. 
This  model  assumes  the necessity  of creating  system-wide  political  institutions 
as  a  requisite  in achieving coordination  of economic,  cultural  and  other  affairs 
among  previously  independent  or  autonomous  enti ties.  As  in the  American  experience, 
the  participating  units  would  have  to  surrender  or agree  to  share  their  previous 
monopoly  over  the  use  of domestic  and  external  force,  over  taxation,  over  direct 
contacts  with  the  individual  citizen  and  over  relationships  among  the states  and 
wi th external  powers. 
The  politic31 model  nas  been  largely rejected at the  continental  level,  with 
the  OAU  being  largely  a consultative  body  rather  than  a  political  collectivity. 
Similarly,  political  integration  at the  regional  level  has  remained  a  hope  rather 
than  a  reality.  Kwame  Nkrumah's  various  plans  for  the  political  union  of  Ghana 
with,  inter -- ia,  Guinea,  Ma1 i and  even  Liberia,  never  advanced  beyond  the  blue- 
125 
print  stage.  Furthermore,  the  heroic  gesture  of  Julius  Nyerere  --  in  suggesting 
a  delay  in  Tanganyikan  independence  so  that  it could  be  coordinated  with  the 
simultaneous  independence  of  Kenya  and  Uganda  within  the  framework  of  a  politically 
unified  East  African  state  -- also  failed  to  reach  fruition.  The  only  other  efforts 
at regional  pol i ti cal  integration  took  place  under  the  aegis  of  European  imperial ism: 
the  union  of  the  four  provinces  of  South  Africa  in  1910  and  the  short-lived  Federation 
of Rhodesia  and  Nyasaland,  which  was  dissolved  as  Zambia  and  Malawi  achieved  indepen- 
dence  as  separate  entities. 
It has  only  been  at the  bilateral  level  that  political  consolidation  has  manage 
to  a1 ter  the  b,oundaries  established  by  the  European  colonial  powers  at the  end  of 
the  nineteenth  and  beginning  of  the  twentieth  centuries.  In  most  of  the  cases  of 
bilateral  consolidation  the  idea  was  launched,  if  not  consummated,  prior  to  one  or 
both  of  the  parties attaining  independence.  This  is particularly  true  ~f the  former 
United  Nations  Trust  Territories,  with  British  Togoland  being  absorbed  by  GLana, 
Ital ian-administered  Soma1 ia  being  united  with  British  Soma1 i land  at independence 
and  the  northern  and  southern  sectors  of British  Cameroon  opting respectively  for 
union  with  Nigeria  and  the  former  French  Cameroon  as  independence  approached. 
Three  other  examples  of  pre-independence  pol i tical  union  have  witnessed,  or are now 
experiencing,  disaster.  The  Ma1 i  Federation,  for  example,  which  had  united  the  forme 
French  territories  of  Senegal  and  the  Soudan,  lasted  only  two  months  beyond  indepen- 
dence.  The  decision  of  the  Four  Powers  at the  end  of  the  Second  World  War  to 
integrate  Italian  Eritrea  into  the  Ethiopian  Empire  is now  being  effectively 
chal lenged  by  various  Eritrean  1 iberation  groups.  Similarly,  the  division  of  the 
Spanish  Sahara  between  Morocco  and  Mauretania  is a1 so  being  contested  by  "1 i beration" 1 
groups  supported  by  A1  geria.  The  only  example  of  post-independence  political  inte- 
gration  has  been  the  1964  union  of  Zanzibar  and  Tanganyika.  It was  only  1977, 
that  the  Tanzania  experiment  began  to  have  substantially  more  than  symbolic  value. 
It is  true  that  both  units  had  recognized  Julius  Nyerere  as  President  and  that  Zan- 
zibar,  however,  continued  to  control  its own  domestic  and  military  matters  and  even 
conducted  i ts  foreign  relations  outside  the  framework  of  the  Tanzanian  Ministry  of 
Foreign  Affairs.  There  was  also,  until  1977,  the  anomaly  of  two  parties  -- one  for 
the  mainland  and  the  other  for  Zanzibar  -- existing  within  a  single party  state! 
The  converse  of  the  pol i tical  model  is  the  functional  approach  to  transnational 
integration.  Essentially,  it has  been  this  model  that  has  been  followed  in  Western 
Europe  today  and  is  currently  being  pursued  by  the  leaders  of  fifteen  West  African 
states  as  well  as  by  the  leaders  of  several  former  French  territories  in  Africa 
where  transnational  cooperation  is  being  sought  in  fiscal  matters,  transportation, 
customs  duties,  research  and  other  "non-poli tical"  fields. 
Advocates  of  the  functional  approach  to  integration  argue  that  pol i tical 
unity -- whether  explicitly or  implicitly  recognized  as  an  end  qoal  of  cooperation 
--  can  only  be  accomplished  on  the  basis  of a  prior  demonstration  of the  feasi- 
bili ty  and  the  value  of cooperation  in non-poli tical  matters.  The  surrender  of 
state  sovereignty  is such  an  emotional  issue  that  the  participants must  be 
convinced  that  the  gains  will  offset  the  losses.  Interstate  cooperation  per  se, - 
however,  does  not  inevitably  lead  to  political  integration.  If the  latter  is 
the  implied goal,  cooperation  must  cover  a  complex  of non-political  issues. 
Secondly,  the  quality of cooperation  is a  factor.  The  areas  singled  out  must 
be  regarded  by  the  parties  as  critical  to  the  functioning  of their  respective 
societies.  They  must  be  of  such  a  character  that  once  the  benefits  of cooperation 
begin  to  be  realized  it would  be  difficult  for  any  of the  parties  to advocate 
a  return  to  the  previously  autonomous  situation.  Hence,  this  was  the strategy 
of the  West  Europeans  in ini tiatins  integrative  efforts  in the  areas  of  coal  and 
steel  production.  Thirdly,  the  process  of  integration  leading  to  pol i tical 
unity must  remain  a  dynamic  one.  Accompl ishments  in a  series  of endeavours 
must  lead  to  demands  for  cooperation  in other  areas  in order  to sustain  the 
drive  to  political  unity.  To  paraphrase  the  historian  Seeley,  political  unity 
would  be  achieved  thereby,  in "almost  a  fit of absence  of mind." 
It  is against  this  background  that  we  undertake  an  analysis  of the  problems  of 
functional  integration on  a  regional  basis  in East  Africa.  The  three  states 
directly  involved  --  Kenya,  Tanzania  and  Uganda  -- have  a  combined  population  of 
36  mill ion  inhabitants  and  cover  an  area  somewhat  larger  than  that  of  the  nine 
states  included  in the  European  Economic  Comnuni ty.  Unl i ke  the  West  European 
situation,  however,  the  economies  of the  East  African  states  are  based  largely 
upon  agri cul ture  and  mineral  extraction,  with  some  beginnings  of industrial ization 
in Kenya.  Curiously,  however,  the  introduction  of  functional  integration  in East 
Afri ca  i n  1948  antedates  the  launchi ng  of serious  efforts  towards  European  economic 
integration  by  three  years. 
The  Origins  of East  African  Dreams  of Unity 
Like  many  of  the  schemes  for  functional  cooperation  which  have  emerged  in 
Africa  during  the  independence  era,  cooperation  in East  Africa  has  largely  taken 
place  within  a  framework  laid down  during  the  colonial  period and   was^  in fact  the 
inspiration  of  the  former  colonial  cfficial s.  Proposals  for  the  pol i tical 
integration of  Britain's territorie,  in East  Africa  began  to  be  floated  as  early 
as  the  First World  War.  Indeed,  the  German  expulsion  from  Tanganyika  made 
possible the  realization  of  Cecil  Rhodes'  dream  of a  great  red  swath  on  the  map 
from  the  Cape  to  Cairo.  Although  belatedly  the  most  persistent advocates  of 
this  idea  during  the  colonial  period were  tne  Kenya  white  settlers,  initially 
it was  British officials  in London  and  colonial  administrators  on  the  local 
scene  who  advanced  and  sustained  the  concept.  At  several  stages,  moreover,  the 
unification  of East  Africa  was  viewed  as  part  of  a greater  scheme  to  unite  all 
British territories  between  the  Sudan  and  the  Zambezi  River.  This  would  have 
provided  Nyasalahd  (now  Malawi )  and  Northern  Rhodesia  (now  Zambia)  with  direct 
access  to  the  Indian  Ocean  and  lessened  the  dependence  of these  two  territories 
on  the  whi te-dominated  regimes  in South  Africa  and  Southern  ~h0desia.l  Sir Harry 
Johnston,  a  longtime  colonial  officer who  had  been  responsible  for  the  extension 
of  British  rule  in both  Nyasaland  and  Uganda,  saw  this  grand  scheme  of East  and 
Central  African  closer  union  as  a  device  for el iminati ng  "balkanization"  --  the 
popular  European  political  scapegoat  as  the  cause  of war  in the  post-World  War 
I  era? 
An  even  more  persistent  advocate  in official  circles,  however,  was  Mr.  L.S. 
Amery,  a  staff officer who  ultimately  assumed  the  post  of British Colonial  Secretary 
in the  mid-1920s.  Even  before  the  British  forces  under  General  Jan  Smuts  had 
defeated  the  Germans  in Tanganyika,  Amery  had  allied himself with  Smuts  in pressing 
for  the  inclusion of Tanganyika  in a  federation  of British dependencies.  Amery 
felt  not only  that  the  larger  territory would  be  easier  to  administer  but  that  it 
would  more  efficiently  contribute  to  the  needs  of  the  empire.3  He  was  supported 
in this  position by  a  member  of the  Economic  Commission  of  the  East  Africa 
Protectorate  in 1919  who  argued  that  strategically,  financially  and  ideological ly 
(that  is,  the  superiority  of  the  British presence  in Africa)  closer  union  of  East 
and  Central  Africa was  a  necessi ty.4 
It was  not  unti 1  1924,  in response  to  a  British House  of  Commons  resolution, 
that  any  official  action  was  taken  on  the  idea  of closer  union.  A  comnission 
under  the  chairmanship  of W.  Orrnsby-Gore  was  dispatched  to  East  Africa  to  investigate 
economic  conditions  and  development  plans  and  to  recommend  policies  for  the coordi- 
nation  of  transport,  agriculture  and  medicine  in the  several  territories.  To 
the chagrin  of Amery,  who  had  become  Colonial  Secretary  upon  the  fall of  the  Labour 
government  in 1924,  the  Ormsby-Gore  Commission  did not  recommend  closer  union.  The 
commission  instead  argued  that  the  exDense  and  di ffi cul ties  of  comrnuni cation 
made  such  a  move  impractical .5  Undaunted,  Amery  persisted  in  his  goal  by  having 
his  nominee  for  the  governorship  of  Kenya,  Sir  Edward  Grigg,  champion  the  idea. 
Subsequently  another  commission,  under  the  chai rmanship  of  Si r  Hi  1 ton  Young,  was 
appointed  to  investigate  closer  union,  and  still  a  further  inquiry  into  the  idea  was 
conducted  in  1929  by  the  Permanent  Under-Secretary  of  State,  Sir  Samuel  Itlilson.6 
Ul timately  the  series  of  recommendations  were  submitted  to  a  Joint  Select  Committee 
of  both  Houses  of  Par1 iament.  The  comni ttee's  recommendation  was  that  closer 
union  of  a  political  or  constitutional  character,  while  in  many  respects  desirable, 
was  inapproapriate  at  that  time.  The  best  that  could  be  hoped  for was  greater 
cooperation  and  coordination  through  periodic  rneeti ngs  of  the  governors  of  the 
three  territories -7  This  recommendation  was  accepted  by  the  British  government 
in  1931,  and  there  the  matter  of  political  union  rested. 
During  the  decade  of  pressure  from  Amery  and  others  at  the  official  level, 
it was  apparent  that  the  idea  of  closer  political  union  had  few  advocates  among 
the  permanent  residents  of  East  Africa.  The  Africans  in  general  were  a  poorly 
organized  pol i tical  force  at  that  time.  Individual  Africans,  nevertheless,  did 
give  testimony  in  opposition  to  the  idea,  arguing  that  the  first consequence  of 
closer  union  would  be  further  alienation  of  land  in  Uganda  and  Tanganyika  to 
Europeans  along  the  1 ines  followed  in  Kenya.  The  most  vociferous  organized 
African  opposition  came  from  the  Baganda.  This  largest  of  the  twenty  ethnic 
groups  in  Uganda  suspected  that  their  privileged  position  as  an  'agreement  state' 
within  the  Uganda  Protectorate  woul d  be  jeopardized  through  their  participation 
in  any  federal  legislative  arrangement  which  would  find  them  enjoying minority 
status.  Similarly,  the  Asians  in  the  three  territories  for  the  most  part  opposed 
closer  union,  unless  they  could  be  accorded  equality  of  representation  with  the 
dorni nan t  European  group. 
For  differing  reasons,  the  Europeans  in  the  three  territories were  not  initially 
enthusiastic  about  federation.  The  Kenya  settlers  feared  that  it would  compl icate 
their  plans  to  make  Kenya  a  European-managed  self-governing  colony.  The  Europeans 
in  Uganda,  already  chaffing  over  customs  charges  and  the  cost  of  operating  the 
railroad  which  inexorably  linked  landlocked  Uganda  to  Kenya's  seaport  at Mornbasa, 
feared  further  domination  by  the  comercia1  interests  in  iiai robi ; Tanganyi ka 
settlers  were  equal ly  suspicious  of  their  neighbors  in  Kenya,  particularly  after 
it was  proposed  that  the agricul turally-rich  area  around  Moshi  and  Arusha  in 
northern  Tanganyi ka  s houl d  be  ceded  to  Kenya. 
In  the  end,  one  of  the  most  effective opponents  of  the  idea  was  not  a 
resident  of  the  region,  but  Sir  Dona1 d  Cameron,  who  had  become  Governor  of 
Tanganyika  in  1925.~ Cameron  viewed  closer  union  as  a  real  threat  to  the 
economic  development  of  one  of  Britain's  poorest  dependencies.  He  based  his 
fear  of  Kenya  settlers  not  only  on  their  coveting  of  the  Arusha-Moshi  area, 
but  also  upon  thei r  opposition  to  the  construction  of  the  Mwanza-Tabora  railway 
link,  which  would  divert  some  traffic  away  from  Lake  Victoria  and  the  Kenya- 
Uganda  Railway.  His  greatest  concern,  however,  was  that  closer  union  would 
undermine  his  implementation  of  ' indirect rule, '  a  philosophy  of  colonial 
administration  of  which  he  had  become  enamored  while  serving  under  Lord  Lugard 
in  Nigeria.  He  feared  that  the  Kenya  practice  of  appointing  warrant  chiefs  would 
be  appl ied  throughout  the  region  under  closer  association. 
In  any  event  the  British  government  in  the  decade  following  the  rejectic~ 
of  closer  union  by  Parliament  gave  a  very  low  priority  to  reopening  the  question. 
The  government  was  much  more  concerned  wi th  battl i ng  the  worl dwi de  depression  and 
coping  with  the  growing  pol i tical  and  military  crisis  in  Europe.  Concurrently, 
however,  the  previously  hostile  Kenya  settlers  under  Lord  Del amere  began  to  view 
closer  union  with  enthusiasm.  Sensing  that  eventually  the  ideas  of  Amery  just 
might  prevail,  Lord  Delamere  decided  to  strengthen  the  bargaining  position  of  the 
Kenya  settlers.  He  began  insisting  that  Nairobi  would  have  to  be  the  capital 
of  any  future  East  African  federation  and  that  the  whites  in  Kenya  would  have 
to  have  an  elected  rnajori ty  in  that  colony's  legislative  counci 1.9  Del arnere 
managed,  moreover,  to  convene  two  conferences  of  white  settlers  from  several  East 
and  Central  African  territories  in  1925  and  1926  in order  to  galvanize  the 
Europeans  into  presenting  a  united  front  in  dealing  with  any  proposals  for political 
reorganization.  What  ul tirnately  did  propel  the  Europeans  in  Kenya  and  Tanqanyi ka 
into  a  more  positive  posture  with  respect  to  closer  union  was  the  spectre  of 
Tanganyi ka  being  sacri ficed  to  Nazi  Germany's  demands  for  colonial  lebensraum. 
The  indecisiveness  on  the  part  of  both  the  Bal dwin  and  the  Chamberlain  governments 
in  the  1930s  convinced  the  settlers  that  their  fears  were  well-grounded.  A 
series  of  peti tions  were  made  to  the  Bri tish  government  demanding  closer  union 
as  an  assurance  that  Tanganyika's  place  in  the  British  Empire  would  be  assured.10 
The  petitions  were  apparently  ignored,  but  Tanganyi ka  remained  under  Bri tish  control 
During  the  Second  World  War  the  idea  of  closer  union  was  again  bruited  about 
in  various  forms.  One  proposal  emanating  from  Kenya  was  that  a  Joint  East  African 
War  Council  be  established  to  provide  for  common  policy  under  a  unified  comnand. 
Both  administrators  and  residents  in Uganda  and  Tanganyi ka  rejected  the  idea. 
Also  rejected was  the  revival  of one  of Awry's  pet projects,  the  naming  of  the 
Governor  of  Kenya  as  the  High  Comnissioner  for  all  British areas  between  the 
Sudan  and  the  Zambezi.  The  only  regional  proposal  that  did bear  fruit was  the 
es tab1 ishment  of  a  Joint  Economic  Counci 1  to  coordinate  economic  and  comercial 
planning  for  six  territories  in East  and  Central  Africa  (including  Zanzibar,  but 
excluding  Southern  Rhodesia).  Created  in 1940,  the  Council  did not  survive  the 
war,  and  it was  constantly  criticized for  favoring  Kenya's  economic  development 
and  welfare  at the  expense  of  its neighbors. l1 
Creation  of  the  East  Rfrica  High  Comission 
Of  greater  significance  than  the  wartime  cooperation  were  the  statements 
made  in London  towards  the  end  of  the  Second  World  War  which  indicated  that  the 
British  coalition  government  of Conservatives  and  Labourites  was  thinking  in 
terms  of  amalgamation  -- either  administratively  or  politically  -- of colonial 
units.  The  purpose  of  amalgamation  would  be  to carry  out  the  provisions  of 
the  Colonial  Development  and  Welfare  Act  of  1940  in a more  effective  fashion 
and  to rationalize  defense  planning within  the  British Empire.  With  respect 
to  East  Africa  the  British government  insisted  that  it was  only  advocating 
economic  and  technical  cooperation  rather  than  political  union.  The  statements, 
nevertheless,  were  viewed  with  suspicion  by  members  of all  races. l2  First of 
all,  the  post-war  proposals  regarding  the  creation  of an  East  Africa  High 
Comission  seemed  to  give a  pre-eminent  role  to  Kenya  by  virtue  of the  Governor 
of  Kenya  being  chairman  of the  Commission,  with  the other  two  governors  as  his 
colleagues.  Secondly,  the creation  of an  executive  authority  and  a  Central 
Legislative  Assembly  were  regarded  as  the  thin edge  of a wedge  in creating 
political  institutions.  Fears  were  not allayed  by  the  claim  that  the  High 
Commission  had  only  1 imi ted authority with  respect  to specified  economic  and 
technical  functions  and  was  expressly  denied  authority  to  deal  with  basic 
administration,  pol ice  services,  education,  agriculture,  forestry,  veterinary 
services,  health,  labor  and  other  matters  which would  be  left to the  terri- 
torial  governments.  Thirdly,  the  various  formulae  regarding  racial  represen- 
tation  in the  Assembly  seemed  to displease  everyone  except  the  Indians. 
Despi te  the  many  expressed  ~nisgivings, the  proposal  was  pushed  through  by  the 
British  government,  and  the  East  Africa  High  Commission  came  into existence 
on  January  1,  1948.13 
The  final  grounds  for  suspicion  of  the  High  Commission  was  that  pari 
passu  with  events  in East  Africa  the  British  Labour  government  was  initiating 
the  proposals  for  the  political  amalgamation  of  the  two  Rhodesias  and 
Nyasaland.  This  was  taking  place  without  substantial  consul tation  with  the 
African  majorities  in any  of  the  territories.  It was  against  this  background 
that  the  'Kabaka  Crisis'  of  1953  in Uganda  must  be  evaluated.  The  event  which 
triggered  the  political  turmoil  in Buganda  was  a  remark  of  the  Colonial 
Secretary  in London  on  June  30,  1953,  in which  he  praised the  Central  African 
Federation  and  suggested  that  the  idea might  well  be  extended  to  East  Africa. 
There  was  immediate  fear  in Buganda  that  federation  would  threaten  the  pri vi leged 
position  of  the  Baganda  within  East  Africa  and  subordinate  their  intererts  to 
those  of  the  Kenya  white  settlers.  Accordingly,  a  broad  spectrum  of  politiral 
groups  in Buganda  compelled  Kabaka  Mutesa  to  take  a  firm stand  not only  against 
federation  but  also  against  submerging  of Buganda's  distinct  political  identity 
within  a  unified  Uganda.  In a  heated  reaction  to  the  situation  Governor  Sir 
Andrew  Cohen  took  the  extraordinary  step  of  deporting  the  Kaba ka,  thereby 
pl unging  Buganda  into pol i tical  chaos.  A1 though  much  more  was  involved  in 
the  1955  settlement  which  ultimately  brought  the  Kabaka  back  to  Buganda,  it 
was  clear  that  closer  political  union  under  the  colonial  umbrella  had  been 
dealt  a  deathblow  by  the  intransigence  of the  Baganda  -- at  least  insofar  as 
European  settler  or British  Colonial  Office  initiative was  concerned.14 
There  was,  however,  one  further  attempt  made  at political  union  in East 
Africa  under  the aegis  of  the  colonial  umbrella.  The  inspiration,  however,  was 
African  in origin.  This  was  the  offer of  Julius  Nyerere  in 1961  to  delay  the 
scheduled  independence  for  Tanganyi ka  if there  could  be  immediate  progress  on 
plans  for  the  political  federation  of East  Africa,  with  Africans  in control  of 
the  process.  This  was  an  attempt  to  give  concrete  action  to  the  words  he  had 
prophetical ly uttered the  year  previously,  indicating  that 
the  feeling  of  unity which  now  exists  could  be  whittled away 
if each  country  gets  its independence  separately  and  becomes 
too  open  to  the  temptations  of  nationhood  and  the  intrigues 
of  those  who  find  their  strength  in the  weakness  of small 
nations  .  .  .  . Further the  leaders  of each  state  will  become 
so  preoccupied with  the  problems  of their  own  government  that 
the  long-term  advantages  which  can  come  from  the  ectabl ishment 
of a federation  wi 11  get  crowded  out  of  considerat ;on.l5 
Unfortunately,  the  British Colonial  Office  failed  to  respond  positively to 
Nyerere's  remarkable  offer,  and  the  African  leadership  in both  Kenya  and  Uganda 
was  unable  to  respond  due  to  the  great  domestic  political  problems  that  each 
of  them  faced.  Independence,  thus,  came  to each  country  without  the  assumed 
benefits  of  pol i tical  federation. 
Economic  and  Technical  Cooperation  under  Col oni a1  Rule 
Despi te  di ffi cul ties  encountered  on  the  pol i tical  front,  the  economic 
and  technical  integration  of  East  Africa  under  colonial  rule had  rapidly 
proceeded.  The  economic  interdependence  of two  of  the  territories,  Kenya  and 
Uganda,  had  in a  sense  been  forged  much  earlier when  the  British decided  in 
the  nineteenth century  to  add  Buganda  and  the  other  Uganda  kingdoms  to  the 
British holdings  in Kenya,  and,  secondly,  when  the  decision  was  made  to 
construct  the  rai lway  1 inking Uganda  to  the  Kenya  port of Mombasa.  During 
the  first  two  decades  of the  twentieth  century,  however,  the  links  served  as 
an  irritant  to  elements  in Uganda  rather  than  an  unmitigated  blessing.  Indeed, 
the  designation  of  the  customs  union  in 1917,  permitting  the  free  flow  of domestic 
comrnodi ties  between  Kenya  and  Uganda  and  standardizing  customs  col lections  for 
the  two  countries,  at first only  further  aggravated  the  situation.  The  Uganda 
commercial  interests  chafed  under what  they  regarded  as  the  unfair division  of 
the  customs  receipts  and  of the  railway  charges  and  revenues.  Some  lessening 
of  the  hostility occurred  in the  early  1920s  when  a  new  formula  was  devised 
for  distributing customs  receipts  and  Uganda  was  included on  the  membership 
of  the  newly  created  Railway  Council,  which  supervised  the  operation  of the 
Mombasa- Kampala  1 ine.  A similar history  of suspicions  arose  in Tanganyi ka 
after  the  First World  War,  particularly when  plans  were  developed  to  have  the 
produce  of  the  Moshi-Arusha  area  routed  through  the  Kenya  port of Kilindini 
rather  than  through  Tanga  or Dar  es  Salaam.  It was  not  until  1927  that  the 
free  trade  aspects  of  the  common  market  were  extended  to  Tanganyika,  and 
the  common  customs  administration only  took  effect  in Tanganyika  in 1949, 
after  the  creation  of the  High  Commission. 
Para1 lel with  the  proposals  for  closer  political  union  during the  1920s 
and  1930s,  a  series  of  recommendations  were  made  for  the extension  of coopera- 
tion  in economic  and  technical  matters.  For  example,  the  Grigg  scheme  of 
1927  --  ultimately  rejected  by  the  British cabinet  -- envisioned a federal 
counci 1  for  East  Africa  entrusted with  control  of  transportation,  customs, 
defense,  communications  and  research  throughout  the  region. l6 
Perhaps  due  to  the  League  of Nations  Mandate  status  of Tanganyika,  which 
gave  it special  international  significance,  most  of  the  constructive  economic 
cooperation  among  the  three  territories  during  the  inter-war  period  was  brought 
about  informal ly and  wi thout  specific  legal  authorization  from  the  British 
government.  Obviously,  the  Colonial  Office  in London  was  aware  of 
these  developments.  I  refer  to  the  schemes  for  cooperation  and  coordination 
which  emerged  from  the  annual  meetings  of the  East  African  governors  which 
took  place  during  the  1930s.  These  conferences  produced  agreements  -- or 
agreements  in principle  --  regarding  uni form  taxation pol icy with  respect 
to  Africans,  elementary  education  in the  vernacular,  transport  and  communica- 
tions,  and  industrialization.  One  very concrete  move  -- objected  to  by  the 
German  member  of  the  League  of Nations  Permanent  Mandates  Commission  -- was 
the  1932  amalgamation  of the  East  African  postal  services.  The  decisions  of 
the  Governors '  Conferences,  however,  were  not  always  subjected  either  to 
public  discussion  or  to  the  consent  of the  territorial  legislative councils. 
In many  instances  the  agreements  could  have  been  unconstitutional. 
At  the  end  of  the  war  the  Labour  government,  in the  name  of greater 
efficiency,  was  commi tted  to  some  form  of  i nter-terri torial  cooperation. 
Recognizing  the  fears  in East  Africa  regarding  closer  political  union,  the  East 
Africa  High  Commission  was  advanced  as  a  mechanism  for  furthering economic  and 
technical  cooperation.  The  organization  which  came  into effect  in 7948  pro- 
vided  for  a  series  of  new  or  reorganized  agencies  that would  provide  comnon 
services  throughout  the three  territories.  The  areas  speci fi cal ly covered  were 
posts  and  tel ecommuni cati ons ; rai 1 roads,  harbors,  and  inland steamers ; touri srn; 
East  African  Airways;  scientific  research  in a  broad  range  of  fields;  joint 
customs  and  tax  systems;  shared  currency;  comnon  immigration  controls;  an 
integrated  university  system;  and  the  framework  for a  comnon  economic  market. 
These  agencies  were  in addition  to  the other supra-terri  torial  insti tutions 
of cooperation  such  as  the  East  African  Navy  and  the  East  African  High Court 
of Appeals. 
Despite  the  initial  misgivings  of the  African  political  leaders  in Uganda 
and  Tanganyi ka  regardi ng  the  East  Africa  Hi gh  Comni ssion,  the  technical  services 
were  handled  in an  even-handed  fashion  and  did contribute  to  the  development 
of  the  region  as  a  whole.  Kenya,  it is true,  enjoyed  a  favored  position as  the 
most  prosperous  of the  three  territories  and  had  the  headquarters  of the  High 
Commission  establ ished  in Nairobi .  The  Colonial  Office,  nevertheless,  managed 
to  supervise  the  operations  of  the  High  Comnission  and  resolve  points  of 
conflict  among  the  three  governors.  Indeed,  the  system worked  so  we1 1  that 
Julius  Nyerere  and  TANU  were  resolved  that  --  in the  absence  of  federation 
prior to  independence  --  the  cooperati ve  arrangements  with  Kenya  and  Uganda 
shoul d  pers i st after  Tanganyi ka  recei ved  i ts  i ndependence  i n  December  1961. 
Accordingly,  the  High  Commission  was  transformed  into the  East  African  Common 
Services  Organi zation.  The  High  Authority  for  the  Organization consisted  of 
the  heads  of  government  of the  three  units  involved.  Gone,  however,  would  be 
the  staying  power  of  an  external  body,  such  as  the  Colonial  Office,  to resolve 
controversy.  Each  state  could exercise a  veto  with  respect  to policies  it 
regarded  as  prejudicial  to  its best  interests .l 
The  Framework  of  Coo~eration in the  Post-Inde~endence Period 
The  failure  of  the  Ugandan  and  Kenyan  nationalist leaders  to respond  to 
Nyerere's  offer  regarding  federation  prior  to  independence  did not  indicate 
hostil i ty  towards  the  idea  of pol i tical  union.  It was  apparently  attributable 
to  the  matter  of  timing  and  the  serious  internal  problems  both  Jomo  Kenyatta 
in Kenya  and  Mi 1 ton  Obote  in Uganda  faced.  Indeed,  once  the  Baganda  crisis  in 
Uganda  had  been  resol ved  and  Uganda  achieved  independence  as  a federal  state, 
the  call  for  federation  was  again  made.  A1 though  this  may  have  been  timed  to 
force  the  British to  set  an  early  date  for  Kenyan  independence,  the three 
leaders  did make  a  public  announcement  in June  1963  of their  intentions  to 
achieve  federation  of  the  three  East  African  states  by  the  end  of that year.18 
Federation  did not  in fact  take  place  by  the  end  of 1963.  Kenya  did achieve 
its  independence  wi th  i ts  1 eaders  openly  comni tted to  the  concept  of pol i ti cal 
unity.  A  conference  held  in 1964  at Kampala,  however,  clearly  brought  out  the 
economic  considerations  which  were  to  compl icate  the  pol i tical  question  for  the 
ensuing  decades.  Indeed,  the  situation  had  so  a1 tered  that  the  original  champion 
of  coopera ti on,  Tanganyi ka,  threatened  wi thdrawal  from  even  the  i nformal  common 
market  arrangements  a1 ready  in existence.  It was  apparent  that  it was  no  longer 
sufficient  to  argue  that  increased  complementarity  among  the  three  partners  woul d 
ultimately  be  of benefit  to  all.  Efficiency could  not  be  the  sole  criterion  in 
making  decisions  regarding  the  location of new  industrial  and  other  forms  of 
development  opportunities  in the  region.  For  there was  a  genuine  insistence on 
the  part of the  two  less  developed  participants  -- Tanganyika  and  Uganda  --  that 
the  benefits  of  devel opment  be  distributed more  quickly  and  more  widely  through- 
out  the  region.  Otherwise  employment  opportunities,  revenues  from  trade  and  the 
generation  of  weal th  through  industrial ization  would  accrue  to  the  more  privileged 
Kenyan  economy,  to  the neglect  of Tanganyika  and  Uganda. 
As  matters  stood  in 1964,  Kenya  -- and  Nairobi  in particular -- enjoyed 
distinct economic  advantages  over  the  rest of  East  Africa.  The  rationale  for 
this  economic  advantage  is complex.  Partially  it is a matter  of  geography. 
Kenya  serves  as  the  transit  route  not  only  for  landlocked  Uganda  but also  for 
the  most  prosperous  region  of Tanzania,  the  area  around  Moshi  and  Arusha. 
The  harbor  at Mombasa  is superior  to  anything along the  Tanzanian  coast.  Given 
Kenya's  varying  a1 ti tudes  and  cl imatic  conditions,  moreover,  its agricultural 
products  are  more  diversified  than  those  of  its neighbors.  During most  of 
the  twentieth  century,  it has  had  a  well  educated  and  relatively prosperous 
European  population  that  i ntroduced many  techno1 ogical  innovations  in agri cul- 
ture  as  well  as  commencing  industrial  development.  Being  a  Crown  Colony,  more- 
over,  external  investors  felt far more  secure  in putting  their  funds  into 
Kenyan  development  rather  than  risking them  on  the  Uganda  protectorate  or  the 
Tanganyi ka  Mandate  (1 ater  Trust)  Territory.  Over  time,  Uganda  and  Tanganyi ka 
had  become  the  consumers  of  Kenya's  manufactured  goods  which  were  protected  by 
the  common  market's  tariff wall.  Trade  relations were  not  reciprocal,  for  the 
cotton,  sisal,  coffee,  tea  and  other bulk  commodities  of Uganda  and  Tanganyika 
were  sold  abroad  rather  than  in Kenya.  Finally,  Nairobi  enjoyed  distinct 
advantages  wi th  respect  to  the concentration  of manpower  ski 11 s , banking  and 
other  conercial  faci 1 i ties,  transportation,  electrical  and  other  power  needed 
for  industrial ization,  and  other  factors.  Thus  both  foreign  and  domestic  East 
African  investors  found  the  situation  compel1 ing to opt  for  Kenya  in the  expan- 
sion  of existing -- or  the  location of new  --  industrial  and  comnercial  enter- 
pri ses. 
The  Kampala  Agreement  of 1964  attempted  to  correct  the  imbalances  between 
Kenya  and  its two  neighbors  by  resort  to  several  devices :I9 (1 )  compel1 ing 
beer,  footwear,  cement  and  other  firms operating  in all  three  countries  to 
increase  production  in the  deficit  countries  as  a way  of reducing imports  from 
Kenya;  (2)  providing  the  defict  countries  with  monopolies  in new  industries, 
such  as  fertilizers  in Uganda  and  tires  and  tubes  in Tanzania;  (3)  bolstering 
production  of  a  commodity  produced  in more  than  one  state  by  allowing  the 
deficit  state  or  states  to  apply  quotas  on  imports  from  the surplus  country  or 
countries;  (4)  increasing  sales  general ly from  deficit  to  surpl us  states;  and 
(5) reaching  an  early  agreement  within  the  East  African  commn  market  on  more 
equitable  distribution  of  industrial  development  by  wa;,  both  of  positive  induce- 
ments  as  well  as  arbitrary  allocations  of  new  industries  to  certain  states. 
The  Kampala  Agreement  obviously  favored  Tanganyika  and  Uganda  and  perhaps 
accounts  for  the  failure  of  Kenya  to  ratify  it.  Nevertheless,  despite  the 
lack  of  formal  acceptance,  the  first  provision  was  carried out  through  pressure 
being  exerted  on  local  firms  with  headquarters  in Kenya.  The  quota  provision, 
moreover,  was  all  too  liberally implemented  by  Tanzania  with  respect  to  an 
expanding  1 ist of  i tems  imported  from  Kenya.  Curiously,  a1 though  it did  reduce 
the  trade  deficit between  Tanzania  and  Kenya,  Tanzania  was  compel led to  import 
the  needed  items  from  abroad,  frequently  at even  higher prices.  This  action 
neither  helped  Tanzania 's overall  balance  of payments  problems  nor  encouraged 
complementari ty within  East  Africa.  The  a1 location of new  industries  to 
deficit  countries,  moreover  was  not  entirely  a  sacrifice on  Kenya's  part  since 
these  firms  had  not yet  decided  to  locate within  East  Africa. 
The  informal  ad hoc  implementation  of  the  "disengagement"  features  of the 
Kampala  Agreement  was  fol lowed  by  other  actions  which  threatened  the  tenuous 
progress  a1 ready  made  within  the  East  African  common  market.  The  first was 
the  break-up  of  the  East  African  Currency  Board by  virtue  of Tanzania's 
decision  in 1965  to  issue  its own  currency.  This  was  followed  two  years  later 
by  the  nationalization  of banking  and  other  monetary  institutions  and  the 
announcement  of  the  Arusha  Declaration.  The  latter  provided  Tanzania  with  a 
distinct  political-economic  ideology  which  effectively  set  Tanzania  on  a 
separate  path  of development  from  that  followed  by  its neighbors.  These 
developments  came  on  the  heels  of even  earlier  actions  which  eliminated  supra- 
national  institutions.  Tanganyi ka,  for  example,  had  opted  out  of the  East 
Afri can  Navy  shortly  after  independence.  Uganda,  upon  achievi ng  i ts  independence, 
withdrew  from  the  East  African  tourist  board  on  the  grounds  that  it paid  25  per 
cent  of  the  costs  of  the  agency  but  received  only  nine per cent  of the  tourist 
revenues  wi thin  East  Afri ca. 
Real izing  these  actions  were  eroding the  comnuni ty,  the  three  leaders 
returned  to  Kampala  in June  1967  to  consider  steps  for  strensthening  the 
cornon  market  and  for  the  first  time  giving a  legal  and  comprehensive  basis 
to  the  many  steps  that  had  been  taken  since  the  1917  customs  union  between 
Kenya  and  Uganda  had  been  introduced.  The  1967  Treaty  for  East  African  Coopera- 
tion  stressed  the  need  not  only  for  economic  growth  of  the  region,  but  for 
the  "accelerated,  harmonious  and  balanced  development"  of East  Africa.  While 
retaining  the  common  customs  tariff  for  East  Africa  and  striving  for  the  long- 
term  objective  of  free  trade  within  the  region,  the  Treaty  did provide  for 
short- term quanti tati ve  l imi ts  being  imposed  on  industrial  products  (as  we1 1 
as  exemption  of agricultural  products)  in order  to  protect  infant  industries. 
For  a  period up  to  fifteen  years,  transfer  taxes  -- a  euphemism  for  tariffs  -- 
could  be  levied  against  Kenya  products  to  encourage  industrial  development 
in the  deficit  states.  A1 though  restrictions  were  imposed  on  the  use  of 
transfer  taxes,  this  has  constituted  the  most  serious  inroad on  the  concept  of 
East  African  free  trade.  Three  additional  provisions  of  the  Treaty  were  the 
fiscal  incentives  to  new  industries;  the establishment  of an  East  Afric:,n 
Development  Bank,  designed  parti cularly  to  assist Tanzania  and  Uganda ; and 
the  provision  for extending  the  East  African  Comuni ty  to other  nations  in 
Africa,  such  as  Zambia,  Zaire,  Mozambique  and  Ethiopia. 
The  new  Community  perpetuated most  of the  state  sovereignty  features  of 
the  Common  Services  Organization,  for each  of  the  heads  of  state,  who  collec- 
tively  constitute  the  East  African Authority,  can  exercise a  veto.  But  there 
was  an  attempt  to  create a  bureaucracy with  a  commitment  to  the  region  as  a whole. 
A  further  effort to  equal ize  the  involvement  of the  three  participating  states 
was  the  decision  to  locate  the  headquarters  of two  major  operations  within  each 
of  the  states  involved.  Thus  the  Comuni ty headquarters  was  located  at Arusha, 
the  Harbors  Corporation  in Dar  es  Salaam,  the  Bank  and  also  Posts  and  Telecommuni- 
cations  were  to  go  to  Kampala  and  Railways  and  the  Airways  Corporations  would 
remain  in Nairobi. 
Assessment  of Coo~eration in the  Pos t-Inde~endence Era 
In  the  fourteen  to sixteen  years  of  independence  and  the  decade  since  the 
1967  Treaty  er tab1 ishing  the  East  African  Communi ty,  the  progress  of functional 
integration  has  been  --  to  paraphrase  Lenin  --  "one  step  forward;  two  steps 
backward".  There  is still  a  vigorous  verbal  comnitment  on  the  part of Presidents 
Nyerere,  Kenyatta  and  Amin  to  the  vital  necessity  of  East  African  cooperation. 
Yet,  instead of economic  and  technical  cooperation  drawing  the  members  of  the 
Comnunity  closer  together  politically,  the  states  have  barely  been  able  to  main- 
tain  diplomatic  relations with  each  other.  Most  accerbated  have  been  the  relations 
between  Tanzania  and  Uganda,  which  since  1971  have  been  in a  virtual  state  of 
war.  This  situation  stemmed  initially from  the  political  and  military  support 
which  Nyerere  attempted  to  provide  Mi 1 ton  Obote  following  his  ouster  by 
General  Idi Amin.  The  conflict  has  been  a  constant  source  of  friction,  with 
recurrent  raids  across  the  Uganda-Tanzania  border  and  the  massing  of  troops 
having  brought  most  interstate  trade  and  other  forms  of contact  to  a  standstill. 
