Memories, commemorations, and representations of Chernobyl: Introduction

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This special issue of *AEER* is dedicated to memories, commemoration practices, and representations of Chernobyl[1]. The idea for the issue was born during the final conference of the international research project "Politics and Society after Chernobyl" in Potsdam, Germany, in April 2011.[2] The conference took place barely a month after the tsunami and the following nuclear accidents in Japan and just a few weeks before the 25th anniversary of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster.

As usual, anniversaries raise a sudden public interest in topics that were shut away for quite a long time in some hidden place of the "memory chalet" (Judt 2010). The refreshed public interest during the course of an anniversary opens the door to this remote room and exposes memories, observations, art and scholarly works long forgotten. If the anniversary topic can be connected to some current issue or - even more powerful – to an occurring catastrophe, the interest grows even much stronger and turns itself into a twirling broom that eagerly sweeps away the dust from the objects in the room of forgotten experience and expertise. At the same time, new (or at least apparently new) objects are added to the collection. After some time, mostly even before all corners of the memory room have been polished and the new items arranged, the eagerness to finish this process is already vanishing. Meanwhile, a new room in the chalet opened its doors and all the interest moved there.

After it appeared quite forgotten and was at risk to become a mere footnote in the history books connected to some remote times and places somewhere in far-away Eastern Europe, "Chernobyl" had indeed returned to be a buzzword around its 25th anniversary in spring 2011 and stayed it – at least in Western Europe and to some extent also in the U.S. – for the months to follow. The nuclear accidents in Fukushima that followed the devastating tsunami in March 2011 played an important role in the rejuvenated interest in Chernobyl. Suddenly, experience and expertise were in great demand to assess the Japanese disaster process, to codify and make meaning of it. In particular during the first days after the breakdown of the reactors in Fukushima, images and recollections appeared that were evidently borrowed from Chernobyl and in many cases had nothing to do with the disaster reality in Japan. For instance, the German newspaper *Berliner Zeitung* dedicated the front page of its first issue after the accidents with a full-page graphic radiation map with a radioactive cloud that could only remind readers of Chernobyl (Berliner Zeitung 2011, March 12:1). But, at this stage, any more or less reliable data was missing. This, in turn, recalled memories of Chernobyl, where due to the Soviet concealment policy information was scarce and the Western media had to deal with incomplete and often contradicting accounts of what happened and what consequences were to be expected.

Although the Belarusian writer Svetlana Aleksievich declared as early as the 10th anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster in 1996 that the accident at the Soviet Ukrainian nuclear power plant already had become history and "it seems to us as if we knew everything

about Chernobyl" (Aleksievich 1998: 25), in fact there is still much we do not know. It is true that many books have been written, films and pictures shot, and even computer games and virtual realities generated. However, many aspects of the disaster remain undisclosed, and have not become "history" yet. In the end, Fukushima showed us how little we know, and how little we made out of the things we do know. Twenty years after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the convenient Cold War security promise of the Western world that Chernobyl could only happen in such an ailing system as the Soviet Union was shaken thoroughly far beyond the circles of the ever criticizing and overanxious anti-nuclear-power activists. Fukushima proved wrong the prevailing Western thesis of the specific Soviet irresponsibility, the incompetence of its technicians, and the specific social negligence of Eastern authorities. We still know little about the impact of such large-scale "man-made" disasters on societies, in particular about their transnational consequences transcending nation state borders; this is despite the many texts and images produced during the last 26 years, which often lack profound analysis.

This special journal issue cannot answer all the open questions, and it does not claim scientific "objectivity" at all times; rather it aims at disclosing some specific aspects of Chernobyl's "symbolic fallout" (Phillips 2008:159) thereby asking more and new questions, hopefully giving incentives for further research. The issue pays special – and very selective - attention to the processes and ways that Chernobyl has been remembered and presented in the countries most affected by its radioactive fallout. It analyses individual as well as collective memories, visual as well as literary memories. It shows the different, sometimes peculiar interpretations of and reactions to the disaster where contradictions can stand side by side and remain unchallenged. Thereby it addresses from different and interdisciplinary perspectives commemorations, but also non-commemorations, the integrating of the disaster into everyday life and biographies, and the distancing and dissociating which take place at the same time in the long-term disaster process, which is far from over.

