

Discussion

Fritz Breithaupt: Is this a test or not? Well, no. This is not a test because—

Richard Nash: Sure, can we believe you? [Laughter.]

Breithaupt: Well, you know, of course, in all these kinds of tests the real test is not what you ask for. The famous thing is you have people fill out paperwork and then you do the spill test. That means you walk by them and you spill pens and you want to see if other people help you or not; and, depending on what activity you gave them to do, they help you or not, and those kinds of things.

Dwight Codr: So I have to worry about everything, not just what I am saying? OK, great, perfect.[Laughter].

Breithaupt: So I will spill things at you, and we will see if you manage to remain polite, prudent, and playful. So, it is my great pleasure to chair this session of two papers that I think fit together extremely well, I mean, kind of mark the bookends of many discussions here. And I really will not be able to do justice to all the possible connections there are between them.

Let me first introduce our two speakers. So, I'll start with Dwight. Dwight comes to us from the University of Connecticut where he just started; basically, this is the end of his first year there. He's an Assistant Professor in the department of English, at University of Connecticut in Storrs. Before that he got his PhD at Cornell University and had a stint at Tulane University in between. His book, I don't know exactly when it will come out, but it will come out soon, I assume, hopefully, and it's called *Damnably Usurers and Gambling Indians: The Making of Anticipatory Subjects in the Long Eighteenth-Century*. And as we can hear, the paper seems to be something that is, at least, dear to his project here as well, relating to the anticipatory subject. He also has published widely on many things including money in the eighteenth century, economics, John Law, usury, and so on and so on, and, also, about the rise of the novel.

Miranda is one of our locals—known to many of us here, of course. She's in the department of English where she is completing her dissertation, and the title of her dissertation is "Embedded and Embodied: An Intimate Tradition of Criticism in the British Novel." Mary Favret, our director, whom we try to embody in a very different way, is the director of the study and Jesse Molesworth is also on the committee of that dissertation. But we can say many other things about Miranda; she's also widely published already and has been a guest editor of *Partial Answers: A Journal of Literature and the History of Ideas* for an issue on British woman writers (in 2010). She has written, published articles, including on Austen, and we have one of her Austen papers. And she works on theories of literary criticism, basically starting in the earlier 1700s. So this probably, seems to be the late end of where her dissertation may go. The final thing I want to say about Miranda is that she is affiliated with our center in many ways, but also financially (since we will talk about finances here), she is a recipient of our Center for Eighteenth-Century Studies Fellowship for this year. So, we are happy to get some of that . . .

Miranda Yaggi: I'm literally indebted to the Center in so many ways. [Laughter].

Breithaupt: We possess you here in many ways. How I want to preface my comments is by throwing out two larger questions that I think these papers give us an opportunity to get into; that we have touched on at times, but never have really developed. And the first larger question is the question of the, that we can consider, is the typologies of players. And, by typologies I mean not so much the empirical many kinds of people that play games, but, rather, the types of subjects that are produced by games and by playing.

We could talk, in that sense, about the technologies of the self, in the sense of Peter Galison. That the media, the technologies, or the games, produced certain forms of subjects. And the question for us could be: what type of subjects are produced here and in which ways are they produced? Are there different types that come out of this gaming culture of the eighteenth century? Or the playing culture? These are not just one and the same, as we have already seen in many ways. And this, of course, connects both papers in numerous ways. I mean, the anticipatory subject is a very clear figure of that, but we also have several incarnations of that in Miranda's paper with the powerful queens, the moves that the queens can make, but also with the question of reading, to which I will come back.

So that is my first overall question that I hope that we may engage with in the discussion here that may even extend the papers at some point.

The second overall question that we have not really discussed yet much even though it has come up—Anne has brought it up—is the question of narration in play. And that I think is a very interesting question that deals with an observation both of Fielding and, to varying degrees, of Austen, too: *reading* becomes an activity that becomes more and more problematic. We don't know what a text means any longer.

Miranda reflects about that very directly: that the discovery of meaning is delayed. There is something that is happening there. There is a potentially a game of discovery or there is even a back and forth between the narrator and the reader. The narrator may be fooling the reader to kind of come up with something, not just in the game of charades but, perhaps, especially in that one.

So the question for me there is: to which degree is narration a good angle for us to look at play and playing? And to which degree, also, narration is, maybe, a red herring, that leads us into other directions or maybe things that go into different directions? But I think that co-history of it maybe something we may want to look at. I think in general that whole idea of reading as play may be an interesting one. I mean there is something new about, late eighteenth-century and, especially, nineteenth-century reading that has reimagined what reading is. It's with, of course, the invention of the detective and that sort of thing, there is suddenly something new in motion. Those are the overall two questions I want to put into the room here and that do connect to the papers, I believe, but also will allow us to maybe bring in a couple other things.

Now, I want to give a few comments about the papers, and I will actually omit reiterating their precise readings of Fielding and Austen, not because I think they are not good, but it's rather the opposite, because they are so clear and so powerful that I think we will have many questions on that. Instead I will just focus on a couple of theoretical undercurrents that I see in them.

Dwight's paper, of course, comes to the topic of the workshop in a way, in a negative fashion or indirectly, first of all, because he asks what prudence is in the eighteenth century. And so, in that sense what could be less prudent than gambling? So he comes to it from that side. However, what seems to be in the beginning a fairly clear opposition—being prudent and gambling—turns out to be much more complex in the course of Dwight's deeper reading and development here.

And he gives us a larger framework of what prudence is prior to Fielding and what it becomes afterwards. And Fielding is in kind of the messy middle of this. “Prudencia”: prudence in the . . . somewhere—we don’t know where exactly, but somewhere before—prudence was just a virtue. One of the key virtues, actually, that marked a good character.

Prudencia comes from the Latin *providere*: seeing forward, having provisions and those kinds of things, and having morally good outlooks of what the results of those actions might be. However, at the end of the eighteenth century, we see the kind of meaning that we nowadays mostly relate to prudence, we see mere calculation, we see economic calculation, the planning, the wise investments, economic activities. Which means that we are moving from, to put it very brutally, from a notion of prudence that is marked by quality to one of mere quantities. And that is not quite the words that Dwight uses, he is a little bit more careful here, he uses . . . he looks at in the words of, he finds in the treatise by William De . . . DeBretton, is it . . . it’s not Berton?

Codr: It’s various spellings.

Breithaupt: OK, William DeBriton. He puts, he himself asks the question in that very popular treatise—it’s a late seventeenth-century treatise that was reprinted many times throughout the eighteenth century—where he asks whether prudence in itself is a virtue or whether it is a mere modality. And then also the second question related to that is the question related to the difference between manipulation and calculation.

And this move to the quantification of prudence is the one that Dwight connects in with the anticipatory subject. That is the center I would say for, for our discussion and for the paper here: what is this anticipatory subjectivity that emerges somewhere in the eighteenth century, that is hardly there, but is filling up; is not fully there yet, but coming. And here this is also where my first set of questions will center, and I will ask whether this—how you will or how we will all distinguish this anticipatory subject or *whether* we will distinguish it from the self-interested man and the *homo economicus* that are all figures that seem very close to each other here. I mean the self-interested man is a notion that does come up in Dwight’s paper as well here that is often seen as the same thing as the self—the anticipatory subject, my apologies.

So, my first question is here: are these three kind of things really sides of the same thing? Then I will ask Dwight why he is focusing on the anticipatory subject rather than these other modalities of self-interest and economical planning. That’s the first question, the second question, then, affiliated with just this notion or this concept of this anticipatory and self-interested man (both come up here) is the question of who defines self-interest. Who is really the one who calls something a calculation?