Similarly,  relations  between  Uganda  and  Kenya  have  flared-up  from  time  to  time 
over  issues  such  as  the  trans-shipment  of  Russian  tank  ferries  to  Uganda  over 
Kenya  roads,  the  rash  "historic  claims"  of  Idi Amin  to  large areas  of western 
Kenya  in 1975,  and  the  support  given  by  Kenya  to  the  Israeli  comnandos  follow- 
ing  their  1976  raid on  Entebbe  airport.  Such  conflict  has  led to  the  temporary 
closing  of  borders  or  demands  by  Kenya  that  Uganda  pay  for  oil  and  other 
essential  goods  in foreign  currency  and  pay  in advance  of the actual  sale.  To 
complete  the  circle,  the  "permanent  sealing"  of the  Kenya-Tanzania  border  in 
1977  was  but  the culmination  of  a  series  of border  closings,  mutual  deporta- 
tions  of each  others'  citizens  and  fiscal  harrassment which  has  plagued 
relations  between  Kenya  and  Tanzania.  The  absence  of a  heal thy  set  of diplo- 
matic  relations  among  the  leaders  of  the  three  states,  however,  is not  the  only 
problem which  has  checkered  the path  to  integration. 
Ideological  Postures.  In part  the  diplomatic  and  military confrontations  have 
been  attributable  to  the  divergences  in ideology  which  have  developed  in the  period 
si nce  independence.  Admi ttedly  difficulties  can  and  do  arise  even  among  leadership 
groups  with  similar  ideological  view  points  when  each  is attempting  to consoli- 
date  its position within  a  relatively  unstable  political  milieu.  When  the 
divergences  are  as  great  as  they  are  in East  Africa  today,  however,  the  possi- 
bility of  discord  becomes  more  of a  certainty.  In many  respects  Tanzania  and 
Kenya  are  almost  polar  opposites  in terms  of development  models. 
Tanzania  has  taken  perhaps  the  most  radical  departure  from  the  legacy  of 
political  culture  developed  or imposed  during the  later years  of British 
colonial  rule.  It is one  of the  few  states  in Africa  where  a  serious  effort 
has  been  made  to  translate  the  easy  rhetoric  of socialism  into a  concrete 
program  of action.  In contrast,  too,  with  other states  where  the  single 
dominant  party  has  ei ther  become  moribund  or  been  replaced  by  a military  govern- 
ment,  the  dominant  party  -- TANU  (or  the  Revolutionary  Party,  as  it was  restyled 
in 1977)  --  has  become  the  spearhead  of mobilizing  the  citizenry with  respect 
to  the  new  society.  Nyerere's  version  of  development  is labelled  agrarian 
socialism.  It  recognizes  the  dual  fact  that  upwards  of  ninety  per  cent  of 
Tanzania's  population  lives  in the  rural  areas  and  --  in the  absence  of sig- 
nificant mineral  resources  --  that  the  costs  of modernization  will  ultimately 
come  from  the  surplus  from  agricultural  production.  There  are  several  key 
elements  in Nyerere's  program.  The  first  is an  emphasis  upon  increased  crop 
production  and  processing  of  agricultural  comodities  at  the  expense  of 
instant  industrial ization.  This  is not  a  rejection  of  industrialization  per 
se;  it accepts  the  fact  that  industrialization  is capital  intensive  and  tends  f 
to further  aggravate  the  problems  of  urban  unemployment.  Secondly,  as  a  matter 
both  of  social  justice  and  economic  efficiency,  Nyerere' s  program woul d  di rect 
a  significant  portion  of the  profits  of growth  back  to  the  rural  sector.  This 
would  improve  not only  the  means  of production  in the  area  of  greatest  promise 
but  it would  also  improve  the  lot of  those  who  are  contributing most  to  development 
--  the  rural  peasant.  The  concrete  manifestation of this  policy  is the  implemen- 
tation  of  the  ujamaa  vi ji jini,  or  the  villagization  scheme.  It has  been  the  aim 
of  TANU  to  get  as  many  people  as  possible  organized  into  self-help  rural  comnunities, 
where  the  services  of government  can  be  provided  in a  more  efficient way  and  where 
the  citizenry  is provided with  a  mechanism  for  participating  in decision-making 
on  national  development.  Thirdly,  Nyerere's  program  attempts  to  reduce  the  impact 
of  historic  and  geographic  accident  which  have  contributed  to  the  unequal  distri- 
bution  of the  benefits  of modernization.  Hence,  he  has  limited the  salaries  and 
other  perquisites  of the  civil  servants,  lawyers  and  others  who  have  had  the 
privilege of a  better education,  and  he  has  removed  from  the  private  sector  such 
occupations  as  that  of doctor,  pri vate  shopkeeper  and  others  which  contribute  to 
the  emergence  of an  incipient capitalist  class.  Also,  in terms  of  "betting  on  the 
weak",  he  has  attempted  to  redirect  development  funds  to  the  regions  of the  country 
that  were  relatively  neglected  during  the  colonial  era.  Finally,  Nyerere's  social ism 
emphasizes  self-reliance.  This  means  not only  that  each  person  must  contribute  his 
full  measure  of  talents  to  national  development,  but  that  the  society  must  avoid 
becoming  so  dependent  on  external  funds  and  personnel  for  development  purposes,  that 
one  surrenders  freedom  to  determine  one's  own  fate. 
At  the  opposite  end  of  the  pole  is Kenya,  whose  leadership  in public  proclaims 
a  commitment  to  African  social ism,  but  which  in fact  has  provided one  of  the  most 
vigorous  examples  of African  development  based  upon  massive  infusions  of external 
capi tal  and  personnel.  A1 though  its critics  charge  that  Kenya  has  become  subservient 
to  the  foreign  capitalists  upon  whom  the  economy  is dependent,  Kenya  leaders  argue 
that  the  major  directions  of  growth  are  determined  by  the  state  and  not  by 
foreigners,  that  Kenyans  are  coming  into  full  control  of  the  major  economic 
enterprises,  that  the  surpluses  from  growth  allow  for  training programs  which 
put  Kenyans  in positions  of  control  in the  economy,  and  that  the  ultimate  test 
of  an  economy  is how  well  it produces.  On  the  last point,  it is true  that  the 
growth  rate  in Kenya  has  been  phenomenal.  Kenya  has  witnessed  not  only  industrial 
development  but  its improvement  in the  agricultural  sector  makes  it a  more 
effective  competitor  in the world  market  than  Tanzania  or  Uganda.  Kenyans  claim, 
moreover,  that  the  diversification  of  sources  of external  aid and  personnel  give 
no  single  power  the  ability  to  control  events.  However,  it must  be  acknowledged 
that  the  benefits  of  development  are  distributed in a highly  uneven  fashion 
within  Kenyan  society.  The  major  concentration  of industrial  growth  has  taken 
place  in the  vicinity  of Nairobi,  with  some  auxiliary  development  in and  around 
the  port of Mombasa.  One  ethnic  group  --  the  Kikuyu  --  have  reaped  an  extra- 
ordinary  share  of the  new  wealth  as  great  private  fortunes  are  being made.  The 
involvement  of  the  masses  in political  and  economic  decision-making  has  been 
minimal,  with  KANU  (Kenya  African  National  Union)  becoming  more  and  more  a 
machi ne  party which  serves  the  electoral  and  patronage  objecti ves  of  the  el i te. 
The  ideological  position  of the  third member  of  the  community  is difficult 
to  classify.  Uganda  has  undergone  three  changes  of  government  since  independence, 
and  each  represents  a change  in ideology.  The  first government,  under  the  presi- 
dency  of the  Baganda  Kabaka,  reoresented  a  form  of  ideological  neutrality as  the 
leadership  tried  to  balance  the  interests  of the  various  historic  kingdoms 
and  the  series  of competitive  parties.  This  gave  way  in 1966  to  Mi1 ton Obote's 
brand  of  socialism within  a highly  centralized  Uganda  state,  following  the 
second  exi le of  Kabaka  Mutesa  and  the  collapse  of Baganda  separatism.  A1 though 
Idi  Amin  since  his  coup  of  1971  has  retained  the  centralized  state,  one  could 
hardly  classi fy  his  frenetic  and  capricious  brand  of persona1 ized mil i tary  rule 
as  even  an  aberrant  form  of social ism.  Reginald Green,  a  former  economic  adviser 
to  Nyerere,  has  characteri zed  Uganda  development  as  a  "commi tment  to i negal i tarian , 
right-wi ng,  xenophobic  popul ism. "ZO 
Reasons  of State.  Even  if the  ideological  commi tment  of the  three  states  had 
been  the  same,  the pol i tical  demands  of each  new  society  would  in any  event  have 
resulted  in some  measure  of separate  development.  Once  the  decision  had  been  made 
to  reject  pol i tical  integration within  the  framework  of a  coordinated  independence 
program,  i t became  necessary  to  move  rapidly  in developing  distinct  national  ins ti tu- 
tions  and  economic  development  plans  within  the  three  states.  Each  is a  con- 
siderable  entity  ranging  in size  from  Uganda's  91,134  square  miles  (roughly 
comparable  to  Pennsylvania)  to  Tanzania's  363,708  square  miles  (the  size  of 
Texas,  Oklahoma  and  Louisiana),  with  Kenya's  224,960  (the  size  of Texas  alone) 
placing  it in between.  They  range  in population  from  fourteen  million  in 
Tanzania,  to  twelve  mill ion  in Kenya,  and  ten  mill ion  in Uganda.  The  geographic 
development  of each  territory  under  colonial  rule was  very  uneven,  with  northern 
areas  of  both  Kenya  and  Uganda  and  the  southeastern  section  of Tanganyika  being 
relatively  out  of touch  with  the  main  economic,  educational  and  political  changes 
in their  respective  territories.  Despite  a1 1  the  British pride  in accomplishment, 
the  educational  systems  under  colonial  rule  did not  leave  behind  a  sizeable  cadre 
of  trained manpower  to  run the  government,  the  economy,  the  universi tie:,  the 
military and  other  institutions.  The  political  system  at the  state  level,  f~rther- 
more,  really  only  acquired  significance  for  the  African  majority  during the  last 
few  years  or months  of colonial  rule.  So  unstable  was  each  of  the  three  East 
African  political  systems  that  it was  only  the  hasty  return of  British paratroopers 
in 1964  that  saved  each  of  the  regimes  from  rebellious  military  forces. 
With  this  in mind,  it is understandable  why  two  European  observers  of the 
East  African  scene  concl uded  in 1965  that  the  time  was  not  ripe  for  pol i tical 
federation.  They  concluded  that  the  problem  had  two  main  aspects: 
First,  the  'political  system'  in each  East  African  state  --  its 
members,  its modes  of operation,  its balance  of power  --  is new 
and  only  imperfectly  understood  by  those  who  are operating  it; 
and  the  dominant  characteristic  of politics  is the  extreme  deli- 
cacy  of  the  balance  of  forces  which  goes  to  make  up  the  new 
pol i ti cal  system,  the  extreme  fragil i ty of  the  structures  which 
the  national  leadership  is creating  for  solving  problems  and 
mobi 1 i zing  support  for pol i cies .  The  leaders  are  cease1 essly 
preoccupied with  the  problem  of sustaining  the  system  so  that 
re1 ations  between  di fferent  groups  can  become  more  steadi ly and 
clearly  defined,  avenues  of  pol i tical  action  become  legitimated, 
new  elements  admitted  into  the  top  leadership  and  old ones  eased 
out  -- a17  without  fundamental  crises  .  .  .  . 
In relation  to  this  fundamental  political  fact  the  prospect 
of  federating  --  involving a  partial  surrender  of  sovereignty  -- 
may  introduce on  the  scene  an  unknown  factor  of  unknown  magnitude. 
No  one  knows  what  its effect  on  the  system  precariously  emerging 
in their  own  country  will  turn  out  to be.21 
The  various  schemes  for  East  African  federation  did not  envision  the 
elimination of  the  state  political  apparatus;  the  leadership  in Tanzania,  for 
example,  would  still  be  responsible  to  that  constituency  within  the  East  African 
conmuni ty  which  had  only  recently  started  to  consider  i tsel f  Tanzanian  rather 
than  Chagga,  Sukuma  or  Makonde.  It would  be  the  immediate,  rather  than  the 
long-range,  consequences  of economic  cooperation  which  would  motivate the  masses 
to  suoport  or  reject  the  incumbent  leadership  at  the  state  level.  It would  hardly 
provide  satisfaction  to  the  starving  or  the  unemployed  to  inform  them  that 
an  agricul tural  processing  industry  could  not  be  established within  their 
district  because  that  industry  had  been  allocated  to  a  neighboring  country. 
Moreover,  since  it was  firmly  believed  in Tanzania  that  money  was  a  significant 
element  in development,  and  since  most  of  the  money  in East  Africa  seemed  to 
be  flowing  to  Kenya,  the  way  to  reverse the  situation was  for  Tanzania  to 
print  its own  currency,  nationalize  the  banks  and  keep  the  money  within 
Tanzania.  Thus,  it was  not surprising  to  find  the  East  African  Currency  Board 
going  out  of existence  and  each  state  being  encouraged  to  set  its own  policies 
regarding  money  supplies,  taxation  and  interest  rates,  as  we1 1  as  manipulating 
the  economy  for broad  social,  economic  and  political  goals.  Planning was  to 
be  carried out  on  a national  basis,  not  regional. 
Simi larly,  since  doctors,  engineers,  1 awyers  and  other  professionals  might 
tend  to  stay  in the  countries  where  they  were  trained  rather  than  serving 
their  countries  of origin,  it is perhaps  also  understandable  why  the  agreement 
on  assignment  of  separate  teaching  functions  among  Makerere  Uni versi ty,  the 
University  of  Dar  es  Salaam  and  the  University  of Nairobi  hardly  lasted till 
the  ink  was  dry.  The  effective  dissolution  of  the  University of  East  Africa 
shortly  after  the  Cormunity  came  into existence  merely  confirmed the  reality 
of the  situation,  namely,  that  the  national  plans  of each  state  projected 
differing  needs  for  doctors  to  eradicate  malaria,  engineers  to plan  the 
construction  of  roads  and  dams,  and  lawyers  to  frame  the  unique  legal  system 
"  developing  in each  country.  Despi te  the  continued  existence  of an  Inter-uni versi ty 
Commi ttee  for  East  Africa,  1 ess  than  two  hundred  students  were  exchanged  among 
the  three  states  in 1974.  The  use  of external  examiners  and  the holding  of joint 
research  conferences  are  among  the  few  remaining  ves ti ges  of educational  cooperation. 
Divergences  were  also  the product  of the  freedom  of action available  to 
each  member  to  formulate  external  relations  best  suited  to  its own  developmental, 
ideological  or other  interests.  Outside  the  African  context,  Kenya  --  in 
keeping with  its modified capi talist development  -- has  very  strong  links with 
the  West.  Tanzania's  approach  to  social ism makes  it less  fearful  than  its 
neighbors  of  relying heavily  upon  economic  support from  China.  And  Muslim 
General  Amin  -- politically  isolated  from  most  of  his  black  African  neighbors 
and  the  West  --  has  forged  ties  with  the  Arab  world  and  revolutionary  Libya, 
in particular.  This  complicates  the  problem  of  regional  sol idari ty  in dealing 
with  world-wide  and  even  continental  issues.  It also  directly  affects  the 
economic  future  of the  corrmon  market  since  many  of  the  trade  arrangements  link 
an  East  African  state  with  a non-African  economy.  Tanzania,  for  example,  must 
pay  off  its share  of the  Chinese  loan  for  the  Tanzara  Railway  by  buying  Chinese, 
rather  than  Kenyan,  manufactured  goods.  In selling  its cotton  to  Czechoslovakia, 
Uganda  may  be  forced  to buy  Czech  rather  than  Kenyan-made  shoes. 
Indeed,  the  problems  of  regional  sol idari ty are  also  affected  by  the  separate 
relationships  established  by  members  of the  Community  with  other African  states. 
Nyerere,  for  example,  has  been  one  of Africa's  most  vigorous  opponents  of white 
rule  in southern  Africa  and  has  insisted that  liberation must  remain  hi~h 
his  priority  list regardless  of any  repercussions  this  may  have  on  East  African 
unity.  Hence,  he  was  prepared  -- no  matter what  the  cost  to  his  involvement 
in the  East  African  Comuni ty  --  to  lessen  the  dependence  of  Zambia  on  white- 
dominated  Rhodesia  and  South  Africa.  The  decision  on  the  Tanzara  Railway  was 
negotiated without  reference  to  Uganda  and  Kenya,  which  together  with  Tanzania 
coll ecti vely  had  administered  the  other  rai 1 way  sys tem  in East  Africa.  Since 
there  was  already  controversy  regarding the  cost of operating the  existing 
East  African  railways,  the  Tanzara  Railway  had  to be  built and  operated  outside 
the  East  African  Railways  Corporation.  The  Kenyans  may  yet be  proved  correct 
that  the  new  1 ine  is a  "white  elephant",  particularly  if independence  of 
Mozambique,  majority  rule  in Rhodesia  (Zimbabwe),  and  the  ending  of civil  strife 
in Angola  lead  the  Zambians  to  reestablish  their transit  trade  through  the 
shorter  rail  1 inks  to  the  sea.  In the  meantime,  a  complication  of the  problem 
arose  in 1974  when  a  quasi-private  Kenyan  transport  firm  had  persuaded  Zambia 
to  have  some  of  its exports  and  imports  transported  by  road  between  Mombasa 
and  Lusaka.  The  rationale  for  this  was  that  the  crowded  conditions  and  escalat- 
ing surcharges  at  Dar  es  Salaam  harbor  demanded  an  alternative  route.  This 
arrangement,  however,  clearly  threatened  the  ul timate  fiscal  sol vency  of  the 
Tanzara  Railway  and  the  new  port  facilities  at  Dar  es  Salaam.  In addition, 
it put  an  additional  financial  burden  on  Tanzania,  since  it was  its roads 
which  were  being severely  damaged  by  the  heavy  trucks  transporting  the  copper 
and  oil .22  It was  this  situation  which  led the  Tanzanians  to  temporarily 
close  the  border  with  Kenya  in 1974  and  at periodic  intervals  thereafter  until 
the  "permanent  sealing"  in 1977.  The  completion  of the  Tanzara  Railway  and 
the  improved  efficiency  of Dar  es  Salaam  cargo  hand1 ing  led  the  Zambians  them- 
selves  to  abandon  road  transhipment  through  Mombasa.  Indeed,  by  1976  Dar  Es 
Salaam  was  actually  handling more  tonnage  than  Mombasa  and  over  eighty  per  cent 
of  Zambia's  copper  was  being  exported  from  the  Tanzanian  port.  Hence  a  con- 
siderable  economic  a1 1 iance  was  diverting Tanzania's  attention  southward, 
away  from  its common  market  neighbors. 
Common  Services  Corporations.  A  number  of  the organizations  which  jointly 
served  the  three  states  fell  victim  to  the  demands  of political  sovereignty 
once  independence  had  been  achieved.  In this  category  was  the  early  demise  of 
the  East  African  Navy,  the  High  Court  of Appeals,  the  University  of  East  Africa 
and  --  somewhat  later  --  the  Currency  Board.  Certain  other  agencies  which 
lacked  an  elaborate  infrastructure  were  more  easily  dissolved  as  soon  as  one 
or more  of  the partners  decided  there  was  more  to  be  gained  by  operating 
separately  rather  than  jointly.  Such  was  the  fate  of the  Tourist  Association. 
There  were  a  few  common  services,  such  as  the  railways,  harbors,  the  air 1 ine 
and  postal  services,  where  it was  initial ly assumed  that  the  costs  of separate 
operations  by  each  state  would  be  prohibitive  and  the  benefits  of collaboration 
were  substantial.  Consequently,  the partners  agreed  not  only  to  continue  co- 
operation  in these  areas,  but actually  to expand  the  enterprises. 
Each  partner,  unfortunately,  tended  to  view  the  functioning of the  comnon 
services  from  a  national  perspective.  Uganda  and  Tanzania,  the  two  economical ly 
Doorer  members,  expected  that  the  more  profitable  Kenya  operations  of the  rail- 
roads,  airways,  harbors  and  other  enterprises  would  pay  for  the  development 
of  services  in those  areas  which  had  been  relatively  neglected  during the 
colonial  era.  .Conversely,  the  Kenyans  chafed at having  to subsidize  what  they 
regarded  as  the  less  efficiently  managed  and  less  productive  operations  in 
Tanzania  and  Uganda. 
Fiscal  affairs  also  plagued  the  functioning  of the  corporations.  Accord- 
ing  to  the  original  formula  each  partner  state was  to  share  in the  cost  of 
operating  the  services,  and  the  locally collected  revenues  of each  corporation 
were  to  be  forwarded  to  its central  headquarters.  Here  again,  however,  Tanzania 
and  Uganda  found  themselves  at a  disadvantage.  The  headquarters  of  the  two 
largest  corporations  --  Railways  and  Airways  -- were  located  in Nairobi,  and 
the  conflict with  General  Amin  delayed  both the establishment  of the  Develop- 
ment  Bank  in Kampala  and  the  transfer  of  Post  and  Telecommunications  to  that 
city.  Tanzania  did have  one  revenue-earning  corporation  with  the  relocation 
of  the  Harbours  Corporation  in Dar  es  Salaam.  Its  second  operational  head- 
quarters  -- that  of  the  Economic  Community  at Arusha  --  did  not  entai 1 
significant  revenue  transfers  from  the  other  two  states.  Thus,  the  imbalance 
of  payments  within  the  Community,  which  was  already  distorted  in  favor  of  the 
superior  Kenyan  trading position,  was  further  aggravated  by  the  transfer  of 
corporation  revenues  to  Nai robi .  Whi  le  Tanzania's  re1 uctance  to  transfer  funds 
was  largely  economic  and  related  to  the  fluctuations  in  the  value  of  the 
Tanzanian  shill ing,  Uganda's  obstinacy  was  more  overtly  pol i tical.  General 
Amin  used  the  revenues  issue  as  a  form  of  hostage  in  his  efforts  to  secure  his 
official  recognition  as  Uganda  chief  of  state  by  Nyerere.  In  any  event  the . 
fai 1 ure  of  revenue  transfers  1 eft  the  corporations  with  serious  cash  flow 
problems  in  meeting  payrolls  and  purchasing  fuel.  The  failure  of  the  govern- 
ments  to  contribute  their  pledged  assessments,  moreover,  prevented  the  -epai rs 
and  rep1 acement  of  obsolete  equipment. 
The  East  African  Rai lways  Corporation  was  the  first  of  the  corporations 
to  encounter  the  threat  of  dissolution.  The  three  states  quarreled  about  the 
scarcity  of  rolling  stock,  which  Tanzania  and  Uganda  charged  was  being  kept 
in  Kenya  for  more  profitable  runs.  Tanzania  objected,  moreover,  to  the  freight 
from  the  Arusha-Moshi  area  of  Tanzania  being  shipped  out  of  Mombasa  instead  of 
contributing  to  the  further  development  of  the  port  facilities  at Dar  es  Salaam. 
Even  more  irritating  to  the  Tanzanians  was  the  diversion  of  some  of  the  more 
profitable  rai 1 road  cargo  to  the  quasi -state  Kenatco  trucking  firm  in  which 
rnany  Kenyan  pol i ticians  had  substantial  personal  interests. 
Faced  with  the  refusal  of  the  other  two  states  to  transfer  corporation 
revenues  to  Nairobi,  Kenya  attempted  to  deal  with  the  problem  by  insisting that 
a1 1  service  on  the  Kenya  portion  of  the  rai 1 roads  be  paid  for  in  Kenya  currency. 
This  was  a  harsh  blow  to  landlocked  Uganda  whose  economy  was  in  dire straights 
under  General  Amin.  Tanzania,  however,  was  able  to  retaliate  by  ha1 ting  all 
passenger  service  to  Kenya  in  February  1975  and  later  that year  removed 
sections  of  the  track,  thereby  bringing  a1 1  inter-terri torial  freight  service  to 
a  halt  as well.  From  that  point  onward  the  railroads  ceased  to  operate  as  a 
coordi nated  enterpri se,  the  headquarters  of  the  corporation  was  di ssol ved 
and  the  only  discussions  which  took  place  thereafter  were  over  the  distribution 
of  the  rolling  stock,  the  lake  steamers  and  other  assets  as  well  as  the 
parcel 1 i ng  out  of  responsi bi 1.i ty  for  the  debt  service. 
A  similar  fate  befell  the  Harbours  Corporation,  which  had  hived  off  from 
the  Railways  in  1969,  with  the  headquarters  being  moved  from  Mombasa  to  Dar  es 
Salaam.  Kenyans  were  upset  with  having  to  use  revenues  collected  at  the  more 
profitable  Mombasa  port  to  retire the  World  Bank  loan  for  the  expansion  of 
facilities  at  Dar  es  Salaam.  It was  particularly  annoying  since  the  Kenyans 
felt  that  they  should  have  had  a  second  port  of  their  own  to  relieve  congestion 
at Mornbasa.  In this  instance  it was  Kenya  that  refused  to  remit  revenues  of 
the  corporation  to  i ts  headquarters  in Tanzania.  By  mi d-1976  the  controversy 
had  led  to  the  decision  that  each  country  would  operate  its own  port  facilities, 
and  a year  later Tanzania  froze  the  bank  accounts  of  the  corporation  and 
fired  the  Kenyan  and  Ugandan  employees.  The  demise  of the  corporation  was 
complicated  by  the  fact  that  international  loans  to  the  Community  were  premised 
on  the  continuation  of  regional  cooperation  in operating the  seaports. 
The  hi story  of  the  Posts  and  Telecomnunications  Corporation  fol lowed  a 
similar  course.  The  dispute  with  Amin  was  not merely  an  inter-governmental 
controversy;  the  Kenyan  and  Tanzanian  employees  of the  Corporation  objected 
to  having  to  live  in the  climate  of  fear  which  pervaded  the  Uganda  capital. 
The  Kenyan  and  Tanzanian  governments  a1 i ke  were  re1 uctant  to  transfer  corporati on 
funds  to  Uganda,  which  was  experiencing  spiraling  inflation  under  Arnin's  erratic 
economic  pol icies.  Ul timately  each  country  began  printing  and  sell ing its own 
stamps  and  handling  its own  telegraphic  services.  In any  event,  the  difficulties 
experienced  by  both  the  railways  and  the  airways  made  the  coordinated  shipment 
of  mail  and  parcel  post  impossible  to accomplish. 
The  coup  de  qrace  to  the  aspirations  for  unity,  however,  was  the  demise  of 
the  East  African  Airways  and  the  events  preceding  and  following  the  decision. 
A1 though  Airways  had  frequently  operated  at a  deficit,  as  recently  as  1974  it 
enjoyed  a  period of  record-breaking  profits.  Given  the  high cost  of each 
country  purchasing  separate  equipment  and  paying  the  salaries  of pilots  and 
other  professional  staff,  it was  long  predicted  that  Airways  had  the  best 
prospects  for  survi val  within  the  Comnuni ty.  There  were,  however,  long-stand- 
ing controversies  over  both  its foreign  and  domestic  operations.  Tanzania  and 
Uganda,  which  have  the  more  impressive  game  parks  in East  Africa,  had  chafed  at 
the  fact  that  over  eighty  per  cent  of the  international  flights  were  directed  in 
and  out  of Nairobi.  Thus,  the  mounting  number  of camera  safaris  would  book  tours 
and  accomodations  in Kenya  and  travel  by  private  vehicles  to the  game  parks 
in the  neighboring  states.  Not  only  did  this  mean  that  most  of the  tourist 
revenues  remained  in Kenya,  but  it meant  that  Tanzania's  impressive  international 
airport  at Moshi -Arusha  and  Uganda ' s  Entebbe  airport were  almost  redundant. 
A  further  aggravation  with  East  African  Airways  was  Tanzania's  insistence  that  the 
more  profitable  international  service  should  help  subsidize  the  network  of 
feeder  runs  which  were  regarded  as  vital  factors  in maintaining  internal  com- 
munications  and  trade  in the  largest  of  the  three  states. 
As  in the  case  of  the  other  corporations,  the  crisis  with  Airways  came 
to  a  head  over  the  issue  of  revenue  transfers  to  the  headquarters  in Nairobi 
and  the  shared  responsi bi 1 i ty of  purchasing  new  equipment.  Al though  the  demise 
came  in stages,  by  February  1977  Airways  was  formally  dissolved  after  thirty 
years  of  existence.  Each  state  scrambled  to retain  whatever  equipment  and 
assets  of  the corporation  were  physically  present  in the  country  at  the  time  of 
dissolution.  Kenya  was  left with  the  unpaid  bills of  the corporation,  and  during 
the  ensuing  months  great  wrangling  took  place  over  the  distribution of the  assets 
and  debt  obligations.  In  the  meantime  Kenya  and  Uganda  each  set  up  sep~rate 
national  airlines,  and  Tanzania  turned  southward  to  Mozambique  and  secured  a 
bilateral  agreement  to  establish and  operate  a  single public  airline.  This 
further  accelerated  the  redirection  of Tanzania's  economic  interests  away  from 
the  East  African  Communi ty . 
With  the non-functioning  or formal  demise  of  the  Comuni ty  corporations, 
all  that  has  remained  of  system-wide  institutions  has  been  the  General  Fund 
Services.  This  comprises  the  Central  Secretariat,  which  continues  to  function 
in Arusha  and  has  responsibility  for  meteorology,  customs  and  research  on 
industrial  development,  natural  resources  and  medicine. 
The  Fate  of the  Comon  Market  Arranaements 
The  compl emen tary  feature  to  the  Communi ty ' s  techni cal  servi ces  corpora- 
tions  has  been  the  common  market  arrangements.  The  Treaty  which  was  fashioned 
at Arusha  in 1967  was  to  be  the  lynch-pin  in the  quest  for  political  unity 
via  the  functional  route.  Indeed,  the  enthusiasm  of the  three  East  African 
partners  was  so  infectious  that  several  of  the  neighboring  states  almost  im- 
mediately  applied  for membership  or  registered  an  interest  in an  expanded 
economic  communi ty  i n  eastern  Africa.  Of  the  three  participants,  Kenya  stood 
to  gain  the  most  from  the  common  market  arrangements,  thus  counterbalancing 
the  advantage  in benefits  that  the  other  two  states  were  to  have  received  from 
an  upgrading  of  the  technical  services.  The  edge  which  Kenya  enjoyed  in industrial 
growth  under  colonial  rule would  be  further  enhanced  by  its  ready  access  to 
markets  close  at  hand.  Its economic  hegemony  within  East  Africa  could  further 
serve  as  a  springboard  for  the  establishment  of even  more  significant  markets 
I  in Zambia,  Zaire  and  even  West  Africa  as  we1 1 as  the  expansions  of non-African  trade 
I  and  investment  1 inkages. The  1967  Treaty,  nevertheless,  was  designed  to  be  of  benefit  to  all  three  parties 
by  permitting  the  less  developed  partners  to  improve  their  industrial  standing I 
relative  to  Kenya.  The  decision,  however,  to  locate  the  Community  headquarters  at 
Arusha  --  the  geographic  center  of  East  Africa  --  did  little to  counteract  the 
I  economic  dominance  of  Nairobi.  Foreign  investors,  the  World  Bank,  American  aid and  foundation  officials  and  others  early  recognized  that  Nairobi  was  the  vital 
center,  whereas  Arusha  had  lost even  the  dynamism  it had  enjoyed  in the  later 1 
days  of  the  colonial  era. 
Efforts  to  redress  the  trade  imbalance within  the  Comnuni ty consisted ( 
primarily  of giving monopolies  in certain  manufacturing  fields to  Tanzania  and 
Uganda  to  protect  thei r fledgl ing industries.  The  arrangements  did not work. I 
Kenya  early violated  the  agreement  to  leave  the  textile  industry  to  the  other 
two  states,  and  even  in the  agricultural  sector  Kenyan  production  was  becoming 
1  more  efficient  in those  key  areas,  such  as  sisal  and  coffee,  where  the  other  two 
1  had  enjoyed  the  competitive  edge.  Kenya  complained  that  the  two  neighbors 
abused  the  transfer  tax  arrangements  whereby  tari ffs were  1 evied against  Kenya 
industrial  products  to  protect fledgl ing enterprises.  By  1975  the  situation  had 
so  deteriorated  that  Tanzania  began  to  prohibit  the  importation of any 
goods  from  Kenya  that  could  be  manufactured  in Tanzania  even  if Tanzanian  firms 
could  not  meet  the  domestic  demand.  The  duplication  of  industrial  functions  had 
been  further  accelerated by  resort  to  exchange  controls , the  imposition  of 
import  licensing  and  the  use  of  industrial  licensing  in proliferating activities 
which  could  have  more  efficiently  been  confined  to a  single  factory.23 
By  the  mid-1970s  the  erosion  of the  free  trade  aspect  of  the  Communi ty was 
plainly  apparent.  Instead of the  three  states  becoming  each  other's  best 
customers,  imports  and  exports  among  the  three  had  suffered  a  drastic  decline 
during  the  first half of the  decade.  In 1975  alone,  the  Tanzanian  exports  to 
its  East  African  partners  suffered  a  decline  of  39  per  cent  from  the  1974  situation, 
with  a  roughly  similar  slide  in its imports  from  Uganda  and  Kenya.  The  deterioration 
in relations  with  President  Amin  and  the  "permanent  sealing"  of  the  Kecya-Tanzanian 
border  in 1977  could  bring  the  inter-trade  relationship  among  the three  close  to  the 
zero  point.  The  three  former  partners  are  clearly  looking elsewhere  for economic 
ties.  Tanzania,  in addition  to  the  long-term  link with  China  resulting from  the 
Tanzara  Railway  loan,  is shifting  its attention  southward  in Africa,  fashioning 
stronger  bonds  with  Zambia  and  Mozambi~ue.  Kenya,  now  cut  off  from  its  road 
links with  Zambia  and  Zaire,  is casting  its economic  net  on  a  worldwide  basis, 
with  Mexico,  Japan  and  other  non-African  states  figuring  prominently  in its 
trade  and  investment  patterns  along  with  other African  states  outside  the 
eastern  Africa  region.  Uganda  has  become  more  and  more  reliant on  aid and 
trade  with  Russia,  Libya  and  an  assortment  of other states. 
If the  problems  of the  comnon  market  were  dealt  with  in purely  economic 
terms,  it would  be  apparent  that  all  three countries  are  the losers  by  the 
break-up  of the  East  African  Comuni ty.  Each  state  is faced  with  the  prospect 
of a  balance  of  payments  problem  as  its foreign  reserves  are  drained  to  the 
more  industrial ized areas  of  the  world  rather  than  remai ni ng  wi thin  East  Africa. 
The  demise  of cooperation  in the  transport  field and  the  search  for  ext~rnal 
economic  links  has  increased the  ultimate  cost  of  both  imported  and  exported 
products  -- a  situation  further  aggravated  by  the  increased  price of oil. 
Finally,  the  failure  of  trade  and  transportation  within  the  region  has 
contributed  substantially  to  the  inflationary  spiral  in each  of  the  three 
countries. 
Prospects  for  the  Future  of East  African  Unity 
It became  all  too  apparent  that  if the  East  African  Community  were  to 
achieve  even  its more  1 imi ted  goal  of economic  cooperation  -- to  say  nothing 
of  its larger  goal  of political  federation  --  there  had  to be  some  sacrifices 
made  with  respect  to  state  sovereignty.  The  Community  needed  an  authority 
that  could  act  independently  of  the  total  membership.  While  not  lamenting 
the  passing  of  colonial  rule,  this  is precisely  what  the  imperial  government 
provi ded  the  region  prior to  i ndependence.  Whenever  the  del i berati ons  among 
the  three  colonial  governors  had  reached  an  impasse,  the  Colonial  Office 
could  step  in and  provide a  solution,  however  unsatisfactory  it may  have  been 
to  one  or more  of  the  parties.  The  colonial  system was  able  to  stimulate 
growth  in selected  areas,  based  on  the  needs  of  the  British empire  as  a  whole. 
The  system  could  also  work  in reverse.  That  is,  a  territory  might  be  prevented 
from  developing  a  crop  or  an  industry which  would  put  it into  competition  with 
another  territory within  the  colonial  system.  Since  independence,  no  super- 
territorial  authority  has  been  able  to  impose  cooperation. 
The  rule of  unanimity  which  obtained  in the  operation  of the  various  insti- 
tutions  within  the  East  African  Community,  moreover,  was  not  likely  to  be 
surrendered  easi ly,  given  the  state  of  underdevelopment  in Tanzania,  the  vagaries 
of  the  military  regime  in Uganda  and  the  re1 uctance  of  the  Kenyans  to  have 
their  1 imi ted  prosperity  subsidize  what  they  regarded  as  the  mismanaged  or 
ideological ly misguided  economies  of  their  two  neighbors.  Any  national  regime 
in Kenya,  Tanzania  or  Uganda  which  voted  to  surrender  a  portion  of  its sover- 
eignty might  find  itself threatened  with  ouster  at the  first  sign  of  economic 
hardship  for  its people. 
The  history  of  events  in East  Africa  seems  to  confirm  that  there  must  be 
a  constant  momentum  forward  and  a  continuing  surrender  of  state  authority  in 
increasingly  complex  areas  --  if only  to  preserve  existing  achievements  in 
cooperation.  East  African  leaders  since  independence  have  faced  a considerably 
more  difficul t situation  than  that  faced  by  American  leaders  in 1787  or  West 
European  statesmen  at the  end  of  the  Second  World  War.  Instead of  the  East 
African  economies  being  basically  complementary,  they  are  competitive  with 
respect  to  their main  source  of production,  agricul ture.  They  lacked,  moreover, 
complementarity  with  respect  to  the  basic  ingredients  of industrialization, 
which  proved  to  be  the  initial  binding  element  in West  European  cooperation. 
Instead of  closing  the  industrial  gap  which  had  given  Kenya  a  relative 
advantage  over  its neighbors,  the  gap  had  considerably  widened.  Each  was 
compelled,  by  virtue  of the  diversity of  its external  trade  commi tments  and 
investment  opportuni ties,  to engage  in transactions  which  weakened,  rather  than 
strengthened,  regional  economic  unity.  Indeed,  no  real  effort had  been  made 
to  engage  in regional  economic  planning,  despite  the  provision  for  it in the 
1967  Treaty.  Far  from  breaking  down  the  separate  nationalist  feelings,  each 
state  had  been  pursuing a  different  approach  to national  language  policy and 
the  development  of  disparate  symbols  of  nationalism.  Attempts  to  develop  a 
common  citizenship  remained  dormant.  Even  the  efforts  to  develop  a  regional 
ci vi 1  service  committed  to  East  African  cooperation were  undermined  by  delays 
in transferri ng  the  headquarters  of  Posts  and  Telecommuni cations  to  Uganda, 
the  expulsion  of  Kenya  workers  on  East  African  Railways  assignment  in Tanzania 
and  other acts  which  made  few  want  to  risk  the  relative  security  of national 
employment.  Even  before  the  closing  of  the  borders,  the  erection  of customs 
and  irrmi gration  checkpoints  at each  inter-terri torial  crossing,  moreover, 
hindered  the  free  flow  of  individuals  throughout  the  region.  No  country  was 
immune  to  demands  that  "foreign  Africans"  be  expelled  to provide  more  jobs 
for  the  local  population.  Certainly  there was  no  group  of  "federationists" 
who  could  politically challenge  the  leadership  of  the  three  separate  states. 
What  could  have  reversed  this  process  of  retrogression?  Perhaps  inter- 
nal  changes  in one  or  more  of  the  member  states  coul d  have  provided the 
basis  for  closer  cooperation.  One  could  not  pin much  hope  on  the three  states 
achieving  a  level  of  economic  parity  through  the  pursuit  of nationally- 
directed economic  plans;  therefore,  the  changes  would  had  to  have  been 
pol i tical .  This  could  have  come  about,  for  example,  through  the  emergence  of 
a  more  social ist-oriented  leadership  in Kenya,  through  Tanzania  adopting  a 
1 ess  antagonistic  attitude  towards  capi tal ist development  or  through  Uganda 
being  1 iberated  from  the  personalized  rule of  General  Amin. 
A1 ternati vely , increased cooperation  could  have  been  the  consequence  of 
external  pressures,  such  as  a military  threat  to  the  freedom  of  the  three states, 
from  whatever  source.  Indeed,  the  closest  thing  to  external  pressure  ws the 
decision  of  the  World  Bank  in 1976  to  suspend  its $50  mill ion worth  of  loan:  to 
the  Community  after  Uganda  had  reportedly withheld  its portion of  the  repay- 
ments.  It was  unofficially  hinted  that  the  move  was  calculated  to  pressure  the 
three  states  to  improve  relations  with  each  other.  The  effort  of  the  World 
Bank,  however,  was  both  muted  and  short-lived,  and  it eventually  lifted the 
suspension  wi thout a substantial  change  in relations  among  the  three  partners. 
