Resource Drain vs. Constitutive Circularity: Comparing the Gendered Effects of Post-Soviet Migration Patterns in Ukraine*

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While there is relatively little social science analysis of the impact of emigration[2] on the sending country, the popular stories we tell about the effects of emigration on the sending tend to fall into two camps: positive and negative. Those who emphasize a mostly positive impact on the sending country see emigration as providing monetary remittances, a "release valve" for social tension due to overpopulation or unemployment, and a viable (sometimes state-driven) economic development strategy (Guarnizo 2003, Massey et al. 1998). Those who emphasize a mostly negative impact on the sending country see emigration as causing brain drain, a myriad of social problems, and challenges to the sending country's national identity (see Fitzgerald 2009). Recently increased attention is being paid to the "homeland impact" of emigration.[3] Following a well established division in migration studies where scholars tend to *either* study the sending country *or* the receiving country but rarely both (Schmitter Heisler 2008), the concept of homeland impact asks us to focus exclusively on the sending country, isolating it analytically from the receiving sites in which emigrants reside and work.

However, thinking through the case of Ukraine, I argue that receiving countries and the particular ways in which they are connected to the sending country in specific migration patterns can be crucial in understanding the complexity and scope of effects on the sending country. In my comparative ethnographic study of Ukrainian migration to Italy and California in the post-Soviet period I argue that these two migration streams comprise two different migration patterns and therefore have different sets of effects in Ukraine. Consequently simply asking "What is the homeland impact of emigration on Ukraine?" obscures the variation in effects due to *migration pattern*. Furthermore, the concept of homeland impact encourages a conceptualization of discrete objects arriving from outside the borders of the sending country and altering something inside those borders. This may be why the focus of such studies tends to be economic remittances, which fit this conceptual framework better than macro-level social changes. While the concept of homeland impact suggests that transnationalism be placed in the background of the analysis,[4] I

argue for the importance of a transnational lens.[5] Economic remittances are important for Ukraine, but I argue that emigration is also implicated in large-scale and profoundly gendered social transformations. This discovery can only be illuminated by studying sending and receiving countries in relation to each other.[6]

In what follows I argue that the migration pattern from Ukraine to California is the pattern that migration scholars are most used to studying – a permanent migration to the United States. I argue that in the case of Ukraine, this migration pattern is a drain on Ukraine's resources because, unlike other sending countries with permanent migration to the United States such as Mexico, the Ukrainian state has not been able to create the institutional infrastructure that allows its post-Soviet emigrants to reinvest human or economic capital in Ukraine. A comparison with the migration pattern to Italy reveals a strikingly different set of effects in Ukraine. I show that the migration to Italy certainly does have economic effects, but it also forms the basis of Ukraine's nation-building process in the context of postsocialist transformation. In order for Ukraine to fulfill its First World aspirations of joining Europe, the Ukrainian state is pursuing a reorganization of gendered family and work relations that has both discursive and structural dimensions. I show that these changes are accomplished, in part, through the migration of not just women but specifically older women to Italy. The language of "impact on" obscures the complex ways that gendered processes of migration and nation-building are in fact mutually constitutive.

Emigration: Ukraine since Soviet Collapse

Ukraine declared independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. The disintegration of the Soviet Union left Ukraine in economic crisis. The decline in gross domestic product over the 1990s was calculated at 54%, worse than Russia at 40%, and twice as severe as the general estimate for economic decline in the United States during the Great Depression (Kubicek 2008:151). Not until 2000 did Ukraine experience positive economic growth. Ukraine faces pressing economic issues: wage arrears, widespread corruption, rising unemployment, and poverty rates that today hover at 40% of the population (The World Factbook 2009).[7] Emigration increased after Ukrainian independence, and for those migrating west, the United States and Italy are the two largest receiving countries.[8] Increased migration to the United States after Soviet

collapse is not surprising since it is a continuation of the four previous waves of Ukrainian migration to the region (Satzewich 2002). A confluence of factors has made Italy a key destination country for Ukrainians. Italy has an aging population, one of the lowest fertility rates ever recorded in work population history, and a welfare state that is dependent on the household to provide personal services relying on money transfers to households rather than the provision of services (King 2000:11; Sciortino 2004). This creates a high demand for careworkers, especially for the elderly. The Italian state consciously sees foreign domestic workers as the solution to this "care crisis" (Bonifazi 2000, Scrinzi 2004, Sciortino 2004). This is also reflected in Italy's tendency to pass legislation to legalize undocumented migrants after they have already entered and found work in Italy giving preference to careworkers. Additionally, there are a number of church-based institutional channels between Italy and Ukraine that facilitate Ukrainian migration to Italy (Solari 2006b).