I will briefly quote an interesting objection to the notion of self-interest and by extension, too, of economic anticipation by Amartya Sen. Amartya Sen is famous for his criticism of the notion of self-interest. I mean, he is a Nobel prize winner at Harvard University, and he says: “It is possible to define a person’s interests in such a way that no matter what he does he can be seen to be furthering his own interests in every isolated act of choice.”¹ So what Sen says is really self-interest is a false notion because we always (and anticipation in a similar sense) because we always, whatever we do, we always do that. So, it’s a matter of observation. The whole question is really only, it’s not about that subject, that anticipatory subject, but it’s rather that someone else *calls* other people that way. So that’s my second question in here, how do you deal with that?

¹ Amartya Sen, “Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory,” *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 6 (1977).

Dwight's question, of course, in his paper and brilliantly developed is the question how Fielding tries to rescue prudence from, well, in a way from calculations that are too prudent. I mean how can you rescue something that escapes the mere quantification and manipulations and so on and so on. Is there a way to rescue some moral substance or something that the old notion of prudence had?

And here he introduces this wonderfully interesting notion of the radical player, the player who plays for the sake of playing who doesn't want to make profit. And, now I would like to give Dwight the chance to elaborate on this a little bit more, especially in light of what we discussed here during the workshop yesterday and today already we had a lot of figures of playing for playing's sake. I'm now wondering how we can locate this radical player into this. We had the notion of the trifler, Jonathan just introduced that, is that the same thing? Probably not, it seemed to be something different. We also had the player who plays for the sake of connecting socially, which may or may not be a trifler. Again, that seems to be a different notion. Then there's the seventeenth-century aristocratic notion of the wasteful aristocrat who says basically "I waste, therefore I am." Which is again, I don't think the notion that Dwight has in mind here, even though it sounds similar to the notion of Bataille here. We also have the notion of Schiller and, then, of course, of Huizinga where we also have this playing for playing sake here. So I want to know a little bit more basically, how do you locate that? And, I mean, tell us more, bring this radical player on the table. It's very interesting, yeah? I'll leave it with those questions here.

Miranda has given us a reading that managed to repeatedly surprise me. She looks at play and game in Austen's very early text *The History of England* and she digs out one level of playing and one kind of game after another. And, I've basically distinguished four larger shapes of this that I want just to just of recite briefly. You've read it, I mean, just to recall this, and I will do this by the actual games that she mentions and brings in here.

The first game that she discovers is basically the card game and the chess game, where she talks about the kings and the queens, the images that come up both in the symbolical way in the . . . well, sorry . . . The historical figures that rule in *The History of England*, especially the queens, and how they are described by Austen in the logic and language of playing a board game or playing a card game, that is the first level where they come in and she draws many conclusions from it.

The second level where games and play comes in her reading, then, is the one of the puzzle where reading (this is the first time that reading pops up, even though there will be a second time), reading becomes an activity that has no borders, that yet asks for interpretation. She quotes Wolfgang Iser, for example, among other people in this connection and there she says we "puzzle together meaning." The text doesn't close it, there's something that is yet to come. We puzzle together meaning. So the puzzle is the second kind or type of game that she brings up.

Then there's the third type of game that she brings up, which is the bulwark game of building communities, the historical games where you recite the large sea battles of England, where everyone becomes a part of it. She refers to Benedict Anderson and Homi Bhabha in this sense where the players of the game establish a communion across time and space (as she quotes it here), that everyone who plays this game becomes a part of that particular history of England even though he or she wasn't there, and can thereby become part of the imaginary community. I don't know how you call this type of game, these kind of war games, historical games (in a way), I mean, role-playing games you may even, to some degree, call it nowadays.

The fourth game that she comes to is the game of the charade, in which there is a secret word to be found in the text. I have to say that I'm not, I didn't fully understand how "carpet" and the

homosexuality of the king really related to each other, but I trusted your reading there, so maybe you can elaborate that for me to some degree here. But, it's yet another game where there is, that involves, in this case, the reader and the narrator.

So my questions for you are basically—what I was kind of wondering after reading this—and of course all of this was done extremely well (I mean, playfully, actually). But I was wondering myself whether you almost, I wonder whether you could make even more of this powerful narrator in the text. I mean, and you refer to this repeatedly in your reading. I mean, the narrator in *History of England* is incredibly witty, she—I mean, “he or she” (narrators are neutral in that sense)—constantly undermines herself, is naïve, is incredibly witty at the same time, and is playing games with the reader, the whole time. The reader has to kind of play with the narrator, and the reader kind of has to feel to see whether it's a fencing game, it's a teasing game, it's a challenging game, it's a naïve childish kind of game, I mean, this is some interesting location that the narrator forces from the reader. So, that is the first thing that I would like you to elaborate a little bit more. There is something we could talk more about here, the figure of the narrator and the game that the narrator engages with the reader. I mean there is the specific game of the charade, but there's something more in just the language game of this ironic (but not just ironic) self-undermining and forceful positioning there of the narrator in between all of this history of England.

And the second one, the second invitation that I would issue for you is then (and really I could pick any of those four levels of games that you identified here) is to elaborate a little bit more on the site of reading in yet another way, which is the question of this delayed meaning of the text that comes up twice in your games. On the one side of the reading builds communities, but also on the side of the charades of the word yet to be found, I mean, the secret that is to be. Where you, I believe, show us that the texts are incomplete as they are, they need this activity reading, where really playing becomes a form of delaying something, too.

There's a new temporal dimension in here, that we don't know where this is coming to, and there seems to be two sides of that and that's, there's a bifurcation of two types of reading games here, that I could potentially see. The one is the one that goes towards a solution; there's a delay, but then there's a solution. You know, it was “carpet” or “homosexuality” or something like that or a detecting kind of story where you now know, I know the murderer: Queen Elizabeth, I figured it out. And then you have solved it, and then the game is over. I mean you have a delay, a hermeneutic operation and it's over. But there's a second kind of open-ended game, of course, where the meaning becomes open-ended, where you keep it going, where hermeneutics don't stop, where there's a permanent process. And I wonder whether that distinction about a game that comes to an end and a game that is just open-ended could be something that may be a guideline to elaborate what reading as a playing activity could mean in Austen. But I will leave it with this and open the discussion. Well, no, no. Sorry I asked you questions, so I should give you a chance to reply, I'll go I guess in historical order, so I guess Miranda has a few seconds here.

Codr: Thanks. Some great questions and I'm going to, for the moment, I guess, pass over the question of narration and sort of address the questions that you raised as your head questions on typologies and then the three questions that you asked specific to my project. So, the question being: What types of subject are produced by playing or what different kinds of subjects get produced out of different sort of forms of gambling (or gaming)? I think that is a very appropriate question. It seems like when the [game] pieces are paper, the players that are produced are gamblers; when the pieces are young women; they tend to be libertines.

What my project is trying to do in its larger context is recuperate a sort of interest and ethical necessity of risk and specifically irrational, non-prudential, un-thinking—in short, bad behavior (at least in economic terms)—and locate it more centrally in the emergence of a modern “financial subject” (and I will return to *homo economicus* in a moment). And that grows specifically out of early modern objections to the practice of usury. Usury has recently been the subject of much interest for people working in the history of sexuality, talking about the sort of way that money generating more of itself through a kind of unnatural, onanistic financial principle is unholy or damnable and that’s all, I think, been quite interesting and useful for me.

But, there’s a specific argument that gets made in anti-usury polemic in the sixteenth and seventeenth century that I think hasn’t received due attention. And, that is not the argument that usury is heartless, cruel, anti-communitarian, greedy, destructive (all of which are true) but, rather, that it makes a certain kind of claim on the future: that it codifies and makes certain, future contingencies. Contingencies that are to be properly understood as existing within the realm of the providential or the divine. This is to say that the usurious contract or, frankly, any contract seals the giver of the gift from any potential for loss. Now obviously, that is not, objectively speaking, always true, but conceptually, that would be the horizon of what a contract should do, is foreclose the possibility of contingency. This foreclosure of contingency is itself religiously, morally problematical because it takes away a certain elemental gambling instinct, a risk quality that for Protestant divines in particular (dissenting divines more intensely) is the mark of a truly ethical commerciality.