One  further  mechani sm  which  might  have  contributed  to  successful  functional 
integration would  have  been  the  expansion  of the  Community  along the  lines 
envisioned  in the  1967  Treaty.  This might  have  led to  a  reduction  of  tensions 
among  the  original  participants.  The  inclusion  of Zambia,  for  example,  might 
have  had  the  dual  effect  of convincing  the  Kenyans  that  another  relatively 
prosperous  state  would  be  making  a  contribution  to  the  development  of poorer 
areas  while  at  the  same  time  reassuring  Tanzania  through  the  inclusion  of an 
ally who  is closer  to  itself both  in ideology  and  commi tment  to  southern 
African  1 i beration.  The  addition  of Malawi,  Zaire,  Rwanda,  Burundi,  Ethiopia 
and  Soma1 ia could conceivably  have  led to a  relaxation  of the  unanimi ty  rule 
in decision-making.  Unanimity  is more  difficult  to  achieve  in a  union  of only 
three  members,  when  there  is the  possi bi 1 i ty of  two  partners  forming  a  continu- 
ing coalition  against  the  third.  There  might  have  been  one  drawback.  The 
broader-gauged  approach,  which  is currently  being  considered  by  fifteen  states 
i n West  Af ri ca , woul d  perhaps  have  1 imi ted  cooperation  to economi c  and  techni cal 
matters  for  some  time  to  come.  Increasing the  diversity  of  the  Community  would 
have  diminished  even  further  the  prospects  for  an  early  consideration  of pol i tical 
federation. 
Until  the  break-up  of  the  East  African  Airways  Corporation  in February  of 
1977,  there  were  many  who  continued  to  take  great  comfort  in small  things 
regarding  the  prospects  for  regional  integration.  After  all,  the  leaders  of 
the  three  East  African  states  continue  even  today  to  make  pub1 ic pronouncements 
regardi ng  thei r commi tmen t to  the  concept  of  uni ty .  Despi te  the  fai 1 ure  of 
the  heads  of  state  to  meet  as  the  collective  executive  of  the  Community  since 
October  1971  there  had,  nevertheless,  been  frequent  meetinas  of officials  at 
the  ministerial  level.  The  Ministers  of  Finance  as  we11  as  the  ministers  in 
charge  of  power  and  communications,  for  example,  met  at  fairly  frequent  inter- 
val s.  There  have  even  been  bilateral  negotiations  between  Kenyan  and  Tanzanian 
officials  following  the  demise  of the  joint  airways.  None  but  the  most  blatant 
optimists,  however,  could  assume  that  it was  possible  to  reconstitute  the  East 
African  comnunity  in the  form  that  it existed  at  independence  or  at the  signing 
of  the Treaty  of  1967. 
The  Theoreti cal  Si gni fi cance  of the  East  African  Experience 
Adrni ttedly  some  of  the  experience  with  functional  integration  in East  Africa 
is sui  generis  and  has  no  relevance  to  the analysis  ri efforts  elsewhere  to 
achieve  a higher  plane of  cooperation  among  previously  autonomous  pol i tical  units. 
There  are,  however,  a  number  of  general  propositions  which  do  emerge  from  this 
study  which  may  have  significance  for  students  interested  in the  problems  of 
trans-national  integration. 
Proposition  1  ("Mutual  Benefits") :  A1 though  in the  initial  states  of  integra- 
tion,  one  or more  partners  may  be  willing to  forego  immediate  advantages  or  even 
to  suffer minor  disadvantages,  in the  long  run there  must  be  steady,  demonstra- 
ble and  substantial  benefits  to  the  major  units  in the partnership  in order 
to  sustain  integrative efforts. 
Proposi tion  2  ("Qua1 i ty  of  Cooperation") :  In functional  integration  the  qua1 i ty 
of cooperative  efforts  (that  is,  the  critical  importance  of the  activity  to 
the  participants  and  the  degree  of  increased  interdependence  and  compl ementari ty 
it establishes)  is more  important  than  the  mere  quantitative  increase  in the 
number  of areas  of cooperation. 
Proposition  3  ("Dynamic  Process") :  Functional  integration  is a  dynamic  process 
which  requires  continuous  forward  movement  into new  and  related areas  of coopera- 
tion  in order  to  prevent  the  initial  areas  of  cooperation  from  becoming  politicized 
in terns  of  the  separate  interests  of  the  participating states. 
Proposition  4  ("Irrevocable  Transactions") :  Functional  integration which  is 
designed  to  lead  to  political  unity  must  be  based  upon  transactions  which  are 
by  their  nature  irrevocably  binding  on  the  ~ol  units  involved. 
Proposition  5  ("Numbers  and  Relative  Strenpth") :  In  any  integrative  effort  which 
goes  beyond  1 imi ted  cooperation  in  narrow1 
\,J 
specified  areas,  the  number  of 
participating  units  and  their  strength  relative  to  one  another  become  critical 
to  the  sustained  success  of  the  venture. 
Proposition  6  ("Shifting Coalitions"):  In  cases  of  increasingly  complex  func- 
tional  integration,  there  must  be  sufficient  diversity  to  enable  the  formation 
of  shifting coalitions  on  major  issues.  On  each  new  issue  there  must  at  least 
be  the  presumption  that  any  one  of  the  partners  could  serve  as  a  potential  a1 ly. 
Proposition  7  ("Supra-national  Authority" ) :  Sustained  functional  integration 
requires  the  existence  of  a  supra-national  institution  having  authority  to 
make  binding  decisions  on  a  basis  other  than  unanimity  rule. 
Proposi tion  8  (" Indi vi dual  and  Group  Contacts ") :  Functional  i ntegration  desi gned 
to  lead  to  pol i tical  integration  must  go  beyond  intergovernmental  relationships 
and  involve  significant  and  sustained  contact  among  private  individuals  and 
groups  which  transcend  pol i ti cal  boundaries. 
Proposition  9  (" Increased  Inner  Direction") :  Functional  integration  designed 
to  lead  to  pol i tical  integration  requires  that  increasingly  the  importance  of 
the  collective  effort  to  each  of  the  participating  units  comes  to  outweigh  the 
importance  attached  by  the  members  to  external  pol i tical  units  and  relationships. 
Proposition  10  ("Ideological  Compatabil i ty"):  Functional  integration  is  neutral 
wi  th  respect  to  i deol ogy.  Functional  integration,  however,  cannot  proceed  where 
the  ideol ogical  divergences  among  the  participating  units  regarding  strategies 
of  development,  participatory  democracy  and  other  issues  are  too  basic  to  the 
areas  in  which  cooperation  is  being  pursued. 
END  NOTES 
1  Alexander  Hetherwi ck,  "Nyasaland  Today  and  Tomorrow,"  Journal  of  the  African 
Society  17  (1917) :  11-19;  'Africanus'  (Frederick  Melland),  "A  Central  African 
Confederation,"  Journal  of  the  African  Society  17:  (July,  1918) :  276-306. 
2  Harry  Johnston,  Story  of  My  Life  (London:  Chatto  and  Hindus,  1923). 
3  Kenneth  Ingham,  A  History  of  East  Africa  (New  York:  Praeger,  1962),  pp.  310 
ff. 
4  C.F.  Andrews,  The  Indian  Question in East  Africa  (Nairobi:  Swift  Press,  19?1), 
pp.  6-7. 
5  Report  of  the  East  Africa  Comnission,  Cmd.  2387  (1925). 
6  Report  of the  Comnission  on  Closer  Union  of the  Dependencies  in Eastern  and 
Central  Africa,  Cmd.  3234  (1929). 
7  Joint  Select  Cornmi ttee  on  Closer  Union  in East  Africa,  Report  and  Minutes  of 
Evidence:  1930-31,  2  vols.  (London:  HMSO,  1931). 
8  Sir  Donald  Cameron,  My  Tanganyika  Service  and  Some  Nigeria  (London:  Allen 
and  Unwin,  1939),  passim. 
9  For  a discussion  of  the  shifting settler  attitudes  on  closer  union  and  other 
subjects,  see  the  1 i vely  correspondence  between  two  Engl i sh  women  in El speth 
Huxley  and  Margery  Perham,  Race  and  Politics  in Kenya  (London:  Faber,  rev.  ed. 
1955). 
10  Ingham,  A  History of  East Africa,  pp.  314-320. 
11  Ibid.,  pp.  375-376. 
12  Colonial  Office  Paper  No.  191  (London:  HIISO,  1945). 
13  Jane  Banfiel d,  "The  Structure  and  Admini stration  of the  East  African  Common 
Services  Organization ," in Col in Leys  and  Peter  Robson,  eds . , Federation  in 
East  Africa:  Opportunities  and  Problems  (London:  Oxford  University  Press, 
14  David  Apter,  The  Political  Kingdom  in Uganda  (Princeton:  Princeton  University 
Press,  1967 ),  pp.  276-288. 
15  Anthony  Hughes,  "Communi ty of  Disinterest,"  Africa  Report  20  (March/Apri 1, 
1975) :  37-38. 
16  Cameron,  My  Tanqanyika  Service,  pp.  224-225. 
17  Banfield,  "Structure  and  Administration,"  pp.  30-40. 
18  Cf.  Donald  Rothchild,  Pol i tics  of  Integration:  An  East  Africa  Documentary 
(Nairobi :  East  African  Pub1 ishing House,  1967),  passim. 
19  B.U.T.  Muthari ka,  Toward  Mu1 tinational  Economic  Cooperation  in Africa 
(New  York:  Praeger,  1972),  pp.  267  ff. 
20  "East  African  Comrnuni ty  --  1975  and  After,"  Africa  Contemporary  Record, 
1975-76,  p.  A59. 
21  Leys  and  Robson,  Federation  in East  Africa,  pp.  185-186. 
22  Hughes,  "Community  of Disinterest,"  pp.  37-43. 
23  Philip  Ndegwa,  The  Common  Market  and  Development  in East  Africa  (Nairobi : 
East  African  Publishing  House,  1965),  pp.  136-148. 
THE  ORIGINS OF EOU?/DARY  COI!FLICT  IN  AFRICA 
J.  Barron  Boyd  Jr.,  LeMoyne  College 
Because  boundaries  define  an  important  segment  of  the  environment  with- 
in which  decision  makers  must  function,  they  have  had  a  mu1 ti faceted  and 
complex  impact  upon  the  dynamics  of African  foreign  policy.  Boundaries  in 
Africa  have  served  the  traditional , geopol i tical  role of partially  determin- 
ing  the  capabil i ties,  resources  and  perhaps  even  power  which  the  African 
states  can  employ  in support  of their  foreign  pol icy.]  Boundaries  define 
the  extent  of  territory  under  the  sovereign  control  of a  group  of decision 
makers  and  the  presence  of  certain  non-human  components  of the  power  equa- 
tion will  depend  upon  the  qua1 ity or  character  of  that  territory  included 
within  the  national  boundaries.  The  natural  resources  at a  state's  disposal, 
the  ease  or  difficulty  with which  it can  engage  in intercourse with  the  rest 
of  the world,  the  presence  or  absence  of natural  barriers  against  invasion, 
the  heterogeneity  or  homogeneity  of the  state's  population,  to mention  but 
a  few  characteristics,  are  all  determined  by  the  shape  and  location of its 
physical  boundaries. 
This  function  of  boundaries  is obviously  not  unique  to Africa  and  holds 
equally  in a1 1  areas  of the  world.  The  factors  which  make  the  role of 
boundaries  in African  foreign  pol icy  particularly worthy  of note  and  inves ti- 
gation  derive  from  the  process  by  which  the  contemporary  African  borders  were 
defined  and  the  rather  unique  set  of pressures  which  are  consequently  present 
in the  foreign  pol icy environment  of the  African  states. 
The  importance  of boundary  re1 ated  issues  in African  international  re1 a- 
tions  is often  attributed to  the  supposed  arbitrary  and  artificial  nature 
of  the  continent's  modern  terri torial  boundaries.  It has  frequently  been 
maintained  that  the  states  which  now  dot  the  continent were  created  during 
the  great  scramble  for Africa  by  a1 ien  diplomats  who  knew  1 i ttle of,  and 
cared  less  for,  the  social,  political  and  topographical  realities of Africa. 
European  diplomats  were  comnonly  depicted  sitting about  green  baize  tab1 es 
in their  respective  capitals with  ruler and  blue  pencil  in hand  carving  up 
the  continent without  regard  for  the  disruptive  effects  that  their  efforts 
at  partition would  have  on  Africa.  For  example,  Lord  Salisbury,  in a  humorous 
rnomen t, observed  that 
We  have  been  engaged  in drawing  1 ines  upon  maps  where  no 
white  man's  foot  ever  trod;  we  have  been  giving  away  moun- 
tains  and  rivers  and  lakes  to each  other,  only  hindered  by 
the  small  impediment  that  we  never  knew  exactly  where  the 
mountains  and  rivers  and  lakes  were.2 
The  ramifications  of  these  actions  are  seldom  depicted  in such  a  humorous 
manner.  To  the  contrary,  parti tion  grouped  together  peoples  who  shared  lit- 
tle sense  of  common  identity,  separated  ethnic  and  linguistic  proups  whose 
traditional  patterns  of trade  and  interaction were  thereby  disrupted  by  a 
relatively  impermeable  barrier,  and  created  political  units whose  size  and 
composition  were  in some  cases  incompatible  with  the  goals  of economic  and 
pol i tical  development. 
On  the basis  of  this  boundary  artificiality,  many  authors  have  postu- 
lated that  colonialism  laid the  base  for  frequent  conflict  between  the  ~frican 
states  once  they  gained  their  independence.3  In particular,  it was  felt  that 
after  independence  the  African  communi ty would  be  plagued with  efforts by  the 
indi vi dual  states  to  readjust  the  boundaries,  through  forceful  means  if neces- 
sary,  to make  them  more  congruent  with  the  ethnographic  landscape.  The  fol- 
lowing  observation by  I.  William  Zartman  is typical  of  the  viewpoint  which 
prevai led during  the  early  and  mid-1960s: 
Any  African  state  can  have  boundary  problems  if it wants. 
The  newness  of  African  states  and  the  frequent  i rrelevance 
of  their  geographic  frames  to  their  economic,  social  and 
political  lives  make  the  continent  more  potentially sus- 
cepti ble to  territorial  disputes  than  any  other.4 
Because  of the  obvious  importance  of boundary  disputes  in an  environment  where, 
because  of  the  colonial  legacy,  "any  state  can  have  boundary  problems  if it 
wants,"  a  thorough  and  systematic  evaluation  of the forces  which  lead  to 
boundary  conflict would  be  an  important  project  in itself;  but  since  there 
are  several  other  issues  of more  general  importance which  are  linked to  the 
dynamics  of boundary  conflict,  such  an  investigation  would  be  of wider  rele- 
vance. 
As  we  have  menti oned,  contemporary  African  boundary  confl i cts  are  often 
felt to  be  a  direct and  immediate  product  of  the  continent's colonial  heritage. 
If Africa's  modern  boundaries  had  been  allowed  to evolve  in a  more  natural 
manner,  or  if the  colonial  powers  had  based  their  parti tion  on  a  more  thor- 
ough  appreciation  of the  socio-cul tural  mosaic  of  the  area,  it is assumed  that 
the  international  environment  in Africa  would  be  less  conducive  to  boundary 
disputes.  A  systematic  empirical  study  of  the  origins  of  boundary  conflict 
in Africa  would  therefore  help  to  indicate  the  extent  to which  current  prob- 
lems  on  :he  continent  are  1 inked  to  the  colonial  past. 
Moreover,  because  boundary  related  foreign  pol icy  is a  part  of  the  over- 
all  phenomenon  of  African  foreign  policy  formulation,  an  assessment  of  the 
factors  which  serve  as  a  catalyst  to  the  outbreak  of territorial  conflict 
could  indirectly  indicate  some  of  the  more  general  causes  of  intra-African 
conflict.  An  analysis  of  the  dynamics  of  boundary  conflict  could  at least 
provide  some  interesting hypotheses  about  why  African  states  fight. 
Boundaries  and  Forei gn  Pol icy 
Pol i tical  boundaries  mark  sharp  discontinuities  in pol i tical  jurisdiction. 
No  matter  what  the  degree  of  physical  proximity  of  individuals  on  either  side 
of  the  boundary  1 ine,  the  fact  that  a  political  border  separates  them  means 
that  their  national  political  orientations,  duties  and  obligations  will  be 
sharply  divergent.  When  the  national  pol i tical  environment  does  not  coincide 
with traditional  patterns  of ethnic  affinity,  subnational  political  contact 
or traditional  forms  of  social  and  economic  relations,  some  disruption will  be 
the  result.  This  disruption will  occur  because  both the  ethnic  group  and  the 
national  government  will  be  placing  simul taneous  and  often confl icting demands-- 
for  respect,  primary  a1 legiance,  deference,  etc. -- upon  the  people.  While 
the  central  government  may  have  a  monopoly  on  the  use  of coercive  means  to 
force  the  people  to  give  it primary  loyalty,  ethnic  ties  may  be  deeply  in- 
grained and  difficult  to break.  As  a  consequence  of the  fact  that  such  cross- 
cutting and  sometimes  irreconci lab1 e  pressures  are  placed  upon  them,  some 
disruption will  plague  the  people. 
When  discussing  the  relationship between  political  boundaries  and  those 
of  the  socio-cul tural  setting,  it has  been  customary  to  make  a  distinction 
between  antecedent,  consequent  and  superimposed  boundaries.5  Antecedent 
boundaries  are  those  which  are establ i shed  before  human  settlement  patterns 
are  establ ished,  and  therefore  before the  socio-cul tural  environment  of a 
state  has  coalesced.  The  disruptive  effects  of such  political  boundaries  are 
at a minimum  for  their  antecedent  status  will  insure  that  they  play  a major 
role  in gui di ng  and  shaping  the  evol ution  of subsequent  socio-cul tural  group- 
ings.  Because  the  political  boundaries  are established before  the  people  arrive, 
they  will  play  an  integral part  in determining  what  patterns  of  interaction 
will  develop  at a  later  time. 
Consequent  boundaries  are  those  which  are  established  after  human  set- 
tlement  patterns,  affinity  groups,  markets  and  other relationships  have 
sol idified,  but  this  type  of  boundary  coi nci des  with  those  socio-cul tural 
patterns.  Uhen  one  refers  to natural  boundaries,  it is generally  this  type 
which  is cited.  Like  antecedent  boundaries,  consequent  ones  have  a  low 
potential  for  disruption  since the  political  and  socio-cul tural  environments 
mesh. 
The  final  category  in this  crude  typology  is the  superimposed  form  of 
boundary.  Superimposed  boundaries  are  simi 1 ar  to  consequent  ones  i n  the 
sense  that  they  are  developed,  or  imposed,  after  the soci o-cul tural  en\.i ron- 
ment  is solidified but  the  crucial  difference  between  the  two  is that  super- 
imposed  boundaries  do  not mesh  with  the  out1 ines  of  the  socio-cul tural  setting. 
When  boundaries  are  of  the  superimposed  type,  ethnic  groups  are  often  bisected 
by  pol i ti cal  boundaries,  and  competitive  or  hostile social  enti ties  are  often 
1 umped  together  within  the  same  administrative  or  political  jurisdiction. 
When  this  is the  case,  the  disruption  mentioned  earlier  can  be  expected  to 
pose  a  problem  for  both the  affected individuals  and  the  central  government. 
As  most  African  boundaries  are  of the  superimposed  type,  and  as  it is 
this  form  of  pol i tical  boundary  which  causes  the  greatest  discontinuity  be- 
tween  the pol i tical  and  socio-cul tural  frames  of reference  for  the  people, 
the  domestic  disruption  in Africa  can  be  expected  to  reach  severe  levels. 
Sirni larly,  because  the  bisection of ethnic  groups  by  national  boundaries  pl aces 
part of  the  same  group  in different  states,  the  presence  of superimposed 
boundaries  can  have  international  imp1 ications  as  well.  However,  to  agree 
that  superimposed  boundaries  like  those  in Africa  will  cause  domestic  and 
perhaps  transnational  disruption  is not  sufficient  to specify  the  manner 
in which  this  disruption  is translated  into  the  policy  of  the  various  states. 
It is not  boundaries  per  which  cause  conflict,  but  rather  it is state pol- 
icy which  causes  it.  And  while  the  friction which  is a  product  of artificial, 
superimposed  boundaries  may  be  a  factor  which  goes  into the  generation  of  con- 
flict,  it is only  one  of  the  many  stimuli  which  help  determine  the  course 
of a  state's policy. 
In order  to more  ful ly understand  the  relationship  between  the  presence 
of  superimposed  boundaries  and  African  foreign  pol icy  confl ict the  following 
strategy  will  be  adopted.  First,  an  effort will  be  made  to  present a  number 
of  possible explanations  for  the  outbreak  of  boundary  confl ict.  These  possible 
explanations  are  derived  fron a  thorough  overview  of  the  existing  literature 
on  boundary  conflict  and  as  such  represent  the  "traditional  wisdom"  on  the 
topic.  Unfortunately,  this  traditional  wisdom  does  not provide  us  with  the 
clear  answers  which  we  seek  for  the  explanations  it offers  are  complex,  con- 
fusing  and  often contradictory.  Therefore  in order  to more  effectively 
determine  the  validity  of  such  propositions  an  attempt  will  be  made  to  use 
modern  methods  of  data  analysis  to  test  them  with  data  derived  from  the  actual 
behavior  of  the  African  states. 
One  manifestation  of  boundary  related  conflict  has  a  purely  domestic 
impact.  Upon  having  their  traditional  patterns  of socio-cul tural  relation- 
ships  disrupted by  the  superimposi tion  of pol i tical  boundaries  (first by  the 
colonial  powers  and  later by  the  modern  independent  African  states  which 
adopted  the  colonial  divisions  of the  continent with  1 i ttle a1 teration) , 
the  affected  domestic  groups  can  be  expected  to  make  demands  upon  the  govern- 
ment  for  alleviation  of the  disruption.  Such  demands  can  take  various  forms 
ranging from pressure  to  relax  the  sanctions  against  free  movement  across 
the  border  to  calls  for  cession  of the  affected  territory to  another  state. 
But  no  matter  what  form  the  demands  take,  the  aim  is to  elicit a  change  in 
government  pol icy  to permit the continuation  of  traditional  patterns  of re- 
lations.  When  faced  with  such  demands,  the  central  government  has  essential ly 
two  options  in domestic  policy:  it can  ignore  its vested  interest  in main- 
taining  the  sanctity  of  the  borders  and  increase  its permeability,  or  it can 
attempt  to  strictly enforce  the  present  boundaries  hoping  that  eventual ly 
ethnic  boundaries  will  come  to  conform  to  the national  ones.  Given  the 
jealousy  with  which  many  African  states  guard  the  trappings  of sovereignty 
after  the  prolonged  colonial  domi nation,  and  the  potential  chain  reaction 
of  separatist  claims  which  might  be  set  off by  acquiescence  to  any  particu- 
lar ethnic  group's  demands,  the  second  option  seems  to  be  the  most  likely 
solution.  The  result of attempting  to  force  closure  of the  border  is,  if 
feelings  run  deep  enough,  some  form  of  domestic  confl ict. 
This  same  basic  pattern  of  demands  can  have  international  as  well  as 
domestic  ramifications  when  none  of  the  above  options  are  available  to  the 
acting  state.  If the  challenged  government  is reluctant  to  allow  the  per- 
meabil i ty of  its borders  to  increase  and  is simultaneously  unwill ing,  or 
unable,  to  apply  domestic  sanctions,  it has  the  option  of  trying  to  ease 
domestic  demands  through  foreign  pol icy  pressure  on  other  states .6  The 
aim  of  the  government  which  adopts  this tactic  is to  adjust  the  boundary 
through  pressure  on  a  neighboring  foreign  power. 
The  emergence  of  this  pattern  of  interstate  conflict  is generally 
predicated  upon  the  existence  of a  situation where  ethnic  groups  are 
bisected  by  state  boundaries  with  parts  of  the  same  group  being placed  on 
either  side  of  a  state  border.  This  phenomenon  is termed  ethnic  population 
overhang.  The  proposition  that  such  ethnic  population  overhang  is a  cata- 
lyst to  international  conflict on  territorial  issues  is perhaps  one  of  the  most 
obvious  and  s traight-forward  explanations  of  the  1 inkage  between  boundary 
artificiality  and  conflict,  and  it has  received  a  great  deal  of support  in the 
1 i terature. 7  The  following comment  by  a  student  of African  boundary  problems 
is typical  of  the  importance  attached  to  the  ethnic  population  overhang 
hypothesis,  "... the  commonest  situation  in Africa  [is]  to  find ethnic  groups 
who  wish  to  be  united with  their  fellow  men  across  the  border  and  whose  de- 
sires  are  used  by  the  government  to  justify  boundary  changes. "8 
The  Horn  of Africa  is felt  to  be  one  area  where  the  overhang  effect  has 
been  most  pronounced  and  hence  where  it has  had  the  most  impact  upon  boundary 
conflict.  As  a  result of  the  colonial  parti tion  of Africa  the  Somal i people 
were  widely  dispersed  throughout  the  entire  Horn  area.  While  the  Somal i 
Republic  is the center  of Somali  habitation,  members  of this  general  ethnic 
group  also  occupy  extensive  territory  in both  Kenya  and  Ethiopia.  It would 
seem  that  as  a  basic  consequence  of this  severe  ethnic  fragmentation  (itself 
a  product  of  the  colonial  partition  of  the  continent)  the  Somali  government 
has  issued claims  on  some  80,000  square  miles  of Ethiopian  and  45,000  square 
mi 1 es  of  Kenyan  terri tory  since  gai ni ng  independence. 
While  there  are,  as  we  shall  see  in subsequent  pages,  many  facets  to  this 
problem,  Somal ia's  irredentist  claims  to  Kenyan  and  Ethiopian  territory  have 
been  based  upon  a  cultural  rationale.  The  Somali  Republic  claimed  that  since 
the  colonial  divisions  of Africa were  an  archaic  legacy  which  had  little 
relevance  for  modern  African  national i sm,  the  Soma1 i people  coul d  not  be  considered 
fully  independent  unti 1  that  legacy  was  eradicated and  a1 1  Soma1 i people 
were  united  under  the  same  political  jurisdiction.  In support  of  their  claims 
to  territory  the  government  of  the  Somali  Republic  maintained  at the  Pan 
African  Summit  of  1963  that  all  Somalis  were 
members  of a  single  Somali  nation,  Somali  is our 
language,  spoken  from  the  Gulf  of Aden  to  the 
Northern  Frontier  District  [of  Kenya].  Islam 
is our  culture,  pastoralism our  way  of life. 
We  want  to  reunite with  our  brothers  with whom 
we  can  evolve  an  administration  suited  to our 
way  of  life.9 
As  rnioht  be  expected,  Somali  claims  to  Kenyan  and  Ethiopian  territory were 
not  welcomed  by  the  governments  of those  states  and  political  friction 
ensued.  In the  period  between  the  early  1960s  and  the  present  the  Horn 
of  Africa  has  been  the  scene  of much  boundary  related conflict as  the  Somalis 
continued  to  level  claims  to territory  and  Kenya  and  Ethiopia  reacted  to 
those  c1 aims. 
Many  authors  have  isolated  this  situation  and  asserted  that  it is the 
most  overt  and  obvious  manifestation  of Africa's  artificial  boundaries  lead- 
ing to  the  fragmentation  of an  ethnic  group  which  in turn  resulted  in boundary 
confl ict between  the  several  affected  states.  For  example: 
The  circumstances  of  Kenya's  connections  with  Somalia 
and  many  of  the  conflicts  and  problems  which  beset  the 
Horn  are  founded  in the  present  day  distribution  of 
Somali  speaking  peoples  and  in the  ways  in which  they 
have  become  di vi ded  among  several  different  states  and 
powers.  The  anomalies  and  inconsistencies  of territorial 
boundaries  in north east  Africa  provide  classic  examples 
of  the  problems  which  arise with  a  strong  sense  of na- 
ti onal  uni ty  among  a  peopl e  who  have  been  di vi ded  among 
several  different  territories  in the  past .lo 
While  the  Horn  area  may  be  the  most  noted  example,  the  impact  of  ethnic  popu- 
lation  overhang  is not  confined  to  that  region.  The  disputes  between  Ghana 
and  Togo  (1956-1966)  also  seem  to  have  been  a  product,  at least  partially, 
of ethnic  population  overhang.  During the  period of colonialism the  Ewe 
ethnic  group  was  divided  between  British and  French  jurisdictions.  With  the 
coming  of  independence  the  Ewe  national ist leaders  in the  former  French 
territory  of Togo  claimed  the  Ewe  occupied  territory  in formerly  British 
Ghana.  Initial ly the  Togolese  based  thei r claims  on  cultural  criteria 
maintaining  that  they,  1 ike  the  Somalis,  sought  to  reunify  the  Ewe  group. 
When  this  argument  proved  to  lack  support  in international  and  African  forums, 
the  government  a1 tered  its  tactics  and  used  an  historical  argument  to  buttress 
their  claims.  During  the  period of German  colonial  occupation  the  Togolands 
were  uni ted,  and  it was  this  boundary  configuration  that  the  Togolese  asserted 
shoul d  be  the  bas i s  for  post- i ndependence  boundaries . 
Ghana,  then  led by  Nkrurnah,  did  not  accept  Togolese  claims  to  its ter- 
ritory and  in fact  turned  Togo's  argument  around.  Since  Ghana  was  then  strong- 
ly committed  to  Pan  African,  anti -colonial  ideology,  Nkrumah  coul d  not  easily 
argue  that  the  colonial  borders  were  sacrosanct.  He  therefore  chose  to  counter- 
attack  from  a  Pan  African position.  He  asserted  that  the  best  way  for  the 
Ewes  to be  reunited was  by  union  with  Ghana.  A  Ghanaian  annexation  of  Togo 
would  thus  both  remove  a  potentially disruptive  boundary  problem  and  be  con- 
sistent with  Nkrumah's  interpretation  of  Pan  Africanist  dogma.  While  the 
boundary  conflict was  raised  to  a  higher  level--  that  of a  debate  over  ideology-- 
the  initial  catalyst  for  conflict  lay  in the  ethnic  population  overhang  be- 
tween  the  two  states  and  the  demands  placed  upon  the  government  of Togo  as 
a  result of  that situation  by  the  Ewes. 
These  are  but  two  of the  many  examples  of  territorial  conflict which 
seem  related  to ethnic  population  overhang.ll  However,  as  these  cases  are 
more  thoroughly  investigated,  it often appears  that  other factors  have  at 
1 east  equal  importance  i n  the generation  of boundary  confl ict. 
One  of  these  factors  is the  degree  of  ethnic  homogeneity  which  obtains 
in the  domestic  environment  of  the  conflict  prone  state.  It has  been  sug- 
gested  that  domestic  pressure  on  a  government  will  be  more  1 i kely  to el ici t 
a  response  of  foreign  policy  conflict  if the  acting state  is not ethnically 
fragmented.12  For  example,  it has  been  asserted  by  many  authors  that  one 
reason  for  the  fervor  of  Somalia's  boundary  agitation  is the  fact  that  it is 
an  apparently  cohesive  state.  Because  of  this,  Sornal ia's  irredentist  policies 
do  not  risk  opening  a  "Pandora's  Box"  of claims  to external  territory  by 
other ethnic  groups  in the  domestic  scene.  Similarly,  it has  also  been  sug- 
ges ted  that  Sornal i a  coul d  afford  to  annex  territory wi thout worryi ng  about 
upsetting whatever  ethnic  balance  might  be  at work  in the  domestic  political 
environment.13  Also,  in a  uni-ethnic  state  there  would  be  little chance  that 
cross-cutting,  competing  demands  from  other  groups  in society would  offset 
and  moderate  the  demands  of any  one  group.  Thus  it has  been  maintained  that 
Somali  demands  could  be  more  clearly articulated  than  would  have  been  the 
case  if they  were  only  one  of  many  ethnic  groups  competing  for  the  limited 
attention  of  the  central  gsvernmen t. 
There  also  seem  to  be  situations  in which  the  importance  of ethnic 
criteria  in the  domestic  political  environment  lead to  boundary  conflict. 
If an  ethnic  group  has  a  particularly  significant  or  pivotal  place  in the 
political  environment,  the  1 i kel ihood  that  its demands  for  some  form  of al- 
teration  in the  boundary  status  quo  will  result  in the  formulation  of gov- 
ernment  policy  is greater.  It nay  well  be  that  politically  unimportant 
ethnic  groups,  or  ethnic  groups  which  operate  in a  political  environment 
where  ethnicity  is not  an  important  factor,  have  their  demands  ignored  while 
those  with  greater  political  clout will  be  more  successful  in their  claims. 
In this  case,  the  presence  of  population  overhang  may  be  of  initial  importance, 
but the  factor  which  is crucial  in the  generation  of boundary  conflict  is the 
sal ience  of ethnici ty  in internal  pol i tics. 
I  Once  again  the  Somali  situation  is cited as  a  case  where  this  set  of 
circumstances  has  led to  boundary  conflict.  As  was  mentioned,  while  all 
citizens  of  the  Somali  Republic  are  of the  same  general  ethnic  unit,  the 
Somali  ethnic  group  is not  a  cohesive  one.  It is highly  fragmented  into 
kinship  groups  which  compete,  through  party  organizations,  for  pol i tical 
power  and  influence.  In Somalia,  then,  ethnicity  can  be considered  to be  a 
sal ient pol i tical  variable.  An  important  explanatory  force  in Somalia's 
problems  with  Ethiopia,  therefore,  was  the  fact  that  the  pol i tically  impor- 
tant  Daarood  group  was  most  strident  in its agitation  for  the  reunification 
of  "Greater  somalia".14 
Because  the  Daarood  depended  heavily  on  grazing  and  water  rights  in 
Ethiopia,  they  frequently  criticized the  government  for  not  taking  active 
steps  to  reunite  the  Somali  people--  and  to  thereby  annex  the  Somali  oc- 
cupied  territory  in Ethiopia which  the  Daarood  depended  upon  so  heavily. 
For  example,  in 1959  the  Daarood  deputies  in the  National  Assembly  vociferous- 
ly challenged  Ethiopia's  provocative  "acts  of aggression  along  the  frontier," 
and  demanded  that  the  government  take  definite  action  on  the  Greater  Somalia 
issue. 15 
Such  demands  seem  to  have  had  considerable  impact  upon  the  tempo  of the 
Somali  Republic's  claims  to  Ethiopian  territory,  and  since  the  Daarood  group 
was  an  integral  element  of the  complex  ethnic  balance which  then  influenced 
Soma1 i politics,  it is reasonable  to  surmise  that  it was  the  political  salience 
of  the  affected ethnic  group  which  accounted,  at  least  partially,  for  the 
impact  of  its demands  on  Somali  pol icy. 
A  different  type  of  hypothesis  1 inks  general  domestic  unrest  and  the 
pressure  of  domestic  problems  to  interstate  conflict.  Much  as  the  specter 
of  neo-colonial ism  and  continuing  colonial ism were  seen  by  some16  as  an 
enemy  against  which  the  African  states  (no  matter  how  strong  their  particular 
differences)  could  unite,  the  fomentation  of boundary  conflict  could  serve 
to  create  an  external  enemy  to  unify  contentious  elements  of a  population.~7 
A  boundary  dispute could  act  as  a  safety  valve  for  domestic  turmoil  by  letting 
domestic  groups  which  are  at odds  with  one  another  vent  their  hostility 
against a  real  or  imagined  external  enemy  rather  than  against  each  other. 
The  "safety  valve"  hypothesis  seems  to  enjoy  at  least  face  validity  for  in 
those  states  plagued with  domestic  dissention  the' inherent  artificialicy 
of  boundaries  presents  the  government  of  the  African  state with  an  easily 
manipulated  issue  about  which  to  rally  support. 
Because  the  causes  of domestic  disruption  may  be  diverse,  the  demands 
placed  upon  the  government  cannot  all  be  presented  as  having  their  origin 
in the  boundary  issue  area.  Economic  discontent,  inter-ethnic  friction, 
governmental  inefficiency,  etc.,  can  each  contribute  to  internal  problems, 
but  these  factors  may  have  little or  nothing  to  do  with  the  discontinuity 
between  modern  and  traditional  boundaries  which  was  at the  root  of  our  previous 
set  of  hypotheses.  No  matter  what  the  cause  of the  domestic  turmoil,  the 
central  government  has  chosen  to  act within  the  boundary  issue  area,  to 
foment  boundary  confl ict,  as  it seeks  a  solution  for  the  turmoi 1.  Given 
this  situation,  the  observation  that  "any  African  state  can  have  boundary 
problems  if it wishes"  assumes  added  significance  and  the  ease  with which 
boundary  problems  can  apparently  be  fabricated works  to  the  advantage  of 
the  state  which  wants  to  divert  attention  away  from  its internal  problems. 
This  tactic  seems  to  have  been  adopted  on  several  occasions.  In 1963 
Cahomey  (now  named  Benin)  began  a  boundary  dispute  with  Niger.  The  conflict 
has  been  blamed  upon  the  fact  that  there was  a  considerable  amount  of turmoil 
in Dahomey  after  the  overthrow  of  President  Maga,  and  it could  be  that  the 
new  ruler  of  Dahorney  sought  to  foment  boundary  conflict with  Niger  in order 
to  defuse  this  domestic  dissent.'*  Similarly,  when  the  Somali  National  As- 
sembly  was  threatened  with  a  no  confidence  vote  in April  1962,  it was  rescued, 
at  least  partially,  by  an  escalation  in the  tempo  of  the  border  conflict with 
Ethiopia.19  And  again  in 1964  when  the  general  election  in Somali  was  ap- 
proaching  there  was  a  serious  outbreak  of  fighting  with  ~thio~ia.20 
In the  preceding  cases  the  stimuli  which  elicited  boundary  conflict 
arose,  di rectly or  indirectly,  from  domestic  actors  within  the  states.  There 
are  also  examples  of  boundary  confl ict which  do  not  seem  related  to  domestic 
factors  but rather  seem  to  emanate  from  either  the  overall  foreign  pol icy 
stance  of  interacting  states  or  from  sources  internal  to  the  governing  elite 
of  a  belligerant  state  itself. 
Several  instances  of  conflict  appear  to  indicate  that  if a  pattern  of 
generalized  hostility exists  between  a  group  of  states,  the  artificiality 
of  African  boundaries  will  make  them  convenient  points  for  the  articulation 
of  that  general  hos ti 1 i ty.21  When  African  governments  want  to demonstrate, 
in a  tangible  and  direct  fashion,  their  displeasure  with  or  hostility  toward 
another  state,  boundary  issues  are  ready  made  for  such  a  purpose. 
In this  case  the  forces  which  generate  boundary  conflict may  arise  out- 
side  of  the  boundary  issue  area--  in the  larger  foreign  policy environment 
of  states--  but  the  policy  which  is formulated  in response  to such  stimuli 
is  clearly pursued  within  it.  Domestic  actors  here  are  of peripheral  impor- 
tance  in the  manifestation  of boundary  conflict,  and  while  they  may  be  affect- 
ed  by  the  policy,  or even  cited  as  the  cause  of it, their  substantive  impact 
upon  pol i cy  formul ati on  i s  negl i gi bl e. 
The  :!iger-Dahomey  dispute  has  already  been  noted  in support  of  the  hypo- 
thesis  which  isolates  domestic  unrest  as  a  primary  factor  in the  outbreak  of 
boundary  cnnfl ict.  But  if the  evidence  is interpreted in another  manner,  this 
case  can  also  support  the  hypothesis  which  places  primary  emphasis  on  general 
forei qn  pol icy  hosti 1 i ty  as  a  cause  of  boundary  confl i ct.  After  the  overthrow 
of  President  Maga  the  new  regime  in Dahomey  accused  the  Niger  Republic  of sup- 
porting  a  counterrevol utionary  plot.  In retal iation  for  this  accusation,  for 
the  arrest  of a  number  of  its citizens  by  the  Dahomians,  and  because  Niger 
suspected  Dahomey  of aiding  the  subversive  Sawaba  Party,  the  Niger  National 
Assembly  announced  that  it would expel  a1 1  Dahomians  1 iving on  the  northern 
side  of the  Niger  River.  Dahorney  then  closed  its borders  and  effectively 
sealed  landlocked Niger  off from  the outside  world. 
This  series  of events  signaled  a dramatic  downturn  in the  tone  of  foreign 
pol icy  relationships  between  the  two  governments.  In this  context  it is interesting 
to  note  that  as  diplomatic  relationships  soured,  the  long  standing  discus- 
sions  on  the  status  of  Lete  Island  were  transformed  into  rancorous  debates. 
When  the  overall  foreign  policy  position  of  the  two  states  turned  hostile, 
a  previously  dormant  boundary  issue  flared  up  as  well.  It  is  also  interesting 
that  once  relations  improved  the  Lete  Island  issue  lost  importance  and  a  corn- 
promise  was  quickly  worked  out. 