Migration to the United States from Ukraine both increased and was transformed after 1991. Whereas migration from Ukraine to the United States in the 1970s and 1980s was predominantly Jewish refugees with the greatest flows to New York, after 1991 other persecuted groups such as Baptists and Ukrainian Greek Catholics were also granted refugee status by the US state and joined the migration streams. There was also a surge in the migration of ethnic Ukrainians and Russians without claims to refugee status sponsored through US family reunification policies. Not only did the religious and ethnic make-up of this migration pattern change, but so too did the primary US destination state. While New York still has the largest overall Ukrainian population in the United States, California is the largest receiving state for Ukrainian immigrants arriving after 1991.[9] This migration is largely a legal and permanent migration of entire extended families. As families reconstitute themselves in California, human and material resources flow primarily from Ukraine to California. I call this "resource drain."

While this migration pattern from Ukraine to California builds on a preexisting migration stream, Italy is a new post-Soviet migration destination. Those migrating to Italy are largely undocumented, temporary laborers the majority of whom are women over 40 years-old (Shehda and Horodetskyy 2004). Soviet-era doctors advocated 18 as the ideal age for first births and the vast majority of Ukrainian women gave birth to their first child by their early 20s regardless of education level (Perelli-Harris 2008:770).[10] In 2000, the mean age at first birth was 22.8 (Perelli-Harris 2008:769). Therefore, women over 40 are often grandmothers. While the migration of

grandmothers is in itself an unusual and interesting finding, the migration pattern is analytically significant because it is intimately connected to Ukraine's post-Soviet nation-building project, making it impossible to conceptualize resources or effects as moving linearly; rather, there is a continuous circular flow. Hondagneu-Sotelo (1997) critiques the transnationalism literature for placing too much emphasis on the physical movement of migrants between sending and receiving countries, arguing that settlement does not preclude transnational practices such as transnational mothering. I agree with this observation and want to note that my use of the word "circular" does not refer to moving bodies although migrants with documents do move with regularity between Italy and Ukraine, but rather to the flow of effects. What I hope to highlight is that this particular articulation of Ukrainian nationhood (a Ukraine that is European not "Soviet" or "Russian") and the migration pattern to Italy (the temporary labor migration of "grandmothers") are inextricably linked. In fact post-Soviet Ukraine, or what my informants call the "new" Ukraine, is being constituted transnationally. The migration pattern to Italy and the production of the "new" Ukraine are mutually constitutive and so the homeland effects of this migration pattern are best understood not as resource drain but as "constitutive circularity."

The concept of constitutive circularity draws on the work of Joan Scott (1988) who argued that gender should be theorized as a "constitutive element in social relations." Applying this to migration studies, Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo (2003) suggests that we think of "gender as a key constitutive element of immigration." Following Scott and Hondagneu-Sotelo, what I hope to show by developing the concept of constitutive circularity is that gender forms the basis of the migration pattern on the one hand and Ukraine's nation building project on the other. The emergence of both of these migration patterns is rooted in Ukraine's postsocialist transformation.[11]

An Ethnography of Two Migration Patterns

This paper is based on 16 months of ethnographic work and 158 in-depth interviews conducted between June 2004 and November 2006 in Rome, Italy; L'viv, Ukraine; and San Francisco, California. The domestic workers I interviewed in both Italy and California left Ukraine after 1991. All had some higher education as well as professional work histories, with high school teachers, accountants, and engineers being the most common professions reported.

While the migration to Italy is predominately women over 40, the migration to California has more diversity in age and gender. However, since I was controlling for occupation and immigrant receiving institutions in San Francisco channeled older women into domestic work jobs (Solari 2006a), my interviewees in Rome and San Francisco were mostly women and some men between 40-65 years-old.

I spent seven months intensively immersed in the San Francisco field sites. I conducted 41 interviews with Ukrainians homecare workers providing in-home cleaning and caring services to the elderly. I also attended Russian-language union meetings for homecare workers, participated in the parishes of two Ukrainian churches, and attended countless community cultural events.

During six months in Italy, I conducted 61 in-depth interviews with women and men from Ukraine providing care to the elderly and many more formal interviews with community leaders including religious leaders and labor organizers. While the primary language of communication was my American-accented Russian, as the US born daughter of Italian immigrants, my fluency in Italian also proved vital to the project, allowing me to conduct participant observation in the Italian organizations that represent and service domestic workers as well as the Ukrainian women workers' union and the offices of Rome's Ukrainian and Russian language newspaper. I conducted ethnographic work in a Ukrainian Greek Catholic and a Russian Orthodox Church where I attended weekly services, meals, and activities. Three months into my field work, a contested presidential election in Ukraine sparked the Orange Revolution (see Solari 2000b). I spent countless hours observing Ukrainians demonstrating in solidarity with the mass protests in Ukraine in addition to attending cultural events and informal gatherings.

Italy and Ukraine are physically connected by a fleet of Soviet-era courier vans and buses that carry goods and workers back and forth. I rode the "migration bus" from Rome to L'viv in Western Ukraine, the region most of my informants are from. I stayed in L'viv for three months and conducted 38 interviews with young adults who had one or both parents working abroad. I then completed the migration circuit by riding the bus back with Ukrainians heading to Italy to work.[12]

This multi-sited field research led me to ask: What are the effects in Ukraine of post-1991 emigration? Do these two migration patterns have different sets of effects? In answering

these questions, let us examine these two migration patterns from Ukraine—resource drain and constitutive circularity—in turn.