The accident on April 26, 1986

Even today, 26 years after Chernobyl, not all of the technical, physical, biological, medical, and psychological consequences of the reactor explosion have been understood, simply because of their enormous complexity. Consequently, one has to deal with data that is often both imprecise and contradictory. What is certain is that a planned test triggered the explosion, radioactively contaminating large areas of Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia, but also parts of the rest of Europe and far beyond its borders. Today's Belarus which, in the public and scientific perception of Chernobyl, is still in Ukraine's shadow, received approximately 70 percent of the total radioactive fallout. Twenty-three percent of the Belarusian territory was contaminated with more than one Curie Caesium-137 per square kilometre.[3] In addition to the difficulties of measuring radioactivity and its impact on human beings, radioactive pollution is highly variable and thus complicates risk assessment. Locally it can vary strongly even within a single settlement. It is out of the question that life could continue in "the normal way" in the most affected regions, as the Belarusian president Aliaksandr Lukashenka never tires of stressing (Lukashenka 2006). In Belarus, it is not only the case that settlement patterns have been changed by evacuation, relocation and resettlement since Chernobyl – it is also perceptions of landscapes, nutritional practices, and cultural practices which have

altered.

Even more difficult to judge than the radioecological impacts are long-term medical consequences. Indeed, cancer – and here particularly the previously very rare forms of childhood thyroid cancer – as well as respiratory, eye, blood, heart and gastrointestinal diseases, diabetes, immune defects ("Chernobyl AIDS") and various forms of dystonia (a neurological movement disorder) and encephalopathy (a collective term for different brain disorders) increased considerably following the disaster.[4] However, to draw a direct connection to the catastrophe is often problematic, because there are several other factors which might have triggered the disease. Furthermore, every human organism reacts differently to radiation. Expert statements concerning the additional cancer deaths resulting from the emanated radioactivity fluctuate between several hundreds and hundreds of thousands because of the different methodical approaches (Sahm 1999: 191-192). These imprecise indications, together with the use of ever changing numbers and references, form the sounding board of manifold uncertainties, fears, and also panic.

From Chernobyl to Fukushima

Neither the damage to the Japanese nuclear power plants nor the 25th anniversary of Chernobyl attracted much attention in the Eastern European regions most affected by the 1986 radioactive fallout, a fact that shocked many Western observers.[5] Nor is there a pronounced anti-nuclear-power attitude, not even among the so-called "Chernobyl children", children and young grown-ups who lived or were born in the more or less radioactively contaminated regions. Rather, most continue to believe in the reliability and safety of the technology, which they also regard as more environmentally acceptable than fossil fuels, indicating that Soviet era perspectives on nuclear energy have persisted despite the disasters. They have even been harnessed more recently to support nuclear energy as a means for gaining and retaining national independence. Thus if one of the central arguments against the use of atomic energy in the post- Chernobyl era turned around condemnations of the USSR for engaging in ecological "genocide", the dependence on Russian energy supplies that followed have led to powerful arguments for building nuclear power plants or the continued use of already existing ones. Although there is an awareness of possible risks, the health problems people have experienced, and the general acknowledgement that the disaster was a terrible event among the people directly affected, most of them have banished Chernobyl from their everyday lives, regardless of whether they continue to live in contaminated regions or if they have moved away from them. Irina Narkevich, a German translator from the Belarusian capital of Minsk, who traveled repeatedly in her youth as a "Chernobyl child" to Germany and later accompanied groups of "Chernobyl children" as an assistant, puts it like this: "Chernobyl cannot be avoided. You can't take these radioactive substances out of the soil anymore, neither can you wish it (Chernobyl) away from your life, but this does not mean that the topic is a very current issue" (Interview with the author:2010).