The  Ghana-Upper  Vol ta  dispute  of  1963-1966  was  presented  as  a  disagree- 
ment  over  an  interpretation  of  evidence  used  in  the  definition  of  the  border 
which  separated  the  two  countries.  But  the  dispute  seems  to  have  had  its 
origin  in  a more  general  friction  between  the  states.  From  1961  onward  Ghana 
had  attempted  to  forge  close  links  with  Upper  Vol ta,  but  Nkrumah  had  been 
rebuffed  in  1963.  At  the  same  time  as  it was  turning  away  from  Ghana,  t'pper 
Volta  had  begun  to  pursue  a  rapprochement  with  the  Ivory  Coast.  Nkrumah  wac 
quite  piqued  at this  policy  shift  by  Upper  Vol ta,  and  when  Upper  Vol ta  began 
to  suspect  that  Ghana  was  attempting  to  subvert  its  government,  relationships 
between  the  two  states  reached  a  low  ebb.  It was  at  this  juncture  that  the 
ongoing  boundary  discussions  became  an  important  means  through  which  each 
country  tried  to  influence  the  other.  Ghana  sought  to  demonstrate,  through 
manipulation  of the  boundary  issue,  that  i t  could  cause  considerable  trouble 
for  an  uncooperative  neighbor,  and  Upper  Vol ta  attempted  to  damage  Nkrumah's 
credibility  by  portraying  his  state  as  expansionist.  Again,  it appears  that 
in  this  case  boundary  problems  were  simply  a  function  of  a  more  general  and 
deep-seated  pattern  of  antagoni sm  between  a  set of  states. 
Several  othe  examples  could  be  given  in  support  of  this  proposition 
(for example  the  Tanzania-Malawi  dispute  of  1967)  but  the  major  justification 
for  its  val idi ty  is  the  observation  that  those  states which  have  experienced 
little  foreign  policy  conflict  and  which  share  a  common  ideological  perspec- 
tive  -  Upper  Volta  and  Niger,  Chad  and  the  Central  African  Empire,  Mali  and 
Aigeria  -  have  had  little or  no  boundary  conflict.22 
Another  perspective  attributes  the  origin  of  some  boundary  disputes  to 
the  governing  elites  of  the  various  states.  This  perspective  tends  to  down- 
grade  the  importance  of  both  external  infl uences  and  domestic  factors.  Rather, 
from  this  viewpoint,  boundary  disputes  are  explained  by  the perceptions,  de- 
sires  and  motives  of  the  governing  elites  in  any  country.  Zartman  suggests, 
for  example,  that  the  desire  for status  in  the  African  comnunity  could  motivate 
leaders  to  embark  upon  an  expansionist  course.23  As  evidence  of  this  process 
he  cites  a  remark  by  a  Moroccan  ambassador  that  his  country  needed  more  terri- 
tory  "to look  as  big  as  Algeria".  He  further  argues  that  one  factor  in  Ghana's 
claims  to  Togolese  territory was  Nkrumah's  continental  aspi rations  to  status 
which  were  "far greater  than  the  size  of  the  country. "24 
A  similar  view  stresses  the  fact that  changes  in  government  leadership 
seem  to  be  related  to  the  outbreak  of  boundary  conflict.  It was  pre- 
viously  noted  that  boundary  conflict  fol lowed  closely  upon  the  heels  of  Maga's 
downfall  in  Dahomey.  The  same  pattern  can  be  discerned  in  the  flareup  of 
conflict  between  Sudan,  Ethiopia  and  Chad  after  the  1964  revolution  which 
overthrew  the  regime  of  General  Abboud  in  Sudan.  Boundary  problems  were 
dormant  until  the  coup,  but  after  the  regime  change  they  grew  rapidly  in 
intensity. 
Instability within  a  country's  governing  elite  could  potentially  affect 
boundary  issues  in  several  ways.  A  regime  change  often  marks  a  far  reaching 
shift  in  the  ideology,  guiding  assumptions  and  the  norms  of  conduct  for  the 
unstable  state.  This  could,  in  turn,  reverse  any  pre-existing  friendly 
relationships  with  neighboring  states  and  facilitate  the  outbreak  of  boundary 
tensions.  A1 so,  since  a  regime  change  fosters  suspicion,  uncertainty  and 
fears  on  the  part  of  contiguous  states  about  the  intentions  of  the  new  leaders, 
the  initial  period  after  a  coup  could  be  a  time  of  testing  and  probing  the  new 
regime  through  the  fomentation  of  boundary  troubles.  Or  finally,  it could  be 
that  the  newly  installed  elite  in  a  country  will  foment  boundary  conflict  as 
a  means  of  generating  popular  support  and  solidifying  their  domestic  position. 
This  final  explanation  appears  to  be  a  modification  of  the  "safety  valve" 
hypothesis  alluded  to  earlier. 
At  this  point  it should  be  obvious  that  the  "traditional  wisdom"  about 
the  causes  of  boundary  confl ict  provides  the  analyst with  a  complex,  confusing 
and  often  contradictory  set of  propositions  from  which  to  chose.  Indeed, 
several  different  explanations  are  often  given  for  the  same  case  of  conflict. 
Pl ausi ble  explanations  of  the  Soma1 i -Ethiopian  dispute  are  offered  by  referring 
to  the  "safety  val ve"  hypothesis,  the  ethnic  population  overhang  factor or 
the  salience  of  ethnicity  in  domestic  politics.  How  then  are we  to  determine 
which  of  these  propositions  gives  the  most  satisfactory  general  answer  to 
the  puzzles  of  boundary  conflict? 
To  adequately  answer  this  question  some  means  must  be  devised  to  subject 
each  of  these  ideas  to  thorough  and  systeniatic  empirical  testing.  We  must 
compare  each  of  the  propositions  to  "real  world"  data  and  see  which  are  con- 
firmed  by  the  evidence  and  which  do  not  stand  the  test  of empirical  analysis. 
This  is necessary  because  at  their  present  stage  of  development  the  insights 
presented  in the  various  models  represent  little more  that  a  set  of  ideas 
which  previous  analysts  have  gleaned  from  is01 ated  inci dents  of  boundary  con- 
flict  and  which  further  specify factors  which  might  be  at  the  root  of  such 
conflict.  For  the  most  part,  moreover,  these  insights  have  been  based  upon 
case  studies  of boundary  conflict  and  consequently  we  have  little idea  of  their 
genera1  val i di ty.  To  ill ustrate,  ethnic  population  overhang  may  indeed  prove 
to  be  a  significant  factor  in the  generation  of boundary  conflict  in the 
Horn  of  Africa,  but  such  a  conclusion  will  tell  us  little about  the  impact 
of  ethnic  overhang  in the  whole  of Africa.  To  make  a  judgement  about  the 
universal  validity  of  the  postulated  causes  of  conflict on  a  continent-wide 
scale,  a  multicase  analysis  must  be  conducted.  We  must  look  at the  impact 
of such  things  as  ethnic  population  overhang  in as  many  cases  as  is possible 
before  any  definitive  statement  can  be  rendered. 
Thus  if our  knowledge  about  the  factors  which  are  related to  boundary 
conflict  is to  move  beyond  conjecture,  some  means  must  be  devised  to  subject 
our  propositions  to  systematic  mu1 ticase  empi rical  testing.  As  a  first 
step  i n  that  effort  the  propositions  heretofore  presented  must  be  transformed 
into  a  group  of  formal  hypotheses,  the  prerequisite of  rigorous  testing. 
1.  The  greater  the  ethnic  population  overhang  between  a  set  of states. 
the  greater  the  conflict  between  them. 
As  was  mentioned,  this  hypothesis enjoys  the greatest  support  in the 
traditional  1 i terature.  It posits  that  when  an  ethnic  group  is bisected by 
an  artificial  border there  will  be  domestic  disruption.  This  disruption  will 
cause  demands  to  be  placed  upon  the  central  government  of the  state  for  redress 
of  the  situation,  and  these  demands  will  elicit some  form of boundary  related 
foreign  pol icy  formulation.  The  aim of the  foreign  pol icy will  be  to force 
an  adjustment  of  the  border  so  that  the  disrupted  ethnic  group  will  limit  its 
demands.  If this  proposition  is sustained,  some  evidence  will  be  provided  to 
the  effect that  the  African  states  have  been  directly  affected  by  the  legacy  of 
colonial ism  and  owe  much  of  their  current  conflict  to  the  artificiality  of 
thei r boundaries. 
2.  The  greater  the  level  of  domestic  ethnic  fragmentation,  the  lower 
the  level  of  boundarv  conflict. 
This  hypothesis  begins  to  address  the  important  relationship between 
domestic  attributes  and  foreign  policy  behavior.  It has  been  suggested  that 
those  states  which  suffer  from  excessi ve  ethnic  fragmentation  cannot  afford 
to  engage  in foreign  policy  activities,  such  as  conflict over  boundaries, 
which  could  be  interpreted  as  being  favorable  to  any  single  domestic  ethnic 
group  for  fear  of  upsetting  the  domestic  political  equilibrium.  Further,  it 
has  been  suggested  that ethnically  fragmented  states  engage  in irredentist 
activities  only  at  the  risk of opening  a  "Pandora's  box"  of subsequent  claims 
to  territory  in neighboring  states.  Thus  this  hypothesis  seeks  to  determine 
the  extent  to which  a  domestic  attribute,  ethnic  fragmentation,  acts  to  in- 
hibi t boundary  conflict. 
3.  The  greater  the salience  of  ethnic  criteria  in domestic  politics, 
the  greater  the  levels  of boundary  conflict. 
This  hypothesis,  like the  previous  one,  seeks  to  inject domestic  variables 
into  the  analytic  process.  Integral  to  this  statement  is the  idea  that  in a 
domes tic pol i tical  environment  where  ethnic  consi derations  are  of prime  impor- 
tance  the  demands  stemming  from the  presence  of  a  superimposed  border will 
have  a  greater  impact  upon  policy  than  would  have  been  the  case  if ethnic  cri- 
teria  were  not  important  political  variables.  Whereas  decision  makers  could 
perhaps  afford  to  ignore the demands  of an  ethnic  group  if it was  not pol i ti - 
cally  important,  this  tactic  would  hinder  political  stability  if a  premium 
was  placed  upon  ethnic  identification  in domestic  politics. 
4.  The  greater  the  degree  of domestic  instability,  the  greater  the 
levels  of  boundary  conflict. 
This  is a  formal  expression  of  the  "safety  valve"  hypothesis.  In essence 
it posits  that  when  domestic  instability becomes  a  problem  for  a  state's  leaders 
those  leaders  will  seek  to divert  attention  from  internal  tensions  by  creating 
an  external  enemy  to  unify  the population.  In this  case  the  widespread  aware- 
ness  of  the  artificial i ty of  boundaries  on  the  continent makes  boundary  issues 
particularly  1 i kely points  for  the  creation  of an  external  enemy.  All  leaders 
real i ze  that  thei r  boundaries  were  created  by  a1 ien  dip1 omats  during  the  col oni a1 
7eriod  and  share  a  certain  ancunt  of  consensus  about  the  conflict  ooten- 
tial  inherent  in such  a  situation.  Consequently,  when  they  need  an  issue 
to  manipulate  boundary  questions  are  particularly  useful . 
5.  The  greater  the  level  of non-boundary  foreign  policy  conflict  for 
a  state  the  greater  the  level  of boundary  conflict. 
This  proposition  seeks  to  test  the  val idi ty  of  those  observations  which 
postulate  a  linkage  between  the  factors  of  general  foreign  policy  and  boundary 
disputes.  It would  seem  only natural  that  ideologically  hostile  states  would 
engage  in conflictover boundaries  and  that  there  would  be  some  spill-over 
from  the  more  general  domain  of  non-boundary  issues  to  those  of territorial 
concerns.  Gi ven  the  eas i 1 y  nanipul ated character  of boundary  quest ions,  one 
might  even  presume  that  boundary  conflict would  be  more  intense  than  that 
found  i n  non- boundary  areas. 
6.  The  greater  the  disparity  between  size  and  desire  for  status,  the 
greater  the  levels  of boundary  conflict. 
Thi s  hypothesi s  assumes  that  those  states  which  have  pretensions  to 
high  status  in Africa  but whose  physical  capabilities  are  not conmensurate 
with  those  pretensions  will  attempt  to  increase  their  size,  and  hence  their 
capabilities,  through  expansionist  activity.  It could also  be  that  a  suc- 
cessful  spate  of boundary  agitation  will  serve  a symbolic  function,  i .e. , 
that  it will  demonstrate  to others  in Africa  that  a1 though  a  country  may 
be  small  it still  has  the  capability  to  influence others  and  is thus  worthy 
of  high status. 
7.  The  qreater  the  level  of elite  instability,  the greater  the  level 
of boundary  conflict. 
This  hypothesis  posits  a  linkage  between  the  elites  in a  state  and  its 
foreign  pol icy.  Di fferent  analyst s  have  provi ded  various  expl anations  about 
the  manner  in which  turmoil  at the  elite  level  could  lead  to  the  development 
of boundary  conflict.  But  in spite of  this  explanatory  diversity,  many 
agree  that  this  linkage  is an  important  one. 
Before  attempting  to  deal  directly with  the  problems  posed  by  the  need 
to  empirically  and  systematically  test  these  hypotheses,  it is essential  to 
isolate  some  of  the  basic patterns  which  are  implicit  in the  statements. 
It appears  that  boundary  conflict  and  the  stimuli  which  are  thought  to moti- 
vate  it could  be  1 inked  in two  different ways.  Several  of  the  hypotheses 
suggest  a  direct  1 inkage  between  stimul i and  pol icy,  while  others  propose 
that  the  relationship  is more  indirect. 
In the  group  which  suggestsa  direct  linkage,  the  presence  of artificial 
boundaries  serves  as  an  immediate  catalyst  to  conflictual  policy.  To  develop 
this  theme  let us  expand  upon  a  few  points  made  earlier.  Superimposed  boundaries 
create  a  discontinuity  between  the  boundaries  of  the  modern  state  and  those 
of  the  traditional  ethnic  or  ascription  groups  in a  society.  This  discontinuity 
creates  tension  as  the  affected  individuals  are  torn  between  the  demands  of  their 
traditional  groups  and  those  of  the  modern  state.  These  individuals  will,  as  a 
consequence  of  that  tension,  issue  demands  on  the  central  government  to  relieve 
either  the  discontinuity  itself or  the  pressures  which  derive  from  it.  When 
faced  with  a  situation where  significant  elements  of the  polity  are  making  demands 
for  boundary  adjustments,  a  government  obviously  has  a plethora  of  means  through 
which  it can  attempt  to  answer  the  demands,  but  three  general  options  stand  out. 
A  government  can  try  to  lessen  the  popular  pressure  by  relaxing the stringency 
of  its control  over  the  border,  increasing  its permeability,  and  thus  easing  the 
disruptive  impact  of the  boundary.  While  this  option  is one  solution  to  the  problem, 
a  number  of  factors  would  seem  to  blunt  the  viability of such  a  tactic.  While  the 
objective fact  of  independence  may  exist  for  the  African  states,  the psychological 
realization  of  full  independence  may  not yet  have  been  achieved.  As  a  consequence, 
governments  of the black  African  states  are generally  quite  jealous  of the  trappings 
of  soverei gnty.  The  premi um  pl aced  upon  symbol ic aspects  of  independence  deri ves 
from  the  state's  insecurity  and  lack  of  confidence  in its  genuine  autonomy.  Respect 
for  the  symbol i c  aspects  of soverei gnty  thus  serves  to  give  evidence  that  these 
states  are  indeed  fully  independent,  legitimate political  enti ties.  As  control 
over  its  territory  is one  of the  most  overt  manifestations  of independence,  it can 
be  assumed  that  the  first option,  increasing the  permeability  of the  border,  will 
not  be  a  very  attractive  policy  gambit. 
The  second  option  available  to  a  state  which  is faced  with  domestic  boundary 
demands  is that  of stifling dissent  through  coercion.  Once  again,  this  option  may 
not appear  to  be  particularly attractive.  In a  very  real  sense  the  1 imi ted  capa- 
bi 1 i ties  of the  African  states  to apply  widespread  sanctions  will  mi 1 i tate  against 
this  policy.  While  the  military and  police  establishments  of the  various  states 
often  consume  a  disproportionate  amount  of total  government  expendi ture,  these 
organizations  are,  in a-bsolute terms,  of small  size.  A  widespread  campaign  of 
coercive  pressure  could well  overtax  the  military  or police.  This  is particularly 
true  when  one  realizes  that  to  stifle boundary  discontent  and  its consequent  demands 
upon  the  government  more  than  temporarily,  the coercive  measures  would  have  to be 
implemented  over  a  long period  of  time  until  new  identification  patterns  had  time  I 
to  form  and  replace  the  traditional  ones.  To  be  truly  effective  the  appl ication 
of  force  could  not  be  a one  time  affair,  but  rather  would  have  to  be  a  continuous  fl 
process. 
African  governments  might  also  shy  away  from  the coercive  maintainance  of 
boundaries  due  to  the  disruptive  effect  that  such  a  policy  could  have  on  the  domes- 
tic  scene.  It is a well  established postulate  of African  politics  that  major 
threats  to  security  for a  regime  are  not  external  but rather  emanate  from  the  do-  ~ 
mestic  environment: 
It is not  the country  that  is in danger  of  attack  of  conquest, 
but  the  government  that  is in danger  of overthrow  or  collapse. 
Insecurity  is thus  endemic,  inherent,  and  pol i tical  rather 
than  specific,  external  and  mi 1 i tary.25 
As  a  consequence,  the  use  of  domestic  sanctions  in response  to  demands  miqht  appear 
to  be  too  dangerous  a  tactic  if any  other  options  remain  since  it could  result  in 
an  escalation  of  dissent,  aggravate  an  already  disruptive  situation  and  have  the  ef- 
fect of increasing discontent  rather  than  ameliorating  it.  This  action  could  thus 
pose  a  greater  threat  to  the  government's  stability  than  the  original  problem.  ~ 
In contrast  to  the  two  previous  ploys,  the  third option  which  is open  to  the 
African  leaders--  that  of engaging  in some  form  of  foreign  pol icy  interaction with 
a  neighboring  state  to alleviate  the  situation--  seems  to have  a  number  of  positive 
advantages.  This  a1 ternative  is relatively  cheap  to adopt.  The  spectrum  of  foreign 
policy activity  is quite  broad  and  ranges  from  verbal  activity  to actual  physical 
contact.  By  confining  policy  action  to  verbal  activity  alone  problems  can  be  ad-  L 
dressed  without  the  allocation of  funds  or  the  use  of  scarce  resources.  Further, 
foreign  policy  activity  has  great  symbolic  value,  and  the  awareness  of a  population  L 
that  the  government  is,  through  the  medium  of foreign  policy,  attempting  to  adjust 
a  situation  can  serve  to  blunt  the  intensity  of  demands.  This  indirect  satisfaction 
of  demands  can  be  effective whether  or  not  any  substantial  a1 teration  in the  si tua- 
tion  actually  occurs.  As  long  as  the  population believes  that  the  government  is at- 
tempting  to  look  out  for  its interests  the  fervor  of  its demands,  in the  short  run 
at least,  may  diminish. 
Thus  for  those  hypotheses  which  posit  a  direct  linkage  between  the  presence 
of disrupti ve,  superimposed  boundaries  and  confl ict the  pattern  is clear.  Boundaries 
cause  disruption.  This  disruption  leads  to  demands  being made  upon  the  government. 
And  the  government  chases to  respond  to  those  demands  through  the  medium  of  foreign 
nolicy  conflict with  a  neighbor.  As  a  consequence  the  hypotheses  which  fall  within 
this  general  category  include variables  which  are  the  product  of  the  peculiar  sort 
of  boundaries  which  are  found  in Africa:  ethnic  population  overhang,  ethnic  fragmen- 
tation  and  the  salience  of ethnic  politics. 
Another  set  of  statements  specify  a  more  indirect  relationship  between 
boundaries  and  policy.  For  this  group  conflict  derives  not  so  much  from  the  specific 
imgact  of  boundaries  upon  the  lives  of  individuals  or  the  environment  as  from 
the  impact  that  the  boundary  situation  has  had  upon  the perceptions  and  views  of 
African  decision  makers.  Boundaries  in Africa  are  recogni zed  by pol icy makers 
to  be  the  creation  of  a1 ien  diplomats,  and  the  potential  for  disruption  felt  to 
be  inherent  in such  a  situation  is also widely  accepted.  Thus  the subjective 
awareness  of  the  artificial  character  of  Africa's  boundaries  is a  major  component 
of  an  African  leader's  view  of continental  affairs.  Believing boundaries  to be 
artificial,  and  aware  of the  disruption  inherent  in this  situation,  the African 
leaders  see  boundary  issues  as  ones  which  are  quite easily  seized  upon  when  conflict 
with other states  can  help  in the  pursuit  of their  individual,  domestic  or inter- 
national  goals. 
Therefore  when  the African  states  need  an  issue  to  manipulate,  for whatever 
reasons,  the  objecti ve  fact  of  the existence  of arti ficial , superimposed  boundaries 
as  well  as  the  wide-spread  subjective  awareness  of this  situation  make  boundary 
questions  a  most  likely focal  point  for  the  articulation  of  that  issue.  Within  this 
category  the  relationship  between  boundaries  and  policy  is obviously  much  less  di- 
rect  than  was  the  case  in the  previous  group  since  the  stimuli  which  elicit  foreign 
policy  dctivity  are  not  necessarily  directly  related  to  the  presence  of artificial 
boundaries.  Hence  the  variables  which  are  included  in this  group  are  such  factors 
as  el i te  instability,  domestic  instability,  non-boundary  conflict  and  the  size- 
status  relationship. 
Hypothesis  Testinq 
Mi th  these  comments  in mind  it is necessary  to  address  the  problems  presented 
when  attempting  to  test,  in an  empi rical  manner,  the previously  elaborated  hypothe- 
ses.  The  first  step  in a  testing process  requires  that  the  variables  in the  hypo- 
thesis  be  operationalized;  that  is that  they  be  transformed  into a  measurable  form. 
For  example,  to  assess  the  relationship  between  ethnic  fragmentation  and  boundary 
conflict  for  a  set  of states  it is necessary  to  develop  a  numerical  index  of the 
level  of ethnic  fragmentation  within  each  country  and  to  construct  a  similar  index 
for  the  level  of  boundary  conflict  in each  ca5e.  Once  this  has  been  done  it will 
be  possible  to  correlate  ethnic  fragmentation  with  conflict  and  let  the  strencth 
of  the  observed  relationship indicate  the  validity  of  that  hypothesis  which  links 
the  two  variables. 
To  this  end  the  independent  variables  in the  hypotheses  were  given  numerical 
val ues  by  fol lowing  we1 1  establ ished  procedures  for  the  construction  of  cornposi te 
measures  of  such  variables .26  Briefly,  several  quantitative  indicators  were 
selected  as  potential  measures  for  each  independent  variable.  The  statistical 
technique  of  factor  analysis  was  then  used  to  determine  which  of  these  potential 
i ndi ca tors  appeared  to  be  val id represen tati ves  of each  vari abl e,  and  then  those 
which  did  demonstrate  their  relationship  to  the  underlying  independent  variable 
were  combined  to  give  a  composite  numerical  value  for  all  variables  in each 
African  state.27  For  example,  the  number  of  riots,  the  number  of anti-government 
demonstrations  and  the  number  of  deaths  resul ting  from  domestic  unrest  were  taken 
as  indicators  of  domestic  instability.  By  aggregating  these  values  for  each 
country,  it was  possible  to  develop  a  measure  for  that  concept  in all  cases.  The 
same  process  was  repeated  for  each  independent  vari abl e  in the  hypotheses , and 
we  were  thus  able  to  arrive at  an  expl ici t numerical  value  for  each  African  state 
on  each  of the  factors specified  above.28 
A  different  strategy  had  to  be  adopted  in the  operationalization  of  boundary 
conflict  since  foreign  pol icy activity  does  not  have  any  readily  apparent  quanti- 
tati ve  indicators.  Fortunately,  an  innovative  form  of  data  generation,  events  - 
data,  has  been  developed which  allows  scholars  to  specify  the  vol ume  and  content 
of  foreign  policy interaction  between  a  set  of  states.  Students  of African 
foreign  policy  are  fortunate  that  one  of  the  most  elaborate  and  complete  events 
data  collections  yet  constructed,  the  AFRICA  data  file*,  uses  the black  African 
countries  as  its sample  group.  With  this  data  it was  possible  to  categorize 
and  measure  the  frequency  of African  boundary  confl i ct .29 
The  AFRICA  events  data  also  gives  us  a  more  thorough  inventory  of  boundary 
conflict  than  would  have  been  the  case  if a  more  traditional  technique  had  been 
adopted.  Most  analyses  of  boundary  conflict  isolate  only  the  extreme,  highly 
visable  acts  of overt  physical  or  verbal  conflict.  However,  it would  seem  that 
there  is more  to  boundary  conflict  than  just  the  spectacular  event.  We  need  to 
look  at the  routine  event  as  we1 1  as  the  spectacular  one--  the negative  comment 
*Discussed  in detail  in the  chapter  by  P.  J.  McGowan  and  T.  H.  Johnson  in this 
book. 
as  well  as  the  armed  clash--  and  events  data  will  tap  more  of  these  routine 
events.  We  thus  have  a  more  thorough  and  adequate  representation  of  boundary 
confl ict with  events  data  than  would  have  otherwise  been  the  case. 
Once  the  independent  and  dependent  variables  found  in the  hypotheses  were 
o~erationalized the  relationships  in them  could  be  empi rically tested  using 
simple  bi -variate  correlation.  Correlation  analysis  indicates  the  degree  to 
which  a  pair  of  variables  in an  hypothesis  co-vary.  That  is,  it shows  the 
degree  to which  a  rise  in for  example,  ethnic  fragmentation,  is accompanied 
by  a  rise  in boundary  conflict.  If the  correlation  coefficient  (which  ranges 
 fro^  +1.00  to  -1.00)  is larger  than  +.30  or  -.30,  a  relationship  of moderate 
strength  is  indicated and  our  confidence  in the  validity  of the  hypothesis 
is  increased.  It is also  important  to  note the  direction  of  the  correlation 
which  is indicated  by  the  sign  of  the  coefficient.  If we  have  a  moderate-to- 
strong  positive  relationship  (+.30  to +1.00)  it means  that  a  rise  in the  level 
of  the  independent  variable  is accompanied  by  a  rise  in the  level  of  the  depen- 
dent  one.  Conversely,  a  moderate-to-strong  negative  relationship  (-.30  to  -1.00) 
indicates  that  a  rise  in the  level  of  the  independent  variable  is associated 
with a  fall  in the  level  of  the  dependent  variable.  The  results  of  the  hypothesis 
testing  process  are  presented  in Table  1. 
TABLE  1 
CORRELATION  COEFFICIENTS 
I nde~enden  Dependent  Hypothesis  Correlation 
Variable  (A)  Variable  (B)  Category  (A)  with  (B) 
Ethnic  Population  Boundary  Di rec t  +. 07 
Overhang  Conflict 
Ethnic  Boundary  Di rec t  +.I6 
Fragmentation  Conflict 
Domestic  Boundary  Indi rect  - .38 
Instability  Conflict 
Non- boundary  Boundary  Indirect  +.08 
Conflict  Conflict 
Si ze-Status  Boundary  Indi rect  -. 38 
Relationship  Conflict 
El i te  Boundary  Indi rect  +.54 
Instabi 1 i ty  Conflict 
Salience  of  Boundary  Di rect  +.31 
Ethnic  Politics  Conflict 
The  results  indicate  that  four  cf  the  seven  hypotheses  could  be  verified 
at moderate  levels  of confidence.30  Domestic  instability,  the  size-status 
relationship,  elite  instability  and  the  sdience  of ethnic  politics  all  seem 
to  have  a relationship  to  boundary  conflict.  The  remainins  variables,  while 
mentioned  in the  traditional  literature  on  boundary  conflict,  do  not  show 
much  relationship  to  confl ict when  eval uated  in an  empirical , systematic, 
mu1 ti-case  manner. 
The  strength  of  the  relationship  between  conflict  and  the  salience  of 
ethnic  politics  indicates  that  there  is a  slight  tendency  for  states  that  have 
politically  important  domestic  ethnic  groups  to  engage  in boundary  conflict. 
This  would  seem  compatible  with  an  intuitive assessment  of the  dynamics  of 
boundary  conflict  since  it is reasonable  to  expect  that  a  state whose  domestic 
environment  places  a  premium  on  ethnicity  would  be  more  likely to  respcnd  to 
demands  issued by  such  a  group.  Moreover,  the  relative weakness  of  this 
correlation  is not  surprising,  for  while  there  may  be  a  number  of  African 
states  where  ethnicity  is an  important  political  factor,  it is not  likely 
that  there are  many  in which  an  ethnic  group  is both  politically  important  and 
directly  affected  by  boundary  disruption.  Were  we  to  confine  the analysis  to 
those  states  where  key  ethnic  groups  are bisected  by  a  national  border,  such  as 
Somalia  or Togo,  the strength  of the  relationship would  probably  be  much  greater. 
In this  regard  it is interesting  to  note  the  lack  of correlation  between 
population  overhang  and  conflict.  It appears  that  it is not  the  specific 
rmgnitude  of ethnic  population  overhang which  is the  causal  factor  in the  generation 
of boundary  conflict,  but  rather  the  crucial  variable  seems  to  be  whether  the 
demands  of the  affected  group  are  deemed  to be  politically  salient.  This  is an 
important  point  which  seems  to  have  been  missed  by  many  previous  analysts  of 
boundary  confl ict. 
Our  analysis  also indicates  that  there  is a moderate  correlation between 
the  size  and  status  of  an  African  state  and  its propensity  to engage  in boundary 
conflict.  While  the  magnitude  of  the  correlation signals  a  moderately  strong 
relationship between  the  t.wo  factors,  the  di recti on  of the  correlation  (negative) 
imp1 ies  that  cur  original  hypothesis--  which  posited  that  the  high-status, 
small-side  states  wtiuld  be  prone  to  engage  i n  boundary  conflict--  is in Error. 
Insi,ead,  it appears  that  large  stztes  which  have  little status  in the African 
comnunity  are  more  likely to fomen:  bocndary  conflict.  A  more  va1 id proposi ;;ion 
lirking the  t.wo  variables  would  thus  read:  "Large  states  with  little status  in 
Africa  are-more  1 i kely  to  engage  in boundary  conflict. " 
It could  be  that  those  large African  states  which  are  given  little 
status  by  their  fellow  states  on  the  continent  seek  to  increase  their  status 
by  initiating expansionist  policy.  Such  policy  might  be  calculated  to  demon- 
strate  the  power  of  the  large  state  and  to  convince  other  African  nations  that 
it deserves  greater  recognition  in African  affairs.  In any  case,  while  this 
finding  contradicts  the  traditional  1 i terature  on  African  boundary  confl ict, 
it is consistent  with  at least  one  other  investigation of  the  impact  of  size 
and  status  on  state  behavior.  Maurice  East  has  found  that  large,  underdeveloped 
(and  hence  low  status)  nations  tend  to  engage  in more  general  foreign  policy 
conflict  than  any  other  type  of state.31  Thus,  the  African  states  differ 
little from  others  in the  international  system  in this  regard. 
The  strongest  of  the  correlations  was  between  elite  instability  and 
boundary  conflict.  A  number  of  possible  explanations  for  this  phenomena 
were  offered  earlier  in this  chapter.  The  question  then  arises,  which  of  the 
possible  explanations  are  the  most  viable?  Changes  in African  1 eadershi p 
are  often  accompanied  by  an  a1 teration  in the  prevail ing ideologies,  atti tudes 
and  views  of the decision  making  elites  in the  unstable  states.  We  have 
mentioned  that  such  an  alteration  in the  status  quo  could  lead  to  a reversal 
in any  pre-existing  climate  of  foreign  policy  amity.  However,  there  seems  to 
be  one  major  flaw  in this  explanation.  It may  well  be  that  elite changes 
transform  peaceful  relationships  into confl ictual  ones,  but would  elite 
instabil i ty  not  a1 so  transform  confl ictual  relationships  into peaceful  ones? 
In the  long run  it would  seem  that  such  changes  in the  tone  of  foreign  policy 
caused  by  elite instability would  cancel  each  other out  and  the  strength  of 
the  correlation would  diminish  accordingly. 
The  two  remaining  explanations  therefore  seem  more  plausible.  Turmoi 1 
at  the  hi ghest  levels  of government  reduces  the  predictabil i ty of an  unstable 
state's  foreign  pol icy.  When  an  established elite  is removed  from power,  by 
whatever  means,  those  states  which  have  been  interacting with  the  outgoing 
el i tes  are  no  longer  dealing  with  a  knownquanti ty whose  probable  reaction  to 
any  pol icy  initiative  can  be  gauged  with  accuracy.  A  need  may  thus  arise  for 
tes ti ng  and  probi ng  the  newly  establ i shed  government  i n order  to di scern  their 
mode  of  operation  and  to  determine  the  1 imi ts  of acceptable  foreign  pol icy 
action.  Neighboring  countries  may  therefore  seize  upon  such  an  opportunity 
to  foment  boundary  confl ict,  an  issue  which  is quit?  at:ienabl  e  to  manipulation 
when  the  exigencies  of  the  times  demand,  in order  to  test  the  new  elites. 
It  is also  possible  to  postulate  that  the  "safety  vahe"  hypothesis  has 
some  relevance  for  elite  instability  as  well  as  for  general  social  unrest. 
As  elites  change,  new  leaders  could  seek  to  secure  the  support  of  their  popu- 
lation by  creating  an  external  enemy  with  the  manipulation  of boundary  issues. 
A  good  deal  of  credence  is lent  to  this  explanation  by  the  fact  that  the 
hypothesis  1 inking  domestic  turmoil  and  conflict was  also  confirmed  by  the 
data  analysis.  If leaders  of a  state  have  used  the  fomentation  of boundary 
issues  to  offset  one  form  of instability,  it is quite  likely  that  the  same 
strategy  would  be  used  by  elites  in an  attempt  to secure  their  position  of 
power.  The  convergence  of  these  two  veri f i ed  hypothese s  seems  to  prov' je 
added  empirical  support  to  the  safety  valve  proposition  in both  situations. 
Before  attempting  to draw  some  general  conclusions  from  the  analysis, 
it is important  to  consider the  hypotheses  which  were  not  verified.  The 
lack  of  support  for  the  ethnic  population  overhang  hypothesis  has  already  been 
cited,  but  how  could  it be  that  an  apparently  invalid hypothesis  could  generate 
enough  support  to  become  almost  axiomatic  in the  literature as  an  explanation 
for  conflict?  Of  course  there  are  a  multitude  of  possible  explanations  for 
this,  but  the  most  straightforward  one  involves a  comparison  of the  data  base 
in this  study  with  those  of  previous  analysts. 
Whereas  the  present  work  has  attempted  to base  its conclusions  on  a 
thorough  and  systematic  analysis  of  the  32  black  African  states,  most  previous 
studies  have  been  idiographic  in nature;  that  is,  they  have  formed  conclusions 
on  the  analysis  of  a  single  case  of boundary  conflict.  When  a  single  case 
forms  the  sole  base  for  analysis  it is often  possible  that  factors  unique  to 
that  case  are  accorded general  validity.  This  seems  to  be  a  particularly  acute 
problem  in the  ethnic  population  overhang  example  since  previous  works  have 
not only  been  based  upon  a  single  case,  but  the  majority  of  them  have  also 
been  based  upon  the  same  case,  that  of  the  relations  between  Somalia,  Kenya 
and  Ethiopia  in the  Horn  of Africa.  It is this particular  case  where  ethnic 
population  overhang,  by  the  Soma1 i people,  appears  to  have  had  the  most  im- 
mediate  impact  upon  policy.  Therefore  these  studies  have  tended  to  reify  the 
importance  of  population  overhang  and  this  factor  has  been  accorded  almst 
universal  validity. 
It is also  interesting  to  note  that  conflict  in the  general  sense  has 
1 i ttle  relationship  to boundary  conflict.  It is almost  intuitively  obvious 
that  if states  engage  in general  foreign  policy  conflict  they  will  also  tend 
to  conflict  over  boundaries,  but  again  this  does  not  seem  to  be  the  case. 
Perhaps  such  a  finding  indicates  that  African  leaders  make  an  irnplici t or 
expl ici t  distinction  between  boundary  confl ict and  other  types  of foreign 
pol icy conflict.  Besides  providing additional  justification  for  an  investi- 
gation  of  boundary  confl ict,  this  a1 so  seems  to  partial ly veri fy  our  contention 
that  the  politics  of boundaries  occupies  an  important  and  unique  place  in the 
cognitive  and  operational  milieux  of African  leaders.  It also  indicates  that 
when  conflict over  boundaries  is  fomented,  such  action  is designed  to  further 
very  special  needs  and  goals  of  the  state. 
We  now  have  a  rather  comprehensive  inventory  of the  factors  which  serve 
as  specific  catalysts  for  boundary  conflict,  and  we  have  also  been  able  to 
discard  some  of  the  variables  which  have  incorrectly  been  surmised  to  cause 
conflict.  We  can  say,  with  some  confidence,  that  elite  instability,  general 
domestic  turmoil,  the  salience  of ethnicity  in domestic  politics  and  the desire 
for  status  by  large  states  are  determinants  of  boundary  confl ict.  Conversely, 
ethnic  population  overhang,  ethnic  fragmentation  and  non-boundary  conflict have 
1 i ttle  relationship  to  boundary  tensions.  But what  larger  generalizations  are 
possible from  these  results?  What  overall  patterns are  discernable  in the  data? 
It is possible  to make  a  tentative  judgement  about  the  relative  potencies 
of  internal  and  external  sources  of boundary  pol icy.  At  independence  i t was 
widely  assumed  that  domestic  factors  would  be  of paramount  importance  to  African 
leaders  as  they  formulated  foreign  pol icy.  In the  immediate  post-independence 
era  i t was  fel t that  the  rnos t pressi ng  problems  for  the  African states  would 
1 ie  in the  areas  of  domestic  consol idation,  national  integration,  institution 
building  and  the  like.  As  a  consequence,  when  foreign  policy was  initiated, 
it would  be  designed  to support  and  further  these  pressing  domestic  goals  and 
pri ori ties: 
The  determi nants  of  foreign  pol icy  in the  new  African states 
are  often  obscured  because  the  di sti nction  between  foreign 
and  domestic  policy  is often  difficult to  establish.  Activities 
and  decisions  which  on  the  surface  fa1 1  within  the  realm of foreign 
policy  may  well  be  designed  as  much  or  more  for  internal  consumption 
as  for  their  effect on  relations  with  other  states.32 
The  personalization  of  African  pol itics was  also  thought  to  reinforce  the salience 
of  domestic  factors  in  foreign  policy  formulation.  As  the  African  states 
moved  toward  one-party  government,  decision  making  authority  for  both  domestic 
and  international  questions  became  centralized  in  the  hands  of  a  single  leader 
or  a  small  coterie  of  his  followers.  These  leaders  had  a  primary  concern  with 
securing  their  positions  of  power  within  the  state,  and  foreign  pol icy  thus 
was  more  likely  to  be  a  reflection  of  that  domestic  concern. 
Similarly,  the  lack  of  bureaucratization  within  the  foreign  pol icy 
establishments  of  the  new  African  states  was  felt  to  increase  the  salience 
of  domestic  factors.  The  lack  of  a  well  developed  foreign  policy  bureaucracy 
made  the  gathering  of  accurate  information  about  the  external  environment 
difficult  to  accomplish.  With  no  clear  view  of  the external  situation  those 
factors  which  could  be  more  easily  gauged--  domestic  forces--  assumed  5-eater 
importance. 
While  such  arguments  seem  compel1 ing,  not  all  analysts  shared  these 
conclusions,  and  some  concluded  that  external  factors  were  of  equal  if  not 
greater  importance  in  determinina  the  content  of  African  forei gn  no1 icy. 
Zartman  succinctly  surrmarizes  this  viewpoint  in  the  following  statement: 
A1 though  there  may  be  some  relation  between  domestic  and 
foreign  politics,  there  is  frequently  too  little relation 
between  domstic  and  foreign  policies.  Western  African 
relations  are  anything  but  "domestic  pol icy  pursued  by  other 
means  ... carried  out  beyond  the  boundaries  of  the  state ...." 
For  the  most  part,  intra-African  foreign  policy  has  little 
to  do  with  domestic  needs  or  purposes.  Instead,  it is often 
an  exercise  in  pure  politics--  a  struggle  for  external  in- 
fluence  for  its own  sake ... .33 
Thus  this  author  would  seem  to  discount  the  1 inkage  between  domestic  factors 
and  foreign  policy.  Instead,  he  stresses  the  leader's  desire  for  power  in 
the  international  environment  as  a  motivating  force. 
Fortunately,  our  research  sheds  some  light  upon  this  controversy  and, 
for  boundary  pol i tics  at least,  indicates  that  internal  factors  do  indeed 
exhibit  the  greatest  correlation  with  foreign  policy.  While  only  one  of  the 
three  hypotheses  which  incl ude  external  variables  coul d  be  confi rmed,  three 
of  the  four  remaining  internal  factors  produced  significant  correlations. 
We  can  thus  affirm  the  accuracy  of  those  who  have  isolated  domestic  factors 
as  crucial  in  the  generation  of  foreign  policy  activity. 