Resource Drain: Migrating to California

While some families board a plane to the United States as a unit, most families migrate in stages, slowly collecting their members in California over time as family members in the United States become eligible to sponsor other family members in Ukraine. The migration pattern to California involves naturalization with the intent of following family trees both horizontally and vertically in order to collect extended families in California, a process that often spanned years and even decades. I found that as long as families were separated and family members in the United States had not incurred large debts such as a home mortgages, those in the United States sent remittances back to Ukraine.[13] However, once families were reconstituted in the United States, informants generally stopped sending remittances to Ukraine, explaining that there was "no one left to send money to." In one extreme case, I interviewed an elderly couple in L'viv who were actually sending money from Ukraine to their daughter and son-in-law in California! Their second daughter still living in L'viv joked that they would go down in the "Guinness Book of World Records as the only family sending money *from* Ukraine *to* the United States!" This couple was so anxious about the size of their daughter's home mortgage, a terrifying concept for many in Ukraine where bank loans are rare, that they felt they had to help.

Over the long term, net resources in this post-Soviet migration flow from Ukraine to California. Immigrants in my sample pursued strategies such as delaying the immigration of adult children so that they could finish university degrees in Ukraine at lower costs than in the United States. These tactics accentuated the transfer of resources from Ukraine to California by taking advantage of less expensive reproductive services in Ukraine. These costs are borne by the Ukrainian state while the benefits in human and cultural capital are enjoyed by the US state.[14]

For those who migrated after 1991, there are virtually no formal institutional channels that connect them to Ukraine. The Ukrainian state does little to encourage remittances or facilitate the renovation of schools or the repairing of roads by post-Soviet Ukrainian emigrants abroad, nor does it recognize dual citizenship. This is in sharp contrast to the Mexican state

which also has a permanent migration of families to the United States and yet actively seeks to maintain access to the material resources of its emigrants through state sponsored institutions such as home town associations. In other words, even when entire families move to the United States, the Mexican state makes sure there is "someone to send money to" in Mexico. The Mexican state also maintains its human resources by extending dual citizenship to Mexican nationals who become naturalized US citizens, supporting the incorporation of emigrants into homeland political parties, and encouraging the formation of a Mexican lobby in Washington D.C. (Fitzgerald 2009, Sherman 1999). Mexico, emulating other sending states, is able to "manage" its emigration as part of an economic development strategy and as a way of reinforcing the Mexican state (Fitzgerald 2009, Sherman 1999). The processes of post-Soviet transformation have resulted in a weak state in Ukraine (Kubicek 2008, Solari N.d.). At least for now, the emigration of Ukrainians to California is characterized by a continuous loss of material and human resources. Immigrants continue to arrive to California and sponsor others and the Ukrainian state simply does not have the ability to manage this process.

Constitutive Circularity: Migrating to Italy

Resource drain is not the only set of effects of emigration in Ukraine. The migration pattern to Italy is quite different and therefore has different effects. While I am able to tell a relatively linear and straightforward story about the impact of migration to California, migration to Italy has many complex, contradictory, and circular effects.[15] This is because not all migration patterns have the same cultural and political significance. The migration pattern to Italy is more closely implicated in Ukraine's post-Soviet transformation and Ukraine's nation-building process in particular than the migration pattern to California. Rather than attempt to look at all of the effects migration to Italy has in Ukraine, I will look specifically at the gendered effects of this migration pattern in terms of monetary remittances, the production of the post-Soviet Ukrainian family and labor market, and the Ukrainian state.

Monetary Remittances: Good Mothers, Bad Mothers

While immigrants to California provided many reasons for leaving Ukraine: economic hardships, low job satisfaction due to limited resources (for example doctors and nurses often cited inability to provide adequate care to patients), limited career opportunities for their children, and general indicators of poor quality of life, those who migrated to Italy placed remittances, most often as proof of being a "good mother," at the center of their narratives. Migrant women I interviewed in Italy often lived on a bare-bones budget. They denied themselves basic needs or small comforts in order to send most of their wages to their family, usually adult children, in Ukraine. While official statistics are difficult to come by and are subject to debate since the majority of migrants from Ukraine in Italy are undocumented, there is popular and media recognition within Ukraine that remittances from temporary labor migrants abroad (*zarobitchany*), including those in Italy, have a significant impact on the Ukrainian economy and, according to one estimate, total $8.4 billion, about 8% of Ukraine's GDP (Drach and Najibullah 2009; Keryk 2004; Shelburne and Palacin 2007). Yet interviews I conducted in L'viv with children who had a parent—usually a mother—abroad, as well as interviews with migrants in Rome, suggest that the impacts of remittances are contradictory. Migrants most often reported that remittances allowed them to pay for their children's university tuition, purchase an apartment, or pay for medical services for elderly parents. All three services—higher education, housing, medical care—used to be provided by the Soviet state. However, as part of economic transformation, these costs have devolved to families and in Ukraine, this means finding a way to pay for these services has largely fallen to mothers and grandmothers (Hrycak 2005; Verdery 1994; Zhurzhenko 2001, 2004). Migrants expressed a sense of pride in being able to "help" their children through remittances. Yet when speaking of other people's children, remittances were cast in a negative light. I was told story after story of children who were "corrupted" by the "easy" money and used it to buy drugs. I heard many second hand accounts of children who used their mothers' hard earned remittances to buy cars or motorcycles and then died in crashes. The adult children in L'viv I interviewed often recognized their mother's sacrifices but spoke of peers who no longer wanted their mother to return home because "they grew to love the money more than her." Ukrainian Greek Catholic Priests, prominent figures in Rome's Ukrainian migrant community, warned parishioners of the negative consequences on migrant women as well as