One of the reasons for this negation might be that "fear always demands a counterproposal (Gegenentwurf)", as the German historian Bernd Greiner (2009:21) pointed out. In the long run fear is bearable neither for individuals nor for collectives: Individuals are at risk to sustain psychological damage; societies can meet the limits of political integration and cohesion if the state fails to fulfil its own unique task, namely to provide security and

freedom from want, fear and uncertainty. To neglect the consequences of the disaster, to let them fade into the background, might be a "culture of coping" (Greg Bankoff 2002) to deal with the constant presence of possible health risks and the emotional and material challenges connected with this uncertainty.

Another reason can be seen in the fact, that nuclear energy played a major role in the systems' competition during the Cold War. In the East, the building of nuclear power plants was celebrated as one of the major achievements of socialism. The Soviet Union based a critical part of its legitimacy on the promises of modernity and in particular on the technology created by it. Universal and rational knowledge, especially the achievements of technology, should be accessible for everyone. They were supposed to pave the way towards communism. In this process, risks were proclaimed to be calculable and controllable. Uncertainty was equated with incompetence or the lack of experience and scientific expertise. In this worldview, which actually resembled approaches in the West in the 1950s and 1960s, risk was portrayed as manageable, a concern mastered by scientists and engineers.

The development of nuclear energy played a crucial role in the Soviet modernization process. In addition to its economic importance it also had tremendous symbolic value. It promised progress, modernization, and human control over nature at the most basic level. Following the successes in Western Europe and the United States and the death of Joseph Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev set off a nuclear euphoria. In ideological symbiosis with the anthropocentric Marxist world view, one in which humankind would ultimately subdue nature, the communist buildup was marked by an "unlimited euphoria of technology" (Gestwa 2003:350) and technological "gigantomania" (Josephson 1996:300). Khrushchev's atomic enthusiasm built directly on Lenin's schemes for electrification and his well-known adage that "Communism is Soviet power plus electrification." It built as well on Stalin's enormous canal projects, which transformed Soviet landscapes, and it was pursued with similar verve and gusto (Josephson 1995; Gestwa 2004). Indeed, because the party leadership believed in science and technology as panacea for economic and social problems, they trivialized any dangers associated with this or any other technology. Nuclear energy was given an open door.

While nuclear euphoria in the West was articulated primarily by intellectuals while the population at large remained rather skeptical, the population in the Soviet Union overwhelmingly seemed to accept the scientific-technologically justified claims of security, and that only increased as the successes of nuclear energy became an important feature of Soviet ideology and education. The new cities that rose around the nuclear power plants, proudly called "*atomograd*y" (atomic cities; e.g. Pripyat next to the Chernobyl power plant, or Visaginas next to the Ignalina power plant in the Lithuanian Soviet Republic) were showpieces of modern, family-friendly architecture and lifestyle.[6] Images of dark, sordid industrial halls with premodern equipment were contrasted with white-collar pictures from spaceship-like command centers of the nuclear power plants. Furthermore, the population was kept out of the political processes to the greatest possible extent and was only provided with sanitized accounts of progress if they were provided with any information at all.