So that’s where this project grows out of. So, in short, what I’m interested in—to get to the questions of *homo economicus* and the sort of self-interested man—is that the figure of *homo economicus* as it’s traditionally talked about is characterized by the exorcism of these demons of irrationalism and supernaturalism and risk and *homo economicus* is ideally constructed as something that has nothing to do with a vulnerability. So, I talk somewhat about this idea of conditions of sufficient ethical vulnerability. That you actually...that your ethical status consists in making yourself vulnerable in some way. And, it’s partly ethical, but I think it’s also partly aesthetic. So, just to give a brief concretization of what I mean by that: that there’s a certain kind of thrill, certainly, that comes with having accurately predicted something in the stock market, but the real pleasure that one takes from making a wise investment has actually very little to do with calculation. In fact, if we were purely calculative we would take no pleasure in it. When your 401K statement comes in and you see that you’ve made a hundred dollars this month—which would be a great month these days—there’s no pleasure there at all, it’s a purely rational...

Richard Nash: Speak for yourself.

Codr: What’s that? Well, OK. [Laughter]. Well, maybe there is some pleasure, but I’m trying to sort of isolate a *separate* kind of pleasure that comes precisely from having made a decision without having any particularly good information to begin with. And, that there is some sense of gratification that accompanies having made a decision based on absolutely no good reason whatsoever. And we could say that is because we feel blessed or we could say that is because we feel lucky. There are a lot of different ways of describing that particular affect, but that’s what I’m trying to sort of theorize, that particular moment. And so, *homo economicus*, then, does not contain within it this sort of deviant, contrary identity.

I should mention, as a sort of point, just a kind of digression . . . While I think I necessarily sort of have to lay this out as something of a historical argument, I think that the point that I'm trying to make more broadly is that there is actually nothing particularly linear about this narrative; that the emergence of this subject that carefully balances the prudential and the gambling is something that is perpetually having to be worked through in/under conditions of capital.

I'll briefly (I don't want to take too much time), but on the points about everything being self-interested (the Amartya Sen point). I mean, this is similar to Barbara Herrnstein Smith's critique of Bataille in *Contingencies of Value*² where she basically says: well, the problem with Bataille is he basically just reverses it and, in fact, every instance of expenditure is really just a moment of another kind of self-interest; and, certainly you could, as Bataille observes tends to be the case, you could construe any behavior as self-interested which, of course, evacuates the concept of "self-interest" of all meaning whatsoever. So, certainly Bataille is guilty of a little bit of pure inversion, but I think that the value of thinking about Bataille is that Bataille's way of thinking about things precisely co-exists with political economy. That is, if they are inversions, then yes, the solution is political economy in the liberal tradition *and* Bataille, where the emphasis is not on production and accumulation and consumption, but on getting rid of all of this excess stuff that we end up getting.

So, the last point that I would make: the question about, you know, how can prudence be rescued. Prudence is fine; I don't think prudence ever really needs to be rescued. I think that the issue is how prudence does not completely overtake the gambler, and so this is the sort of somewhat (although not particularly fun) form of play that I initiate on the last page of the chapter. The sort of moment where I try to think about the sort of, the anxious (and "anxious" might not even be the right word), but sort of uncomfortable balancing act that happens affectively when you enter the casino. That on the one hand there's this long tradition of demonizing this kind of behavior, and yet nobody ever feels that way at all when you're actually in the casino. There's something completely disingenuous about this opprobrium that's attached to gambling. And so, I'm trying to sort of think about this uneasy relationship; that it's not a matter of exclusion (which the model of *homo economicus* in its historical emergence presupposes), but rather one of careful balancing.

And one last point: the trifler. Certainly, there's some trifling going on here. And, social bonds that are established through acts of gambling are also of great importance. On the subject of the wasteful aristocrat (as you put it), the wasteful aristocrat says, "I waste therefore I am." And, what I guess I am trying to look at is the economic subject who wastes and, therefore, he wastes because he must; he must waste.

So anyway . . . well, but . . . [Dwight Codr trails off, and indicates to Miranda it is her turn to respond].

Yaggi: That's quite an act to follow. I just have, I think just a few, much more cursory responses to Fritz's questions. The first question: Could I make more of the narrator? I think my answer is yes. And maybe I can just leave it at that? [Laughter]. Actually, yes, I can and I want to, and, in fact, that gets to the very heart of what brought me to this paper in the first place. In reading . . . *History of England* has always been sort of one of my favorite pieces of the juvenilia. It's short, it's hilarious, it's a lot of fun to read (as is much of her juvenilia), but it's more compact in its own way. And so, I actually found myself really surprised when I ran out and did the reading

² Barbara Herrnstein Smith, *Contingencies of Value: Alternative Perspectives for Critical Theory* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988).

around this particularly piece and found that there are really these two very specific, very stubborn responses and they are often joined together.

One is that Austen is rehearsing family politics. And so therefore, this positions her, much like Kathryn [Gleadle] was discussing in her paper, as a passive recipient. So as a child she's sort of—I mean, albeit brilliantly and precociously—she's still just essentially repeating what she's seeing in her own home life and just doing it in her, you know, brilliant Austen way, which I found to be a very limiting way to look at this particular piece. The other response is to say: It's a piece of amusement and, therefore, that has been used as a criteria to sort of close down this text, to say either we can't take it too seriously or to take it back to the first premise, therefore, we should only see it again as this game in family politics. And, it was precisely the function of the narrator that made me think that those two premises, while certainly true and important, don't go far enough because that narrative voice is so powerful. And, as Fritz says: it forces. I felt constantly forced to engage with that narrative voice in a way that neither of these two approaches seemed to make much of.

And so my project and the paper—in fact, the move to play for me was just an organic one because I felt that I was being played with. So then I wanted to kind of figure out what was being played, and I went from there to the Lilly Library to see what kind of games did kids play in this moment. And I found that there was this really rich culture that I just had been unaware of, and I thought that was a much more structuring component that perhaps needed to be considered a bit more.

So, I think at the heart of the paper what I am trying to do is actually to engage more with the narrator, and to say that there is something much more active and engaging that is taking place, rather than a repetition of family. And also to say that the idea that this is an amusement shouldn't necessarily mean that is the criteria by which this gets closed down, but, in fact, could become the very grounds by which we open it up more. To say “she's trying to amuse, let's think of this game playing as not something that's simple and static, but is, in fact, it's own more active engagement or project.”

The second question about delayed meaning of the text, I appreciate that. I think I tried to point in the charade section to the way that Austen later in *Emma* points out the problem of, “Yes, you can solve a riddle, but if you play a game that merely ends, while fun”—right, they build a book of the charades in *Emma* and it provides them a lot of amusement—but it doesn't actually, not only does it not actually do something productive, but in fact it becomes destructive because Emma ends up misleading Harriet and the entire plot sort of ends up revolving around the ways in which she allows the game to end. Rather than realizing that this is a game that must, in fact, extend because interpretation extends and it has very serious consequences socially, politically that sort of thing. So I was interested in the ways in which Austen starts at this very early place in *The History*, but goes throughout the entire sort of body of her work really thinking (and, again, for me it's a very gendered sort of premise) that for all sort of participants reading is always an active and engaging process. But, nowhere is it more important or can it be more dangerous than for women who just sort of become passive, consumptive creatures rather than actively engaged because often their welfare is wrapped up in the ways in which they either do or do not participate acutely and critically in interpretive acts both of texts, but also of contexts and places, in which they are kind of acting.