their children and families in Ukraine when "money becomes the object of life." However for migrant women, remittances were infused with gendered social meanings about good and bad mothering. Furthermore, these constructed meanings were situational, with migrants and those left behind using both the money itself and its perceived effects as a way of drawing boundaries between "good" and "bad" mothers and "deserving" and "undeserving" children.[16]

The Post-Soviet Labor Market and Ukrainian Families: A Gendered Reorganization

The effects of migration to Italy on family structure are perhaps even more complex than monetary remittances. In order to understand how this migration pattern and the reorganization of the Ukrainian family are intertwined, I must place this migration pattern in the context of post-Soviet transformation, Ukraine's attempt to constitute itself as a legitimate nation separate from Russia, and the importance of Ukraine's claim that it is a *European* nation. The coming of capitalist markets to Ukraine and widespread unemployment have lead to a gendered reorganization of work and family which is deeply connected to this new Ukrainian nationalism and the emigration of specifically older women to Italy.

The Soviet state required full employment to meet production quotas in a labor intensive, production based socialist economy. To facilitate the employment of women and "liberate" women from the "triple burden" of housework, mothering, and wage work, the Soviet state attempted to socialize domestic labor and provided maternity benefits, state-run childcare facilities, and even collective dining halls (Verdery 1994). The state usurped certain patriarchal functions and responsibilities and replaced men as the head of the Soviet family. Men were pushed to the periphery of Soviet families while women were "married to the state" (Kiblitskaya 2000). Women achieved near full participation rates in the labor force. However, while the Soviet state did restructure domestic labor to some extent, women continued to take primary responsibility for the home as well as perform wage work. The Soviet state relied on youthful retirement ages (generally 55 for women and 60 for men) to perform unpaid household labor (Verdery 1994). The Soviet family then was an extended family, often with a strong grandmother figure who ran the household and was responsible for rearing the grandchildren (Rotkirch 2000).[17] Therefore a particular gendered understanding of the relationship between men and women and women and the state (underlined by an economic need for women's employment)

not only made "mother-workers" a structural reality but was accompanied by state discourses that exalted mother-workers as Soviet "heroes." In fact, migrants I interviewed in California and Italy expected to continue in this Soviet family structure and retire at 55 to raise their grandchildren, allowing daughters and daughters-in-law to join the labor market.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the socialist economy was dismantled and with it this Soviet gender order. The radical egalitarianism of Soviet rhetoric was never achieved. Women in the Soviet Union rarely attained top level jobs, were channeled into sex segregated occupations, and earned lower wages than men. Since Ukrainian independence, these trends have been exacerbated. Top management and executive positions are still dominated by men, sex segregation of the labor market has increased, and women currently earn wages 30 percent lower than men (UNDP 2008:29). Women face considerable gender discrimination on Ukraine's expanding "free" market in the form of local hiring practices such as job advertisements that ask only young, attractive women apply and increasing rates of sexual harassment at work (UNDP 2003:30). Women also face increased barriers to employment because of their reproductive functions. As the state shifts the economic burden of social entitlements to private industry, women, as potential mothers, become expensive to employ (LaFont 2001). Additionally, the number of state-subsidized childcare facilities has drastically declined due to budget cuts (Perelli-Harris 2008). The transformation of the workplace from state-run to private has forced women who can no longer rely on the state for childrearing support to take substantial time out of the labor market (Perelli-Harris 2008). According to anthropologist Katherine Verdery (1994), with the coming of market capitalism the socialist welfare state that had once taken on some of women's nurturing and care-giving roles is now considered too costly in a free market economy and it is devolving these responsibilities back onto the shoulders of women (also see Burawoy, Krotov, and Lytkina 2000). Verdery further argues that the gendered organization of capitalist households cheapens the cost of labor for capital by assigning reproductive labor to women and calling it "housework" which is unpaid. This cheapening makes post-socialist economies viable in the global marketplace. Given these structural barriers to employment for women post-Ukrainian independence, it is not surprising then that "in every age group the level of employment is lower for women than for men" (UNDP 2008:28). Highly educated women clustered in state-run services and enterprises such as education, health care, and scientific research institutes have been especially hard hit by the Ukrainian state's closure of these

institutions, reductions in staff, or inability to pay state employees (UNDP 2003). In fact a disproportionate number of Ukrainian migrants in my Italian sample were high school teachers forced into early retirement because the state could no longer pay them. Once unemployed, women have a harder time finding employment than their counterparts who are men (UNDP 2003).