The handling and also the commemoration of the disaster in the former Soviet Union must also be seen against the background of devastating World War II experiences and their commemoration practices in the Soviet Union. The suffering of the population as well as the

heroism of the Soviet soldiers who fought the Germans, played an undefeatable role in the Soviet political culture and are ever-present in today's Belarus (and to some extent in Ukraine). The Soviet Union was built on the concept of the heroism of the Soviet people. Worshipping of heroes is recurrent also in terms of the memory of Chernobyl. Thereby the disaster is transformed into a challenge that can be solved by the heroic, self-sacrificing commitment of the best of the people. Though state ideology plays a part in encouraging this worship, it is also encouraged by those who were affected, especially the organizations of so-called "liquidators" – the clean-up and rescue workers at the destroyed power plant site. Their behaviour, their attitudes and the manner of their treatment often recall those of the wartime heroes. The same is true for some scientists, intellectuals and NGO leaders. The impossibility of questioning this approach is rampant. Thereby not only World War II is used as a reference, but also the Soviet war in Afghanistan. For example, in Slavutich, the city built for evacuees from Pripyat and today's Chernobyl workers, a "liquidators'" organization was founded already in 1991 bearing the name "*Afgantsy Chernobylia*" (Afghans of Chernobyl).

Fukushima was not Chernobyl. What could be hidden for three years from the Soviet public (and partly from its Western counterpart), was disclosed almost in real time on TV and computer screens all over the world in March 2011. The images of the exploding buildings of the nuclear power plants in Fukushima were an immediate media event that was followed by millions of spectators all over the world. Even if the corresponding information about the causes, conditions and dangers was scarce, everyone who had any kind of media connection was directly informed about the accidents. This was completely different 25 years ago.

What is a striking similarity, however, are the Western feelings of uncertainty and helplessness that were expressed after both the incidents – even if the outcomes were of different resoluteness.[7] Governments in the Western part of the globe felt the necessity to assure their polities of their national nuclear power plants' safety and underscore that their own nuclear power complexes were not as vulnerable as those in Japan. Much like after Chernobyl, checkups were pursued to inspect the safety of the plants. The uncertainties thereby do not only relate to the safety of the reactors next door but also the states' inability to deal with the complex risks of radioactivity, to completely evaluate them, and the challenges of turning these incomplete evaluations into reliable and trustworthy safety actions. After Chernobyl, some European countries such as Italy, Sweden, or Germany either closed their nuclear power plants or took first attempts for a phase-out of atomic energy. However, as Chernobyl gradually sank into oblivion and the argument of climate compatibility of nuclear power came to the fore again, decisions were revised, delayed or withdrawn. The most prominent example is Germany. More than ten years after Chernobyl, the new red-green coalition of Social Democrats and the Green Party enacted a moratorium in 1998 to phase out Germany's nuclear reactors. Shortly before Fukushima, at the end of 2010, the re-installed Christian Democratic – Liberal government pursued the exit strategy from the exit strategy. It seemed as if the historical caesura of Chernobyl was leveled out completely. But just a few months later Fukushima abruptly reanimated the debate that finally led to the return to the phase-out decision and proclaiming a fundamental change in Germany's energy policy.[8]

This issue

This issue approaches Chernobyl at three different levels, even if this ideal typological distinction is blurred by the many interconnections these three levels share and by the impossibility of sharply distinguishing between them. The first focus includes individual memories and "communicative"[9] recollections by direct witnesses of the disaster. According to the pioneer in modern memory research, Maurice Halbwachs (1985, 1967), individual memories are reconstructions based on social reference frameworks of the present and thereby are always formed more by the present than by the past. Furthermore, individual memory is always intertwined with the collective memory of a certain group or community. Collective memories, commemorations and (physical) memorializations of these memories in Belarus build the second part of the special issue section. Here, the authors pay special attention to the different reference frames that underlie alternative narratives of the same event - the Chernobyl disaster - and which are used for the demarcation of different memory groups. Visual and literary representations of the disaster, which are both constructed on memories and at the same time construct memories, form the third level of inquiry.

Individual memories

In many western European countries, the closest and firsthand connection to Chernobyl for many people were the so-called "Chernobyl children" who spent their holidays in the neighbourhood or in their own families. You can hardly find someone who never heard of the "Chernobyl children." Together with "Chernobyl" one could dare to call the "Chernobyl children" a transnational *lieu de mémoire*.