Perhaps  the  most  significant  general  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  the  data 
analysis  concerns  the  nature  of  the  relationship  between  the  colonial  heritage 
and  con temporary  probl ems.  Recall  that  the  various  hypotheses  were  di chotorni zed 
into  direct  and  indirect  groupings.  Hypotheses  in the  direct  category 
represented  immediate  1 i nkages  between  the  arti ficial i ty of  African  boundaries 
and  contemoorary  confl ict.  If the  nany  previous  assumptions  about  the  magnitude 
of  colonialism's  impact  upon  the  foreign  and  domestic  policies  of  the  African 
states  are  to  be  sustained,  one  would  expect  that  the  majority  of  valid hypo- 
theses  about  the  correlates  of  boundary  conflict  would  fall  within  this  group. 
To  sustain  the  proposition  that  colonial  actions are  at  the  root  of current 
problems,  it must  be  demonstrated  that  an  artifact of  colonialism  (like arti- 
ficial  boundaries)  served  as  a  specific  catalyst  to  modern  intra-African  con- 
fl ict.  Because  the  direct  hypotheses  represent  this  immediate  1 inkage  between 
boundary  conf 1 ict and  artificial  boundaries--  because  the  variables  speci fied 
in the  direct  hypotheses  impel  the  various  African  states  to  act--  it is these 
propositions which  must  be  confirmed  to  validate  the  suspected  link  between 
colonialism  and  modern  problems.  Among  the  original  hypotheses  there  is a 
rather  even  split  between  the  two  categories  (four  hypotheses  in the  indirect 
group  and  three  in the  direct)  but  three  of  the  four  verified  statements  fell 
within  the  indirect  group.  Such  a  finding  seems  to  indicate  that  rather 
than  being  compelled  to engage  in boundary  conflict  by  the  endemic  disruption 
of  boundary  artificiality,  African  leaders  tend  to  manipulate  the  potentiality 
for  confl ict latent  in the  boundary  situation when  the  exigencies  of  the  times 
demand.  If faced  with  elite instabi 1 i ty,  domestic  turmoi 1  or  a  perceived  need 
to  increase  thei r status,  the  African  leaders  seize  upon  boundary  questions  as 
a  means  of attempting  to  improve  their  various  positions.  Further,  it is 
possible  to  conclude  from  this  that  the  impact  of  colonial ism  on  the  modern 
African  scene  is more  indirect  that  heretofore  suspected.  In the  case  of  boundary 
problems  and  conflict  the  impact  of  the  colonial  legacy  has  not compelled  the 
states  of Africa  to  fight,  but rather  it has  created a  situation  in which  the 
African  leaders  can  exercise a wider  latitude of policy  choice  than  would  have 
been  the  case  if the  continent's  boundaries  were  of a  more  natural  configuration. 
In all  probability  boundary  disputes  and  the  politics  of boundaries  will 
continue  to  be  an  important  aspect  of  intra-African  foreign  pol icy activity. 
If past  patterns hold  up,  boundary  problems  may  be  an  outgrowth  of  domestic 
turmoil  as  the  decision  makers  attempt  to create a  set  of external  enemies 
against  which  to  rally  the  ~opulation.  In  a  similar  manner,  when  elites  in 
a  country  become  unstable,  when  rulers  have  reason  to  suspect  that  their 
tenure  in  power  is  threatened,  boundary  troubles  could  follow  as  those 
leaders  seize  upon  the  ever  present  boundary  situation  as  a  means  of  generat- 
ing  support  for their  leadership.  It  is also  probable  that  if  politically 
important  ethnic  groups  demand  a  boundary  adjustment, foreign  pol icy  confl ict 
will  be  the  result.  And  finally,  it is  quite  likely  that  large  states  which 
feel  that  they  are  not  accorded  sufficient  status  in  the  African  community 
will  attempt  to  use  boundary  issues  as  a  means  of  demonstrating  their  capa- 
bilities  in  hopes  that  such  action will  convince  other  states  that  they  are 
worthy  of  greater  consideration  in  continental  affairs. 
In  a  more  general  vein,  it is  likely that  domestic  factors  will  continue 
to  have  primacy  in  this  facet  of  African  foreign  policy.  Perhaps  as  the  foreign 
pol icy  bureaucracies  of  the  states  become  more  entrenched  and  sophisticated, 
or  if  African  pol i tics  should  become  less  personalized,  external  factors  will 
come  to  exert a  greater  influence  on  the  formulation  of  pol icy. 
And  finally,  while  the  impact  of  the  colonial  past  on  contemporary  Africa 
cannot  be  denied,  the  immediacy  of  the  linkage  between  the  past  and  the  present 
problems  of  foreign  relations  is  likely  to  be  less  apparent  than  some  analysts 
would  have  us  believe.  If  boundary  politics  are  in  any  way  typical  of  the  full 
range  of  African  foreign  policy  behavior,  the  colonial  legacy  will  not  cause 
modern  conflict  as  much  as  it will  provide  a  rationale,  or  perhaps  an  excuse, 
for  action  when  the  situation  demands. 
END  NOTES 
1  Harold  Sprout  and  Margaret  Sprout,  "Environmental  Factors  in the  Study 
of  International  Relations,"  in James  N.  Rosenau,  ed.,  International 
Politics  and  Foreign  Policy  (New  York:  Free  Press,  1966),  p.  43. 
2  Joseph  C.  Anene,  The  International  Boundaries  of Nigeria  (London:  Long- 
mans,  1970),  p.  3. 
3  Rupert  Emerson,  "Nation  Building  in Africa,"  in Karl  Deutsch  and  William 
J.  Fol tz,  eds.,  Nation  Building  (New  York:  Atherton  Press,  1963),  p.  105. 
4  I. William  Zartman,  "The  Foreign  and  Military Politics  of African  Boundary 
Problems,"  in C.  G.  Widstrand,  ed.,  African  Boundary  Problems  (Upsal la: 
Scandinavian  Insti tute of African  Studies,  1969),  p.  79. 
5  2..  Pounds,  Pol i tical  Geography  (New  York,  1963),  pp.  61 -65. 
6  Ravi  Kapil , "On  the  Confl ict Potential  of  Inherited Boundaries  in Africa," 
World  Politics  18  (1966):  656. 
7  Zartman,  "Politics,"  p.  82;  Kapil,  "Conflict  Potential,"  pp.  665-666; 
R.  Mansell  Prothero,"  North  East  Africa:  A  Pattern  of Conflict."  in 
R.  M.  Prothero,  ed.,  Geography  of Africa  (New  York:  Praeger,  1969), 
p.  201;  and  Saadia  Touval,  "The  Sources  of Status  Quo  and  Irredentist 
Pol icies ," in Widstrand,  ed.,  Boundary  Problems,  pp.  11 5-1 16. 
8  Zartman,  "Politics,"  p.  82. 
9  Adekunle  Ajala,  Pan  Africanism  (New  York:  St.  Martin's  Press,  1974). 
10  Prothero,  "Pattern  of Conflict,"  p.  157. 
11  Touval,  "Status  Quo,"  p.  117. 
12  Kapi 1,  "Conflict  Potential ," pp.  672-673  and  Touval , "Status  Quo,"  p.  109. 
13  Not  all  analysts  accept  this  contention.  Indeed  many  deny  that  Somalia 
is a  cohesive  state.  While  a1 1  of its citizens  are  Somal is,  and  while  the 
government  does  justify  its irredentist  claims  by  saying  that  it wishes  to 
unite  all  Somalis,  close  observers  have  noted  that  there  are  several  kinship 
groups  in the  Somal i Republic  which  function  as  competing  and  conflicting 
ethnic  groups.  As  shall  be  seen  in the next  few  pages,  these  analysts  explain 1 
Soma1 ia's  pol icy on  the  basis  of domestic  ethnic  political  competition.  See, 
I  for example,  A.  A.  Castagano,  "The  Soma1 i-Kenyan  Controversy:  Implications 
for  the  Future,"  Journal  of Modern  African  Studies  2  (1964):  165-188. 
1  14  Ibid.,  p.  165. 
I  15  Ibid. 
16  Kwame  Nkrumah,  Neo-Colonialism  (New  York:  International  Publishers,  1965). 
Touval,  "Status  QUO," p.  116;  Castagano,  "Controversy,"  p.  533;  and 
Zartman,  "Pol itics ," p.  87. 
Touval,  "Status  Quo,"  p.  117. 
Castagano,  "Controversy,"  p.  534. 
Touval,  "Status  Quo,"  p.  117. 
A.  Alliott,  "Boundaries  and  Law  in Africa,"  in Widstrand,  ed.,  Boundary 
Problems,  p.  19.;  Touval,  "Status  Quo,"  p.  113;  and  Zartman,  "Politics," 
p.  88. 
Zartrnan,  "Politics,"  p.  88. 
Ibid,  p.  87. 
Ibid. 
I.  William Zartman,  International  Relations  in the  New  Africa  (Englewood 
Cliffs:  Prentice  Hall,  1966),  p.  49. 
The  two-step  factor  analysis  method  was  used  to  demonstrate  the  convergent 
and  discriminant  val idi  of  the  indicators  for  each  variable.  See  Dona1 d 
T.  Campbell  and  Donald  W.  Fiske,  "Convergent  and  Discriminant  Validation 
by  the  ilul tiTrai t-Mu1 tiMethod  Matrix,"  Psychological  Bul letin 56  (March 
1959),  for a  discussion  of  this  approach.  See  Patrick  McGowan  and  R.  Lewis, 
"Cul ture  and  Foreign  Pol icy Behavior  in Black  Africa ," (Paper  presented 
at  the  American  Pol i tical  Science  Association  Annual  Meeting,  1973).  for 
an  application of  this  technique.  And  see  J.  Barron  Boyd,  Jr., "The  Deter- 
minants  of Boundary  Related Foreign  Pol icy  in Africa,"  (Unpubl ished  PhD 
Dissertation,  University  of  South  Carolina,  1975),  for a  complete  discus- 
sion  of  the  methodology  used  in this  particular  operationalization  process. 
For  a  comprehensible  discussion  of  factor  analysis,  see  R.J.  Rummel,  "Un- 
derstanding  Factor Analysis,"  Journal  of Conflict  Resolution  (1967). 
Data  for  the  operational i zation  of the  variables  domestic  instabi 1 i ty, 
ethnic  fragmentation,  the  sal ience  of ethnic  pol itics and  elite  instabil- 
i ty was  selected  from  Donald  G.  Morrison,  ~t.. . , Black  Africa:  A  Com- 
parati ve  Handbook  (New  York:  Free  Press,  1972).  The  specific  indicators 
for  these  variables  are  as  follows: 
Domestic  Instability; 
Communal  i ns tabi 1 i ty 
Turmoi 1 
Intensi ty of  violence 
Ethnic  Fragmentation; 
Largest  ethnic  unit  as  a  7;  of  total  population 
Principles  of  reckoning  descent 
Settlement  patterns 
Hierarchy  above  fami ly 
Type  of  authori ty sys tern 
Sal ience  of  Ethnic  Pol i tics; 
Number  of  political  parties 
Legislative  fractionalization 
Percentage  vote  cast  for winning  party in pre- 
independence  election. 
Elite  Instability; 
Cabinet  resignations  and  dismissals 
Elite  instability. 
Idon-boundary  conflict  was  measured  through  a  factor  analysis  of  Patrick 
McGowants  AFRICA  events  data  project.  The  entire  data  set  was  factor 
analyzed  and  those  events  which  appeared  on  a  conflict  factor  were  com- 
bined  to  form  the  final  index.  Ethnic  population  overhang  was  measured 
by  a  close  analysis  of  the  ethnic  patterns  tables  for  contiquous  coun- 
tries  found  in the  Black  Africa  ~ahdbook.  Evidence  of ethnic  popula- 
tion overhang  was  noted  and  the  number  of  individuals  on  either  side 
of  the  border  was  recorded.  The  population  figures  for  groups  transcending 
state  borders  were  transformed  into a  total  population overlap  index  with 
the  fol 1 owing  formul a : 
where  POI=  population  overhang  index 
El=  the  larger  ethnic  unit 
ES= the  smaller  ethnic  unit 
N=  the  total  number  ethnic  units  bisected  by  the  border. 
Status  was  measured  by  computing  the  ratio of  foreign  policy events  sent 
to  those  received by  a  state.  This  method  of measuring  status  is based 
upon  a  communications  model  and  assumes  that  those  states  with  greater 
status  will  tend  to receive  more  comnunications,  through  the  medium  of 
foreign  pol icy,  than  they  send.  See  Steven  J.  Brams,  "The  Structure  of 
Infl uence  Re1 ationships  in the  International  System,"  in James  N.  Rosenau, 
ed. , International  Politics  and  Foreiqn  Pol icy  (New  York:  Free  Press, 
1069),  pp.  583-599.  Once  status  was  measured,  it was  a  rather  simple 
matter  to  construct  a  size  to  status  ratio figure  for  each  state.  These 
independent  variables  were  intercorrelated,  and  no  evi dence  of mu1 ti- 
col ineari ty was  observed. 
29  A  composite  index  for  boundary  conflict  in each  case  was  constructed  by 
factor  analyzing  the  boundary  conflict  data  in the  AFRICA  file.  Those 
acts  which  appeared  on  a  conflict  dimension  were  used  in the  computation 
of  a  boundary  conflict  index  for  each  state. 
30  The  analysis  is based  upon  the  22  black  African states  which  had  some 
form  of  boundary  conflict  during the  1964-1961  period. 
31  Maurice  East,  "Size  and  Foreign  Policy  Behavior,"  World  Politics  25  (1974): 
556-576. 
32  L.  Gray  Cowan,  "Political  Determinants,"  in Vernon  McKay,  ed.,  African 
Diplomacy  (New  York:  Praeger,  1966),  p.  120. 
33  Zartman,  International  Relations,  p.  53. 
THE  AF9ICA  PROJECT  AND  THE  COMPARATIVE  STUDY  OF  AFRICAN 
FOREIGN  POLICY 
Patrick  J.  McGowan,  University  of  Southern  California 
Thomas  H.  Johnson,  Uni versi ty of  Southern  Cal i fornia 
In this  chapter  we  wish  to  describe  the  methods  and  some  findings  of 
the  African  Foreign  Relations  and  International  Conflict  Analysis  (AFRICA) 
Project as  they  relate  to  the  comparative  study  of African foreign  policy. 
Because  the  AFRICA  project  uses  a  research  strategy  based  on  recent  advances 
in research  methods  for  the  comparati ve  description  and  explanation of forei gn 
policy  behavior,  it is important  to  discuss  briefly a  number  of the  assumptions 
and  technical  aspects  of our  approach  before we  review  the  contributicqs  of 
this  project to  our  understanding  of African  international  relations. 
Method01 ogi cal  and  Conceptual  Concerns 
Among  the  major  objectives  of the  discipline  of international  relations 
(IR)  are  the  description,  explanation  and  evaluation  of the  behavior  of 
international  and  transnational  actors  within  the  mu1 tidimensional  inter- 
national  system.  Unl i ke  many  physicists  and  chemists  in their  laboratories, 
the  international  relations  scholar  cannot  observe  first-hand  or experimental- 
ly manipulate  most  of the  more  intriguing and  important  events  that  occur  in 
the  world.  In addi tion,  international  phenomena  are  highly  dynami c--process 
and  change  are the  essence  of  IR.  The  analyst  of  international  relations  is 
therefore  confronted with  a  dilemma  of considerable  magnitude  -  how  do  we --- 
know  what  we  claim  to  know  about  the  behavior  of  international  actors  such  as --------  -  -- 
African  states?  How  one  answers  this  question,  we  would  argue,  has  a great 
impact  on  one's  preferred  research  strategy  for  creating  knowledge  and  the 
uses  one  is will ing to  make  of  the  knowledge  once  it is created. 
A  common  response  to  this  dilemma  made  by  many  students  of worl d pol i tics 
is based  on  the  notion  that  international  phenomena  are  non-repeatable  and 
unique  and  must  be  treated  as  such.  If an  analyst  adopts  this  belief,  he 
will  likely  choose  to describe  and  explain  a  particular aspect  of international 
relations  by  undertaking  a  detailed case  stuay  that  attempts  to exhaust  every 
relevant  facet  of  the  problem  at hand.  The  knowledge  produced  by  such  case 
studies  is often  ideographic,  that is,  knowledge  of the  particular  and  the 
unique.  Thus  case  studies  can  provide  very  rich descriptions  of selected 
events  but  they  often  fail  to  produce  knowledge  that  is rep;  icable,  veri- 
fiable  and  general.  Without  general,  or -- nomothetic  knowledge,  it is  dif- 
ficul t and  perhaps  impossible  to  explain  and  eval ~ate  behavior. l 
This  is  so  because  every  explanation  makes  reference  to  generalizations.  To 
"explain"  the  death  of a  relative,  for  example,  one  may  say  that  the  deceased 
died  from  a  heart  attack.  The  specific  and  unique  event  of one  person's 
death  is  "explained"  by  reference  to  our  general  knowledge  that when  the 
normal  functioning  of  the  human  heart  is interrupted,  death  general ly follows. 
In a  similar  fashion,  we  may  explain  conflict  between  Somalia  and  Ethiopia 
by  showing  how  it is a  particular  instance  of a  general  pattern of border 
disputes  that  occur  frequently  in Africa  because  of the  arbitrary  nature  of 
most  African  boundaries.  Hence,  while  we  do  think  that  case  studies  of the 
foreign  pol icies  of particular African  states are  descriptively  useful2, 
we  have  chosen  a  research  strategy  that  we  feel  is a  more  direct  route  to 
general  knowledge  about  African  international  behavior. 
The  AFRICA  Project  i s  based  upon  the  assumption  that  international 
phenomena  are  repeatable  and  not  necessarily  unique.  If they  are  filtered 
through  useful  conceptual  categories , these  phenomena  can  be  grouped  and 
analyzed  in a  systematic  fashion.  Among  the  highly  repeatable  aspects  of 
African  foreign  policy  are  voting  at  the  United  Nations,  visits  among  heads 
of  state  and  government,  the  receipt  of foreign  economic  and  mil i tary  assistance, 
border  confl i cts  and  denunciations  of South  African  apartheid.  Moreover, 
while  each  vote,  visit,  aid  contract,  border  closure  and  verbal  condemnation 
are  unique  in that  they  happen  only  once  at a  specific  time  and  place,  they - 
can  also  be  conceived  of as  types  of  foreign  policy  behavior.  To  do  so,  one 
must  have  a useful  typology  of categories  of action  exchanged  between  states 
and  other  international  and  transnational  actors  that  permits  the  cl assi fi cation 
of each  action  as  to  its type.  Once  classified and  coded,  the  particular, 
unique  foreign  policy  action retains  these  characteristics but  it also  acquires 
new  attributes  for  it has  been  expl ici  characteri zed  as  representing  a 
certain  type  of forei gn  pol icy behavior.  These  types  may  be  compared  along 
a  variety  of dimensions  such  as  their  origin,  their  targets,  their  frequency 
over  time,  their  relations  to other types  of behavior,  their  "causes"  and 
"consequences"  and  thei r eval uati ve  imp1 i cations  for  the  acting state  and  its 
regional  international  system. 
Thus,  the  AFRICA  project  has  adopted  a  "scientific"  approach  in its research 
because  we  assume  that  African  foreign  policy  behavior  is repeatable  and 
not  necessarily  unique  and  because  we  want  to  create  nomothetic  knowledge 
about  this  behavior  that  is reliable,  valid  and  general.  This  approach  is 
necessary  if we  are  to claim to be  able  to explain why  African  leaders  be- 
have  the  way  they  do  in the  international  arena.3  Moreover,  the  type  of 
knowledge  produced  by  the  AFRICA  project  is essential  for an  understanding 
of where  particular  African  states,  as  described  in ideographic  case  studies, 
fit into the  more  general  patterns  of African  international  behavior. 
As  a  research  strategy  the  scientific  approach  has  many  varied  appli- 
cations.  Physicists,  geologists,  medical  researchers  and  international  re- 
lationists  use  a  wide  variety  of different  techniques,  yet  we  would  argue 
that  a1 1  scientific  research  is characterized  by  explicit conceptualization, 
careful  measurement  usually  leading  to  the  quantification  of data  and  .he  com- 
parison  of as  many  cases  as  possible  and  appropriate.  These  features  of the 
scientific  approach  have  the  consequence  of creating what  has  been  called 
"intersubjectively  communicable  knowledge"  because  the  methods  and  findings 
are  created  and  reported  in such  a  fashion  as  to  make  them  relatively  inde- 
pendent  of  the  personal  val ues  and  i deol ogi es  of  the  researcher .4  Findings 
can  be  shown  to  be  independent  of  their  originator's  values  by  repl ication 
wherein  other  researchers  with  presumably  different  values  are  able  to  repeat 
or  perhaps  modify  the  original  knowledge  base.  For  repl ication  to occur  the 
original  data  must  be  available  to other  researchers.  The  AFRICA  project  data 
are  available  to  readers  of this  chapter  for  research  uses  or  for  the  purpose 
of  replicating any  of the  findings  we  shall  subsequently  report.5  in the 
remainder  of this  section  we  shall  focus  on  the  issues  of comparison,  data- 
making  and  measurement,  and  conceptualization. 
The  Cases-for-Comparison 
The  central  idea  in comparative  analysis  is to make  inferences  about 
the  truth of  hypotheses  using several  instances  of the  phenomenon  in question. 
For  example,  if a  student  is interested in explaining the  dependency  on  France 
of  its former  African  colonies,  he  would  examine  relations  between  France  and 
all  these  territories  rather  than  merely  studying  the  foreign  pol icy of a 
single  former  French  territory.  By  identifying similarities  and  differences 
in France's  relations  with  a  large  number  of African  states  the  analysis 
moves  beyond  a  particular  case  to  higher  levels  of  generalization. 
Because  our  research  seeks  to  produce  general  knowledge  about  the  sources, 
types  and  consequences  of  African  foreign  relations,  the  AFRICA  project 
created  a  large-scale,  quantitative  and  comparable  data  set.  Thirty-two 
independent  states  of  sub-Saharan  black  Africa  (as  listed on  Table  3)  or 
thei r forty- three  pol i ti cal  regimes  between  January  1 , 1964,  and  December 
31,  1966,  represent  our  cases-for-comparison.  These  states  and  regimes 
were  selected  for  a  number  of  reasons.  First,  the  states  represent  a  cluster 
of  countries  that  for  various  reasons  (e.g.,  newness  of  statehood,  lack  of 
appropriate  data,  Western  ethnocentrism,  etc.)  have  been  to  a  large extent 
neglected  i n previous  comparati ve  research  concerning  foreign pol icy  behavior .6 
Second,  these  states  represent  a  re1 ati vely  homogeneous  subset  of African 
states,  excluding the  quite  different white  minority  controlled  territories  of 
Southern  Africa  and  the  North  African  Arab-speaking  states  that  previous 
research  had  shown  to  be  rather  distinct  in their  international  behavior.7 
Third,  these  states are  identical  to  the  countries  included  in the  North- 
western  and  York  Universities  African  National  Integration Project  which  has 
gathered  a  very  extensive  data  set  on  historical  and  domestic  characteristics 
of each  state  of black  ~fri  This  is especial ly advantageous  considering 
the  special  interest  of the  AFRICA  project  in examining  the  relationships 
between  domestic  factors  such  as  political  regime  change  or modernization  and 
the  external  behavior  of these  states.9 
Let  us  be  clear what  these  cases  represent.  In talking  about  African 
foreign  policy behavior  one  may  be  thinking about  the  foreign  relations  of 
African states.  If that  is the  case,  then with  our  AFRICA  project  data  one 
may  look  at  the  behavior  of the  thirty-two  states  during the three year  period 
1964-66.  Upon  occasion,  however,  when  we  talk  about  this  topic  we  mean  the 
foreign  pol i cies  of certain  governments  or pol i ti cal  regimes.  Thus,  between 
the  beginning of 1964  and  the  end  of  1966  the  state  of Ghana  had  two  different 
governments,  that  of President  Kwame  Nkrumah  and  then  a  mi 1 i tary-based  gov- 
ernment  that  took  power  in an  anti-Nkrumah  coup  d'etat  on  February  23,  1966. 
This  fact  creates  "two"  Ghanas  and  it may  well  be  that  the  foreign  policies of 
these  two  quite  different  regimes  were  different as  well.  Hence,  if one  is 
thinking of the  foreign  policy  behavior  of governments,  the  AFRICA  data  are 
also  organized  in a  fashion  to  permi t comparisons  among  the  forty-three 
di fferent  regimes  that  governed  these  thi rty-two  states  between  1964  and  1966. 
The  time  period selected,  1964-66,  was  chosen  because  it represents 
the  first  period of  political  unrest  for  these  thirty-two  African  countries 
after  receiving  independence.10  During  this  period,  military-ledccupsd'etat 
rep1 aced  ci vi 1 ian rulers  with  mi 1 i tary-bureaucrati c  governments  in one-quarter 
of  these  countries.  This  instability  in some  but  not  all  states  in this  one 
region  and  during  this  short  expanse  of  time  provides  an  ideal  focal  point 
for  an  inquiry  into  the  relationships  between  political  regime  change  and 
foreign  pol icy behavior. 
This  time  period  is also  advantageous  because  it enables  the  researcher 
to  evaluate  the  effect of the  initial  stages  of nation-building  in most  of 
these  countries.  Twenty-two  of these  states  had  been  independent  less  than 
four years  by  1964.  Therefore,  special  attention  can  be  given  to  the analysis 
of political  development  in its earliest stages  and  its possible effect  on 
the  foreign  policies  of African  states. 
Conceptual ization,  Data-making,  and  Measurement 
Given  the  AFRICA  project's  decision  to  study  the  foreign  pol icy  behavior 
of  thi rty-two  bl ack  Afri can  countries  and  thei r forty-three  regimes  we  turned 
to  "events  data"  for comparable  indicators  of external  behavior.  Events 
data,  which  were  developed  by  Dr.  Charles  A.  McClelland and  associates  at 
the  University  of  Southern  ~al  refer  to  verbal  and  physical  actions 
that international  actors  direct  toward  their  external  environments.12  Put 
simply,  events  data  serve  as  an  indicator of a  state's  behavior  by  recording 
"who  says  or  does  what  to  whom."  Thus,  events  data  are  historical  materials 
and,  actually,  very  "traditional . "  The  main  difference  between  the  tradi- 
tional,  case-study  scholar  and  the  quantitative  analyst  of  foreign  pol icy  is 
that  the  latter  is dealing with  historical  events  in terms  of  quantity  and 
at a  higher  level  of abstraction while  the  case  study  analyst  focuses  on 
individual  or  small  groups  of narrative,  historical  accounts. 13  The  rapid 
growth  of events  data  as  a  research  technique  can  be  attributed  to  the  re- 
di scovery  that  the  study  of  international  relations  is largely an  historical 
subject  and  the  availability and  utility of electronic  computers  for  the 
storage,  retrieval  and  analysis  of  such  data.14 
Our  use  of events  data  makes  our  basic  unit-of-analysis  the  foreign 
policy  acts  that  are  exchanged  among  African  states  and  governments.  Be- 
tween  any  three African  states,  for  example,  there are  six possible  linkages: 
For  the  thi rty-two  black  African  states  there  are  992  possible  intra-African 
"dyadic"  linkages. l5 This  means  that  in order  to  understand  black  African 
i ntra-state  behavior  the  researcher  must  look  beyond  the  conventional  view 
of  thirty-two  states  and  concentrate  on  the  conception  of  relational  flows 
or action  among  African  states. 
The  notion  of  relational  flows  counters  the  idea  that  a  state  has  a 
single,  uni-dimensional , foreign  pol icy.  Instead states  or  regimes  have 
many  different  foreign  pol icies  that  are  constantly  shifting and  changing 
according  to  a wide  variety  of  factors.16  One  variable  that  plays  a central 
role  in this  repertory  of  behavior  and  action  is the  target  of a foreign  policy 
action.  The  AFRICA  project  defines  foreign  pol icy actions  or events  as  "the 
official,  nonroutine,  deli berate,  overt  actions  of governmental  representatives, 
directed at external  actors  for  the  express  political  purpose  of modifying 
the  behavior  of  those  targetsU.l7  The  target  of the  action  will  influence 
the  action  itself.  For  example,  Nkrumah's  Ghana  did not  act  the  same  way 
towards  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  Ivory Coast.  Not  only  did  the  target,  be 
it the  U.S.S.R.  or  the  Ivory  Coast,  evoke  variation  in Ghana's  foreign  policy, 
but  actions  also  vary  according  to  "issue  areas. "18 Put  simply,  different 
kinds  of subject  matters  lead  to different  types  of action  and  reaction  on 
the  part  of  the  nations  involved.  Hence,  each  African  state  has  mu1 tiple 
foreign  policies  that  cannot  be  viewed  in a  static  way  but  rather  as  a  flow 
of behavior  that  changes  direction  and  speed  according  to many  variables. 
To  operational ize  this  conception  of foreign  pol icy acts,  the  AFRICA 
project  relied on  McClelland's  notion  that  international  interactions  are 
"single action  i tems  of a  nonroutine,  extraordinary,  or newsworthy  character 
that  in some  clear  sense  are  directed across  a national  boundary  and  have, 
in most  instances,  a  specific  target."19  Three  points  are  worth  mentioning 
concerning  this  idea  that  directly  infl uenced  our  data  col lection  process. 
First,  the  assumption  that  action  is of  a  "newsworthy  character"  led the 
AFRICA  project  to  search  for  a  news  source  that  could  serve  as  a  reliable 
basis  for  the  identification  and  abstraction  of African  foreign  pol icy  acts. 
The  Africa  Research  Bull etin  (Pol i ti cal  and  Economic  Series)  was  selected 
to  fulfil 1  this  purpose.  This  single  source  was  chosen  not  only  on  the  basis 
of  "face  validity,"  that  is,  it has  the  reputation  among  African  area  special- 
ists  as  being  the  most  comprehensive  and  accurate  chronology  of African 
political  and  economic  affairs  currently  available,  but  also  because  it is a 
regional ly specialized  source.  Africa  Research  Bulletin was  viewed  as  much 
more  appropriate  for  our  research  purposes  than  a world-wide  data  source  such 
as  the  New  York  Times  because  research  has  shown  such  sources  to  report  little 
African  behavior. 20 
The  second  assumption  concerning  McClel land's notion  of international 
interactions  that  directly  infl uenced  the  AFRICA  project's  data  gatherGng 
operations  dealt with  the  idea  that  the  interactions  were  "single action 
i terns. "  The  AFRICA  project  foll owed  this  notion  by  operational ly defini ng 
a foreign  pol icy act as  "a  simple  declarative  sentence  about  an  activity 
undertaken  by  a  state  or  its official  representative(s),  wherein  it may  be 
inferred that  the  actor  undertook  the  action  in order  to affect  the  behavior 
of the  external  recipient of the  act."21  By  concentrating  on  simple  declara- 
tive  sentences,  the  AFRICA  project  operationally  employed  a  1 inguistic  unit 
of  analysis  which  represents  the  most  di screte  uni t conveying  information 
about  forei gn  pol icy behavior.22 
The  last point  to  be  noted  about  this  conceptual  definition  is that 
it conceives  of  foreign  pol icy behavior  as  being  carried out  by  means  of 
both  discrete  verbal  and  physical  (non-verbal)  control  attempts  by  an  actor 
directed  at a  target.23  A1 though  the  distinctions  are  often  ambiguous, 
concrete  differences  can  be  seen  between  verbal  and  physical  acts.  For  example, 
most  threats  in international relations  are  usually  conceived of as  verbal  acts 
with  contingent  intent  directed  from  one  actor  to another,  but  tacit  threats 
are  also  possible.  Physical  acts,  such  as  border closures  or  troop  movement, 
often  signal  threats  by  non-verbal  communication.  In fact,  if we  are  to 
understand  foreign  pol icy  behavior  in a  thorough,  complete  fashion,  we  should 
attempt  to  observe  regularities  in the  relationships  between  the  use  of verbal 
and  physical  means  in undertaking  foreign  pol icy. 
The  AFRICA  project  utilized three  separate  stages  in the  collection 
and  management  of  its foreign  pol icy data.  The  first state  of the  process 
involved  the  identification  and  abstraction  of  individual  events  from  the 
text  of  Africa  Research  Bulletin.  After  identifying  behavior  that satisfied 
our  codebook's  definition  of a  foreign  policy  act,  a  trained  abstractor  then 
translated  the  act  onto  a  code  sheet  in the subject-verb-object  form  of a 
simple  declarative  sentence,  such  as  "Guinea  signed  a  trade  agreement  with 
Hungary". 
Once  the  act was  identified and  abstracted,  the  second  stage  of  the 
data-making  process  took  place.  This  phase  of the  procedure  dealt  with  the 
numerical  coding  of  the  previously  abstracted  event  across  thirty  subs tanti ve 
variables  and  nine  "bookkeeping"  type  codes  used  by  the  AFRICA  project.24 
The  number  of variables  coded  is much  more  substantial  than  similar  data  sets. 
The  WE IS^^  project,  for  example,  coded  only  five  variables:  date,  actor,  action, 
target  and  arena.  It was  felt that  the  wide  variety  of variables  that were 
coded  for  each  event  would enable  a  researcher  to  examine  comparatively  a 
wide  variety  of questions  associated  with  foreign  pol icy behavior. 
The  last stage  of the  data-making  process  dealt  with  the  storage  and 
management  of the  data.  To  effectively  handle  a  data  set  of this  size  it 
was  vital  to  utilize an  electronic  computer.  Before  this  was  done,  however, 
the  data  had  to  be  made  "machine  readable."  Hence,  each  of  the  14,669  coded 
foreign  policy  actions  had  to  be  keypunched  on  computer  cards  so  that  they 
could  be  read,  stored  and  retrieved by  the  computer.  Following our  rules, 
the event  "After  the  overthrow  of  President  Nkrumah,  Ghana  expels  Soviet 
technicians"  would  be  translated  in "machine  readable"  language  for  the  first 
four  of our  variables  in the  following way:  452  660315  7200  365,  where  452- 
Ghana  (actor),  660315-March  15,  1966  (date),  7200-the  event  of expel 1 ing 
personnel , groups,  or organi zations  (action),  and  365- the Soviet  Union  (target). 
The  re1 i abi 1 i ty of the  codi ng  was  judged  qui te  adequate  wi th an  average 
inter-coder  re1 iabi 1 ity coefficient  for  all  five  coders  across  all  thirty 
variables  of  .87.26  This  value  is quite  impressive  considering  that  each 
act  represented  thi rty separate  subs tanti ve  coding  decisions.  Obviously, 
each  individual  user  of the  data  will  have  to make  his  own  decisions  as  to 
the  re1 iabi 1 i ty  levels  that  are  viewed  acceptable  and,  therefore,  which  parts 
of the  data  to  use.  It is our  conclusion,  however,  that  the  overall  reliability 
of  the  data  is good  to  excel lent.27 
Dimensions  of  Black  African  Foreign  Pol icy,  1964-66 
Having  explored  a  number  of method01 ogi cal  and  conceptual  concerns  of 
the  AFRICA  project,  let us  return  to  the  main  objective  of this  chapter--the 
description  and  explanation  of  some  patterns  of  the  foreign  pol icy  behavior 
of  tropical  African  states.  As  stated earlier,  our  entire  data  set  consists 
of  14,669  foreign  policy  actions.  These  actions  can  be  broken  down  into a 
subset  of actions  which  represents  only  intra-African  behavior  or,  in other 
words,  actions  initiated by  African  states  toward  other  tropical  African 
states.  There  were  4802  such  actions  identi fied,  representing  thi rty-three 
per cent  of  the  total  behavior  of the  thirty-two  states  in question  during 
the  time  period.  Another  twenty-seven  per  cent  of the  behavior  was  directed 
at African  non-state  targets  such  as  the  O.A.U.  (6.5%),  U.N.E.C.A.  (1.b:) 
and  0. C.A.M.  (1.3%)  and  states  not  part of  independent  black  Africa--Rhodesia 
(2.4%),  Egypt  (1.2%),  South  Africa  (1 .I%) and  Tunisia  (0.8%).  Only  forty 
per  cent  of  tropical  African foreign  pol icy behavior was  directed at non- 
African  targets  in Europe  and  el sewhere. 
These  figures  describe  the  average  behavior  for  a1 1  thi rty-two  African 
states.  In the  comparative  study  of  foreign  pol icy we  are less  interested 
in average  or  typical  behavior  and  more  interested  in variation  around  such 
averages.  For  example,  Liberia  directed  fifty-one  per  cent  of its foreign 
policy  behavior  toward  other  tropical  African  states  and  Upper  Volta sent 
forty-six  per  cent  of  its behavior  to  these  same  targets.  In comparison, 
Tanzania  sent  only  twenty-seven  per cent  of  its actions  toward  other  black 
African  states  and  Ghana  thirty-one  per cent.  Why  did Upper  Vol ta  and  Liberia 
pay  more  attention  to  the  rest of Africa  than  did Ghana  and  Tanzania?  Con- 
versely,  why  were  Tanzania  and  Ghana  more  interested  in a  "world  role",  as 
indicated by  the  extent of their  extra-African  activity?  It is the  exciting 
job  of  research  to frame  answers,  often  called  hypotheses,  that  can  then  be 
tested  against  the  facts.  A possible  explanation  of these  differences  is 
that  land-locked  and/or  relati vely  small  states  wi 11  focus  thei r behavior 
on  their neighbors  because  of weakness  and  geographical  vulnerability. 
Our  AFRICA  data  help  us  think  of such  questions  and  are,  of course,  indispensi- 
ble  in attempting  to  answer  them. 
TABLE  1 
CATEGORIES  OF  ACTION 
BETWEEN  ACTORS 
V  E  R  B  A  L  ("words") 
i : 
Actor's  Evaluation,  Actor's  Desire  for  Actor's  Intent 
1PerceptionofPast  FutureActionby  Regarding  Own 
I  or  Current  Action  Target  Possible  future 
by  Target  Action  Vis-a- Vis  Target 
*, 
(3)  (5) 1140  DENY  (deny  31 50  DEMAND  (order,  51 70  THREATEN 
I  accusation,  attribu-  comnand,  insist,  ( threaten  to ; 
ed  action,  or  pol icy)  demand  compliance  take  Future 
I 
I  20  ACCUSE  (charge,  3130  action  unde- (make  ,ired  by  tar- 1  ' 
criticize,  blame,  formal  or  informal  get,  with  or 
I  I  disapprove,  denounce,  complaint) I 
i  denigrate)  without  spe- 
I  I  3100  NEGATIVE  PRO-  cific  negative 
I  1020  VEGATIVE  COM-  POSE  (offer proposal ,sanctions:  a 
I  '  MENT  (comment  on  urge,  suggest  action,contingent  "if 
I  situation,  explain  pol icy  undesired  by  . . .then  state- 
,  j  policy  undesired  target)  ment) 
I  i  51 60  WARN 3090  NEGATIVE  RE-  (warn  of  a I  / 
11  QUEST  , ask  future  situa- 
I  for  information, aid,  action  in  con-  tion  or action 
I  undesired  by 
I  I  text  undesirable  to  target  un- 
I  +I  target) UI 
1  -,  desired  by 21 
actor) 1 
o ,  5110  REJECT 
10' I  (turn  down  pro- 
1 
I I 
I  posal , protest, 
I  I  demand,  threat; refuse,  oppose, 
harden  position) 
i  I i 
I  5020  NEGATIVE 
I  i  INTENTION  (ex- 
plain  future 
(7) 7220  FORCE  (forceful  or  vio- 
lent  use  of  military  re- 
sources,  equipment  to 
achieve  objectives.  Mi  1 i tary 
engagement,  non-mil i tary  de- 
struction,  non-injury  de- 
struction ) 
71 80  DEMONSTRATE  (armed 
force mobilization,  movement, 
exercise,  boycott,  or walk 
out)  demonstration, meting, 
display.  Non-mi 1 i tary 
7230  INCREASE  MILITARY  CAPA- 
BILITY  (increase military 
spending,  troop  levels;  de- 
velop  weapons,  authorize 
military  action,  reserve 
call -ups) 
7240  AID  OPPONENT  (give 
mi  1 i tary  aid  to  opponent 
of  target) 
7190  REDUCE  RELATIONSHIP 
(cancel  or  postpone  pl anned 
event,  reduce  routine  inter- 
national  activity,  recall 
officials,  ha1 t  negotiations, 
break  diplomatic  relations) 
7210  SEIZE  (seize position 
or  possessions,  detain  or 
arrest  personnel ) 
7200  EXPEL  (expel  organi za- 
tion,  group,  or  personnel ) 
7280  SUBVERT  (aid to  insur- 
gents,  non- verbal  attempts 
to  i nfl uence  i nternal  pol i - 
pol icy  unde-  tics  of  target  undesired 
sired  by  tar-  by  target) 
get 
TABLE  1  -  CONTINUED 
i I  V  E  R  B  A  L  ("words") 
/  2020  POSITIVE  COM- 
MENT  (comment  on 
situation,  explain 
policy  desired  by 1 
target) 
2040  APPROVE 
(praise,  hail, / 
applaud,  sup- 1 
port,  thank) 
(4) 
4090  POSITIVE  RE- 
QUEST  (appeal, 
ask  for  action, 
aid,  information, 
policy  in context 
des i ra bl e  to 
target) 
4100  POSITIVE  PRO- 
POSE  (offer  pro- 
posal,  urge,  sug- 
gest  action,  pol- 
icy desired  by 
target) 
4250  NEGOTIATE 
(participate  in 
substantive  talks, 
negotiations  on 
specific  issue  or 
interest  area) 
(6' 
6020  POSITIVE 
INTENTION  (ex- 
plain  future 
policy  desired 
by  target) 
6100  OFFER 
(offer  to take 
future  action 
desired  by 
target) 
6050  PROMISE 
(assure  of 
future  action 
desired  by 
target) 
6080  AGREE 
(accept  pro- 
posal,  agree 
to meet  or 
negotiate, 
I  N  0 N  -  V  E  R  B  A  L  ("deeds") 
1  R 
(8) 8010  YIELD  (surrender,  submit 
retreat,  evacuate) 
8030  CONSULT-VISIT  (make  offici 
visits,  participate  in a  meet 
i nvol vi ng  foreign  travel  for 
least one  participant,  consul T 
with  some  foreign  official  at 
home  or  abroad) / 
8060  GRANT  (end  negative 
sanctions,  end  confl ictful 
action,  end  threat  of conflic 
action ; express  regret,  apol o 
gize;  give  invitation,  asylum, 
privilege,  diplomatic  recogni 
tion,  release,  return  persons 
property 
8070  REWARD  (gi ve  econorni c, 
technical,  mil itary aid) 
8260  REDUCE  MILITARY  CAPABILI I 
(reduce  military spending,  troo ~ 
I  agreement) 
I 
I 
t 
agree  to 
future  action, 
substantive 
/  9020  NEUTRAL  COMMENT  9090  NEUTRAL  REQUEST  9020  NEUTRAL 
I 
I 
9100  NEUTRAL  PROPOSE  INTENTION 
level s,  reduce  readiness  for 
mi1 itary action 
8270  CARRY  OUT  AGREEMENT 
mentation  by  actor  of a  previ 
agreement,  e.g.,  a  diplomatic 
economic,  cul tural  or mi 1 i 
agreement .  Host  conferences )- 
8290  INCREASE  RELATIONSHIP  (i 
crease  economic,  diplomatic 
re1 ations) 
8300  ACCEPT  (accept  or  recei v\ 
official  visits,  economic, 
financial , cul tural , mi 1 i tary 
i \  aid or support) 
As  the  other  chapters  in this  book  illustrate,  one  of  the  prime  concerns 
of  international  relations  is  to  describe  and  explain  patterns  of cooperation 
and  conflict  among  states  and  other  international  actors.  In order  to  do 
this,  however,  one  must  have  some  means  of distinguishing  between  cooperative 
and  conflictful  behavior.  In the  AFRICA  data  set  we  do  this  by  coding  each 
foreign  policy event/action  into one  and  only  one  cell  of Table  1.  For  example, 
take  the  events  (1 )  "Ghana  President  Nkrumah  denied  that  his  government  was 
involved  in attempts  to  overthrow  the  government  of Niger"  and  (2)  "President 
Obote  of  Uganda  began  an  official  visit  to West  Germany." 