Compared to the Soviet era where the state pursued a policy of full employment, Ukraine's economic transformation has meant high rates of unemployment and underemployment for both women and men. However, market reforms were supposed to raise the economic welfare of families and make the one-earner family possible; that "one-earner" is assumed to be a man (Zhurzhenko 2004). This shift in Ukraine's structural reality has coincided with a reorganization of gendered relations. In post-Soviet discourse, the way to deal with high unemployment rates is to "send women back to the home where they belong" (LaFont 2001). It suggests that Soviets were the "enemies of nature" by trying to force humans to act contrary to their gendered disposition, creating "weak" men and "masculine" women. Socialist paternalism and women are jointly accused of having destroyed the ethno-nation (almost extinct due to low birthrates), the national character, and "traditional" national values (Gal and Kligman 2000; Verdery 1994).[18] The natural order between the sexes is now understood as best exemplified by the capitalist, European, nuclear family. In Ukraine, this shift from a Soviet extended family to a traditional patriarchal family is seen as a "return" to an imagined authentic, pre-Soviet Ukrainian culture which constructs the newly independent Ukraine as separate from all things "Soviet" or "Russian." [19] This rise of neofamilialism is a fundamental part of nationalist discourse and is further tied to a religious resurgence of Catholic, Christian Orthodox, and Protestant denominations in Ukraine (Predborska 2004; Zhurzhenko, 2004).

It is not only women who are called to embrace new "Ukrainian" norms. There are new moral rules for men as well who must reject the "weak" and "effeminate" position of their Soviet fathers, reclaim their masculinity through breadwinning, and take back from the state their rightful place as the head of the family. Nevertheless, in this narrative about Ukraine's national identity it is "our women" that make Ukrainians *Ukrainian* and not Soviet. The new icon of ideal Ukrainian womanhood is *Berehynia*, an ancient pagan goddess who has come to embody the protectress of the family hearth and the Ukrainian nation (Rubchak 1996). Berehynia, the "hearth-mother" is the "perfect Ukrainian woman, the spirit of the Ukrainian home, the ideal

mother, who played an important role in Ukrainian history, the preserver of language and national identity" (Pavlychko 1996:311). Like Ukrainian women, she is strong but committed to maternal duties, independent but family-oriented and respectful of husbands, and symbolizes a pre-Soviet and distinctly Ukrainian national culture in which Ukrainian men and women had separate responsibilities but were equally respected.[20] It is this respect accorded to women for their "separate responsibilities" that is understood as one of Ukraine's cultural traits that makes Ukraine "modern" and "European." In the context of development discourse, gender equality is one of the measurable indexes that provide access to such labels. In fact, some argue that historically, Ukrainian society was even matriarchal compared to patriarchal (read "backward") Russia (Rubchak 2001). The power of the Berehynia image lies in part in the fact that it is a symbol of an independent Ukraine that all Ukrainian citizens from east to west can embrace.[21] The image is widespread and ranges from the statue of Berehynia atop a 40-foot-tall column that has replaced the statue of Lenin in Kyiv's Independence Square to former Ukrainian prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko's iconic Berehynia braids.[22]

The dilemma for Ukraine is that this nuclear family formation considered the foundation of the post-Soviet, "capitalist," and "European" Ukrainian nation does not happen spontaneously with capitalism. Men's wages are not high enough to support this family formation. In order to produce *Ukrainian* women as Berehyni and *Ukrainian* men as patriarchs, it seems someone must go abroad and send back remittances. Older women are pushed out of state-based occupations and are even less likely than young women to find work in the private sector. Yet as their daughters are increasingly housewives by default if not by choice due to structural changes that make it increasingly difficult for them to enter the labor market, older women find that their expected role of providing primary care to their grandchildren is becoming obsolete. Doubly marginalized from the labor market and expected family responsibilities, informants reported that they felt the most useful thing they could do for their family was migrate and send back remittances.

From the perspective of the migrant women themselves, the reality that their labor abroad permits their daughters to be housewives and their sons patriarchs is a significant effect but one they feel highly ambivalent about (Solari In press). Women I interviewed were proud that their remittances helped their families and were pained that their daughters had university educations but no jobs. For these professional women who came of age in Soviet Ukraine where housework

was considered "unproductive labor," it is unclear whether doing domestic work abroad so that their daughters and daughters-in-law can do unpaid domestic labor back home is a positive or negative impact of their decision to migrate. On the one hand, their daughters are celebrated as the "Berehyni of our people" and their sons are welcomed into the center of family life as able breadwinners.[23] In Ukraine's nationalist discourse this gendered reorganization is necessary for Ukraine to "reclaim" its European roots. Joining "Europe" is a goal migrant women in Italy overwhelmingly support. On the other hand they worried that their daughters would become "dependent on unreliable husbands," their sons might be unable to shoulder familial economic responsibilities, and that there would no longer be a place for themselves as Soviet women in this European Ukraine.[24]