Because the social security system that existed in the former Soviet Union was not set up to deal with the problem of providing multiyear care for hundreds of thousands of disaster victims (and one might wonder if any of the social security systems worldwide would be), in many aspects, the now independent former Soviet republics were (and still are) dependent on international engagement – not only at the state level, but also at the level of civil society. As early as in the period of late *perestroika,* various foreign civil society organizations started their involvement in the affected regions. In addition to the U.S., Italy and Japan, Germany provided the largest portion of private assistance to the affected (Sahm 2006). More than 1,000 German volunteer organizations have been concerned with helping the victims of the Chernobyl disaster, in particular the "Chernobyl children" since the beginning of the 1990s.[10] Over the last 20 years around 200,000 Belarusian children and young adults have stayed in at the invitation of these organizations for some weeks in German host families or at German youth hostels to recuperate and/or get medical attention. Today, around 6,000-10,000 Belarusian children continue to spend their holidays in Germany each year.[11] In light of the appearance of the transnational solidarity movement, the consequences of the disaster, alongside many negative metaphors, have turned out to be not only destructive. In the end, Chernobyl also marked a clearly perceptible turning point in the transnational commitment to civil society, reaching beyond Europe's borders, a symbol of civil society's aggregate nature, which consists of innumerable smaller and larger groups. Western European, North American, and Japanese citizens who knew little about Ukraine and Belarus beforehand voluntarily got involved in efforts to assist victims of the disaster. After Chernobyl, they became interested in the fate of the people living there, offering them their compassion and

material support in overcoming the consequences of the disaster. Furthermore, civil society structures in the West were strengthened – the involvement in the mitigation processes in the most afflicted countries had a clear impact on policy structures in the Western countries.

One of the children who travelled repeatedly as a "Chernobyl child" to Germany, France and Italy was Svetlana Bodrunova. Today chair of the Department of Media Design and IT in Media at the Faculty of Journalism at St. Petersburg State University in Russia, Bodrunova left her home - 19 miles from Gomel, one of the most affected district capitals in Southern Belarus - as a child with her parents because of radiation. In her article in this special issue, she offers not only her personal narrative of the disaster's aftermath and her experience with the health trips, but also reflects on the remembered observations and interpretations of fellow "Chernobyl children." Additionally, she contrasts these reminiscences of the "real Chernobyl" experience with the non-memories of young adults familiar only with a "virtual Chernobyl" through computer games such as "S.T.A.L.K.E.R." As different as they are, all three perspectives are according to Bodrunova built on mythologization processes of the disaster.

Jana Kopelentova Rehak, a photographer and anthropologist originally from Prague, now teaching at the Loyola University Maryland and Towson University, Baltimore, tells the story of another group of ecological refugees after "Chernobyl" in her photo essay of the Northern Bohemian village of Kurivody. She collected the individual memories of ethnic Czechs who lived in Ukraine when the disaster happened and decided to move back to the Czech Republic because of the dangers of radioactivity in their village in Ukraine. It is not only the memories of these almost completely unknown and forgotten (re)migrants Rehak is presenting in an impressive way, but also the different histories, memories and legacies inscribed into the small Czech settlement. The notion of "lost land" thereby acquires a manifold meaning and ever-changing spatial localization.

Collective memories and commemorations

Rehak's photo essay builds a bridge between the first and the second level of analysis in this special issue section by unfolding the interconnection between individual memory and the collective memory of the rather small group of the Czech remigrants. Marharyta Fabrykant, Andrei Dudchik, and Tatiana Kasperski follow this line by shedding light on even more obvious collective memory processes. First, Marharyta Fabrykant and Andrei Dudchik from the Belarusian State University in Minsk examine Belarusian history textbooks for secondary schools and university with regard to their handling of the Chernobyl disaster. They demonstrate how the disaster is framed within a general *perestroika* narrative and thus disappeared into the background of importance with no space for individual experience or memories.