In order  to  code  correctly  each  event,  we  ask  and  answer  a  series  of 
questions.  First,  is the  behavior  verbal  or  physical?  Nkrumah's  denial  was 
clearly  verbal  and  Obote's  visit was  physical.  We  then  ask  with  regard  to  the 
verbal  behavior  whether  it represents  an  eval uation/perception,  a  desire  or a 
statement  of  intent.  Nkrumah  did not  express  an  intention  toward  Niger  nor 
did  he  state  a  desire for  action  by  Niger,  so  it must  be  an  instance  of an 
evaluation.  We  now  know  that  the  first event  goes  in column  1 of Table  1 
and  the  second  event  in column  4. 
In order  to  get  the  correct  row  we  ask  how  the  target  might  typically 
view  the  action  in question.  Ordinarily  states  welcome  officials'  visits, 
indeed  if they  did not  the  visit could not occur,  so  Obote's  visit  is classi- 
fied  in the  bottom,  cooperative  row.  Ordinarily,  governments  do  not  appreciate 
subversive  behavior  and  denials  of what  they  claim  to  be  true,  so  Nkrumah's 
behavior  is placed  in the  first,  orconflict row.  Nownote  that  by  askingand 
answering  this  series  of interrelated questions  we  have  classified each  event. 
We  have  decided  that  Nkrumah's  denial  is an  instance  of conflictful  verbal 
evaluation,  cell  1,  and  must  be  either  a  "negative  comment",  an  "accuse",  or 
a  "deny".  We  then  read the  description  of each  of these  three  types  of actions 
and  conclude  that  1140,  DENY,  best  describes  Nkrumah's  action.  Following  a 
similar logic,  Obote's  trip  to West  Germany  is considered  to  be  best  described 
as  an  instance  of 8030  CONSULT-VISIT,  behavior  and  is so  coded.  Each  of our  near- 
ly fifteen  thousand  foreign  policy  acts  has  been  coded  in this  fashion,  permit- 
ing  us  to  describe  patterns  of African  foreign  pol icy  cooperation  and  confl 
Table  2  dtscribes  the  types  of  foreign  policy  behavior  tropical  African 
states  undertook  vi s-a-vi s the  international  sys tem  and  the  Intra-African 
system  respectively.  The  thi rty-nine  action  types  of Table  1  have  been  grouped 
into  nine  broader  categories  that  range  from  conflictful  behavior  (I,  11,  111, 
TABLE  2 
TYPES  OF  TROPICAL  AFRICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY  BEHAVIOR 
Type  and  Categories  of Action  Intra-Afri can  Behavior  Total  Behavior 
N  0'  N  a 
I.  Mi 1 i tary  Incidents  &  Subversion: 
1.  Actions  of Military  Force  (722)  7 
2.  Subversive  Actions  (7280)  5 
3.  Actions  Aiding  Opponents  of 
Target  Regime  (7240)  0 
SUBTOTALS 
I I  .  Coercion: 
4.  Actions  Increasing  Mi 1 i tary 
Capabi 1 i ty  (7230) 
5.  Seizures  of Personnel  and 
Property  (7210) 
6.  Expulsions  of Individuals, 
Organi zations  (7200) 
7.  Demonstrations  (7180) 
8.  Threat  Actions  (5170) 
9.  Warnings  (5160) 
10.  Demands  for  Action  (3150) 
SUBTOTAL 
I1 I.  Pressure: 
11.  Actions  Reducing  Relations  (7190) 
12.  Rejections  (5110) 
13.  Statements  of Negative 
Intention  (5020) 
14.  Protests  (3130) 
15.  Hostile  Proposals  (3100) 
16.  Hostile  Requests  for  Action  (3090) 
17.  Denials  of Action  (1140) 
SUBTOTAL 
IV.  Accusations: 
18.  Accusations  (1 120) 
19.  Hostile  Comments  on  Actions 
of  Others  (1020) 
SUBTOTAL 
TABLE  2  -  CONTINUED 
Type  and  Categories  of Action  Intra-Afri can  Behavior  Total  Behavior 
N  ;;  N 
V.  Communication: 
20.  Neutral  Comments  on  Actions 
of  Others  (9020)  448  9.3  1950  7  3.3 
21.  Neutral  Requests  for  Action  (9090)  53  1.1  302  2.1 
22.  Neutral  Proposals  (91 00)  83  1.7  463 - - 3.2 
SUBTOTAL 
'I.  Consultation: 
23.  Negotiate  (4250)  204 
24.  Consult-Visit  (8030)  599 
25.  Accept  Visits  and  Assistance  (8300)  115 
SUBTOTAL  91 8  19.1  2681  18.3 
I.  Support: 
26.  Positive  Comments  on  Actions 
of Others  (2020) 
27.  Approve  Actions  of Others  (2040) 
28.  Positive  Requests  for  Action  (4090) 
29.  Posi ti ve  Proposal s  (41 00) 
30.  Statements  of Positive 
Intention  (6020) 
31.  Offers  of  Positive  Action  (6100) 
32.  Promi se  Pos i ti ve  Action  (6050) 
33.  Reward  with  Assistance  (8070) 
SUBTOTAL  1425  29.8  4104  27.9 
I.  Agreement: 
34.  Agree  to  Action  (6080)  708 
35.  Carry  Out  Agreements  (8270)  91 
SUBTOTAL  799  16.6  2105  14.4 
:X.  Reconcil iation  and  Disengagement: 
36.  End  Hostile  Actions  (Grant)  (8060)  100 
37.  Actions  Increasing  Relations  (8290)  90 
38.  Yield  Positions  (8010)  0 
39.  Actions  Reducing  Military 
Capabi 1 i ty  (8260)  1 
SUBTOTAL  191  4.0  479  3.3 
TOTAL  (N)  4802  100.0  14669  100.0 
IV)  through  rather  neutral  behavior  (V,  VI)  to  cooperative  behaviors  (VII, 
VIII,  IX).  If one  aggregates  the  behavior  into  these  three  broad  categories 
one  sees  a strong  tendency  for  the  foreign  pol icy of African  states  to be  of 
a  friendly--cooperative  type  for  both  total  behavior  (45.6%)  and  intra-African 
behavior  (50.4%).  Although  there  may  be  many  explanations  for  this  pattern, 
a  few  are  obvious.  First,  African  states  have  the  least  developed  capacity 
to  engage  in violent  conflict  in comparison  to  all  states.  This  limited 
capabi 1 i ty for  violent  conflict  is especially  prevalent  in the  low  frequencies 
for  nonverbal  conflict  behavior  (I and  11)  where  mili tary capabilities  may 
play  a  role  in the  formulation  of  this  type  of  foreign  policy.  Actions 
involving small  scale  military operations,  such  as  Mil i tary  Incidents  and 
Subversion,  aimed  at  "destabl izing"  another  African  regime  were  very  rtre 
during  this  time  period. 
Conflict  did occur  over  Rhodesia's  unilateral  declaration  of indepen- 
dence  in 1965  and  between  Ghana  and  her  neighbors  involving alleged  Ghanaian 
subversion,  but  in general  it appears  that  African  statesmen  may  have 
viewed  inter-state  confl ict during  this  early  stage  of economic  and  pol i tical 
development  as  dy~functional.~~  only  two  forms  of  conflict  that  occurred 
fairly  frequently  in African states'  foreign  pol icy were  verbal  confl ict 
behaviors--pressure  and  Accusation--representing  16.4  per  cent  and  15.4 
per  cent  of  the  behavior  directed  respectively  within  the  region  and  the 
international  system  as  a  whole.  These  patterns  of action  depict  many  of 
the  sanctions  used most  frequently  among  African  states  to  i nfl uence  each 
other  via  rejection or mild  hostile action  such  as  closing  borders,  with- 
drawing  diplomats,  breaking off negotiations  and  cancel 1 ing or postponing 
planned events  such  as  international  conferences.  Conflict  such  as  this 
i nvol ves  infl uence  attempts  based  purely  upon  verbal  charges  and  cri ticism 
centered  on  accusations  of misbehavior,  as  in violating norms  of non- 
interference  enshrined  in the  O.A.U.  Charter,  and  criticism of others' behavior 
via  hostile  comments.  These  forms  of  behavior  are  significant within  Africa 
because  they  represent  about  the  most  violent  types  of  conflict African  states 
can  undertake  toward  each  other. 
A  second  possible  explanation  of  the  dominance  of cooperative behavior  in 
the  foreign  policies  of  these  states  may  be  attributed  to  the  fact  that  the 
years  1964-66  represent  the  initial  period of  good  will  between  African  countries 
following  the  formation  of  the  O.A.U.  This  dimension  of behavior  is seen 
clearly  in Figure  I  which  depicts  only  intra-African  interactional  data 
(N-4802). The  O.A.  U.,  which  represents  common  African  goals,  provides  a 
useful  forum  in which  African  states  can  establish  and  maintain  informal 
contacts  (communication)  and  involve  themselves  in formal  consultation 
and  presentation  of  positions  on  international  and  intra-Afri can  issues. 
Over  thi rty per cent  of  intra-African  foreign  pol icy behavior  was  produced 
by  the  communication  and  consultation  activities  of  corrmenting  on  the 
behavior  of others,  visiting  and  negotiating.  The  amount  of  visiting  and 
commenting  behavior  within  tropical  Africa  is really quite  high  in compari- 
son  to  the  behavior  of  all  states  as  reported  in the  WEIS  file,  for e~arnole.~~ 
This  suggests  that  during  1964-66  African  statesmen  were  invol ved  in 
creating  an  African  international  subsystem  via  1 inkage  building among 
the  newly  independent  states  of  the  continent.31  During  the  colonial  period 
there  was  minimal  contact  across  the  Sahara  and  among  African  territories 
belonging  to  di fferent  empi res  as  a  consequence  of imperial  di vi de-and- 
rule  pol icies.  Beginning  in the  1950s  with  the  achievement  of  independence 
by  Tunisia,  Morocco,  Sudan,  Ghana  and  Guinea  and  intensifying  in 1960  with 
Nigeria's  independence  and  the  numerous  former  French  colonies'  decoloniza- 
tion,  the  African continent  soon  comprised  nearly  forty  states  with  few 
existing  contacts.  Such  contacts  had  to be  established  if an  African  inter- 
national  subsystem  autonomous  from the  coloni a1  powers  and  other  non-Afri can 
states  and  consistent  wi th  Pan-African  aspi rations  was  to  come  i nto exi stence. 
The  creation  of  the  O.A.U.  in 1963 was  a  turning  point  in this  process,  but 
our  data  also  suggest  that  linkage-building  continued  at a high  level  after 
that  date.32 
The  single  most  frequent  type  of behavior  engaged  in by  tropical  African 
states  was  Support  type behavior  wherein  African states  undertook  mainly  verbal 
support  and  received material  assistance.  Much  of  this  support  activity  arises 
from  sentiments  of Pan-African  sol i dari ty  vi s-a-vi s  the  ex-metropol es  and 
white  regimes  of the  South  and  from  explicit  attempts  to  support  allies  and 
friends  engaged  in conflict with  other  African  states  such  as  the  Entente 
states  (Ivory  Coast,  Niger,  Togo,  Upper  Volta  and  ~ahomey) vs.  Nkrurnah's 
Ghana  or  Ethiopia  and  Kenya  vs.  a  then  irredentist  Somalia.  During  the 
middle  1960s,  our  data  clearly  show  the  basically  pacific nature  of tropical 
African  foreign  relations. 

The  Action  Category,  Agreement,  represents  actions  i nvol vi ng  the  reaching 
or  carrying  out  of  international  agreements.  African states  reach  agreements 
on  a  variety  of  issues  far more  frequently  than  they  are  reported  to  be  im- 
plementing  previous  agreements  as  shown  in Table  2  by  the  differing  frequencies 
of  these  two  types  of behavior  under  the  general  Agreement  category  (VIII). 
The  general  level  of  agreewnt  by  and  among  tropical  African states  was 
relatively  high  and,  hence,  impressive. 
Final ly,  Reconcil iation and  Disenqagement  involved actions  that retract 
or  amend  hostile or  negative  statements  or actions  and  that  close  military 
hosti 1 i ties  through  withdrawal  or surrender.  Given  the  1 imi ted nature  of 
mi 1 i tary  engagement  by  tropical  Afri can  states , no  behavior  yiel ding  posi tion 
was  observed  and  only  one  instance  of  the  reduction  of mili tary  capability 
was  recorded.  Thus,  while  disarmament  did not  characterize  African  relations 
in this  period,  periodic  detentes  represented  by  ending  hosti 1 e  actions  and 
increasing  re1 ationships  did occur  in intra-African  relations.  Examples  of 
thi s  pattern were  the  reconci 1 i ation  between  the  Entente  states  and  Ghana 
after  the  fall  of  Nkrumah  and  the  increasing  integration of Sekou  Toure's 
Guinea  into  the  West  African  state  system  after  1962-63. 
Black  Africa  as  a  Set  of Regional  Subsystems 
One  of  the great  advantages  of  events  data  is their  great  flexibility 
for  use  in different  research  contexts.  Remember  that  each  of our  14,699 
actions  reports  who  said or did what  to  whom  during the three year  period 
1964-1 966.  Examples  a1 ready mentioned  are : 
(a)  Guinea  signed  a  trade  agreement  with  Hungary. 
(b)  Ghana  President  Nkrumah  denied  that  his  govern- 
ment  was  involved  in attempts  to  overthrow  the 
government  of  Niger. 
(c)  President  Obote  of  Uganda  began  an  official 
visit  to  West  Germany. 
(d)  After  the  overthrow  of  President  Nkrumah,  Ghana 
expels  Soviet technicians. 
As  Table  2  showed,  4,802  of  these  events  or  thirty-three  per cent  were 
initiated by  one  of  our  thirty-two  African  states  and  directed at one  of 
the  other  black  African  states studied  in our  project.  Thus,  one  may  create 
a  32  x  32  matrix  where  each  row  represents  a  foreign  policy  actor  and 
each  column  is a foreign  policy  target.  This  is done  in Table  3,  which 
represents  a quantitative  description  of  the  tropical  African  regional 
subsystem  during  1964-66. 
Let  us  first of all  explain  the  organization  of Table  3.  Our  thirty- 
two  African  states  are  not  listed alphabetically  or  by  size,  rather  they 
are  grouped  by  geographical  region.  The  fourteen  states  from  Gambia  to 
Nigeria  represent  "West  Africa" ; the  eight  states  from  Cameroun  to  Zaire 
are  "Central  Africa";  the  six  states  from  Uganda  to  the  Sudan  are  "Eastern 
Africa" ; and  the  four  states  from  Zambia  to  Lesotho  represent  "Southern 
Africa".  We  have  used  this  method  of organization  in order  to  better  il- 
l ustrate  the  regional  character  of  intra-Afri can  re1 ations .  Second,  e;ch 
cell  in Table  3  represents  the  actions  by  a  row-member  toward  a  col umn- 
member.  Thus,  the  intersection  of  the  Nigeria  row  and  Senegal  col umn  shows 
that  during  this  period of  time  Nigeria  sent  twelve  foreign  policy  actions 
to  Senegal  whereas  the  Senegalese  row  and  Nigerian  column  shows  that  Senegal 
sent  sixteen  acts  to  Nigeria,  a  roughly  balanced  relationship.  Finally, 
the  row  and  column  totals  give,  for any  state,  the  number  of foreign  policy 
acts  sent  or  received  and  the  number  of  targets  of behavior  and  initiators 
of actions  received.  Thus  Ghana,  which  played a  leading  role  in intra- 
African  affairs  during  this  period,  sent  374  acts  to  twenty-ei ght other 
African  states  and  received 473  acts  from twenty-nine  states  on  the continent. 
There  are  32  x  31  or 992  cells  in Table  3 and  only  433  or 43.6  per cent 
recorded any  behavior  during  this  period  of time.  This  is a  consequence 
of  the  fact  that  the  average  number  of actions  initiated and  received was 
only  150  and  that  the  average  number  of  states  that  each  state  interacted 
with  was  only  thirteen.  By  this  measure  of  cohesiveness,  tropical  Africa 
was  not a  well-linked  international  subsystem  between  1964  and  1966.  There 
are,  of course,  few  reasons  to  expect  Chad  to  direct  behavior  at Lesotho, 
some  2,900  miles  away  or for  Somalia  to  interact with  Gabon,  2,500  miles 
away.  It must  be  stressed,  however,  that  because  we  show  no  exchange  of 
behavior  between  any  two  states  this  does  not mean  that  nothing  happened 
between  them  for  three  years.  It does  mean,  however,  that  nothing  "news- 
worthy"  happened  as  far as  our  source  was  concerned.33  But  overall,  Table  3 
seems  to  contradict  the  cl ai m  that  tropi cal  Africa  represented  an  inter- 
national  subsystem  during  1964-66  because  one  of  the  necessary  condi tions 
for  the existence  of  such  subsystems,  regular  and  intense  contact,  is missing.34 
ACTOR  rn  LZ < 
LLJ a  m 
GAMn T A  - -  -4 
St t.11 GAL  3  -- 
MTIIJR  I TAN I A  1 0 
WL I  2 7 
G(J I NEA  14 
SICHf4  L.  1 
LlUtRIA  1 
GtIAfJA  7  2 
lVOI(Y  COAST  3 
UPPtK  VOLTA 
TOGO 
DtlIiOME Y 
NIGER  11 
NIGFI(1A  1  12 
m  CAME ROUII  6 
0 GAt3Olil ru 
CHA[)  5 
CAR 
COfIGO,  U. 
f3UR(JFlrll 
H\.JP  fl nA 
7AIKE  2 
U(;API  [)A 
hi NYA  1 
TAIi /AIJ  I A  1 
SOMAL I A 
LTtiIOPIA  1  4 
SIJIIAII 
IAMB I A 
MALAWI 
GOTSWAPiA 
LF5IlTIIO 
TOTAL  ACTS  15  9;) 
r  (:ILLS  7  14 
- 
TABLE  3 
INTRA-AFRICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY  BEHAVIOR  MATRIX 
Quite clearly,  what  Table  3  does  show  is  the  very  powerful  influence 
of  geographical  proxini ty  in  i ntra-African  relations.  By  1 isting  the  states 
next  to  their  geographical  neighbors  we  see  that  most  behavior  clusters  near 
the  diagonal  of  the  table,  permitting  us  to  identify  a  series  of  partially 
over1 apping  regional  subsys tems : 
1.  Senegal  River  states--Senegzl  , Mauritania,  Ma1 i  and 
Gui nea ; 
2.  The  West  African  coas t--Gui nea,  Sierra  Leone,  Liberia, 
Ghana  and  the  Ivory  Coast; 
3.  The  Conseil  de  1 'Entente  and  its  rivals--Ivory  Coast, 
Upper  Vol ta,  Togo,  Dahomey  (Benin), Niger,  Ghana  and 
Nigeria; 
4.  Equatorial  Africa--Cameroun,  Gabon,  Chad,  Central 
African  Republ ic and  Congo,  Brazzavi 1 le; 
5.  The  Congo  Region--Zai  re,  Burundi  and  Rwanda; 
6.  East  Africa--Uganda,  Kenya,  Tanzania  and  Zambia;  and 
7.  The  Horn  of  Africa--Kenya,  Somalia,  Ethiopia  and  the  Sudan. 
The  highest  cell  frequencies  in  Table  3  are  the  actions  of  Somal ia  toward 
Kenya  (115) and  Ethiopia  (147).  During  this  period  the  government  of  the 
Somal i  Republic  had  an  openly  irredentist  foreign  pol icy  seeking  to  unify  a1 1 
Somali-speaking  people  under  one  government.  This  policy  was  opposed  by 
Kenya  and  Ethiopia  because  if  the  Somal i  minorities  in  these  two  states were 
joined  to  Somalia  this  would  have,  in  their  view,  represented  an  unacceptable 
loss  of  population  and  territory.  Out  of  this  conflict  of  interest,  the  Horn 
of  Africa  regional  subsystem  took  shape. 
The  second  most  important  factor  during  this  early  post-independence 
period  was  colonial  heritage.  Not  only  did  the  territories  of  the  French, 
British  and  Belgian  colonial  empires  tend  to  cluster  together,  but  specific 
economic,  pol i tical  and  cul tural  patterns  were  imposed  that  enhanced  inter- 
action  possi bi 1 i ties  for  some  Afri can  states  and  hindered  interaction  for others. 
The  most  fundamental  cleavage  in  tropical  Africa  was  1 inguisti c,  dividing  the 
continent  into  English  and  French-speaking  states--at  least  among  the  elites 
who  formulate  and  implement  foreign  pol icy.  Particularly  for  the  francophone 
African  states  Table  3  shows  a  tendency  to  interact with  each  other. 
A  third  general  factor  is  the existence  or  creation  during  1964-66  of  a 
functional  regional  organization  serving  the  interests  of  regional  member 
states.  Senegal,  Mauritania,  Ma1 i and  Guinea  interact  because  they  are  mem- 
bers  of  the  Organization  of  Senegal  River  States  and  Kenya,  Tanzania  and 
Uganda  interact  because  of  their  membership  in the  East  African  Common  Ser- 
vices  Organization  which  was  during  this  time  frame  in the  process  of  becom- 
ing  the  East  African  Comuni ty.  While  conti nent-wide  Pan-African  unity  re- 
mains  a  noble  ideal,  in the  practical  day-to-day  affairs  of  development  and 
interstate  relations  Africa  is a  continent  of regions  and  regional  organiza- 
tions  and  this  fact  is  reflected  in foreign  policy  behavior. 
Final ly,  Table  3  reflects  the  existence  of  "diplomatic  constellations" 
arising  out  of  intra-African  conflicts.  Ghana  under  President  Kwame  Nkrumah 
stood  for mi 1 i tant  Pan-Africanism,  state  social ism  and  anti-imperial ism aim- 
ing at the  removal  of  European  influence  and  colonial ism from  the continent. 
The  Ivory  Coast  under  President  Houphouet-Boigny  and  the  allied states  of 
the  Consei 1  de  1 ' Entente--Upper  Vol ta,  Togo,  Dahomey  and  Ni ger--opposed 
Ghana's  policies  and  there  thus  arose  a  system  of foreign  policy  action  and 
reaction  in West  Africa  centering  on  these  six  states. 
Since  the  foreign  policy  acts  in each  cell  may  he  further  broken  down 
into  types  of behavior,  such  as  cooperati ve  or  confl ictful , Table  3  provides 
amp1 e  opportuni ty  for  the detai led analysis  and  cornpari son  of i ntra-African 
foreign  pol icy.  A  second  research  opportunity  high1 ighted  by  the  table  is 
the  analysis  of  deviant  cases--states  that  do  not  fit the  general  pattern. 
Four  tropical  African  states--Ghana,  Nigeria,  Zaire  and  Ethiopia--were  we1 1 
linked as  actors  and  targets  to most  of the other states  of the  continent. 
Mhy  was  this  the  case?  While  these  four  countries  are  among  the  largest  or 
wealthiest  on  the  continent,  we  do  not  think  that  these  variables  were  opera- 
tive,  except  for  Nigeria,  the  most  populous  of African  states.  Under  President 
Nkrumah  Ghana  conducted  an  acti ve  foreign  pol icy in support  of  its Pan-Africanist 
and  anti-imperial i st pol i cies.  Thus,  Ghana  had  more  embassies  throughout  the 
continent  than  any  other  black  African  state.  These  policies  and  diplomatic 
network  are  reflected in Table  3.  Ethiopia,  on  the  other  hand,  was  a  center 
of  foreign  policy  because  of its role  as  host  to  the  O.A.U.  and  because  of 
the  personal  prestige  of  its Ernperior,  Haile  Selassie  I.  Zaire,  then  known 
as  Congo,  Kinshasa,  was  a  focus  of  intra-African  foreign  policy  because  of 
its instability  and  the  various  foreign  interventions  from  within  and  with- 
out  the  continent  in its internal  affairs. 
A  feature  of measuring  foreign  pol icy  behavior we  have  not yet  discussed 

is  the  fact  that  each  of  our  foreign  pol icy  actions  is coded  as  to  the  date 
at which  it occurred,  permitting  us  to  make  time-series  profiles  of  foreign 
policy  behavior.  Figure  2  takes  the  same  4,802  intra-African  foreign  policy 
actions  of  Table  3  and  graphs  them  as  a  frequency  histogram by  month.  As 
is  normal  in histograms,  the height  of  the  line above  each  month  represents 
the  number  of  foreign  policy  acts  of  that  type  undertaken  during  the  month  in 
question.  We  have  grouped  behavior  based  on  the  distinctions  introduced  in 
Table  2:  confl ict behavior  (categories  I-1,  neutral  behavior  (category  V), 
and  cooperati ve  behavior  (categories  VI-IX)  .  Thus,  thi rty-six  months  of  intra- 
African  forei gn  pol i cy  are  described  in the  fi gure. 
No  apparent  trends  in any  of  the  four  types  of  behavior  are  revealed  by 
Figure  2  over  the  entire  three year  time  span.  It is true  that  both  1965 
and  1966  manifest  more  behavior of all  types  than  1964,  but  1966  was  not  signi- 
ficantly  more  active  than  1965.  The  one  feature  of considerable  theoretical 
interest  is the  apparent  correlation  overtime  of conflict and  cooperative  types 
of  behavior.  Note  that  periods  of  conflict behavior  such  as  March-June  1965 
and  March-July  1966  are  also  periods  of high  amounts  of cooperative  behavior. 
This  pattern  also  is revealed  elsewhere  in the  figure where  as  conflict  declines 
so  does  the  level  of  cooperation.  This  pattern  of behavior  is not exclusively 
common  to states  of tropical  Africa.  It would  appear  that  international  crises 
and  confl icts  call  forth  both  confl ict behavior  (by  definition)  and  cooperative 
behavior  as  statesmen  consult  and  support  one  another  in efforts  to cope  with 
and  control  events. 35 
From  January  1964  to October  1964  a  clear  downward  trend occurred  in 
i ntra-African  foreign  relations  activity.  Some  confl ict was  registered  in 
August  1964,  the  second  month  of Moise  Tshombe's  premiership  in Zaire  and 
the  month  during  which  Stanleyvi 1 le (~isangani) fell  to  supporters  of Gizenga 
and  Gbenye.  From  Noverrber  1964  through  June  1965  the  trend  of activity moved 
sharply  upward  as  a  consequence  of  four intra-African  issues:  (1)  the  rebel- 
liorl  in Eastern  Zaire;  (2)  the  Fourth Afro-Asian  People's  Solidarity  Conference 
in Ghana  (May,  1965)  which  was  attended  by  three  hundred  delegates  representing 
more  than  seventy  political  organizations;  (3)  renewed  hostilities between 
Ethiopia  and  Somalia  in March  1965  and  the  continued  struggle  by  Kenya  against 
Soma1 i "shifta" ; and  (4)  the  diplomatic  offensive  launched  against  Nkrumah's 
Ghana  by  Niger,  the  Ivory  Coast  and  other  West  African  states  charging  Ghana 
with  supporting preparations  for  rev01 utions  in these  countries. 
The  period  July  1965  to  January  1966  was  not  marked  by  much  conflict 
and  generally  we  see  less  behavior  of  all  types  than  in  early  1965  or  1966. 
Of  course,  Rhodesia's  UDI  did  take  place  in  November  1965,  but  this  crucial 
event  generated  cooperati ve  behavior  among  black  African  states  in  October 
1965 within  the  context  of  the  OAU  Assembly  and  the  Council  of  Ministers 
meetings.  Conflict  behavior,  which  did  occur,  was  directed  outside  tropical 
Africa  to  the  whi te-ruled  South  and  Great  Britain. 
Beginning  in  February  1966  the  trend  again  turned  upward  as  a  consequence 
of  coups  d'etat  in  Nigeria  (twice) and  Ghana  and  the  constitutional  crisis 
in  Uganda  (February) where  Obote  suspended  the  constitution  because  of  an 
alleged  "coup".  In  the  case  of  the  fa1 1 of  power  of  Kwame  Nkrurnah  in  Feb- 
ruary  1966,  large  amounts  of  cooperative  behavior  were  directed  toward  Ghana 
by  Nkrumah's  former  opponents  while  Sekou  Toure's  Guinea,  where  Nkrumah  care 
to  reside,  conflicted  heavily  with  Ghana  and  to  a  lesser extent  the  Ivory 
Coast  for  the  remainder  of  the year.  After  July  1966  the  trend  again  turns 
downward  until  the  end  of  our  time  period  is  reached  in  December. 
There  does  seem  to  be  some  periodicity  in  Figure  2  in  that  the  first 
six months  of  each  year  register  more  behavior  than  in  the  last  six months. 
Why  this  is  so  is not  clear,  for while  the  U.N.  General  Assembly  meets  each 
fall  in  New  York  and  may  thus  draw  attention  away  from  intra-African  problems, 
the  OAU  Assembly  of  Heads  of  State  and  Government  also meets  in  the  fa1 1, 
which  one  would  expect  to  produce  intra-African  behavior.  There  is,  of  course, 
a  danger  in  positing  trends  or  regular  periods  of  high  and  low  activity 
levels  based  on  relatively  short  time  series.  We  would  need  data  covering 
ten  or  more  years  before  we  would  be  willing  to  make  general  statements  about 
the  behavior  of  African  foreign  policy  overtime. 
While  space  limitations  prevent  us  from  so  doing  in  this  chapter,  readers 
should  recognize  that  figures  such  as  Figure  2  could  be  created  for  any  single 
African  state  or  for  any  subset  of  these  states  and  since  the  AFRICA  data 
were  collected  on  a  daily  basis  the  time  interval  used  can  be  days,  weeks, 
months,  quarters  or  whatever  time  unit  is  of  interest to  the  researcher. 
We  view  this  time-series  aspect  of  foreign  policy  event  data  to  be  one  of 
its principal  advantages  because  it permits  us  to  ask  and  answer  basic  questions 
relating  to  stability - and  change  in  foreign  policy  behavior. 
Patterns  of  Black  African  Foreign  Pol icy 
Having  explored the  dimensions  of black  African  foreign  pol icy  and  the 
regional  subsystems  within  tropical  Africa,  we  will  not  attempt  to  answer 
a  number  of  questions  concerning  general  patterns  in their  behavior.  As 
Albert  Camus  once  noted,  there  is no  truth,  only  truths.  This  is certainly 
the  case  when  one  attempts  to  answer  inquiries  about  a  state's  foreign  policy. 
No  single  explanatory  scheme,  such  as  "power  pol i tics"  or Marxist  dialectical 
materialism,  can  cover  all  aspects  of  this  phenomenon.  This  is so  because  the 
foreign  policy  of  a  nation  is an  extraordinarily  broad  and  complex  happening. 
Thus,  in what  follows  we  encourage  readers  to  come  up  with  their  own  explana- 
tions  of African  foreign  policy  behavior  which,  as  hypotheses,  they  can  test 
and  compare  to our  findings. 
Table  4  reports  the  absolute  and  relative  frequency  of  the  foreign  policy 
behavior of  each  of  the  thirty-two  states  in the  AFRICA  project.  The  first 
col umns  represent  total  behavior  directed  to all  targets  and  the  columns  on 
the  right  report  behavior  di rected  toward  other  tropical  African states. 
Thus,  Tanzania  was  the  most  active  state,  initiating  1,233  foreign pol icy 
acts  over  this  three  year  period,  fifty-three  times  more  behavior  than  the  least 
active  state,  Botswana.  Tanzania's  behavior  represents  8.4  per  cent  of all 
behavior  observed  and  Botswana's  actions  are  only  0.2  per  cent  of all  behavior. 
The  most  active  state  in intra-African  relations  was  Ghana  with  374  actions, 
7.8  per cent  of the  total  intra-African  behavior  and  Botswana,  which  only  be- 
came  independent  in September  1966,  was  again  the  least  active. 
Table  4  clearly  neither  distinguishes  between  the  types  of foreign  pol icy 
actions  each  state  undertook,  nor  does  it inform us  about  who  were  the  targets 
of  their  actions.  However,  even  at  this  aggregate  level,  the  table  does  perrni t 
us  to  distinguish  between  active  and  passive  states.  The  ten  most  active  states, 
from  Tanzania  to  Zaire,  account  for  57.6  per  cent  of all  behavior  and  56.1  per 
cent  of intra-African  behavior.  The  ten  most  passive  states,  from  Malawi  to 
Botswana,  represent  only  8.4  per  cent  and  9.9  per cent  of  the  same  behaviors. 
This  means  that  Tanzania  or Ghana  individually  initiated nearly  as  much  foreign 
policy  actions  as  the  combined  totals  of these  ten  least  active  states. 
Now,  why  is  it that  some  African  states  are  comparatively  active  in foreign 
affairs  and  others  are  relatively  passive?  Note  that  such  a question  could 
neither  be  asked  nor  could  it be  answered  without  comparative  foreign  policy 
TABLE  4 
AFRICA  PROJECT  ACTORS 
AND  THEIR  FOREIGN  POLICY  FREQUENCIES,  1964-66 
Total  Behavior 
(n  =  14669) 
Intra-African  Behavior 
(n  =  4802) 
STATE 
absol ute  relative  absol ute  relative 
frequency  frequency  frequency  frequency 
Tanzania 
Ghana 
Zarnb i a 
Kenya 
Soma1 ia 
Ni geri a 
Uganda 
Ethiopia 
Senegal 
Zai re 
Ivory  Coast 
Niger 
Gui nea 
Ma1 i 
Sudan 
Dahomey  (Benin) 
To go 
Mauritania 
Upper  Vol ta 
Cameroun 
Congo  Republ i c 
Sierra  Leone 
Ma1 awi 
Chad 
C.A.R. 
Liberia 
Burundi 
Gabon 
Rwar; da 
Lesotho 
Gamb i a 
Botswana 
mean 
std.  dev. 
1  data  as  provided  by  the  AFRICA  project  data  set.  Second,  such  a  question 
is just  what  the  comparative  analysis  of  foreign  pol icy  is designed  to 
,  answer.  We  have  here  a variable,  the  frequency  of  foreign  pol icy behavior 
of  each  African  state  during  1964-66,  given  in the  left hand  column  of Table 
1  4.  Can  we  think  of  other  variables  that  may  be  related  to  this  measure  of 
activity  so  that  we  can  "explain"  foreign  policy  activity  by  demonstrating 
such  a  re1 ationship?  Scientific  or comparative  research  on  foreign  pol icy 
represents  nothing  more  complicated  than  establishing  relations  between 
variables  and  developing  theoretical  explanations  of why  they  exist. 36 
Let  us  be  "deductive"  and  attempt  first  of all  to  theorize  about  what 
may  "cause"  some  African  states  to  be  active  and  others  passive  in foreign 
t  affairs.  Frequently,  scholars  attempt  to  explain  foreign  pol icy variables 
I 
on  the  basis  of  features  of  the  individual  leaders  of nations.  Hence,  Presi- 
I  dent  Kwame  Nkrurnah's  Pan-African  proposals  for a  "continental  union  Govern- 
I  ment"  for Africa  probably  had  an  impact  on  Ghana's  foreign  pol icy as  did 
I  Emperor  Haile  Selassie's  longevity  and  prestige  on  Ethiopia's  foreign 
actions.  Explanations  of  foreign  pol icy  that  use  the  characteristics  of lead- 
ers  involve  what  James  N.  Rosenau  has  called  "individual"  variables.37  In 
our  view,  because  the  individual  characteristics  of leaders  are  so  difficult 
to  a  better  starting  point is  the  character  of the  acting state, 
such  as  its size,  wealth  or political  system.  When  one  uses  such  variables 
in an  effort  to explain foreign  pol icy one  is involved with  "national  attri- 
butes"  as  explanatory  factors.  In cost-benefit  terms  we  suggest  that  students 
should  attempt  to explain  the  foreign  behavior  of states  by  these  national 
attribute  characteristics  of states  and  then  look  at individual  variables 
only  when  attributes  fail  to do  the  job. 39 
What  features  of African  states,  then,  may  "cause"  them  to be  compara- 
tively  active  or  passive  in foreign  policy?  Quite often  answers  to  a  question 
such  as  this  are  suggested  by  thinking  about  the  nature  of the  phenomenon 
we  are  trying to  explain.  To  be  "active"  in foreign  affairs  implies  that  the 
state  has  the  capacity  or capability  to act  frequently.  That  is,  while  a 
state  may  have  the  capacity  to  undertake  an  active  foreign  policy  and  choose 
not  to  use  this  capacity  and  thus  be  passive,  if a  state  has  an  active  policy 
profile  it must  have  the capacity  to  produce  such  frequent  behavior.  All 
other  things  being  equal,  then,  the  greater a  state's  capability  to  conduct 
foreign  policy,  the  more  active will  be  its foreign  policy.  Now  capability 
may  take  various  forms,  but  certainly  the  extent  of available  resources 
and  an  extensive  diplomatic  network  contribute  to  a  state's  capacity  to  under- 
take  foreign  pol icy.  We  can  "measure"  resources  by  recording  each  black 
African  state's  Gross  Domestic  Product  in 1965  and  its diplomatic  network 
by  the  number  of  diplomats  it sent  abroad  in 1963-64.  Our  measure  of foreign 
policy  activity  is taken  from  Table  4. 
Having  decided  how  to  measure  or  "operationalize"  our  concepts  of  capacity 
and  foreign  policy  activity,  we  may  state  our  research  hypotheses: 
HI  The  greater  the  resources  a  state  possesses,  the  more 
active will  be  its foreign  policy. 
Hz  The  more  extensive  a  state's  diplomatic  network  is,  the 
more  active  will  be  its foreign  policy. 
HO  There  is no  relationship between  resources  or  diplomatic 
networks  and  foreign  pol icy activity. 
This  last hypothesis  is the  "null  hypothesis".  If we  can  show  that  it is 
false,  this  implies  that  H1  and  Hp  are  probably  correct  for  these  African 
states during  this  time  period. 
There  are  many  procedures  that  can  be  used  to  "test"  hypotheses  such 
as  ours;  Table  5  represents  one  such  approach  known  as  cross-tabulation. 