The Ukrainian State: The Politics of Gendered Migration

Finally let us turn to the impact of temporary labor migration to Italy on the Ukrainian state which is actively pursuing this reorganization of family and work structures with some measure of success. One might assume that the Ukrainian state would view the migration pattern to Italy favorably. After all, it is through the physical removal of these women as grandmothers and the monetary remittances earned through their labor power abroad that provides the basis of these traditionally "Ukrainian" nuclear families and the "capitalist" reorganization of Ukraine's labor market. The migration pattern to Italy not only supports the Ukrainian state's economic goals, but reinforces the state's discourse that this restructuring of gendered relations between men and women is an imagined "return" to an authentic Ukrainian culture that places Ukraine firmly in the European family of nations. And yet, while the migration pattern to California is benignly tolerated by the Ukrainian state, those who leave to work in Italy are negatively stigmatized by the Ukrainian state as "prostitutes" and "betrayers" of the Ukrainian nation. In fact, while former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma famously addressed Ukrainian women inside Ukraine as the "Berehyni of our people," every informant in Italy repeated with indignation that he called all Ukrainian women abroad "prostitutes." I suggest that these two migration patterns are viewed differently by the Ukrainian state because the emigration of families to the United States and older women to Italy are differentially implicated in Ukraine's nation-building process.[25]

In nationalism discourse more generally, women are often constructed as the symbolic bearers of the nation responsible for both its biological and cultural reproduction. Examples of this range from India to Romania (Radhakrishnan 2007, Verdery 1993). Emigration policies are as much a product of national identity as economic concerns. This is especially true when the migrants are women. In other words, the kind of emigration policy a state has towards its women and whether or not the state is "protecting their women," is understood as a reflection of the national identity and the values that nation possesses as well as an indicator of where the nation-state lies with respect to the accepted global markers of development: democracy, human rights, and gender equality (Oishi 2005). Not only does the emigration of women violate Ukrainian national identity constructed around a particular idealized conception of an authentic Ukrainian woman as Berehynia, but it violates the Ukrainian state's most dearly held socio-political goal: joining Europe. For the Ukrainian state this means being accepted into the European Union and international recognition of Ukraine as a European nation. It is a signifier of prestige and of a particular historical-cultural heritage as well as affirmation of Ukraine's "First World" economic trajectory. Yet the effects of the migration pattern to Italy on the Ukrainian state are contradictory. The state produces this migration pattern through its economic and social policies and the migration pattern in turn provides the structural basis for the realization of the state's domestic goals of reorganizing the institutions of family and work. At the same time, nothing signals "Third World" in the international arena like the mass emigration of women to do domestic labor abroad. Ironically, the very migration pattern that allows for the constitution of the social and economic structures within Ukraine that permits the state to make claims to Europe and the "First World" also makes Ukraine look like it may belong to the "Third World" instead. This is a dilemma specific to the relationship between post-Soviet transformation and emigration where former bloc countries are "Second World" and the outcomes of post-Soviet economic transformation are largely uncertain.

Therefore the migration pattern from Ukraine to Italy produces complex effects in Ukraine as the sending country. I looked at monetary remittances, family and labor market structures, and the Ukrainian state, starting with the smallest of the nested blocks (monetary remittances) and moving towards the broadest (the state). At each level I showed that emigration had gendered constitutive effects. In other words, it is not that the Ukrainian "homeland" is a static entity and individual migrants or even migration patterns "impact" it. It is not a collision

but rather best understood as a process of mutual constitution or what I have called here constitutive circularity. While one could argue that all sending countries are engaged in dynamic processes of change, this is especially heightened for Ukraine in this historical moment of post-Soviet transformation.

Reaching for a Gendered Transnational Lens

Homeland impact is an important first step to opening up a discussion about the effects of emigration on sending countries, and it also has limitations. Studying the sending country in isolation, while a familiar approach because it reproduces the way most immigration scholars study receiving countries, it homogenizes emigration as if it is a singular phenomenon.[26] This comparative ethnographic analysis of two migration patterns from Ukraine reveals that migration patterns, an analytical framing that requires a consideration of both sending and receiving countries, can have differential effects. Whereas the most salient effect in Ukraine of the permanent migration of families to California is a continuous loss of human and economic resources over time, the temporary labor migration of mostly grandmothers to Italy is productive of Ukraine's nation-building project and part of a large-scale reorganization of gendered relations. This gendered reorganization has a structural dimension which consists of a shift from an extended to an increasingly more nuclear family as well as a changing labor market that includes men as breadwinners while excluding more and more women as mothers or potential mothers. It also has a discursive dimension that constructs this particular family formation as modern, capitalist, and European as well ethnically and culturally Ukrainian, and promotes it as the building block of a new Ukraine knocking at the door of Europe and the First World. These two migration patterns—resource drain vs. constitutive circularity—are only visible from a transnational perspective that connects sending and receiving countries.