The "disappearance" of Chernobyl in the public discourse is also part of the conclusions drawn by Tatiana Kasperski from the European Humanities University in Vilnius. In her article, she focuses on public commemoration practices and memoralizations of the disaster in Belarus. By contrasting official and oppositional approaches to the commemoration, she reveals different narratives which both contributed to the fading of the disaster memory in everyday life in Belarus. Chernobyl is deprived of its primary meaning

and rather has become instrumentalized for political purposes and used as a tool for claiming power.

Visual and literary memories and representations

The power of images was a salient feature of all the articles. Because of their ever increasing importance, the third part of this issue's special Chernobyl section will be dedicated to them in their varying manifestations - photographs, films, computer games, and also the images created by texts.

The reactor ruin with its smokestack, and the evacuated ghost city Pripyat--in particular its Ferris wheel which never took passengers to its top, since it had to be abandoned just a few days before its opening--became icons of our era, an era labelled as "risk society" (Beck 1986) or "age of ecology" (Radkau 2011). Pictures of disasters are "visible booties [or plunder] from the empire of speed and movement", as the German literary scholar Bernd Stiegler (2009:235) put it. In particular the first pictures of the exploded reactor - taken from a helicopter or the in the public rather unknown pictures of the hastily organized evacuations - can be understood as confirmation of Stiegler's proposition. But Chernobyl images are also booties that try to make the empire of standstill and void visible. Andrea Zink from the University of Innsbruck, Austria, shows this on the basis of the works by photographer Robert Polidori and filmmaker Nikolaus Geyrhalter. In her analysis she also includeswritten images - the testimonials of witnesses collected in documentary prose by Iurii Shcherbak and Svetlana Aleksievich.

Both types of "visible booties" can be found in Aleksandr Mindaze's movie "Innocent Saturday", as Johanna Lindbladh from Lund University in Sweden demonstrates in her contribution to this special issue. In the movie, which came out in the "Chernobyl year" 2011 (the 25th anniversary of the disaster), the void is contrasted by moving images of speed. Everyday life and everyday concerns in the *atomograd* Pripyat are contrasted with the high-speed disaster reality that is creeping in into the scenes to be only hesitantly acknowledged by the movie's characters. By examining the deviating attitudes that developed towards the movie in Western and Eastern Europe Lindbladh displays how perception not only changes with time, but also with the person doing the perceiving. Thereby distinct concepts of heroism play a decisive role, as Lindbladh argues.

While it seems easy to detect irreality in a movie, the same becomes a challenge in assessing the future perspectives of the so-called "zone", the radioactively contaminated area around the exploded reactor. Sarah D. Phillips and Sarah Ostaszewski from Indiana University play - in text (Phillips) and pictures (Ostaszewski) with the ideas for "redevelopment" and "exploitation" of the exclusion zone that emerged in Ukraine and Belarus. Not without a cynical wink they question understandings of the "zone" in Eastern as well as in Western Europe by critically yet playfully examining five "strategies" of transforming the contaminated region.

Two book reviews on recent books on Chernobyl - the French *Les silences de Tchernobyl. L'avenir contaminé* edited by Galia Ackerman, Guillaume Grandazzi and Frédérick Lemarchand (reviewed by Katrin Jordan) and the translation of Sergii Mirnyi's *Worse than Radiation and 7 Odd Chernobyl Stories* (reviewed by Harrison King) - complete the special Chernobyl section of this issue of *AEER*.

"The longer I stayed in Belarus, the more I departed from Chernobyl. From my German sense of Chernobyl," wrote the German journalist Merle Hilbk (2011) after she had travelled through the contaminated regions of Belarus and Ukraine for several months. Brought up and socialized in West Germany in a period described as full of a ubiquitous sense of fear (Biess 2008:52), she observed a fading of Chernobyl through the experience of being confronted by the "culture of coping" of the people living with the everyday experience of the disaster. For them, the disaster was not an abnormal occurrence anymore, but still continued to frame the future visions of those living in the contaminated areas. Thereby the construction of memory and non-memory played and continues to play a crucial role. Hopefully, this special issue on "Memories, commemorations, and representations of Chernobyl" offers various links for rapprochements to an almost already forgotten disaster.