I also want to return to Fritz's opening question about what kind of subject do games create. And, I think that at least for Austen, I think that Austen wants to produce a different subject, that that's kind of the project of *The History of England*. She wants to, through the act of reading and

specifically, I think, the reading history, wants to activate a different kind of subject. And, she does that by going to games because games—even ones that end, but certainly ones that don't—require that you be a subject that is much more anticipatory, much more critical, much more self-interested, and it disrupts all of the kinds of things that I think Austen finds troubling here and in other places. So, yes, I think games create different kinds of subjects, and one subject in particular or one very kind of broad rubric we would use is it creates a participatory subject. And, for Austen to be participatory is the first step toward something quite important for her. I'll leave it at that.

Codr: Excellent, Excellent.

Breithaupt: You followed the act, you were not so sure whether you were . . . Well, I will take a quick survey now about who wants to be on the main list up front, but you will have many, many chances. So, please.

Nina Dubin: I . . .

Breithaupt: OK, you can start. Well, please, Nina?

Dubin: Both of you just now seemed to be invoking different kinds of pleasure in your responses, so maybe that would be an interesting starting point. So, what struck me in your, Dwight, when you, in your remarks Dwight, you mentioned that you're interested in the aesthetic component of the pleasure that one has when one makes an investment and then has a return based on, you know, volitional causes or a volitional act. And, I was just thinking, Miranda, about your . . . I wondered if you [Codr] could speak more about what makes that pleasure distinctly aesthetic?

And, I was also curious about, just going back to the notion that this Austen text, you seem to be suggesting, kind of failed. I mean, you seem to be saying that it's—I'm not sure, was it the initial readership didn't quite welcome it? Because, you know, she's a woman author, there's a way in which it's considered to be kind of trifling. So I wondered if, I mean, does that somehow say something—I was just wondering what you made of that failure? You know, that it failed to kind of create the kinds of pleasure in reading that subsequent texts . . .

Yaggi: *History of England* you mean? Well of course *History of England*, and this is something I'm always sort of confronting in this piece, is troubled by its genre: it's a piece of the juvenilia. So, it wasn't actually read sort of contemporarily at the time, right, and it wasn't read until much later. And, even now the juvenilia occupies such a strange space within our scholarship: to what extent can we put any kind of interpretive weight on it? So, that's something I'm sort of always bumping up against. So, I'm not sure whether it *can* succeed or fail because I think it was an imaginative experiment for Austen; what would she like for history to be if it could be other than it is as a genre. But it does mean it was read by others, we only really know it was read by Cassandra and performed, perhaps, out loud by family. And, I think that we've sort of lost the joke as scholars because of distance and context and our unwillingness to see juvenilia in certain ways. So, I'm not sure how to address—I'm not sure that it fails, I also, I don't think that we can say it succeeds either, so I'm not really sure how to engage that question.

But the pleasure of the aesthetic, there are a lot of ways to go about answering that and I'll leave some of those open, I think, to all of us; we might have a lot to say about that. But what strikes me initially is to say that for Austen there is both a power and a pleasure in understanding that historiography and an engagement with history is not, in fact, a text of undisputable facts or indisputable facts. And it is not something that is monolithic. It is, in fact, something that is already inundated and pervaded by things that we would find in fiction. And it is, you know, that's Catherine Morland's great speech, all those speeches that those kings and queens made, most of those had to be invention, and invention is what delights me. So, Austen recognizes that history although it is not perceived as pleasurable often by women readers, it should be more because if we understood how much of it is infiltrated by things that are coming heterogeneously into it there would be more pleasure in that. So she takes that which should already be a pleasure that's there, and I think she ratchets it up with all of these anachronisms and all of her, sort of, her cheeky play and makes us sort of have—either become entirely frustrated by her or have a great deal of fun understanding that somebody can't be happy about a beheading that hasn't happened yet... you know, in the text.

Breithaupt: The word juvenilia came up, so Richard immediately had a short intervention. After that I have Danny, Jesse, and Kathryn so far.

Nash: It actually wasn't juvenilia, it was "trifler" that got me started because you referred to this piece as being dismissed as trifling which reminded me of Jonathan bringing that term in. It does seem to me that one of the ways to think about what you're claiming on behalf of Austen's history is that we should take—that rather than dismissing this as a trifle by a juvenile trifler, we should be taking trifling more seriously. And I was thinking reading your paper about the relation that this text has to history in ways—not unlike what you might think of Jon Stewart's *The Daily Show* having to journalism or the Reduced Shakespeare Company having to English history, right? This is the earliest Reduced Shakespeare Company I am aware of. And there does seem to be a sense of which that's a kind of play that can have value for investigating more seriously than we . . . And that raises that question of what is the status of the trifler? How seriously should one take the trifler? And, when is something only playing at being the trifler but is, in fact, doing something else?

Breithaupt: OK, Danny?

Daniel O'Quinn: I was really engaged with these two papers in lots of different ways, but I want to just make one thing about bringing them together. Dwight in your paper when you retold *The Modern Husband* from the perspective of the prop that was just a thrilling moment, right? because it was like suddenly we're now actually taking about dramaturgy, we're actually, you know, moving away from script analysis, and we're now trying to imagine... And you do that moment where you try to imagine how it would play, right? How is she going to handle that piece of paper, and so much of that dramaturgy depends on the audience's understanding of how they handle pieces of paper.

Codr: Great point.

O'Quinn: And so, that there's a—Fielding is really careful, it seems to me, about how the, that piece of paper is going to play and is going to play with the people around it. In other words it is going to generate the subjectivities on the stage that will then be identified by the audience and a whole social world can then be handled around that piece.

Codr: That's great.

O'Quinn: And then, it seems to me that a similar thing happens in Miranda's piece, right. Because the thing that was just revelatory about your piece is that, and I just felt like an idiot [laughter] for not having thought about it, is it's like, right, you have to look at cards, right? You have to look at the material objects that she's dealing with, right? And then, when you make the move to *Emma* it's so great because (actually I would have gone to *Mansfield Park*), it's suddenly the materiality, the technology of the novel, right, becomes the stand-in for the card game or for the chess game or whatever. So, for instance, the end of *Mansfield Park* when the narrator says "Well, OK, we've come to the end of three volumes, we know they got to get married, let's wrap that up, we're done." [Laughter]. And, basically indicates that the people who have followed that game are just, like, failed to understand that Mary Crawford is more interesting, right? That Mary Crawford is really the person that Austen is interested in. And so, there's this way in which the technology that is required for gaming is used to change the terms. And I'm just—it seems to me that you've both hit upon really crucial components of how they work as, whether as novelists or as dramatists, right? That they're interested in that, that they're interested in their media as parts of the play world, right. Does that make sense?

Yaggi: Yeah.

Codr: Yeah. I mean, I never really think about audiences which is, you know, probably apparent in my response to Fritz. But that particular moment where Mrs. Bellamant sort of must pocket it without looking it and hand it over without looking it, I mean, I can imagine that idea of how those scenes would be staged in each instance as being totally freighted with all sorts of social codes. When Richly, for instance, hands this note to Mrs. Bellamant—I mean, I can absolutely see how the intimacy and the seduction or the attempted seduction is all, you know, mediated in that very freighted moment of passage of this piece of paper. And, I haven't thought about it much, but it's wonderful. I'm trying to, I mean, I'm not quite sure how to ascribe significance to it, but I see exactly what you're saying and how the audience would then relate to this as a kind of social practice organized around the transfer of paper. I have to think about how that fits into the larger argument though. Do you know how? Can you tell me? [Laughter].

O'Quinn: Well, it just seems to me it relies on the audience having already done this.

Codr: Yeah, yeah.

O'Quinn: That they've had these kind of paper relation, because otherwise, it's going to be ... handling that piece of paper is going to be so labored on stage. . .

Codr: Yeah.

O'Quinn: . . . it's just going to be awful to watch.

Codr: Right, right, right.