We  have  converted  our  quantitative  information  on  the  number  of  foreign 
policy actions,  the  dollar  value  of G.D.P.,  and  the  number  of  diplomats 
abroad  into  rank  orders.  Thus,  the  Sudan  had  a  comparatively  "large" 
G.D.P.  in 1965  and  was  "moderately  active"  in foreign  policy  between  1964 
and  1965.  When  each  of our  thirty-two  states  is given  the appropriate 
score  on  G.D.P.  and  foreign  policy  activity  it may  be  classified into one 
and  only  one  cell  of the  3  x  3  table.  Study  of Table  5  should  convince 
any  reader  that  there  is a  clear  pattern with twenty-one  of thirty-two 
states  in the  three  diagonal  cells  running  from  large  and  active  to small 
and  passive.  Eleven  states  do  not  fit the  pattern exactly,  with  the  Somali 
Republic  being  the  most  "deviant  case",  in that  it had  a  small  G.D.P.  but was 
in the  top  ten  most  active state  category.  It should  be  clear,  then,  that 
cross-classification  tables  such  as  Table  5  permit  researchers  to see  patterns-- 
resources  are  positively  related  to  foreign  policy  activity  -- and  to  identify 
exceptions  to our  general izations  that  require  further  research,  possibly 
of a  case  study  sort.40 
How  "strong"  i s  the  relationship  between  resources  and  activity  described 
TABLE  5 
THE  RELATIOI(St1IP  BETWEEN  RESOURCES  AND  FOREIGN  POLICY  ACT1 VITY 
- -- ---- _  _-.____p 
Gross  Domestic  Product,  1965(~) 
Extent  of 
Activity 
- - 
La rge --------  Medi urn  Srna 1 1  N 
GHANA  UGANDA  SOMALIA 
NIGERIA 
Active 
ETHIOPIA 
ZAIRE 
TAN ZAN I A 
KENYA 
SENEGAL 
ZAMB I A 
8  1  1  10 
SUDAN  CAMEROUN  CONGO,  B. 
IVORY  COAST  NIGER  TOGO 
DAHOMEY  MAURITANIA 
UPPER  VOLTA 
GUINEA 
MAL I 
Moderately 
Active 
2 
-- 
6  3  11 
SIERRA  LEONE  BURUNDI 
MALAW I  CAR 
CHAD  GABON 
LIBERIA  GAMBIA 
RWANDA 
LESOTHO 
BOTSWANA 
Passive 
SOURCES:  (a)  Calculated from  Table  4. 
(b)  Fro111 Donald  G.  Morrison,  et.  al.,  Black  Africa: .  A  Coxarative  Handbook 
(New  York:  Free  Press,  1972),  p.  50. 
NOTE :  Gacl~rr~a  . 80 . 
in Table  5?  Descriptive  statistics  perrni t  us  to  answer  such  questions. 
One  such  statistic  is Gamma,  a  measure  of  the  degree  of association  or 
correlation  between  two  rank  ordered  variables .41  The  formula  for  Gamna 
G  =  p$!  , where 
P  represents  the  number  of  rank  agreements  and  ()  the  number  of  rank, disagree- 
ments.  For  example,  there  are  eight  cases  in the  large-active  cell  and  twenty 
cases  in the  four  cells  below  and  to the  right of this  cell.  Mu1 tiplying 
8  x  20  gives  160,  which  is the  first element  of P.  To  get  the  first element 
of  Q  note  that  there  are  only  two  cases  in the  two  cells  below  and  to  the  left 
of Uganda ' s  cell,  giving  1  x  2  =  2.  Working  our way  through  Table  5  in this 
fashion  (rather  than  having  the  computer  do  it for  us  which  is normal)  pro- 
duces  the  fol lowing  calculations : 
Thus,  for  Table  5  Gamma  is  .8.  Gamma  can  range  from  .O  indicating  no  rela- 
tionship  to +1.0  or -1.0  indicating perfect  direct  or  indirect associations; 
we  may  conclude  that  the  relationship  between  resources  and  activity  is strong 
and  direct  as  predicted by  our  first hypothesis. 
Table  6  repeats  this  exercise  for  the  second  of our  hypotheses,  that 
diplomatic  networks  will  be  directly  related to  foreign  pol icy activity. 
The  pattern  is not  as  evident  as  in the  previous  test  and  this  is reflected 
in the  low  value  of Gamma,  .32.  The  reason  we  find  little support  for our 
second  hypothesis  is that  the  newly  independent  Eastern African states  had 
few  diplomats  but  active  foreign  policies  (the  few-active  cell)  and  because 
the  "old"  African  state  of  Liberia  had  many  diplomats  but a cautious  and 
passive  foreign  pol icy  during  this  time  period. 
It would  appear,  then,  that  our  first hypothesis  is strongly  supported 
but  that  our  second  hypothesis  receives  only  weak  support.  What  about  the  null 
hypothesis  of no  re1 ationship  between  capabi 1 i ty and  foreign  pol icy acti vi ty? 
We  hope,  of course,  to  show  that  this null  hypothesis  is false  so  that we  may 
infer  that  our  two  research  hypotheses  are  true  for  these  states  during  this 
time  period.  The  way  we  try to show  that  nu1 1  hypothesis  is wrong  is by  cal- 
culating  the  level  of  statistical  significance  of each  of our  observed  Gamnas, 
TABLE  6 
THE  RELATIONSHIP  BETWEEN  DIPLOMATIC  NETWORK  AND  FOREIGN  POLICY  ACTIVITY 
Number  of  Diplomats  Abroad,  1963-64(~) 
Extent Activi ty  Many  Few 
Active 
GHANA  ZAIRE  TAN ZAN I A 
NIGERIA  SOMAL IA  KENYA 
ETHIOPIA  ZAMBIA 
SENEGAL  UGANDA 
Moderately 
Acti ve 
CAMEROUN  NIGER  MAURITANIA 
MAL I  CONGO,  B. 
SUDAN  UPPER  VOLTA 
IVORY  COAST  DAHOMEY 
GUINEA  TOGO 
5  5  1  11 
--- 
LIBERIA  SIERRA  LEONE  GABON 
BURUNDI  GAMB I A 
CAR  RWANDA 
CHAD  MALAW I 
LESOTHO 
BOTSWANA 
Passive 
GAMMA  =  .32 
-  .  - - - .- --  ---  - --  - -----  --  - 
SOURCES:  (a)  Calculated  fro111 Table  4. 
(b)  Froni  Morrison,  et.al.,  - Black -- Africa,  p.  153. 
NOTE :  Garr~ma =  .32. 
.80  and  -32.  What  this  means  is  quite  simple.  Look  again  at  Table  5  where 
resources  and  activity are  related.  The  strength  of  this  relationship  as  measured 
by  Gamma  is  .80. Now,  what  "caused"  this  relationship  to  be  as  it is?  We  would 
like  to  believe  that  the  association  exists  because  our  reasoning  was  correct 
and  our  first  hypothesis  is  true,  resources  "cause"  foreign  pol icy  activity. 
However,  another  possible  "cause"  of  the  pattern  shown  in  Table  5  is mere  chance. 
That  is  to  say,  for  these  thirty-two  states  during  this  time  period  resources  I 
are  not  causally  related  to  foreign  pol icy  activity  and  therefore,  the  association 
we  see  and  index  by  calculating  Gamna  is  the  simple  consequence  of  a  random 
distribution  of  the  cases  into  the  nine  cells.  Another  way  of  stating  this 
is  that  if  countries  are  assigned  to  each  cell  on  a  random  basis,  then  each  cell 
wi  11  receive  one-ninth  or  between  three  and  four  countries.  This  obviously  did 
not  happen  in  Table  5,  so  when  we  do  a  test  of  significance  on  Gamma  we  determine 
the  probabi 1 i ty  that  mere  chance  produced  the  observed  distribution.  If  this 
probabi 1 i ty  is quite  small , say  less  than  .05,  we  may  say  the  nu1 1 hypothesis 
of  no  relationship  is false. 
The  calculation  of  the  significance  of  Gamna  is  too  lengthy  for  this  chapter,42 
so  we  merely  report  that  for  Table  5  it is  .0004  and  for  Table  6  it is  .19.  Thus, 
only  four  times  in  ten  thousand  would  chance  produce  the  relationship  seen  in 
Table  5.  We  may  therefore  reject  the  null  hypothesis  for  resources  and  regard 
our  first hypothesis  as  "true"  until  new  evidence  shows  it to  be  "wrong".  For 
Table  6,  on  the  other  hand,  random  assignment  could  produce  this  pattern  nineteen 
times  in  a  hundred.  While  chance  apparently  does  not  seem  to  be  a  big  factor, 
it is  greater  than  the  conventional  five  times  in  one  hundred,  so  we  cannot 
reject  the  null  hypothesis  and  we  must  conclude  that  our  second  hypothesis  con- 
cerning  diplomatic  networks  is probably  "wrong". 
We  have  now  shown  how  the  AFRICA  project  data  may  be  used  to  do  comparative 
or  scientific  studies  of  foreign  policy.  We  began  with  an  observation--that 
some  African  states were  active  and  others  were  passive  in  their overall  foreign 
pol icy  behavior.  We  then  asked  why  this  was  so  and  proposed  a  theoretical 
explanation  based  on  the  notion  that  states with  the  capacity  to  undertake  an 
acti ve  forei gn  pol icy  woul d  have  such  pol icies.  We  then  "operational i zed"  our 
concepts  by  using  frequency  of  actions  to  measure  foreign  pol icy  activity  and 
Gross  Domestic  Product  and  diplomats  abroad  to  measure  two  different  aspects 
of  capacity--resources  and  diplomatic  networks.  The  next  step  was  to  observe 
the  relationships  among  these  three  variables  by  constructing  Tables  5 and  6 
and  calculating  Gamna.  Having  found  a  "strong"  relation  between  activity  and 
resources  and  a  "weak"  relation  between  activity  and  diplomacy,  we  evaluated 
the  null  hypothesis  via  tests  of statistical  significance.  We  concluded  by 
determi ni ng  from  the  accumul ated evi dence  that  resources  probably  do  faci 1 i ta te 
an  active  foreign  policy  (accepting  Hi)  but  that  diplomatic  networks  probably 
play  no  role  in fostering  an  active  foreign  policy (rejecting  Hz). 
All  of  this  should  be  treated  as  an  example,  in that  many  readers  are 
probably  not interested  in what  explains differences  between  active  and  passive 
African  states.43  The  point  is to  encourage  you  to  create  foreign  pol icy 
variables  that  interest you  and  to  get  you  then  to  attempt  to  explain  African 
foreign  policy  behavior  in the  comparative  manner  we  have  just  illustrated. 
As  one  of  us  has  shown  elsewhere,44  this  process  of  asking  and  answering  corn- 
parati ve  questions  about  foreign  pol icy  behavior  can  produce  important  advances 
in our  understanding  of  international  relations. 
Let  us  now  look  somewhat  more  briefly  at  three  more  patterns  of black 
African  foreign  pol icy during the  middle  1960s:  intra-African  conflict, 
the  targets  of African  foreign  pol icy behavior,  and  the  individual  and  organ- 
izational  initiators  of  this  behavior.  Table  7  reports  the  frequency  by 
country  of confl ict behavior  among  our  thi rty-two  states.  During  1964-66 
these  states  initiated 885  conflict  acts,  or  18.4  per  cent  of  the  4,802  total 
intra-African  actions.  The  Somali  Republic  was  by  far  the  most  conflictful 
state  during  this  period  because  it undertook  forty-four  more  conflict actions 
than  Ghana,  the  second  ranking  state,  and  particularly  because  forty-six  per 
cent  of  its behavior  was  of the  conflict  type,  the  next  highest percentage  being 
Burundi's  29.3  per  cent.  Tanzania  is an  interesting exception.  By  volume  its 
thirty-six conflict  events  make  it one  of  the  ten  most  conflictful  states,  but 
this  was  only  10.8  per cent  of Tanzania's  total  intra-African  behavior,  which 
is considerably  below  average  for  a1 1  thirty-two  states. 
Again,  Table  7  suggests  many  questions,  one  of which  is why  do  some  African 
states  undertake  more  foreign  policy  conflict  behavior  than  others?  There 
are  two  explanations  that  are  frequently  cited  in the  literature on  foreign 
pol icy  behavior.  The  fi rst is that  domestic  confl ict fosters  external  conflict.45 
The  idea  here  is  that  elites  confronted  with  internal  instability and  violence 
wi 11  attempt  to  reduce wi thin-group  conflict  by  undertaking  conflict with  out- 
groups,  i .e.,  other  states.  El i tes  do  this,  often  call ed  "scapegoating",  be- 
cause  it is frequently  observed  that  when  members  of a  group  are  conflicting 
224 
TASLE  7 
TABLE  7:  INTRA-AFRICAN  CONFLICT  BEHAVIOR,  1964-66 
Absol ute  Z  of  Total 
Rank  Country  Val ue  Intra-African  Confl ictual  Behavior 
1.  Soma1 ia  142  46.0 
2.  Ghana 
3. 
98  26.2 
Kenya 
4. 
76  22.0 
Zaire  (Congo,  K.)  60 
5.  24.5 
6.  Uganda  45  18.8 
7.  Niger  42  23.5 
8.5  Tanzania  36  10.8 
8.5  To go  36  19.6 
10.  Guinea  35  25.8 
11.  Upper  Vol ta  30  19.8 
12.  Ivory  Coast  27  10.6 
13.  Burundi  24  29.3 
14.  Dahoney  (Benin)  21  13.3 
15.5  Nigeria  18  10.8 
15.5  Sudan  18  10.4 
17.  Zarnb i a  17  7.9 
18.5  Chad  15  14.7 
18.5  Senegal  15  10.7 
20.5  Congo,  Brazzaville  13  20.0 
20.5  Malawi  13  23.6 
22.  Rwanda  11  15.9 
23.  Central  African  Rep.  10  11.8 
24.  f4a 1 i  9  6.3 
25.5  Liberia  6  6.3 
25.5  Sierra  Leone  6  6.6 
27.  Cameroun  4  4.9 
28.5  Gabon  3  9.7 
28.5  Mauritania  3  5.0 
30.  Lesotho  1  10.0 
31.5  Botswana  0  0.0 
31.5  Garnb i a  0  0.0 
TOTAL  885  100.0% 
with  an  external  enemy  they  limit or  end  conflict  within  the  group.  A  second 
possible explanation  is based  on  a  simple  stimulus-response  model  called  "tit- 
for-tat".  According  to  this  argument,  if states  receive  confl ict behavior 
from  other  states  they  will  then  respond  in kind.  Foreign  pol icy  el ites behave 
in this  fashion  for  a  variety  of  reasons--because  the  most  effective  counter 
to  force  is superior  force,  because  such  behavior  has  been  learned  and  agrees 
with  the  rules  of  the  diplomatic  game,  and  because  they  lack  sufficient  imagi- 
nation  to  do  otherwise. 
We  thus  have  two  competing  hypotheses  designed  to  explain foreign  pol icy 
conflict  behavior  among  African states: 
Hi  The  greater  the  domestic  conflict an  African  state 
experiences,  the  more  foreign  conflict  it wi 11 
undertake. 
Hz  The  greater  the  foreign  conflict an  African  state 
receives,  the  more  foreign  conflict  it will  undertake. 
We  also  have  the  null  hypothesis: 
HO  There  is no  relation between  domestic  conflict or 
received  foreign  conflict and  foreign  conflict 
behavior  among  African  states. 
We  shall  use  the  first  column  of Table  7  to  measure  foreign  conflict behavior 
sent  to  other  African  states  and  another  part  of the  AFRICA  data  to measure 
the  extent  of conflict  received.  Domestic  conflict  is measured  by  the  total 
number  of  deaths  from  domestic  violence  in the  five year  period,  1961-1965.~~ 
Tables  8  and  9  present the  results  of our  test of the  preceding  hypotheses. 
There  is at best  only  a  moderate  relationship  between  domestic  conflict and 
foreign  conflict,  for  only  sixteen  of thirty-two  states  are  on  the  expected 
high-high  to  low-low  diagonal.  Deviant  cases  are  Togo  and  Guinea  that  had 
little domestic  conflict  between  1961  and  1965  but  had  high  foreign  conflict 
and  Rwanda  and  Cameroun  where  the  reverse  pattern  is observed.  Gamma  equals 
.43  which  is  in the  correct  direction,  but  it is not  significant  at the  .05 
level,  so  we  cannot  reject the  null  hypotheses  as  regards  domestic  conflict 
and  decide  that  Hi  is probably  "wrong".  Two  points  should  be  made  with  regard 
to  Table  8.  First,  our  finding  agrees  with  considerable previous  research 
that  found  little or no  relationship  between  domestic  and  foreign  conflict 
when  states  other  than  African  countries  were  ~tudied.4~ Second,  our  hypothesis 
would  have  been  supported  if the  four  deviant  cases  had  not occurred.  The 
TABLE  8 
THE  RELATIONSHIP  BETWEEN  DOMESTIC  CONFLICT  ADD  FOREIGN  CONFLICT 
- - - -  -  -  - - - - -- - - - - . --  - ----  --A  -  ----  -  - -  -  - - 
. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  -  - --  -  ---  . - --  - -- - - - 
Deaths  From  Domes tic  Violence,  1961-65 
Conf 1 ict Actions 
Sent , 1964- 66  Hi gh  Medi urn  Low  N 
- -- -- ----  -  --  -- 
KENYA  SOMAL IA  TOGO 
ZAIRE  GHANA  GUINEA 
ETHIOPIA  NIGER 
UGANDA  TANZANIA 
BURUNDI 
NIGERIA 
SUDAN 
ZAMBIA 
Medi unl 
DAHOMEY  UPPER  VOLTA 
CHAD  IVORY  COAST 
SENEGAL 
CONGO,  B. 
MALAW I 
RWANDA  GABON  C.A.R. 
CAMEROUN  LESOTHO  MAL I 
LIBERIA 
SIERRA  LEONE 
Low  MAURITANIA 
BOTSWAPJA 
GAMB I A 
2  2  7  11 
-----  ---  ----  ----A-  - 
N  10  11  11 
SOURCE:  C.  L.  Taylor  and  M.  C.  Hudson,  --- Handbook  of Pol i tican - and  Social  Indicators, 
2nd.  ed.  (New  Haven:  Yale  University  Press,  19721,  pp.  110-115. 
NOTE:  Gamnia  =  .43,  p  =  .07. 
TABLE  9 
THE  RELATIONSHIP  BETWEEN  FOREIGN  CONFLICT  RECEIVED  AND  SENT 
- -  -- - - -- - - - - -  ______ -  -_ 
I_ -- - -----  -- 
--  - 
Conflict  Actions  Received,  1964-66 Confl ict Actions 
ZAIRE 
Hi gh  ETHIOPIA 
TANZANIA 
GUINEA 
7 /  7 
1  'In I  IU 
BURUNDI  IVORY  COAST  UPPER  VOLTA 
SUDAN  DAHOMEY  CHAD 
CONGO,  B.  NIGERIA  SENEGAL 
ZAMBIA 
Med i urn  MALAW I  Gamma  =  .82 
p  .001 
Low 
RWANDA  C.A.R. 
MAL I  BOTSWANA 
SIERRA  LEONE 
LEBERIA 
MAURITANIA 
CAMEROUN 
GABON 
GAMB I A 
LESOTHO 
--  -  -----  0  -  2 ---_-  _  --_  9  11 
--. -  -  --. -  --- 
N 
- - - - - - - - - --  -- 
10  9  13  32 
--  --  - ---  __ 
question  naturally  arises  as  to  why  Rwanda,  Cameroun,  Togo  and  Guinea  do  not 
fit the  overall  pattern.  Comparative  case  studies  of  Rwanda  and  Cameroun 
on  the  one  hand  and  Guinea  and  Togo  on  the other  hand  are  clearly  suggested 
by  Table  8.  Therefore,  if a  hypothesis  fails  to  receive  support  this  result 
is not  necessarily  "bad".  Often  the  most  we  can  hope  to  achieve  is  the  rejection 
of  plausible but  factually  incorrect  hypotneses.  Such  results  unquestionably 
do  enhance  our  understandi ng  of  forei gn  pol i cy  behavior. 
Table  9  provides  striking support  for  our  second  hypothesis  that  conflict 
received  is associated with  conflict  behavior  undertaken.  The  va1 ue  of  Gama 
is positive  and  large,  twenty-one  of  thirty-two  cases  are  on  the  diagonal,  and 
chance  could  produce  such  a  distribution  less  than  once  in a  thousand  times. 
Our  only  sharply  deviant  case  is again  Togo  which  received  little foreiqn  con- 
flict  (one  act)  but  undertook  a  high  level  of conflict  behavior  (thirty-si~ 
acts).  This  may  be  explained  when  wenote  that  seventy-eight  per cent  of Togo's 
conflict activity  was  directed at its neighbor  to  the  west,  Ghana.  A  border 
dispute  with  Ghana  over  the  Ewe  people  who  1 ive  in both  countries  and  charges 
of  Ghanaian  interference  in Togolese  domestic  affairs  led Togo  to  be  a  relatively 
high  conflict  initiator.  It would  appear,  then,  that  our  second  hypothesis, 
the  "ti t-for-tat"  theory,  is supported  for  these  states  during  this  time  period. 
Since  it would  appear  that  there  is a  strong  tendency  for  African  states 
to  send  conflict  to  other African states  on  the basis  of  the  conflict  actions 
they  receive  from  these  same  states,  let us  look  somewhat  more  deeply  at  this 
pattern.  Table  10  presents  the  twenty-one  pairs  or dyads  of  African  states  that 
recorded  ten  or nore  conf:ict  behaviors  between  1964  and  1966.  Thus,  Soma1 ia sent 
si xty-nine  confl ict acts  to  Ethiopia,  making  this  the  single  most  confl ictful 
dyad  whereas  Zambia  sent  ten  such  acts  to  Ghana.  Table  10  tells  us  a  great 
deal  about  intra-African  foreign  policy conflict  in the  middle  1960s. 
First,  these  twenty-one  dyads  account  for  sixty-five  per  cent  of all  the 
conflict  behavior  within  tropical  Africa  at this  time,  a  very  large  proportion 
when  we  remember  that  there are  992  such  pairs  of  states.  Second,  note  that 
sixteen  out  of  twenty-one  dyads  are  contiguous,  illustrating  the  fact that 
African  states  mainly  conflict with  bordering states.  Conflict  at a  distance, 
particularly  the  most  intense  forms  such  as  mi1 i tary  incidents,  subversion  and 
coercion,  is infrequent.  Thi rd,  examination  of  the  AFRICA  data  indicates  that 
during  this  time  period  there  were  two  main  types  of confl ict behavior--border 
issues  and  interference  in internal  politics.  Some  states,  such  as  Somalia 
TABLE  10  ~ 
DYADIC  CONFLICT  IN  TROPICAL  AFRICA,  1964-66  ~ 
Military 
Contiguous  Incidents,  All  Conflict 
1 k  Dya d  States  Subversion,  Acts  Type  of  Conflict 
And  Coercion 
Somalia  Ethiopia 
Somalia  Kenya 
Ghana  Guinea 
Ethiopia  Sornal ia 
Kenya  Soma1 i a 
Niger  Ghana 
Togo  Ghana 
Upper  Vol  ta  Ghana 
Zaire  Congo,  B. 
Uganda  Zaire 
Guinea  Ghana 
Burundi  Rwanda 
Zaire  Burundi 
Ivory  Coast  Ghana 
Dahorney  Niger 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Border,  irredentist 
Border,  i rredenti st 
Interference,  defensive 
Border,  defens i ve 
Border,  defensi ve 
Interference,  defensi ve 
Interference,  offensive  &  defensive 
Interference,  defensive 
Interference,  defensi ve 
Interference,  offensi ve 
Interference,  offensive 
Interference,  offensi ve 
Interference,  offensi ve 
Interference,  defensive 
Border,  i rreden ti s t 
Chad  Sudan  Yes  5  12  Border,  defensive 
Malawi  Tanzania  Yes  2  11  Interference,  defensi ve 
Ghana  Zaire  No  1  11  Interference,  offensive 
Rwanda  Burundi  Yes  0  11  Interference,  defensive 
Ivory  Coast  Guinea  Yes  3  10  Interference,  defensive 
Zambia  Ghana  No  0  10  Interference,  defensive 
TOTAL  6 1  578  ~ 
1s  '?  OF  ALL  SUCH  ACTS 
DURING  1964-1 966 
and  Dahomey,  claimed  territory or  pooulations  "beloncjing"  to  neighboring  states  A 
and  thus  were  irredentist.  Others,  such  as  Ethiopia,  Kenya  an3  Chad,  defended 
their  possessions.  We  see  here  in  tropical  Africa  the  classical  pattern  of  I 
territorial ly revisionist  vs.  territorially  status  quo  powers. 
The  most  frequent  high  conflict  issue,  fifteen  out  of  twenty-one  cases, 
was  over sovereignty  and  non-interference  in domestic  affairs.  This  arose 
from  two  somewhat  different  processes.  First,  certain  states  such  as  Ghana 
and  Burundi  sought  to  change  the  domestic  and  foreign  pol i cies  or  personnel 
of neighboring  states  via  conflict  of an  offensively  interfering sort  which  i 
tended  to provoke  defensive  conflict  by  Niger,  Togo,  Upper  Volta,  Zaire  and 
the  Ivory  Coast.  The  second  pattern  was  when  internal  instability  or a  coup 
d'etat  created  situations  where  other African states  got involved  in a7  effort 
to  bring  to  power  friends  or  to  attack  those  who  removed  from  power  friends 
and  allies.  This  explains  Guinea's  conflict with  Ghana  after  the  overthrow 
of  President  Nkrumah  and  most  of  Zaire's  conflict  linkages.  We  think,  then, 
that  Table  10  illustrates  well  the  fundamental  question  asked  in comparative  I 
research  on  foreign  pol icy--"of  what  larger  pattern  is this  behavior  an  in~tance?"~8 --  - 
Each  time  this  question  receives  a  plausible  answer  students  and  researchers  wi 11  I 
have  achieved  considerable  progress  in understanding  and  explaining  the  forei gn  ~ 
pol icy behavior  being  studied. 
There  were  220  targets  toward  which  our  thirty-two  African  states  sent 
behavior  between  1964  and  1966.  Table  11  reports  in a  rank  order  fashion  the 
forty-si x  targets  that  received  one  hundred  or more  foreign  pol icy actions  during 
this  period.  Note  that  nearly  seventy-four  per cent  of African  foreign  policy 
behavior  was  sent  to just  twenty-one  percent  of  the  target:,  illustrating  the 
concentrated  nature  of  this  foreign  policy  behavior.  The  targets  fall  into  several 
meaningful  categories.  First  are  the  "top  dog"  nations  including  the  major 
colonial  powers  and  their political  and  economic  allies  such  as  the  United States,  ~ 
West  Germany  and  Japan.  It has  been  suggested  that  dependent,  "underdog"  nations 
will  interact more  with  powerful  metropolitan  top  dog  nations  than  with  each  1 
other .49  Our  data  certainly  do  not  contradict  this  proposition,  even  though  the 
second  most  important  category  of  targets  is other  African  states  ranging  from 
Ghana  to  Burundi. 
The  thi rd category  compri ses  the  two  major  communist  states-- the  People's 
Republic of  China  and  the  Soviet  Union.  Together  they  received  nearly  five  per 
cent  of African  foreign  pol icy  behavior  during  this  time  period whereas  the 
TABLE 11 
THE TARGETS  OF  AFRICA!$  FOREIGX  POLICY  BEHAVIOR,  1964-1965 
Rank  ia rge t  Acts  f 
Un i ted  Ki ngdorn 
Ghana 
France 
"Africa" 
United  States 
People's  Republ ic of  China 
Organization  of African  Unity 
Rhodesia 
Zai re 
Kenya 
Ethiopia U.S.S.R. 
Tanzania 
O.A.U.  Heads  of  State  Conference 
O.A.  U.  Council  of Ministers 
Gui nea 
U.N.  Economic  Com.  for Africa 
Uganda 
Niger 
West  Germany 
O.C.A.M. 
Sornal ia 
European  Econorni c  Comnuni ty 
Nigeria 
Egypt  (U.A.  R.  ) 
Uni ted Nations  Organization 
Ivory  Coast 
Zambia 
Consei 1  de  1 ' Entente 
Sudan 
Eas t Afri ca 
Republ ic of South  Africa 
Cornonweal th  of Nations 
Portugal 
llpper  Vol ta 
Ma1 i 
"Nestern"  countries 
Tunisia 
Be1 gium 
Togo 
U. N.  misc.  organs 
Da homey 
Chad 
Burundi 
East  African  C.S.O. 
Japan 
Unclear Targets  21 6  1.5 
Other  ~argets (N  =  173)  3659  24.9 
Total  14669  100.0 ---- 
NOTE :  Total  number  of targets  =  220. 
western  capital ist countries,  including  the  former  colonial  powers,  received 
nearly  fifteen  per  cent.  This  ratio of  3:l  indicates  the  absence  of non- 
a1 igned  foreign  pol icies  in tropical  Africa  during  the  middle  1960s.  African 
states  were  "pro-Western"  in their  behavior  patterns.50  The  fourth  type  of 
target  comprises  international  organizations  of a  uni versa1  type  (U.N.  ) , con- 
tinental  type  (O.A.U.)  and  regional  type  (O.C.A.M.)  of  importance  to  African 
states.  One  of  the  major  sources  of African  states'  power  and  influence  in 
international  affai rs  is thei r role  in international  organizations  and  this 
is reflected  in their  behavior.  Finally,  the  fifth category  contains  other 
African  states  not  part of  independent  black  Africa  during  1964-66  such  as 
Rhodesia,  South  Africa,  Egypt  and  Tunisia.  Action  was,  of course,  directed  at 
the  white  minority  regimes  of Southern  Africa  as  part of the  struggle  for  majority 
rule  and  decol oni za tion  in that  region.  Arab-speaki ng  northern  African  states 
received attention  from  sub-Saharan  African  states  because  of the  Arab  role 
in the  O.A.U.  and  in intra-African  linkage  building. 
It should  be  remembered  that  Table  11  summarizes  the  behavior  of all  thirty- 
two  African  states  in our  project.  Working  with  the  AFRICA  data,  students  and 
researchers  could  construct  a series  of such  tables  for  individual  African 
states  which  would  permit  a whole  series  of fascinating  comparative  research 
questions  to  be  asked  and  answered.  We  again  stress  that  in this  chapter  we 
can  only  illustrate  the character  and  a  small  part of  the  research  potential 
of  the  AFRICA  data,  primarily  in an  effort  to  stimulate  students  to do  compara- 
ti ve  studies  of  African  foreign  pol icy behavior  themsel ves. 
The  final  variable  we  shall  present from our  data  is information  on  who 
actual ly initiated each  foreign  pol icy action.  Table  12  reports  this  information 
for  all  behavior  and  for  intra-African  behavior.  One  weakness  of event  data 
is  immediately  apparent  in the  table,  the  fact  that  sources  of events  frequently 
do  not  report which  office or  member  of a  government  undertook  the  action. 
Rather,  they  say 
"Guinea  signed  a  trade  treaty with  Hungary. " 
or 
"Ghana  cl osed  i ts  border  with Togo. " 
In such  circumstances  we  can  only  code  that  the  "State  or  Society"  initiated 
the  behavior,  which  represents  29.3  per cent  of all  behavior  in our  data  set. 
However,  for  the  remaining  70.7  per cent  of behavior  we  do  know  who  it was  ~ 
that  acted  for  the  state. 
TABLE  12 
FOREIGN  POLICY  ACTOR  CATEGORY 
Events 
Source  of  Event  Total  Behavior  Intra-Africa  Behavior 
Absol ute  Relative  Absol ute  Relative 
Frequency  Frequency  Frequency  Frequency 
Head  of  State  5492  37.4  1843  38.4 
State  or  Society  4294  29.3  1 1 36  23.7 
Foreign  Minister  921  6.3  331  6.9 
Misc.  Minister  846  5.8  328  6.8 
Gov' t. as  a  Whole  70 0  4.8  2 74  5.7 
Official  Delegation  659  4.5  335  7.0 
Finance  Minister  41 9  2.9  53  7.1 
Diplomat  Ambassador  390  2.7  153  3.2 
Unspecified  Individual  209  1.4  102  2.1 
Exec.  Department  156  1.1  45  0.9 
Official  of  Exec.  128  0.9  48  1.0 
Organization  104  0.7  27  0.6 
Defense  Mini ster  86  0.6  46  1 .O 
An  Indi vi dual  7 1  0.5  10  0.2 
Legislature  as  a  Whole  40  0.3  13  0.3 
Mi  1 i tary  Forces  40  0.3  24  0.5 
Member  of  Legislature  35  0.2  12  0.2 
Group  of  Individuals  26  0.2  6  0.1 
Group  of  Organizations  26  0.2  4  0.7 
Mi  1 i tary  Official  15  0.1  6  0.7 
Pol i tical  Party  Officer  12  0.1  6  0.1 
Total  14669  4802 
In  tropical  Afri ca  where  the  bureaucratic  organi zations  that  manage  forei gn 
affairs  are  small  and  new,51  individuals,  particularly  heads-of-state  and  foreign 
ministers,  take  most  foreign  pol icy actions.  Organizations,  groups  and  other 
individuals  are  far  less  important,  except  that  in i ntra-African  affairs  official 
delegations  are  used  frequently  as  foreign  policy  actors.  Also  note  that  finance 
ministers  are  not  very  important  within  Africa  but  rather  frequent  representa- 
tives  of  their  states  in general  foreign  affairs.  Why  is it then,  that  official 
delegations  are  important  in one  arena  and  finance  ministers  in another?  Why 
is  it that  heads-of-state  initiate nearly  forty  per  cent  of all  African  foreign 
pol icy  behavior?  Why  is it that  executive  departments  such  as  foreign  ministries 
are  relatively  unimportant  actors?  Studies  of the  bureaucratic  pol i tics  and 
organizational  process  aspects  of forei gn  pol icy behavior are  designed  to  pro- 
vide  answers  to  such  questions .52  We  shall  neither  summarize  that  1 i terature 
nor  attempt  answers  to  the  above  questions  at this  time.  We  do,  however,  invite 
students  to  read  into  this  literature,  to  use  the  AFRICA  data  to construct 
tables  like Table  12  for sets  of  African states  of interest to  them,  and  then 
to ask  and  attempt  to  answer  comparative  questions  about  this intriguing  aspect 
of African foreign policy. 
Concl usion 
As  we  noted at the  outset  of  this  chapter,  the  foreign  policy  behavior 
of  a  nation  is an  extremely  complex  matter  to describe  and  explain  in a  systematic 
fashion.  If we  think  of a  state's  foreign  policy  as  the  external  goals  its 
leaders  establ ish and  the  actions  they take  to  achieve  these  goals,  then  we  are 
confronted with  great  difficulties  in gathering  information  about  goals  and 
actions.  There  are,  however,  a  variety  of types  of data  that may  be  used  to 
achieve  this  purpose: 
(1 )  votes  in international  organizations ; 
(2)  memberships  in organizations,  all iances  and  treaties; 
(3)  transactions  of  goods  (trade  and  aid),  people  (tourism 
and  students)  and  i deas  (news  service  subscriptions , 
book  translations,  letters) ; 
(4)  surveys  of mass  and  elite attitudes  on  foreign  affairs; 
(5)  networks  of diplomatic  representation; 
(6)  themati c  perceptions  as  revealed  in speeches  of leaders; 
(7)  simulations  of  behavior  by  nationals  of  the countries 
i nvol ved; 
(8) decisions  made  by  leaders;  and 
(9)  actions  actually  undertaken  by  the  states. 
While  all  of  these  data  types  are  useful,  the  AFRICA  project  chose  to  work  with 
actions  as  described  in "newsworthy"  events  reported  in a  pub1 ic chronology-- 
Africa  Research  Bulletin.  Event  data  are  clearly  most  directly  related  to  the 
foreign  policy actions  of  states  and  since  many  events  report  verbal  desires 
and  intentions  (see  Tables  1 and  Z),  they  are  a  good  source  of  information  on 
goals  as  well. 
Host  of  this  chapter  has  involved  a  description  of how  the  AFRICA  event 
data  were  made  and  i 11 ustrations  of  how  these  data  can  be  used  to  describe 
African  foreign  policy  behavior  and  to  explain  that  behavior  as  well.  Since 
our  data  include  14,699  events  by  thirty-two  states  or  forty-three  political 
regimes,  each  event  being coded  for  thirty  different  variable  attributes,  we 
could  only  scratch  the  surface  of the  AFRICA  project  data  in this  report. 
Other  uses  that  have  been  made  of the  AFRICA  data  involve descriptions  of basic 
foreign  pol icy    at terns ,53  studies  of how  national  cultural  attributes relate 
to  behavior,54  the  analysis  of  foreign  conflict,  participation  and  dependence 
among  African  states ,55  and  tests  of status-field  theory. 56  Since  the  AFRICA 
data  are  publ ic,57  anyone  may  acqui re them  for  thei r own  research.  The  study 
of African  international  re1 ations  does  not merely  invol ve  reading  textbooks 
such  as  this.  Students  should  not  just  consume  knowledge  about  African foreign 
policy,  they  should  try  to produce  such  knowledge  themselves.  If this  chapter 
has  stimulated  some  readers  to  use  the  AFRICA  data  in their own  research,  we  wi 11 
have  achieved  our  purpose  and  we  wish  you  luck  in your  research! 
END  NOTES 
Johan  Galtung,  "The  Social  Sciences:  An  Essay  on  Polarization  and  Inte- 
gration,"  in-K.  Knorr  and  J .l. Rosenau,  eds. ,- Contending  Approaches  to 
International  Politics  (Princeton:  Princeton  Uni versi tv  Press.  1969). 
Some  of  the  better  case  studies  are:  A. K.  Akinyemi , Foreign  Pol icy  and 
Federal ism:  The  Ni qerian  Experience  (Ibadan:  Ibadan  University  Press, 
1974) ; J.  Barber,  South  Africa's  Foreign  Pol icy,  1945-1970  (New  York: 
Oxford  University  Press,  1973) ; C.  Hoskyns,  "Africa's  Foreign  Relations : 
The  Case  of Tanzania,"  International  Affairs  44  (July  1966) :  446-462; 
G.  Idana.  Niaeria:  Internal  Politics  and  Foreian  Pol icy,  1960-1966 J  -  d  d 
(Ibadan:  Ibadan  University  Press,  1974) ; K.  Ingham,  ed. , Foreign  Relations 
of Afri can  States  (London :  Butterworth,  1974) ; C.  McMas ter,  Ma1 awi : 
Foreiqn  Policy  and  Development  (New  York:  St.  Martin's  Press,  1974);  S. 
Nolutshungu,  South  Africa  in Africa  (New  York:  Africana  Press,  19;4)  ; 
W.A.E.  Skurni k,  The  Foreign  Pol icy of  Senegal  (Evanston:  Northwestern 
University  Press,  1972);  W.S.  Thompson,  Ghana's  Foreign  Pol icy,  1957-1966 
(Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press,  1969) ; J. E.  Spence,  Republ ic under 
Pressure:  A  Study  of South  African  Foreign  Policy  (London:  Oxford Uni- 
versity  Press,  1965);  A.  Vandenbook,  South  Africa  and  the  World  (Lexington: 
University  of  Kentucky  Press,  1970) ; J.  Pettman,  Zambia:  Security  and 
Conflict  (New  York:  Africana,  1974). 
The  1 i terature  on  the  comparati velscientific  study  of  foreign  pol icy  has 
grown  rapidly  in recent years.  Starting  points  are:  James  N.  Rosenau, 
The  Scientific  Study  of  Foreign  Pol icy  (New  York:  Free  Press,  1971 ) ; 
Patrick  J.  McGowan  and  Howard  B.  Shapiro,  The  Comparative  Study  of  Foreign 
Pol icy:  A  Survey  of  Scientific  Findings  (Beverly  Hi 11 s :  Sage  Publ i cations, 
1973);  James  N.  Rosenau,  ed.,  Comparing  Foreign  Pol icies:  Theories,  Findinqs, 
and  Methods  (New  York:  Hal sted  Press,  1974) ; Charles  W.  Kegley,  Jr.,  et. a1 . , 
eds.,  International  Events  and  the  Comparative  Analysis  of  Foreign  Pol icy 
(Col umbia:  Uni versi t-y of  South  Carol ina  Press,  1975) ; and  chapters  in 
Patrick  J.  McGowan,  eb.,  Sage  International  Yearbook  of  Foreign  Pol icy 
Studies  (Beverly  Hi 11s:  Sage  Publ ications,  annual  since  1973). 
A.  Brecht,  Pol i tical  Theory  (Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press,  1959), 
pp.  113-116. 
All  requests  for  the  AFRICA  data  should  be  sent  to:  The  Inter-[lniversity 
Consortium  for  Political  and  Social  Research,  P.O.  Box  1248,  Ann  Arbor, 
Michigan,  48106,  U.S.A.,  attention  I.R.  Archive. 
See  HcGowan  and  Shapiro,  The  Comparative  Study  of  Foreign  Policy,  for  the 
few  comparative  African  studies  publ ished  up  to  1973. 