Additionally, the conceptual language of "impact on" favors an economic analysis with a focus on remittances. I have shown that migration patterns out of Ukraine are connected, perhaps more importantly, to macro processes of post-Soviet transformation. Nonetheless, even when looking solely at economic remittances, migration pattern still matters. Remittances sent by post-Soviet immigrants in California to family members in Ukraine, in general, support those individuals until they are able to join their family members in California. In contrast, the money

sent by migrant women in Italy to family members in Ukraine, intentionally or not, supports a drastic institutional transformation of family and work. Of course it is not only a transnational lens that is important in this analysis but a gendered lens as well. Anthropologists Sarah Mahler and Patricia Pessar (2006) maintain that gender is neglected in migration studies and call for multi-sited ethnography as both a methodology and an analytical framework for getting at the important ways that gender organizes social life. They argue that a gendered analysis can also be important to the ways in which we theorize migration. Once again the comparison between two migration patterns from the same sending country proves valuable and reveals that gender can be at the center of theorizing one migration pattern and de-centered in another. While gender is always a useful category of analysis, it may not always be the most salient category. In this comparative study, gender is the very basis of constitutive circularity. While gendered processes of economic transformation inside Ukraine are important in creating the material basis of both migration patterns, gender is not at the center of theorizing resource drain.

Analyzing the effects of emigration through a gendered transnational lens may be particularly relevant not only to Ukraine, but other countries experiencing post-Soviet transformation. Resource drain and constitutive circularity represent two radically different experiences of the postsocialist condition for those left behind. In the former, family members leave for California with the hope of then sponsoring others to leave Ukraine permanently. In the latter, mothers and grandmothers leave, in their words, "so that my children won't have to." The hope is their children will live in this wonderful, new Ukraine. While I have only alluded to this here, elsewhere I show that these two migration patterns also produce different experiences of postsocialism for the migrants themselves. In the case of migration to California, there is greater possibility of severing ties to Ukraine. Instead, migrants to Italy, where transnationalism is embedded in the migration pattern itself, find themselves in painful negotiations regarding Soviet and market moralities, status systems, and what constitutes an honorable person in this time of flux.[27]

Finally, this study shows that a gendered perspective is important in understanding the production of "capitalism" in the post-Soviet world. There are many numerous of post-Soviet "transition" that focus on the study of elites, the so-called "oligarchs" or large financial institutions (see Burawoy 2001a). While most scholars of the region wonder if you can have capitalism from above, a gendered analysis illustrates that, in the case of Ukraine, economic

transformation rests on a particular set of gendered relations that structure the most basic elements of social and economic life from below.

Notes

[*] I thank Michael Burawoy for his encouragement and his valuable insights on this paper. Thanks also to Maryna Bazylevych and Sarah Phillips for a careful reading of this piece.

[1] Cinzia Solari will receive her PhD in sociology at the University of California, Berkeley and looks forward to joining the faculty as an assistant professor of sociology at the University of Massachusetts Boston. Her multi-sited ethnographic dissertation, *Exile vs. Exodus: Nationalism and Gendered Migration from Ukraine to Italy and California*, explores how two contrasting patterns of migration in the post-Soviet period (exodus vs. exile) generate distinct practices, lived experiences, and subjectivities for individual migrants abroad. It also analyzes how these patterns of migration are differentially implicated in Ukraine's nation-building process.

[2] For a small but growing set of studies that focus on sending states (see Fitzgerald 2009), "emigration" and "emigrants" are the preferred terms. "Immigration" is the term we are most used to seeing because most social science research on migration is actually from the point of view of the receiving country, most often the United States, and focuses on settlement and assimilation. I use the term "migration pattern" to signal that both sending and receiving country are equally implicated. I hope to have successfully navigated the terms "emigration," "immigration," and "migration" in this paper.

[3] This paper was inspired by my invitation to and attendance at the Conference "How Migrants Impact Their Homeland" organized by Susan Eckstein and Adil Najam at Boston University. I thank the organizers and participants for opening up this interesting and understudied topic.

[4] Personal communication by Susan Eckstein.

[5] Elsewhere I conceptualize this in terms of "global ethnography." See Burawoy (2000, 2001b).

[6] I reiterate that the migration patterns from Ukraine to California and Italy are not simply migrations to two different destinations, but are fundamentally different migration patterns. In other words, countries such as the Philippines send domestic workers to a number of countries but they constitute only one migration pattern which is highly managed by the Philippine state (see Rodriquez 2010). In this study I compare two different patterns of migration. They differ both structurally and experientially. Structurally, the migration to California is permanent, legal, with variation by age and gender while the migration to Italy is temporary, largely undocumented, and mostly women over 40. Subjectively, those leaving for California experience migration as "choice," while those leaving for Italy experience migration as "expulsion." In my dissertation, Exile vs. Exodus: Nationalism and Gendered Migration from Ukraine to Italy and California, I compare what I call the exile of older women to Italy and the exodus of entire

families to California and show that there is a classic "interaction effect" between sending and receiving contexts which produces different subjectivities and practices for migrants in exile vs. exodus.

[7] According to The World Factbook 2009, 37.7% of Ukraine's population lived below the poverty line in 2003.