O'Quinn: You need to be able to go [gestures slipping a piece of paper into his pocket], right, and everyone would just know what that means.

Codr: Right.

O'Quinn: So that's suddenly the audiences is right on?? So, now we have a theater that's no longer about players, but it's about props and that seems very powerful to this.

Codr: That's great.

Yaggi: I also actually just want to add in here as well. You have made me more acutely aware of something that I think I was, sort of, less consciously aware of in the paper which is this kind of shared materiality between things like the charades and the novels because, of course, they're all sort of making up and trafficking in the same print marketplace, right? That novels are part of this amusement culture that is every bit as much infiltrated by and made up by and made popular by things like these charades that are circulating and these magazines that are coming out that are specifically for this juvenile audiences and would have puzzle games in them and would end with charades and would . . . so, of course novels and all of these word games and puzzle games and logic games are all part of this growing commercial market that's made, sort of, that's built around this kind of proliferating print, paper production. So, yeah, I do think that Austen is certainly playing with how her media intersects with these other media, to do the same kind of puzzling work.

Breithaupt: Rebecca was going to . . .

Rebecca Spang: I was going to pick up on Danny's comment on Dwight. Which is to say, that I know from my own research on paper money and the French Revolution that even when there are literally eight hundred million pieces of state issued paper in circulation, people claim and police commissioners believe them when they claim, "Oh, it was *that* one." They claim to know a specific bill, a specific piece of paper, and to be able to distinguish it from all the others. So, either there is something very different going on in British culture or the characters in this play really are fools and that's part of the audience's joy in watching. Because the audience is sitting there thinking "Look at it, you idiot," and she's just putting it in her pocket.

Codr: Yeah, yeah. In this particular instance it would have had, it would've borne a signature, but, so, there wasn't sort of officially state sanctioned, sort of, anonymous pieces of currency sort of floating out there. I mean, it is certainly looking forward to that, right? I mean the, sort of, you know, why would you really need to look? I mean, the overlooking of the signature becomes, sort of, normative and possible. Yeah, OK, you know, I don't really need to inspect this, right? It sort of signals its, sort of, incorporability into that culture before there will be, sort of, massively, you know, voluminous, circulating, anonymous paper notes.

Breithaupt: Jesse.

Jesse Molesworth: Dwight I want to applaud you by, for writing on prudence, which has to be the least sexy topic.

Codr: It really is, it really is. [Laughter].

Molesworth: Outside of humility and piety. Well, I mean I want get to . . .

Codr: I get to some sermons too, just in case.

Molesworth: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Well that's the root of my question I guess, and I want to steer to you back to, you know, Fritz's comments about narrative and its importance, and I guess my question is: is it possible to imagine a likeable or sympathetic prudent character within a novel? And, you've probably read my book, so you know what I'm going to say. If prudence involves the subduing of risk and the subduing of risk involves the subduing of plot, well the novel from its beginning had a bias, obviously, towards the imprudent. So if Robinson Crusoe says, yes I'll listen to my father and not go on that . . .

Codr: Absolutely. And stay here: the end.

Molesworth: Or if Tom Jones says, yeah, you know this sleeping around is not really for me then . . . [Laughter]. And, you know this is a problem that I think virtually every late eighteenth-century novelist is trying to engage with. How do I do prudence well? How do I do prudence in a likeable way? And I think that Austen, for one, you know, fails miserably in *Mansfield Park*. You know, Fanny Price totally unlikeable, a killjoy, you know, and that's the root of much of the hatred of that novel. Edgeworth, *Belinda*, you know, we've got Belinda the prudent foil to the Lady Delacour, the dissipated Lady Dealcour who looks fabulously sexy to us as readers. So, I mean, is there any novelist, is there any fiction that navigates this problem successfully?

Codr: No. [Laughter]. No, you're absolutely right, but I think the question is when you say (and I hope I'm not cutting you off), but, I mean, when you say do readers, could readers like a prudent character, I mean, what do we mean by "like"? I mean we *love*, we love prudent characters when they're villains. In other words, and that's sort of the, it's that balancing, it's that particular kind of pleasure that sees a Blifil against a Tom Jones. That sort of, that clash, it's that collective element—I mean, neither is interesting in their own right.

Molesworth: But by that same token we love prudent characters when they behave imprudently, so Clarissa being the great example of taking an incredibly imprudent decision to run away.

Codr: Yeah. And I think, I mean, to speak about the kinds of pleasures associated with novel reading, I mean, I think, you know, that schism between the prudent and the imprudent or the, sort of, the prudent character and the gambler figure that I'm thinking about, that can be refracted through multiple characters. I think it can be refracted in different moments of a single character. And it's precisely that tension that is, I think, significant here. In other words, you know, this is what's so wonderful about your book, if I may say, I mean.

Robert Schneider: You sure can. [Laughter].

Spang: You can say it again. [Laughter].

Codr: It's brilliant, it's truly a brilliant book because it's so importantly recuperative of that, that thrill that comes with the completely improbable and the completely unpredictable. When we look at the end of *Tom Jones*, for example, and in the last closing page Fielding says, well, you know, "and after all of these experiences Tom Jones gained a degree of prudence uncommon in one of his lively parts." It's like, well, did he? [Laughter]. Really? I mean it's a completely hastily tacked on solution to a moral problem that the novel's form can never ever come close to solving. Now, I will say that there are interesting cases of . . . well, I'll just leave it at that.

Breithaupt: I've two smaller comments here. Robbie is the first of them.

Schneider: I mean, I could make a prudential character interesting, but prudence can be interesting and at least it was interesting and controversial. Again, going back to the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century where it was highly fraught with moral ambiguity. I mean, and you mention or you quote some pieces that mention reason of state, and it's the prudential statesmen was really a kind of controversial figure insofar as there was kind of disassociated morality driven by interest, not necessarily by morality. And, I think again, going back to the courtier, the prudential courtier, too, while not necessarily the libertine, was steeped in notions of dissimulation, of game playing, of self-interest, and the like. So I think there's a lot more interesting about the notion and the discourse earlier on than maybe what we're seeing in the eighteenth century.

Codr: I agree completely. I think that's the tradition out of which a lot of these anxieties that, you know, start to appear in prose fiction of English eighteenth century where that's coming from. And, Machiavelli is a common point of reference, for example. Not so much Castiglione, but certainly the prudent courtier is an Ur figure there.

Breithaupt: OK. I have a list of more small comments here. So, the next one is Danny, then Cornelis.

O'Quinn: I'm not certain that I can agree with Jesse on Austen: Mr. Darcy? Mr. Bennet? Elizabeth Bennet? It seems to me that Fanny is staged precisely to reinvigorate the novel after the ultimate success of *Pride and Prejudice*, right? Because she's managed to generate real desire for Darcy, who is in some ways stiff and boring, right? But he's, he can be relied upon, right? And the people who mess up in reading *Mansfield Park*, to my eyes, are the ones who find, you know, one of the things she's trying to do is to sort of exorcise the success of that earlier novel to get at something really different. So I think that there is a successful prudential—

Molesworth: I think it is far easier when you've got, you know, plots that are smaller in their conception, obviously, and smaller in their, you know, global consequence. And, you know that notion of the slowing down of that movement that one sees in Austen.

Cornelis van der Haven: The continuity of the discourse on prudence from what I remember, people must correct me, is that *Prudencia* always is, always has this mirror, and there's always this ambiguity, I think, on the one hand, between this wisdom and, on the other hand, this self-knowledge which can be very well, indeed, self-interest. So the question is, if there is a break in this discourse and if this hasn't already, this very, maybe even economic or this political ambiguity, is [inaudible].

Codr: I'll have to look into that. Thanks a lot. Emblems, you mean?

Van der Haven: Yeah. I mean . . .