Patrick  J.  McGowan,  "Africa  and  Nan-a1 ignment:  A  Comparative  Study  of 
Foreign  Pol icy,"  International  Studies  Quarterly 12  (September  1968) : 
262-295  and  McGowan.  "The  Pattern  of African  Diplomacy:  A  Quantitative 
Comparison,"  ~ournai of  Asian  and  African  Studies  4  (july  1969):  202-221. 
Part  of  these  aggregate  data  have  been  publ ished  in Donald  G.  Morrison, 
et.  al.,  Black  Africa:  A  Comparative  Handbook  (Rew  York:  Free  Press, 
1972).  The  remainder  are available  from  the  address  given  in  footnote  5. 
9.  See  Thomas  H.  Johnson  and  Gary  K.  Gartin,  "A  Preliminary  Examination  of 
Foreign  Conflict  Behavior  in  Independent,  Black  Africa,  1964-1966,"  A  paper 
presented  to  the  annual  meeting  of  the  International  Studies  Association 
I  (West) , San  Francisco,  Apri 1  1975. 
10.  The  AFRICA  data  are  being  updated  (for the  years  1967-1969)  by  Ms.  Martha 
Gephart  with  the  support  of  a  National  Science  Foundation  doctoral  research 
grant.  Ms.  Gephart's  data  should  soon  be  available  from  the  Consortium 
address  given  in  footnote  5. 
11.  See  C.A.  McClelland  and  Gary  D.  Hoggard,  "Conflict Patterns  in  the  Inter- 
actions  among  Nations,"  in  J.N.  Rosenau,  ed.,  International  Politics  and 
Foreiqn  Policy  (New  York:  Free  Press,  1969),  pp.  71 1-724,  and  C.A.  ~IcClelland, 
et.  al.,  "The  Management  and  Analysis  of  International  Event  Data:  A  Corn- 
puteri zed  System  for  Moni tori ng  and  Projecting  Event  Flows. "  Los  Angeles : 
Worl d  Event/Interaction  Survey  Project,  University  of  Southern  Cal ifornia, 
1971.  (Mimeographed. ) 
12.  For  a  survey  of  event  data  see  Phili~  Buraess  and  Richard  W.  Lawton, 
Indicators  of  International  ~ehavior': An  ~sgessment of  Events  Data  ~esearch 
(Beverly  Hills:  Sage  Publications,  1972)  and  C.W.  Kegley,  et.  al.,  eds., 
International  ~vents. 
13.  Charles  A.  NcClelland,  "Some  Effects  on  Theory  from  the  International  Event 
Analysis  Movement,"  Los  Angeles:  WEIS  Project,  U.S.C.,  1970.  (Mimeographed. ) 
14.  As  discussed  in  Ronald  G.  Sherwin,  WEIS  Project  Final  Report  (10s Angeles: 
School  of  International  Relations,  University  of  Southern  California,  1973). 
15.  That  is,  there  are  n(n-1)  or  32  x  31  =  992  directional  or  AHB pairs  of 
states  and  n(n-1 )/2  or 496  non-directional  pairs,  where  A  * B. 
16.  Char1 es  A.  McCl el l and,  "Many  American  Forei gn  Pol i cies :  The  Stresses  from 
Mu1 tiple  Goals  and  Complex  Administration,"  in  M.B.  Hickman,  ed.,  Problems 
of  American  Foreign  Policy  (Beverly  Hills:  Glencoe  Press,  1968), pp.  14-19. 
17.  Charles  W.  Kegley,  Jr.,  "The  Generation  and  Use  of  Events  Data,"  in  C.W. 
Kegley,  et.al.,  eds.,  International  Events,  p.  99. 
18.  For  a  discussion  of  "issue-areas"  see  James  N.  Rosenau,  "Pre-theories  and 
Theories  of  Foreign  Policy,"  in  R.B.  Farrell , ed.,  Approaches  to  Comparative 
and  International  Pol i tics  (Evanston:  Northwestern  University  Press,  1966), 
p.  67  and  passim  and  C.A.  McClelland,  P.J.  McGowan  and  Wayne  R.  Martin, 
Threat,  Confl ict,  and  Commitment:  Final  Report  of  the  Threat  Recognition 
and  Analysis  Project  (Los  Angeles :  International  Relations  Research  Institute, 
University  of  Southern  California,  1976),  Part  11,  pp.  32-36. 
19.  McClelland  and  Hoggard,  "Conflict  Patterns,"  p.  713. 
20.  Gary  Hoggard,  "Differential  Source  Coverage  in  Foreign  Pol icy  Analysis ," 
and  Fobert  Burrowes,  "Mi rror,  Ki rror,  on  the  :/all  . . . . A  Corn~ari  of 
Event  Data  Sources ," in J.A.  Rossnau,  ed.,  Comparing  Foreiqn  Pol icies, 
pp.  353-81  and  pp.  363-406. 
21.  P. J.  McGowan,  James  Kean  and  Robert  Morle,  "A  Manual  and  Codebook  for  the 
Identification,  Abstraction  and  Codinq  of  Foreiqn  Po1ic.y  Acts."  AFRICA 
Project  Research  Report,  no.  1.  Syracuse:  Department  of  Pol i tical  Science, 
Syracuse  University,  1972.  (Mimeographed. ) , p.  1. 
22.  Burgess  and  Lawton,  Indicators  of  International  Behavior,  p.  43. 
23.  Rosenau,  Scientific  Study  of  Foreign  Policy,  pp.  197-237. 
24.  McGowan,  Kean  and  Morje,  "A  Manual  and  Codebook,"  passim. 
25.  WEIS  stands  for  the  World  Event/Interaction  Survey.  See  Sherwin,  WEIS 
Fi nal  Report. 
26.  Patrick  J.  McGowan  and  James  Kean,  "Coding  Reliability  of the  AFRiCA  Project 
Data. "  AFRICA  Project Research  Report,  no.  2.  Syracuse :  Department  of 
Pol i tical  Science,  Syracuse  University,  1972.  (Mimeoaraphed.) , p.  8. 
27.  Ibid. 
28.  Our  action  categories  are  derived  from the  original  WEIS  codes,  see 
Sherwin,  WEIS  Final  Report,  as  modified  by  Walter  H.  Corson,  "Measuring 
Confl ict and  Cooperation  Intensity  in East-West  Relations:  A  Manual  and 
Codebook,"  Ann  Arbor:  Institute  for  Social  Research,  Uni versi ty  of 
Michigan,  1970.  (Mimeographed.),  pp.  16ff.  They  are  similar  to  the  Corn- 
parative  Research  on  the  Events  of Nations  (CREON)  Project,  see,  Charles 
F.  Hermann,  et.al.,  CREON:  A  Foreign  Events  Data  Set  (Beverly  Hills: 
Sage  Publ i cations,  1973). 
As  argued  by  Raymond  W.  Copson,  "Conflict  in the  Foreign  Policy of African 
States,  1964-69,"  in P.J.  McGowan,  ed.,  Sage  International  Yearbook  of 
Foreign  Pol icy  Studiel,  vol . 1  (Beverly  Hi 11 s :  Sage  Publ i cations , 1973), - 
pp.  199-200. 
30.  McClel land  and  Hoggard,  "Conflict  Patterns ," pp.  716-71 7 and  C.W.  Kegley, 
Jr.,  A General  Empi ri cal  Typology  of Forei gn  Pol icy Behavior  (Beverly  Hi 11 s : 
sage  Publ ications,  1972). 
31.  I. William  Zartman,  "Africa  as  a  Subordinate  State  System  in International 
Relations,"  International  Organization  21  (1967) :  545-564,  and  Zartman, 
"Africa,"  in James  N.  Rosenau,  et.al.,  eds.,  Horld Politics  (New  York: 
Free  Press,  1976),  pp.  569-94. 
David  H.  Johns,  "Diplomatic  Activity,  Power,  and  Integration  in Africa" 
in P. J.  McGowan,  ed.,  Sage  International  Yearbook  of Foreign  Pol icy  Studies, 
vol.  3  (Beverly  Hills:  Sage  Publications,  1975),  pp.  85-105,  and  Johns, 
"The  'Normal ization' of  Intra-African  Diplomatic  Activity,"  Journal  of 
Modern  African  Studies  10  (December,  1972) :  597-610. 
Behavior  may  have  occurred,  but  it was  either  so  routine  as  to  have  been 
ignored  by  the  editors  of  our  source,  Africa  Research  Bulletin,  or  it was 
secret,  covert  behavior  that  wi  11  not  be  known,  if  ever,  until  the  relevant 
national  archi ves  are  opened.  As  regards  cl assi fied  or  secret  behavior, 
it may  be  estimated  to  involve  only  five  to  ten  per  cent  of  all  behavior, 
and  when  it is  significant,  such  as  the  recent  U.S.  "covert"  intervention 
in  Angola,  it often  becomes  known  pub1 ically  after  the  fact  and  is  thus  re- 
corded  in  an  event  data  collection. 
W.  R.  Thompson,  "The  Regional  Subsystem:  A  Conceptual  Ex~lication and  a 
Propositional  Inventory,"  ~nternaiional Studies  ~uarterly 17  (March  1973) : 
89-117. 
For  a  summary  of  our  knowledge  on  crises,  see  Charles  F.  Henann,  ed., 
International  Crises :  Insights  from  Behavioral  Research  (New  York:  Free 
Press,  1972) . 
Fred  N.  Kerlinger,  Foundations  of  Behavioral  Research  2nd  ed.  (New  York: 
Hol  t,  Rinehart  and  Winston  1974), argues  that  such  activity  is common  to 
all  branches  of  the  social  sciences. 
James  N.  Rosenau,  The  Adaptation  of  National  Societies  (New  York:  McCaleb- 
Seiler,  1970). 
For  genuinely  i nnovati ve  work  in  attempting  to  measure  psychological  trai ts 
of  leaders  see  Margaret  G.  Hermann,  "Leader  Personality  and  Foreign  Pol icy 
Behavior,"  in  J.N.  Rosenau,  ed.,  Comparing  Foreign  Pol icies,  pp.  201-234. 
That  is,  for  readers  who  know  some  elementary  statistics,  all  we  are  saying 
is  that  national  attribute  variables  should  be  used  to  explain  statistical ly 
as  much  variance  as  possible  in  foreign  policy  behavior.  The  variance  not 
explajned  by  such  variables,  when  it is  large,  should  then  be  considered 
as  a  consequence  of  leaders '  characteristics. 
Reasons  why  Somalia  was  so  active,  despite  its small  G.D.P.,  have  been  men- 
tioned  earl ier  on  in  this  chapter.  A  useful  exercise  would  be  to  frame  an 
explanation  of  activity  based  upon  factors  other  than  resources  and  then 
do  a  case  study  of  Soma1 ia  to  see  if  it fits your  explanatory  model. 
Li nton  C.  Freeman,  Elementary  Appl ied  Statistics  (New  York:  Wi  ley,  1965), 
pp.  79-88. 
Ibid.,  pp.  162-175. 
But,  it should  be  noted  that  relative  activity  levels  seems  to  be  a  funda- 
mental  characteristic  of  foreign  pol icy  behavior,  see  Charles  W.  Kegley, 
Jr.,  et.al.,  "Convergencies  in  the  Measurement  of  Interstate  Behavior," 
in  P. J.  McGowan,  ed.,  Sage  International  Yearbook  of  Foreign  Pol icy  Studies, 
vol.  2  (Beverly  Hills:  Sage  Publications,  1973), pp.  309-339. 
McGowan  and  Shapiro,  The  Comparative  Study  of  Foreign  Pol icy,  passim. 
A.B.  Bozeman,  Conflict  in  Africa  (Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press, 
1975); L.  Coser,  The  Functions  of  Social  Conflict  (New  York:  The  Free  Press, 
1956);  and  L.  Coser,  Continuities  in the  Study  of  Social  Conflict  (New 
York:  The  Free  Press,  1967). 
Taken  from  C.L.  Taylor  and  M.C.  Hudson,  World  Handbook  of  Political  and 
Social  Indicators,  2nd  ed.  (New  Haven:  Yale  University  Press,  1972),  pp. 
110-115. 
R.J.  Rummel,  "Dimensions  of  Conflict  Behavior  within  and  between  Nations," 
Genera1  Systems  Yearbook  8  (1963):  pp.  1-50;  Rummel,  "Some  attributes  and 
Behavioral  Patterns  of Nations ," Journal  of Peace  Research  4  (1967) : 
196-206;  R.  Tanter,  "Dimensions  of  Conflict  Sehavior  within  and  between 
Nations,"  Journal  of  Conflict  Resolution  10  (1966):  41-46. 
James  N.  Rosenau,  Scientific  Study  of  Foreiqn  Pol icy,  p.  31. 
Johan  Gal tung,  " International  Relations  and  International  Confl icts :  A 
Sociological  Approach,"  a  paper  presented  to  the  International  Socioloqical 
Association,  September  1966;  Marshall  R.  Singer,  Weak  States  in a  'lorld 
of  Powers  (New  York:  Free  Press,  1972);  and  Singer,  "The  Foreign  Policies  of 
Small  Developing  States,"  in J.N.  Rosenau,  et.al.,  eds.,  World  Politics:  An 
Introduction  (New  York :  Free  Press,  1976),  pp.  263-290. 
McGowan,  "Africa  and  Non-a1 ignment ," and  McGowan,  "The  Pattern of African 
Diplomacy. " 
Published studies  of African foreign  policy  decision  making  and  organization 
are:  T.M.  Shaw,  "The  Foreign  Policy  System  of Zambia,"African  Studies  Review 
19  (April  1976) :  31-66;  I .W.  Zartman, "Decision-making  among  African  Govern- 
ments  on  Inter-Afri can  Affai rs,"  Journal  of ~evelo~ment  2  (January 
1966):  98-119;  D.G.  Anqlin,  "Zambia  and  the  Recoanition  of Biafra."  African 
Review  1  (September  1977):  102-136;  M.A.  East,  "Foreign  Policy ~akin~ 
Small  States:  Some  theoretic  Observations  Based  on  a  Study  of  the  Uganda 
Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,"  Pol icy Sciences  4  (December  1973) :  491-508; 
M.  Dei-Anang,  The  Administration  of  Ghana's  Foreign  Relations,  1957-1965 
(Atlantic  Highlands,  N. J. :  Humanities  Press,  1975) ; S.A.  Gi telson,  "Why 
Do  Small  States  Break  Diplomatic  Relations  wi th Outside  Powers?  Lessons 
from  the  African  Experience,"  International  Studies  Quarterly 18  (December 
1974):  451-484;  A.H.M.  Kirk-Green,  "Diplomacy  and  Diplomats:  The  Formation 
of  Foreign  Service  Cadres  in Black  Africa,"  in K.  Ingham,  ed.,  Foreign  Re- 
lations  of African  States  (London:  Butterworth,  1974)  pp.  279-322;  C.S. 
Phi 11 ips,  Jr.,  The  Development  of Nigerian  Foreign  Pol icy  (Evanston: 
Northwestern  Uni versi ty  Press,  1964) ; and  6. V.  Mtshal i , "The  Zambian  Forei gn 
Service  1964-1972,"  African  Review  5  (1975) :  303-316. 
As  in,  for  example,  Henry  A.  Kissinger,  "Domestic  Structure  and  Foreign 
Pol icy,"  Daedal us  95  (Spring  1966):  503-529  and  Graham  T.  All ison,  "Con- 
ceptual  Models  and  the  Cuban  Missile  Crisis ," American  Political  Science 
Review  58  (September  1969):  689-718. 
Patrick  J.  McGowan,  "Dimensions  of African  Foreign  Pol icy  Behavior:  In 
Search  of  Dependence,"  AFRICA  Research  Report,  no.  3.  Syracuse:  Department 
of  Pol i tical  Science,  Syracuse  University,  1972.  (~imeographed. ) 
P. J.  McGowan,  R.  Lewis  and  H.  Purkitt,  Cu1 ture  and  Foreign  Policy  Behavior: 
A  New  Look  at an  Old  Problem  with  African  Data  (Beverly  Hi 11s:  Sage  Pro- 
fessional  Paper  in International  Studies,  1977). 
55.  P.J.  McGowan  and  K.P.  Gottwald,  "Small  State  Foreign  Policies:  A  Compara- 
tive  Study  of  Participation,  Conflict  and  Political  and  Economic  Dependence," 
International  Studies  Quarterly 19  (December  1975):  469-500. 
56.  Brian  W.  Tornlin,  "Relative  Status  and  Foreign  Policy  Behavior,"  Journal  of 
Conflict  Resolution,  forthcoming,  1977. 
57.  As  described  in  footnote  5. 
ACP  States.  See  European  Economi c  Communi ty 
Africa,  Central,  .js  a  subsystem,  208-21 1 
Africa,  East.  Set  also  Kenya,  Tanzania  and  Uganda 
as  a  subsystem,  208-211 
conflicts  in,  141-153 
regional  integration  in,  126-156 
Africa,  Equatorial,  as  a  subsystem,  210 
Africa,  Southern 
as  a  subsystem,  208-21 1 
Angola  in,  108-110,  118 
Botswana  in,  114-116 
Lesotilo  in,  114-116 
Malawi  in,  113-114 
Mozambique  in,  110-112 
Namibia  in,  105-107 
regional  relations  in,  90,  105-121 , 146-147 
Republic  of  South  Africa  in,  105-121 
Rhodesia  in,  107-108 
Swaziland  in,  114-1 16 
Tanzania  in,  116 
Zaire  in,  116 
Zambia  in,  112-113 
Africa,  West,  as  a  subsysteni,  208-211 
AFRICA  Project.  See  African  Foreign  Relations  and  International  Conflict 
Analysis 
Africa  Research  Bulletin,  as  a  data  source  for  the  AFRICA  project,  196 
African  Foreign  Relations  and  International  Conflict  Analysis  (AFRICA), 
178-173,  790-241 
coder  reliability  of  data  in,  197 
coding  rules  for,  199-201 
data  coll ecti ng  procedures  for,  196-1 97 
data  set  for,  193-201 
data  source,  196 
operational i zation  of  data  for,  195-196 
updating  of  data  for,  237n 
African  uni ty.  See  Pan-Africanism 
Afro-Asian  People's  Solidarity  Conference  (May,  1965),  21 3 
Arnery,  L.S.,  on  unification  of  East  Africa,  130-131,  133 
Amin,  Idi,  126,  140,  141,  143,  145,  147,  149,  151,  154 
Angol a 
and  Cuba,  109-110 
and  the  USA,  18 
and  the  USSR,  19 
civil  war  in,  109 
in  Southern  African  subsystem,  107-110,  118 
Apartheid.  See  Republic  of  South  Africa 
Arab  states,  relations  with  Africa,  11-12 
Armed  Forces  Movement  (of  Portugal ) 
Africa  policy  of,  109-110 
Arusha  Declaration,  139 
Azania.  See  Republic  of  South  Africa 
Ba~anda, 137, 143 
o~~osition  to  East  African  integration,  131,  134 
Balkanization,  13C) 
Eanda,  H.  Xarnuzu,  113-114 
Benguela  Railway,  108,  116 
Benin.  See  Dahomey 
Botswana 
foreiun  policy  of,  215 
in  Southern  Africa  subsystem,  114-1 16 
Boundaries.  See  a1 so  Conflict,  boundary 
and  domestic  conflict,  162,  163,  175-176 
and  international  conflict,  159-186 
antecedent,  161 - 162 
artificial  nature  of,  in Africa,  7,  159-160 
consequent,  161 - 162 
derivation  of,  in  Africa,  7,  159-161,  163 
functions  of,  159-160 
superimposed,  161-186 
Bourgeoisie,  comprador.  See  Elites 
Bri tai n.  See  Great  ~ri 
British  South  Africa  Company,  107 
Burundi , foreign  pol i cy  of,  223-228 
Cabinda,  109,  116 
Caborra  Bassa  Hydroelectric  Project,  11 1 
Cameron,  Sir  Donald,  132 
Cartel s , international , 48-49 
Case  study 
examples  of,  8-10 
methods  of,  172,  152,  190 
Center,  as  power  elite of  state,  91-95 
defined,  91 
Central  African  Federation,  128 
c.reation  of,  arouses  fears  in  East Africa,  134 
Central  Legislative  Assembly  (East Africa),  133 
Chad,  and  conflict  with  Ethiopia  and  Sudan,  171 
China,  Peoples  Republ ic  of.  See  Peoples  Republ ic of  China 
Cohen,  Governor  Sir Andrew,  and  the  Kabaka  Crisis,  134 
Colonial  -  settlers 
defined,  96 
in  conflict with  metropol i tan  government,  96-101 
in  Kenya,  130-1 32 
in  South  Africa,  98-99,  101,  103 
role  in  dependency  relations,  96-103 
Cornpari son 
examples  of,  10-12 
in  the  study  of  foreign  qolicy,  192-203,  198,  215-217,  222-223 
Conference  of  €as  t  Af ri can  Governors,  1 36 
Conflict,  boundary,  161-186,  228-230.  See  also  individual  countries 
involved  in 
and  ethnic  population  overhang,  164-168,  172-173,  180 
and  sub-imperial ism,  71 
el i tes  as  a  cause  of,  170-1 71 , 174,  180-1 82 
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East  African  Development  Bank,  140,  142 
East  African  Harbors  Corporation,  140,  147 
demise  of,  148-149 
East  African  High  Court  of  Appeals,  136 
demise  of,  147 
East  African  riavy,  136 
demise  of,  139,  147 
East  African  Posts  and  Teleconmunications  Corporation,  136,  140,  147 
demi se  of,  149 
East  Af ri can  Tourist  9oard 
demise  of,  139,  147 
East  African  Railways  Corporation,  140,  146,  147 
demise  of,  148 
Economic  Commission  for Africa  (ECA),  45 
and  sub-imperial ism,  68 
Economic  Cornmuni ty  of  West  African  States  (ECOIdAS),  14,  127,  128,  154 
and  sub-imperial ism,  68 
Egypt,  and  the  Soviet  Union,  63 
El i tes 
as  a  cause  of  boundary  conflict,  170-171,  174,  180-182 
transnational,  49-53,  57,  53,  62,  74-75,  92-93 
Entente.  See  Conseil  de  1'Entente 
Entebbe    aid, 141 
Ethiopia 
and  conflict  with  Somali  Republic,  71,  164-170,  132,  205,  210,  213 
and  conflict  with  Sudan  and  Chad,  171 
foreign  policy  of,  209,  211 
Ethni c  popul ati on  overhang 
as  a  cause  of  international  conflict,  164-168,  172-173,  180,  182 
defined,  164 
EurAfrica  concept,  15,  60 
European  Economic  Comnuni ty  (EEC) , 45 
functional  integration  and  the,  129,  153 
relations  of  African  states  with,  15,  59-60 
Events  data,  10-11,  178-179.  See  also  African  Foreign  Relations  and 
International  Conflict  Analysis 
analysis  of,  198-235 
Charles  A.  McClelland  and,  194-196 
definition  of,  194-195 
inclusiveness  of,  238n 
Factor  analysis,  173 
Federation  of  Rhodesi a  and  Nyasal and.  - See  Central  Afri can  Federation 
FNLA,  109-110 
Foreign  pol icy,  African,  39-41.  See  a1 so  Non-a1 ignment  and  individual 
states 
and  the  AFRICA  project,  185-236 
and  the  Middle  East,  11 -12 
bibliography  of  studies  of,  8-22 
boundaries  and,  161-1 86 
conflict  in,  204,  213-214,  223-230 
cooperative  behavior  in,  204-207 
dependency  and,  51-57,  59 
influence of  colonial  experience  on,  184-186,  210 
infl uence  of  doines tic  fzctors  apor,,  1C3-:66 
i nfl uence  of  extern??  fzctors  uvon , 183-1 86 
internatiofial  organization  as  a  fccus  of,  12-15 
patterns  of,  198-235 
self-reliance  and,  72-73 
time-series  ~rofi  of,  212-214 
types  and  frequences  of  interactions  in.  2Q1-237,  21 5-223 
Forei qn  ~ol  the  study  of,  190-235 
and  concept  of  nu1 ti ol e  forei gn  poi i ci es,  195 
and  excrlanatory  val ue  of  "indi vi dual  variables",  21 7 
case  study  method  for,  8-10,  190-191,  194 
comoarati ve  study  method  for,  10-17.  191-193,  198,  215-21 7,  222-223 
need  for  intersubjectively  communicable  know1 edcje  in,  132 
role  of  typologies  in,  191 
scientific  approach  to,  191-192,  217 
France,  and  arms  sales  in  Africa,  65-66 
Frelimo,  109,  115,  116,  118 
Fringe  of  state,  91 -95 
defined,  91 
Gamma,  as  a  measure  of  association,  220 
General  Fund  Services  (East Africa),  150 
Germany.  See  also  kest  Germany 
as  colonial  power  in  Togoland,  166 
complaints  of,  against  formation  of  common  postal  arrangements  in 
Eastern  Af ri ca , 1 36 
demand  for  return  of  Tanaanyika  by,  132 
Ghana 
and  conflict  with  Entente  states,  205,  207,  211,  213 
and  conflict  with  Togo,  165-166,  170,  228 
and  conflict  with  Upper  Vol ta,  170 
foreign  pol icy  of,  198,  209,  21 1 , 21 5,  223-229 
Great  Britain 
Africa  policy  of,  21 
and  Pjngola,  101 
and  arms  sales in  Africa,  65-66 
and  army  mutiny  in  East  Africa,  144 
and  ~hodesia, 107-108 
colonial  policies  of,  in  East  Africa,  129-137,  144 
Gui nea 
and  conflict  with  Entente  states,  214 
relations  of,  with  West  African  states,  207,  230 
High  Commission  Territories.  See  Botswana,  Lesotho  - and  Swazi land 
Horn  of  Africa.  See  also  Ethiopia  and  Republic  of  Somalia 
as  a  subsystem,  210 
as  an  example  of  ethnic  population  overhang  as  a  cause  of  conflict, 
164-1 68 
conflict in,  71,  &7n,  164-168,  182 
Soviet  Union's  interest in,  7 
United  States'  interest  in,  6-7 
Hostility,  as  a  cause  of  boundary  conflict,  169-170,  174,  183 
Hypothesi s 
methods  of  testing,  177-180,  218-222,  228 
null,  218-222 
Idiographic  studies.  - See  Case  study  method 
Indian  Ocean 
Soviet  Union's  interest  in,  7 
United  States'  interest  in,  6-7 
Indirect rule  in  Kenya,  132 
Inequalities.  See  also  Middle  powers  - and  Sub-imperialism 
between  states,  46-51,  55,  62,  66-68,  75-76,  90-101 
within  states,  49-51,  55,  67,  91,  143-144 
Intepration,  bilateral.  128 
Integration,  regional,  58,  126-128.  See  also  names  of  specific 
regional  orsani za tions 
and  sub-imperialism,  66-72 
bibliography  of  studies  on,  12-15 
functional,  128-156 
goals  of,  126,  129 
in  East  Africa,  14,  126-156 
in  Europe,  129 
in  Southern  Africa,  116-1 17 
in  West  Africa,  14 
political,  127-129 
problem  of  unequal  distribution  of  gains  in,  67,  132,  133,  136, 
137-140,  150-152 
requirements  for  success  of,  129,  153-1 56 
Inter-Universi ty  Comni ttee  for  East  Africa,  145 
Interdependence  of  African  states,  42,  44-45,  58,  72-76 
Intermediary  power.  See  Middle  power 
International  Court  of  Justice,  and  South  West  Africa,  4,  106 
International  law,  African,  43 
international  organization.  See  also  names  of  specific  organizations 
as  a  target  of  African  foreign  pol icy actions,  231-232 
bibliography  of  studies  on.  12-15 
functional,  and  African  regionalism,  210-211 
in  Africa,  42-43 
Israel , 63 
and  Entebbe  Raid,  141 
relations  of,  with  African  states,  11-12,  13 
Japan 
and  sub-imperial ism,  68 
frequency  of  interactions  of,  with  African  states,  230-231 
Johnston,  Sir  Harry,  on  unification  of  East  Africa,  130 
Joint  Economic  Council  (East Africa),  133 
Kabaka  Crisis  (of  1953),  134 
Kabaka  Mutesa,  134 
Kampala  Agreement  of  1964,  138-139.  See  also  Treaty  for  East  African 
Cooperation 
Kenatco  trucking  firm,  148 
Kenya,  126- 156 
and  conflict  with  Somali  Republic,  164-168,  182,  205,  210,  213 
and  crrflict  with  Tanza~ia, 126,  141-152 
and  cc  '1 ict with  Ugands,  141 -152 
as  ecr  nit center  of  East  Africa,  16,  1313-140,  150-151 
condi tlons  in,  144 
foreign  ~olicy  145,  149 
ideological  views  of  government  of,  131-143 
white  settlers  in,  130-1 32 
Kenya  African  iiational  Union  (KANU) , 143 
Kenya tta,  Jom,  137,  140 
Khana,  Sir Seretse,  115 
Ki kuyu,  143 
Kuanda,  Kenneth,  9 
Labor.  See  Migration 
Labor  aristocracy , 52,  56-57 
Land-locked  states,  7,  47,  58,  114-115,  130,  138 
foreian  policies of,  198 
Leabua , Chief  Jonathan,  11 5 
League  of  Nations 
and  South  West  Africa  Manadate,  106 
and  Tanganyi ka  Mandate,  136 
Lesotho,  in Southern  Africa  subsystem,  114-1 16 
Lete  Island,  and  the  ?liger-Dahoney  confl ict (1963),  170 
Liberia,  foreign  pol icy of,  198 
Libya,  and  Cganda,  145-146 
Linkage,  between  domestic  and  foreign  policy,  183-186 
Machel,  Samora,  111 
Malawi 
and  c,onflict  with  Tanzania  (1967),  170 
foreign  policy  of,  9-10,  215 
in Southern  Africa  subsystem,  113-114 
Mano  River  Customs  Union,  127 
McClelland,  Charles  A.,  and  events  data,  194-196 
Middle  East,  and  Africa,  11-12 
Middle  powers,  16,  46-49,  53,  58,  66-67.  See  also  Inequalities 
and  Sub-imperialism 
characteristics  of,  94-95 
economic  relations  of,  with  core  states,  102-103 
Republic  of South  Africa  as  a,  95-105,  116-121 
Rhodesia  as  a,  96 
role  of bourgeois  national ists  in,  100-101 
role  of colonial  settlers  in,  96-100 
U.S.  relations  with,  62 
Migration,  2,  14 
labor,  in Southern  Africa,  105,  110-112,  113-114,  115 
Mombasa-Kampala  ?.ajlway,  135 
Mozambique,  109 
and  Tanzania,  joint  air services,  150 
economic  pol icy of,  11 1 
in Southern  Africa  subsystem,  110-112,  118 
relations  of,  with  Swaziland,  115 
Rhodesia  policy  of,  111-112 
MPLA,  109-119,  118 
Mu1 tinational  corporations  (MNC).  See  also  Parastatals 
and African el i tes,  49-50 
and  parastatal  strategy,  54-56 
Mutiny,  of  East  African  armies,  144 
Nairobi,  as  center  of  economic  development  in Kenya,  143 
Namibia.  See  South  blest  Africa 
National ism,  African,  121 
Neocolonialism,  44,  53,  54 
New  International  Economic  Order,  16,  75 
and  se? f-re1 i ance,  72 
and  U.S.  policy  in Africa,  61 
Niqer,  and  conflict with  Dahomey  (1963),  168-170 
Nigeria 
foreign  pol icy of,  8-9,  20,  209,  211 
relations  with  the  Soviet  Union,  20 
Nkrumah,  Kwame,  166,  170,  171 
effects  of  loss  of  power  of,  on  West  African  politics,  214 
foreign  pol icy  views  of,  21 1 
views  on  African  Unity,  127-128 
Nomothetic  know1 edge,  defined,  191 -1 92 
Non- a1 i gnrnen t , 41 , 57-66,  72 
changes  in content  of,  57-58 
lack  of,  in African  foreign  policies,  232 
Northwestern  and  York  Universities  African  Elational  Integration 
Project,  193 
Nyerere,  Julius,  56 
and  agrarian  social ism,  141-1 52 
desire  to unify  East  Africa  at independence,  134-135,  137,  140 
views  of,  on  Southern  Africa,  146 
Obote,  Yilton,  137,  141,  la3 
Operationalization  of  variables 
defined,  177-1 78 
procedures  for,  183n  -  184n 
Organization  of  ~frican  (OAU),  43-44,  127.  See  also  Pan- 
Afri cani srn 
and  African  diplomacy,  205 
bi bl iography  of  studies  on,  13 
role of,  12 
Organ i za t i on  of  Senegal  Ri ver  States , 21 1 
Ormsby-Gore  W.,  on  unification of  East  Africa,  130-131 
Ormsby-Gore  Commission,  130-1 31 
Pan-Afri cani sm, 41 , 43-44,  72,  166,  21 1 
bi bl iography  of,  14-1 5 
definition  of,  126-127 
Parastatals,  67.  See  also  Mu1 tinational  corporation 
strategy  of,  in African  development,  45,  50,  54-57,  68,  78n 
Peopl es  Republ i c  of China 
Africa  pol icy  of  the,  20-21,  63-65,  71 
and  military  relations  with  African  states,  66 
and  sub-imperial ism,  66 
and  Tanzania,  21,  6a-65,  140-146 
frequency  of  interaction  of  the.  with  African  states,  230-232. 
Peri~heral state,  91 -95 
defined,  91 
Pol i tical  economv,  40-89,  90-1 21 
bib1 ioqraphv  of  studies  of,  16-17 
Portuqal 
Anqola  policy  of,  108-110 
attempts  of,  to  aid  whi te  Rhodesian  qovernnent,  137 
effect  of  revolution  in,  on  Southern  African  affairs,  117-118 
Railway  Council  (East  Africa),  135 
Refugees,  7 
Republic  of  Somalia.  See  also  Somali 
and  conflict with  Ethiopia,  71,  164-170,  182,  205,  210,  213 
and  conflict with  Kenya,  164-168,  152,  205,  210,  213 
Daarood  ethnic  group  in,  167-168 
foreign  pol icy  of,  223 
Republ ic  of  South  Africa 
Africa  policy  of,  104 
and  Angola,  108-110,  120 
and  Botswana,  11 4-1 16 
and  Lesotho,  114-116 
and  Swaziland,  114-116 
and  the  U.S.A.,  17-18 
as  a  middle  power,  16,  95-105,  116-121 
bi bl iography  of,  4-5 
colonial  settlers  in,  98-101,  103 
foreign  pol icy  of,  5-6 
international  canpai gn  against,  6 
Malawi  policy  of,  113-114 
mi  1 i tary  expenditures  of,  120 
klozarnbi que  pol icy  of,  11 0-1 12 
Namibia  policy  of,  105-107 
nuclear  weapons  and,  6 
Rhodesia  policy  of,  107-108,  118-121 
Revolution,possibility  of,  in  African  states,  50-51,  57,  74 
Rhodes,  Cecil,  107,  117,  130 
Rhodes i a 
as  a  middle  power,  96  . 
bi bl i ography  of,  2-4 
civil  war  in,  4,  120-121 
in  Southern  Africa  subsystem,  107-108,  118-120 
international  sanctions  against,  3-4,  107-108 
Rhodesian  Railways,  113,  115 
Rosenau,  James,  and  "individual  variables", 21 7 
"Safety  val VP"  hypothesi s 
as  a  cause  of  international  conflict,  168-169,  171,  173-174,  180,  182 
defined,  168 
Sahel,  8 
Salisbury,  Lord,  on  artificial  nature  of  African  boundaries,  159-160 
Sanctions,  international 
and  Rhodesia,  3-4,  107-108 
and  the  Republic  of  South  Africa,  6 
Sawaba  Party,  169 
Selassie,  iiaile  I, foreign  policy  of,  211 
Self-reliance,  41,  44,  58,  68,  72-76 
defined,  72-73 
in Tanzanian  socialism,  142 
Senegal  River states,  as  a  subsystem,  210-211 
Settlers.  - See  Colonial-settlers 
Smuts,  General  Jan,  130 
Sobhuza,  King  of Swaziland,  115 
Socialism.  See  also  State  socialism 
African,  44,  62,  69,  72,  74,  121 
agrarian,  in Tanzania,  141-142 
Somali  ethnic  group,  164-168,  182,  187n.  See  also  Sepublic  of Somalia 
Soma1 i Republic.  - See  Republic  of Somalia 
South  Africa,  Republic  of.  See  Republic  of South  Africa 
South  West  Africa 
bibliography  of,  4 
relations of,  in Southern  Africa,  105-107 
Southern  African  Customs  Union  and  problem of uneven  gains  from 
association.  67 , - 
Soviet  Union 
Africa  policy  of,  19-20,  62-63,  68-71,  86n 
and  communist  parties  in Africa,  62,  69 
and  Egypt,  63,  68 
and  sub-imperial ism,  68-71 
Angolan  policy of,  19,  109-110 - 
frequency  of interactions  of,  with  African  states,  230-232 
military  relations  of,  with  African  states,  66 
Nigerian  pol icy of,  20 
pol icy  of,  in the  Horn  of Africa,  7,  71 
Spanish  Sahara,  conflict  in,  8 
Spinola,  General  Antonio,  109 
State  capital ism,  52-57.  73 
in  the  Republic  of  south  Africa,  123n 
State  social ism,  52-56,  73.  See  also  Socialism 
in Ghana,  211 
sub-imperialism,  66-73.  See  also  Middle  powers 
and  inter-African  conflict,  71 
defined,  66 
Sub-system,  5-6,  15 
and  African  regions,  207-214 
and  African  relations,  205,  208 
Sudan,  and  conflict with  Ethiopia  and  Chad,  171 
Swaziland,  in Southern  Africa  subsystem,  114-1 16 
TANU,  141-142 
Tanzam  Railway,  21,  64-65,  112,  116,  127,  146-147,  151 
Tanzania,  126-156.  See  also  Tanzam  Railway 
and  conflict with  Kenya,  126,  141-152 
and  conflict  with  Malawi,  170 
and  conflict  with  LJgznda,  7, 
and  Rhodesia,  116 
and  the  Peonles  Re?ubl ic of  China,  ?I,  64-65,  145-146 
Arusha  Declaration  of,  139 
conditions  in,  144 
foreign  policy of,  145-147,  198,  215,  223 
German  demands  for  return of,  132 
ideological  views  of,  141-152 
in Eastern  Africa  subsystem,  116 
in Southern  Africa  subsystem,  116,  145-147,  150-152 
joint  air services  of,  with  Mozambique,  150 
union  of,  with  Zanzibar,  128 
Testing,  empirical 
compared  to  case  study  method,  172,  182 
need  for,  172 
Togo,  and  conflict  with  Ghana  (1955-1966),  165-166,  171,  228 
Tourism.  See  also  East  African Tourist  Board 
in East  Africa,  149 
Transnational  organization,  42-43.  See  a1 so  !lul tinational  corporati3ns 
Treaty  for  East  African  Cooperation  0,139-140,  150,  153-155. 
See  also  Kampala  Agreement 
Typology,  and  the  conparative  study  of  foreign  policy,  191 
Uganda,  126-1 56 
and  conflict with  Kenya,  141-152 
and  confl ict with  Tanzania,  71 , 141 -1 52 
conditions  in,  144 
Ujamaa,  152 
Union  Douaniere  et Economique  de  1 'Afrique  Central e  (UDEAC)  , 127 
UNITA,  109-1 10 
United Nations 
African  foreign  policy  and,  11-13,  232 
and  South  West  Africa,  4,  106-107 
Uni ted  Piations  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development  (UNCTAD) , 45 
3ni ted  States  of America 
Africa  policy  of,  17-19 
and  Israel,  61 
and  the  Republic  of South  Africa,  17-18,  61 
Angolan  policy  of,  18,  109-110 
arms  sal es  of,  to Africa,  65-66 
as  model  of  political  integration,  127,  153 
economic  pol icy of,  61-62 
frequency  of  interaction of,  with  African  states,  230-231 
policy of,  in the  Horn  of Africa,  6-7,  71 
relations  of,  with  African  middle  powers,  62 
role of,  in Africa,  60-62 
University  of  East  Africa,  dissolution of,  145,  147 
Upper  Vol ta,  foreign  pol icy of,  198 
Vorster,  Prime  Minister,  118-120 
West  Germany,  frequency  of  interactions  of,  with  African  states,  230-231 
Wi twatersrand  Native  Labour  Association,  110 
World  Bank,  loan  to  East  African  Community,  149,  154 
Zai re 
desire  of,  to  annex  parts  of Angola,  109-110,  116 
conflict  between,  and  African  states,  230 
foreign  policy  of,  209,  211,  215 
in  Southern  Africa  subsystem,  116 
Zambia.  See  also  Tanzarn  Railway 
and  Rhodesia,  112-113 
and  Tanzania,  116,  146-147 
and  the  Republic  of  South  Africa,  112 
and  the  Tanzam  Railway,  65 
economy  of,  11 3 
foreign  policy  of,  9-10,  113 
in  Southern  Africa  subsystem,  112-113 
Southern  Africa  pol icy  of,  108 
Zimbabwe.  See  Rhodesia