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[1] By using the term "Chernobyl" I do not only mean the disaster *event* that took place on April 26th 1986, but use it synonymously for the whole disaster *process* going far beyond the mere accident at the nuclear power plant "Vladimir Ilich Lenin" in Soviet Ukraine.

[2] I would like to thank Sarah D. Phillips for the great opportunity to guest edit this special issue and for her inspiring work. My gratitude is also extended to the authors of this special issue who made the editing process a pleasure, my colleagues in the international research project "Politics and Society after Chernobyl", my colleagues at the Centre for Contemporary History Potsdam, and last but not least the Volkswagen foundation who funded the research project. Information about the German-Belarusian-Ukrainian project can be found at www.after-chernobyl.de. An anthology of the results of the conference with guest contributions will be published at the end of 2012.

[3] Cf. www.chernobyl.info. (accessed August 5, 2010).

[4] Sahm, Astrid.1999. Transformation im Schatten von Tschernobyl. Umwelt und Energiepolitik im gesellschaftlichen Wandel von Belarus und Ukraine [Transformation in the shadow of Chernobyl. Environment and energy policy in the societal change of Belarus and Ukraine]. Münster: Lit.:191-192.

[5] See also Phillips, Sarah D. 2011. Chernobyl forever. Online: http://somatosphere.net/2011/04/chernobyl-forever.html.

[6] For Visaginas see the study *From Pioneers to Target Group: Social Change, Ethnicity and Memory in a Lithuanian Nuclear Power Plant Community* by Kristina Sliavaite (2005. Lund: Lund University), for the Soviet model city Shevchenko the research project by Stefan Guth, University of Bern, Switzerland (http://www.hist.unibe.ch/content/personal/guth_stefan/index_ger.html#forschungsschwerpunkte), and for Soviet *atomograd*y on the territory of Russia, Lithuania, and Ukraine the project by Anna Veronika Wendland, Marburg University, Germany (http://www.herder-institut.de/startseite/projekte/laufende/atomograd y.html). See also her article "Povernennia do Chornobylia. Vid nacional'noï trahediï do innovaciinykh pidkhodiv v istoriohrafiï ne til'ky Ukraïny [Chernobyl revisited. From national tragedy to innovative approaches in the historiography of (not exclusively) Ukraine]."

[7] Cf. for the German case: Melanie Arndt. 2011. Tschernobyl: Auswirkungen des Reaktorunfalls auf die Bundesrepublik und die DDR [Chernobyl. Impacts of the nuclear accident on the Federal Republic and the GDR]. Erfurt: Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Thüringen. For a Russian translation see: http://www.thueringen.de/imperia/md/content/lzt/tschernobyl.pdf

[8] For the German case see Kersten, Jens and Frank Uekoetter and Markus Vogt, Europe After Fukushima. German Perspectives on the Future of Nuclear Power, Rachel Carson Center Perspectives 1/2012, Online: http://www.carsoncenter.uni-muenchen.de/download/publications/perspectives/2012_perspectives/1201_fukushima_web_color.pdf

[9] Cf. for the concept of "communicative memory": Jan Assmann 2011. Cultural Memory and Early Civilization: Writing, Remembrance, and Political Imagination. Cambridge: University Press.

[10] For the German Chernobyl aid also see Melanie Arndt, 2010, From Nuclear to *Human Security*? Prerequisites and Motives for the German Chernobyl Commitment in Belarus. Historical Social Research 35(4):289-308. Online: http://www.anthro.uni-goettingen.de/gk/download/HSR_35_4_komplett.pdf.

[11] Private archive of Astrid Sahm who I thank for providing me with the numbers.

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