Breithaupt: And there is actually (I looked that up, too), there is even the case that vanity was suddenly seen as a danger of that, too. I mean, precisely in this image, actually. I think that image might have triggered that, but I couldn't verify that. So, I think that that indeed is very interesting. And you also had—

Anne Maurseth: I want to make a very small comment on the question of prudence and narration because I think I agree with what's said here that prudential character is difficult to be sympathetic as narrated in a novel somehow. But, at the same time, it might be worthwhile renouncing this statement because in retrospective stories you have that prudence inscribed in the very narrated technique somehow that you have. In particular, in first-person narrations that the person narrating has become, has achieved prudence somehow by help of his imprudent behavior in the past. And I guess you would find it in English literature, and in both Marivaux's novels in *Parvenu* or *Manon Lescaut*, for example. They both are displaying that kind of structure, that the protagonist has become a prudent man by help of his story somehow, and he is telling about this plague of the coming prudential characters and that's the goal of the narration somehow.

Breithaupt: Nice, interesting. Does someone what to . . . ?

Codr: Seems like whether one graduates out of a life of imprudence to become an author in eighteenth-century England is a... There's a question, right? It would matter, you know, deciding to write your memoir in 1719 as Crusoe purports to do is sort of entering into a new sea of difficulties and certainly not exactly a position of cultural respectability. But, you're absolutely right, that through the narration there are these opportunities for reflection and, sort of, moral self-aggrandizement.

Yaggi: Actually, can I add a bit? In some strange way, this is kind of precisely what's at the heart of historiography at this moment, too, right? It's this idea that, especially as Anderson puts it, the way that you smooth over these antique slaughters and make of them this narrative of progress and I think you call that "prudence": how we've come, as a nation, to become a more prudent nation in light of this history through which we've been. And, that's exactly the project that Austen's trying to disrupt as itself a fiction. That we are not, in fact, writing ourselves into more prudential beings, but, in fact, we're becoming sort of thoughtless, consumptive readers that need to be more aware of this heterogeneous debris that's in the text itself or in the history itself.

Codr: Yeah, that historiography sort of drives forward, and sort of, I love that phrase that you use respecting Austen, that there's a consistent chattiness, right? There's this sort of, like, wanting to talk back to history to sort of slow it down. This is also a sort of point that I think you were making Richard, that's trifling, but it's also the tension that's sort of built. You know, when are we actually going to find out what happened with Henry VIII? We really don't care because what's more interesting is what this person is saying back to—

Yaggi: Right, the conversation itself, the mode, the play is more interesting than the end.

Codr: Yeah, exactly, precisely, yeah that's great.

Breithaupt: Hence, this speaks very well to the German tradition where you have this later narrations where some narrator prudently looks back at one's not so prudent beginnings. We have to, we now find, I think I like that a lot. We have to, I mean we now finally come to Kathryn who was one of the very first ones to raise her hands and the very first woman. [Laughter.] Which is a typical Workshop thing...

Yaggi: Does that speak to the delay of games we were talking about earlier?

Breithaupt: There were delays and interventions and all these things; it's a long game, so thank you for your patience. We have more on the list afterwards, too. But you were one of the beginners, so thank you for your patience. It's your turn.

Kathryn Gleadle: I guess it's more of a comment for Miranda. So, you're talking through the various strategies of interpreting this text so as to answer the criticisms that "you're placing too much interpretive weight on a piece of juvenilia," and I wanted to suggest another strategy for doing that. And I guess it requires us to suspend our knowledge that we know Austen goes on to become a great writer and just to think that this is a fifteen-year-old young woman writing in the 1790s. And, that actually she's part of a very rich culture of juvenilia both within family practices where, this goes back to your point about reading Fritz, children were encouraged to be very interpretive or experimental readers, to act out texts, to play with them.

And you find in family papers lots of examples of this very witty, very playful appropriations of these kinds of genres, but also in the 1790s some of the more serious sub-genre of this juvenilia is being published, like *Debates on the French Revolution*. And it is starting to get some debate in some of the journals, and people are talking about the concept of juvenile politicians. And I don't know whether this is a useful idea for you or not, but a kind of idea I've been playing around with in a piece that I'm writing at the moment is to think whether in the 1790s and the 1800s there was, in the British context, a kind of fleeting moment of juvenile Enlightenment.

And, so what you find in a lot of family papers is people saying: How are your children responding to the French Revolution? What are they making of it? And what they are worried about is that children are listening to these tales of overcoming tyranny and liberty, and that it's going to disrupt family relationships. And there's some very interesting exchanges where parents say "Oh, no I've managed to have a talk with them about that." But in some diaries I've come across I have been seeing the same factors, children really playing around with these ideas of liberty and tyranny. "I told X (you know, my elder sister) that just because she's older than me that

doesn't mean that she has more rights. If we're all equal, then we should all be equal, and why should I go to bed." [Laughter].

So, there seems to be lots of ways in which within family cultures and some aspects of literary culture at this particular moment children and young adults are starting to question some of these things. And in the particular diaries I've been looking at, I've been struck that they're been situated within communities where there is a very young, very dynamic political culture, such as Norwich, where political, radical societies are run by people of a very young chronological age. And this seems to have given a very fleeting political empowerment. And in the Mary Spongberg article, which I mentioned to you earlier, she talks about *The History of England* as being part of the Burke debate, that we need to understand it as an unpublished response to Burke.³ And, that she's playing around with ideas of Jacobite feminism. So, rather than seeing juvenilia as a kind of a trajectory to the mature Austen, we need to kind of cut that off sometimes, I think. What can it tell us about actually the dynamics of family and different cultures in the UK?

Yaggi: It helps a great deal, in fact, because one of the challenges that I've been facing with this particular piece is this question of public/private. That I'm never quite sure how to negotiate. Because the idea is if I want to make this argument that Austen is envisioning a new relationship between reader and writer or reader and historian, I keep getting sort of resistance to the idea that how can you really make that case when there were no readers. I mean she's not publishing this, it's private.

And, I keep getting directed to, I always forget her first name, but Vallone has a piece about all these young girls who were writing counter-narratives to history in their diaries.⁴ But, that case is being made—it's sort of what you're saying, that they're being encouraged to be inventive, to have their own responses to history, but it's also very closed off in the idea that it's private responses and it's just for themselves. They are rewriting these histories, particularly of Mary, Queen of Scots, that she becomes a romanticized figure through which they can have these sort of moments of individual play-acting, but that it can't be sort of taken beyond there in some ways. So, I'm always sort of struggling how to think about the fact that I *do* think, regardless of real readers or non-readers, that Austen is using this piece, at this moment, regardless of her later fiction, to think about the very stakes of reading and through that to—and the very stakes of reading history, that in this context this is a very important genre. It's not just reading, I mean, yes, it expands to reading per se, but the reading of history is such an important moment for literacy instruction, for civic instruction. That for her she wants to reimagine this relationship; and I need to somehow get beyond that public/private divide that I don't like, and I think that this helps.

Gleadle: Yeah, and I guess, I mean that contemporaries are well aware that that the revolutionary discourse thing that Austen talks about is about transforming the private relationships as much as the public. I would think that for many families who may not be particularly, overtly politicized it's within family dynamics that they might have experienced some of these ideas in a fairly raw and rough and ready way, rather than really refined ideas of liberty and equality. I mean: what does it mean for us and how we actually interact with each other?

³ Mary Spongberg, "Jane Austen and the 'History of England,'" *Journal of Women's History* 23 (2011), 56-80.

⁴ Lynne Vallone, "History Girls: Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Historiography and the Case of Mary, Queen of Scots." *Children's Literature* 36 (2008): 1-23.

Yaggi: Right, absolutely.

Breithaupt: Jonathan.