[8] Ukrainians and ethnic Russians living in eastern Ukraine are also migrating east to Russia, although in smaller numbers. For more on the migration of mostly men to do construction work in Russia see Leontina Hormel and Caleb Southworth (2006). While Ukrainian migration to Russia and other former bloc countries is certainly significant, the National Bank of Ukraine reported that 91% of its total remittance inflows came from outside the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 2006 (Shelburne and Palacin 2007).

[9] Thanks to Marcel Parcet for running the IMPUS data through 2006 and providing the evidence for this claim.

[10] Interestingly, Perelli-Harris (2008) discovers that the drastic decline in Ukraine's fertility rate is almost entirely accounted for by the decline in second births as opposed to less women becoming mothers.

[11] For a discussion of the use of the term postsocialist "transformation" rather than "transition" see Burawoy and Verdery (1999).

[12] While this paper is informed by and steeped in extensive ethnographic field work, given the constraints of space and the goal of writing a concept-driven piece, I do not present detailed accounts of my ethnographic data here. I invite those interested in reading more about the ethnography to see the other pieces I have written from this study. They are listed in the bibliography.

[13] Interestingly, informants in California, even when children or parents were still in Ukraine, reported sending smaller percentages of their total wages than migrants in Italy. Many citied mortgages, car payments, or the high cost of living in general that prevented them from sending more money to Ukraine.

[14] For a more in-depth analysis of costs borne by sending countries, benefits reaped by receiving countries, and the "structures of coercion" involved in the maintenance and reproduction of migration systems see Burawoy (1976).

[15] I reiterate that I am only focusing on the post-1991 migration to the United States. The effects of emigration on Ukraine become more complicated to detail if we look at previous waves of Ukrainian immigrants to the United States which have created a network of formal organizations. However, post-Soviet immigrants in San Francisco reported feeling unwelcome in Ukrainian churches and organizations, many of which were founded by WWII immigrants and their descendants. Post-Soviet Ukrainian immigrants in San Francisco were perceived as "Soviet"

rather than "Ukrainian" by WWII immigrants and their descendants. Therefore post-Soviet immigrants have limited resources to found their own organizations and are not joining already established Ukrainian organizations. This exacerbates the trend of resource drain for this current immigration wave.

[16] This argument is further developed in a paper presented at the American Sociological Association, Montreal, August 2006 and is currently a working paper titled, "Ukrainian Migration to Italy: Constructions of Poverty, Motherhood, and Nation."

[17] Also see Rotkirch (2000) for an interesting analysis of this family form and Soviet women's "extended mothering" practices.

[18] Verdery (1994, 1996) and Gal and Kligman (2000) further argue that nationalist policies driving women back to their "proper" nurturant role, an increasingly visible ethno-nationalism coupled with a anti-feminist and pro-natalist politicking are features common to post-Soviet Eastern European countries. They suggest that these processes are tied to the post-socialist experience. However, the way in which this plays out in individual countries varies. See for example Groven (1993) and Haney (2002) on Hungary, Verdery (1993) on Romania, Ashwin (2000) on Russia.

[19] While in popular discourse this is seen as a "return" to a provider-housewife family structure, LaFont (2001:213) reminds us of the reality that in most former Soviet bloc countries, societies were agricultural and women worked alongside men in the fields until the communist push for industrialization. Therefore the "bourgeois family of a man as provider and woman as homemaker" was not the norm and in most cases did not exist in the first place.

[20] The idea that the Soviet Union created "masculine" women and "effeminate" men, distorting the "natural" order between the sexes is not specific to Ukraine but has swept across the post-Soviet world. What is specific to Ukraine is the particular way capitalism, gender, migration, and nation intersect.

[21] For more regarding the cultural, ethnic, and political divisions in Ukraine see Wilson (2000). For more on how the divisions between eastern and western Ukraine play out on the terrain of nation-building and migration see Solari (N.d.) "Prostitutes and Defectors: Gendered Migration and the Ukrainian State."

[22] For more on this Berehynia imagery see Rubchak (2005).

[23] President Kuchma famously addressed Ukrainian women as the "Berehyni of our people" in a speech on National Women's Day. For an analysis of this address see Hrycak (2005).

[24] It is worth noting that this perspective of constitutive circularity is different than Levitt's (1998, 2001) "social remittances." In a field where effects on sending countries are often exclusively understood in terms of economics, the concept of social remittances which Levitt (1998:927) understands as the "ideas, behaviors, identities, and social capital that flow from

receiving- to sending-communities" is a useful one. Unlike the concept of social remittances, constitutive circularity does not try to capture cultural diffusion from sending to receiving country terms of new ideas via letters or phones calls, but rather seeks to demonstrate the ways in which the migration pattern and gendered social transformation are productive of each other.

[25] For an in-depth analysis of the Ukrainian state's construction of these two migration patterns see Solari (N.d.).

[25] Elsewhere I argue that immigration studies would also benefit from studying sending and receiving contexts in relation to each other rather than in isolation.

[26] For more on moralities in the context of post-Soviet transformation see Humphrey and Mandel (2002).

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