Jonathan Elmer: So my . . . I was thinking of something that bounced off of Dwight's remarks to you after you asked your first questions, Fritz, and it had to do with the background of your project, Dwight, and the role of religious thinking in it. So, my question is to simply clarify that, go over it again because I don't think I quite understood. But, it got me thinking about the relationship in different religious cultures and configurations at this time between attitudes towards gaming, attitudes towards gaming and play, generally, the concept of risk, and, then, narrative.

So, some people that haven't shown up that much, yet, are, say, Calvinists. Now, Calvinists like to write narratives; they thought they were very interesting prudential characters, to themselves. [Laughter]. They wrote a lot of prudential narratives about themselves. They did so in the understanding that their story was already told in some place inaccessible to them. But, and so, there was a very strangely radicalized, bifurcated attitude towards risk and narration. It's all decided somewhere, but I need to now play this game so that I appear to myself to be the most likely character to get the outcome that I wish for. And that ends up being largely a prudential posture. And it's also, of course, a culture violently opposed to gaming, in most of its accepted forms; not entirely, but it certainly had its issues.

So, I just throw that out as one side of a more specific question to Dwight. So, it seems to me you might imagine, you know, kind of different postures towards these values, and you just distribute the energies to one or another. One culture might say, might be ready to endorse and play with, precisely, the model of gaming to play as equivalent to social life. And, this seems to me to be largely what Fielding is up to. It seems to be, in a more complicated way, what Austen is up to because she's involving readers and conventions. And these are relatively easygoing attitudes towards using those models to talk about what most matters. Calvinists were not so easygoing about this and they had a different model of narration for that very reason, it seems to me. But, the question was really: You were mentioning usury; can you say it again?

Codr: Yeah . . . well . . . it's, I mean, this is the problem. So, there's a long debate amongst, sort of, historians of economy about Calvin's position on usury compared to Luther's, and I won't dwell on that. But I will say that as late as 1680s-1690s you have Calvinist dissenters like Christopher Gellinger [?] or even, I mean, as an inheritor of, you know, certain Calvinist doctrines through Presbyterianism, people like Charles Morton who was Defoe's teacher. Basically saying that the problem with usury is this anticipatory quality, that it sort of forestalls the possibility of loss, that it sort of excludes chance or contingency.

So in early—and I mean it's not exclusively a Calvinist sentiment, by no means, in the sixteenth century, the Anglican divine, Miles Moss says: Uou know, it's not just taking money on a loan, interest on a loan. It's not even sealing it in a paper contract. Even expecting that somebody might give you back something that you've given them makes you a damnable usurer and you will burn in hell. Just *expecting* that you might get paid back. Right? So, this is a widespread, if somewhat radical position to take. Now, the horizon of that argument should be that gambling is great. Right? I mean, it should be fine because it's a moment of total contingency. I don't know why that isn't allowed; I really, I'm not sure. I mean, yeah.

Elmer: I guess one way to point the question, theologically speaking, is the attempt to control or suppress loss or risk, on the hands of these people opposing it, is that understood to be damnable because of its effects on this worldly life? or is it damnable because it is, in essence, an attitude towards the soul?

Codr: The soul.

Elmer: The attitude of where someone is headed permanently.

Codr: I think the latter.

Elmer: So, it's not just I'm going, by controlling the future with usurious means, I'm also telling myself a fib about the control I might have over the state of my soul once I'm gone. OK. Yeah, thank you.

Schneider: It's a dealing with time and only God controls time.

Codr: Right, exactly.

Schneider: Using, it's exploiting time, and that's not man's province at all. And, to assume that is blasphemy.

Codr: Exactly.

Elmer: But prudential, what we've come to see as prudential economic behaviors of saving, of non-waste, of building up over time, is also very characteristic of many of these cultures who are very afraid of trying to control time. So we are back to these Weberian paradoxes, and I can't understand it, I never have understood it. I've studied these crazy people for twenty-five years, I still don't understand it. [Laughter].

Breithaupt: Rebecca and I both want to follow-up briefly, and then we have Richard's question.

Spang: OK, firstly I'm not about Calvinists.

Codr: That's good. [Laughter].

Spang: Yeah, but at least in the older tradition in thinking about usury or sort of scholastic, is that a piece of land or livestock reproduces naturally; and therefore, it's reasonable to expect a return on it, but money doesn't, money is sterile. It's the sterility of it that is the problem.

Codr: Yeah.

Breithaupt: I'll try to be as brief as that. Calvin, of course, rings for me another bell, which is pietism in general, I mean, the other traditions that are coming out at that point. Because there is a very different, I just wanted to throw it out, completely different form of subjectivity that is not this anticipatory subjectivity, but it's a self-defined man. I mean, this comes from the Dutch tra-

ditions, it's very dominant counter-discourse. But I just wanted to mention it and I know that would be a large question. Richard; finally.

Nash: I like both these papers, a lot. And, I think I'm going to work my way around to *Emma*, which I think too little of the world, except for me, understands as an agricultural novel. [Laughter]. And, believe it or not, I think I'm going to be able to bring that back to Miranda's paper. But, I'm going to try to do that through this question of prudence and going back to something that Danny said yesterday in his session. You were asking why the Corinthians wager on Molineaux, and you thought money couldn't be the reason. I think you're exactly wrong. I think money was the reason. In the sense that where prudence most closely attaches to gambling (I think especially in the eighteenth century, but continuing now) is in that iconography in which you see prudence often represented as having three faces: the young face, the face looking out at the present moment, and then looking to the future. When I buy my racing form (which I do with great regularity) I immediately go and consult the past performances, which is precisely what's presented to you in order to handicap a race is a coded articulation of what these animals have done in the past. And the idea is that your job in making your wager is to review that past set of performances, make your decision now (in the present) about what the future outcome is. That's providence. Gambling *is* exercising prudence, that faculty of prudence. And I think that's precisely how it was understood.

And I think those people who had wagered on Cribb, and saw Cribb win by virtue of the Fancy, were now inclined to back Molineaux, right? That's how that works, which may have made them wonderful marks, right? This is part of what makes gambling so much fun and which is why in 1740 there is a bill passed by Parliament to prohibit dishonest and deceptive gaming practices, right? That's why it rises to this level of national legislation.

The interesting question about can we get a prudent character, right? Can there be a prudent character of interest? I liked the suggestion of Darcy, but I was thinking more in terms of Mr. Knightly. Precisely because in that text that you talk about (that Emma creates, of charades for Harriet) she is playing at what Knightly has attempted previously with her and failed. Remember, at the beginning he has set her a set of texts and she is to be his student. But, it starts off as fun for a while, but then there's a whole lot of reading, and she's a lot like our students: she quits. But, having quit she then turns around and begins teaching her pupil, and creates danger because she's creating this juvenile instructional text that she doesn't quite have control over or however. That is, what is the difference between the model of instruction that she abandons under Knightly, the consequences of that instruction when she passes it on to Harriet, and how that all, in the narrative, gets turned around with her learning the lesson and coming back?

So, in that sense, this is some way of thinking, the note that rings false about how Tom Jones acquires prudence, and I agree completely, I think the end of that novel depends entirely on Mr. Western. Mr. Western is the only reason that novel has a happy ending. In *Emma*, it seems to me you work out to, and part of that is the critical incident is the imprudent behavior of Frank Churchill, right, that becomes the turning point at Box Hill. So, I mean, in some ways it seems to me the question that can you have a prudent character of interest brings us back to *Emma* is, I guess, what I'm saying. All of which I think has to do with the importance of agriculture. [Laughter].

Codr: Well, I think you could, I mean, I wouldn't say that the issue is not of "interest" originally, it was whether these are likeable characters. Certainly they can be objects of desire, but would we want to really follow the story of *Emma*, you know, through the eyes of Mr. Knightly?

I don't know, that sounds pretty dull to me, but, maybe that's just me. In other words, I mean, I don't think there's any problem with having prudent characters or anything like that. I think as an object of desire, it's a perfect match for Emma. I mean, dear God, what does she need more than prudence, right? [Laughter] So, it seems fitting that that would be something that she would want. But whether that would make a good novel, I think that's a different question.

Yaggi: Yeah, I'm not sure how to respond to this. [Laughter]. Except to say that you've now made me think of *History of England* as the book of charades, and if you think of *History of England* as the book of charades that's a terrifying thought. Of course the difference would be the difference in authorship: Jane Austen at sixteen is, I think, quite different than Emma Woodhouse is at sixteen, but both reinforce the idea of programs of reading.

And, I'm not sure how this fits, but one of the things I've been going back and forth in my mind about is the distinction between or the distinction I'm trying to draw between didactic and pedagogic. Because there's certainly this sense, especially when it comes to women's reading that the kind of reading we want to endorse for women is that which is didactic, which has a clear—and I think that it actually goes back to a distinction Fritz was making in the beginning about games that end versus games that continue. Something that is didactic closes down, it is programmatic, and you cannot be sure that even if you get the right answer, like a charade, that you will walk away with anything other than the answer. Whereas something that is, or what I'm positioning as pedagogic, is something that is more interactive. Not just active, but interactive, that requires didactic interaction between two or more people.

And that's not something that Emma gets or certainly not that she exercises with the program of reading that she—and at one point she comes up with her own program of reading, right? And then she abandons, "I will read these twelve brilliant things and then I will be smarter, therefore..." and then she leaves. But, of course, that's not an interactive program of pedagogy. Whereas what she produces in *The History of England*, I think is something that requires and seeks to be more than didactic, and, in fact, won't allow itself to be didactic but wants to be pedagogic. I'm not sure if that relates, but it's what this makes me think of.

Breithaupt: Jonathan.

Elmer: I just wanted to—this is just a little, I think little—but just trying to pick up something that Kathryn brought into the discussion earlier that I have been thinking about. I just keep wanting to clarify the domains of play and grid it so that everything doesn't slip into everything else.

Nash: What fun. [Laughter.]

Elmer: And it turns out that's not really very interesting to do, ultimately.

Yaggi: You're a spoilsport.

Elmer: Maybe.

Breithaupt: Prudent.

Elmer: But I am committed to the continuum model, and your remark, Kathryn, recommitted me to that. It's easy to imagine, I mean, contemporary game theorists, people who are working in new media departments, like to say "Our thing, our object is different than *Emma*. Our object, you do something with your thumbs. So it's a performed practice. Reading a novel is not; it's just a text." Ditto, many, some performance theorists say we're interested in embodied action, we're not interested in *texts* per se. But, the best performance theorists know that that's an untenable distinction, but it's still is something that's used as a leverage.

So, there are attempts to line up differentia and say that texts are something different, but what you are reminding us about in terms of the practices of juvenile writing, the encouragements from parents and elders, the staged readings of these..., the idea that texts written and read are in various kinds of, have performative protocols, makes...It puts texts back into a whole play environment rather than separates it out. So that doesn't clarify the field at all, but it shades the continuum in a better way, as far as I am concerned. So, that was helpful to me.

And it makes sense of Miranda's, I think, quite brave and ambitious attempt to bring in the topic of interpretation and reading as itself a play practice. We've touched on this, it's implicit in much of what we say. We've sometimes said it explicitly, but I don't think anybody in the papers that we've looked at has argued for it as explicitly as Miranda has; and, how to make sense of that other than a purely metaphorical version, but really as a part of a suite of embodied behaviors. Kathryn's remark helped me think through that a little bit, so . . .

[Unknown participant]: Well I think it also, I think your project also, really, Miranda, also really helps us think of the implications of free indirect discourse, in the sense that it's kind of play, right? And it really sort of is dawning on me that I'm thinking about an interpretive level that it leads the reader through thinking like things like "Anne was happy in all she felt or all she thought she felt," right? It doesn't end, and it is a, sort of, it helps to makes sense of Austen's trajectory in terms of her technical scope, right? And I think that is a really, kind of, a larger implication of what you are talking about.

Yaggi: And her narrative strategies, to go back to what Fritz was saying, to make more of the narrative model, to say that that is free indirect discourse, which is so often attributed to Austen, is in fact, another sort of level of strategy at the narrative level to play with readers.

Codr: Excellent.

Breithaupt: Those, these three will be wonderful sort of closing remarks, for especially if we can manage to get Dwight into the mix, so that was exactly what I was of wondering.

Codr: I actually just wanted, sorry just one moment, to return to actually Nina's question, the very first question that you asked that I didn't get a chance to answer to, and I want to just answer it because I think that it re-muddies the grid, maybe productively, maybe not. So this... we've been talking it seems to me a lot about (and this goes back to the Schiller conversation in particular) suppressing time in time, and thinking about play as sort of delimited moments and whether how functional that conception of play is. That is that, you know, at time X play starts and then play ends. And then it's, even when we've been talking about the repetition of play, the repetition seems to suppose at some level an integrity to the play experience that can be reproduced, like a text or an image.

But, I guess when I was talking about the sort of pleasures, the pleasures of the anticipatory subject, is that this figure that I'm trying to sort of describe is characterized by both planning and waiting. And, there's something in that tension that's sort of constitutive of this particular kind of economic subjectivity that is at once sort of thrilling and at once extremely boring. And, so I guess what one of the things that the conversation about play as something that happens and then ends—and maybe we're not talking about that, maybe that's just what I've been hearing or maybe that's what I'm arguing against as a way of clarifying my own thinking—is that play is potentially just a mode of all kinds of action. That there are play dimensions to a variety of very mundane behaviors, very utilitarian or rational behaviors, and we could take pleasure in those moments, as a kind of play it's just a matter of sort of looking at it from a different perspective.

So, I don't know that just... I just kind of wanted to return to that question of the pleasurable aspect because there's not really anything more. As I said, I start off by saying prudence isn't sexy it's because basically finance is boring. But there is also something that is really, I think, potentially titillating about these moments depending upon how we think about it, so.

Breithaupt: OK, well, two things: the first is we really want to applaud our presenters here [applause and expressions of gratitude from multiple people]. Thank you. The second thing is, I hope I have a question here for the debate that is coming: do we get some instructions at this point so that we can think this over for the lunchtime, be prudent?

Spang: The further directions are as follows: we convene at 2:00 for the debate. Richard will make his prepared opening comments; Jesse will make his prepared opening comments. Richard will have a chance to refute Jesse; Jesse will have a chance to respond to Richard. Then, we open up to the rest of you continuing in that order. So, we would then need a green, a red, a green, a red. If no red speaks we can't have two greens in a row, that's not the way debate works.

Codr: What's the pencil count looking like here?

Molesworth: I have six left.

Nash: I have five left. Four and a half because I sat on one.

Breithaupt: Shall we have the trading round after they give their opening speeches?

Spang: You might want to talk to them; they're in charge of assembling their own teams. I don't know how they want to do it.

Schneider: Who has the blues?

Spang: I have the blues.

Nash: We've all got the blues.

Breithaupt: Is there a time limit for, I mean, that's actually what I'm wondering, is there a sixty seconds kind of thing? What, how much do we speak? How long? We need some kind of rules here. Otherwise we don't know how to cheat.

Molesworth: It's up to the moderator, I think.

Spang: I think it's up to the moderator, but the moderator is inclined to say a hundred and thirty-five seconds and no more.

[Laughter and chatter concerning the new rules.]

Spang: So, do you need any further clarifications?

Elmer: Did we decide whether it was possible to purchase both a red or a green and a blue?

Spang: It is today.

Elmer: How much are the blues today?

Spang: How many of them do you want?

Nash: There is a discount for volume.

Spang: So, see you all at 2:00. You have an hour and a half for lunch, and there are a number of restaurants downtown.